0% found this document useful (0 votes)
10 views4 pages

RFC 9734

This document defines a new Extended Key Usage (EKU) identifier for Instant Messaging (IM) URIs to be included in X.509 v3 public key certificates, aimed at enhancing security by providing a specific purpose for IM identity certificates. The KeyPurposeId 'id-kp-imUri' is introduced to prevent misuse of general purpose identifiers in IM systems. This specification is part of the Internet Standards Track and has been approved by the IETF community.

Uploaded by

xobocih539
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as TXT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
10 views4 pages

RFC 9734

This document defines a new Extended Key Usage (EKU) identifier for Instant Messaging (IM) URIs to be included in X.509 v3 public key certificates, aimed at enhancing security by providing a specific purpose for IM identity certificates. The KeyPurposeId 'id-kp-imUri' is introduced to prevent misuse of general purpose identifiers in IM systems. This specification is part of the Internet Standards Track and has been approved by the IETF community.

Uploaded by

xobocih539
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as TXT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R.

Mahy
Request for Comments: 9734 Rohan Mahy Consulting Services
Category: Standards Track February 2025
ISSN: 2070-1721

X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs

Abstract

RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers


(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines an
Instant Messaging (IM) identity KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key
certificates

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force


(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,


and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9734.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal


Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Definitions
3. The IM URI EKU
4. Security Considerations
5. IANA Considerations
6. References
6.1. Normative References
6.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
Acknowledgments
Author's Address

1. Introduction

Instant Messaging (IM) systems using the Messaging Layer Security


(MLS) [RFC9420] protocol can incorporate per-client identity
certificate credentials. A subjectAltName in these certificates can
be an IM URI [RFC3860] or Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP) URI [RFC6121], for example.

Organizations may be unwilling to issue certificates for an IM client


using a general KeyPurposeId, such as id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-
clientAuth, because of the risk that such certificates could be
abused in a cross-protocol attack.

An explanation of MLS credentials as they apply to IM is described in


[E2E-IDENTITY]. These credentials are expected to be heavily used in
the More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) Working Group.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. The IM URI EKU

This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-imUri, which may be


included in certificates used to prove the identity of an IM client.
This EKU extension MAY, at the option of the certificate issuer, be
either critical or non-critical.

id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {


iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 40 }

4. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this


document. The id-kp-imUri extended key purpose does not introduce
new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by
providing means to identify if the certificate is generated to sign
IM identity credentials. Issuers SHOULD NOT set the id-kp-imUri
extended key purpose and an id-kp-clientAuth or id-kp-serverAuth
extended key purpose: that would defeat the improved specificity
offered by having an id-kp-imUri extended key purpose.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA has registered the following OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). This OID is
defined in Section 3.
+=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+
| 40 | id-kp-imUri | RFC 9734 |
+---------+-------------+------------+

Table 1

IANA has also registered the following ASN.1 [ITU.X690.2021] module


OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in Appendix A.

+=========+===============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+===============+============+
| 113 | id-mod-im-eku | RFC 9734 |
+---------+---------------+------------+

Table 2

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[ITU.X680.2021]
ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.

[ITU.X690.2021]
ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1-2021,
February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate


Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,


Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC


2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

6.2. Informative References

[E2E-IDENTITY]
Barnes, R. and R. Mahy, "Identity for E2E-Secure
Communications", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
barnes-mimi-identity-arch-02, 4 February 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-barnes-mimi-
identity-arch-02>.

[RFC3860] Peterson, J., "Common Profile for Instant Messaging


(CPIM)", RFC 3860, DOI 10.17487/RFC3860, August 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3860>.

[RFC6121] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence


Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence",
RFC 6121, DOI 10.17487/RFC6121, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6121>.

[RFC9420] Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,


Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9420>.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [ITU.X680.2021]


and [ITU.X690.2021].

<CODE BEGINS>

IM-EKU
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-im-eku (113) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=


BEGIN

-- OID Arc

id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=


{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

-- Extended Key Usage Values

id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 40 }

END

<CODE ENDS>

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Sean Turner and Russ Housley for reviews, suggestions,


corrections, and encouragement.

Author's Address

Rohan Mahy
Rohan Mahy Consulting Services
Email: rohan.ietf@gmail.com

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy