Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION
Part I: NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?
1. Meaning of the Word "Philosophy"
2. Philosophy and Ordinary Knowledge
3. Speculative Sciences, Practical Sciences, and the Arts
4. Definition of Philosophy
5. Philosophy and a "World-View"
CHAPTER 2
PHILOSOPHY AS WISDOM
1. Wisdom in Human Existence
2. Types of Wisdom
3. Wisdom and Science
4. Wisdom and Ignorance
CHAPTER 3
PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE
1. The Scientific Nature of Philosophy
2. Unity and Multiplicity in Philosophy
3. Philosophy and Particular Sciences
4. The Philosophical Foundation of Particular Sciences
5. Autonomy of the Sciences
CHAPTER 4
THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY
1. Continuity with Ordinary Knowledge
2. Philosophy and Intellectual Evidence
3. Philosophy and Experimental Proof
4. The Specialized Study of Philosophy
Part II: DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER 1
METAPHYSICS
1. What Metaphysics Is
2. Metaphysics and the Unity of Philosophy
3. Metaphysics, the Science of Being as Such
4. Parts of Metaphysics
CHAPTER 2
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
1. What Philosophy of Nature Is
2. Philosophy of Nature and "Cosmic View"
3. The Significance of Philosophy of Nature
4. Philosophy of Nature and the Experimental Sciences
CHAPTER 3
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIVING BEINGS
1. The Philosophy of Living Beings and Natural Philosophy
2. The Metaphysical Study of Man
3. The Study of Man and Particular Sciences
CHAPTER 4
ETHICS
1. Ethics, a Practical Science
2. The Object of Study of Ethics
3. Parts of Ethics
4. Ethics and Metaphysics
CHAPTER 5
LOGIC
1. What Logic Is
2. Logic and Metaphysics
3. Logic and Human Knowledge
4. Parts of Logic
CHAPTER 6
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
1. Philosophical Significance of History of Philosophy
2. The Study op History of Philosophy
3. Progress in Philosophy
4. Principal Periods in the History of Philosophy
Part III: PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY
CHAPTER 1 THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE
1. Reason and Faith
2. What Theology Is
3. The Role of Reason in Theology
CHAPTER 2
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
1. The Role of Philosophy in Theology
2. "Christian Philosophy"
3. Philosophy and Dogmatic Statements
4. Philosophy, an Instrument of Theology
CHAPTER 3
PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY
1. Philosophy in Early Christianity
2. The Medieval Synthesis
3. Christianity and Modern Philosophy
4. Continuity in Christian Philosophy
CHAPTER 4
THE CHRISTIAN BEFORE PHILOSOPHY
1. Faith and Philosophical Study
2. Philosophy and Christian Living
3. Church Magisterium and Philosophy
BIBLIOGRAPHYFrancis B. OngkingcoFrancis B. Ongkingco222015-07-03T14:39:00Z2015-07-
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NONEINTRODUCTION

Philosophy is etymologically defined as love of wisdom. A person who strives to go deeply into it must
be aware from the very start that mere erudition would not be enough. The task requires a deliberate
effort to seek the truth.

Mariano Artigas

Classical works are quoted according to their traditional division, without any reference to specific
editions. Numerical references appearing in quotations from works of St. Thomas Aquinas are from
the Marietti edition.

The abbreviations used in order to quote from works of St. Thomas Aquinas are as follows:

In Phys.:Commentary on Aristotle'sPhysics.

In Metaphys.:Commentary on Aristotle'sMetaphysics.

In Ethic.:Commentary on Aristotle'sNicomacheanEthics.

In Post. Anal.:Commentary on Aristotle'sPosterior Analytics.

In BoetdeTrin.:Commentary on Boethius'On the Trinity.

S. Th.: Summa Theologiae

De Veritate:Disputed QuestionsOn Truth.Francis B. OngkingcoFrancis B. Ongkingco222015-07-

Francis B. OngkingcoFrancis B. Ongkingco222015-07-03T14:39:00Z2015-07-

CHAPTER 1 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

1.Meaning of the Word "Philosophy"

The term "philosophy" comes from Greek, and it means "love of wisdom." Ancient tradition tells us
that the early Greek thinkers called themselves "wise men," and that, out of humility, Pythagoras
wanted to call himself simply a "lover of wisdom" or "philosopher." This is the origin of the term
"philosophy."

Cicero traced the origin of this tradition to a disciple of Plato, named Heraclides Ponticus[1]

St. Thomas Aquinas made reference to it, and he concluded: "From then on, the term "philosopher"
replaced that of "wise man," and the term "philosophy" replaced that of "wisdom." The term is
significant in this context. For one who seeks wisdom for its sake and not for any other motive loves
wisdom; a person who seeks something for some other motive loves that motive more than the thing
sought".[2]Hence, we see that philosophy, strictly speaking, is knowledge sought purposely for its
own sake, and not for the sake of some other knowledge.[3]

The human being possesses a keen desire to know,that leads him to seek the causes of events or
happenings. He looks for answers to questions that occur to him, and the answers he gets frequently
give rise to further questions. His search for knowledge is induced by theoretical considerations
(knowing for the sake of knowing, to satisfy the demands of his intellect) as well as practical reasons
(the need for knowledge in order to act with moral uprightness, or with technical efficiency).

