PLDT vs. CA, GR No.

57079, September 29, 1989

Doctrine
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence
for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the
same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

Facts
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered.

PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which
should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an
independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under
the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.

In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident
involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with
PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work
site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.

Issue
Whether PLDT is liable to the private respondent?

Ruling
No. The lower courts findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby
precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and
prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of
his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of
petitioner.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall
into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,
such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate
cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is
basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm
and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that
exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of
his imprudence.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, GR No. 53401, November 6, 1989

Doctrine
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said to be an eventuality which directly caused the
victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
place.

Facts
A court case involves conflicting evidence from both parties over the cause of a disputed
event.

Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M, After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out towards the direction of the
Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on
Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo. The
two walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls
attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the
deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like
fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he
turned back shouting that the water was grounded.

Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC
Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric
lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. He also saw an electric wire about 30
meters long strung across the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the
current of the water."

Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00 A.M.. The skin was grayish or, in medical
parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor
found an "electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on
the left hand was a burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the
cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution"

The heirs of the deceased instituted an action for damages with the aforesaid CFI. After due
trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint but awarded
to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed
with the CA which set aside the judgement and sentenced the petitioner to pay plaintiffs
actual damages of P30,229.45; compensatory damages of P50,000.00; exemplary damages
of P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in both instances.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death

Ruling
Yes.
The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated
from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons
and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was
not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.

Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55
Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When
an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts
to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that
when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early
morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines
hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets
or at the INELCO office (vide, CA Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's
duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed,
confirming the negligence of petitioner.

Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809

Doctrine
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Facts
Plaintiff was riding on his pony over Carlatan bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Plaintiff pulled the pony to the right side of the bridge, thinking he didn't have enough time
to cross over to the left. The Defendant continued to approach, guiding the vehicle toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. thinking the horseman
would move to the left. The car got close to the pony and the Defendant quickly turned to
the right to avoid hitting the horse, but the pony got frightened and was struck by the car's
flange, breaking its leg. The horse died and the Plaintiff was thrown off and received
injuries.

Issue
Whether the defendant was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done?

Ruling
Yes.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here
in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

People vs. Delos Santos, 355 SCRA 415 (2001)

Doctrine
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.

Facts
Glenn de los Santos was charged with multiple murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder after a tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City that claimed the lives of several
members of the Philippine National Police who were undergoing a training exercise. Glenn
immediately surrendered to authorities and was charged with using his vehicle to
deliberately kill and inflict wounds on the police members who were participating in an
endurance run.

While in the endurance run, 6 joggers, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands
at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a
distance of 100 meters away from the joggers rear portion, but which accused failed and
refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high
speed directly towards the joggers. Despite warning signals, Glenn drove his vehicle at high
speed towards the runners, causing the death of 12 police members. Eleven trainees and
police officers were injured during an incident, while one trainee died days later due to lack
of medical assistance. After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the
incident, leaving behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless

Glenn’s version, on the way back to CDO, Glenn saw a bright light coming from the opposite
direction of the national highway and heard bumping thuds. He could not determine what
he had hit and drove home in fear. He later found out that he had hit a PNP group and
surrendered to the governor.

The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the
qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to
indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the
victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each of the victims of
attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.

Hence, this automatic review.

Issue
Whether there was an intent to kill or injure the jogging trainees or was it reckless
imprudence.

Ruling
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was
more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on Glenn’s part.

The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that the accused intentionally rammed and hit
the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds,
he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the
absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scenes.

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons
killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to
note that there is no shred of evidence that Glenn had an ax to grind against the police
trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.

Considering that the incident was not a product of malicious intent but rather the result of a
single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries.
Evelyn Acuna vs. Rodolfo A. Alventara, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br.50, Villasis, Pangasinan (A.M.
No. 01-1463, March 20, 2001)

Doctrine
Having taken possession of the property under the writ of attachment, it was respondent's
duty to protect the property from damages or loss. The respondent was bound to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care for the preservation of the properties

Facts
Evelyn Acuña charged Rodolfo A. Alcantara, Sheriff IV, with negligence and manifest
partiality relative to his conduct in Civil Case No. V-0413 ("Mrs. Gloria R. Ocampo vs. Mrs.
Evelyn Acuña") for "recovery of sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment." The
trial court granted the preliminary attachment prayed for by plaintiff Ocampo. The writ was
thereupon issued on the two flatboats of herein complainant Acuña.

