Judgement on the Pleadings (Section 34)

1. Subunun vs. Go G.R. No. 163280 February 2, 2010

2. Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 156304 October 23,
2006
3. Diman vs. Alumbres GR No. 131466
4. Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank GR. No. 202597
5. GR No. 199687

Summary Judgement (Rule 35)

1. Ontimare vs. Elep GR. 159224

2. G.R. No. 153827 April 25, 2006
3. G.R. No. 178899 November 15, 2010

Judgments, Final Orders, and Entry (Rule 36)

1. G.R. No. 107345 January 27, 1994

2. G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988
3. G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.
4. G.R. No. 107302 & 107306 June 10, 1997
5. G.R. No. 79425. April 17, 1989
6. G.R. No. 59284. January 12, 1990
7. G.R. No. 150134 October 31, 2007
8. G.R. NO. 161777 : May 7, 2008
9. G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012
10. G.R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016

Subunun vs. Go G.R. No. 163280 February 2, 2010

Facts:
Doris U. Sunbanun, the petitioner, owns a residential house in Cebu City,
which she leased to Aurora B. Go, the respondent, on 7 July 1995 for one
year. The lease required a deposit of ₱16,000, and respondent sublet part of
the house to lodgers, earning ₱15,000 per month. In March 1996, petitioner
forced the lodgers to leave, stating the lease would end on 7 July 1996.
Respondent filed a lawsuit against petitioner in May 1996, claiming loss of
income from the lodgers (₱45,000) and additional travel expenses due to her
job in Hong Kong.

Petitioner defended by arguing that respondent violated the lease by

subletting the property and that the lease expired in July 1996, meaning
respondent had no right to stay. The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent, stating that the lease allowed for lodgers and that petitioner
wrongfully evicted them. The court awarded ₱45,000 in damages and ₱8,000
in attorney's fees.

Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the decision, ordering
petitioner to pay ₱45,000 in actual damages, ₱50,000 in moral damages,
₱50,000 in exemplary damages, ₱8,000 in attorney’s fees, and the cost of
the suit. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner’s early eviction of
respondent’s lodgers without valid reason breached the lease contract,
violated the Civil Code, and showed bad faith and oppressive conduct.

Issue:
I. WON the court of appeals erred in affirming the award of actual
damages by the trial court.

Ruling:
The petition is found to be without merit. In this case, the trial court rendered
a judgment on the pleadings based on the motion filed by the petitioner,
Doris U. Sunbanun, who argued that the only dispute was the interpretation
of the lease contract. The trial court ruled without the need for further
evidence because both parties agreed to submit the case for judgment on
the pleadings.

The court concluded that petitioner’s actions in ejecting respondent Aurora

B. Go's lodgers three months before the lease’s expiration, without valid
reason, violated the terms of the lease. The lease allowed respondent to
sublet the property, which included using it as a lodging house. Petitioner’s
actions led to respondent losing income, justifying the award of ₱45,000 in
actual damages.

The court also sustained the award of moral damages to respondent.

Petitioner’s act of ejecting the lodgers in bad faith—without informing
respondent, who was working in Hong Kong—constituted an injury contrary
to good customs and public policy, justifying the moral damages under
Articles 21, 2219, and 2220 of the Civil Code.

Additionally, the court upheld the award of exemplary damages and

attorney’s fees, reasoning that petitioner’s conduct was oppressive and done
with bad faith, which warranted such awards under Article 2232 of the Civil
Code. Thus, the court affirmed all the damages and fees awarded to the
respondent.

Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 156304 October

23, 2006
Facts:
The petitioners, co-owners of a 60.8544-hectare rice land in Bulacan, filed a
complaint in 1993 to determine and receive just compensation for the land,
which was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No.
27 (P.D. No. 27) in 1972. They claimed no payments had been made and
sought ₱6,000,000 in compensation. Various parties, including the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank, argued that
jurisdiction over the case belonged to the DAR and that compensation should
be based on P.D. No. 27.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint in 1994,
ruling that just compensation should be determined by the DAR. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was partially granted,
and the case was archived until primary determination of compensation was
made. The petitioners then filed with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
but the case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. The RTC then
reopened the case, and after pre-trial, the parties agreed that the central
issue was whether the compensation should be determined under P.D. No.
27 or Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. No. 6657).

In February 1998, the RTC rendered a judgment on the pleadings, concluding

that just compensation should be based on the land's value at the time of its
acquisition in 1972 under P.D. No. 27, as the property was acquired through
the land reform program established by the decree. The RTC ruled that there
were no factual disputes between the parties, and the case was decided
based on the legal interpretation of the applicable law. The case was
dismissed.

The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),

requesting the case to be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings to
determine the just and fair market value. However, on May 30, 2002, the CA
upheld the RTC's decision and dismissed the appeal. The CA also denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, which was filed late, and found no
reason to modify its decision.

Issue:
I. WON CA erred in sustaining the propriety of the motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents with the RTC.

Ruling:
I. Yes, The CA had erred in sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ruling that just compensation for the expropriated land should be
based on its value as of October 21, 1972, under Presidential
Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). The Court noted that the agrarian
reform process was still incomplete, and thus, just compensation
should be determined under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657
 (R.A. No. 6657), which supersedes P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228. This decision aligns with a more recent ruling (Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Natividad) that just compensation should be
assessed under R.A. No. 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27, due to
delays in the compensation process.

The Court also criticized the RTC for dismissing the petitioners’ case
after deciding which law should apply, instead of proceeding with
determining the just compensation. The petitioners had already
faced a back-and-forth between the RTC and the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), with no resolution of their claims.

