D

Approaches to the Study of Indian Politics and

Nature of the State in India:
Liberal, Marxist, and Gandhian

introduction
One of the most ancient spheres of intellectual enquiry, politics was originally seen as an arm
of philosophy, history and law. Its central purpose was to uncover the principles upon which
human society should be based. From the late nineteenth century onwards, however, this
philosophical emphasis was gradually displaced by an attempt to turn politics into a scientif-
ic discipline. The high point of this development was reached in the 1950s and 1960s, with
an open rejection of the earlier tradition as meaningless metaphysics. Since then, however,
enthusiasm for a strict science of politics has waned, and there has been a renewed recogni-
tion of the enduring importance of political values and normative theories. 1

Approaches to Politics
Historical Approach
Before the advent of the 20th century, the study of politics was largely dominated by his-
tory, ethics, philosophy and law. A great number of political thinkers, from Plato to
Edmund Burke, have used the premises of history, philosophy and law to lay down prin-
ciples of political theory. In the field of comparative politics as well, the historical
approach exerted influence during the late 18th century and the 20th century. In the study
of political institutions, in this phase, 'interest came to be centred primarily among first
principles, upon the coming of history, upon the construction of audacious developmen-
tal theories, unilinear in form, based on single determining principles'. Best examples of
2 Ch.tptl'r l

such .tn .ippro.tcli \\'oukl b( fo und in the works of _Heg~l, wi~ his belief in th_e unfolding
of Rc.ison .ind \ ;rccdom and in those of Marx, with his belief m the unfolding of free-
dom through class contlict.2
.\ lthough t~istoricism has since long been discredited, the field o f Comparative Politics
owes :1 great dcitl to this phase in Western social thought. Many of its concepts such as
'class' arc still used fruitfully. However, on the flip side, 'their broad-scale theorizing was
mainh- a matter o f abstract and formal speculation upon the broadest conceivable ques-
tions. · For the cano ns of accurate observation, they had a monumental disregard. Their
data, almost in every case, were invoked merely to illustrate, not to test their theories, so
tl1:H o ne searches in vain in their works for a methodologically valid bridge between the-
ory and data.'3

Philosophical Tradition
The origins of political analysis date back to Ancient Greece, and a tradition usually
referred to as political philosophy. This involved a preoccupation with essentially ethic~,
prescriptive or normative questions, reflecting a concern with what 'should', 'ought to' or
'must' be brought about, rather than what 'is.' Plato and Aristotle are usually identified as
the founding fathers of this tradition which involves the analytical study of ideas, and doc-
trines that have been central to political thought, as expressed or codified in a collection
of 'major thinkers' or in 'classic' texts. This approach has the character of literary analy-
sis- it is primarily interested in examining what major thinkers said, how they developed or
justified their views, and the intellectual context within which they worked. Although such
analysis may be carried out critically, and scrupulously, it cannot be objective in any scien-
tific sense, as it deals with normative questions such as 'why should I obey the state? or
'how should rewards be distributed?'4

Legal-institutional Approach
The state-centred approach is at once the most traditional and the most fashionable
approach to comparative politics. In the early part of the twentieth century, scholars
focused their attention on the formal institutions of government-legislature, executive
and judiciary- and the constitutions which governed the relation,ships between these
institutions. The style of these early studies was extremely descriptive. Constitutions and
formal organizations of government were examined in legal and historical terms, reflect-
ing the origins of political science in these two disciplines. Informal relatio~ships
between political actors went unstudied. Little attention was given to less 'official' o~gan-
izations' such as pressure groups or the mass media. The wider social context within
which government operates was ignored. The approach was also strongly culture bound,
confined largely to the study of governments in the United States and Europe. Finally,
the style was very uncritical. 'Perhaps, Webbs' study of Soviet government in the 1930s
represented the 'summit' of this approach. This described the formal organization of
the Soviet state in min'u te detail, in the apparent conviction that everything worked as
Stalin's propagandists alleged.' 5
 Approaches to the Study of Indian Politics 3

After l 945, the state-centred or institutional approach became unfashionable. The

focus shifted from the state to society. In the 1980s, however, attention returned to the
state. 'Bringing the state back in' became a rallying-cry in comparative politics (Evans et
al.1985).
Partly, this reflected a belated recognition that the baby had been thrown out with the
bathwater. After all, the state is the single central concern of political science.
Furthermore, the spread of constitutional governments to parts of the second and third
world in the 1980s and 1990s meant that constitutions and institutions had become a bet-
ter guide to the realities of power. However, despite the renewal of interest in the state,
today's focus is not so much on institutional detail but on the state as an active agent, shap-
ing and reshaping society. The state is seen as using its administrative capacity, and monop-
oly of legitimate force to bring about important changes in society. For example, Skocpol
show~d how successful revolutionaries such as the Russian Bolsheviks, and Iranian
Mullahs used their control of the state to produce total transformations of society. Even
in the Western world, the large-scale role of the state has enabled it to lead social and eco-
nomic change. The state has facilitated industrialization, led the development of mass edu-
cation and helped in creating modern welfare states.6

Systems Approach
The demand for a science of politics peaked in the 1950s and 1960s with the emergence
of a form of political analysis heavily influenced by behaviouralism. As the name indi-
cates, behaviouralism studies only the observable and measurable behavior of human
beings. This led political analysts such as David Easton to believe that political science
could adopt the methodology of the natural sciences. Consequently, there was a prolifer-
ation of studies in area like voting behaviour where systematic and quantifiable data were
readily available.
Symptomatic of this effort to make study of politics value-free was the switch in the
1960s and 1970s of the focus of comparative politics to examining politics in its social
context. The Second World War had stimulated new developments in social science tech-
niques (e.g. attitude surveys) which younger scholars were keen to apply to politics. So,
attention shifted away from government institutions to the political system. The political
system refers to all the factors which influence collective decisions, even if those factors
are not formally parts of the government. Thus, parties, voters and social movements all
form part of the system of politics, even though they are rarely mentioned in constitutions
and other formal documents. The systematic approach to politics was pioneered by David
Easton. According to Easton (1957, 1965a, 19656), the political system consists of all
those institutions and processes which are involved in the 'authoritative allocation of val-
ues' for society. The political system stakes inputs from society. These consist of (a)
demands for particular policies and (b) expressions of support. Supports include compli-
ance with laws and payment of taxes and diffuse support for the regime. The political sys-
tem converts these inputs into outputs-authoritative policies and decisions. These
outputs then feed back to society so as to affect the next cycle of inputs. However, inputs
 4 Chapter I

are regulated by ~ntekccpcrs such as parties and inten..:st groups, which bias the sys tem
in
fan1u;· of certain demands :ind against others.
Easton's model helped to move political science away from an exclusive concern with
~m-crnm cnt institutions. Howeve r, he achieved this by reducing the state to nothing more
tlrnn a 'black box· in ~111 abstract diagram. Critics also alleged that E aston's model was too
static, paying tittle attention to how political systems change. 7