Complainant averred that, in implementing the writ, respondent sheriff had failed to take
the necessary precautions in protecting the attached property. Respondent entrusted the
flatboats to a relative of plaintiff Ocampo under whose care one of the flatboats submerged.
Later, the flatboats were turned over by respondent to the Philippine Coast Guard of Sual,
Pangasinan, in whose custody the flatboats were totally damaged due to several typhoons
that visited the area.

Respondent implemented a writ of attachment on the flatboats, but they were not
seaworthy. He sought assistance from the Philippine Coast Guard in Sual, but they declined
without a court order. Respondent had to dock the flatboats at the Sual port and entrust
them to the son of the plaintiff while keeping the keys himself. In May 1998, after being
informed that one of the boats had sunk, he asked for a court order to transfer the boats to
the Philippine Coast Guard. The court ordered so, and the respondent implemented the
order, hiring men to lift the submerged boat and depositing the boats with the Philippine
Coast Guard. A request was received from the Coast Guard to transfer the boats to a safer
place, but typhoons struck before it could be done and the boats were destroyed.
Respondent claimed he took necessary measures to protect the attached property.

The OCA recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 for
negligence in the performance of his duties.

Issue
Whether Respondent is guilty of negligence?

Ruling
Yes.

The OCA did not err in holding that respondent sheriff was guilty of negligence. The refusal
of the Philippine Coast guard to initially take custody of the flatboats should have prompted
him to forthwith ask the trial court for an order to have the custody of the flatboats
transferred to the Philippine Coast Guard. He delayed in seeking such a court order. But
while respondent failed to thusly implement the writ of preliminary attachment and to
safekeep the property in his custody,1 it would appear that he exerted efforts to protect the
flatboats. The eventual deterioration and loss of the boats had, in fact, been caused by
calamities beyond his control. Given the circumstances, by and large extant from the
records of the case, the Court deems it appropriate to impose on respondent a fine but on
the reduced amount of from P5,000.00 recommended by the OCA to P3,000.00.

Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping M.V., et.al. vs. Phil. Insurance Co., In., GR
No. 14133, June 5, 2002

Doctrine
The presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the
following causes:
(1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) an act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or
(5) an order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of
destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the
carrier is liable therefore.

Facts
CMC Trading A.G. sent 242 coils of prime cold-rolled steel to the Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation. Upon arrival, 4 of the coils were damaged and declared a total loss. The
consignee demanded payment from the defendants but was rejected; as a result, the
plaintiff-appellant paid the consignee and became subrogated to the rights and causes of
action. The complaint was then filed to recover the amount paid.

The defendants contended that any liability, if any, should not exceed the limitations of
liability in the bill of lading and other laws because the damage was caused by
pre-shipment damage, inherent nature of the goods, perils of the sea, inadequate packing,
acts or omissions of the shipper, or their representatives.

RTC dismissed the Complaint because respondent had failed to prove its claims with the
quantum of proof required by law.

In reversing the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the
damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on common carriers.

The CA further held as inadequately proven petitioners' claim that the loss or the
deterioration of the goods was due to pre-shipment damage. It likewise opined that the
notation "metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented" placed on the Bill of Lading had
not been the proximate cause of the damage to the four (4) coils.
Issue
Whether the petitioner acted with negligence.

Ruling
Yes. Petitioners contend that the presumption of fault imposed on common carriers should
not be applied on the basis of the lone testimony offered by private respondent. The
contention is untenable.

Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with
respect to the safety of the goods and the passengers they transport. Thus, common
carriers are required to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the goods tendered for
shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as
their nature requires.” The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for transportation by the carrier
until they are delivered, actually or constructively, to the consignee or to the person who
has a right to receive them.

Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule,
are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated
or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary
diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage,
therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence.

However, the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the
following causes: (1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity; (2) an act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or
omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) the character of the goods or defects in
the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act of competent public authority. This is a
closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated
circumstances, then the carrier is liable therefore.

That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is revealed in the
case at bar by a review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent.
Phoenix Construction vs IAC, 148 SCRA 353 (1987)
Doctrine
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent among other
reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason.

Facts
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was
driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio
tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and
nervous breakdown. Dionisio filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix
Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while
intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the private
respondent.

Issue
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by
respondent’s own negligence.

Ruling
We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked, in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the petitioners would have us
adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably
the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant
have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even
in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important
but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil 398 (1958)

Doctrine
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

Facts
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters,
Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is charged. 14
year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.

Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but
avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident.
Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision
over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the
circumstances.

After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to
this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

Issue
Whether the death of Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of the defendant
and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

Ruling
No. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy,
toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the
pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the
pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for
that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security
guards who are available always in case of emergency.

The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of
the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life, from
manual resuscitation to calling for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for
that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals and Ernest E. Simke, G.R. No.
L-51806, November 8, 1988

Doctrine
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Facts
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons
went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a
better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or
terrace of the airport. While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private
respondent slipped over an elevation about four inches high at the far end of the terrace. As
a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. The next day,
December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about three hours.Private
respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict against petitioner
CivilAeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer, operate,
manage, control,maintain and develop the Manila International Airport. 3.Said claim for
damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills, consequential damages forthe
expenses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize
certain business transactions and for the publication of notices announcing the
postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which had to be cancelled
because of his accident. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondent, the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision. Judgment was rendered in the private respondent's
favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial
court's decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for, Reconsideration but
this was denied

Issue
Whether the petition was negligent as the entity empowered “to administer, operate,
manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport”.

Ruling
Yes. The Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective
condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. It has
observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of many
government buildings and offices. Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate in the
terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattended. The
inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a
ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or
pedestrians from sliding.

National Airports Corporation is now non-existent, and the Civil Aeronautics

Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its
own rights and in its own name. The better practice there should have been to make the
Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports
Corporation.

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30 (1998)

Doctrine
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby
he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In
such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the
fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Facts
When the vessel reached one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two
shackles were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken due to this. A commotion between the crew members ensued.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern
(half speed). Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankow likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damages as well.

Issue
Whether the compulsory pilot/master is liable for the damage caused.

Ruling
Yes. As a general rule, the harbor pilot on compulsory pilotage is responsible under
compulsory pilotage, solely for the damage caused to a vessel or life and property at ports
due to his liability for the damage caused by the negligence or fault. However, if there is
contributory negligence on the vessel to the pier, at the port of part of the master or the
crew, then the pilot will not be solely destination, for his negligence responsible for
damages. In this case, Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankiv were both negligent, hence, should
be held solidarily liable together with Far Eastern Shipping Corp, the owner of the vessel.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910)
Doctrine
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. When the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal
occurrence as one of its determining factors, he can not recover damages for the injury.
Facts
David Taylor, a 16-year-old boy, filed a lawsuit against MERALCO to recover damages for the
loss of his eye and other injuries. MERALCO is a foreign corporation that operates a street
railway and electric light system in Manila. David and another boy named Manuel Claparols
visited MERALCO's premises to find someone who could make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine. While wandering around the premises, they found brass fulminating caps
used for blasting charges of dynamite. They picked up the caps and carried them home.
Later, they conducted experiments with the caps, which resulted in an explosion causing
injuries to all three of them.

Issue
Can MERALCO be held civilly responsible for the injuries sustained by David, considering
that his own deliberate and reckless actions contributed to the accident?

Ruling
No. The court applied the principle of contributory negligence, stating that when the
immediate cause of an accident resulting in injury is the plaintiff's own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for the injury.
While MERALCO may have been negligent in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
David's own actions were the immediate cause of the explosion and his injuries.
Despite his age, David was found to have sufficient capacity and understanding to be aware
of the danger he exposed himself to when he deliberately cut open the cap and applied a
match to its contents. The court emphasized that the care and caution required of a child is
according to their maturity and capacity.

United States vs. Bonifacio, 34 Phil. 65 (1916)

Doctrine
“Any person, who, while violating any regulation, shall, by an act of imprudence or
negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence, commit an offense, shall suffer the
penalty of Arresto Mayor in its medium degrees”.

