Appellant Memorial
Appellant Memorial
(APPEAL)
(UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF
YAARA MIXOL......................................................................................................APPELANT
VERSUS
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF IONIA..........................................................RESPONDENT
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Books Referred
3 Statutes Referred
4 Other Resources
7 Index of Authorities
8 Statement of Jurisdiction
9 Statement of facts
10 Statement of Issues
11 Summary of Argument
12 Argument Advanced
2
12(B) ISSUE II- WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE
APPELLANT UNDER SECTION 102 READ WITH SECTION
105 OF THE IPC IS BAD IN LAW?
2.1-The appellant can’t be convicted on the basis of circumstantial
evidence on record.
2.1.1- The confession of appellant is wholly unreliable and
inadmissible under section 23 of IEA.
2.1.2-Confession regarding the murder weapon is inadmissible.
2.1.3- Credibility of the respondent witnesses is highly suspicious.
2.2-Ther guilt of the appellant not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and appreciate correctly.
3
13 Prayer
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
P. NO
CASE LAWS
2 times cited
Anwar P. V v. P.K. Basheer & Ors 2014 10 SCC 473.
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal 2020 7 SCC 1. 3 times cited
Shafhi Mohammad vs The State of Himachal Pradesh 10 (2018)2 SCC 801.
Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate (2010) 4 SCC 329.
Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital (2009) 9 SCC 709.
Ranjithsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 CrLJ 2533.
Fry v. United States, (293F1013 DCcir 1923).
Daubart v. Merryll Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 113SCt.2786 (1993).
M.H.Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544.
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374.
Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam, (2011) 4 SCC 729.
Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627.
Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 2 SCC 584.
Moti Lal Saraf v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 180.
Husainera Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1973 SC 1369
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC (Supp) 1841
Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2010 (7) SCC 263
4
.ABBREVIATION USED
5
29 Const. Constitution
30 CriLJ Criminal Law Journal
31 Govt. Government
32 Hon’ble Honorable
33 http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
34 Ltd Limited
35 u/s Under section
36 U.P Uttar Pradesh
37 V. Volume
38 W.P. Writ Petition
39 MIGA Make Ionia Great Again
40 Neo-MPR Neo Mixolydia People’s Revolution
41 Co. Corporation
BOOKS REFERRED
SL. NO BOOKS
1 1, M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th Edn. Lexis Nexis 2010)
2 10, DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
(8th Edn. Lexis Nexis 2012)
3 2, H.M SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th Edn. Universal law publishing
Co. 2021)
4 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK LAW DICTIONARY (8th Edn. 2024)
9. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, INDIAN PENAL CODE (34th Edn. Lexis Nexis
2018)
6
10 4 J K SOONAVALA, SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL DIGEST (1950-2015), (6th
ed. LexisNexis 2016).
11 DR. BENNY PAUL & TINA BENNY, SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE (4th ed. Sree Ram Law House 2022).
12 P. ISHWARA BHAT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THEIR
INTERRELATIONSHIP (Easter Law House 2004).
13 KD GAUR, THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT (2nd Edn. Lexis Nexis 2020)
14 BATUL LAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (24TH Edn. Central Law Publication
2023)
15 Dr. ISHITA CHATTERJEE, LAW ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (3RD Edn.
Central Law Publication 2022)
16 SR BHANSALI, CMMENTARY ON THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT
(3rd Edn. Universal Law Publication 2015)
17 VAKUL SHARMA, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW AND PRACTICE (8TH
Edn. Lexis Nexis 2023)
18 SHIKHER DEEP AGGARWAL & KUSH KALRA, COMMENTARY ON THE
INGFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT (2ND Edn. Whitesmann Publication, 2024)
19 MP TANDON, THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872 (14TH Edn. New Era Law
Publication, 2023)
20 Dr. AVTAR SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (24TH Edn.
Central Law Publication 2023)
STATUTES REFERRED
SL. NO STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
2. The Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
3. The Information Technology Act, 2000
4. The Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 1860
7
OTHER RESOURCES REFERRED
SL. NO ONLINE DATABASE
1. SCC ONLINE
2. AIR ONLINE
3. MANUPATRA
4. LEXISNEXIS ONLINE
5. HEIN ONLINE
6. LIVE LAW
7. BAR & BENCH
8. CASEMINE
9. JSTOR
8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble High Court of Moda has the power and jurisdiction to try and entertain the appeal
against conviction by virtue of section 374(2) of CrPc.