Structural-functional Approach
TI1 e structural-functi onal approac h to comparative politics provide d another importa
nt
justification for the switch in emphasis from governm ent to political system. This
approac h raised the question, 'even if political systems vary greatly in their institutio
nal
arrangements, are there certain functions which any political system must perform if
it is
to survive and operate effectively'. Almond and Powell (1978, 1988) provide d the most
importa nt analysis of the functions of political systems: The first three functio ns-recru
it-
ment, socialization and commu nication -concer n the mainten ance of the system, while
the last four-interest · articulation, interest aggregation, policy-making and policy-im
ple-
mentati on-rela te to the process by which collective decisions are made and impleme
nt-
ed. Functionalists argued that a check-list of this kind provide d-an objective, standardized
and culture-free approac h to comparative politics. For instance, political recruitm ent is
an
essential function in all political systems; however, it is perform ed by differen t institutio
ns
in differen t countries. In the first world, elections are a major recruiting agent. In commu-
nist states, the ruling party was the key vehicle in recruitment. Once the party
had
approve d a nomina tion for office, election became a mere form~ty . In some third world
states, persona l connect ions are more significant in recruitm ent. 8

Rational Choice Theory

Among recent theoreti cal approac hes to politics are formal politica l theory, variousl
y
known as 'politica l econom y,' 'public- choice theory' and 'rationa l choice theory.' This
approac h draws heavily upon the example of econom ic theory in building up models
based upon procedu ral rules, usually about the rationally self-inte rested behavio ur
of
the individuals involved. It provide s at least a useful analytical device which may pro-
vide insights into the actions of voters, lobbyist s, bureauc rats and politicia ns as well
as
into the behavio ur of states within the internat ional system. Such techniqu es have been
used by writers such as Anthon y Downs, Mancur Olson and William Niskane n, in fields
such as party compet ition and interest group behavio ur and the policy influenc e
of
bureauc rats.
By no means, however, has the rational-choice approac h to political analysis been uni-
versally accepted. 9 While its support ers claim that it introduc es greater rigour into the
dis-
cussion of political phenomena, critics have question ed its basic assumptions. It may,
for
instance overestimate human rationality in that it ignores the fact that people seldom
possess a clear set of preferred goals, and rarely make decisions in the light of full
and
accurat e knowledge. 10
 Approaches to the Study of Indian Poli tics 5

Thus the ~rari~ry_ o~ approaches that have come to be adopted for the study of politics
as an academic d1sc1pline has made political analysis richer and more diverse. To the estab-
lisl:ed nor11:ativc, institutional and behavioural approaches have been added not only
rnuo'.1al-cho ice theory,_but also, more recently, feminism (a struggle for the recognition of
the ng_h_ts of women, tor equality between the sexes and for redefinitions of womanhood)
and cnucal theory ( refers to the work of the Frankfurt School established in 1923 that was
repelled by Stalinism and criticized the deterministic and scientific tendencies in orthodox
Marxism, and disillusioned by the failure of Marx's predictions about the inevitable col-
lapse o f capitalism.) 11

Nature of the Indian State

An interesting historical poser that has engaged the curiosity of political scientists is how
much of the structure of the Indian state after independence was inherited from late
colonial times? Partha Chatterjee in his article 'The State,' in Niraja Gopal Jayal and
Pratap Bhanu Mehta's edited book The O>ford Companion to Politics in India, writes that
while it is true that the partition of the country into India and Pakistan and the integra-
tion of the princely states within India meant a significant reconfiguration of the territo-
rial boundaries drawn in the period of British India, that did not significantly alter the
colonial administrative apparatus. The inauguration of the constitutional republic in 1950
did introduce some radically new features into the state structure. First, there was a sov-
ereign legislature elected by direct universal suffrage without communal representation,
but with reservations for SCs arid STs. Second, there was a constitutionally guaranteed set
of fundamental rights of all citizens. The Constitution provided for a parliamentary sys-
tem of government of the British type with an executive responsible to Parliament, but
with an indirectly elected head of state. It also provided for an independent judiciary with
certain powers pertaining to the judicial review of laws made by Parliament. The consti-
tution was also federal, with state governments responsible to directly elected state legis-
latures, but with a distribution of powers between the Union and the states that was heav-
ily inclined towards the Union. 12
H owever, writes Chatterjee,' . . . other than these institutional changes, the basic appara-
tus o f governmental administration in independent India was inherited from the colonial
period, despite the huge increase in size. The Indian members of the Indian Civil Service(
ICS), the much acclaimed steel frame o f the British Raj, were retained after independence,
but a new Indian Administrative service (IAS), modelled on the ICS, was constituted as its
successor. The basic structure and administration of civil and criminal law was also inher-
ited from the colonial period.'
The major difference was of course the creation o f a Supreme Court and its position
within the new constitutional system. However, the working o f the high courts and district
courts maintained an unbroken history from colonial times, continuing the same practices
of legal tradition and precedence. The Indian armed forces too maintained a continuing
history from the colonial period. The British traditio n of a professional army strictly u nd er
 1

6 Ch:iptcr I

the control of the political leadership was successfully maintained in the period after inde-
)cndcncc and unlike most other countries, there was not even a joint command of the
~nm , n:tY )' and air forces except in the office of the political head of government. 13

Liberal Interpretation of the Indian State

The basic principle of modern liberalism is the view that politics is artificial. Government
is necessary, but not natural as liberty is the natural human condition. The legitimate ends
of government are limited to securing the conditions of all ways of life, and therefore con-
sist largely of the secular goals of peace and prosperity. Hence the modern liberal state is
a constitutional one, characterized by the rule of law and toleration for diversity. Both
Liberal and Marxist scholars have analysed the nature of the Indian state, from their
respective ideological vantage points. The liberal account of the Indian state will be taken
up first, followed by the Marxist understanc,ling. .
Conspicuous by its absence is the category of 'state' in the early liberal discourse on Indian
politics. 'Government ' was rather the preferred category. This may have been in keeping
with the traditions of Political science followed in Anglo American countries that focused
on the study of government. Contrariwise, Continental European traditions of law and
politics, however prefer the term 'state', to 'government'.
However, the late 1970s have seen a conceptual/pa radigm shift in Anglo-American Political
Science favouring the state. This had a resonance in the recent literature on the liberal per-
spectives of the Indian state, with an elaborate treatment of the state, and its structure is
seen in the works of Rajni Kothari, Llyod and Susanne Rudolph and M.P. Singh.14

Liberal Institutional
Atul Kohli's chief concern is to explain the paradox of the growth of centralization and
simultaneous powerlessness at the centre. He writes, 'Political turmoil not only threatens
the prospect for establishing legitimate and coherent authority, but also undermines the
government's ability to facilitate socio-econom ic development.' 15
Kohli defines the crisis of governability in India as '1. the absence of enduring coalitions,
2. policy ineffectiveness and 3. an incapacity to accommodate political co nflict without vio-
lence.' He adds, 'A government whose power rests on fluctuating coalitions and whose
leaders repeatedly fail to fulfill their stated goals and to control politically directed violence
will be deemed to be a government with low capacity to govern.' He refers to the growing
disjuncture between centralization and development in the post N ehru era. Centralization
might temporarily aggrandize the personal powers o f leaders but seriously erodes the legit-
imacy of the state and its development power.
In his work, '&thinking Democracy,' Rajni Kothari also rues the decline of the Indian State,
which 'far from being useful to the masses, has led to their further exclusion in a period of
economic stagnation and political instability.' 'With this erosion in the role of the state,'
writes Kothari, 'not only the poor but even middle class professional, eco nomic and politi-
cal strata seem unable to wield authori ty in a meaningful way. At best, they are pawns in the
 Approaches 10 rhc Sr-ud y of Indian Politic:, 7

hands of forces beyond their control.... The decUne of the state has led tr> a sharp decline
in the ru le of law, a parallel decline in the authority of the elected governin g elite and a grad-
ual erosio n even in the power of hitherto dominan t individuals and social gr<>ups such a<,
the upper castes. Alongside, we are witnessing the rise of new fundame ntalisms '>f rcligi()u ~
sects and with that the growth in power of organizations Uke the RSS, Vf IP and the Jamaat-
e-Islami. The basic result has been growing communalism within secular politics and, as a
direct conseque nce of that, a decline in the politics of socio-eco nomic transform ation.
These facto rs have caused changes in the character of the state, making it lcss dcmocrntic,
less secular, less institutionalized and based less on concern for the people.>!('