As a result, the Court remanded the case to the RTC for the final
determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, to ensure
that the petitioners are not left without recourse, as their property
had been expropriated long ago, and the farmer-beneficiaries have
already been enjoying its produce.

Diman vs. Alumbres GR No. 131466

Facts:
This case involves a complex legal dispute between the Heirs of Veronica V.
Moreno Lacalle (petitioners) and the Diman family (respondents) over
ownership of a parcel of land in Las Piñas. The petitioners filed a complaint
for "Quieting of Title and Damages," claiming ownership of the land, which
had allegedly been transferred to Veronica Lacalle in 1959. The Dimans,
however, disputed the Heirs' claim, asserting they held valid titles to the
property and countered that the Heirs' title was fake.

The legal proceedings were marked by several delays, motions for

extensions, and attempts by the Dimans to expedite the case using legal
tools such as summary judgment and judgment on demurrer. The Heirs
failed to respond to the Dimans' Request for Admission, leading the Dimans
to argue that the matters requested were deemed admitted. They also filed
motions for summary judgment and demurrer to evidence, asserting there
was no genuine issue in the case due to the Heirs' failure to produce
adequate evidence, particularly the original title.

The trial court initially denied the Dimans' motions for summary judgment
and demurrer to evidence, and the case proceeded. The Dimans' subsequent
petitions for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition to dismiss the case and
stop further proceedings were also denied by the Court of Appeals, which
upheld the trial court's decisions.
Issue:
I. WON the CA erred in dismissing the motions or summary judgment.

Ruling:
I. Yes, The Court criticized the trial court for failing to apply the rules
of discovery and summary judgment properly. The Heirs did not
respond to a request for admission by the Dimans, leading to the
automatic admission of facts, which the trial court ignored. The
Court pointed out that the trial court mistakenly treated the case as
one for judgment on the pleadings, instead of summary judgment,
failing to recognize that the Heirs' issues were not genuine but
fictitious. The Heirs presented insufficient evidence to support their
claim of ownership, and the trial court’s refusal to grant summary
judgment or judgment on demurrer to evidence was deemed a
grave abuse of discretion. The Court reversed the decision, annulled
the trial court's orders, and dismissed the case, with costs imposed
on the Heirs.

Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank GR. No. 202597

Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of
Appeals (CA) to nullify a decision from the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
regarding the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens. The CA scheduled a
preliminary conference and ordered the petitioners to file a pre-trial brief.
However, instead of complying, the petitioners filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance, and failed to attend
the scheduled conference.

On November 16, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, citing the petitioners'
failure to attend the pre-trial and file a pre-trial brief, as required by the
Rules of Court. The CA emphasized that pre-trial was mandatory and that
failure to comply with its requirements would lead to dismissal. The
petitioners' motions to resolve their requests before the pre-trial were
deemed improper, as it was up to the court to decide. Additionally, the
petitioners failed to follow other procedural requirements, such as providing
proof of service of their Motion for Reconsideration to the opposing party.
The CA invoked Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, noting that failure to
comply with court orders warrants dismissal.

The petitioners filed multiple motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA, including one for being filed late. This led to their appeal
to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
I. WON motions for summary judgment can be filed before the pre-
trial

Ruling:
I. Yes, The Court finds that the CA's statement was incorrect, as a
motion for summary judgment can be filed before the pre-trial.
Under Section 1, Rule 35, a party may file for summary judgment
after the pleading is served, provided it includes supporting
documents. Summary judgment is meant to expedite cases where
no material facts are in dispute. If the facts are contested, a trial is
needed.

The CA’s misunderstanding of Rule 18, Section 2(g) is clarified: it

only states that pre-trial is when a court may consider a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment if no motion was
previously filed. The pre-trial judge cannot initiate these judgments
without a motion.

The court however finds that the petitioners wrongly argue that the
pre-trial appearance was not mandatory due to amendments in
2004. Administrative Circular No. 3-99 and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC still
stress the mandatory nature of pre-trial. Failure to appear results in
dismissal or default judgment.

Pacific Rehouse Corporation v. Court Of Appeals G.R. No. 199687

Facts:
This case involves a dispute between Pacific Rehouse Corporation, Pacific
Concorde Corporation, Mizpah Holdings, Inc., Forum Holdings Corporation,
and East Asia Oil Company, Inc. (petitioners) and Export and Industry Bank,
Inc. (Export Bank) over the unauthorized sale of DMCI shares by EIB
Securities, Inc. (E-Securities). The petitioners argued that E-Securities was an
alter ego of Export Bank, citing the fact that Export Bank owned 499,995 out
of 500,000 shares in E-Securities and had shared legal representation. They
contended that this justified piercing the corporate veil without needing
proof of fraud or illegality.

The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a preliminary injunction on October 25,

2011, halting the enforcement of the RTC orders. The petitioners challenged
this decision, but the CA, through a Special Division of Five, upheld the
injunction on December 22, 2011. The petitioners then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.

On April 26, 2012, the CA ruled in favor of Export Bank, nullifying the RTC
orders. The CA stated that ownership alone was not enough to pierce the veil
of corporate fiction. There was no evidence that Export Bank misused the
corporate structure of E-Securities, and the shared directors and officers
were not sufficient to establish that the two companies were the same entity.
As a result, the CA’s decision rendered the preliminary injunction permanent.

