Globalisation Notes
Globalisation Notes
World
Idea of Justice by Amartya Sen
Chapter 2: Rawls and Beyond
● Sen begins outlining Rawls's "justice as fairness" by stating that the notion of
fairness is foundational and "prior" to the principles of justice. He agrees with Rawls
that justice is inherently linked to the idea of fairness.
● Sen explains that fairness requires avoiding bias and considering the interests of
others, essentially demanding impartiality.
● He describes Rawls's "original position" as an imagined situation of primordial
equality where individuals, unaware of their identities and interests, choose
principles of justice under a "veil of ignorance." This "selective ignorance" ensures
impartiality in choosing principles for the basic structure of society.
● Sen quotes Rawls's explanation of the original position from "A Theory of Justice"
(1971): "The original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that
the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair." This quote emphasizes the
centrality of fairness in the selection of principles of justice.
● Sen notes that Rawls, in his later work "Political Liberalism" (1993), further
elaborates on the idea of fairness as a "political conception of justice." This concept
emphasizes the importance of finding common ground for cooperation despite diverse
"comprehensive doctrines" or personal views of the good life.
● Sen explains that the Rawlsian process aims to identify principles that determine
just institutions for a society. He emphasizes the significance of the unanimous choice
in the original position, which Rawls claims will produce a single set of principles that
constitute the appropriate "political conception" of justice.
From Fairness to Justice (Paragraphs 13-19)
● Sen outlines the multi-staged process in Rawls's theory, where the choice of basic
principles of justice leads to the selection of institutions in the "constitutional" stage
and subsequent social decisions in the "legislative stage." He notes the structured and
sequential nature of this process.
● However, Sen expresses "considerable skepticism" about Rawls's claim that a
unique set of principles will emerge unanimously from the original position. He
argues that multiple, sometimes conflicting, concerns related to impartiality and fairness
exist, and there might not be a single set of principles that perfectly embodies them.
● Sen uses the example of three children arguing over a flute (mentioned in the
Introduction) to illustrate his point. Each child's claim is based on a different but
impartial principle (utility, equity, and entitlement), highlighting the plurality of unbiased
principles.
● He argues that the absence of a unique set of principles undermines the entire
"justice as fairness" theory, as the foundation for choosing just institutions would be
missing.
● Sen acknowledges that Rawls, in his later work "Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement," softens his earlier claim of a unique set of principles and concedes
that the "balance of reasons" rests on judgment.
● Despite this softening, Sen highlights the tension within Rawls's own reasoning and
suggests that the stage-by-stage theory of justice as fairness may have to be
abandoned if there is no unanimous agreement in the original position.
● Sen concludes this section by reiterating his appreciation for Rawls's contribution to
understanding justice, even if the theory of "justice as fairness" itself is flawed. He
believes that valuable insights from Rawls's work remain even if the specific theory is not
fully tenable.
Application of Rawlsian Principles of Justice (Paragraphs 20-28)
● Sen presents the two principles of justice that Rawls claims will emerge from the
original position:
○ (a) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.
○ (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they
must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged members of society.
● Sen notes the priority given to liberty in Rawls's principles, placing it above
considerations of economic or social equity. While acknowledging the "extremism" in
this absolute prioritization, Sen highlights the underlying idea that liberty holds a unique
place in human lives and cannot be treated merely as a facility.
● He explains the second principle's focus on ensuring equal opportunities and
distributive equity (the "Difference Principle").
● Sen describes Rawls's concept of "primary goods" as general-purpose resources
needed to achieve various ends, including rights, liberties, opportunities, income,
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. He notes that while liberty is included in
primary goods, its priority as outlined in the first principle signifies its special status
beyond mere utility.
● Sen points out that Rawls excludes considerations of merit, desert, or property
ownership from his distributive framework, providing reasoned justification for
these exclusions.
● He observes that while productivity is not directly addressed in Rawls's principles, it
receives indirect recognition through its contribution to efficiency and equity. This
means that inequalities related to productivity are acceptable if they benefit the worst-off,
for example, through incentives.
● Sen raises the problem of reconciling incentive-based inequalities with the idea that
individuals in a just society would act in accordance with the principles agreed upon
in the original position. If a just economy should not have such inequalities, should the
principles chosen in the original position eliminate the need for incentives? This raises
the question of whether individuals would spontaneously fulfill their productive duties
without the need for incentives.
● He contrasts two responses to this problem:
○ G. A. Cohen's argument that accommodating incentive-based inequality
limits the reach of Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness," questioning
whether it can be part of a plausible theory of justice.
○ The argument that eliminating the need for incentives based on the
assumption of perfect compliance with the principles chosen in the original
position is unrealistic. This highlights the tension between transcendental
justice (Cohen's view) and comparative justice, which focuses on
comparisons between feasible possibilities.
Some Positive Lessons from the Rawlsian Approach (Paragraphs 29-36)
● Sen discusses two problems with Rawls's approach that can be addressed without
fundamentally altering the theory:
○ The "total priority of liberty" being too extreme, raising the question of
whether all violations of personal liberty are always more important than
issues like hunger, starvation, or lack of medical care. Sen acknowledges that
Rawls softened this stance in later works, and suggests that partial priority of
liberty is more reasonable.
○ The "Difference Principle" not accounting for variations in individuals'
ability to convert primary goods into a good life. For example, a disabled
person might require more resources than an able-bodied person to achieve
the same level of well-being. Sen proposes focusing on "capabilities" rather than
primary goods as a solution, arguing that this shift aligns with Rawls's underlying
aim of considering human freedom.
Difficulties That Need Fresh Investigation (Paragraphs 41-55)
● Sen identifies several difficulties that require further investigation: (1) The
Inescapable Relevance of Actual Behaviour (Paragraphs 41-48)
○ Sen criticizes Rawls's exclusive focus on "just institutions" rather than "just
societies." He contrasts this with the "nyaya" perspective, which considers actual
social realizations resulting from a combination of institutions and behavior
patterns.
○ He argues that assessing justice requires understanding the interplay
between institutions and actual behavior, as the acceptance of principles does
not guarantee corresponding behavior.
○ Sen suggests that Rawls's focus on a "political conception" of justice that
everyone accepts simplifies the complex task of combining principles of
justice with actual human behavior. He believes that understanding the
relationship between institutions and actual behavior is crucial for any theory of
justice aimed at guiding social choices.
(2) Alternatives to the Contractarian Approach (Paragraphs 49-53)
● Sen discusses the distinction between "fairness" and "justice" in Rawls's theory,
noting that fairness relates to persons while justice relates to institutions.
● He recounts a conversation with Isaiah Berlin, who pointed out that some languages,
like French, do not have distinct words for fairness and justice.
● Sen shares Rawls's response that the absence of distinct words is not significant as
long as the conceptual distinction can be made.
● He then describes a linguistic observation by W. V. O. Quine regarding the
etymological difference between "justitia" (justice) and "justitium" (court
vacation). This anecdote highlights the importance of choosing the right words to
express concepts accurately.
● Sen concludes by emphasizing the need to move beyond Rawls's framework while
acknowledging its profound impact on understanding justice. He argues against
intellectual "standstill" ("justitium") and advocates for continuous pursuit of justice
("justitia").
Conclusion
This detailed analysis of Sen's critique of Rawls's "justice as fairness" demonstrates the
complexities and nuances of the theory, highlighting both its strengths and weaknesses. Sen,
while appreciating Rawls's contribution, calls for a more comprehensive approach to justice that
considers actual behavior, explores alternative frameworks, and incorporates global perspectives.
The analysis provides a deeper understanding of the evolution of ideas regarding justice in
contemporary political philosophy.
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A society is organized through its main institutions, like schools, courts, and governments, which
work together as a system. These institutions are built on rules that define roles and guide
actions, making them the foundation of society. However, the rules for judging the fairness of
institutions are different from those for judging individuals.
Key Ideas:
John Rawls talks about how society can be arranged to be fair and just. He has two key
ideas:
2. The Difference Principle: It's okay for some people to earn more or have better
opportunities, but only if those inequalities benefit the least advantaged people in
society. For example, if a doctor earns more, it's fine because their work improves
health care for everyone, including the poorest.
● Maximizing the Worst-Off: The system should be set up so the poorest people are as
well off as possible. This is the most just option.
● Acceptable Inequality: It’s okay if inequalities exist and don’t fully maximize benefits
for the poorest, as long as they still help them somewhat and don’t violate anyone’s basic
rights.
● Chain-Connected Society: In this setup, helping the poorest indirectly helps
everyone else too. Think of it as a ripple effect.
Finally, Rawls clarifies his idea: any inequality must genuinely work to help the least advantaged
people, while also ensuring fair opportunities for all. This combination is what he calls
democratic equality, a fair and balanced system for society.
Rawls focuses on how to make society fair by following certain principles. Here's what he
means:
1. Fair Equality of Opportunity: This is about ensuring everyone has a fair chance in
life, regardless of their starting point. For example, everyone should have access to
good education and job opportunities.
○ Rawls says society should aim for pure procedural justice, where fair
opportunities ensure fair outcomes.
○ But there's an order to these principles: first, the Difference Principle (helping
the least advantaged) must be in place. Once that’s set, you apply fair equality of
opportunity to ensure the system remains just.
[As long as opportunities are truly fair and open to everyone, and the system prioritizes helping
the least advantaged, society will be just.]
· How It Works:
○ Rawls uses "primary social goods" to measure fairness. These are things everyone
values, like rights, wealth, and self-respect.
○ Instead of needing exact numbers, he just compares people’s positions—how
well-off someone is compared to the least advantaged person.
· Why This is Good: Rawls defines "good" as whatever helps people achieve their
goals. Since primary social goods (like rights and opportunities) help everyone pursue
their aims, they are considered valuable.
[Rawls' method doesn’t require perfect measurements. It’s enough to focus on ensuring the least
advantaged person gets a fair share of the things everyone values, like rights and resources.
This makes society just and fair.]
In Rawls' idea of justice as fairness, every person has two key positions in society:
1. Citizenship: This is the shared, equal position that everyone has just by being a
member of society. Everyone has the same basic rights and duties as a citizen.
2. Social and Economic Position: This is based on how much income, wealth, and
resources a person has. This position reflects the inequalities that exist in society.
● To judge whether inequalities are fair, Rawls identifies "representative persons" who
represent different groups in society.
● The most important group to focus on is the least advantaged people—those who have
the fewest resources or face discrimination due to factors like sex, ethnicity, or natural
circumstances.
● From the perspective of these least advantaged groups, Rawls defines a "reasonable
social minimum"—the basic level of rights and resources everyone should have.
Key Idea:
Rawls’ framework uses these social positions to ensure fairness. It focuses on:
1. Compensating for Inequalities: People don't choose their talents, intelligence, or the
circumstances they are born into. These are like winning or losing a "natural lottery." The
principle says society should support those who are disadvantaged by these random
factors, so everyone gets a fair chance.
2. Shared Talents: Talents and abilities are not something people "deserve." So, they
should be seen as resources to benefit everyone, not just the person who has them.
3. Helping Everyone: Cooperation is essential for society to function well. Even the most
talented people benefit when the whole system works smoothly. Helping the least
advantaged ensures stability and fairness, benefiting everyone in the long run.
4. Not Just Meritocracy: Rawls argues against a society where people use their abilities
only for personal gain, leaving others behind. Instead, a sense of fraternity (brotherhood)
should guide us, where people want to succeed together.
5. Self-Worth Matters: Justice involves recognizing everyone's value. A fair society
provides opportunities and support for all, so no one feels left out or worthless, even if
they lack certain advantages.
[A fair society doesn’t focus on rewarding talent and ambition alone but ensures those with fewer
opportunities are supported, fostering cooperation and dignity for all.]
John Rawls explains how society should be organized and what rules people should follow.
Here's a simplified version of the ideas:
Anti-Capitalism
The collapse of communism and the perceived failure of alternative models like the Swedish
model or the Kerala model have created a sense of "tyranny of the missing alternative," fueling
anti-capitalist sentiments.3233
●
Example: The author mentions the anti-Davos meeting in Brazil held concurrently with the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, as an example of this resurgence of
anti-capitalist rhetoric.34
He notes the nostalgia for communism among older generations of anti-capitalists and their
frustration with those who, like George Soros, advocate for progressive capitalism.3435
●
Example: He describes the clash between Soros and anti-capitalist revolutionaries at the
anti-Davos meeting, where Soros was seen as an enemy despite his progressive views.34
The author then focuses on the anti-capitalist discontent among younger generations, particularly
those on college campuses.36
He outlines several factors contributing to this discontent:
1.