Facts
Bonifacio was an engineer and was conducting the heavy freight train one morning in
Batangas. The train had just rounded a curve when Bonifacio saw a man (Eligio Castillo)
walking along the railroad track. The former immediately blew his whistle twice; unknown
to him, Castillo was a deaf-mute. Noticing that Castillo did not step aside from the track,
Bonifacio tried to slow down the engine, but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid
running down the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to cross the
track. Bonifacio was charged in the trial court with homicide committed with reckless
negligence and he was convicted of homicide committed with simple negligence.

Issue
Whether Bonifacio is liable for the death of Castillo.

Ruling
No. The defendant cannot be held liable under Article 568 of the Criminal Code for
negligence resulting to homicide granting true that he has violated the speed limit
regulation of heavy trains, considering that he has exerted efforts to blow the train’s whistle
to warn the victim, as well as slowing down, although no action was taken by victim due his
being deaf-mute.

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 (1996)

Doctrine
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Facts
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos
highway to her home in Araneta Avenue. She was with a companion. While driving she
noticed something was wrong with her tires. She stopped at a lighted place and verified it
to ask help if needed. She was told by the people present that her tire was flat and decided
to park her car and turned on the emergency lights. She alighted from her car and assisted
the man who will be fixing her tire when suddenly she was bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by Richard Li and registered under Alexander Commercial, Inc. This accident
resulted in her confinement for 20 days and amputation of her knee. The expenses for the
hospital amounted to Php 120,000 and the cost of the artificial leg was Php 27,000 which
were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Valenzuela asked for Php 1M for moral
damages, Php 100,000 for exemplary damages and Php 180,000 for other medical and
related expenses. Richard Li denied the allegation that he was negligent. He claimed that
Valenzuela’s car was improperly parked and the area was poorly lit. He also
counter-claimed for damages for Valenzuela was negligent for driving without a license. A
witness testified that Li’s car was approaching the scene very fast. He stated that Li was
under the influence of alcohol since he could smell it. The trial court found Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It also held
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer as jointly and severally liable for the damages
under Article 2180. The Court of Appeals sustained that Li was liable for the damages but
absolved Alexander Commercial Inc., Li’s employer, from any liability against Valenzuela. It
dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims.

Issue
Whether Li should be liable for damages

Ruling
Yes. Negligence is commonly understood as the conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The
circumstances established by the evidence showed that Li was grossly negligent in driving
the Mitsubishi Lancer. It was emphasized that he was driving at fast speed at 2:00AM after a
heavy downpour which made the road slippery. There was also ample evidence showing
that he was under the influence of liquor.

Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co. 57 Phil. 478 (1932)
Doctrine
There is a presumption of negligence on the part of the company (or private entity) who
owns the property causing the nuisance.

Facts
August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric Company on
Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of
Manila and its suburbs Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that
the wire was burning and its connections smoking the wire parted and one of the ends of
the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way Noguera went to the
nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the
Manila Electric Company 2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him
that they would send an inspector 4 p.m.: The neighborhood school was dismissed and the
children went home. Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touched the wire. Jose
Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to
touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Alberto del Rosario said that "I
have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling challenged put out
his index finger and touch the wire He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay!
Madre". The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. A
crowd soon gathered, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body Upon arrival at
St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.
Issue
Whether Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the
death of Alberto.

Ruling
Yes. The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will recover from
the defendant the sum of P1,250, with costs of both instances.

The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special
inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's
inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
Presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from the breakage of
this wire has not been overcome, and it is in our opinion responsible for the accident.

It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased,

owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do
something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing
that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased,
— a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such
negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the
determining cause of the accident.

Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co. 57 Phil. 478 (1932)
Doctrine
There is a presumption of negligence on the part of the company (or private entity) who
owns the property causing the nuisance.

Facts
August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric Company on
Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of
Manila and its suburbs Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that
the wire was burning and its connections smoking the wire parted and one of the ends of
the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way Noguera went to the
nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the
Manila Electric Company 2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him
that they would send an inspector 4 p.m.: The neighborhood school was dismissed and the
children went home. Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touched the wire. Jose
Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to
touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Alberto del Rosario said that "I
have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling challenged put out
his index finger and touch the wire He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay!
Madre". The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. A
crowd soon gathered, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body Upon arrival at
St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.

