Data as Sovereign Rights and UNCLOS: Protection of Undersea Cables through

Legislative Mechanisms

Dr Pooja Bhatt
Maritime Security and Governance Scholar, New Delhi, India

Abstract
This working paper argues that while undersea cables are largely owned and operated by
private conglomerates, the transnationality of data being transferred between various nations
should be seen enough for using the ‘sovereign rights’ clause for their protection in the EEZ,
Archipelagic waters and High Seas. It invokes the United Nations Convention for the Laws of
the Seas that provides rights to the coastal states in these maritime zones. Data flowing in and
out of a country needs to be seen as a sovereign property that travels through the undersea
cables that would allow states to build their domestic and regional laws and mechanisms. This
would also allow like-minded nations to pool their resources and form undersea cables
protection task forces that can preemptively avoid an attack, espionage, and damage from state
or non-state actors and also legislate against the perpetrators as a remedial measure. In case
of damage to the cable, the task force can help safeguard the civilian repair ships that might
have to operate in unstable or unfavourable natural or geopolitical conditions. As an additional
measure, this paper also suggests that maritime law enforcement agencies of the nations and
also at the transnational level must attempt to be members of the International Cable Protection
Committee (ICPC), a multinational organization that protects the world’s submarine cables.

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1. Introduction
How can states and governments play their roles to safeguard submarine cables traversing the
maritime domain which are increasingly becoming vulnerable, often leading to loss to nations
and their citizens? This working paper presents a user justification to make a case for nations
to develop regional frameworks to protect and repair these cables through international
cooperation and collaboration both within and beyond their maritime jurisdiction. While private
enterprises and telecom conglomerates hold the ownership of these submarine cables, the data
passing through the cables belongs to people throughout the globe. In other words, the data
passing through the submarine cables may be seen as a Global Good. Therefore, there is strong
motivation as well as incentive for States and international organisations to collaborate to
protect these cables and data passing through them as a part of national security. The maritime
domain is governed by UNCLOS. The paper argues that the states can use the framework
provided by UNCLOS to collaborate and cooperate to protect and repair the submarine cables.
However, the issue of cooperation on submarine cables calls for deeper discussion between
stakeholders such as countries and organisations such as Quad and NATO amongst others are
seeking to strengthen cable resilience across the world.
The existing framework around submarine cables needs to be seen as more than just
connectivity infrastructure. The value of the submarine cables should also be derived from the
fact that they carry the data of billions of people, organisations/institutions and states. The
people as creators and end users of the data need to be considered as stakeholders and therefore
they expect their data as the ‘global commons’ to be protected by their governments. This in
turn provides States an opportunity to protect their citizen's data through various unilateral and
multilateral cooperative mechanisms.
This paper is divided into five parts to present the existing picture of the submarine cable
discourse. The first section engages with the emergence of the security of submarine cables
amongst nations and international bodies as stakeholders. The second section argues that data
being shared by the submarine cables should be seen as a Global Good based on the UN
Roadmap on digital connectivity. The third section highlights the international maritime law
under UNCLOS that provides the framework for the States to cooperate with their partners and
stakeholders. The last and fourth sections raise some questions, present challenges for the states
to discuss and deliberate, and also provide some suggestions for pragmatic and effective
cooperation by the states on submarine cable protection.
2. The Undersea Cables in Security Discourse
While the undersea cables have existed since the late 1800s for telegraph purposes, they have
become a critical soft target in global geopolitics. The recent attacks on the NordStream
undersea pipelines in 2022 as well as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea earlier this year have
brought international focus on the importance of these as critical infrastructure. As of 2024,
there are over 800,000 miles of undersea cables stretched across the ocean connecting the
continents. They carry over 95% of the internet data. In the age of satellite communication, the
expanded bandwidth and overcoming the issue of redundancy provided by these cables make
them crucial and irreplaceable for data transfer, internet connectivity, telephonic exchanges and
so on. According to TeleGeography as of 2023, over USD 5 trillion of financial transactions
flow over the submarine cables each day including 45 million SWIFT transaction messages.
Moreover, the cables are responsible for high-quality internet connectivity forming the
foundation of today’s and future economic development, and digital connectivity impacts
billions of lives.