Social Justice Concerns: Many young people perceive capitalism as a system incapable of
addressing social justice issues.38 They fail to recognize the potential of capitalism to destroy
privilege and create economic opportunity for the many.39
○
Example: He cites his own misjudgment in his 1966 book where he expressed admiration for the
Soviet Union's economic progress.38
2.
He criticizes the persistent belief that controls and direct allocations are superior to markets in
addressing inequality, highlighting the negative consequences of socialist planning in countries
like India.39
3.
Influence of Intellectual Currents: Students in humanities and social sciences are exposed to
intellectual currents that promote skepticism towards capitalism.40 Deconstructionism,
postmodernism, and Foucauldian thought contribute to a rejection of economic reasoning and a
focus on power dynamics that reinforces the perception of corporations as exploitative
entities.4041
○
Example: He cites Terry Eagleton's analysis of Derrida's deconstructionism as a political
practice aimed at dismantling systems of thought that maintain power structures.40
4.
Marxist texts also influence students, shaping their views of capitalism as an inherently
exploitative system.42
○
Example: He quotes V.S. Naipaul's portrayal of a Pakistani guerrilla who, influenced by Marxist
literature, embraced revolution without critically examining its complexities.42
5.
Post-colonial theory further fuels suspicion of Western scholarship and the perceived threat of
globalization to non-Western cultures.43
6.
Disconnect Between Empathy and Action: The author identifies a novel factor contributing to
anti-capitalist sentiment: the dissonance between empathy for the suffering of others in distant
parts of the world, fostered by media exposure, and a lack of understanding of how to effectively
address those problems.48
○
Example: He cites David Hume's and Adam Smith's writings on the concentric circles of
empathy, where sympathy diminishes with distance. He argues that technology has inverted this,
bringing the suffering of those in the outermost circle closer to our awareness.495051
7.
This heightened awareness of global problems, coupled with inadequate intellectual tools to
address them, leads to frustration with the perceived callousness of the capitalist system.48
○
Example: He describes his encounter with student protesters dressed as turtles at the 1999 WTO
meeting in Seattle, who were unaware of the details of the shrimp-turtle case they were
protesting. This highlights the gap between emotional engagement and informed action.53
8.
Perception of Capitalism as a Dominant Discourse: Intellectuals often portray capitalism and
globalization as a dominant discourse that promotes corporate profit-making and undermines
social achievements.55 They view market-oriented reforms as a form of conservative
counterrevolution that masks regressive policies as progress.55
○
Example: He cites Edward Said's and Pierre Bourdieu's critiques of "Clinton-Blair
neoliberalism" as an example of this perspective.55
9.
The author challenges this view, arguing that it inverts reality. He contends that reforming past
policies, even those considered progressive, is not conservative but rather a pragmatic response
to their failures.56
10.
He argues that the debate is not about rejecting markets altogether but about defining their
limits.58 He emphasizes that the turn towards market-oriented reforms in developing countries is
a reaction to the failures of dirigisme, not a triumph of conservatism.59
Anti-Globalization
The author argues that anti-capitalist sentiments easily translate into anti-globalization views,
particularly among left-leaning individuals.60
●
Example: He cites Lenin's and Nikolai Bukharin's writings on imperialism, which link
globalization to the exploitation of weaker nations by capitalist powers. This resonates with the
idealistic views of young activists who see globalization as an extension of capitalist
exploitation.6061
Anti-Corporation Attitudes
Multinational corporations, as the main agents and beneficiaries of capitalism and globalization,
become the primary target of anti-globalization criticism.6263 The belief that globalization
enables corporations to exploit workers and undermine social legislation in pursuit of profits
fuels this hostility.63
●
Example: The author cites Alan Wolfe's casual reference to "increasingly rapacious global
corporations" as an example of the widespread acceptance of this negative perception.63
He challenges the "race to the bottom" argument, which claims that globalization forces
countries to lower labor and environmental standards to attract investment. He argues that the
evidence does not support this claim, but acknowledges that the perception persists.64
Anti-corporation activists often seize upon isolated incidents of corporate misconduct to validate
their biases.64
●
Example: He cites the popularity of films like Erin Brockovich and The Insider, which portray
corporations as villains, as evidence of the prevalence of this sentiment.64
The author also highlights the strategic targeting of corporations by anti-globalization
activists.65 They exploit media attention surrounding meetings of international organizations and
focus on highly visible corporations like Nike and Gap to amplify their message.6566
●
Example: He describes the targeting of McDonald's by landless rural worker movements in
Brazil as a strategic move to gain media attention and symbolize the perceived negative
influence of corporations.67
The author compares the deep-seated hostility towards corporations to the historical
condemnation of usury in medieval times, both reflecting a deep moral aversion to certain
economic practices.69
●
Example: He provides a historical account of the laws against usury in England, highlighting the
persistent moral condemnation despite changing economic realities.70
Anti-Americanism
The author identifies resentment towards American hegemony as another source of
anti-globalization sentiment.78 The unprecedented military and economic power of the United
States generates resentment globally, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a
countervailing force.78 Opposing globalization is seen as a way to resist American
dominance.78
The source begins by discussing the fundamental question that concerns political anarchists:
Why is the state’s coercive power justified? A partial answer is provided: states are justified if
they are created by the people through a convention to fulfill crucial roles for moral and
self-interested reasons. This process involves establishing authority and coercive power, vested
in individuals designated as the "state," who then execute the roles for which the state was
created.
This explanation distinguishes "states" from "systems of mastery." Citizens of states participate
in maintaining and potentially changing their leadership convention. Those subject to systems of
mastery lack such power due to technological disadvantages employed by the ruling entity.
However, the source acknowledges that elements of mastery might exist within states.
This partial answer remains unsatisfactory to anarchists because people can desire harmful things
and fail to desire beneficial ones. The diverse nature of states throughout history, including their
actions, goals, and understanding of their roles and the roles of their subjects, necessitates a more
comprehensive response. To address the anarchist challenge adequately, it's crucial to recognize
that some states, even if not systems of mastery, lack moral justification due to the nature of their
laws and goals. This recognition necessitates defining the goals and laws that constitute a just
state.
Morally justified political societies are those that are not systems of mastery, are maintained by
the people's convention, strive for justice, and are reasonably successful in achieving it. These
societies provide a counterargument to the anarchist claim of unjustifiable political coercion.
Even those dissatisfied with such societies would struggle to challenge their moral justification.
Discontent in a society that is both desired by the majority and reasonably just may stem from
opposition to justice or a self-serving interest in dominating others.
The challenge lies in the lack of consensus on the nature of justice. Disagreements among
political philosophers and citizens on the actions of a morally justified state and the justness of
existing states arise from this lack of consensus. Individuals may not recognize their state's moral
legitimacy if they find its conception of justice questionable, even in societies where political
forms are sustained by convention.
Part 2 of the book examines disagreements about justice, focusing on distributive justice, which
encompasses rules of property, exchange, inheritance, taxation, and regulations on
wealth-creating or wealth-using institutions. The source reviews four approaches to defining
distributive justice: utilitarianism, Rawlsian contractarianism, libertarianism, and egalitarianism.
Due to these disagreements, citizens cannot unanimously agree on the justness of any regime,
potentially giving anarchists an edge in arguing that no extant state possesses moral legitimacy.
However, this argument is deemed unfair because the overlap among these views allows for
agreement on clearly unjust states (impoverished populations) and well-functioning states
(well-nourished and happy populations with equal treatment, opportunities, political power, and
resources). Nevertheless, there is no definitive answer to what a fully just state looks like.
The source concludes this section by mentioning theorists like Karl Marx who argue that
defining distributive justice is futile, as resource distribution reflects prior systemic structures.
Changing these structures using non-distributive justice conceptions is seen as necessary to
ensure a better distribution.
The source introduces utilitarianism, a theory outlined by Jeremy Bentham, who aimed to
provide a framework for rational legislation. Dissatisfied with the legislative processes of his
time, Bentham argued for using the "principle of utility" to construct morally sound legislation,
rejecting the traditional notion of "rights."
Utilitarianism, according to Bentham, suggests that just as individuals maximize their happiness,
states should maximize the happiness of their community. This is likened to maximizing the total
amount of happiness in individual "wells" representing each person's happiness level. Bentham
defines "utility" as the property of an object that produces benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or
happiness, or prevents mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness. He further defines the "principle of
utility" as the principle that directs the state to maximize the community's utility. This principle
is advocated as a rational basis for legislation, replacing vague intuitions with a clear formula for
evaluating laws.
Mathematically, the principle of utility in its classical form is represented as maximizing the sum
of the utility of each person in a society. Average utilitarianism, a modification, directs us to
maximize the sum of utility divided by the number of people, preventing the justification of
maximizing utility solely through population increase.
Utilitarianism's appeal lies in its simplicity, seemingly "scientific" nature (due to its
mathematical formulation), and its focus on human welfare. It has been particularly attractive to
proponents of the welfare state who favor government involvement in societal institutions using
a rigorous principle focused on human welfare.
Critiques of Utilitarianism
Despite its allure, utilitarianism has faced significant criticism, leading to attempts to modify and
redefine it. The source explores these criticisms, starting with the theoretical assumptions
underlying Bentham's principle of utility.
One assumption is that individuals can evaluate their happiness and that policymakers can assess
this evaluation. This assumes that happiness is quantifiable and measurable, representable by a
single number. Further, the principle assumes that individual happiness can be added together to
determine total happiness.
These assumptions are challenged by critics. First, the idea of measuring happiness is questioned,
especially if happiness encompasses diverse experiences and feelings beyond just pleasure. John
Stuart Mill, a proponent of utilitarianism, argued that experiences of pleasure differ not only in
quantity but also in quality. He argued that the pursuit of higher pleasures, which distinguish
humans from lower animals, is more valuable than simply maximizing pleasure in any form.
Mill's view, however, complicates the principle of utility, making it difficult to determine which
pleasures to prioritize and how to measure and combine them in a way that guides policy
decisions.
Second, the assumption that individuals can reliably measure their happiness is questioned.
Critics argue that self-awareness may not be sufficiently transparent for accurate measurement of
pleasure and pain. This challenge extends to policymakers, who are tasked with assessing
individual happiness.
The most significant challenge lies in the fourth assumption: the ability to quantitatively compare
happiness across individuals. While ordinal comparisons of happiness are common (e.g.,
recognizing that one person is happier than another), we lack access to others' experiential states
to make precise cardinal comparisons of utility. However, implementing the principle of utility
requires not only ordinal ranking but also knowledge of the magnitude of happiness differences
between individuals.
This difficulty, known as the "interpersonal comparison of utility problem," has led many to
consider Bentham's principle impractical and a false "science." A genuine science would provide
clear legislative prescriptions, which the interpersonal comparison problem prevents. The
practical challenges are illustrated by the controversy surrounding "diminishing marginal utility,"
the notion that a good provides more utility to someone with fewer resources than to someone
with abundant resources. Determining the validity of this phenomenon and its implications for
maximizing group utility becomes difficult given our inability to compare individual experiences
directly.
To address these challenges, some utilitarians propose refining Bentham's idea by identifying and
quantifying human welfare in a more measurable and aggregatable way. One suggestion involves
equating human welfare with the satisfaction of preferences, regardless of their content, and
using contemporary expected utility theory to "measure" the satisfaction of preferences.
However, critics like Amartya Sen argue that "preference satisfaction" is an inadequate
representation of human welfare and that expected utility theory is misused when applied to this
notion of welfare. They raise concerns about the nature of preference "measurement" in game
theory. Furthermore, the source questions whether expected utility theory can address the
interpersonal comparison of utility problem.
Defenders of utilitarianism argue that evaluating preferences based on intuitions about their
authenticity or acceptability is unreliable and that all preferences should be considered. However,
incorporating all preferences into the utilitarian calculation is impractical because individual
preferences change over time. The utilitarian needs a way to determine which preferences at
which time to prioritize to avoid inconsistencies and enable the maximization of preference
satisfaction.