State and Party System

In liberal discourse and theory, the party system is the most vital link between the state and
civil society. Whereas , in Marxist discourse, the party system is complete ly appropria ted by
the state In Kothari's classic, 'Politics in India,' the Indian state is menti oned only in passing,
'To no small degree, the state has become the arbiter of society. This is not to deny the
autonom y of social and economi c factors in the developm ental process; indeed, it seems
likely that with increasin g diversification of centres of power, this autonom y will
increase.' 17
Morris Jones writes in a similar vein, 'The character of the political system of any mod-
ern state is substantially dictated by the manner in which political forces ~re organized in
a party system.' He did not theorize about the Indian State, except for analyzing vital state
18

institutio ns such as the Parliame nt and the party system. Accordin g to Morris Jones, in the
period between 1947 to 1967, India had a party system characterized by 'dominan ce coex-
19
isting with competit ion but without a trace of alternation,' because oppositio n parties
had little hope of preventin g the Congress from obtaining sizeable maj ority in the legisla-
tures despite the ruling party's failure on most occasions to gain a majo rity of valid votes
cast. Neither, by and large, did oppositio n parties share power in coalitions with Congress
at the state level. Hence India had a 'competitive party system . .. in which the :competi ng
parts play rather dissimilar roles.' There was 'a most importan t·'opennes s' in the relations
between Congress and the other parties.. a positive commun ication and intera.c tion
between them.'20 This meant that the main hope that oppositio n leaders had o f exerci sing
political influence was to 'address themselves . .. to likemind ed ... groups in the do minant
party'.
Congress occupied not only the broad centre of the political spectrum , but most o f the
left and right as well. This relegated the oppositio n parties not only to the margins o f the
Congress , but to the margins of the political and party systems as well. To make matters
worse, these parties found th<i!mselves on opposite sides of the Congress, which killed any
21
hope o f their making comtpon cause against it.
After the 1967 election, in which the Copgress los t its predo minance in the states,
there emerged what Morris Jones termed :J. market polity' in India. This was no t new.
'There ~as plenty of competit ion and bargaining before 1967,' but it had taken place
largely within the Congress, between g roups and in semi-institutionalized fo rm.' In the
 8 Chapter I.

1967 election however, which saw the Congress lose power in six states, the competition
had grown to,o severe to be contained by the party's i~ternal bargaining, _so that dissident
Congressmen played an important role in the weakentng of th~ ~arty ... 1~ perha~s every
Jost State except Tamil Nadu. This brought a number of opp~s1?on parties fully mto the
market place, and competition that had previously occu_r~ed w1th1~ the Con~ress was now
brought into the realm of interparty conilict. Compeu uon also mcreased m as much as
opposition parties formed coalition governments in every state they controlled except
Tamil Nadu, and 'coalition governments are themselves small markets'. 22 ·
The task of creating and sustaining the immensely broad Congress coalition in that first
phase was, in the view of Morris Jones, made possible by the complexities and ambigui-
ties of Indian society, which prevented class or other polarization and the formation of
contradictions that might fracture an all-embracing alliance of interests.
Rajni Kothari also makes a similar observation as Morris Jones about what he calls
'openness of political communication' in the Indian political system in his 'Politics in Indid
(1970). He writes, 'but there is another kind of openness somewhat peculiar to India: the
continuous interaction between opposition parties and factions within the government
party .... they are able to influence policy and decision-making not only by providing a com-
plete alternative to the government party ... but also by influencing factions within the lat-
ter, either by criticism in the constituencies and legislatures or by the sheer personal weight
of some opposition leaders.'23
Kothari's Politics in India (1970) gives an influential account of the Indian state, operat-
j ing within a process of democratic modernization. Using a structural-functional frame-
work, he described the political system as working around a 'dynamic core' of institutions
characterized by the dominance of the Congress party. It was a differentiated system func-
tioning along the organizational structure of the party, from village or town to district to
provincial to national levels, but 'connecting' at each level with the parallel structure of
government. This allowed for the dominance of a political centre as well as dissent from
the peripheries, with opposition parties functioning as continuations of dissident groups.
The emphasis was on coalition -building and consensus-making. Hence, while the political
. centre consisting of the modernizing elite tried to use the powers of state to transform
society, th·e P!essures of consensus-making through an electoral system set many con-
straints on t~is modernizing project. 24
Kothari writes, 'Political dissent was thus a function of fragmentation of the political
centre of society rather than a projection of autonomous interests in the social and eco-
nomic spheres. Such dissent was largely articulated through the new institutions of parlia-
mentary democracy and adult franchise at different levels of governm ental and develop-
mental activity. It was not from the diversity of social in terests but the fragmentation of
political groups thern sclves that oppositional activity found its stimulus.'25 He further
writes of the Congress system, 'lt is a party system with a difference, oriented towards
building an authoritative structure of political affiliations downward to the base, assimilat-
ing new and divergent interests upward to the ccntrc..The system was di fferentiated,
crystalli zed through a confident impleme ntation of universa l ad ult franchise, which, by

l
 Approaches to the Study of Indian Politics 9

allowing for an open confrontation between competing elements at various levels, made
acceptance of the authority of the governing legitimate and mandatory. The elections con-
firmed the dominance of the Congress at the national level, led to political consolidation
at various other levels, provided substantial cushioning through the mobilization of rural
support, and together with the penetration of planned programmes, for the first time,
enabled a national government to reach out to the villages of India.'26
/ It was only later that Rajni Kothari, the ·ideologue of the 'Congress system,' disillu-
sioned with the Indian model of democracy during the ascendancy of the Indira regime,
analysed the Indian state. The real tests of the Indian model of 'incremental democratic
modernization,' came in the period between 1962 and 1967, when in a short span of time, , /
the system encountered a series of crises from change in leadership and leadership roles
through challenges to the agrarian, economic and language policies to droughts, rising
prices and mass demonstrations.
Faulting this system, Kothari said that 'horizontal aggregation, at the top had come to be
ju.xtaposed by a deliberate strategy of vertical disaggregation. Politicization and challenges
from the bottom met with a response from the top that was essentially premised on the
politics of populism from the top. A crisis of institutions and a ~risis of values together
produced the proclivity for personalized power on the part of those who were in the gov-
ernment and for the cult of oppositionalism or the tendency of the opposition to subor-
27
dinate other goals to the simple aim of displacing those who happen to be in power.'
Political Economy View
Early attempts to present a systematic account of the Indian state, such as those by Palmer
(1962) and Morris Jones (1964) were usually framed within a liberal modernization theory,
and more often than not, were ·celebratory in tone. Key institutions of the state _were
shown to have been put in place during British rule. It was believed that with a liberal dem-
ocratic constitutional system and universal suffrage, the Indian political system would
gradually develop its own processes of democratic decision-making, rational administra-
tion and modern citizenship. Features such as patronage relations based on caste, or reli-
gious loyalties and solidarities based on ethnicity were regarded as vestiges of underdevel-
opment that would go away. 28 ·