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As US Federal Reserve staff director Steve Malphrus stressed at the 2009 cable security
conference, “When communications networks go down, the financial services sector does not
grind to a halt. It snaps to a halt. ” While there is enough redundancy present in the submarine
cable network to sever an entire country off the connectivity, a cut-off does have huge financial
and communications implications.
The sheer power of the internet to impact lives led the UN Broadband Commission Target 3 to
make sure broadband internet penetration reaches 75% of the world’s population. The UN’s
Roadmap for Digital Cooperation calls for Eight key areas for action including achieving
“universal connectivity by the year 2030" and “promoting digital public goods to create a more
equitable world”.
As the submarine cables lie up to 6000 mts in the oceans, they are also vulnerable to natural
and manmade causes such as seismic activities, tsunamis, ship anchors, attacks by sharks and
deep sea crocodiles. Only a small percentage has been impacted by human attacks till now,
however, espionage and purposeful destruction by adversary actors have become a real threat
in recent times. According to available data, bottom trawling fishing, which is now extended to
newer and deeper regions of the seas, is not only depleting fish but also damaging the anchors.
Dragged anchors from cruise ships, cargo vessels etc. have severed multiple cables in Scotland,
Taiwan etc. in recent times.
In this regard, the paper examines four crucial questions concerning damage to the submarine
cables. Firstly, why may the cables be wilfully targeted or damaged? Second, how will it be
damaged? Third, where will it be damaged and fourth, what can States do to safeguard these
lifelines of national security? While the following paper attempts to describe the first three
questions, it makes a serious reflection on the fourth question.
Firstly, the danger has become palpable as during a crisis, damaging the undersea cables of a
country can bring its financial transactions, internet and telephone connectivity, and cyberspace
to a standstill for a week, heavily imposing losses to the country and endangering the economic
and cybersecurity of the countries. Such a situation can only be perceived as the tip of the
iceberg before it impinges on the vast array of interconnected infrastructure including
healthcare, financial transactions, data security, e-commerce and so on affecting billions of
lives. The psychosis created by reverberations of damage to undersea cables on comprehensive
national security has led to dialogue and discussions on the securitization of these critical
infrastructures.
The 2022 NordStream pipeline sabotage, the repeated Houthi attacks on submarine cables in
the Red Sea, etc. are some examples of the ability of the adversaries to inflict physical damage.
Most importantly what these also demonstrate is that submarine cables within the EEZ are more
vulnerable to attack. The comparatively lesser depth of the cables lying in the EEZ makes them
more vulnerable to attacks and espionage by adversaries. For example, the alleged Houthi attack
on the cables under the Red Sea severed the global internet and communications for the country.
2.1. International Cable Protection Committee
The submarine cables are governed by the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)
established in 1958 as an intergovernmental and commercial body to establish standards for
cable installation, maintenance, and protection. The ICPC monitors international treaties,
various legislation, and the installation of cable, and supports research initiatives to ensure that
submarine cable interests are protected. It provides a forum for its members in which relevant
technical, legal and environmental information can be exchanged.

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With 160 members from over 60 nations, including cable operators, owners, manufacturers,
industry service providers, as well as a few governments, ICPC's representation of 98% of the
world’s submarine cables makes it the world’s premier submarine cable organisation.
Nevertheless, ICPC can benefit from more governmental bodies and other stakeholders’
participation in the shaping of the submarine protection regime.
3. Making a case for Data under Sovereign Rights and UNCLOS
The free movement of data is essential not only for a stable global economy but also for the
well-being of citizens. With more people relying on internet connectivity for myriad daily life
activities, the security of this data becomes primary. Therefore, governments across the world
are finding practical solutions to safeguard individual privacy and cybersecurity. One of the
biggest challenges to data flow is protection. While cybersecurity is another level of a complex
issue, this paper is focused on physical protection and repair of those cables. It argues that
individuals and nations are concerned about data protection and therefore governments can play
their role in building a secure ecosystem for the physical protection of submarine cables that
carry the data, through the high seas, beyond their national jurisdiction.
The submarine cables carry data through the internet that connects one country to another across
the seas. The data could range from information like bank transactions, online purchases and so
on. While the countries do have sovereignty over the protection of the submarine cables in the
territorial seas under the international maritime and domestic maritime laws, the same becomes
difficult in the High Seas. Therefore, this paper attempts to make a case that data that is
increasingly becoming a “Global Good” may be used by the states to safeguard these cables in
the High Seas.
States might use their sovereign rights over the submarine cables passing through the seas
beyond their jurisdiction with like-minded countries or the affected parties to both protect and
also repair in the case of eventualities.
Sovereignty and sovereign rights are crucial angles to look into the issue of the protection of
submarine cables within and outside maritime delimitation zones. Whereas the “sovereignty of
a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters…to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea” (Article 2(1) UNCLOS) and to “the airspace over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil” (Article 2(2) UNCLOS). Sovereignty, for nations or states,
comprises “rights and power over a territory, responsibility and accountability over a
population, general and specific authorities, and recognition by other sovereign states”. This
applies within the 12 nautical miles of territorial seas. The coastal state is empowered to
formulate its domestic maritime legislation and related infrastructure to govern, conserve and
protect the seas, undersea, the airspace above and subsea resources within its territorial waters.
The coastal state is also empowered to restrict and regulate the movement of the ships, vessels
and any other maritime or airspace activity by other states within this zone. In other words,
Subject to certain jus cogens norms, sovereignty means, at a minimum, the absolute power of a
state to regulate any activity in its territory.
Therefore, for the 24-mile Contiguous Zone from the coastal baseline, the rights are not absolute
and only extended to certain commercial and safety-related issues. As it forms a zone
contiguous to the territorial sea, in which the coastal state only has the limited but still important
right to “exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish
infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea”.
The data carried by the cables also include economic and fiscal related data, therefore,
incentivises states to protect the cables lying in their Contiguous Zone.