The challenge remains: how do we determine which preferences are most important or authentic
without relying on the very intuitions that preference-satisfaction utilitarianism attempts to
avoid? Unlike pleasure-based utilitarianism, which can prioritize preferences based on their
contribution to pleasure maximization, preference-satisfaction utilitarianism lacks a clear
principle for making such determinations. This lack of clarity makes it difficult to formulate
policies that effectively address the changing nature of individual preferences.
Additionally, attempts to construct a social welfare function by aggregating individual ordinal
preferences over policies have proven unsuccessful, as demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow's
impossibility theorem.
The decline in utilitarianism's popularity is further fueled by concerns about its potential policy
recommendations, particularly regarding distributive justice and individual rights. Critics argue
that prioritizing total happiness could lead to policies that impoverish some members of society,
even if it results in greater overall utility. This contradicts our intuition that justice requires
fairness and protection from such sacrifices.
While utilitarians may appeal to the concept of diminishing marginal utility to defend the
theory's potential for generating egalitarian policies, critics point out that this phenomenon may
not be universally applicable. They demand a theory of justice that consistently prioritizes
fairness and prevents excessive sacrifices from individuals for the sake of the community.
The conflict between utilitarianism and intuitions of justice is further illustrated by its approach
to punishment. Utilitarianism justifies punishment solely based on its contribution to maximizing
total utility. This could lead to situations where guilty individuals are not punished if doing so
does not increase utility, or even worse, where innocent individuals are punished if it benefits the
community as a whole.
While rule utilitarianism, which focuses on utility-maximizing rules rather than individual
actions, attempts to address these concerns, critics argue that it ultimately leads to "rule
worship," prioritizing rules over total utility, which contradicts the core principle of
utilitarianism.
The criticism of utilitarianism often relies on appeals to "intuitions." This raises concerns about
the nature and reliability of intuitions as a basis for evaluating moral theories. Utilitarianism aims
for a rational foundation for moral reasoning, while intuitionism, a theory that grounds morality
in fundamental moral ideas, faces criticism for its inability to systematize, prioritize, or
adjudicate conflicting intuitions.
The reliance on intuitions also poses a challenge to identifying which intuitions are morally
sound, especially considering the potential for cultural prejudices to influence them. A robust
theory of justice should address and potentially replace problematic intuitions rather than
incorporate them into political society.
His argument draws upon the concept of a hypothetical social contract, not to justify state
authority as in Hobbes and Locke, but to clarify the nature of justice. Unlike the historical social
contracts of Hobbes and Locke, Rawls focuses on a hypothetical agreement process in which
individuals, situated in the "original position," agree on principles of justice that will govern their
society.
The idea of a social contract as a tool for understanding justice dates back to Plato's Republic and
the Stoic Epicurus. However, it was Immanuel Kant who explored the idea in a way that directly
influenced Rawls. For Kant, the social contract was an "idea of reason" that helps us determine
just legislation. By considering what individuals could agree to, he devised a thought experiment
to assess the moral adequacy of policies without relying on literal consent or potentially biased
intuitions.
Kant's social contract test serves as a "moral proof procedure" for evaluating the rightfulness of
laws. For example, laws permitting slavery or establishing a hereditary ruling class would be
rejected by those subjected to domination, indicating their injustice. Conversely, policies
recognizing the equal status of all individuals would likely be universally agreed upon,
suggesting their justness.
The effectiveness of the social contract test lies in its acknowledgment of individuals as "ends in
themselves" rather than merely means. Recognizing someone's intrinsic value implies respecting
their interests and perspectives, which the social contract test achieves by hypothetically
involving each member of society in assessing policies.
Rawls, building on Kant's ideas, argues that the social contract, by involving each individual in
selecting principles of justice, ensures respect for each person, a core element of justice. He
contrasts this approach with utilitarianism, which he critiques for conflating individuals and
prioritizing aggregate welfare over individual well-being.
Rawls emphasizes the importance of preserving the "distinction of persons" in moral reasoning.
He argues that utilitarianism, by merging individuals into a single entity for calculation,
disregards the moral significance of individual welfare and permits unequal resource distribution
as long as it maximizes total utility.
To address this, Rawls proposes a contractarian approach that respects each person's moral
claims. The hypothetical agreement process ensures that conceptions of justice that exploit or
sacrifice individuals for the benefit of others are rejected. He argues that this approach aligns
with our intuitive understanding of justice as requiring respect for each individual.
Rawls expands on Kant's idea by arguing that the contract procedure should evaluate
comprehensive conceptions of justice rather than specific laws or policies. This holistic approach
is deemed necessary because large-scale societal institutions deeply impact individuals' lives and
identities. Only by assessing and revising institutions from a comprehensive justice perspective
can we ensure that they operate in a way that honors and respects each individual.
To achieve this, Rawls proposes a thought experiment where individuals choose between
competing conceptions of justice, the most prominent being utilitarianism and his own theory,
"justice as fairness." The conception agreed upon by the contracting parties, he argues, is the best
defensible conception of justice.
1. First Principle: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others." 2. Second Principle (Difference Principle):
"Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably
expected to be to everyone's advantage—and in particular, to the advantage of the least-well-off
persons, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all."
Rawls prioritizes the first principle, ensuring that equal liberty precedes the distribution of social
and economic resources. This conception emphasizes equality and concern for everyone,
particularly the least advantaged, contrasting with utilitarianism's focus on aggregate happiness.
Rawls's theory allows for unequal resource distribution if it benefits everyone, including the least
advantaged. This recognizes that giving more resources to some may lead to an expansion of the
"economic pie," benefiting everyone. However, he acknowledges that extreme inequality can
negatively impact self-respect, a primary good, and sets limits on acceptable inequality.
To ensure that the agreement on his conception of justice is reasoned and not based on mere
intuition, Rawls provides a detailed account of the "original position," the hypothetical situation
preceding the agreement process. He outlines the considerations that individuals in this position
do and do not take into account when evaluating conceptions of justice.
The most crucial feature of the original position is the "veil of ignorance." To eliminate biases,
prejudices, and morally distorting factors, individuals are made ignorant of their social position,
religious or metaphysical views, moral beliefs, social theories, and so on. This ensures objective
and impartial preferences over conceptions of justice.
To facilitate reasoned decision-making, Rawls introduces several ideas that individuals in the
original position can consider.
2. Primary Goods: Individuals must have some understanding of their desires, and Rawls
stipulates that they desire "primary goods," which are instrumentally valuable for achieving life
plans. These goods include rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, and self-respect.
4. Maximin Rule: Individuals should use this rule, which dictates choosing so as to maximize
their minimum prospects, when deciding on a conception of justice. This is justified because
individuals in the original position cannot estimate the probability of various outcomes (e.g.,
being rich or poor), creating a situation of uncertainty.
Combining these elements, the reasoning process in the original position can be summarized as
follows:
Step 1: Embrace the veil of ignorance, becoming a moral personality. Step 2: Desire the
maximum amount of primary goods for oneself and one's family. Step 3: Acknowledge the
applicability of the circumstances of justice. Step 4: Subject proposed conceptions of justice to
the constraints of the concept of right. Step 5: Recognize the possibility of being anyone in
society due to the veil of ignorance. Step 6: Use the maximin rule to select a conception of
justice that maximizes one's minimum prospect, ensuring an adequate amount of primary goods
even if one is among the least advantaged. Step 7: Choose "justice as fairness" over
utilitarianism because it prevents the sacrifice of any individual for the community's benefit and
distributes resources to benefit everyone, particularly the least advantaged.
Through this structured argument, Rawls aims to demonstrate the rational basis for his theory
without relying solely on undefended intuitions. However, he acknowledges that intuition still
plays a role in justifying the components of the original position and assessing the plausibility of
the conclusions. He strives for "reflective equilibrium," where carefully considered intuitions
align with theoretical conclusions.
Beyond the original position argument, Rawls directly defends his conception of justice as one
that respects each person. He argues that it prevents unreasonable sacrifices from some for the
benefit of others and rejects penalizing individuals for lacking certain talents, skills, or luck.
Rawls aims to dismantle "caste" thinking, advocating a system where individuals are treated
equally regardless of their natural endowments, life prospects, or social circumstances.
Despite its influence, Rawls's theory has faced criticism from both the right and the left. These
criticisms target both his original position argument and the conclusions it supports.
One criticism concerns the genuinely "contractarian" nature of Rawls's argument. The source
highlights that the argument is presented as a reasoning process followed by a single individual
in the original position. Any individual, reasoning alone, would likely arrive at Rawls's two
principles.
This raises the question of whether the selection of these principles truly stems from a
contractual agreement or simply from the "I could be anyone" perspective enforced by the veil of
ignorance. The lack of genuine bargaining or differences in interests among the identically
defined parties in the original position further weakens the contractarian aspect of the argument.
Rawls acknowledges this limitation, stating that unanimous agreement is reached because each
person in the original position is convinced by the same arguments.
The absence of a genuine contract raises questions about the argument's contractarian
foundation. While a connection may exist between acknowledging the individual, a characteristic
of contractarian arguments, and the "I could be anyone" perspective, the lack of a concrete
agreement might be perceived as damaging the argument's credibility.
Applying this principle to the original position, individuals would assign equal probability (1/n)
to being any specific person in society and choose a conception of justice that maximizes their
expected utility, considering all possible positions they could occupy. This line of reasoning
resembles average utilitarianism, suggesting that Rawls's argument, if revised to incorporate a
more plausible decision-making rule, might lead to utilitarian conclusions.
John Harsanyi, advocating for average utilitarianism, had previously proposed a similar
reasoning procedure, further bolstering the criticism that Rawls's departure from Harsanyi's
approach was a theoretical error.
Rawls defends the maximin rule, but his arguments are deemed problematic. The use of the veil
of ignorance, which eliminates genuine differences in interests and bargaining power among the
parties, further contributes to the perceived weakness of the contractarian aspect of the argument.
This raises fundamental questions about the nature of a morally revealing contractarian theory.
Constructing such a theory requires including only morally relevant information while ensuring
that a genuine contract can take place. Determining what constitutes "morally relevant"
information remains a challenge.
Critics from both the right and the left have targeted the conclusions of Rawls's theory.
Right-wing critics argue that Rawls fails to acknowledge the role of effort, merit, and
responsibility in resource distribution. They question why individuals should receive equal
allotments despite variations in work ethic, investment choices, or contributions to the
community.
They claim that ignoring such differences undermines individual responsibility, encourages
laziness, and allows for free-riding on the efforts of the industrious, potentially leading to social
unrest and economic decline. While Rawls's theory permits unequal distributions if they benefit
everyone, including the least advantaged, right-wing critics contend that those who create
economic gains through their efforts should be entitled to a larger share, even if it increases
inequality.
Left-wing critics, on the other hand, express concern about Rawls's willingness to depart from
strict equality of holdings. They favor a conception of equality that prioritizes equal welfare over
equal resources. Furthermore, they find fault with his limited incorporation of personal
responsibility into his theory.
The next sections will explore the alternative suggestions proposed by both right-wing and
left-wing critics. Notably, these critiques, despite their disagreements with Rawls's conclusions,
draw inspiration from his theoretical ideas and argumentation, highlighting his significant
contribution to the discourse on distributive justice.
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia presents a libertarian response to Rawls's A Theory
of Justice. Nozick argues that Rawls's theory unfairly excludes consideration of libertarian
conceptions of justice and defends a more conservative, liberty-based approach.
Unlike Rawls, Nozick does not rely on contractarian arguments in this part of his book. Instead,
he appeals to "considered convictions" about justice to demonstrate that they support a
conception of justice different from Rawls's.
Nozick criticizes "patterned" and "end-state" conceptions of justice. Patterned conceptions aim to
implement a distribution scheme based on a principle like "to each according to his —," while
end-state conceptions strive for a specific outcome through resource distribution.
He argues that Rawls's theory, which mandates maximizing the prospects of the least
advantaged, is an end-state conception bound to be unfair. To illustrate this, Nozick proposes a
thought experiment where a society perfectly implements a patterned or end-state conception of
justice. As individuals engage in trades, contracts, gifts, and other voluntary transfers, the initial
pattern is disrupted. Maintaining the pattern would require prohibiting such transfers, which
would be unjust and economically inefficient.
Nozick highlights this argument with the "Wilt Chamberlain example." In a society with a
patterned conception of justice, individuals willingly pay a premium for tickets to see Wilt
Chamberlain play basketball, making him wealthy and disrupting the initial distribution pattern.