Issue
Whether Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the
death of Alberto.

Ruling
Yes. The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will recover from
the defendant the sum of P1,250, with costs of both instances.

The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special
inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's
inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
Presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from the breakage of
this wire has not been overcome, and it is in our opinion responsible for the accident.

It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased,

owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do
something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing
that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased,
— a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such
negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the
determining cause of the accident.

Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, 163 SCRA 697, July 29, 1988
Doctrine
Teachers and heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
However, if it is shown to the court that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage, their responsibility ceases.

Facts
In 1963, private respondent Mauro Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School while another private respondent, Edgardo Aquino was a teacher thereon. At that
time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop
that was destroyed in World War II. Since the huge stones pose serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, and ordered them to
dig beside a 1-ton concrete block to make a hole where they can bury the stones. The work
was left unfinished. The next day, Aquino called 4 pupils to complete the excavation. Aquino
then left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went away to get
some rope. Before Leaving the children, Aquino allegedly told them "not to touch the stone."
As soon as Aquino left, the children playfully jumped into the pit, however, the huge
concrete block continued to slide down towards the opening. The other three children were
able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete
block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As
a result, Ylarde sustained serious physical injuries and died 3 days later.

Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1)that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own
reckless imprudence. CA affirmed. Petitioners base their actions against Aquino on Article
2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their son's death while the
complaint against Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article2180.

Issue
Can both private respondents teacher Aquino and principal Soriano be held liable for
damages?

Ruling
As regards principal Soriano, he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child
Ylarde, since he is the head of an academic school and not of a school of arts and trades. As
held in Amadora vs. CA, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who
should be answerable for torts committed by their students. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano, a
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school
and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

In Aquino’s case, he can be held liable for being negligent in his supervision over them and
his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence when he failed to avail himself of services of adult
manual laborers. The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in
such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by
themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Since the stone was so heavy
and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury to the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by Aquino
which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. Furthermore, the
excavation should not be placed in the category of Work Education like school gardening,
planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that
could result in death or physical injuries. A simple warning as "not to touch the stone" is not
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to
his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
company. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have
occurred.
Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co. vs. Phil. Motors Corporation, 55 Phil. 129 (1930)
Doctrine
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

Facts
Culion was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it used for its
fishing trade. To save costs, Culion decided to have the engine changed from gasoline to a
crude oil.

Quest, the manager of Philippine Motors, agreed to do the job. In the course of the work, it
was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline and other fuel was
trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest.

The engine stopped during a trial run and upon being started, a back fire occurred which
then instantly spread and engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but
Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion moved for the recovery of the damages against
Philippine Motors.

Issue
Whether the incident was due to the negligence of Philippine Motors as experts.

Ruling
Yes. Proof shows that Quest had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but not on boats. But nonetheless, a person skilled in that particular sort of work
would have been sufficiently warned from those possible risks to cause him to take greater
and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the
Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from an accident, but this accident was in no
sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or
lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but
whether Quest was free from blame.

Dr. Ninevetch Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188 (1997)
Doctrine
When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in
proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and
skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established by expert
testimony
Facts
Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus,
and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. On
March 22, Rowena Umali accompanied her mother to the hospital and spent the night
there, for the operation was to be conducted on the following day. Rowena noticed that the
clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. On
the day of the operation, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed.
Because of this, Dr. Cruz called Lydia in her office. Consequently, Lydia informed Rowena
that the operation must go on as scheduled.

While Lydia’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet
ampules, and Rowena’s sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to
buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished. However, Dr.
Cruz again asked the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood
available in the blood bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to
Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for breath–apparently, the oxygen
supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went
into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so
she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was
without the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came
to take Lydia to the other hospital.

In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was
oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new
hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr.
Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr.
Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated
intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.

Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in
homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not
guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali’s
death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Issue
Whether the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr.
Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Ruling
No. The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage /
hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors.
Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel
that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a
clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia’s death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’
allegation that the cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’
fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.

E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914

Doctrine
One’s state of intoxication is generally irrelevant in the determination of his negligence, but
it is a factor that may be considered.