A person's keen desire to know, on the theoretical level, is a yearning for truth, to which the human
being is naturally inclined through his intellect. The quest for reasons or explanations, therefore, is
something that flows from human nature. This has important practical consequences. For instance, a
human being experiences the need to seek and discover the purpose of his own existence; for this, he
needs to find the answers to many questions about things existing around him.

When we use the term "philosophy," we refer to the search for a profound knowledge about reality,
that is, a knowledge that goes beyond spontaneous knowledge and the knowledge attained by the
arts, and particular as well as technical sciences.

2.Philosophy and Ordinary Knowledge

A certain knowledge about reality, including the ultimate truths that are the object of philosophy,
such as the existence of God, the immortality of the human soul, the principles of the natural law, can
be attained by the human intellect in a natural way, even without any scientific study, as long as
reason is used correctly. Any person who has not done violence to his intellect through bad
dispositions (by fostering pride, for example), or through bad moral habits, is capable of affirming the
real existence of beings around him, of acknowledging the need for a Maker of beings found in
nature, of knowing that there is life after death, without having to study philosophy.

Philosophy does not do away with this spontaneous knowledge. Rather, in agreement and in
continuity with spontaneous knowledge, philosophy studies all these realities in a scientific way,
taking into account their nature and their foundation. It can, for example, draw up arguments to
demonstrate the existence of God or of the human soul, some of which have already been affirmed
by spontaneous knowledge. In other words, philosophy, basing itself on spontaneous knowledge,
perfects this knowledge by striving for greater precision, making distinctions or clarifications,
expressly stating many of its elements, and purifying it of some erroneous factors linked to a specific
cultural milieu. Philosophy should never contradict spontaneous knowledge, since scientific thinking is
carried out with the same knowing faculties and starts from the same basic evident truths shared by
all human beings. To try to make philosophy "start from scratch," as if no valid previous knowledge
existed, would not be legitimate. Besides, historically, this position has led to bitter consequences, far
removed from a genuine knowledge of the truth, of the world, and of man. A correct spontaneous
knowledge— not identical to a general agreement among particular groups of people, which can be
imbued with prejudices— is necessary for philosophy. To turn away from it means to turn away from
a correct knowledge of reality.

Descartes affirmed that to proceed rigorously, the philosopher must doubt all knowledge and begin
from zero,proving everything from the very beginning with a certainty similar to that of mathematical
proofs.[4]This approach can be quite appealing; in fact it has exerted a considerable influence up to
our time. Nevertheless, besides being impossible, this stand is illogical. Indeed, the philosopher
should study in depth the reasons behind everything, but in order to do so, he should make use of
common knowledge and basically acknowledge the value it has. Otherwise, he will not be able to
reason out, and inevitably end up maintaining skeptical or contradictory views.

3.Speculative Sciences, Practical Sciences, and the Arts

Philosophy goes beyond the arts. Art arises when, starting from some experiences, one arrives at a
universal judgment applicable to all similar cases. Philosophy seeks explanations based on knowledge
of causes; hence, we have to affirm that it is a science, and that it deals with some knowledge higher
than that obtained in the arts.

St. Thomas defines art as the rationality of actions through which some objects Carte-facts') are
produced.[5]It is a form of knowledge possessing some universality. In this sense, it goes beyond
mere experience arising from specific events. Through art, we get to know the reason behind some
things. In contrast, experience, which may be valuable and desirable, does not seek to know the
causes of events.[6]Over and above art lies science,which is the knowledge through causes of
something that is not immediately evident. It entails a reasoning process through which one begins
from some previous knowledge and arrives at some other knowledge through the use of logic.[7]
 
But philosophy, as a science, is different from the so-called particular sciences.The latter limit
themselves to the search for proximate causes, while the former seeks the highest or ultimate causes,
that is, the causes that suffice by themselves, in so far as there are no deeper causes than them. For
example, physics and chemistry strive to explain how material substances are transformed into other
substances, whereas philosophy seeks to know the essential properties of matter and its origin, and
thus arrives at the creation of matter by God.
 
Theoretical sciences are different from practical sciences. The former are geared more towards
knowledge of truth. The latter, too, require knowledge, but they are more interested in its application
in order to carry out specific deeds or works.[8]
 
We need to state, moreover, that philosophical knowledge is attained through the natural power of
reason. Thus, philosophy is different from the higher knowledge of supernatural faith,through which,
with the help of God's grace, we attain truths contained in divine revelation. Philosophy is also
different from supernatural theology,which studies these revealed truths in a scientific manner.
 
