Caro vs CA

Facts:

 Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin Benito were the registered co-owners pro-
indiviso of a vast tract of land covered by TCT. On January 16, 1957, Mario Benito died
intestate. In an intestate proceedings, the decedent's wife, Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito
and his father, Saturnino Benito, were appointed as co-administrators of his estate.
 On August 16,1959, Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners, sold his one-third (1/3)
undivided share to petitioner Luz Caro. Luz Caro thereafter filed before the defunct Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon, acting as a land registration court, a petition to subdivide the
land.
 On September 27,1960, upon verbal motion of Luz Caro and for reasons known only to her,
the consideration of the petition for subdivision was held in abeyance until further notice
from her. Eight years later, petitioner Luz Caro filed an ex-parte motion to set the case for
hearing, and the trial court, without notifying anybody, proceeded with the reception of
petitioner's evidence ex-parte. On even date, the trial court issued an order directing the
issuance of a separate title to Luz Caro, but holding in abeyance the issuance of certificates
of title covering the shares of Mario Benito and Alfredo Benito, for the reason that both
were then deceased and the court had not been informed as to who their legal heirs were.
 The Register of Deeds of Sorsogon issued Transfer Certificate of title No. 4978 to petitioner
Luz Caro, covering her one-third (1/3) segregated portion. Upon her motion, the then Court
of First Instance of Albay issued an order directing the administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de
Benito (private respondent herein) to deliver to Luz Caro the possession of Lot No, I-C as well
as enjoining private respondent or her representatives from gathering the produce thereof

Issue:

I. W/N the CFI of Sorsogon has jurisdiction to order directing the issuance of separate title
to Luz Caro and W/N the CFI of Albay the CFI has jurisdiction in directing private
respondent to deliver the possession and enjoyment of Lot No. I-C to Luz Caro

Ruling:

No, it did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition and/or the land sought to be subdivided for lack
of notice to all the parties in interest, as required under Section 112 of Act No. 496. Notice as
required by the above-cited statute is jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of the
authority to make a valid decree.

For the court to validly acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, the mode and
manner of service of notice is governed by Section 113 of Act No. 496, viz:

All notices required by or given in pursuance of the provision of this Act by the clerk or any
of deeds, after original registration shall be sent by mail to the person to be notified at his
residence and post-office address as stated in the certificate of title, or in any registered
instrument under which he an interest in the office of the clerk or register of deeds, relating
to the parcel of land in question .

All notices and citations directed by special order of the court under the provisions of this
Act, after original registration may be served in the manner above stated, and the certificate
 of the clerk shall be conclusive proof of such service; Provided, however, that the court may
in any case order different or further service, by publication or otherwise, and shall in all
cases do so when the interests of justice require such section.

The order of the CFI of Sorsogon being void is no order at all. It confers no right nor does it impose
any duty. "It neither binds nor bars any one." 2 All acts performed under a void order or judgments
and all claims flowing out of it are also void, for like the spring that cannot rise above its source, a
void order cannot create a valid and legally enforceable right. A fortiori the order of October 19,1968
of the CFI of Albay directing private respondent to deliver the possession and enjoyment of Lot No. I-
C to Luz Caro, is also void.

Javelosa vs CA

Facts:

 The subject land originally owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. He mortgaged it to Jesus
Jalbuena to secure several loans. Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as
mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.
 During the redemption period, Javelosa filed an action to annul mortgage contracts and
public auction sale against the mortgagee. While the case was pending, the period of
redemption prescribed. Consequently, Jalbuena consolidated title over the land, caused
the cancellation of the mortgagor’s title and the issuance of a new title in his name.
 Jalbuena also divided the subject land among his married daughters (private respondents
herein). On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was substituted by his
heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject lot was issued in the names of
private respondents.
 Private respondents demanded petitioner to vacate the area. However, he refused to do so
which prompted private respondents to file a complaint of illegal detainer in the MTC to
eject petitioner from the premises.
 The MTC decided in favor of the private respondents and ordered petitioner to vacate the
land. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision.
 In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents alleged that the RTC erred in
holding that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed out of time. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the complaint
for unlawful detainer was filed on time for the prescriptive period should be counted not
from the issuance of title in the name of paintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the
date of the last demand to vacate made against the defendant. Moreover, the fact that
private respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no
moment for prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. The Court of
Appeals thus ordered the petitioner (defendant in the ejectment case) to vacate the
premises and pay reasonable rentals.

Issue:

W/N the case filed by private respondents is an unlawful detainer cognizable under the MTC or an
accion publiciana whose jurisdiction is with the RTC

Ruling:
Yes, it is un lawful detainer case and MTC has jurisdction over it.