Issue:
I. WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting export
bank’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Ruling
I. The petitioners challenged the validity of the Court of Appeals (CA)
resolutions dated October 25, 2011, and December 22, 2011. They
argued that the October 25 resolution, which granted Export Bank a
preliminary injunction, was invalid because it lacked the
concurrence of Justice Inting. They also contended that the Special
Division of Five, which issued the December 22 resolution, was
improperly formed, as it was meant to decide cases on the merits,
not just grant injunctions.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that these issues were moot
because the CA had already rendered a final decision on the merits
of the case on April 26, 2012. As a result, the petitioners' objections
had no practical legal effect, and the petition was deemed
academic.

Ontimare vs. Elep GR. 159224

Facts:
The case involves a dispute between neighbors, Jose M. Ontimare Sr. and the
respondents, over a construction project. The respondents sought permission
to build a four-door apartment on their property, and Ontimare, who owned
the adjacent property, opposed the project. He filed a complaint with the
Building Official, citing concerns about a firewall affecting his property.

Despite Ontimare's objections, the respondents received a building permit.

On July 15, 1996, Ontimare threatened the workers with a shotgun,
preventing them from finishing a portion of the firewall. This led to water
damage in the respondents' building. The respondents filed a lawsuit for
damages.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a summary judgment ordering
Ontimare to pay damages, including compensation for unrealized income,
damage to property, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Court of
Appeals upheld the RTC decision but modified the amounts for compensatory
damages and interest.

Issue:
I. WON the summary judgment rendered by the trial court proper

Ruling:
I. No. The petitioners argue that summary judgment should only be
granted in favor of the moving party and when there is no genuine
issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages. They
contend that the summary judgment in this case was improperly
issued against the movant, Ontimare Sr., and that genuine issues of
fact existed.

In response, the respondents argue that Ontimare Sr. waived his

right to object to the summary judgment by not challenging their
motion to resolve the case on its merits. They assert that Ontimare
Sr., by moving for summary judgment, indicated he did not want a
trial.

Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court governs summary

judgments. It requires two conditions: (1) no genuine issue of
material fact, except for the amount of damages, and (2) the
moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If
there is a genuine issue that requires evidence, a summary
judgment is not appropriate.

In this case, despite the trial being conducted over two years with
the presentation of evidence from both parties, the court's decision
was labeled as a summary judgment. However, in substance, it
was considered a judgment on the merits, which means the
rules for summary judgment were not fully applicable.
Essentially, the trial court's decision can be treated as a final
judgment on the case rather than a summary judgment.

Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Philippine

Commercial International Bank, G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006

Facts:
In this case, petitioner Asian Construction and Development Corporation
(ASIAKONSTRUKT) seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming a Summary Judgment in favor of Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIBANK). PCIBANK had filed a lawsuit against
ASIAKONSTRUKT for an unpaid debt of approximately $4.5 million, secured
by deeds of assignment of receivables. PCIBANK accused ASIAKONSTRUKT of
fraudulently misappropriating the contract proceeds.

After ASIAKONSTRUKT's defenses were deemed baseless, PCIBANK filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment, which ASIAKONSTRUKT opposed, claiming
genuine issues of fact. However, ASIAKONSTRUKT failed to provide
supporting affidavits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
PCIBANK, ordering ASIAKONSTRUKT to pay the debt and attorney's fees.

ASIAKONSTRUKT appealed to the CA, which affirmed the trial court’s decision
but reduced the attorney's fees award. The CA found that no genuine factual
disputes existed and upheld the summary judgment. ASIAKONSTRUKT's
petition to reverse the decision was therefore denied.

Issue:
I. WON there is a genuine issue as to a material fact which rules out
the propriety of a Summary Judgment.

Ruling:
I. No, Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue of
material fact, except regarding the amount of damages. It is
designed to quickly resolve meritless claims or defenses, saving
time and costs of a trial. Summary judgment is appropriate when
affidavits, pleadings, and admissions show that no real issue exists,
allowing the case to be decided without a trial. A "genuine issue"
requires evidence and is not a sham or false claim.

In this case, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the lower court’s
decision to grant summary judgment. The petitioner,
ASIAKONSTRUKT, had admitted the execution and authenticity of
documents in its answer to the complaint but failed to present any
affidavits or documentary evidence to support its defenses, such as
the claimed financial hardship due to the 1997 economic crisis. It is
essential that a party contesting a summary judgment motion must
show a bona fide defense, which is plausible, arguable, and
substantial. This can be done through affidavits or other proof.
When the affidavits fail to present substantial triable issues,
summary judgment is granted.
 The CA found that the petitioner did not show a prima facie genuine
defense by failing to provide evidence supporting its claims of
financial distress. Additionally, the petitioner’s defenses appeared
contrived to delay judgment, creating a presumption that they were
not made in good faith. The petitioner also failed to file a
counterclaim for rescission of the contracts, despite asserting that it
was unable to meet its obligations due to the economic crisis. This
omission exposed the weakness of the petitioner’s position.

Even if the petitioner faced financial difficulties due to the 1997

economic crisis, it could not use this as a valid excuse to avoid its
obligations. The Court pointed out that under Articles 1266 and
1267 of the Civil Code, contracts must be honored in good faith
unless the performance becomes impossible due to no fault of the
obligor. However, these articles do not apply to obligations to
deliver goods or services (obligations to give), as was the case here.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide details on its financial

situation or how much it had received from its construction
contracts, which only it could have known. This lack of evidence
undermined the petitioner’s defense.

Thus, the CA did not commit reversible error in affirming the trial
court's decision to grant summary judgment. The court also upheld
the reduction of attorney’s fees to P1,000,000, considering that no
full trial had occurred.