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On the other hand, sovereign rights, meanwhile, as utilised by UNCLOS, “pertains to the
entitlements or privileges of a state to a defined area of a sea called the exclusive economic
zone” and thus “represents the limited rights of a state over its exclusive economic zone.
In the EEZ (Part V of UNCLOS), the coastal state enjoys “sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
nonliving, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds” (Article 56 (1) (a) UNCLOS). The
coastal state also has “…jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention” (Article 56(2) (b) and
(c) UNCLOS).
Article 60, inter alia, grants the coastal state the “exclusive right to construct and to authorize
and regulate the construction, operation and use of (a) artificial islands; (b)installations and
structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c)
installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal
State in the zone” as well as “exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and
structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration
laws and regulations”.
The UNCLOS recognizes the exclusive sovereign rights of a Coastal State to all the resources
under and on the seabed in the oceans 200 nautical miles from the baseline, mainly for
conservation, preservation, economic and security purposes. This also includes fishing rights,
energy and mineral resources.
No mention is made of exploring or exploiting any natural resources in the contiguous zone, as
these are covered under the continental shelf or the EEZ regime, as the case might be. Therefore
there is no sovereignty that extends to the contiguous zone, and generally beyond the seaward
limit of the territorial sea. In other words, coastal states may exercise their sovereign rights over
the assets in the contiguous zone and the EEZ.
However, such inherent sovereign powers are not the same concept as "sovereign rights” in the
law of the sea context; therefore, the terms “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights” are not
interchangeable.
4. UNCLOS Position on Undersea Cables
The nature of existing undersea cable governance is archaic and rarely has been updated with
changing times. At the same time, they are limited in scope and cover only the telegram cables.
Presently, the undersea cables also cover energy pipelines, and internet and telephone cables,
however, these are yet to be covered in cable governance laws.
One of the most expensive international laws discussing submarine cables is the United Nations
Convention on the Laws of the Seas 1982. UNCLOS is seen as "the constitution of the oceans"
and is ratified by 169 countries as members. This large membership forms the basis of
cooperation amongst states on the various issues in the maritime domain and submarine cables
are one such area.
UNCLOS provides certain rights and duties to the Coastal and other states concerning the laying
and protection of submarine cables and pipelines, within different maritime delimitation zones
such as territorial seas, contiguous zone, EEZ and the High Seas. The specific articles are listed
below:

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Art 21(c) in the Territorial Seas

The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of the protection of cables
and pipelines.

Article 51 for Archipelagic States-Existing agreements, traditional fishing rights

and existing submarine cables –
An archipelagic State shall respect existing submarine cables laid by other States
and pass through its waters without making a landfall. An archipelagic State shall
permit the maintenance and replacement of such cables upon receiving due notice
of their location and the intention to repair or replace them.

Under this, the coastal state has rights to safeguard its Cable landing Stations
(CLS) The CLS is where the cable connects to land-based power and various
networking provider infrastructure. This piece of cable infrastructure is a critical
component of the entire system as it serves as the point at which the cable reaches
the land which is under the jurisdiction of the state.

Art 58 in the EEZ

In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy,
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in
Article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables
and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.