It is settled that jurisdiction of court over the subject matter of the litigation is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is equally settled that an error in
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the first time on appeal.
The issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar depends on the nature of the case filed by
private respondents in the MTC. If it is an unlawful detainer case, the action was
properly filed with the MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion
publiciana, jurisdiction is with the RTC and the complaint should be dismissed. To
resolve the issue, we should examine the specific allegations made by private
respondents in their complaint.
Clearly, private respondents (as plaintiffs therein) alleged in their complaint that they
are the registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled to possession
thereof; that petitioners were illegally occupying the premises without their consent
and thus unlawfully withholding possession from them; and, despite receipt of their
demand to vacate the premises, petitioner refused to leave the property. On the
face of the complaint, it also appears that private respondents were seeking to
recover merely the physical possession or posession de facto of the subject land.
Private respondents did not allege the incidents respecting the mortgage of the land
and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgage contract as the issue involved
therein is ownership which has no place in an ejectment case. In fine, the allegations
in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. We have ruled in a long line
of cases[10] that "in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is x x x sufficient for
the words `unlawfully withholding’ imply possession on the part of defendant,
which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express
or implied, possession which had later expired as a right and is being withheld by
defendant." Thus, in the case at bar, private respondents’ allegation in their
complaint that petitioner was unlawfully withholding possession of the land from
them is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer.

Tijam vs Sibonghanoy

Facts:
 A suit for collection of sum of money (1,908) was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu by sps. Tijam and tagalog against sps. Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948.
But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original
jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
 The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and thereafter issued a writ of
execution against the defendants as the judgement became final and executory. The writ
 having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond. But the Surety opposed the writ. On appeal to the
CA he never raises lack of jurisdiction as assignment of errors. It was only after the CA
rendered judgement or only after almost 15 years when motion to dismiss base on lack of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time by the Surety.

Issue:

W/N laches bars motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:

Yes, laches bars dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.

Lee vs Presiding Judge

Facts:

 Sps. Lam filed a complaint for ejectment and/or unlawful detainer against Jose P. Lee with
the City court of Legaspi on the ground that the oral contract of lease has expired and Lee
refused to vacate the property upon demand.
 Lee denied the allegations specifically on the ground that Felix Lim is the owner of the
property on the basis of CA decision
 Intervenor Lim moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that city court has no
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the complaint. However it was denied
Issue:

W/N the MTC of Legaspi has jurisdiction over the complaint of ejectment

Ruling:

Yes, the MTC of Legaspi has jurisdiction over the complaint of ejectment.
When the complaint for ejectment was filed before the respondent trial court on September 2,
1981, said court, as City Court of Legazpi City, had concurrent jurisdiction with the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in ejectment cases where the question of ownership is
involved. 'This is expressly provided for in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 which took effect
on June 21, 1969, and which reads:

SEC. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction under Section eighty-
eight of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the following:xxx

(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. The
issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court
first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts" (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552, 556
[1970], please see cases cited therein).

In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate
authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate
authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to
criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly
administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial
comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to
pre-vent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process. (14 Am.
Jur. 435-436, cited in Francisco, Vicente, Revised Rules of Court, pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.).

Furthermore, assuming that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment
case, petitioners are already estopped to raise the question of jurisdiction. As found by the City
Court (now Municipal Trial Court) the issue of ownership was formulated and raised not only in
the September 2, 1981 complaint of plaintiffs Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam but also in the
answer and rejoinder of defendant Jose Lee which were filed on September 7, 1981 and
September 23, 1981, respectively, as well as in the answer in intervention of Felix Lim which was
filed on November 12, 1981. Likewise confirmatory is defendant's admission that "the issue of
ownership over the property in question is an integral part of the main issue in the instant case as
well as the intervenor's submission that the question of possession is intimately linked with that
of ownership. (Decision, Civil Case No. 2687; Rollo, pp. 108-109). Surely, petitioners, as
defendants in Civil Case No. 2687, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed
their answer to the complaint and sought reliefs therefor; participated in the trial of the aforesaid
case; examined private respondent's witnesses; and adduced testimonial and documentary
evidence. They cannot now be allowed to belated- ly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking
the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily. While
generally, jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be conferred by consent of the parties or by
their failure to object to the lack of it, the Supreme Court, however, in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy (23
SCRA 20, 35 [1968], has declared that ... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79)."
Therefore, the respondent trial court has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it
rendered the decision dated December 19, 1983.