(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal
jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions
Judge or on a trial held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more
than seven years has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the
same trial, may appeal to the High Court.
(c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 360
by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session.
9
FACTS OF THE CASE
1. The Ionia is a democratic country in Asia comprising three major states, namely Moda,
Lyndia, and Mixolydia.
2. The Prime Minister of Ionia, Ms. Melody, is accused of preferring Moda over Lyndia and
Mixolydia because the majority of her parliament seats come from Moda.
3. The Ionia was going for a parliamentary election. On the last date of the campaign, i.e.,
June 4, 2024, when Ms. Melody was on her campaign, a paintball pellet of black paint
was shot at the stage and narrowly missed hitting the Prime Minister (Ms. Melody) and
instead exploded onto the banner behind her.
4. Subsequently another shot was fired, which hit the eye of one of the commandos rushing
in front of the PM to escape her. Two days later, the injury led to his death.
5. The police arrested six accused through the AI software “Crime 360." Crime 360 is an AI
tool that is purchased by the Ionian government from Israeli intelligence to detect and
prevent crime.
6. The six accused are Yaara Mixol, Gauri Lydia, Riki Mixol, Fuzail, Iqbal, Fanny Luang,
and Krish Kumar. These accused were members of the Neo-Mixolydian Peoples’
Revolution (Neo-MPR), a pro-independence youth organization, who launched a
campaign on social media to liberate Lyndia and Myxolyndia.
7. The crime 360 detected prime accused Mr. Yaara Mixol has a 92% chance of committing
crime. The crime 360 also rendered that 78% of the face of the Yaara is matched with the
gunman.
8. On search at Yaara’s house, a box of paint gun pellets and several books containing
literature relating to the history of the MPR were seized.
9. The chargesheet was filed for the offenses under Section 3/189/190/191/61/49/103/109 of
the Ionia penal code, relying upon the crime 360 Report’s finding.
10. Yaara had confessed his crime while in police custody. The counsel of the Yaara has
rejected all the charges against him and objected to the admissibility of the crime 360
report by pleading that the report violates the right to privacy and the right against self-
incrimination.
10
11. The trial judge admitted the crime 360 report and found Yaara guilty under Section 102
read with Section 105 of the Ionia Penal Code for causing the death of the commando and
under Section 189(4) for joining an unlawful assembly. The imprisonment for 7 years and
2 years each.
12. Yara’s legal team filed an appeal in the Modal High Court against the conviction,
challenging the admissibility of the crime 360 report, which is in violation of the
fundamental rights and right to a free and fair trial as the crime 360 was not given to him
for cross-checking.
13. The court had admitted the appeal and posted it for hearing.
14. The state of Moda filed a counter appeal seeking conviction under Section 103(1) for
enhancement to life imprisonment.
11
ISSUE RAISED
12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
13
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
14
1. WHETHER THE CRIME 360 REPORT ID INADMISIBBLE AS EVIDENCE?
The counsel on the behalf of Appellant humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court
that the Crime 360 Report is inadmissible as evidence before the court of law. The
reason behind inadmissibility of the report is that it not only lacks transparency but
there is also a question on its authenticity.
1.1. c
1. The lack of access to source code and underlying data, coupled with the potential
for bias, casts doubt on the report's trustworthiness and its admissibility under the
Indian Evidence Act.