(Later, more complex variants of the modernization theory were produced, most
notably by Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) and in the collection on Caste and Indian Politics
(1970) edited by Rajni Kothari, in which it was argued that the elements of 'tradition' such
as caste or religion could infiltrate a modern system of political institutions, adapt to it and
by transforming themselves, find enduring w1thin it as aspects of political modernity. -~·
Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph, in their more recent work, 'In pursuit of Lakshmi: The
Political Economy of the Indian State,' have comprehensively analysed the Indian state in rela-
tion to the economy and society. They depict the Indian State as embedded in group and
class pluralism. They attribute its expanding role in the mixed economy to the historical
legacies of the strong sub-continental state traditions of Mughal and British India; as also
to the strategy of economic development chosen by the post-colonial modernizing elites.
 •
lO Ch1\pter I

As the state was expanding its hold over the economy, society was undergoing a sim~lta-
neous process of politicization, with the emergenc_e of 'demand groups' and organized
interests, characteristic of \Vestern liberal democracies. .. . . .
However, this was accompanied by the decline of polittcal tnstltuttons: the Congress
J party, the parliament, the judiciary, the federal structures and so on. These developme?ts
had serious repercussions for state autonomy. The threats to the autonomy of the ln~an
State came from two sources: first, from the social forces and second, from the state elites
themsdves (which they dub as 'state for itself').29
According to the Rudolphs, the Indian State has oscillated between auto~omous and con-
strained patterns. 'Over the four decades since independence, state capacity and autonomy
declined. The decline encompassed both authoritarian and democratic regimes. The long-
run deterioration in state capacity and autonomy was associated with the deinstitutional-
ization and of both political parties and state institutions.'30
( 'Llke Hindu conceptions of the divine, the state in India is polymorp~o~s, a creature
of manifold forms and orientations. One is the third actor (between capitalist and work-
ing classes) whose scale and power contribute to the marginality of class politics. Another
is a liberal or citizen's state, a juridical body whose legislative reach is limited by a written
constitution, judicial review and fundamental rights. Still another is a capitalist state that
guards the boundaries of the mixed economy by protecting the rights and promoting the
interests of property in agriculture, COf!lIIlerce and industry. Finally, a socialist state is con-
cerned to use public power to eradicate poverty and privilege and tame private power.
Which combination prevails in a particular historical setting is a matter of inquiry.'31 J
The Rudolphs recognized the ultimate centrality of the state in India depicted by what
they term as a 'state for itself.' This meant that the state had emerged as the third actor in
India, negotiating between capital and labour. The 'state for itself' on various occasions,
jealously guards its own interests to the detriment of the other two actors. They also
believe that the autonomy of the Indian state has eroded over the years due to 'de-institu-
tionalization' of both political parties and state institutions.
r -
\.,Another perspective is on the post-liberalization Indian State provided by Partha
Chatterjee who observes that even as the state has voluntarily withdrawn itself from sev-
eral areas of the economic activity, it continues to be the chief allocator of resources and
chief facilitator among social groups. Chatterjee writes that one implication of economic
liberalization since the 1990s is the withdrawal of the state from several sectors of eco-
nomic activity. Even in areas where the state continues to be primarily responsible for pro-
viding services, it has preferred to outsource the job to NGOs or private agencies. This
has happened at the same time political mobilizations have produced electoral majorities
led by lower castes and other hitherto subordinated communities. Thus, while the pres-
sures have increased on state institutions to provide more direct benefits, including reser-
vations in government employment and educational institutions, for backward groups,
there is a contrary pressure on the state, exerted through fiscal, judicial and other regula-
tory institutions, to curtail the range of its activities, and allow those sectors to be operat-
ed by the supposedly more efficient and prudent private organizations.32 )
 Approaches to the Study of Indian Politics 11

(As early as Frankel and Rao (1990), the argument was made that democratic politics in
India was heading towards a split between public institutions, where privileged groups such
as the upper middle classes were entrenched and political institutions, which were being
taken over by representatives of the lower castes and hitherto underprivileged groups.
More recently, it is often remarked that the split is between the private corporate sector,
dominated by the upper-caste, urban, upper middle classes and the state sector, which is
increasingly dominated by the middle and lower classes and the upwardly mobile rural mid-
dle classes. ) ·
More careful analysis shows that both these accounts are simplistic. While the reforms
since the 1990s have undoubtedly led to the withdrawal of the state from many sectors in
which it was previously the dominant or even the sole player, the importance of the state
as the chief regulator, facilitator, ~rbiter and even allocator of resources for society as a
I whole has by no means diminished. The restructured state of the passive revolution, in
which corporate capital has assumed a position, a position of hegemony in civil society
and dominance in the state structure as a whole is still the framework within which all
dominant social classes and most organized democratic '
forces are engaged in their politi-
cal struggles. Hence, it is by no means true that the urban middle classes have abandoned
I
the state or democratic institutions.33 )
What is true, however, is that various institutions and processes within the state structure
are being selectively used by dominant minority groups, such as corporate capitalists, or the
urban middle classes, to curtail the sway of governmental agencies operating as representa-
tives of democratic majorities. These could be courts of law or particular bureaucratic offices,
. often projected in the public domain through the print and visual media. Further, there is also
a certain spatial withdrawal of such dominant minority groups from territories generally
administered by local institutions of the state. Thus, upper-class housing estates often prefer
to reduce their dependence on local municipal services to a bare minimum so as not to deal
with the messy politics of urban neighbourhoods. It is thought that the new Special Economic
Zones, which are meant to contain entire townships, may become enclaves lying outside the
normal jurisdiction of state agencies. Thus, instead of a split between state and non-state
domains, the emergent social oppositions are being played out between different branches of
the state, as well as through tactical and spatial engagements and withdrawals.34

The Marxist View of the Indian State

Marxist theory views the state, r_ot as the .result of an abstract political will nor contract
but as embedded in civil society.Jt is an embodiment of the social dynamics resulting from .,
either the constant change or relative stability of a mode or modes of production and the
consequent class configuration. Marx has given at best an outJ.tne of a theory of state that
contained both instrumentalist and structuralist arguments.35 )
The instrumentalist argument of Marx, readily endorsed by orthodox Marxists, believed
that 'the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managit?g the common
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. Ralph Miliband explains that 'this is a more complex
 12 Chapter I

statemcnr than appears at first sight, but it is a summary and lends itself to oversimplifica-
tion. Ho\\·c,·er, it docs represent the core position of Marxism o n the subject of the
stnre·: 16 In the Eighteenth Brumaire, howeYer, Marx put forth a more complex theory
according to which the bourgeoisie on its own keeps itself away from power because it is
shrewd enough to perceive that that their interests would thus be better served. 'This is the
origin of the neo-Marxist idea of the state being relatively autonomou s of the dominant
economic class even though it acts on behalf of the latter and safeguards its interests.'r
The Miliband 38-Poulantzas39 debate or instrumentalist-structuralist debate, which has
centred around the relative autonomy of the state has theoretically enriched the neo-
Marxist school. Neo-Marxists have, over the years, included developing societies within the
ambit of their study.40 According to Poulantzas, the 'specificity of the political' in these
developing societies has forced a rethinking among neo-Marxist scholars like Hamza Alavi,
A.nupam Sen and Pranab Bardhan, who ha,~e improvised the theory applicable to ad,·anced
capitalist societies to suit an entirely different environment.