Preventing these voluntary transactions would restrict individual liberty and hinder their ability
to improve their well-being. Nozick questions why liberty should be sacrificed for the sake of
maintaining a pattern or achieving a specific end, especially considering the fundamental
importance of liberty in any acceptable conception of justice.
1. Principle of Justice in Acquisition: A person who acquires a holding in accordance with this
principle is entitled to that holding. 2. Principle of Justice in Transfer: A person who acquires a
holding through legitimate transfer from someone entitled to it is entitled to that holding. 3. No
One is Entitled Except by (1) and (2): Only repeated applications of the first two principles can
establish entitlement to a holding.
Nozick also includes a principle of rectification to address past injustices involving violations of
the first two principles.
This conception of justice supports a free market capitalist system with private property and
limited government intervention. However, unlike utilitarian justifications of the free market
based on its economic efficiency or welfare maximization, Nozick's defense rests on its
alignment with individual liberty rights, regardless of its economic or welfare implications. Even
if the free market were less efficient or less beneficial to overall well-being, Nozick would still
defend it based on its respect for individual liberty.
Nozick does not specify the details of the principle of justice in transfer, assuming it would
involve rules governing legitimate contracts, gifts, trades, and so on. However, he elaborates on
the principle of justice in acquisition, drawing on Lockean ideas.
John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, argued that in a state of nature, individuals
can acquire property rights by "mixing their labor" with unowned objects, making them their
own. Since individuals own themselves, they also own their labor and, consequently, anything
they mix their labor with.
Nozick agrees with Locke's general idea but challenges his explanation. He raises questions
about why mixing what one owns with what one doesn't own necessarily results in gaining
ownership rather than losing it. He uses the example of mixing tomato juice with the sea,
questioning whether this action grants ownership of the sea or simply results in losing the tomato
juice.
Despite his sympathy for Locke's conception, Nozick acknowledges the difficulties in
formulating a clear and defensible principle of justice in acquisition.
This contrasts starkly with utilitarianism, which permits sacrificing individual rights for the
greater good. Libertarianism, in a sense, prioritizes individual rights over the collective good,
allowing the community's well-being to be limited by the protection of individual rights.
Nozick justifies this absolute conception of rights by referring to them as "side constraints" that
cannot be legitimately overridden, even in pursuit of worthy goals. These rights are linked to
moral duties owed to every other individual (e.g., not to murder, steal, or physically harm).
He argues that such rights, including property rights, stem from a Kantian view of morality,
where individuals are treated as "ends in themselves" and not merely as means. Nozick claims
that respecting these rights is essential for treating individuals as ends. Allowing the state to
infringe upon these rights, even for a good cause, would be using individuals as means to achieve
that cause without their consent, violating their intrinsic value.
The source acknowledges the apparent contradiction in both Rawls and Nozick claiming to be
Kantian despite their vastly different conceptions of justice. The discrepancy lies in their
interpretation of what constitutes treating people as "ends."
For Nozick, once an individual acquires a property right through legitimate means, it becomes
absolute and cannot be taken away, even by the state, for any reason. This absolute protection of
property rights is seen as essential for respecting individuals as ends.
Nozick argues that this strong conception of property rights is justified by the Lockean link
between property and self-determination. To exercise autonomy and pursue life plans effectively,
individuals need complete control over their possessions. Absolute property rights protect
individuals from arbitrary state power and ensure their respectful treatment, aligning with
Kantian demands.
Nozick criticizes Rawls's theory for failing to protect individuals from state intrusion and for not
treating them as ends deserving of the liberty to determine how to use their property. He objects
to Rawls's defense of state enforcement of the difference principle, which he sees as
disrespecting individual liberty.
Nozick specifically takes issue with Rawls's suggestion that natural talents should be regarded as
a "common asset" and that individuals with greater natural endowments should only benefit from
their talents if it improves the situation of the less fortunate. He views this as using individuals
for collective purposes, violating Kantian moral principles.
Rawls might counter that his theory aims to utilize a person's talents, not the person themselves.
However, Nozick remains unconvinced, arguing that this distinction between individuals and
their talents is too strained and ultimately fails to respect individuals as ends.
He further criticizes Rawls's assertion that virtues of character, influenced by family and social
circumstances, are arbitrary from a moral perspective and should not be considered in resource
distribution. Nozick contends that this undermines individual autonomy and responsibility,
contradicting Rawls's intention to uphold the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings.
He argues that only a system recognizing absolute rights over individuals' bodies, labor,
character development, choices, and acquired possessions can truly embody the Kantian
principle of treating individuals as ends in themselves. In contrast, he perceives Rawls's system
as "using" individuals by requiring the more advantaged to work for the benefit of the less
advantaged, potentially hindering their ability to utilize their talents for personal gain. He
questions the justification for granting the less advantaged a claim on the proceeds of others'
labor.
Underlying Nozick's argument is the assumption that individuals should be held responsible for
their choices regarding their labor and property. Those who make poor choices should face the
consequences without being "bailed out" by an egalitarian regime, while those who make wise
choices should reap the rewards. This notion of moral responsibility, intertwined with liberty,
forms the foundation for Nozick's conception of absolute rights.
Critiques of Libertarianism
Libertarian views, particularly Nozick's version, have faced numerous critiques, some quite
passionate.
The most common criticism targets the libertarian notion of absolute rights. Critics question the
moral justification for such strong rights that trump all considerations of others' welfare, even in
extreme circumstances where respecting those rights could lead to disaster for the community.
They also point out that a libertarian system would prevent state interventions in the market,
even if those interventions, such as antitrust legislation, could benefit the community as a whole.
This highlights the perceived implausibility of absolute rights that prioritize individual claims
over collective well-being, even when the majority might support those interventions.
Libertarians have relied primarily on intuition to defend their position, although more recent
attempts to provide a more reasoned and structured defense have emerged.
While Nozick's motivation for endorsing the proviso stems from his commitment to liberty, his
acceptance of this constraint suggests a recognition that individual property rights are not always
absolute and may be limited by the needs of others. He acknowledges that initial acquisitions that
significantly harm the liberty or well-being of others, such as acquiring the only water hole in a
desert, are illegitimate.
Critics argue that Nozick's acceptance of the Lockean proviso undermines his claim of absolute
rights and implicitly acknowledges the moral relevance of welfare. By allowing for state
intervention to enforce the proviso, he concedes that the state has a moral obligation to ensure a
distribution of holdings that provides "enough and as good" for everyone, effectively endorsing a
pattern in
The article explores the intricate relationship between liberalism and communitarianism,
highlighting their inherent tensions and the limitations of attempts to synthesize them. The
discussion unfolds through a series of conceptual explorations, examining propositions,
narrative, and the nature of political theory itself.
The Communitarian Critique: The Embedded Self and the Significance of Context
● Communitarians challenge liberalism's focus on individual autonomy, arguing that individuals
are inherently embedded within communities.
● They stress the importance of context, arguing that individuals derive their values and
identities from their communal affiliations.
● Moral deliberation, for communitarians, starts from a point of pre-existing relationships and
obligations, not abstract reasoning.
● They question the liberal notion of a detached self, contending that authenticity and
self-respect are rooted in communal ties.
The Persistent Antinomy: The Inescapable Tension Between Abstraction and Context
● The sources argue that the relationship between liberalism and communitarianism represents
an "unresolvable antinomy."
● This antinomy arises from the inherent duality of discourse, where every proposition can be
both a statement of truth and an object of further critique.
● Liberalism aligns with the critical capacity of the "I," constantly re-evaluating and
reconstructing the self.
● Communitarianism finds its ground in the "me," defined by the accumulation of
already-existing propositions and relationships within a community.
The Role of Narrative: History, Novels, and the Interplay of Truth and Authority
● The sources explore the role of narrative in shaping political communities.
● Communitarians emphasize the significance of shared narratives, viewing them as historical
accounts that ground communal identity.
● Liberals, on the other hand, associate with the open-ended nature of narratives, likening them
to novels with the potential for multiple interpretations.
● The antinomy resurfaces in the realm of narrative interpretation.
● Some communities adopt a fundamentalist approach, seeking to preserve the narrative's
original meaning, while others embrace interpretive flexibility.
● The question of truth becomes central, leading to a separation between the individual and the
inherited narrative.
● This separation can foster both doubt and renewed efforts at interpretation, highlighting the
dynamic tension between tradition and innovation.
● The sources acknowledge the influence of authority in shaping the interpretation of narratives.
● Judges and juries, for example, hold the power to establish a definitive "truth," even though
their decisions may not necessarily reflect an objectively superior interpretation.
The Failure of Synthesis: The Inadequacy of Liberal Communities and the Persistence of
Difference
● The sources conclude that attempts to synthesize liberalism and communitarianism are
ultimately inadequate.
● The ideal of a "liberal community" fails to address the fundamental tensions between
individual autonomy and communal belonging.
● Liberals find themselves struggling with the inherent inequalities embedded in political
communities, while communitarians see liberalism's emphasis on individual choice as a threat to
the integrity of shared values and traditions.
● The authors argue that the persistence of difference between liberalism and communitarianism
reflects a fundamental divergence in starting points for moral deliberation.
● Liberals prioritize reason and the potential for individual self-creation, while communitarians
ground their understanding in existing relationships and shared narratives.
● This difference makes it difficult for either side to persuade the other, as each perceives the
other's perspective as a threat to its core values.
The Need for a New Framework: Moving Beyond Liberal and Communitarian Paradigms
● The sources propose that a more comprehensive understanding of political life requires
moving beyond the limitations of both liberal and communitarian frameworks.
● This new framework must account for the complexities of political experience, including the
elements of love, sacrifice, rhetoric, and power that elude traditional liberal and communitarian
accounts.
● The authors suggest that this inquiry may require drawing on insights from disciplines beyond
political philosophy, such as aesthetics, which grapples with the subjective and contextual nature
of meaning and beauty.
Conclusion:
Embracing Complexity and Moving Beyond Dichotomies The sources offer a nuanced
exploration of the interplay between liberalism and communitarianism. They highlight the
persistent tensions between individual autonomy and communal belonging, reason and narrative,
and the limitations of attempts to synthesize these seemingly opposing perspectives. They
ultimately call for a new framework for understanding politics that moves beyond the limitations
of both liberal and communitarian paradigms, embracing the complexities of political experience
and the multifaceted nature of human identity. This exploration, while insightful, is limited by its
focus on Western philosophical traditions. Further investigation could consider the perspectives
of non-Western philosophical and political thought to enrich the understanding of the
relationship between the individual and the community. Additionally, examining the historical
and cultural factors that have shaped the evolution of liberal and communitarian thought would
provide a more contextualized understanding of their contemporary significance.
The source argues that anthropogenic explanations of climate change collapse the age-old
humanist distinction between natural history and human history. This distinction, prevalent since
the 17th century and dominant in the 19th, held that the study of human affairs (human history)
was distinct from the study of nature (natural history).
Several examples from intellectual history are provided to illustrate how this distinction
has been maintained:
● Vico and Croce: The source cites the Viconian idea that true knowledge can only be
attained about human-made institutions (civil and political). Nature, being God's creation,
remains ultimately inscrutable to humans. Croce, in his interpretation of Vico,
emphasized this separation, arguing that the concepts of natural sciences are human
constructs designed for human purposes.
● Stalin: The source cites Stalin's "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" as an example
of the materialist justification for separating human and natural histories. Stalin argued
that geographical environment, while influencing societal development, is not the
determining factor. Changes in geographical environment occur at a much slower pace
compared to the rapid changes in human society, making the history of humanity's
relationship with the environment seemingly timeless and thus not a subject of
historiography.
The source acknowledges the emergence of environmental history in the late 20th century as a
potential bridge between natural and human histories. However, it distinguishes this field's
approach from the current understanding of anthropogenic climate change.
● Alfred Crosby Jr.: The source uses Alfred Crosby Jr.'s work "The Columbian Exchange"
as an example of this perspective. Crosby, a pioneer in environmental history, emphasized
the biological nature of humans before considering their social or cultural identities.
● Daniel Lord Smail: The source mentions Daniel Lord Smail's "On Deep History and the
Brain" as another example of environmental history's attempt to connect evolutionary and
neuroscientific knowledge with human histories. Smail's work explores the relationship
between biology and culture, but it remains focused on the history of human biology, not
the recently proposed idea of humans as geological agents.