Report does not fulfill criteria mentioned under section 63(4) of the Ionian
Evidence Act1
Section 63(4) provides that:
1
The Ionian Evidence Act, 2023 (Act 47 of 2023), s. 63(4)
2
Ibid
3
Anwar P. V v. P.K. Basheer & Ors 2014 10 SCC 473
15
3. The source code for the Crime 360 report was not available4, which directly relates
to the lack of transparency in the algorithm. The absence of access to the source
code makes it impossible to verify how the AI system arrived at its conclusions,
raising concerns about the reliability of the report as evidence. The transparency of
the AI system is essential for understanding its accuracy, potential biases, and
whether it can be trusted as a fair and reliable source of evidence. It does not fulfills
the Criteria laid down under section 63(4) of IEA. Hence, it is inadmissible as an
evidence.
4. The decision of three-judge bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao
Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal5 affirmed the test laid down in Anvar6 with
clarification.
Para 15 and 25 of the judgment provides that under Section 63(4)7, if it is desired to give a
statement in any proceedings pertaining to an electronic record, it is permissible provided
the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) There must be a certificate which identifies the electronic record containing the
statement;
(b) The certificate must describe the manner in which the electronic record was
produced;
(c) The certificate must furnish the particulars of the device involved in
the production of that record.
(d) The certificate must deal with the applicable conditions mentioned under Section
63(4) of IEA.
(e) The certificate must be signed by a person occupying a responsible official
position in relation to the operation of the relevant device.
5. The Crime 360 report in the fails to meet the certification requirements outlined in
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar8 and Anvar P.V.9.Specifically,
the report lacks the necessary certificate identifying the record, describing the manner
of its production, furnishing the details of the device used. Additionally, the lack of
access to
source code and data further exacerbates concerns about its transparency and reliability.
As a result, the Crime 360 report should be deemed inadmissible as evidence due to its
failure to meet the legal requirements for electronic records under Section 63(4) IEA.
The Criteria of Regular Use and Reliability of the Device, not fulfilled
4
Statement of Facts Para 15
5
2020 7 SCC 1
6
P.V vs P.K.Basheer & Ors 2014 10 SCC 473
7
Supra note 1
16
8
Supra note 5
9
Supra note 6
17
6. In Shafhi Mohammad vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh10 and Tukaram S. Dighole v.
Manikrao Shivaji Kokate11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that new techniques and
devices are order of the day. Though such devices are susceptible to tampering, no
exhaustive rule could be laid down by which the admission of such evidence may be
judged. Standard of proof of its authenticity and accuracy has to be more stringent than
other documentary evidence.
7. Section 63(2) of the IEA provides that for the admissibility of electronic evidence, the
device must be in regular use and the same has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal12, that for
electronic records to be admissible, the device or system used to produce them must be
regularly employed for the creation of such records. This ensures that the evidence is
not only authentic but also reliable. In the present case, Crime 360 is being used for the
first
time in this trial. There is no evidence to suggest that this AI tool has been consistently used
in other criminal investigations or legal proceedings, which raises concerns about the
reliability and accuracy of the evidence it generates. The lack of a proven track record of the
tool in real-world applications or previous criminal cases creates a significant risk of
inaccuracy or tampering. Without proof that Crime 360 is a regularly used and trusted tool
in criminal justice, its findings should be questioned.
8. There is no independent verification of the evidence collected by Crime360. The
Crime360 tool relies on footage that was not independently corroborated and the data was
processed through AI without any external audit. The absence of a clear and verifiable chain
of custody for the evidence means that it should not be admissible in the court. ( Search a
case law on this )
9. Given that Crime 360 has not been previously established as a reliable tool, and
considering the political context in which the accused is situated—coming from Mixolydia, a
region where the Prime Minister’s popularity is waning—there is an increased risk of
manipulation of the tool to target the accused. The absence of peer review, independent
validation, or regular usage of the tool in criminal trials creates a real possibility that the
system could be influenced or tampered with to produce false evidence, leading to an
unfair trial.
10. In Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital13, the Supreme Court emphasized that
when a matter involves highly specialized science or technology, expert evidence is
essential. The scientific question at hand, pertains to the workings of Crime 360, an AI-based
tool used to generate investigative reports. As this technology is highly specialized and not
within the knowledge of a layperson, it is crucial to rely on expert testimony to establish its
reliability and accuracy.
