Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2000 > August 2000 Decisions > A.C. No. 5307
August 9, 2000 - IN RE: VICENTE Y. BAYANI:

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000.]

IN RE: VICENTE Y. BAYANI.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

The case before us arose when Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani failed to submit proof of service of the
appellant’s brief on the Solicitor General in G. R. No. 115079 1 and the consequent inability of
the latter to file the appellee’s brief.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On August 09, 1999, the Supreme Court referred Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit the procedural
requirement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. 2

On September 27, 1999, IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes sent a letter to
Atty. Bayani requiring him to submit his comment within five (5) days from receipt of the letter.
3

However, the letter was returned to the IBP with the notation "Return to Sender-Moved." 4

Thus, in her report and recommendation dated January 25, 2000, Commissioner Gonzalez-De
Los Reyes recommended Atty. Bayani’s suspension as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned Commissioner recommends that Atty.
Vicente Bayani, for his violation of Rule 18.03 of the Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, be SUSPENDED from the practice of the law profession for a period of three (3)
months and until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court." 5

On March 18, 2000, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner. 6

We concur.

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. 7

Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of appellant’s brief on the Solicitor General in
G. R. No. 115079 and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience
to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional
ethics.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection required of a member of the
Bar. A counsel must always remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. 8
A lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation.

Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure,
and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to his client’s cause. 9

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani remiss in his sworn duty to his client, to
the Court and the Bar. He is thus SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months and until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the
required proof of service in G. R. No. 115079.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as
a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with copies thereof and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban Quisumbing, Purisima,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

Endnotes:

1. Entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco Albior.

2. Rollo, p. 2.

3. Rollo, p. 1.

4. Rollo, p. 5.

5. In CBD Case No. 00-689, Rollo, pp. 8-10.

6. Rollo, p. 7.

7. Rule 18.03, Canon of Professional Responsibility; Villaluz v. Armenta, 285 SCRA 1 [1998].

8. Torres v. Orden, A.C. No. 4646, April 6, 2000, citing Gerard v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 701
[1990]; Diaz-Duarte v. Ong, 298 SCRA 388 [1998]; Kalubiran v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
320 [1998]; Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 539 [1999].

9. Torres v. Orden, supra, citing Vda. De Alisbo v. Jalandoon, Sr. 199 SCRA 321 [1991].

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2000 > August 2000 Decisions > A.C. No. 4282
August 24, 2000 - TEODULFO B. BASAS v. MIGUEL I. ICAWAT:
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000.]

TEODULFO B. BASAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. MIGUEL I. ICAWAT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated June 25, 1994, complainant Teodulfo B. Basas alleged negligence on
the part of respondent lawyer Miguel I. Icawat in the handling of NLRC-NCR Cases No. 00-09-
05043-90, 00-11-06410-92, and 00-06-03672-93 involving complainant and several of his co-
workers.

Complainant was one of several workers who filed three separate complaints before the NLRC
against their employer, FMC Engineering and Construction, in 1992 and 1993. Respondent was
their lawyer.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

In those cases, the workers alleged that they were illegally dismissed and demanded payment of
termination pay, accrued leave benefits, 13th month pay, and moral damages. On March 21,
1994, labor arbiter Valentin C. Guanio rendered a decision in favor of FMC, after finding that
the workers were project workers whose services were validly terminated upon completion of the
projects for which they were hired. However, FMC was ordered to pay the workers’ claims for
wage differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney’s fees.

Aggrieved, the workers informed respondent that they wanted to appeal the decision. On May
23, 1994, respondent filed a notice of appeal. However, respondent did not file a memorandum
of appeal as required under the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Sensing that respondent had no
intention to file a memorandum, complainant and his co-workers asked respondent to just
withdraw from the case. Instead of withdrawing, however, respondent threatened to sue their
group and the new lawyer they would hire, said the complainant.
Complainant also claims that he and his co-workers gave respondent P280.00 for filing fee but
respondent made a receipt for only P180.00.

In his comment, respondent asserts that he filed a notice of appeal at the behest of Flutarco
Sueño, complainant in one of the labor cases. Respondent claims that herein complainant, along
with the other workers, did not wish to file an appeal since they had no money to spend.
Respondent alleges that complainant and the other workers instead asked him to withdraw from
the case, which respondent refused to do since he did not have a basis therefor and he had
already filed a notice of appeal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent argues that despite his having filed a notice of appeal, he had not received any notice
from the NLRC directing him to file an appeal brief.

On October 24, 1994, we referred this matter to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

In its report dated June 15, 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable
for negligence and unprofessional conduct for his failure to file the required memorandum of
appeal before the NLRC, and to account for all the money he received from his clients. Both are
clear violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report of the Commission, with an amendment that the fine to be imposed
against respondent be reduced to P500.00 from P1,000.00.

We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Rule VI, Section 3(a) of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief
prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order
or award and proof of service to the other party of such appeal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop
the running of the period for perfecting an appeal." (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent’s failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC Rules of
Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he did not
file the memorandum, when he claimed that "despite follow ups made [he had] not yet received
an order wherein which (sic) to file APPEAL BRIEF with the National Labor Relations
Commission." 1 His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his clients.

Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."cralaw virtua1aw library

As we reiterated in Aromin, Et. Al. v. Boncavil, A.C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999: 2

"Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the P280.00 he received from his clients — which
he later on claimed to be insufficient for an "old experienced lawyer", whether the amount be
P180.00 or P280.00 — respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

"A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to FINE Atty. Miguel I. Icawat in the amount of P500.00,
with a warning that a repetition of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with
more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, p. 59.

2. Citing Santiago v. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68, 73-74 (1995).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio city

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 2519 August 29, 2000

TEODORO R RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO,
complainants,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles
on the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint1 reads as follows:

"1. The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;

2. Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located at
Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 España, Manila;

3. That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;

4. That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriff's return, dated
November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the
defendants;

5. That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the
defendants in said cases had already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in
the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement of Judgment dated
September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22, 1982, hereto attached as
Annexes "A" and "B", respectively), without our knowledge.

6. That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he
received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;

7. That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on February
17, 1983, but as of this date the undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See Exhibit "C"
and "D" attached)."

In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he has
the right to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees due
him under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with Mrs.
Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex "8")2 or under the previous
agreement of P20% of P206,000.00.

Complainants, in their Reply,3 vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to respondent.

Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation in our Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor
General considered this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring
respondent's right to present evidence as considered waived due to the latter's failure to appear on
the scheduled hearings. However, the records from said Office do not show any resolution.

In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether supervening
events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise. The copy of said
Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30, 1998 while the copy
to the respondent was returned unclaimed.

Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding
respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a
resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:

"RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151

Adm. Case No. 2519

Teodoro R Rivera, et al. vs.

Atty. Sergio Angeles

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment
that Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his
having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client."
The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Respondent's act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his
sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and
good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession.4 For it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.5 1âwphi1

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in
litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.

This Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes:

1 Rollo, p. 1.

2 Annex "7", Unsigned Deed of Assignment; Rollo, p. 45.

3 Reply, Rollo, pp. 62 and 88.

4 Fernandez v. Grecia, A.C. No. 3694, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 425.

5 Busiños v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 407.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.

VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's
"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is
one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that
he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by
the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965),
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is
not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in
the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid
down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main
decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one
of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration
as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of
time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed
from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act;
and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for
decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor
and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and
public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave
to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in
thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with
NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to
our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face
you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak
the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in
thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons
for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to
tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have
been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for
certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge
its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within
the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would
be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of
the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for
this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew —
or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period
of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction
& Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections
4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless
piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time
and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear
that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he
loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to
public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court
are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations.
10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry
of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts
and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all
to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly
stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to
be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board
of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips
of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court,
72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline
and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26,
1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made
by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from
the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language,
and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their
integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate
and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized
suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the
court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not
appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.
The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other
citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him,
or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners,
it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives
and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of
a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself,
as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and
wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if
any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity.
Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does
not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from
his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights
of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed.
646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal
insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case,
as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions
which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law
in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter
case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408;
People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14,
36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it
our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months
for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister
influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts
of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates
that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to
go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as
"a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding
him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court,
blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is
that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it
has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures
this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries.
Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of
the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of
and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and some
former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt
charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila
Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar
Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be
contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in
Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in

administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the
first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in
any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution
of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent
in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of
law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to
practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.
25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice."
And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he
caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but
to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of
all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath
and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need
therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that,
as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity
of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30
So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the
Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In
the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range
from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps
be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of
candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long
that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on
the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling
outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it
will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to
this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Court's Minute Resolution," 32 Lawyers J.
p. 325; "Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious," 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.
3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 803, 682 and 848
petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 584, 611 and 760 cases,
respectively. For the period covering the first six months of the year 1969, this Court rejected by
minute resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended decision or resolutions 279 cases.

4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967;
Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.

5 In re Gomez, supra.

6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930) ; In re Abistado 57 Phil.
668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265 (1939).
See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432;
In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959) ; In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS
2d 286; Caig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).

7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954).

8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct.,
72 N. W. 193.

9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959).

10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) ; In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-
18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl.
723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E.
194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28
Am. Dec. 657.

11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep.
747; Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v. State,
29 So. 2d 918; Medgar Evers v. State, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.

12 "A judge as a public official," said Justice Thornal in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, "is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office."

13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: "The harsh and sometimes unfounded criticism of the members
of any of the three branches of our Government may be unfortunate lot of public officials ..., but
it has always been deemed a basic principle that such comment may be made by the public ... .
Nor should the judicial branch ... enjoy any more enviable condition than the other two
branches."

In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said: "... an
enforced silence, however, limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench,
would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion, said: "Judges as persons, or
courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or
institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are identified with the interest of justice
they may forget their common human frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been
martinets upon the bench as there have sometimes been wielders of authority who have used the
paraphernalia of power in support of what they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be
kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream
of criticism expressed with candor however blunt "A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels
because his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked
to act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for
what he already has done." ... Courts and judges mast take their share of the gains and pains of
discussion which is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self- restraint, and by good taste.
Winds of doctrine should freely blow for the promotion of good and the correction of evil. Nor
should restrictions be permitted that cramp the feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen
regardless of the temper of the truth of what may be uttered."

14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.

15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.

16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for three years for writing
a judge a letter in which he said that the judge in signing an order took "advantage of your office
to rule with passion and vehemence." Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65, where an attorney was
disbarred for stopping a judge upon the street and addressed abusive, insulting language to him.
See also Johnson v. State, 44 So. 671; In re McCowan, 170 P. 1101; State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d
604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v. Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In
re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262
NYS 2d 349; In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.

17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In Snyder's Case, 76 ALR 666; Re
Troy, 111 A. 723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.

18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba,
Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
579; People vs. Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of Rizal, 99 Phil.
907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30, 1965;
Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775.

19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs.
Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151 Pac. 2d
1002; In re Shannon, 27 Pac. 352; State ex rel. Grice vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs.
Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13 P. 964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W.
204; Patterson vs. Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W. 212.

20 69 Phil. 265.

21 42 O.G. 59.

22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.

24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.

25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61; Griswold, "Of Time and
Attitudes," 74 Harvard Law Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United
States, (1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund, On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.

27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.

28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.

29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs. Aragona, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.

30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.

31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte
Alabama State Bar Ass'n., 8 So. 768.

32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People vs. Kelly,
285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In re
Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A. 799;
States vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783;
State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. O'Niell, 44 Atl. 2d
880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs. Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d 873; Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs.
Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law,
he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now
Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party
of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal
counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of
the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being
paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases
coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City
Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal
case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1,
87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.