Under this article, the Coastal state can protect on its own. But also cable crossing
several countries allows the stakeholder nations to come together and operate at
the multilateral level to safeguard, and repair the cables with the EEZ of the
affected parties.

Art 79 Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf

a. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the
continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this article.
b. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the
continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede
the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines.
c. The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the
continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.

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 d. Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish
conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its
jurisdiction over cables and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the
exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations
of artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction.
e. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to
cables or pipelines already in position. In particular, the possibilities of repairing
existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.

Article 87 (c) Freedom of the High Seas

freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI (Continental

Shelf);

Article112 High Seas- Right to lay submarine cables and pipelines

a. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of
the high seas beyond the continental shelf.
b. Article 79, paragraph 5, applies to such cables and pipelines.

Article 113 Breaking or injury of a submarine cable or pipeline

Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to ensure that the
breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction
of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable
negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or
telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine
pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offence. This provision
shall apply also to conduct calculated or likely to result in such breaking or injury.
However, it shall not apply to any break or injury caused by persons who acted
merely with the legitimate object of saving their lives or their ships, after having
taken all necessary precautions to avoid such break or injury.
The abovementioned laws provide Coastal States varying degrees of rights within their
maritime delimitation zones for laying and protection of the submarine cables. Due to the dated
nature of Articles 112 and 113, while UNCLOS 1982 does provide for the coastal state to adopt
laws and regulations to criminally implicate a ship flying its flag or a person belonging to its
jurisdiction, it is silent on the Coastal state's actions against a ship carrying of other nation,
flagless ship or person who has destroyed the cables. In other words, States cannot punish the
state or non-state actors who have damaged or sabotaged the cables except those of its own.
Therefore, countries and international mechanisms can register their grievances as well as seek
compliance from the state whose flag the perpetrator ship was flying. Alternatively, in the case
of a non-state actor that has destroyed the cable or where the flag is absent, the international
bodies can take action against necessary actions such as arresting them but prosecuting them
under relevant international or domestic laws remains a challenge.

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The use of drones and underwater autonomous vehicles that can participate in the destruction
of submarine cables is another area of concern. Presently, we lack international laws on
autonomous vehicles and their role in warfare. Therefore, these are initial ideas and would need
deeper deliberation from various stakeholders to make a solid framework.
Notwithstanding the above mentioned limitations, the paper argues that UNCLOS provides a
landscape that the coastal states can utilise to develop cable protection laws and mechanisms
both within and outside their maritime delimitation zones. EEZ remains a sui generis maritime
zone and therefore under international lawful uses, a Coastal state will build a domestic legal
framework for the protection of its maritime assets such as submarine cables and pipelines. It
can also seek formal or informal international cooperation along with other like-minded
countries to build cable protective zones, mechanisms or collaborative frameworks adhering to
the existing maritime legal framework.
5. Can International Cooperation Come to the Rescue and How? Challenges and Way
Ahead
The laying and protection of cables is a prohibitively expensive business and requires constant
funding. The cables are owned by the telecom majors, carrying national data across oceans.
Presently it is managed by a few cable repair vessels and crew across the world with limited
aging infrastructure and training of the repair personnel. The overstretched fleet of cable repair
ships is under duress as the countries are expanding their cable networks throughout continents.
The cable repair infrastructure is concentrated within a few nations and is mostly a privately
held enterprise to be hired by the cable companies for their services.
It is, therefore, pertinent for the states interested in developing submarine cable mechanisms or
infrastructures to ponder and discuss the following issues for pragmatic and realistic cable
protection and repair policies across the region. While the possibilities of issues could be
exhaustive, this paper attempts to raise some of those concerns. Firstly, who will fund the cable
protection mechanisms and programmes? The multi-stakeholder status of the submarine cables
divides the onus of laying and repair on the telecom major companies and laying companies.
They come into action during initial laying as well as repair of the cables when damaged due
to natural or manmade disasters. While it is difficult to preempt the cable destruction from an
adversary or manmade crisis, the maritime law enforcement agencies come into action and be
situated near the location during a Red Sea crisis-like situation to deter any possible adversary
move.
Moreover, such a law enforcement presence would be necessary to protect the cable repair
vessels during a tense maritime scenario, for them to carry out their functions. Secondly, due
to the lack of any existing legal framework, the dynamics of laws or mechanisms need to be
chalked out that can provide the framework of cooperation and operation between like-minded
states and their agencies. The governance policies on submarine cables will be a multi-
stakeholder initiative and would require advocacy, awareness and training across sectors
therefore, funding of all these to achieve the policy outcomes is another issue to ponder by the
stakeholders. Third, how are the states and international organizations/ mechanisms looking at
sharing their tasks and responsibilities are looking at sharing their jurisdiction vis-à-vis other
states and also the private operators? In times of crisis in the maritime domain or conflict zone,
in what ways can the maritime law enforcement agencies of stakeholder states/ organizations
support and protect the cable laying and repair industry to ensure the security of cable
infrastructure as well as the protection of that data?