WHEREFORE, the CA decision is AFFIRMED in full, and the petition is

DENIED for lack of merit.

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK v. FELIPE CHUA, G.R. No. 178899,

November 15, 2010

Facts:
In March 2002, Tomas Tan, a stockholder of CST Enterprises, Inc., filed a
derivative suit against PBB and several individuals, including Felipe Chua,
alleging that CST’s properties were fraudulently used as collateral for loans
without proper authorization. Tan claimed the loans were based on a falsified
Secretary's certificate, which purportedly authorized John Dennis Chua to
secure loans from PBB using CST's assets.

PBB filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that Chua was
liable for the loans as a co-signer on the promissory notes. The RTC ruled in
favor of PBB, ordering Chua to pay ₱75,000,000. However, Chua’s appeal
was disallowed by the RTC, and a writ of execution was issued.
Chua filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), which partially affirmed
the RTC’s decision on the appeal but found the RTC erred in issuing the writ
of execution. The CA ruled that the partial summary judgment was
interlocutory and not final, meaning it couldn’t be enforced until the main
case was resolved. The CA annulled the writ of execution and the
subsequent sale of Chua’s property, stating that the partial judgment was
not yet final.

Issue:
I. WON the CA committed an error in recalling and setting aside the
writ of execution and all the proceedings taken for its
implementation on the wrong notion that the partial summary
judgment has not become final and executory.

Ruling:
I. No, under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines. A
summary judgment allows a court to resolve a case without a full
trial if the facts are undisputed, but a partial summary judgment
only resolves certain issues, leaving others for trial. In this case,
PBB (Philippine Business Bank) sought a partial summary judgment
against Felipe Chua, seeking payment for promissory notes Chua
had signed. However, the court ruled that the judgment was
interlocutory, as it did not resolve all issues in the case, such as the
authority of Chua to sign the notes on behalf of CST Enterprises.

PBB argued that Chua’s liability was clear and unaffected by the
resolution of the broader case, but the court disagreed, stating that
the partial judgment did not dispose of the entire case. It also
clarified that certiorari was not the proper remedy to challenge a
partial summary judgment; instead, an appeal should be made once
all issues are resolved.

Ultimately, the court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals,

confirming that the partial judgment was interlocutory and not final,
and that it could not be executed until the case was fully resolved.

BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND WILSON SIY,

G.R. No. 107345 January 27, 1994

Facts:
This case revolves around a petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
decision, which upheld a trial court order in a replevin case between BA
Finance Corporation and Yanky Hardware Co., Inc.. On 15 June 1976, Yanky
Hardware secured a credit accommodation from BA Finance Corporation,
which was guaranteed by a chattel mortgage and a continuing suretyship
agreement by Yanky’s president. Over time, Yanky defaulted on its
obligations, leading BA Finance to demand payment or the delivery of the
mortgaged goods. In October 1981, BA Finance filed a replevin case to seize
the chattels and enforce payment of P559,565. After a series of events
involving public auction and disputes over the delivery of goods, Wilson Siy
emerged as the highest bidder at a second auction in May 1984. However,
issues arose regarding the delivery of the mortgaged properties to Siy,
leading to multiple court orders and motions for reconsideration.

The trial court, after a commissioner’s report and further legal proceedings,
ordered BA Finance to deliver the remaining properties to Siy or pay their
equivalent value. BA Finance appealed the decision, but the trial court
disapproved its notice of appeal due to late filing. BA Finance then filed a
petition for mandamus and certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the trial court's
decision.

Issues:
I. WON the auction, was legally conducted, specifically questioning its
adequacy and regularity..

Ruling:
I. Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals, which upheld the trial court's order requiring BA Finance
Corporation to deliver certain properties to Wilson Siy, the highest
bidder at an auction sale.

Petitioner argued that the 20 June 1984 order was interlocutory and
should be appealed along with the final order. However, the Court
found that the 20 June 1984 order was superseded by a subsequent
final order on 28 June 1984, which addressed the delivery of the
auctioned properties. Since petitioner failed to appeal this final
order, it could no longer question the validity of Siy’s intervention or
the auction sale. Additionally, the Court rejected petitioner’s
argument regarding irregularities in the auction process, as it had
implicitly admitted the auction's regularity by not challenging it
earlier.

Regarding the inventory discrepancy, the Court of Appeals had

ruled that the inventory from the Sheriff's Report of 5 November
1981 superseded the earlier one from 26 October 1981. Petitioner
had not objected to this report for years, and the trial court had
based its order on this updated inventory. The Supreme Court
 affirmed this conclusion, holding that the findings of the Court of
Appeals were supported by evidence, and dismissed the petition.

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. The Honorable Court

Of Appeals, G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988

Facts:
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation applied for a clearance to
operate a memorial park in Caloocan City, opposed by local residents due to
concerns about pollution. While the application was under review, Eternal
Gardens conducted an interment, leading the residents to file a complaint.
The National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) granted the clearance
with conditions but fined Eternal Gardens for the unauthorized interment.
The residents filed an appeal, but it was submitted late. The appellate court
initially granted an extension, but later dismissed the appeal as untimely.