Classical Orthodox Marxist Viewpoint

Accordj.ng to this viewpoint, the state is an instrument in the hands of a ruling-class coali-
cion. 41 (Toe Communis t Party of India, for instance, characterized the Indian state as a
national bourgeoisi e state. The class of nationalist bourgeoisie does not include the
monopolis ts who tend to compromis e with feudalism and imperialism. The CPI ideo-
logues believe that due to their participation in their ant-imperialist struggle, certain sec-
tions of the bourgeoisi e have become progressive in their outlook.· It is because of this
class that the Indian state can take up any anti-monopolistic measures, provided it has the
will to do so. 42
(The Communis t Party of lridia (Marxist) views the Indian state as 'organ of the rule of
the bourgeoisi e and landlords led by the big bourgeoisie who are increasingly colla~orat-
ing with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the capitalist path of developme nt.'
43
J

The Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist)

Similarly, with a slight variation, the Communis t Party of India (Marxist-L eninist views the
Indian state as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state. CPI (ML) ideologues say that 'the
characteris tic features of the new governmen t in the name of independe nt India was a
continuity of the old regime, of the social and economic order, the same administrative
44
machinery of imperialism , the same bureaucracy and the same police'. They conclude
that reforms introduced by subsequen t governmen ts 'have not changed the foundation s of
Indian society in general and the ruling classes in particular .. .There is no change in their
foundation s of power.' They hold that the comprador bourgeoisie has mortgaged India
45

in}-o the hands of foreign capitalists.

\.Other Marxist theoreticia ns such as A. R. Desai, Moin Shakir and Ajit Roy also formu-
lated, though in a more sophisticat ed way, a similar instrument alist view regarding the state.
A. R. Desai says that despite appearance s to the contrary, the state in India is a capitalist
 1\pproaches to the Study of Indian Politics 13

state. /-\jit Roy secs the Indian stat·e as esse ntially the organ of the djctatorship of th e
Indian monop_o ly bourgeo isie and _the rural bourgeoisie_4c, )
/-\. R. Desai observes that despite conversion of the right to property from the status
of a fundamental right to that of a legal right, it stiUallows a right to income through own-
ership. Further, the ensuing gross inequalities of income are seen as socially acceptable.
Profits, rents and interests are all seen as factors inducing economic development. Other
features that point to the capitalist nature of the Indian state are the absence of a legal
assurance of the right to livelihood and of compensation in cases of loss of livelihood of
the masses.
~ Desai also cites the case of the Indian planning machinery which is geared towards
the path of a capitalist mixed economy, and accepts a class structure based on private
ownership as the basis of economic development. While seeking to abolish social
inequality, our planning process does not make a dent on the fundamental class inequal-
ity rooted in priv:;ite ownership of the means of production. Desai says that such a phi-
losophy penetrating the planning mechanism has been nurtured by the mainstream
national movement, which was committed to promoting Indian markets and economy
for its capitalists' interests. ) ·
Further, the Indian economy operates on the principles of profit and production for
the market, a sure sign of a capitalist economy. Desai holds that the Indian mixed econo-
my is tilted towards the private· sector. Agriculture, the largest sector of our economy is
totally privately owned. Wholesale and retail trade is also in the private sector. Consumer
goods industry and the transport sector (even prior to economic liberalization) are by and
large, not in the public sector. Besides, economic, social and legal measures adopted by the
government in the form of tax relief, subsidies, foreign loan facilities and favourable price-
fixation are all geared towards securing the interests of big business and the propertied
classes. What's more, the entire agrarian sector, dominated by big landlords and rich farm-
ers are yet to be covered in the tax net. A.R. Desai, thereby, argues that the Indian state has
not made an organized attempt to support the development of capitalism and resist the
fo rces of socialism. Not a siog~e_of its manifold activities is aimed at restraining the growth
of the capitalist class.
( Desai concludes that the policies o~ the govern_m~nt after Indepe~~ence, ~n th~ whol~,
strengthened propertied classes, especially the capitalist class, compnsmg trading, mdustn-
al and moneyed section and the land-owning class comprising profit-oriente d kulak and
rich farmer stratum in the c~untry. ) .

Neo-Marxist View
Th e neo-Marxists, on the other hand, provide us with a fresher perspective, shorn of
instrum entalist o rthodoxy and throws new light o n the subject. Following the theorization
of Gramsci, th ere is a g reater willingness now to recognize the 'relative autonomy' of the
Indian state. This recognition, however, came at a time when the state was rapidly losing
its autonomous character. An important characteristic of the post-colonial Indian state,
nevertheless, is its autonomous character.
14 Chapter I

( Hamza Alavi was among the first neo-Marxists to argue that a post-colonial state like
lndin has a relative autonomy vis-a-vis civil society. Alavi's theory of the 'over-developed'
pmt-culonial state was greatly influenced by the dependency theory of the late 1960s.
Alavi says that 'the historical specificity of post-colonial societies arises from structural
changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignment of classe~ and _by the
superstructures of . political and administrative institutions that were established 10 that
context and secondly, from radical realignments of class forces which have been brought
about in the post-colonial situation.'47
He adds that the · post-colonial state dispenses with the mediation of politics
because the state is overdeveloped. This means that it has a superstructure which is
capable of dominating all the indigenous social classes. According to Alavi, 'the colo-
nial state had to create a state apparatus through which it can exercise domination over
all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the superstructure
in the colony is therefore overdeveloped in relation to the structure.in the colony, for
its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the
time of independence.'48
The state that is inherited by the post-colonial society is consequently so powerful that
Alavi wonders that 'the excessive enlargement of powers of regulation and control that the
state acquires extends far beyond the logic of what is necessary in the interests of the
orderly functioning of i:he peripheral capitalist economies over which the state presides
an~ the specific needs of each of the dominant classes.'49
(Apart from the colonial legacy, the structure of society also helps the state to maintain
its autonomy. This is in part due to the peculiar class structure within the peripheral capi-
talist system. 'In peripheral capitalist societies ....we are presented with a pattern of class
formation and class alignment that is different both from the advance capitalist countries
and that of Lenin's picture of non-colonized Russia awaiting a bourgeois revolution.'50
Alavi finds a plurality of classes in peripheral capitalist societies and says that none of them
can be designated unambiguously, as the 'ruling class.' Hence no single class is powerful
enough.to dominate over the affairs of the state.
Although Alavi's main concerns are Pakistan and Bangladesh, he has several impor-
tant things to say about India. Certain commonalities are shared by these countries
owing to their common past. While some of his formulations, especially those relating
to a military-bureaucratic ruling class, apply specifically to Pakistan and Bangladesh,
before the advent of democracy in these two countries, his other formulations may be
generalized as follows~1:

(a} . The overdeveloped state apparatus.