The source argues that the understanding of human agency proposed by climate scientists differs
significantly from that of environmental historians. Humans are no longer seen as mere
biological agents but as a geological force capable of impacting the planet on a geological scale.
● Naomi Oreskes: The source cites Naomi Oreskes, a historian of science, to highlight this
shift in understanding. Oreskes points out that denying global warming equates to
denying that humans have become geological agents capable of altering Earth's basic
physical processes.
● Scale of Human Impact: The source emphasizes the unprecedented scale of human
impact on the planet. Humans now have the capacity to change the atmosphere's
chemistry, leading to rising sea levels, melting ice, and climate change.
● Mass Extinction: The source draws a parallel between the current human impact and
past events of mass extinction, highlighting the immense scale of human activity and its
potential to reshape the planet's biosphere.
Legal Plularism
● This article analyzes the notion of legal pluralism, which is gaining momentum in
various law-related fields.
● Legal pluralism exists everywhere, from the local level to the global level.
● The significance of legal pluralism is not just the existence of multiple legal orders but
the diversity among them, which can cause conflict and uncertainty for individuals and
groups.
● This period began with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 5th century and ended
with the Renaissance in the 15th century.
● The early centuries were known as the Dark Ages, when Europe was invaded by various
groups. Commerce slowed, feudalism developed, and local rulers held more power than
kings.
● The 12th and 13th centuries saw a revival of learning in Europe, marked by the
rediscovery of Aristotle's works and the Justinian Code, as well as the establishment of
universities.
● The mid-to-late medieval period was characterized by various forms of law and
institutions operating in the same space, often without a clear hierarchy. These
included:
○ Local customs: often unwritten and in multiple versions
○ Germanic customary law: codified
○ Feudal law: mostly unwritten
○ Lex mercatoria: commercial law and customs followed by merchants
○ Canon law: law of the Roman Catholic Church
○ Revived Roman law: developed in universities
Coexisting Courts
● Under the personality principle, judges applied different laws based on an individual's
descent. For example, Frankish, Burgundian, Alamannic, or Roman Gaul laws were
applied depending on the person's origin.
● The presence of Jewish and Muslim populations with their own laws further added to the
legal complexity.
● Coexisting bodies of law with different geographical reaches: for example, transnational
laws like the ius commune, lex mercatoria, and ecclesiastical law coexisted with national
and local laws.
● Coexisting institutionalized systems: different legal systems governed different social
groups, such as townsmen, countrymen, churchmen, students, and members of guilds.
Each group had its own courts and rules.
● Conflicting legal norms within a system: even within a single system, different legal
norms, particularly customary laws, could coexist, as illustrated by the quote from Bishop
Agobard of Lyons.
● The modern state system did not exist in Western Europe for most of the medieval period.
England had a relatively centralized system after the Norman Conquest, but the continent
was divided among competing rulers.
● Kings and princes had limited control and derived income from feudal lands, customs,
and court fees.
● The Treaty of Augsburg (1555) established the principle that sovereigns could decide
the religion of their subjects.
● The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) divided Europe into separate territories under
sovereign authority, recognizing state control over internal affairs and territorial
boundaries.
● Customary law, a significant part of medieval law, underwent a fateful transition during
the consolidation of state power.
● Legal professionals took control of customary law: as customary law was incorporated
into the state legal system, it became subject to the influence of legal professionals,
leading to a separation between official “customary law” and actual social customs.
● Legal scholar Azo's interpretation of custom as the “founder and abrogator as well as the
interpreter of law” exemplifies how jurists used the concept of custom to enhance their
power.
● The establishment of the state system led to a shift in views about the role of government
and law.
● Law became an instrument to achieve social objectives: this marked a shift from law
reflecting an existing order to law being used as a tool for change and social engineering.
● European colonization of the non-Western world began in the late 15th century, peaked in
the late 19th century, and mostly ended by the 1970s.
● The form and consequences of colonization varied depending on factors like the period,
the colonized area's circumstances, and the colonizer's motivations.
● Initially, European powers were reluctant to exert full legal control over indigenous
populations.
● They mostly left indigenous legal institutions intact, unless they directly impacted
European interests.
● When colonizers expanded legal authority, they often used indirect rule:
○ This involved relying on existing indigenous leaders or creating "native courts"
that enforced customary or religious laws.
○ This approach led to the coexistence of multiple legal institutions and norms,
similar to medieval Europe.
● Warren Hastings' plan for legal administration in India exemplifies the complex interplay
of colonial and indigenous law.
● Key features included:
○ Establishment of separate courts (Diwani Adalat for civil cases, Foujdari Adalat
for criminal cases).
○ Application of different laws based on religion (Muslim law for Muslims, Hindu
law for Hindus in civil cases; Muslim law universally in criminal cases).
○ Involvement of Mughal officials in both civil and criminal courts.
○ Continued jurisdiction of local leaders (zamindars) over petty disputes.
● Later, the British government established its court with jurisdiction over British subjects
and Company employees, adding another layer of complexity.
● As colonial powers extended their legal reach, they employed three main strategies to
incorporate customary or religious law:
○ Codification: writing down customary law, often selectively and in ways that
served colonial interests.
○ Application by state courts: state courts applying unwritten customary law,
similar to the common law tradition.
○ Creation of customary courts: establishing or recognizing informal courts run
by local leaders, often with limited jurisdiction and subject to oversight by state
courts.
● All three strategies faced challenges in accurately reflecting and implementing customary
law.
● Removing customary law from its social context resulted in the loss of its integrity:
codified customary law often lost its flexibility and responsiveness to social dynamics.
Invention of Customary Law
● Research has shown that what was presented as "customary law" was sometimes not truly
customary or traditional.
● Colonial powers or local elites sometimes invented or selectively interpreted customs
to advance their interests.
● Despite challenges, a dual legal system emerged in many colonized areas, with state law
governing certain aspects of life (economy, government) and customary or religious
institutions enforcing local norms.
● State law often had limited practical reach, particularly in rural areas, while
customary and religious law continued to be influential in daily life.
Five Themes
● Scholars have identified several themes related to legal pluralism in the context of
globalization:
○ International Legal Pluralism: the international legal system itself is
fragmented, with multiple tribunals and overlapping legal norms related to
different areas of regulation (trade, human rights, intellectual property, etc.).
○ Human Rights Challenges: invocation of human rights norms, often by NGOs,
to challenge state laws, actions, or cultural practices.
○ Private Legal Orders: growth of self-creating legal orders in areas like
transnational commerce, the internet, and sports, exemplified by the new lex
mercatoria.
○ Transgovernmental Networks: regulatory networks formed by officials from
different countries or international organizations, often operating outside
traditional state control.
○ Global Movement of People: migration creating diverse communities within
nations, bringing different cultural and religious norms that may conflict with
state law.
● Despite its growing popularity, the concept of legal pluralism suffers from deep
conceptual confusion and disagreement.
● Difficulties arise from:
○ Interdisciplinary nature of the concept, with scholars from different fields
bringing varying perspectives.
○ Different motivations and purposes for using the concept.
○ The lack of a universally accepted definition of "law" for social scientific
purposes.
● Normative order: defining law as the maintenance of order within social groups, which
would mean that every social group has "law."
○ Criticism: this definition is too broad, blurring the distinction between law and
other forms of social regulation.
● Public institutionalized enforcement: defining law based on public institutions
enforcing norms.
● John Griffiths, a leading legal pluralist, adopted Sally Falk Moore's concept of the
semi-autonomous social field (SASF) to define law.
● SASF: social fields with the capacity to create and enforce rules.
● This broad definition led Griffiths to argue that many social arenas, including families,
corporations, sports leagues, and even everyday interactions, have their own legal orders.
● Sally Falk Moore: criticizes Griffiths' use of her SASF concept to define “law,” arguing
that this excessively broad definition confounds the analysis and blurs the distinction
between law and social life.
● Other scholars: question the need to label all forms of social ordering as "law" and
suggest using terms like "normative pluralism" or "regulatory pluralism" instead.
● Marc Galanter's inclusion of social ordering patterns in universities, sports leagues, and
housing developments as examples of "indigenous law" illustrates the expansive view of
law adopted by many legal pluralists.
● John Griffiths, initially a strong advocate for legal pluralism, later renounced the concept,
acknowledging the difficulty in defining law for social scientific purposes.
● He now supports using terms like "normative pluralism" or "pluralism in social control"
instead.
● Instead of seeking a precise social scientific definition of “law,” the article proposes
recognizing law as a "folk concept":
● Law is what people within social groups recognize and label as "law," which varies
across time and place.
● These categories are not mutually exclusive, and there can be overlap and interaction
among them.
● Some norms within these systems may be explicitly recognized as "legal" by the official
legal system or by the system itself.
● The framework aims to provide a useful way to study and understand legal pluralism
without relying on a single definition of "law."
Sources of Clashes
● Coexisting normative systems often make competing claims to authority, legitimacy, and
control.
● This can lead to clashes, especially when the underlying norms are inconsistent.
● Clashes can occur:
○ Within a type of normative system: for example, between human rights law and
state law.
○ Between different types of systems: for example, between state law and
customary law.
● Women seeking protection from oppressive customary practices through state law or
human rights norms exemplifies strategic resort to legal pluralism.
Power Differentials
● Clashes between normative systems reveal power differentials in their ability to exert
influence.
● Official state legal systems: often claim a monopoly on legitimate coercion, but their
actual power can vary.
● Customary, religious, and community systems: can be highly influential in social life,
sometimes resisting or undermining state law.
● There are also power differentials among different levels of official legal systems, such as
between state law and international law.
● The relative power of each system depends on the specific context.
Socio-Political Heterogeneity
Group-Based Heterogeneity
● Occurs when a social arena consists of distinct groups, often differentiated by language,
religion, ethnicity, or culture.
● This type of heterogeneity is often linked to migration and can lead to tensions if one
group disproportionately controls the government or legal system.
Individual-Based Heterogeneity
● Exists when individuals with different normative orientations coexist, such as in urban
areas with diverse populations.
● This often involves individuals holding liberal values alongside those adhering to
non-liberal customary or religious norms.
● Capitalism and urbanization are reshaping heterogeneity, both increasing and decreasing
it.
● Increased migration leads to more diverse urban populations.
● Engagement in economic activities and urban life exposes individuals to new norms,
disrupting traditional ties and potentially lessening heterogeneity.
● It's essential to recognize the hybridity and fluidity of groups and individuals in
heterogeneous environments.
● Identities are not static and can evolve through interaction with different normative
systems.
● Official state legal systems can adopt different stances toward coexisting normative
systems:
○ Neutrality: allowing a degree of autonomy to different communities and
religions, typical of liberal societies.
○ Alignment: identification with the dominant community or religion, also possible
in liberal societies.
● Economic/capitalist norms are often a powerful force driving legal and social change,
potentially conflicting with other normative systems.
● It is essential to analyze both the normative systems themselves and the strategic choices
of actors within those systems to understand legal pluralism.
● The relationship between the lex mercatoria (transnational commercial law) and state
legal systems illustrates how seemingly conflicting systems can coexist and even support
each other, as state courts often enforce arbitration decisions made under the lex
mercatoria.
● When clashes occur, strategic actors often seek the support of official legal systems to
legitimize and enforce their claims.
● This is because official legal systems often hold greater institutional and symbolic power.
● While strategic considerations are important, it's crucial to recognize that loyalty,
principle, familiarity, identity, and other non-strategic factors also influence the choices
of actors in pluralistic settings.
Types of Clashes
● The article identifies four major types of clashes that occur at a deeper level of normative
orientation:
● (iii) Public/Private Divide vs. No Separation: clashes between systems that recognize a
clear separation between the public and private spheres (typical of liberal societies)
versus systems where this distinction is blurred, often leading to different understandings
of the role of government and the use of public power.
Conclusion
● Understanding legal pluralism requires focusing on both the interactions among different
normative systems and the strategic choices of actors operating within those systems.
Historical Parallels
● Recognizing historical parallels, like the separation between official “customary law” and
actual customs in both medieval Europe and colonial contexts, can provide valuable
insights into the dynamics of legal pluralism.
● It's essential to avoid both overemphasizing the dominance of state law and viewing all
normative systems as simply parallel to state law.