Facts
Manila Electric operates electric street railways, one of which runs along the street in front
of Wright’s residence. One night, as Wright passed Manila Electric’s railways in his calesa,
the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails
with great force. Wright was thrown as a result sustaining injuries.

Wright filed a civil complaint for damages against Manila Electric contending that it was
negligent in maintaining its railways; that at the night of the accident, the rails were
above-ground at around 5-6 inches, given that the ties upon which the rails rested also
projected out of the ground. Manila Electric, on the other hand, said that Wright was also
negligent, being intoxicated at the time the accident happened. The trial court found both
parties guilty, but the Manila Electric’s negligence is greater than that of Wright. The SC
affirmed.

Issue
Whether the plaintiff was negligent and did not use ordinary care and prudence, and that
the intoxication contributed to his injury.

Ruling
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want
of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending
to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or
sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree
of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a
sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is
immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.

Preciolita V. Corliss vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 (1969)
Doctrine
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. defined Negligence as: “want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

Facts
The instant case is an appeal on the decision of the lower court dismissing Preciolita
Corliss’ complaint for recovery of damages against Manila Railroad Co. On the evening of
February 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Pampanga in front of Clark Air
Force Base, the husband of Preciolia, Ralph Corliss, an air police, was driving a jeep,
together with a P.C. soldier, to the Clark base to return said jeep. The said jeep Ralph was
driving collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad. Ralph died of serious burns in the
base hospital the next day. Preciolita filed a complaint for recovery of damages against
Manila Railroad. The lower court, however, ruled in favor of Manila Railroad. The lower
court opined that Ralph was a victim of his own wrongdoing and miscalculation when he
took the risk and attempted to beat the oncoming locomotive and aiming to reach the other
side of the railroad crossing before said locomotive could pass the jeep by. Hence, the
present case

Issue
Whether there is negligence on the part of Manila Railroad and should be held liable for
damages.

Ruling
In determining the presence of negligence, the court explained that every case must be
dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in
the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the objective standard of
prudence is met, then negligence is ruled out.
In the present case, it is improper to impute negligence on Manila Railroad since material
facts show that it is clear that Ralph Corliss was so sufficiently warned in advance (the
lower court pointed out that moments before the collision, Teodorico Capili who was
manning the locomotive which was then 300 meters away from exact point of accident,
blew the siren andrepeated it in compliance with the regulation) of the oncoming train that
it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in
stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.

Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre vs. Philippine National Railways

Doctrine
Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury."

Facts
Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up
at about 11 o'clock that evening, the spouses proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with
Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level
crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light, and hearing no
whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the
tracks. At the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a
collision between the two. This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to
lose the earnings they used to enjoy as successful career people.The defense is centered on
the proposition that the gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the
collision; that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by section
56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of the
train, and thus, there would have been no collision.

Issue
Whether Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the collision.

Ruling
No. The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the railroad
crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the
party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no warning lights flashing nor
warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming train. They safely traversed the
crossing. On their return home, the situation at the crossing did not in the least change,
except for the absence of the guard or flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the
crossing was safe for passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened
his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of speed for going
over railroad crossings

Ma-ao Central Co., Inc. vs. C.A.

Doctrine
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Facts
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of
Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly
derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side,
caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The
claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private
respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio
ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the
decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent
and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The widow
appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground
that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its own decision, the Court of
Appeals 2 sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of
the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.

Issue
Whether the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence
notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for
disallowing the deductions made by the trial court

Ruling
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by
protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place
by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick
which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned.
Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should
have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.

There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of
preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility
was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the
control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district
were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour.
3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents
instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
Doctrine
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care.

Facts
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. The owners
of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the
station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).

Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their
employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds
that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite,” and
that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at bar,
however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.

Issues
Whether without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
Ruling
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The
gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.. Defendants’
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with
respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. Al., G.R. No. L-52732, August 29,
1988
Doctrine
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.

Facts
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the
residence of the Mables. o Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable
first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence. The request was repeated several
times but they fell on deaf ears. o In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out
in Cruz’s shop. Cruz’s employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire,
but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shop and the
house were razed to the ground. o The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on
their house and the contents thereof. o The Mables filed an action for damages against the
Cruz’s. o The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award of
damages.