(b) The relatively weak societal forces.

Lead to the relative autonomy of the state in these societies. ~ his has been widely
accepted by other neo-Marxist scholars as well. Pranab Bardhan, adding to Alavi's thesis,
says that not only the colonial state, but even the pre-colonial state apparatus in India was
overdeveloped. He says, 'Some Marxist scholars have traced the extraordinary powers of
 /\pproachcs to the Study of ln<lian Politics 15

control and regulation vested in the state to the colonial admini stration ruling an aljen lane.I.
But this overdeveloped state actually goes back to pre-colorual days and was certainly evi-
dent during the peak of Mughal rule in India.'52
Bardhan also emphasizes the undisputed centrality of the state in developing societies,
where he feels, it is more important than in the West. 'In the countries of delayed indus-
trialization, the state has usually played a more active role, as the history of south, central
and eastern parts of Europe, as contrasted with the western part, clearly shows.'53
During independence, Bardhan says, the Indian state acted 'neither at the behest of nor
on behalf of the proprietary classes.'54 But over the years, the autonomy of the state has
declined due to various constraints and hence, 'today the autonomy of the Indian state is
reflected more often in its regulatory role than developmental role.' 55
L Anu~am Sen, another neo-Marxist scholar, argues that the Indian state has been able to
play an independent role vis-a-vis civil society 'because of the nature of the evolution of
its social formation.' 56 He says that the post-colorual state in India is still autonomous
because of the prevalence of a multiplicity of modes of production. The-Indian society is
at the same time, partly feudal, partly capitalist and partly Asiatic. Hence on single class can
emerge as the dominant class. This ensures the state's autonomy. Sen's thesis that the
Asiatic Mode of Production is still valid in India, has courted controversy as AMP as a tool
of analysis for Asiatic societies has long been discredited by Marxist scholars. )
(Achin Vanaik, another neo-Marxist scholar, while accepting almost all of the formula-
tions of fellow neo-Marxists, goes a step further, when he analyses the relationship
between the Indian state vis-a-vis foreign capital and declares that the Indian state is
autonomous not only vis-a-vis civil society (internally) but also vis-a-vis foreign capital
(externally). 57 He has firm belief in the indigenous economic infrastructure which sustains
the pressures from. abroad. He is also sanguine that the ongoing economic liberalization is
not going to alter the situation as 'it is from a relatively stronger position than in the past
and in a carefui and cautious manner 'that the Indian economy is approaching it.
Although Vanaik does not include the Indian middle classes in this ruling class alliance,
he recognizes the pivotal role they play in Indian politics and economy. He writes, 'There
is not enough recognition of the fact that this demographic uruqueness .. .. has played a sig-
ruficant role in enabling the Indian economy to pursue an internally oriented path of
growth with considerable insulation from the world economy, thus reinforcing the state's
autonorny.'58 ) ·

Recent Formulations
More recently, Partha Chatterjee writes that a strong theme in current discussions about
f state institutions in lndia is that of decline. From law-making to administration, policy-
making to public services, the charge is that standards of accountability and probity have
been allowed to deteriorate. The most proximate reason for this is the constant pressure
on state authorities exerted mainly through the electoral process to satisfy the demands of
this or that orgaruzed popular group. The recent comprehensive history of Indian politics
since Independence by Ramachandra G uha (2007) also adopts this narrative line. 59 The
 1

16 Chapter 1

. · . f course that the norms of state practice established in the

dcclmc argument assumes, o , . d
ea rly decades of the Indian Republic when mob~zed demands were res~n~te t~ ~ ~ery
. of tl,e electorate and policy was decided by a handful of patncian politicians,
sma LI sec ti on . • h ·
·h
S OU
Id al
, SO <
have proved adequate in an age when democratic mobilizatio ns are bot
• ,
wider
and deeper. Chatterj ee says that this. assumption is mistaken. While the normative view of
the state required that society, consisting of equal citizens, be treated as ~om~gen~ous, the
evolving practices of democratic politics required the recognition and identification of a
heterogeneous social. . .
The 1980s was a decade of Congress (I) dominance. It was marked by the centraliza-
tion of control of the central leadership over the Congress party. Structural reforms under
the P. V Narasimha Rao government, also transformed the state of the passive revolution.
Measures such as the dismantling of the licence regime, greater entry of foreign capital
and foreign consumer goods and the opening up of sectors such as telecommunications,
transport, infrastructure, mining, banking, insurance and the like to private capital, led to
a change in the very composition of the capitalist class.60
Instead of the earlier dominance of a few monopoly houses drawn from traditional
merchant backgrounds and protected by the license and import substitution regime, there
were now many more entrants to into the capitalist class at all levels, and much greater
mobility within its formation. Unlike the earlier fear of foreign competition, there appears
to be much greater confidence among Indian capitalists to make use of the opportunities
opened up by global flows of capital, goods and services, including, in recent times, sig-
nificant exports of capital. The mast dramatic event was the rise of the Indian IT indus-
try. D omestic manufacturing and services also received a major spurt, leading to annual
growth rates of 8 or 9 per cent for the economy as a whole in the last few years. 61
( There have been several political changes as a result. First, there is a distinct ascendan-
cy in the relative power of the corporate capitalist class, compared to the landed elites. The
political means by which this domination has been achieved needs to be investigated more
carefully, because was no t achieved through the mechanism of electoral mobilization
(which used to be the source of the political power of the landed elites). One study has,
in fact described the economic reforms as having being carried out 'by stealth' Oenkins
1999). Second, the dismantling of the licence regime has opened up a new fi~ld of com-
petitio n between state governments to woo capitalist investment, both domestic and for-
eign. This has resulted in the involvement of state-level political parties and leaders with
the interests of national and corporate capital in unprecedented ways. 1 hird, although the
state conti nues to be the most important mediating apparatus in negotiating between con-
flicting class interests, the autonomy of the state with respect to the dominant classes
appears to have been redefined. Crucially, the earlier role of the bureaucratic - managerial
class, or more generally of the urban middle classes, in leading and operating, both social-
ly and ideologically, the autonomous, interventionist activities of the developmental state
has significantly weakened. There is a strong ideological tendency among the urban mid-
dle classes today, to view the state apparatus as ridden with corruption, inefficiency and
populist, political venality and a much greater social acceptance of the professio nalism and
 Approaches to the Srudy of Indian Poli tics 17