● Each system needs to be analyzed in its specific context, taking into account its unique
features and power dynamics.
● While legal pluralism highlights the limits of state power, it's important to recognize that
state law still holds a distinctive position in the modern world due to the state's role in
domestic and international affairs.
● State law, when functioning effectively, also has a unique capacity to pursue a broad
range of goals and objectives beyond normative regulation.
● The key takeaway is that focusing on framing situations in ways that facilitate
meaningful observation and analysis is more important than seeking definitive answers to
abstract questions like "What is law?"
● This framework encourages studying how different normative systems interact, how they
exert power, and how strategic actors navigate these complex environments.
Globalisation Paradox
Chapter 7
● The author poses a question to his economic development students at Harvard: "Would you rather
be rich in a poor country or poor in a rich country?"
● He clarifies that this considers only personal consumption and defines "rich" and "poor" based on
the top and bottom 10% of income distribution for individuals and average income per person for
countries.
● Most students choose to be rich in a poor country, but this is incorrect.
● The average poor person in a rich country earns three times more than the average rich person
in a poor country ($9,400 vs. $3,000, adjusted for purchasing power).
● This highlights a key point: income disparities are larger across nations than within them.
● The author attributes students' incorrect answers to a misconception about the small percentage of
the population represented by the extremely wealthy in poor countries.
● Being poor in a rich country is significantly better than being rich in a poor country, illustrating
that your birth country significantly impacts your life possibilities.
● This was not always the case. At the start of the Industrial Revolution, the income gap
between the richest and poorest regions was 2:1. Today, it is 20:1.
● The gap between the richest and poorest country is now approximately 80:1.
● While there has been global growth, few poor countries have closed the gap with advanced
nations.
● The author calls this phenomenon "divergence, big time", a term coined by his Harvard
colleague Lant Pritchett.
● The main cause of poverty is low productivity, leading to insufficient production to meet basic
needs like food, housing, health, and education.
● Several factors contribute to low productivity, including:
○ Lack of credit: Hinders producers from investing to increase output and income.
○ Limited access to new technologies: Prevents adoption of efficient production methods.
○ Lack of skills, knowledge, or job opportunities: Reduces the capacity for productive
work.
○ Small market size: Discourages investment in new equipment and technologies due to
lower profitability.
○ Exploitative elites: Often in collaboration with governments, they obstruct economic
improvements that threaten their power.
● Globalization aims to provide universal access to markets, capital, technology, and good
governance, potentially addressing all these poverty-creating deficiencies.
● Yet, despite this potential, the past two centuries of globalization have seen massive economic
divergence. This raises the question: Why so much poverty amidst plenty?
● Economists and policymakers have grappled with the question of globalization's role in the "great
divergence" for a long time.
● Two opposing narratives have emerged:
○ Too little globalization: This view argues that limited integration into the global
economy hinders growth.
○ Too much globalization: This perspective contends that excessive exposure to global
forces is detrimental to development.
● The debate ultimately revolves around whether opening up to or protecting oneself from the
global economy is better for economic growth.
● The author argues that neither narrative adequately explains the varying success of different
countries.
● He proposes a middle ground: Globalization has significant growth potential, but maximizing
integration is not the optimal approach.
● A "thin" version of globalization, similar to the Bretton Woods system, seems to work best.
● This involves selective engagement with the global economy – reaping the benefits while
mitigating the risks.
● The author uses the analogy of "keeping the windows open, but don't forget the mosquito
screen" – enjoying fresh air while keeping out bugs.
Globalization's Uneven Impact in the 19th Century: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
● The Industrial Revolution spread unevenly, primarily benefiting Europe, North America,
Australia, and New Zealand, leaving the rest of the world largely as raw materials producers.
● Globalization played a dual role in this process, both facilitating the spread of new
technologies and entrenching the division between industrial core and raw materials
periphery.
● Japan, despite sharing characteristics with peripheral economies, became the only non-Western
nation to industrialize before 1914.
● This success was attributed to:
○ A group of educated and patriotic businessmen and merchants.
○ A post-Meiji Restoration government (1868) committed to economic modernization and
rejecting laissez-faire ideology.
● The Japanese government played a key role in:
○ Creating a modern national economy: unified currency, railroads, public education,
banking laws.
○ Implementing industrial policies: State initiatives promoting specific industries.
● While many state-run enterprises failed, they provided valuable learning experiences and trained
skilled workers who later joined the private sector.
● The government also facilitated technology transfer by employing foreign experts, sending
students abroad, and protecting domestic industries with tariffs.
● This active approach allowed Japan to diversify away from raw materials and achieve substantial
economic growth.
● **By the late 20th century, Japan's success inspired other East Asian economies (South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) to pursue rapid growth. **
● This "Asian miracle" presented a challenge to the World Bank's free market-centric development
model.
● The World Bank's 1993 report "The East Asian Miracle" highlighted the significant role of state
intervention in these economies, contradicting their own free market prescriptions.
● The report acknowledged the positive effects of government policies, such as credit allocation
and capital controls, in some sections but continued to advocate against industrial policies in
others.
● This contradiction underscores the limitations of rigidly separating markets and state intervention.
● The East Asian experience demonstrates that a combination of state guidance and market
forces is crucial for successful development.
● South Korea and Taiwan, starting from low-income levels in the 1950s, achieved remarkable
growth by mirroring Japan's approach.
● Their success was driven by:
○ Governments focused on economic growth, empowered by prior land reforms and
motivated by geopolitical concerns.
○ Removal of barriers to private investment: excessive taxation, bureaucracy, corruption,
inadequate infrastructure, high inflation.
○ Interventionist policies: Targeted government incentives to stimulate investment in key
manufacturing sectors.
● Both countries used a combination of:
○ Protection from international competition: Shielding infant industries until they became
competitive.
○ Export promotion: Subsidies and pressure to ensure continuous export growth.
○ Public investments: Facilitating private enterprise through cheap inputs and infrastructure
development.
● Their experience exemplifies the importance of pragmatic government actions to energize
the private sector, utilize markets strategically, and diversify away from reliance on natural
resources.
● China's economic transformation since 1978, achieving unprecedented growth while lifting
millions out of poverty, presents a compelling case for globalization's potential benefits.
● However, China's approach also challenges the conventional wisdom of deep integration
through financial globalization and strict adherence to WTO rules.
● China's success stemmed from:
○ Embracing markets while maintaining "Chinese characteristics" in its institutions,
pragmatically adapting Western models to local realities.
○ Experimentation with alternative institutional arrangements, turning weaknesses into
advantages.
● China's opening to the world defied conventional advice, relying on gradual liberalization and
strategic protection.
● Instead of immediate trade barrier removal, China employed a complex system of tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, and import licenses, protecting its domestic industries and ensuring
stability during the transition.
● Special Economic Zones (SEZs):
○ Offered foreign investors favorable conditions and export incentives without jeopardizing
existing state enterprises.
● China's growth was fueled by a shift toward high-productivity, advanced products, defying
expectations for a labor-abundant economy.
● This transformation was driven by government policies encouraging technology transfer
and domestic capability building.
● China strategically leveraged foreign investment:
○ Requiring joint ventures with domestic firms in certain sectors (mobile phones,
computers).
○ Mandating high levels of local content in others (autos).
○ Exploiting weak intellectual property enforcement to facilitate reverse engineering.
○ Creating industrial clusters through decentralized policymaking.
● While many state-supported initiatives failed, they contributed to skills development,
technology diffusion, and the emergence of successful companies like Lenovo.
● Even after joining the WTO in 2001, China continued to use an undervalued exchange rate to
support its industries, effectively providing an implicit subsidy to exporters.
● This demonstrates China's willingness to adapt its approach to globalization to serve its
development needs, even if it meant deviating from established norms.
● The central message from the East Asian experience is the need for economic diversification
beyond commodities and raw materials.
● Globalization, while presenting opportunities, can also exacerbate the "commodities trap."
● To overcome this trap, countries need to invest in social capabilities (technology adaptation,
skills development, specialized inputs, coordinated investments).
● Markets alone are often insufficient to drive this process, as social benefits exceed private
gains.
● Government support, including protective tariffs, subsidies, undervalued currencies, and
other forms of assistance, is crucial to incentivize entry into new industries.
● "Deep integration" globalization models, by restricting such industrial policies, can hinder
development and undermine globalization's positive potential.
● The key is to embrace a "thin" globalization approach, using strategic interventions to
harness globalization's benefits while mitigating its risks.
● The lack of widespread emulation of the East Asian model is partly due to governments
prioritizing power over development.
● However, economists also bear responsibility for promoting narratives that have
misinformed policy decisions.
● Understanding the complex interplay of politics, economics, and globalization is essential
for crafting effective development strategies.
Chapter 9
Argentina's Economic Crisis and the Political Trilemma of the
World Economy
Argentina's Economic Crisis in the 1990s
● Domingo Cavallo, Argentina's foreign minister and later economy minister, believed
that Argentina's economic woes stemmed from inconsistent government policies. He
argued that excessive governmental discretion had eroded investor confidence, leading to
capital flight and a reluctance to invest in the domestic currency.
● Cavallo's solution, implemented in 1991, involved the Convertibility Law, which
pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar at a fixed exchange rate. This law
effectively compelled Argentina's central bank to adhere to a gold standard-like system,
limiting its ability to manipulate monetary policy.
● In addition to the Convertibility Law, Cavallo pursued aggressive privatization,
deregulation, and economic liberalization. He believed that these actions, coupled with
deeper global integration, would restore investor confidence by reducing the potential for
arbitrary government interventions and the undue influence of special interest groups.
● Cavallo saw globalization as a dual force that would both stabilize and stimulate
Argentina's economy. He believed that globalization would not only provide discipline
and credibility to economic policies, but also attract foreign capital, boosting domestic
investment and driving economic growth. He argued that increased competition from
imports would force domestic producers to enhance their competitiveness and
productivity, ultimately solving Argentina's economic problems.
● Cavallo's strategy initially yielded positive results. The Convertibility Law effectively
halted hyperinflation, restored price stability, and fostered a degree of confidence,
attracting significant capital inflows. Consequently, investment, exports, and incomes
experienced rapid growth, making Argentina a model for multilateral institutions and
globalization proponents during the mid-1990s.
● However, Argentina's economic revival proved short-lived. The Asian financial crisis
of the late 1990s negatively impacted the country by reducing global investors' appetite
for emerging markets. A more devastating blow came in early 1999 when Brazil
devalued its currency by 40% against the U.S. dollar. This move granted Brazilian
exporters a significant pricing advantage in international markets, putting pressure on
Argentina, Brazil's main competitor. Concerns grew about Argentina's ability to service
its external debt as its peso appeared overvalued. Confidence plummeted, leading to a
decline in Argentina's creditworthiness, even falling below that of some African
countries.
● Cavallo, who had left office in 1996 due to a strained relationship with
then-President Menem, was reappointed in 2001 by President de la Rúa to restore
confidence. However, his initial attempts to adjust trade and currency policies produced
minimal results, forcing him to implement austerity measures and fiscal cutbacks in an
economy already struggling with high unemployment (20%). In July 2001, he introduced
a "zero-deficit" plan, resulting in significant cuts to government salaries and pensions (up
to 13%). These actions further exacerbated the financial panic.
● Fearing a devaluation of the peso, domestic depositors rushed to withdraw their
funds from banks, compelling the government to impose limits on cash withdrawals.
The fiscal cuts and restrictions on bank withdrawals triggered widespread protests,
nationwide strikes, riots in major cities, and looting. Cavallo and de la Rúa resigned in
December 2001. Facing a severe shortage of funds, the Argentine government ultimately
froze domestic bank accounts, defaulted on its foreign debt, reimposed capital controls,
and devalued the peso. In 2002, incomes plummeted by 12%, marking the most
significant decline in decades. The experiment with hyperglobalization had failed
dramatically.
● The primary reason for Argentina's economic collapse was the conflict between
domestic politics and the demands of hyperglobalization. The painful economic
adjustments necessary for deep integration were not well-received by domestic
constituencies, leading to political instability and ultimately the failure of Cavallo's
strategy.
● In hindsight, Argentina's policymakers successfully addressed the issue of monetary
mismanagement but ultimately ran into another problem: an uncompetitive
currency. A more flexible exchange rate policy or abandoning the Convertibility Law
earlier (e.g., in 1996) could have potentially averted the crisis. However, Argentine
policymakers were deeply committed to the Convertibility Law, making it politically
difficult to abandon.