Eternal Gardens then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
challenging the appellate court's decision to dismiss the appeal and its
jurisdiction to issue further orders while the petition was pending. The Court
required both parties to submit memoranda on whether the appeal was
timely and whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to issue resolutions
while the case was before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
I. WON the CA erred in dismissing the case while the petition is still
pending

Ruling:
I. The Supreme Court ruled that the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) acted with grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its
jurisdiction by issuing resolutions on March 27 and April 5, 1979,
after the petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
The IAC should have refrained from ruling, respecting the higher
court’s jurisdiction and ethical considerations, as the matter was
pending before the Supreme Court.

On the issue of the timeliness of the respondents' appeal, the Court

agreed with the petitioner that the appeal was filed out of time. The
respondents' appeal was based on the order dated August 22, 1978,
which was not an amendment of the previous NPCC order but
merely imposed a fine on the petitioner. After the denial of the
respondents' motion for reconsideration on August 22, they had
only one day left to file an appeal. The appeal, filed on September
8, 1978, was beyond the statutory deadline. Additionally, the
 respondents' payment of docket fees on October 2, 1978, further
delayed their appeal beyond the required period.

As a result, the Supreme Court declared that the IAC did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal, rendering its subsequent orders null
and void. The NPCC's decision from April 18, 1978, was declared
final.

3. NUÑAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.

FACTS:
Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of
private respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the late
Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court
and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the latter.

On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon
and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the
order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends
that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests,
ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable
insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said
share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She
further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
 On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing
the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of
the property

The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the
lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L.
Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property
considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in
Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and
that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded
heir to a final and executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash said
judgment?

RULING:
The Court held in the negative. The Court said that when a final
judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of
land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."

Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects

a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872
has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost
his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would
make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of
his authority.

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against

the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the
subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their
respective claims.

4. Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 107302 & 107306) June
10, 1997
Facts:
Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) is a corporation engaged in
manufacturing and processing veneer and plywood products, operating two
plants: the Butuan Logs Plant and the Stanply Plant, both located in a single
compound. The Butuan Logs Workers Union-WATU represented the rank-and-
file employees of the Butuan Logs Plant. In 1989, ITC decided to permanently
close the Butuan Logs Plant due to anticipated heavy financial losses
attributed to high production costs, erratic raw material supply, and
depressed market conditions. On November 9, 1989, ITC notified its
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the
impending closure effective December 10, 1989.
Following the notice, the employees, through their union, filed a formal
objection, leading to failed conciliation proceedings. ITC subsequently offered
separation pay and other benefits to the employees, of which only 63
accepted. On November 29, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike, which
culminated in a strike vote on December 17, 1989, where 62 out of 173
members voted in favor of the strike. The Butuan Logs Plant ceased
operations on December 10, 1989, and the Union staged a strike at the
common gate of both plants on January 14, 1990.
On January 18, 1990, the Union filed a complaint for illegal shutdown against
ITC, seeking reinstatement and back wages, while ITC filed a complaint for
illegal strike against the Union. The labor arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing the Union's complaint for illegal shutdown but ordered ITC to pay
separation pay and CBA benefits to employees who did not accept
separation. The strike was declared illegal.
The Union appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
which reversed the labor arbiter's decision, declaring ITC guilty of illegal
shutdown and the Union's strike as lawful. ITC's motion for reconsideration
was denied, prompting ITC to file a petition for certiorari.
Legal Issues:
1. Whether ITC was guilty of illegal shutdown of the Butuan Logs Plant.
2. Whether the Union and its members were guilty of staging an illegal
strike.
3. Whether money claims should be awarded to the Union members.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found merit in ITC's petition. It reiterated that the burden
of proof for a legitimate closure lies with the employer, which ITC satisfied by
presenting evidence of impending financial losses. The Court emphasized
that an employer has the prerogative to close operations for economic
reasons, provided they comply with legal requirements, which ITC did.
Regarding the strike, the Court upheld the labor arbiter's findings that the
Union did not meet the majority vote requirement for a valid strike and that
the actions taken during the strike were illegal. The Court noted
inconsistencies in the Union's position regarding the legality of the strike and
the status of its members.
The Court reversed the NLRC's resolutions, reinstating the labor arbiter's
decision and remanding the case to the NLRC to determine which employees
were entitled to separation pay and benefits.