Issues
Whether the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable to the instant case.
Ruling
Yes. The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in
the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material
such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be
found thereon. Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence

Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., G.R. No. L-21749, September
29, 1967
Doctrine
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It
is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more
difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

Facts
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation owned barge L-1892, which was being towed by two
tugboats, “Bangus” and “Barbero,” down the Pasig river in August 17, 1960. It then rammed
against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bridge, causing it to tilt. The Republic of
the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for damages, to which the latter raised the defense
of force majeure – that the ramming was a fortuitous event, and that there should be no
obligation to pay. The CFI ruled in favor of the Republic, and Luzon Stevedoring appealed to
the Supreme Court.

Issues
Whether the damage resulting from the collision was caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure.

Ruling
No. considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges like of appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively
controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on
the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in
the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo
American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the Doctrine of Res ipsa
loquitur.

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals

Doctrine
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby
he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In
such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the
fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Facts
When the vessel reached one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two
shackles were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken due to this. A commotion between the crew members ensued.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern
(half speed). Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankow likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damages as well.

Issue
Whether the compulsory pilot/master is liable for the damage caused.

Ruling
Yes. As a general rule, the harbor pilot on compulsory pilotage is responsible under
compulsory pilotage, solely for the damage caused to a vessel or life and property at ports
due to his liability for the damage caused by the negligence or fault. However, if there is
contributory negligence on the vessel to the pier, at the port of part of the master or the
crew, then the pilot will not be solely destination, for his negligence responsible for
damages. In this case, Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankiv were both negligent, hence, should
be held solidarily liable together with Far Eastern Shipping Corp, the owner of the vessel.

Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCR 334 (1996)

Doctrine
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.

Facts
On September 1988, Petitioner Dr. Batiquin performed a simple caesarean section on
Respondent Mrs. Villegas when the latter gave birth. Soon after leaving the hospital,
respondent began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. The
abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and this prompted respondent to consult with
another doctor, Dr. Kho (not Hayden). When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of respondent to
check her out respondent’s infection, she discovered that a piece of rubber material, which
looked like a piece of rubber glove and was deemed a foreign body, was the cause of the
respondent’s infection. Respondent then sued petitioner for damages. RTC held in favor of
petitioner. CA reversed, ruling for the respondent.

Issues
Whether petitioner is liable to respondent.

Ruling
Yes. Under the rule of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Dr. Batiquin is liable. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality
causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence
whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it
lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of
the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine the happening of an injury permits an inference
of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by
an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of defendant,
and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.

S.D. Martinez, et.al. vs. William Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910

Doctrine
A coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable
time, during which the animals has shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as
usual and was assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into
the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It
was further shown that, to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in unloading
the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by
employers.
Facts
Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of
Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon
belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite
direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of
the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and
stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that
instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by
said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a
serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the
horse which was drawing it.

Issues
Whether the defendant is liable for the negligence of his cochero.

Ruling
No. The act of the defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or
injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society forso long a time that
they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed thevery reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are
beneficial rather than prejudicial.Accidentssometimes happen and injuries result from the
most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customaryresults. To hold that,
because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent is
to go far.

The fact that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a
case does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most
only creates a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the
plaintiff before the defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
disappears.

Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Dev. Co.

Doctrine
While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of non-contractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the
proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not occur as if he having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want
of care.

Facts
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946 while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were
loading grass, an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant
Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of
the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result,
the plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed
through his body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to eyes,
leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not
completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the
incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
show any specific act of negligence.

Issues
Whether the defendant is liable due to his negligence.

Ruling
This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for
itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the
plaintiff had every night to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the sole
control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not
part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strain
and stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as
barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless
someone is negligent (which is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped
suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care and
maintenance.

Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-4478,
August 29, 1986
Doctrine
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Facts
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following: SA IYO WALANG
PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages
based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code

In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the
attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was not meant to be
attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous
acts of its employees.

Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it greatly
affected his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue
Whether Radio Communications of the Philippines is liable.

Ruling
Yes. RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed
any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not
speak well of its concern for their clientele’s interests. Negligence here is very patent. This
negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for
the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its
employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the
RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to
deprive the general public of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.