10
(2018)2 SCC 801 on para 22
11
(2010) 4 SCC 329 on para 23
12
Supra note 6
18
13
(2009) 9 SCC 709 para 16; Ranjithsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 CrLJ 2533; Fry v.
United States, (293F1013 DCcir 1923); Daubart v. Merryll Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 113SCt.2786 (1993)
19
11. The agent from Loopeer Inc., who was trained on Crime 360, admitted that the
complete basis of the tool's report could not be fully known14. This admission casts serious
doubt on the transparency and accuracy of the evidence produced by the tool. Given that
the foundational workings of Crime 360 are unclear, this raises concerns about its reliability
and the risk of potential errors or manipulation in its results.
13. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which
includes the right to a fair trial 17, ensuring that no person is deprived of their liberty except by a
procedure established by law. This right is also reinforced by numerous international
agreements, including Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 18, Article
6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights19, and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights20all of which emphasize the necessity of fairness, equality, and due process in
criminal proceedings.
14. The right of fair trial is a Fundamental Right of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution
of India and reiterated and upheld by the Apex Court in the case of Husainera Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar21, and Moti Lal Saraf v. Union of India. Fair trial has been compromised due
to denial of access to relevant document.
15. The appellant’s right to a fair trial has been severely compromised due to the failure of the
prosecution to provide critical evidence, specifically the Crime 360 report, which was essential to
the case. As per Section 230 of the Ionian Criminal Procedure Code the prosecution is required to
supply all documents it intends to rely on, ensuring the accused has a fair opportunity to prepare
their defense. The withholding of this crucial evidence not only violates domestic procedural law
but also breaches international human rights standards, which guarantee access to relevant
evidence as part of a fair trial.
14
Statement of Facts para 15
15
(1978) 3 SCC 544
16
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374; Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam, (2011) 4
SCC 729; Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627; Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 2 SCC
584.
17
Moti Lal Saraf v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 180 para 48
18
“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in
the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
19
Right to a fair trial
20
20
21
AIR 1973 SC 1369
21
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash
Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020 7 SCC 1) has mentioned that, when it comes to criminal trials, it is
important to keep in mind the general principle that the accused must be supplied all
document that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before commencement, under the
relevant sections of the CrPC. 22 The Court went further in para 54 and laid down that, the
requirement of such full disclosure is an extremely valuable right and an essential feature of
the right to a fair trial as it enables the accused to prepare for the trial before its
commencement.
17. When the lawyers of the accused moved the application under section 230 23 the for the
copy of the source code for the Crime 360 application as well as the data on which the AI
was trained, the same was refused by the prosecutor on the ground that it was not a relied
upon document.24 But Trial Judge has ruled in favour of the admissibility of the Crime 360
report and found that it made a positive identification of Mr. Yaara Mixol as the perpetrator
which was reliable and accurate.25This makes it clear that the report of the Crime 360 was a
relied upon document and the prosecutor while denying appellant the access of the source
code and the data on which the AI was trained, has violated the appellants right to fair trial.
Crime 360 violates Right to Privacy and Right Against Self- Incrimination
18. Article 21 of the Ionian constitution provides that – No person shall be deprived of his life
and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in landmark ruling of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India26 has held that ‘Right to
Privacy’ is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. But here the
Crime 360 AI tool, used to collect and analyze the accused’s personal data, was done so
without the accused's informed consent, which constitutes an invasion of privacy.
19. The Indian Constitution provides immunity to an accused against self-incrimination under
Article 20(3) - 'No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself'. It is based on the legal maxim "nemo teneteur prodre accussare seipsum", which
means "No man is obliged to be a witness against himself." Article 20(3), ensures that an
accused person is not compelled to be a witness against themselves
20. The use of the Crime 360 AI tool could be considered as indirectly compelling the accused to
provide self-incriminating data, which is in violation of this constitutional right. This aligns with the
principle of self-incrimination, which was discussed in Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka 27, where
coercive or involuntary techniques used to extract evidence, cannot be admissible unless
voluntarily provided.
22
Para 52 of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020 7 SCC 1)
23
The Ionian Criminal Procedure Code, 2023, s.230
24
Statement of Facts Para 14
25
Statement of Facts para 20
26
AIR 2018 SC (Supp) 1841
22
27
2010 (7) SCC 263 on para 262 & 263
23
Issue 2: Whether the conviction of the Appellant under Section 102 read with Section 105 of
the IPC is bad in law?
28
(1984) 4 SCC 116; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th edn, LexisNexis 2019) 36-37.
29
Indra Dalal v State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 31; The Ionian Evidence Act 2023, s 23
30
Statement of Facts para 18
24
2.1.2. Confession Regarding the murder weapon is Inadmissible.
24. The exception under Section 23 provides a partial exception to the extent that any information,
confession or not, disclosed by an accused person in police-custody relating distinctly to a fact
discovered in consequence of that information is admissible in evidence.31 The essentials of Section
27 of FEA, as also observed by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, include, among
others, the following: (1) the fact must have been ‘discovered’; and (2) that this discovery must have
taken place ‘in consequence’ of some information received from the accused.32 Presently, it is
submitted that the confession of the appellant cannot become admissible under Section 23 of IEA
even partly because the facts and circumstances do not fulfil its essential elements.
24. In the present case the paintball gun was recovered 0.5 km away from the location where the
incident allegedly took place.33 This raises an issue regarding the discovery of the weapon and its
connection to the crime. The gun was recovered at such a distance and no proof was provided
linking it to the accused.
25. There is no evidence proving that the recovered gun was the same one used to commit the
crime or that it belonged to the accused. For the exception under Section 23 to apply, there must be
a clear link between the confession and the discovery of the weapon. The lack of evidence
confirming that the gun was indeed used in the crime or that it belonged to the accused undermines
the reliability of the confession and does not fulfill the requirements of Section 23 of IEA, which
mandates that the information must lead to a discovery of a relevant fact.
26. The recovery process of paintball gun appears to have been flawed because no independent
witnesses were present during the search34, which is a requirement under Section 103(4) of the
Ionian Criminal Procedure Code35. Section 103(4) mandates that the investigating officer must call
upon two independent witnesses from the locality where the search is taking place or from any
other locality if no local witnesses are available or willing to participate in the search. In this case,
there is no mention of independent witnesses being present at the scene, and the search memo was
only signed by the constable involved in the search, which undermines the credibility and reliability
of the recovery process.
27. It is noted that the witnesses (Prosecution Witness No. 4 and Prosecution Witness No. 5)
had never seen the appellant in person prior to the incident. 36 This fact significantly undermines
the credibility and reliability of their identification of the appellant. The inherent danger of
mistaken
identification is a well-established legal principle, as highlighted in cases like R v. Burchielli37, where
31
Geejaganda Somaiah v State of Karnataka (2007) 9 SCC 315; Aghnoo Nagesia v State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC
119; State of Bombay v Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th
edn, LexisNexis 2019) 150.
32
Kusal Toppo v State of Jharkhand (2019) 3 SCC 676; Geejaganda Somaiah v State of Karnataka (2007) 9 SCC
315; Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657; Pulukuri Kotayya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67.
33
Statement of facts para 18
34
Statement of facts para 18
35
Sadhu Singh v State of Punjab (1997) 3 Crimes 55 (PH); Anoop Joshi v State 1999 (2) C.C. Cases 314 (HC).
36
Statement of Facts para 17
37
Batuk Lal, The Indian Evidence Act (Central Law Agency 2018) 133; Richard Wise, Clifford Fishman and
Martin Safer, ‘How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case’ (2009-2010) 42
Connecticut Law
25
show-up identifications were ruled inadmissible due to the high risk of error. Similarly, in this case,
the witnesses' identification of the appellant carries a high risk of being inaccurate, as they were
seeing him for the first time at the scene.
28. Also, the witnesses did not state that they saw the appellant holding the gun or that they
witnessed the appellant firing the shot. This lack of clarity is crucial, as it weakens the reliability of
their testimony and their ability to identify the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The
absence of specific details, such as the appellant being seen with the weapon or firing the shot,
creates further doubt regarding the accuracy of the witnesses' identification.