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These are some of the difficult questions that policymakers, states and organisations such as
Quad and NATO need to reflect upon while discussing the issue of submarine cables.
Considering that 75% of the world’s population is predicted to be digitally connected by 2025,
the future of submarine cable technology and the submarine cable industry looks promising.
However, the submarine cable repair ecosystem faces several challenges presently. These
challenges could largely grouped under three sections as mentioned below:
5.1. Lack of legal mechanisms at national and international levels
Most countries are still developing their domestic legal infrastructure for submarine cable
protection, which also leads to a lack of coordination among different countries connected
through cables. No agency has been tasked to be a single point of contact for threats to
international cables both at domestic and international levels. This lacuna adds to operational
failure both by domestic agencies as well as international organisations to work out procedures
for repairing submarine cables that are damaged by hostile actions or natural disasters.
5.2. Lack of maritime law enforcement mechanisms at the regional and global level
Legislative mechanisms guide the actions of the enforcement agencies. While some states such
as Australia, New Zealand, India etc have some domestic legal mechanisms in place for
submarine cables, there is a general lack of domestic and international legislative framework
across the globe that also impinges the actions of maritime law enforcement agencies. For
example, in the case of a conflict or war-like scenario, the undersea cables have become an easy
target for the state or non-state actors to sabotage a country’s lifeline and threaten its national
security. Not only has it become difficult for the states to protect their cables but also
expeditiously repair them due to looming security threats, lack of resources and the possibility
of the cable repair operators to function without fear for their life or property. As discussed
earlier in the paper, the protection and repair of vulnerable cables in the shallow waters of the
territorial waters and the EEZ is likely to require a different approach to that of the High Seas.
5.3. Lack of cable laying and repair infrastructure + lack of funding
The submarine cable laying and repair requires niche vessels, technology and more importantly
expertise to live, stay at sea, and work in deep waters in the most hostile environments. Despite
being present for a long time, the submarine cable repair industry has operated in near
anonymity. Therefore, there is lesser-known information on the training and related
infrastructure of the cable repair personnel. Based on available reports, the present fleet of repair
ships is aging, using the same technologies that were used decades ago. These repair chips are
hired by the telecom majors at competitive prices and therefore lack funding for buying a new
ship.
With the growing number of cables, there would be a definite need for more cable ships as well
as trained professionals. Being a specialized and expensive area of study, this provides another
area of cooperation between states and organizations where they can collaborate and pool
resources on training manpower and build capital assets that can be shared amongst like-minded
nations. Submarine cables are costly to build and maintain and therefore, not every country may
have the resources to do so. This issue can be remedied by creating some mechanisms in
collaboration with private players to expand the cable laying and repair industry. This may also
assist in finding and developing newer technologies that are lacking presently. The investments
made by the states may bring down the prohibitive costs of running the cable repair ships.

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Additionally, with a major chunk of submarine cable hardware and Chinese companies, the
issue of espionage, snooping and even weaponization of the submarine cable industry is a major
concern for various countries. Therefore, new mechanisms and suppliers need to be established
and supported by like-minded partners for a transparent and reliable system.
Another challenge in the cable repair industry is the aging cable repair fleet and infrastructure
and the lack of investment and funding. Presently there are around 77 cable ships in the world
out of which only 22 are designed for repair. These operators operating globally are only
contracted by the telecom majors for the laying and repair functions. Besides private companies,
investments and funding from international investment banks and institutions need to be
harmonized.
6. Threat Matrix to Submarine Cables:
Based upon the above mentioned challenges to the submarine cables, the paper presents varying
degrees of the threat matrix to the submarine cables. The levels of threats to submarine cables
differ due to the reasons of depth at which these cables lie in the seas. As states have varying
degrees of sovereignty rights in these different maritime delimitation zones, the paper suggests
different multilateral cooperative solutions that states can develop to address the threats.
Maritime High Seas Exclusive Zone Territorial Seas
Zone