commitment to growth and efficiency of the corporate capitalist sector. The urban mjd-
dle class which once played such a crucial role in producing and running the autonomous
developmental state o f the passive revolution, appears now to have come under the moral-
po~tical sway o f the bourgeoisie. 62
,'H owever, it would be.a mistake to tlunk that the result is a convergence of the Indian
po1itical system ·w:itl1 the classical models of capitalist democracy. The critical difference
has been produced, as described in Chatterjee (2004), 'by a split in the field of the politi-
cal, between a domain of a properly constituted civil society and a more ill-defined and
contingently activated domain of political socie(J1. Civil society·in India today, peopled large-
ly by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normaci,·e
models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony. If thjs
were the only domain, then India today would probably be indistinguishable from ocher
Western capitalist democracies. But there is the other domain of, what I call, political soci-
ety, which includes large sections o f the rural population and the urban poor. These peo-
ple do, of course, have the formal status of citizens and can exercise their franchise as an
instrument of political bargaining. But they do not relate to the organs of the state in the
same way that the middle classes do, nor do governmental agencies treat them as proper
citizens belonging to civil society. Those in political society, make their claims on govern-
ment, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable, constitutionally
defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrange-
/ ments arrived at through direct political negotiations. The latter domain, ,vhich represents
the vast bulk of democratic politics in India, is not under the moral- political leaderslup of
the capitalist class.'63 )
Hence, Chatterjee ~rgues that the framework of passive revoJution is still valid for
India. But its structure and dynamics have undergone a change. ([he capitalist class has
come to acquire a moral hegem ony over civil society, which consists chiefly of the urban
middle classes. It exercises considerable influence over both the central and tl1e state gm·-
ernments not through the elected mobilization of political parties and movements but
largely through the bureaucratic-managerial class, the increasingly influential print and
visual media and the judiciary and other independent, regulatory bodies. The dominance
of the capitalist class within the state structure as a whole can be inferred from the ,·inu-
al consensus among all major political parties about the priorities of rapid economic
growth led by private investment, both domestic and foreign. It is striking that e,·en the
Communist Party o f India (Marxist) in West Bengal and slightly more ambiguously in
Kerala, has in practice, if not in theory, joined tl1is consensus. This means that as far as rhe
party system is concerned, it does not matter which particular combination of parries
comes to power at th e Centre or even in most of the states; state support for rapid eco-
nomic growth is guaranteed to continue. This is evidence of the current success of rhc
passive revolution. 64 )
However, the practice. o f the state also includes the large range of governmenral acti,·-
ities in political society.(Here are fo und the locally dominant interests such as chose o f
landed elites, small producers and local traders, who are able to exercise political influence
18 Chapter 1

through their powers of electoral mobilization. In the old understanding of the passive
revolution, these interests would have been seen as potentially opposed to those of the
industrial bourgeoisie; the conflicts would have been temporarily resolved through a com-
promise worked_out within the party system and the autonomous apparatus of the state.
Now, there is a new dynamic logic that ties the operations of the political society with the
hegemonic role of the bourgeoisie in civil society and its dominance over the state struc-
ture as a whole. This logic is supplied by the requirement of reversing the effects of prim-
itive accumulation of capital, which must inevitably accompany the process of rapid indus-
trial growth.65

Gandhian Theory of the Indian State

In Gandhi's writings, the main target of attack is the amoral, coercive state, and not any
particular class.66 Not that Gandhi was oblivious of or tolerant towards the class conflicts
of modern times. He did recognize the reality of class conflicts between capital and labour,
and between landlords and landless labourers. He also maintained that capitalism and
zarnindari should be 'sterilized' and that in a true democracy, -class conflicts would be tran-
scended.67 He, however, not only opposed the class war approach to social transformation
but also regarded the domination by any particular class to be a lesser evil than the vio-
lence and oppression of the state. He believed that human liberation from 'the evils of
capital' is hampered by the fact that the class conflicts of the imperialist capitalist system
have become enmeshed with and transformed by a basic conflict between the individual
and the state, which he said, 'represents violence in a concentrated form'. 68
As if in anticipation of the :tlaber.masian ,5fug_nosis of the crucial role of state inter-
vention in the maint~nante of the late capitahs't ~ystem, Gandhi wrote that 'the violence
of private ownership is less injurious than the violence of the State'. 69 While he recog-
nized the need for mankind to move beyond the capitalist utilitarian system of social
organization, he was convinced that 'if the State suppressed capitalism by violence, it
will be caught in the coils of violence itself and will fail to develop non-violence at any
(ime.'70 True to his belief in the integral nature of the means-ends continuum, he main-
tained that through violent means, we cannot break out of the 'vicious circle of violence
and exploitation'.
Gandhi's objection to the organized and concentrated violence of the state had to do
with hi s commitment to individual freedom. 'The individual,' he said, 'is the one supreme
consideration'. 'If the individual ceases to count,' he asked, 'what is left of society?'71 In
fact, Gandhi 's entire social theory and praxis were aimed at using and extending civil lib-
erties for the democratization of 'the whole social structure. 72 He shared the liberal con-
cern for individual freedom. But he found the liberal and liberal-democratic method of
securing social order through the supposedly amoral, objectified state to be at the expense
of the political dimension of the freedom of the individual. He therefore sought to
redeem individual freedom even in the political sphere without endangering social harmo-
ny. He, thus, attempted to resolve the contradiction in the theory and practice of liberal
 Approaches to the Study of Indian Politics 19

dr tn\ltmcy between the nfftrm11cio n of individual freedom in the so-called private sphere
of mnmlity and its curtailment in the allegedly amoral or purely technical public or politi-
c1tl sphctt_·.
~ Unlike the prc-libcr:tl world-views, the modern liberal ideology recognizes the ind.ivid-
u~ll·s freedom of judgement, choice, contract and possessions. 73 Th.is has historically been
'n \ '1\St em:1ncip:uory Hchievement for mankind'.74 But the ensuing inequalities in property
:rnd the cbsh of individual, private interests and judgements, which were unleashed by the
liberal re,--o lutio n, endangered social order. The liberal and liberal-democratic answer to
this probkm o f soci,tl o rder was the invention of a political form of government, which
excluded individual private judgernents.75 That is the rule of one man, (through an individ-
ual's priYate judgement), was replaced by the republican form of government, which, with
the eventual democratization of the franchise, became the liberal-democratic state. Th.is
stHte o f the 'political' is supposed to be autonomous from or external to the rest of social
life; the standards of expediency or expediency or effectiveness of the former are assumed
ro be divorced from private, moral standards. That the constitution of the liberal-demo-
cratic state is based on th.is artificial dichotomization of social life into the public/political
and the private, the amoral and the moral, is argued by Carole Pateman:
The liberal answer to the problem of social order inherent in such a society was to divide
social life into two spheres and to substitute for shared principles a 'political method' or pro-
cedure for arbitrating between conflicting individual interests and deciding on the 'public
interest'. ln the private sphere of social life, individuals' non-political natural rights are given
actual expression; this is the proper sphere for individuals to exercise their private judgement
and pursue their interests. In the political sphere, individual private judgement excluded, the
natural political right is given up and decisions are made on behalf of individuals by chosen
representatives. 76

These re presentatives, as Pateman goes on to point out, are supposedly engaged in

representing the political or public interest, not the separate, conflicting interests of
individuals. Political decisions are thus assumed to be value-neutral, procedural or techni-
cal decisions. Similarly democracy is reduced to an allegedly amoral 'political method,'
which, unlike integral or participatory democracy, only gives the people 'the opportunity
of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them' . These rulers or representatives
are supposed to embody 'the political selves, the citizen selves of the members of the
community'. 77
Thus, in liberal democratic theory and practice, the political is reified and objectified
into the representative state, which becomes the bearer of the alienated political rights of
the citizens. H ence, there is a fundamental contradiction in liberal democratic theory and
practice between the affirmation of individual freedom in the private sphere and its cur-
tailment in the public/ political sphere.
Actually, the ob jectificatio n of the political into the state and its priva tizatio n and
hierarchization by the technocrats of power, which militate against the requirements
of the capitalist-industrialist system for state intervention in the process of capital ·
accumulation. 78
2() Chapter I