2.2. The Guilt of the Appellant not Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Trial Court Failed
to Appreciate Correctly
29. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of
Gujarat38, has held in para 5, that it is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an
accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As already established, this is a case based on
circumstantial evidence. In cases of circumstantial evidence, before conviction, the Court has to
satisfy itself completely that there is no other inference consistent with the innocence of the
accused possible nor is there any plausible explanation and the inferences from the circumstances
must be made based on clear and irrefutable logic.39
30. Likelihood of Identification (92%): The Crime 360 analytics tool gave a 92% likelihood of the
appellant being the person involved in the crime. 40 While this may appear strong, the mere 92%
likelihood is not conclusive proof of the appellant's identity. This still leaves a 8% margin for error,
which is significant in the context of a criminal trial where the stakes are high. The uncertainty
surrounding this 92% likelihood should not be disregarded, as it fails to meet the standard of
certainty required for a conviction.
31. Concern Regarding Facial Recognition and Mask: Further raising concerns, the facial
recognition analysis was conducted with the assumption that the suspect was wearing a mask, the
mask covered a significant portion of the suspect's face, which directly impacts the reliability of the
identification process.41 A partially obstructed face makes facial recognition more difficult and
increases the risk of misidentification. This makes the 92% likelihood even more questionable.
32. Comparison with Another Individual (John Doe): Moreover, the Crime 360 tool flagged another
individual, John Doe, whose facial recognition score was 75%, while the appellant's score was 78%.
38
AIR 1964 CS 1563; V.D. Jhingam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1762
39
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2006) 1 SCC 40
40
Statement of fact para 10 & 13
41
Ibid
26
These figures are remarkably close, and when the margin of error is considered, it casts doubt on
whether the appellant's identification can be conclusively linked to the crime.
33. Lack of Corroboration: Beyond the Crime 360 results, there is no corroborating evidence to
support the identification of the appellant. The witnesses in this case, did not recognize the
appellant prior to the incident and did not observe the actual shooting. This further weakens the
case against the appellant and makes the identification highly questionable.
34. Circumstantial Evidence and Reasonable Doubt: As established in previous rulings,
circumstantial evidence must leave no reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused. In this case,
there is sufficient doubt regarding the accuracy of the identification, the reliability of the Crime 360
analysis, and the uncertainty about the recovery of the weapon. There is also a reasonable
possibility that someone else could have been involved, especially considering the presence of a
similarly scored individual (John Doe).
35. It is also to be noted that the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the case of the
defense and must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. and the Trial Court had a duty to
ensure that suspicion must not take the place of substantial legal proof.42 Therefore, the Trial Court
by convicting the accused based on such highly inadmissible and unreliable evidence failed to
appreciate the evidence on record correctly and erred by wrongfully convicting43 under Section 102
read with 105 of the Ionian Penal Code, 2023.
Issue 3: WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 103(1) IPC?
3.1. There Is No Motive Or Mens Rea To Cause Death
36. It is submitted that, upon re-appreciation of evidence, it can be proved that the appellant
had no motive or mens rea to cause the death of the deceased
3.1.1 The Appellant did not have Motive
37. It is indisputable that the accused's motive plays a vital role as the present facts and
circumstances of the case devolves upon circumstantial evidence. 44 It is also true that the
significant role played by motive is only limited to adding to the chain of circumstances and
it cannot form the basis of criminal liability.45 Moreover, the alleged motive of the accused
cannot
42
Somnath Sharma v State of Sikkim 2018 SCC OnLine Sikk 213; Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence
(27th edn, LexisNexis 2019) 36-37
43
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 10;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14-15.
44
Ramesh Durgappa Hirekerur v State of Maharashtra (2017) SCC OnLine Bom 9109; Amitava Banerjee v State
of West Bengal (2011) 12 SCC 554
45
Tara Devi v State of U.P. (1990) 4 SCC 144; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th edn, LexisNexis
27
2019) 69.