Status Open to All Sui Generis, neither Coastal State

open nor closed jurisdiction
Possible Sovereign Rights Sovereign Rights Sovereignty
Rights on
cables
Threat levels Least threatened Most Threatened Less Threatened
to submarine
cables
Threat Earthquake, Tsunami, shark Terrorist attacks, State and non-state
source bites sabotage, espionage actors, cable
etc destruction,
espionage etc.
Cooperation Multilateral cooperation in Multilateral NAVAL International support
level cable laying and repair cooperation for cable through funding and
through legislative protection from training to
mechanisms. state/non-state actors disadvantageous
A multilateral states
institutional Cooperation on
framework such as Landing Station
cable repair ships, security
cable protection etc.
Table: Threat matrix for submarine cables and levels of cooperation at multilateral level
Source: Author’s own

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The depth of the submarine cables in the High Seas makes them more vulnerable to natural
disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or destruction from deep water crocodiles and shark
bites. In the High Seas, therefore, states can pool their resources to fund the cable repair ships
as well as expertise to overcome the present lack of it. Whether it requires a special international
mechanism under which the states can cooperate, is another question in which the states can
work together. Based upon the argument of data ownership, the interested states can build upon
their sovereign rights over the cables and therefore, their right to be involved in the protection
or repair of these cables.
The status of EEZ as neither open nor closed makes it a rather interesting maritime zone. While
the coastal states have certain economic rights such as fishing, and exploration of natural
resources, the 200 nm zone is nearly open to all the countries to operate in a way that doesn’t
harm the coastal states’ interests. Therefore, it is relatively easier for the adversary to destroy
the submarine cables in this zone. The UNCLOS confers the rights on the coastal states to
safeguard the cables and therefore the stakeholder/interested parties to whom the cables belong
in the region can work on minilateral/ plurilateral cooperative mechanisms under which the
naval cooperation could protect the vulnerable cable hotspots could be preemptively protected
during the crisis. The naval cooperation could have acted as a support system to the cable repair
ships who may have to act during times of crisis. A multilateral cooperative mechanism to fund
the cable laying and repair ships as well as training of personnel could be worked upon that can
assist the disadvantageous coastal states that lack the capabilities to do for themselves, or others
on request. Several countries such as Australia have developed submarine cable protection
zones within their EEZs and this template could be replicated by other states in their respective
EEZs too. Taking the idea of establishing cable protection zones a step further, Australia’s
model legislation could also be adopted globally. This initiative could be pursued through
multilateral institutions such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, Quad, NATO etc. Such
legislation would mean that these littoral nations will be able to satisfy their UNCLOS
obligation to protect cables via multilateral support. Furthermore, being an issue of sovereign
rights, the protection of submarine cables has been included in the agenda of the multilateral
maritime mechanisms or institutional frameworks, providing the issue with the required
political support. This agenda could allow national agencies, such as the navies of like-minded
countries to coordinate their work in monitoring high-density cable zones or routes. Based upon
respective assets and jurisdictional purviews, the navies and coastguards could provide support
in the protection of regional subsea cables.
On the other hand, a coastal state can claim sovereign rights over the cables in the territorial
seas based on the data being transferred belonging to its citizens.
While cables lying in the 12-14 nm from the coastal states are vulnerable to attack and
espionage from the state and non-state actors, it is the coastal state's jurisdiction to protect them.
Here, the multilateral cooperation can come in help upon request to protect these assets in times
of crisis and provide assistance in the subsequent repair of it. The protection of Cable Landing
Stations also seeks multilateral assistance if the coastal states find themselves insufficiently
capable of doing it themselves.
To sum up, data is the new oil and the undersea cables carry 99% of it. It is important for states
and international organisations to protect the critical infrastructure that generates, transmits and
stores the data, and the submarine cables in one of them. Stakeholders may draw from
international guidelines and treaties such as UN and UNCLOS, and develop regional and global
mechanisms to protect and support the cable laying and repair infrastructure. This will help
generate the necessary funding, pooling the expensive resources and expertise between the like-
minded partners but also assisting those countries who are presently less than able to do on their
own or not in a position to pick sides during great power competition. In other words, submarine

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cable infrastructure needs international support and state backing more than ever. Seeing the
submarine cables and data as a global good is a good starting point for the multistakeholder
conversation.

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