● Argentina's experience highlights a fundamental conflict between national
democracy and deep globalization. Democratic politics inherently influences financial
markets, making deep integration with the global economy difficult. This lesson,
previously learned by Britain in 1931 when it was forced to abandon the gold standard
and enshrined in the Bretton Woods system, was overlooked by Argentina.
● The failure of Argentina's leaders was not a matter of lacking political will, but
rather the inability to reconcile the demands of global financial markets with the
needs and expectations of the Argentine people. While Cavallo understood the
necessity of adhering to financial market rules, he faced increasing skepticism from
investors and creditors about the Argentine people's willingness to tolerate austerity
measures.
● In his book "The Lexus and the Olive Tree," Tom Friedman argued that
globalization forces nations to adopt a "Golden Straitjacket" characterized by free
trade, free capital markets, free enterprise, and limited government. He believed that
this would lead to economic growth at the expense of political freedom, reducing
domestic policy choices to trivial matters.
● Friedman's assertion that deep integration automatically leads to rapid economic
growth is inaccurate, as demonstrated by Argentina's experience. His view of the
"Golden Straitjacket" as an inevitable reality is also flawed, as Argentina's case
exemplifies the ultimate triumph of domestic politics over deep integration in a
democratic society.
● Despite these flaws, Friedman's core insight about the inherent tension between
hyperglobalization and democratic politics remains valid. Hyperglobalization requires
limiting domestic political choices and shielding technocrats from popular demands.
However, Friedman overestimated the economic benefits of hyperglobalization and
underestimated the power of politics, leading him to overestimate the feasibility and
desirability of deep integration.
● The current global economic landscape exists in an uncomfortable space within the
trilemma, failing to fully commit to any of the three options. The author argues for the
necessity of acknowledging the need to moderate ambitions regarding economic
globalization to preserve the nation-state as the primary locus of democratic politics.
● Instead of simply reverting to the approaches of the mid-20th century, a more
nuanced approach is required. A "thin" version of globalization, inspired by the
Bretton Woods compromise but adapted to the present context, is necessary.
● A reimagined globalization model should focus on enhancing national democracy
rather than undermining it. Global rules can be designed to strengthen democratic
processes by incorporating procedural safeguards, promoting transparency, ensuring
representation, and utilizing relevant evidence in decision-making.
● The hyperglobalization agenda, in contrast, prioritizes the interests of multinational
corporations, big banks, and investment houses over broader social and economic
objectives. This approach requires buying into a narrative that favors these interests,
ultimately limiting democratic decision-making.
● To rectify this imbalance, two strategies are proposed:
○ Globalizing democratic governance alongside markets: This option aligns with
the "Global Governance" approach discussed earlier, but with a stronger emphasis
on democratic accountability and representation.
○ Redesigning trade and investment agreements to create more space for
democratic decision-making at the national level: This approach builds upon
the "Bretton Woods Compromise" by focusing on establishing global rules that
support and strengthen democratic processes within nation-states.
The author's analysis emphasizes the importance of rethinking the relationship between
globalization and democracy. He argues that pursuing deep economic integration without
considering its impact on domestic politics can lead to social and economic instability, ultimately
undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic institutions. A more balanced
approach, focusing on a "thin" version of globalization with a strong emphasis on democratic
values, is crucial for ensuring a stable and prosperous global economic order that benefits all
stakeholders.
Liberalism - Kahm
● The success of liberalism has made it difficult to engage in moral deliberations, particularly when
dealing with extreme cultural differences.
● Liberalism aims to create a public discourse where cultural differences are insignificant, as
exemplified by Rawls's original position.
Example: Rawls's original position, where individuals are stripped of their particular identities and
deliberate behind a "veil of ignorance," demonstrates the liberal effort to neutralize the impact of cultural
differences in political discourse.
● From this perspective, differences are considered irrelevant, focusing instead on shared human
needs and rationality.
● Those unable to adopt this "bare rationality" are deemed "unreasonable," implying a form of
prejudice or intolerance.
● Consequently, liberalism struggles to address those holding illiberal beliefs.
● This limitation is evident in the work of multicultural critics of liberalism, such as Taylor,
Kymlicka, and Tully, who prioritize liberal values of autonomy and equality when evaluating
cultural minorities.
Example: Taylor and Kymlicka argue that cultural minorities deserve recognition and protection only if
they uphold liberal values within their communities.
● This approach fails to adequately recognize and engage with cultures that challenge liberal
values.
● The belief that dialogue can resolve differences in values is a restatement of the liberal faith in
reason, assuming that discussion leads to common ground.
Example: Benhabib's concept of "liberal dialogue" exemplifies this faith in reason as a means of bridging
normative differences.
● However, ethical inquiry is not a scientific endeavor; normative differences can persist even with
mutual understanding.
Example: Charles Larmore acknowledges the persistence of reasonable disagreement despite dialogue,
although he still believes in a shared commitment to equal respect.
● The quest for an "unbeatable" argument or a unifying proposition might be futile, suggesting a
need to focus on self-understanding instead.
● Examining the debate between liberals and communitarians sheds light on the conceptual
framework of liberalism and its limitations.
● Communitarians criticized liberals for failing to offer a robust conception of the subject and
undermining communities where identity formation occurs.
● They argued that normative theory should not begin with an abstract subject like in Rawls's "veil
of ignorance."
Example: Sandel and Gabel critique the liberal conception of the subject, emphasizing the importance of
communities in shaping individual identity.
● Instead, they propose a starting point within existing communities and relationships.
Example: Ignatieff highlights the significance of relationships and responsibilities in shaping moral
experience.
● They question the primacy of rational autonomy, highlighting the role of narrative, tradition, and
attachment in moral life.
Example: Taylor emphasizes the importance of narrative and an "examined life" in shaping individual
identity.
● They reject the "blank-slate" model of the individual, asserting that individuals are always already
situated within communities that shape their values and identities.
Example: Minow and Gilligan underscore the inherent interconnectedness of individuals within various
communities.
● They emphasize concrete differences and responsibilities to others, not abstract equality, as the
foundation of moral behavior.
● Liberals acknowledge that individuals are members of particular communities, but they maintain
that individuals can abstract from those particulars.
● They believe that individuals can imagine a subject prior to such attachments and engage in moral
inquiry from that abstract perspective.
Example: Unger argues for the individual's capacity to step outside their immediate context and engage
in critical reflection.
● Liberals prioritize the value of justice, which they believe requires a capacity for detachment from
any particular context.
● They criticize communitarians for lacking a non-contextualized standard to distinguish good from
bad communities.
Example: Unger highlights the dangers of "false necessity" associated with an overemphasis on context
and the risks of an inflated sense of choice stemming from excessive abstraction.
● Both perspectives hold value, with context emphasizing commitment (love, forgiveness) and
abstraction emphasizing choice (justice).
Example: Post discusses balancing these norms in legal theory, recognizing the importance of both
community and individual autonomy.
● A practical balance between freedom and necessity is crucial for both individual and political
stability.
● Contemporary political theory has sought to reconcile liberalism's emphasis on autonomy with
the development of values within particular communities.
Example: Rawls, Habermas, Ackerman, and Dworkin have explored integrating liberal principles with
historical and communal contexts.
● This shift is also evident in constitutional law's engagement with the "republican revival."
Example: The "republican revival" in constitutional theory reflects an attempt to connect liberal
principles with historical and communal traditions.
Example: The concepts of "ius sanguinis" and "ius soli," rooted in Roman law, demonstrate the historical
and geographical grounding of citizenship, contrasting with liberalism's universal aspirations.
● This creates a tension between liberalism's universal aspirations and the particularity of political
communities.
Example: Fiss explores the challenges of reconciling liberal values with the realities of immigration law
and citizenship.
● Liberals tend to favor global governance based on universal principles of justice as a solution.
Example: Slaughter, Nussbaum, and others advocate for cosmopolitan citizenship and transnational
institutions to address the limitations of the nation-state.
● This trend is reflected in the development of human rights law and the incorporation of
international law into domestic legal systems.
Example: The European law of rights and the increasing constitutionalization of human rights globally
exemplify the movement towards a universal framework of rights.
● However, communitarians view liberalism, even when historically grounded, as a threat to the
integrity of particular communities.
● They fear that the abstract individual favored by liberalism lacks a defined character and may lead
to anomie and a decline in civic institutions.
Example: Glendon and Etzioni critique the perceived negative consequences of liberal individualism on
social cohesion and civic engagement.
● The debate over internet access exemplifies these tensions, with some seeing it as a symbol of
freedom and others as a source of moral decay.
Example: Fiss expresses concerns about the internet's potential to transform individuals into consumers
rather than engaged citizens.
● Ultimately, the synthetic approaches fail to resolve the fundamental tension between individual
autonomy and communal belonging.
The Unresolvable Antinomy of Discourse
Example: Hampton emphasizes the importance of both metaphysics and historical context in
understanding the foundations of liberalism, highlighting the complex interplay between abstract
principles and concrete realities.
● This antinomy manifests at various levels, from simple propositions to narratives and theoretical
reflection.
● Every proposition has a double-character: it conveys content and can become the object of further
reflection.
Example: The Jewish prohibition on naming God can be understood as an attempt to limit the capacity
for critical distance and maintain a sense of awe and reverence.
● This reflexivity applies to first-person propositions, where the subject ("I") becomes an object
("me") of critical examination.
Example: The concept of Cartesian doubt exemplifies this process of self-reflection and the inherent
instability of the subject.
● This creates an endless transition between subjective and objective perspectives, reflecting the
inherent instability of the self.
Example: Mead's work on the "I" and the "me" explores the social and psychological dimensions of this
dynamic process of self-formation.
● Liberalism prioritizes the "I" (subject) and its capacity for critical reflection, while
communitarianism focuses on the "me" (object) shaped by existing relationships and narratives.
Example: Zizek analyzes the interplay between the "I" and the "me" within the framework of ideology
critique, highlighting the role of power and social structures in shaping self-perception.
● Liberalism's open future and the communitarian's defined past reflect this fundamental difference
in emphasis.
Example: Habermas's theory of communicative action emphasizes the potential for rational consensus
and a more just future through open dialogue, reflecting a liberal orientation towards an evolving self and
society.
● However, recognizing the other as a condition of speech doesn't dictate how we should value the
critical capacity of the "I."
Example: Taylor explores the ethical implications of recognition and dialogue, acknowledging the
complexities of balancing individual autonomy with communal responsibilities.
● Both the capacity for detachment and embeddedness are ontological facts of subjectivity,
highlighting the complex interplay between the "I," the "me," and the "you" in shaping individual
identity.
● The antinomy resurfaces in narrative, which requires a community and serves to make sense of its
history and identity.
Example: Anderson examines the role of "imagined communities" in constructing national identities
through shared narratives and symbols.
● However, narratives are open to interpretation and reinterpretation, leading to a tension between
fundamentalist and interpretive approaches.
Example: Cover and Kahn discuss the interplay of "nomos" (law) and "narrative" in legal interpretation,
highlighting the role of storytelling and evolving understandings in shaping legal norms.
● The question of truth creates a gap between the subject and the narrative, allowing for critical
reflection and the potential for both doubt and reaffirmation.
Example: The Talmud exemplifies a tradition that embraces both the preservation of a sacred text and a
dynamic interpretive process.
● Authority plays a role in limiting interpretive debate, but it cannot ultimately resolve the inherent
instability of meaning.
Example: Legal institutions like courts and juries wield authority in establishing the "truth" in specific
cases, but their pronouncements do not necessarily reflect ultimate or objective truth.
● The proliferation of narratives challenges communal unity, with liberalism finding unity in the
authorial subject and communitarianism seeking it in shared content.
Example: Dworkin's "chain-novel" metaphor captures the ongoing process of legal interpretation and the
interplay between individual judges and a shared legal tradition.
● Liberalism's focus on negative liberty and endless possibility contrasts with communitarianism's
emphasis on existing narratives and limitations.
Example: Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty highlights the tension between
freedom from interference and the pursuit of specific goals or values.
● Ultimately, neither liberalism nor communitarianism adequately addresses the realities of political
choice and sacrifice.