28
be warranted unless the prosecution proves its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 46 In the
present case, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to establish any motive for the
appellant’s alleged involvement in the crime. As per the established principle of law, motive
is an important element in circumstantial evidence.
38. None of the witnesses presented by the prosecution have provided any credible or
substantiated evidence regarding the motive of the appellant. There are no statements from
witnesses suggesting any prior disputes, grudges, or conflicts between the appellant and the
deceased, Commando X. The prosecution has not demonstrated any connection between the
appellant and the victim that could suggest a clear reason for the appellant to commit such an
act.
39. Thus, the evidence of motive is purely conjecture put forth by the respondent and is
uncorroborated by any independent evidence. Following the well-settled legal principle, the
absence of motive in a case of circumstantial evidence is a fact that weighs in favour of the
accused-appellant.47
3.1.2. The Appellant did not have Mens Rea to Cause Death
40. The intention makes up a part of the mens rea or mental element of an act and constitutes
as an essential element of a crime and a central aspect of criminal liability. 48 The burden of
proving the intention also lies on the prosecution.49
41. Presently, there is no evidence on record proving that the appellant intended to cause the
death of the deceased or had knowledge that the death of the deceased is likely to be caused.
The alleged confession of the appellant admitting to having caused the death of the deceased
is inadmissible as established earlier and cannot be relied upon to establish the intention of
the appellant.
42. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Stalin v State50 that, for
determining whether the accused had the required intention or knowledge that death was
likely to be caused, the nature of injury, weapon used, and the circumstances and manner in
which the injury was caused are all relevant considerations. However, in the present case
even the
46
Shivaji Chintappa Patil v State of Maharashtra (2021) 5 SCC 626.
47
Anwar Ali and Anr v The State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 116; Pannayar v State of Tamil Nadu by
Inspector of Police (2009) 9 SCC 152
48
Kartar Singh v State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569.
49
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law (12th edn, LexisNexis 2014) 96-97
29
50
(2020) 9 SCC 524
30
trial court has denied the conviction under section 103 IPC on the ground that the appellant did
not have the requisite knowledge that the paintball pellet was likely to cause death. 51
3.2. The Essential Ingredients Under Section 103(1) of the IPC not fulfilled.
43. Given that every voluntary culpable homicide is murder unless it falls under the
exceptions outlined in the FPC, the essential ingredients of voluntary culpable homicide
under Section 100 IPC and murder under Section 101 IPC are the same.52 The essential
ingredients of Section 100 of IPC are as follows, (i) there must be death of a person; (ii) the
death should have been caused by the act or illegal omission of another person; and (iii) the
act or omission causing death should have been done with: (a) the intention of causing death;
or (b) with knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.53
44. The prosecution-respondent has not conclusively proved beyond reasonable doubt that
there was mens rea on part of the appellant, either in the form of motive or intention as
established in Part 3.1. Thus, the ingredient of intention to cause death is not satisfied.
45. In the case of Naga Po Nyein 54 the accused was not held liable for murder as the weapon
could not be said to be a formidable one and the intention to kill could not be presumed. In
the present case, the facts are strikingly similar. The weapon involved, a paintball gun, is not
inherently lethal or formidable enough to lead to a presumption of intention to kill..
46. Since the paintball gun is not a deadly weapon and no conclusive proof has been
presented that it was used with the intent to cause harm, it cannot be presumed that the
intention to kill existed. Given that there is no concrete evidence of the appellant’s motive or
mens rea, and in light of the weapon’s non-lethal nature, it would be unreasonable to infer
that the intention to kill existed in the present case, similar to the ruling in Naga Po Nyein.
47. In the absence of clear proof of intent to kill, motive, and mens rea, the prosecution
cannot rely on mere presumptions. The lack of a formidable weapon and the absence of clear
intention to kill should lead to the same conclusion of not holding the appellant liable for
murder.
51
Statement of facts para 20
52
The Ionian Penal Code, s 101
53
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 465
54
AIR 1933 Rang. 338
31
48. The counsel for the appellant respectfully contends before this Hon’ble Court that the
conviction under Section 189(4) of the IPC is unwarranted. This is due to the absence of
sufficient evidence proving the appellant's participation in an unlawful assembly and the
failure to establish that the appellant was armed with any deadly weapon.