This icch noc ratjzation of politics has been

goin g on even in the liberal democracies.
l lndcr favo urable socio-hi storical condition
s, liberal dem ocra cy has inde ed serv ed
pt:.lccful rnechani sm for securing form al as a
dem ocra tic legitimac y for _the state. But
whe n the
masses have used or threatened to use thei
r civil liberties for push ing the electoral
mal democracies in the direction of a subs or for-
tantive or part icip ator y dem ocra cy, whi ch
have offs et the state-managed private accu would
mul atio n of socially prod uced surp lus valu
tech nocrats of power have raised the cry e, the
of 'governability crisis' and have used coer
meth ods to depoliticize the mass public, ~1ve
thereby furt her objectifying the state and
pnva-
tizin g it as a purely technocratic enterpris
e. . .
Gandhi attacked the late-mod ern capitalis
t state for its fascist proclivities. He believed
the de-reification of the objectified state was that
necessary for redeeming the political dimensi
of individual freedom. 'I look upo n an incre on
ase in the power of the State \vith the grea
fear, because while apparently doing goo test
d by minimizing exploitation, it does the
harm to mankind by destroying individua grea test
lity, which lies at the root of prog ress.'79
He maintained that the state is a 'soulless
machine' and that amo ral poli ties encircle
like 'the coils of a snake'. He therefore soug us
ht to repair the liberal dem ocra tic one-dim
sionaliza tion of free dom and dem ocra cy en-
with out endangering social harm ony by
in g SJ/Jara) (participator y democracy) with com bin-
the satyagraha mod e of inte grat ing politics
and
morality.

Swaraj or Participatory Dem_ocracy

Gan dhi criticize d the liberal-democratic
reification, objectification and tech nocr atiz
of the political and the alienation of the atio n
people's political rights. He also put forw
alter native qf participator y democracy, whic ard the
h rupt ures the positivist disjunction betw
subject and object. een
'A supe rficial study of British hist ory has
made us thin k that all pow er p erco lates to
peop le from parliaments. The trut h is that the
power resides in the peop le and it is entr
for the time being to thos e who m they may usted
choo se as their repr esen tativ es.' 80
'Let us not push the man date theo ry to
ridiculous extreme s and beco me slaves to
olutions of majorities .. ..True dem ocra cy res-
cann ot be wor ked by twen ty men sitting
Cen tre. It has to be worked from belo w at the
by the people of ever y village.' 81
Whi le adm ittin g that the necessity of a
'cen tral governm ent adm inis trati on' cann
be ruled out, Gandhi mai ntain ed th at it ot
need no t and ought no t to b e patterne
'the acce pted Wes tern fo rm of dem ocra d afte r
.cy'. Hi s objectio n was to the cent ral gov
men t admini strati on beco min g the bear ern-
er of th e alien ated political righ ts of
'U nde r my plan ,' he said , 'the Stat e will citizens
be there to carr y out the will o f the peo
to dict ate to them o r fo rce them to do ple, not
its wi ll '.82 Whi le he did cautio n us agai
verting dem ocracy into mob ocracy, be nst con -
insis ted that 'dem ocracy is an imp ossible
unti l pow er is shared by all'. He said, 'Mo thin g
st peo ple do not und ersta nd the com p licat
mac hine ry of the governm ent. Th ey ed
do no t reali ze that ever y citizen silen
no ne theless certainly sustains the governm tl\' but
ent o f the day in ways of whi ch he has
kno wled ge.' 83 no
 Approaches to the Stud y of lncLian Po]jtics 21

Elsewhere, he added , ' Real s1vrmy· wiU come not by the acguisition of authority by a few
but by the acqui:.ition of the capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In o ther
words, swa.rnj is to be attained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to reg-
ulate and control authority.'84
According to Gandhi, the central government administration should not be structured
:is a pyramid but as an oceanic circle.
'ln this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever-widening, never-
ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustruned by the bottom. But it
will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the
viUage, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one
life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing
85
the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units.'
Gandhi also described this model of S1varaj as being 'synonymous with Ram Rajya or
the establishment of the Kingdom of Righteousness on earth.' He described Ram Rajya as
'sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority'.86 Although Garidhi regarded
class-war as alien to the essential genius of India, the Ram Rajya of his dreams 'ensures
rights alike of prince and pauper'.
In the modern context, RamRajya means an ideal state, where the subjects would be
free from the threefold miseries of physical pain, ill fortune and evil circumstances. There
would be no hunger, disease, natural or manmade calamities. All men and women would
love one another live their lives in accordance with righteousness and the injunctions of
the sacred scriptures. There wouldn't be infant mortality or premature death or suffering
of any kind. No one would be destitµte or sorrowful or miserable. Ram Rajya would be
monarchic in form but democratic in practice. The king would never do anything agrunst
87
the wishes of the people. The very basis of Ram Rajyawas the spiritualization of politics.

Conclusion
Today, we find a convergence of sorts in the Neo-Liberal and Neo-Marxist perspectives,
with the former veering towards radical positions and the latter being more liberal in their
approach. Both, today, give the state the position it deserves and agree about the 'specifici-
ty of the political'. Neo-M~rxists, while shedding the determini~m of orthodox Marxists
who are prone to reducing the state to the class, still fail to come to terms with the com-
plexity of the Indian social formation. They tend to take a dismissive view of caste, eth-
rucity, religion and the forces of nationalism in India and the contemporary world.
Meanwhile, the Gandhian ideas of village democracy were sought to be implemented
in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments relating to Panchayati Raj and Nagar
Palika. However, the spirit of participatory democracy is yet to flower and the implemen-
tation of the Act has been tardy. As the Indian state grapples with crises, not least among
them, violent threats to internal security such as Maoism and responds in return \vith 'con-
centrated violence', the Gandhian ideal appears utopian, paradoxically, when its relevance
has never been greater.
22 Chapter 1

. In sum, it may be said that the state in India retains its autonomous character, altbo~gh
1~ autonomr is much less than that inherited from the colonial state. Economic liberaliza-

tion in _India has created conditions for a rapid growth of capitalism in India. Whether or
~ot a smgle class emerges in the process to dominate the
state apparatus is open to qu~s-
~on. But some factors would impede such a development. These are the forces of ~~ruc-
ity, language, religion, region, urban-rural divide and so on which show amazing resilience
in ~e In~an context. Even if a dominant class does emer;e in the course of time: it would
be m the mterest of the dominant class coalition (as the Neo-Marxist debate teSttfies) that
the state retain its autonomy. 88

Notes and References·,·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. Andrew Heywood, Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 12. , .
2. Eckstein Harry, 'A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present,' in Harry EckS tein and
David E. Apter (eds), Comparative Politics: A "Reader (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
3, Ibid.
4. Andrew Heywood,- Politics, .p. 13.
5. Rod Hague et al, Comparative Government and Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), P· 31 .
6. Ibid., p. 32.
7. Ibid., p. 34. \
8. Rod Hague et al, Comparative Gov~rnment and Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 35.
9. Andrew Heywood, Politics, p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 15.
11. Ibid.