Beyond Discourse: Towards an Understanding of Political Action
● Political action occurs before theoretical debates are resolved, highlighting the limitations of
discourse-based approaches to politics.
Example: Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates the complexities of political
decision-making and the role of power, strategy, and contingency.
Example: Hobbes's theory, which prioritizes the avoidance of death and the preservation of life, fails to
adequately account for the phenomenon of political sacrifice.
● Communitarianism also faces difficulties in explaining the state's power to demand sacrifice, as it
emphasizes communal narratives and values that may not always align with state interests.
Example: Plato's "Crito" explores the conflict between individual conscience and the demands of the
state, highlighting the potential for tension between personal beliefs and political obligations.
● The state's claim to loyalty goes beyond contractual agreements, demanding a commitment that
can sometimes require the ultimate sacrifice.
● Liberalism's theoretical strengths do not always translate into a satisfactory understanding of the
complexities of political life.
● The debate between liberalism and communitarianism, while illuminating, ultimately fails to
provide a comprehensive theory of the political.
● A more robust theory needs to account for the interplay of individual agency, communal
belonging, and the realities of power and sacrifice that characterize the political realm.
This response aims to comprehensively analyze the excerpt from Kahm's book, highlighting key concepts,
arguments, and examples provided in the text. The response is structured thematically to address the user's
request for a heading-wise and chronological understanding of the source material.
Colonialism - Cohen
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the East India Company transformed itself from a
trading entity to an administrator. This shift had major implications for the development of India, as it
marked the beginning of British colonial rule. The process was gradual, and involved a number of key
stages.
● Initially, the Company's primary focus was on trade. However, over time it began to acquire
more and more political and military power. This was partly due to the decline of the Mughal
Empire, which created a power vacuum in India. The Company took advantage of this situation to
expand its influence, and by the mid-eighteenth century it had become a major force in Indian
politics.
● A key turning point came in 1757, with the Battle of Plassey. This victory gave the Company
control of Bengal, a wealthy and populous province. The Company used its new power to extract
revenue from Bengal, which it used to finance its military expansion.
● The Company's growing power led to increasing tensions with Indian rulers. This
culminated in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, a major uprising against British rule. The mutiny was
brutally suppressed, and in its aftermath the British government took direct control of India.
The establishment of British rule had a profound impact on India. It led to the introduction of new
legal and administrative systems, the exploitation of India's resources, and the suppression of Indian
culture and society.
The transformation of the East India Company from a trading entity into an administrator was a
gradual process. It began in the early eighteenth century, as the Company started to acquire more and
more territory.
● The Company needed administrators to manage its growing domains. They began by
employing local Indian officials. However, over time they increasingly relied on British officials.
In 1765, Robert Clive, the Governor-General of Bengal, took a decisive step in the transformation
of the Company. He introduced a system of “dual government” in Bengal. Under this system, the
Company took control of the revenue administration, while the Nawab of Bengal remained the nominal
ruler. However, the Nawab was a puppet ruler, and the real power lay with the Company.
● Clive's system was designed to maximize revenue collection while minimizing the
Company's administrative burden. It was highly effective in achieving these goals. However, it
was also deeply unpopular with the Bengali people, who saw it as a form of exploitation.
The East India Company gradually developed a complex legal and administrative apparatus to
govern its territories.
● The Company's legal system was based on English law, but it was also influenced by Indian
law. The Company established courts to administer justice, and it appointed judges and other
legal officials.
● The Company's administrative system was also based on English models, but it was adapted
to the Indian context. The Company created a bureaucracy to manage its affairs, and it
appointed officials to oversee various aspects of government.
The Company's legal and administrative systems were designed to serve its interests, and they were
often used to exploit the Indian people. However, they also played a role in modernizing India and
laying the foundations for the modern Indian state.
Warren Hastings, who served as Governor-General of Bengal from 1772 to 1785, played a key role
in the development of the East India Company's legal and administrative systems. He was a skilled
administrator and a shrewd politician, and he was determined to make the Company's rule in India more
effective.
One of Hastings' most significant achievements was the establishment of a Supreme Court in
Calcutta in 1774. The court was modeled on the English legal system, and it was intended to provide a
more impartial and efficient system of justice than the existing Mughal courts.
● Hastings also reformed the Company's revenue system. He introduced a system of competitive
bidding for the right to collect taxes, which helped to increase revenue collection. He also
established a Board of Revenue to oversee the revenue administration.
Hastings' reforms were controversial, and he was accused of corruption and abuse of power.
However, he was also a visionary leader, and his reforms laid the foundations for the modern Indian state.
The East India Company's Interaction with Existing Legal and Administrative
Systems
The East India Company did not completely replace the existing legal and administrative systems in
India. Instead, it sought to co-opt these systems and use them to its advantage.
● The Company recognized that it could not rule India effectively without the cooperation of
the Indian elite. It therefore sought to accommodate Indian customs and laws, as long as they did
not conflict with its interests.
One example of this is the way in which the Company dealt with the Mughal legal system. The
Company allowed the Mughal courts to continue to function, but it also established its own courts to
administer justice. The Company's courts were generally seen as more impartial and efficient than the
Mughal courts, and they gradually came to supplant the Mughal courts.
● The Company also sought to co-opt Indian administrative systems. For example, the
Company retained the system of zamindari, under which local landlords were responsible for
collecting taxes. However, the Company made changes to the zamindari system to make it more
efficient and to increase revenue collection.
The East India Company faced a number of challenges in understanding and applying Indian law.
● One challenge was the sheer complexity of Indian law. Indian law was a complex mix of
Hindu law, Muslim law, and customary law. It was also often unwritten and based on oral
tradition.
● Another challenge was the language barrier. Indian law was written in a variety of languages,
including Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. Few British officials were fluent in these languages,
which made it difficult for them to understand and apply Indian law.
To overcome these challenges, the Company relied on Indian legal experts. These experts were
known as pandits (for Hindu law) and maulvis (for Muslim law). The pandits and maulvis provided the
Company with advice on Indian law, and they helped to translate Indian legal texts into English.
● However, the reliance on Indian legal experts also created problems. The pandits and maulvis
often had their own agendas, and they could sometimes manipulate the law to serve their
interests. They were also not always consistent in their interpretations of the law.
As the East India Company's power grew, there was a debate over whether English law should be
applied in India.
● Some British officials argued that English law was superior to Indian law, and that it should
be introduced in India to modernize the country. They argued that English law was more just,
more efficient, and more conducive to economic development.
● Other British officials argued that English law was not suitable for India. They argued that
Indian society was too different from British society, and that English law would be impossible to
apply fairly and effectively in the Indian context. They also argued that introducing English law
would be seen as an attack on Indian culture and tradition.
This debate was never fully resolved. In practice, the Company adopted a pragmatic approach, applying
English law in some areas and Indian law in others. However, the trend was towards the increasing
application of English law, particularly in the areas of criminal law and commercial law.
● The Company needed to translate Indian legal texts into English so that British officials
could understand and apply them. The Company also needed to translate English legal texts
into Indian languages so that Indian subjects could understand their rights and obligations.
● It was not simply a matter of finding the right words in another language. It also involved
understanding the different legal concepts and systems of the two cultures.
● A further complication was that there was no single standard for translating legal terms.
Different translators used different terms, which could lead to confusion and misunderstanding.
Despite these challenges, the East India Company made significant progress in translating Indian
legal texts into English.
● One of the most important translations was the Code of Gentoo Laws, which was compiled
by Nathaniel Brassey Halhed in 1776. This code was a compilation of Hindu laws, and it was
widely used by British officials in administering justice.
The Case of William Jones and the Study of Hindu and Muslim Law
Sir William Jones, a British judge who served in India from 1783 to 1794, played a key role in the
development of the study of Hindu and Muslim law. Jones was a brilliant scholar, and he was
fascinated by Indian culture and law. He believed that it was essential for British officials to understand
Indian law in order to rule India effectively.
● Jones set about learning Sanskrit and Arabic, and he began to study Hindu and Muslim
legal texts. He translated a number of important legal texts into English, including the
Manusmriti (a Hindu law code) and the Quran.
Jones' work helped to make Indian law more accessible to British officials, and it laid the
foundations for the modern study of Hindu and Muslim law. Jones also established the Asiatic Society
of Bengal in 1784, which was dedicated to the study of Indian culture and learning.
The East India Company's rule had a profound impact on the Indian legal system.
● The Company introduced a number of new legal concepts and institutions, and it
transformed the way in which law was administered in India. The Company's legacy is still
felt today in the modern Indian legal system.
One of the most significant legacies of the East India Company was the introduction of English
common law into India. Common law is a system of law that is based on precedent, or the decisions of
previous courts. Common law was introduced into India gradually, through the decisions of the
Company's courts.
● Another important legacy of the Company was the codification of Indian law. Codification is
the process of writing down laws in a systematic and comprehensive way. The Company codified
a number of areas of Indian law, including Hindu law, Muslim law, and criminal law.
● It made the law more accessible and understandable. It also made the law more consistent and
predictable. However, codification also had some drawbacks. It could lead to the ossification of
the law, and it could make it more difficult to adapt the law to changing circumstances.
● Some argue that the Company's rule was a period of exploitation and oppression. They point
to the Company's economic policies, which they argue led to the impoverishment of India. They
also point to the Company's suppression of Indian culture and tradition.
● Others argue that the Company's rule was a period of progress and modernization. They
point to the Company's introduction of new technologies, such as the railways and the telegraph.
They also point to the Company's development of modern education and healthcare systems.
The truth is probably somewhere in between. The East India Company's rule was a complex and
contradictory period in Indian history. It had both positive and negative impacts, and its legacy is still felt
today.
● The Battle of Plassey (1757): This victory marked a turning point in the East India Company's
rise to power. It gave the Company control of Bengal, a wealthy and populous province, and the
resources to further expand its influence.
● Dual Government in Bengal (1765): This system, introduced by Robert Clive, gave the East
India Company control over revenue collection while leaving the Nawab of Bengal as a
figurehead ruler. This system aimed to maximize revenue while minimizing the Company's
administrative burden but was seen as exploitative by the Bengali people.
● Warren Hastings' Reforms: Hastings, as Governor-General of Bengal, focused on establishing a
Supreme Court in Calcutta (1774) modeled on the English legal system and reforming the
revenue system to increase efficiency and collection. His efforts were controversial but significant
in shaping the future Indian legal system.
● Co-opting Existing Systems: The East India Company strategically retained aspects of the
existing Mughal legal and administrative systems. This included allowing Mughal courts to
function alongside their own, and adapting the zamindari system to their needs.
● Challenges in Applying Indian Law: British officials faced difficulties understanding and
applying Indian law due to its complexity, diverse sources, and language barriers. This led them
to rely on Indian legal experts, "pandits" for Hindu law and "maulvis" for Muslim law, who often
had their own agendas and inconsistencies in interpretations.
● Debate Over English Law in India: British officials debated whether to apply English law in
India. Some advocated for its superiority and modernizing influence, while others argued its
unsuitability for the vastly different Indian societal context. This debate ultimately led to a
pragmatic approach, applying both systems selectively.
● Importance of Translation: The East India Company heavily relied on translations for effective
governance. They needed to translate Indian legal texts into English for British officials and vice
versa for Indian subjects. However, translating legal concepts between different cultures and the
lack of standard legal terms created challenges.
● Sir William Jones' Contributions: As a judge and scholar, Jones dedicated himself to
understanding Hindu and Muslim law. He learned Sanskrit and Arabic, translated key legal texts
like Manusmriti and the Quran, and his work laid the groundwork for modern legal scholarship in
these fields.
● Legacy on the Indian Legal System: The East India Company's influence left enduring marks
on the Indian legal system, including the introduction of English common law and the
codification of Indian law. While these brought benefits like accessibility and consistency, they
also had drawbacks, potentially limiting the law's adaptability.
● Ongoing Debate on Colonial Legacy: Opinions remain divided on the East India Company's
impact on India. Some view it as a period of exploitation and cultural suppression, while others
highlight its contributions to modernization and development. The truth likely lies somewhere in
between, acknowledging both the positive and negative aspects of this complex period.
These examples highlight the gradual but significant transformation of the East India Company from a
trading entity to a colonial power, and the complex and multifaceted ways in which it shaped the legal and
administrative landscape of India. The sources illustrate the challenges and opportunities that the
Company faced, and the lasting impact of its rule on India's legal and political systems.