5. G.R. No. 79425. Esquivel vs. Alegre, G.R. No. 74339, 254 Phil. 316
(1989) April 17, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Cresenciana Atun Esquivel and Lamberto Esquivel initiated
an ejectment case in the City Court of Legaspi City (Civil Case No. 990)
against respondents Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno, claiming the
right to possession of a 205-square meter parcel of land known as Lot No.
57.
The City Court ruled in favor of petitioners, ordering respondents to
vacate the property. Respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance
(CFI), which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals (CA)
further affirmed the CFI’s ruling, and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld it,
making the decision final and executory on July 25, 1973.
 Before the final decision was executed, petitioners filed Civil Case No.
4883 on August 24, 1973, seeking reconveyance, nullity of judgment,
damages, and a preliminary injunction. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court to set
aside the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Both parties agreed to let
Civil Case No. 4883 be tried on the merits, as recorded in a Joint
Manifestation.
On October 29, 1975, the CFI dismissed Civil Case No. 4883 and
dissolved the preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal, but
the process was delayed.
Respondents Alaurin and Magno sold the property to Wilfredo and
Patrocinia Encinas. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental complaint.
The court declared Encinas as successors-in-interest, binding them to the
judgment on the appealed case.
The CA dismissed the petition of Encinas on November 18, 1982. When
petitioners’ appeal in Civil Case No. 4883 was reviewed, the CA affirmed the
CFI’s dismissal on March 10, 1986. Petitioners challenged the CA decision to
the Supreme Court, resulting in a denied petition on July 2, 1986, and denial
of reconsideration on September 17, 1986.
Petitioners filed for execution, claiming to be the prevailing party
based on the supplemental complaint. The court initially granted the writ but
later restrained petitioners based on respondents’ motion.
Respondents filed for contempt against petitioners, resulting in an
additional restraining order and police enforcement. Petitioners’ subsequent
motions for reconveyance and possession were denied on July 21, 1987, and
August 6, 1987.
Issues:
1. Whether the supplemental complaint judgment modified the original
complaint judgment.
2. Whether petitioners were entitled to possession of the property
based on the agreements and subsequent judgments.
3. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners’ motion for reconveyance and vacating the
premises.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the supplemental complaint did not
modify the original judgment. The supplemental decision declaring
Encinas as successors-in-interest was to ensure they were bound by
the final outcome of the initial litigation, not to amend or supersede
the original judgment.
2. The Court held that the original judgment from Civil Case No. 4883
was conclusive, citing the principles of res judicata. The CFI’s affirming
 decision, upheld by higher courts, resolved the issue of possession in
favor of respondents. Thus, reconveyance or reassignment of
possession to petitioners was unwarranted.
3. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court. The decisions to deny petitioners’ motions and uphold the
restraining order were in line with previous judgments affirming
respondents’ possession rights.
Doctrine:
– Res Judicata: Once a final judgment has been rendered by a competent
court, it becomes conclusive on issues directly litigated in that case.
– Execution of Judgment: The prevailing party is entitled to execution as a
matter of right, which is a ministerial duty of the court mandated by law
(Nunez v. Court of Appeals).
Notes:
– Res Judicata: Essential in preventing re-litigation of settled issues. It
ensures legal stability and respect for judicial decisions.
– Ministerial Duty of Execution: When a judgment becomes final, the
prevailing party can request its execution, and the court is obliged to enforce
it.
– Supplemental vs. Amended Judgments: Understand the distinction; a
supplemental judgment complements the original without superseding it,
while an amended judgment is a new decision replacing the original.

6. G.R. No. 59284. Juanito Cardoza vs. Hon. Pablo S. Singson, et al.
January 12, 1990

Facts:

Plaintiffs Juana Corollo, et al. filed Civil Case No. 1853 against Juan
Cardoza and others, seeking recovery of certain parcels of land.
– The Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte ruled on February 7, 1938,
granting the plaintiffs the right to half of parcels A, B, C, and D and
dismissing claims to other parcels.
The decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals on December 6,
1939, modified and affirmed the original ruling.
 For unclear reasons, the plaintiffs, represented by Atty. Adelino B.
Sitoy, only became aware of the Court of Appeals’ decision on November 11,
1974.
After discovering that there was no recorded entry of judgment, they
sought a writ of execution.
Plaintiffs moved for execution on August 29, 1979, arguing that the
judgment from decades ago had never been officially entered.
The court directed both parties to submit memoranda, and plaintiffs
complied, but the defendants did not respond or submit any documentation.
On July 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order for a nunc pro tunc
judgment to reflect the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered a writ of
execution. A writ of execution was issued on July 21, 1981 and served to the
parties on July 29-30, 1981.
Juanito Cardoza’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on July 31,
1981, which temporarily halted the writ’s implementation.
The heirs of the original defendants filed a manifestation that they had no
objection to the nunc pro tunc judgment.
The trial court reinstated its order and issued an alias writ of execution on
October 14, 1981.
The writ was executed on November 11, 1981, and properties were
turned over to the plaintiffs. Juanito Cardoza was summoned to explain
alleged contempt of court on November 26, 1981.
On January 8, 1982, Juanito Cardoza filed for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition, with preliminary injunction, arguing improper jurisdiction and
mishandling of nunc pro tunc judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether the decision of the trial court as modified by the Court of Appeals
can still be enforced after so many years.
2. Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in making
the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issuing the writ of execution.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court held that the judgment can indeed be enforced. Under
Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), the five-
year period for execution starts from the entry of judgment, not its
promulgation. As no entry of judgment was recorded at the appellate or
lower court levels, the presumption of regularity does not apply.
2. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s issuance of a
nunc pro tunc judgment. The order merely aimed to record the decision that
was already rendered by the Court of Appeals.
The lower court acted within its equity-based jurisdiction, a principle also
recognized in Lichauco v. Tan Pho (51 Phil. 862).
Petitioner was allowed due process as he could present opposition and failed
to substantiate claims over the properties.
Doctrine:
– Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment:
 When an order or judgment should have been entered earlier but
wasn’t due to administrative errors, a court can issue a nunc pro tunc (now
for then) judgment to correct the record. This principle aims to ensure the
historical accuracy of court records.
– Final and Executory Judgment:
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be
amended or corrected by the court, except for clerical errors, invoking the
doctrine that jurisdiction over the matter ceases except for execution
purposes.
Notes:
– Nunc Pro Tunc Judgments: Allows the court to rectify the record to reflect
past judgments accurately. Courts have discretion to issue such orders to
prevent administrative oversights from impacting legal rights.
– Execution of Judgments: Under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190),
the period for executing judgments starts upon the entry of judgment, not its
announcement. Section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure encapsulates this
rule. The judgment must be executed within five years of its entry unless
stated otherwise.