55
The Ionian Penal Code, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023) s 189
32
state that the appellant was among them.56 The mere fact that others wore similar t-shirts
does not directly imply the appellant’s involvement in the unlawful assembly. The appellant
also clarified on television that the #Lokina slogan was used by a new pro-independence
youth organization called Neo-MPR57, which further suggests that the appellant may have
had no direct connection with the individuals involved in the incident, particularly those
wearing the same t-shirt.
53. In the case of Baladin V. State of Uttar Pradesh58, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person member of an unlawful
assembly, unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which
would make him a member of an unlawful assembly or had intentionally joined the unlawful
assembly. Mere presence of a person in an unlawful assembly does not make him liable
unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that
object is one of those enumerated in s 189.
54. Common object is a question of fact to be determined by considering nature of arms,
nature of the assembly, behaviour of the members, etc. The evidence pertaining to
establishment of common intention must be clear and direct which clearly not a case here as
there are no records available as to any behaviour, conduct or communication of the appellant
in furtherance of the incident.
55. The Allahabad High Court in Amar Bahadur Yadav vs State of U.P.59 stated that, this
court has been very cautious in the catena of judgments that where general allegations are
made against a large number of persons the court would categorically scrutinise the evidence
and hesitate to convict the large number of persons if the evidence available on record is
vague.
56. Vague and generalized allegations against large groups must be scrutinized carefully.
Convictions cannot rest on unsubstantiated claims without specific evidence tying an
individual to the alleged unlawful act. The lack of precise evidence against the appellant
demands a cautious judicial approach.
57. Also, the Apex Court in the case of Subal Ghorai and others Vs. State of West
Bengal60, observed in para 53 that unless reasonable direct or indirect circumstances lend
assurance to the prosecution case that they shared common object of the unlawful
assembly, they cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 189 of the IPC.
56
Statement of facts para 17
57
Statement of facts para 3
58
AIR 1956 SC 181
59
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 11691 of 2023
33
60
2013(4) SCC 607
34
58. The points collectively highlight that the prosecution has failed to meet the evidentiary
requirements. Without clear proof of common object, communication, or active participation,
the appellant cannot be justifiably convicted under Section 189(4) IPC. Established legal
precedents and the insufficiency of evidence support the appellant's argument for acquittal.
61
Statement of facts para 18
62
2024 INSC 907
35
4.2.3. Doubts about the Veracity of the Recovery
63. The investigating officer admitted during cross-examination that the appellant gave a
detailed description of the weapon.63 However, this crucial information was not included in
the written statement, raising doubts about the accuracy and reliability of the recorded
procedure. The claim that the report was prepared hastily further undermines the credibility
of the recovery process, as it leaves room for procedural lapses and inconsistencies.
64. In the case Chandra Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh64, the Allahabad High Court, has
held, actually no criminal object is disclosed by the materials available on the record. The
only Object alleged was to commit a crime. No specification of the same has been disclosed.
So far as the possession of the said fire arms is concerned, it has not been proved beyond
doubts and the appellants have got acquittal.
63
Statement of facts para 18
64
1995 SCC OnLine All 364
65
Statement of facts para 9
66
(2016) 4 SCC 160
36
67
2020 SCC Online SC 741
37
68. Also, in case of Bharati Tamang v. Union of India and Ors. 68, in para 41, the Court
observed that in case of deficient / unsatisfactory investigation, it is the duty of the Courts to
ensure effective conduct of prosecution and the Courts have powers to direct re-investigation
in exceptional circumstances in case it warrants due to deficient / unsatisfactory investigation.
69. The lack of corroborative evidence, procedural lapses, and speculative nature of the
allegations highlight the inadequacy of the investigation. In light of these deficiencies, the
Hon’ble Court is urged to reject the findings of the investigation and consider re-investigation
to ensure justice is served.
68
(2013) 15 SCC 578
38