7. G.R. No. 150134 Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Company
October 31, 2007
Facts:
May 21, 1974, Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) entered a loan
agreement with Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP),
securing a loan of US $265,000 and P2.5 million, totaling around P4.4 million.
The loans were secured by real estate and chattel mortgages.
Payments made amounted to P3 million applied to interest, service fees, and
penalties, leaving a balance calculated by PDCP of over P10 million as of May
15, 1983.
 On March 31, 1982, DATICOR filed a complaint against PDCP for
violation of the Usury Law which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance
(CFI).
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) overturned the CFI’s decision,
voiding the interest stipulation. PDCP appealed to the Supreme Court (SC),
docketed as G.R. No. 73198.
During the litigation, PDCP assigned part of its receivables from
DATICOR to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) for P5,435,000.
DATICOR and FEBTC executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on
December 8, 1988, where DATICOR paid FEBTC P6.4 million as settlement.
SC’s Decision in G.R. No. 73198 found only P1.4 million due after
deducting prior payments, implying an overpayment of P5.3 million.
On April 25, 1994, DATICOR filed a complaint claiming the excess of
P4.335 million from PDCP and P965,000 from FEBTC.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati ruled for DATICOR to recover
P4.035 million from PDCP. This decision was appealed, and the Court of
Appeals (CA) held that PDCP should release mortgages, and FEBTC should
refund P965,000 (only).
Petitioners then filed Civil Case No. 00-540 in RTC Makati to recover
the balance (P4.335 million) from FEBTC. And, Motion for Summary
Judgment, DENIED.
The trial court dismissed the case on grounds of res judicata and
splitting of cause of action. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether the complaint is dismissible on the grounds of res judicata and
splitting of a cause of action.
2. Whether FEBTC can be held liable for the balance of the overpayment of
P4.335 million.
3. Whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of
Assignment and MOA regarding the non-effect of the Supreme Court’s
decision in G.R. No. 73198 on the receivables.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal on the grounds of res
judicata, asserting that this doctrine precludes re-litigating issues that have
already been settled by a competent court and to prevent the splitting of a
single cause of action among multiple suits. The final CA decision effectively
adjudicated all relevant claims.
2. The Supreme Court found res judicata applicable and upheld the ruling
that petitioners cannot re-claim amounts from FEBTC as the matter
(P965,000) had been conclusively resolved in the previous case (CA-G.R. CV
No. 50591).
3. The decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was final and established that PDCP
had no further liability. Therefore, additional claims against PDCP in this
context were unwarranted and rightly barred.

Doctrine:
1. **Res Judicata:** When a final judgment is rendered by a competent court,
it bars subsequent actions involving the same parties on the same cause of
action or any matter that could have been raised in the first instance.
2. **Splitting of Cause of Action:** A single cause of action cannot be split
into multiple claims and litigated piecemeal in successive suits.

Notes:
– Res Judicata: Under Rule 39, Sec. 47, once a court renders a final decision
on the merits, the parties cannot re-litigate the same issues or any claims
that could have been brought up in the first action.
– Splitting Cause of Action: Per Rule 2, Sec. 4, dividing an indivisible cause of
action into multiple claims is prohibited, highlighting the importance of
bringing all claims in one comprehensive case.

8. G.R. NO. 161777 : (DOMINIC GRIFFITH, vs. ANGELITO ESTUR,

JUAN OFALSA, and ROLANDO EREVE) May 7, 2008
Facts:
On 25 July 1997, respondents Angelito Estur, Juan Ofalsa, and Rolando Ereve
(respondents) filed an amended complaint[3] for illegal dismissal,
nonpayment of legal holiday pay, 13 th month pay, and service incentive
leave pay against Lincoln Gerald, Inc. (Lincoln) and petitioner Dominic
Griffith (petitioner).

Lincoln, a corporation owned by the Griffith family, is engaged in the

manufacture of furniture. Respondents alleged that petitioner, the Vice
President for Southeast Asia Operations, managed the corporation.

On 4 October 1999, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen (Labor Arbiter

Layawen) decided the case in favor of respondents.
Lincoln filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 1999 but failed to file the
required memorandum of appeal. On 6 July 2001, the decision of Labor
Arbiter Layawen became final and executory, and the first writ of execution
was issued on 2 October 2001.

In February 2002, petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of

execution dated 7 January 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno (Labor
Arbiter Reyno) directed against him and Lincoln.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Labor
Arbiter's order. The appellate court cited Section 19, Rule V of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC (NLRC Rules) which prohibits motions for
reconsideration of any order or decision of a Labor Arbiter. However, when a
motion for reconsideration is filed, it shall be treated as an appeal provided
that it complies with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. The Court of
Appeals held that petitioner's motion to recall the first alias writ of execution
cannot be treated as an appeal.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that the addition of the execution
fee did not modify the decision because the NLRC Rules and the NLRC
Manual on Execution of Judgment (Sheriff Manual) provide for the inclusion of
the execution fee which shall be collected from the losing party.

Issue:
The sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
order of Labor Arbiter Reyno, denying the motion to quash the writ.

The issue revolves on the validity of the first alias writ of execution dated 7
January 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Reyno.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the 4 October 1999 decision of Labor
Arbiter Layawen, finding Lincoln and petitioner solidarily liable to
respondents, became final and executory on 6 July 2001. Petitioner,
however, persists in challenging Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision by
insisting that the judgment debt should have been the sole liability of
Lincoln. Petitioner maintains that the writ is defective because it makes him
personally liable for the judgment debt even though he was only a corporate
officer acting in good faith and within the bounds of his authority. The
inclusion of petitioner in the writ as solidarily liable with Lincoln for the
backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay of respondents does not
make the writ defective. On the contrary, the writ is in accord with the terms
of Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision which the writ seeks to enforce.

Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision is already final and executory and can no
longer be the subject of an appeal. Thus, petitioner is bound by the decision
and can no longer impugn the same.[8] Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a
decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. [9] The
doctrine of finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:[10]

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time
fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to
naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement
of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.[11]
While petitioner can no longer challenge the decision which has become final
and executory, he can question the manner of its execution especially if it is
not in accord with the tenor and terms of the judgment. [12] As held in Abbott
v. NLRC:[13]

In Sawit v. Rodas and Daquis v. Bustos, we held that a judgment becomes

final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration.
Accordingly, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation,
the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution; and
issuance thereof is a ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.

In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the

decision itself but the manner of its execution. There is a big difference.
While it is true that the decision itself has become final and executory and so
can no longer be challenged, there is no question either that it must be
enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any deviation
therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal. [14]
In his motion to quash the writ, petitioner alleged that the writ was a nullity
because it modified the 4 October 1999 decision of Labor Arbiter Layawen by
including the amount of the execution fee in the writ.

The inclusion of the execution fee is not a modification of the Labor Arbiter's
decision. Section 6, Rule IX of the Sheriff Manual provides that the execution
fee shall be charged against the losing party, thus:

SECTION 6. Sheriffs/Execution Fees. - Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall be

provided at the beginning of the month with a cash advance of five hundred
pesos only (P500.00) for transportation expenses which shall be liquidated at
the end of the month with a statement of expenses and itinerary of travel
duly approved by the Commission or Labor Arbiter issuing the writ.

In the National Labor Relations Commission, the sheriff or duly

designated officer shall collect the following execution fees which
shall be charged against the losing party:

(1) For awards less than P5,000.00 - P200.00;

(2) P5,000.00 or more but less than P20,000.00 - P400.00;
(3) P20,000.00 or more but less than P50,000.00 - P600.00;
(4) P50,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 - P800.00;
(5) P100,000.00 or more but not exceeding P150,000.00 - P1,000.00;
(6) P150,000.00 the fee is plus P10.00 for every P1,000.00 in excess of
P150,000.00.
The sheriff or duly designated officer shall be administratively liable
in case of failure to collect the execution fees without any justifiable
reason. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the inclusion of the execution fee does not make the writ of
execution defective.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24

September 2003 and the Resolution dated 16 January 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73663.

SO ORDERED.
9. SHIMIZU v MAGSALIN, G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012
FACTS:
The petitioner claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business as
"Karen's Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply,
delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the
petitioner's Makati City condominium project. The breach triggered the
agreement's termination. When Magsalin also refused to return the
petitioner's unliquidated advance payment and to account for other
monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to
respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding damages
pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the
subcontract. The petitioner filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU
Insurance. The complaint sought to collect P2,329,124.66 as actual damages
for the breach of contract.
FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to
Magsalin, however, the corresponding officer’s address declared that both
she and "Karen's Trading" could not be located at their given addresses, and
that despite further efforts, their new addresses could not be determined. In
an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, the
petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin
by way of publication. Thereafter, the petitioner filed its reply to FGU
Insurance's answer. FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a
third-party complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint,
with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as
third-party defendants. The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and
denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the
action against respondent Magsalin was in personam. Baetiong filed his
answer to the thirdparty complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about
the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin.
The petitioner now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is the
plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve
summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by
publication should have been filed for this purpose. The petitioner also
asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the
status of the summons to the third-party defendants. The RTC dismissed the
case. The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and
denied as well the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal order of the RTC is valid.

RULING:
No. The Dismissal Order is Void. The nullity of the dismissal order is
patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the
facts on which this conclusion is based.
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and,
as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of actions
(under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or
without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]" As a prejudicial dismissal,
the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on
the merits so that the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no
longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is
unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. As
an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order
conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid
judgments and final orders. The rule states: RULE 36 Judgments, Final Orders
and Entry Thereof. Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A
judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its
failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its
complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to
know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had
the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed
to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an
unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any
order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not
say. We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal
orders similar to that appealed in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. A trial court should
always specify the reasons for a complaint's dismissal so that on appeal, the
reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the
dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in
seeking a review by a higher tribunal. We thus agree with the petitioner that
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a denial of due process.

10. G.R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016

Facts:
 Elpidio Magno and the heirs of Isidro M. Cabatic filed a petition against
Lorenzo Magno and other respondents, heirs of Nicolas Magno. The dispute
involves the partition of properties left by Nicolas Magno, who died intestate
in 1907.
Petitioners are successors of Doroteo Magno, Nicolas's legitimate child
from his first marriage. Respondents are successors of Nicetas, Gavino, and
Nazaria Magno, legitimate children from Nicolas's second marriage. An
Amended Complaint was filed on January 30, 1964, in the Court of First
Instance of Alaminos, Pangasinan, seeking property partition.
The trial court granted the complaint on October 5, 1972, but omitted
certain properties from its decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision on June 30, 1981, also omitting the properties in question.
In 1990, a new complaint for partition, accounting, and damages was
filed, claiming omitted properties. Respondents moved to dismiss, citing res
judicata due to the finality of the earlier decision.
The Regional Trial Court denied the motion but later ruled in favor of the
petitioners on November 15, 2007. The Court of Appeals reversed this
decision on July 23, 2012, leading to the current petition.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the partition and distribution of
the disputed land.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, granting the
partition and distribution of the land as part of the estate of the late Aurora
Magno.