To synthesize what we have seen up to this point, let us consider, for instance, the levels of
knowledge involved in the construction of a building. A bricklayer has the experience of carrying out
and finishing some concrete jobs. A foreman can have a mastery of the art of constructing, and know
why things have to be done in a specific way. An architect has acquired the practical science of
constructing, based on different principles studied in a theoretical manner by the engineer, the
physicist, or the mathematician, in different levels. These latter are engaged in their respective
theoretical sciences which benefit construction.
 
These levels of knowledge are mutually beneficial and complementary. Thus, the limitations of mere
experience are overcome through recourse to art and science. Moreover, universal knowledge is
hardly efficacious unless it is complemented by concrete experience.[9]Furthermore, there are
objective links evident among these different levels of knowledge. For instance, the progress of
sciences depends greatly on available experience. The development of theoretical sciences is
fostered, too, by the demands or needs of practical sciences; regarding this point, one may consider,
as a specific case, the close link between modern physics and technology.
 
 
4. Definition of Philosophy
 
In general, we can state what philosophy is by means of the following definition:"Philosophy is the
knowledge of all things through their ultimate causes, acquired through the use of reason."
 
This definition reveals the material object of philosophy, that is, the realities it studies: philosophy
studies all things. All aspects of reality can be the object of philosophical study, since one can seek
their ultimate or most profound causes. In contrast, "particular sciences" concentrate on the study of
some specific aspect of reality, leaving aside all the rest.
 
That is why there can be a "philosophy of art," a "philosophy of science," and the like, since any type
of being or activity can be made the object of philosophical study.
 
The formal object of philosophy, which is that aspect under which it studies its material object, is the
study of reality "through its ultimate causes," that is, by seeking the deepest explanations regarding
the existence and nature of beings. This approach is what characterizes philosophy. It is what
distinguishes it from other types of knowledge, which limit themselves to seeking explanations and
causes within certain restricted levels.
 
The phrase "acquired through the use of reason" is added in the definition to show that philosophy
has a natural scope.It seeks the ultimate explanations that can be arrived at by applying reasoning to
facts supplied by experience. Philosophy analyzes these facts, considers their implications and the
irraison d'etre

Since the ultimate explanations of reality are centered on God and many times refer to purely
intelligible aspects of reality,philosophy possesses a metaphysical character,that is, it is a kind of
knowledge that leads one to explanations based on causes beyond sensible reality.
The proposed definition strictly applies to metaphysics,which is the main part of philosophy. The
definition is applied to other parts of philosophy (such as philosophy of nature, logic, and ethics) in so
far as they are related to metaphysics.

For instance, ethics studies the morality of human acts, and within its proper field is not subordinated
to any other science. Nevertheless, it has to rely on metaphysics for some basic notions it needs to
tackle the issues it confronts from the right perspective. Examples of these are: the notions of good
and evil, human freedom, the existence of God. The same thing can be said of the other branches of
philosophy.

5.Philosophy and a "World-View"

Philosophy is knowledge that is connatural to man. Every person has his or her notion of God, of the
human being, and of the world; he or she has a philosophy with its own degree of coherence, depth,
and veracity. Scientific and political theories also have philosophical foundations. Diverse cultures and
ideologies employ and transmit philosophical ideas. In fact, in all the different levels of knowledge
mentioned, the real issue is not whether one has or does not have a philosophy, but whether one
possesses adequately deep and orderly philosophical ideas or, on the contrary, accepts, with all the
risks of error that this implies, some philosophical ideas that have not been sufficiently pondered
upon.

This is borne out by everyday living when people speak of the "philosophy" that guides the activities
of a firm, a labor union, or a political party. In the final analysis, any activity with planned means and
ends presupposes a certain "philosophy." Whoever fails to reflect sufficiently upon this can
unconsciously welcome influences he may not really want or unwittingly lend a hand in spreading
them.

Hence, the orderly study of philosophy is most recommendable, so as to attain a correct and well-
founded view of reality. It also protects one from the ideologies of certain cultural milieu that deform
truths acquired through spontaneous knowledge, and at the same time allows him to properly discern
the truths and errors contained in ideas prevailing in diverse scientific, cultural and social circles.[10]

The study of philosophy undoubtedly requires effort, and understandably entails difficulties.In
philosophy, as in any other field of specialized study, one acquires an adequate perspective only after
having reached a certain level of knowledge. Besides, familiarity with the specific terminology usually
employed in philosophy is required.

The "obscurity" attributed to many philosophical writings is due, at times, to the two above-
mentioned factors (although it may also be traced to a defect on the part of the writer). At times,
some people mistakenly think that philosophical issues should be within the reach of everyone
without the need to exert any effort. Yet a deep study of philosophy requires at least as much effort
as that demanded by other specialized fields of knowledge.

Indeed, philosophical understanding not quite infrequently demands a greater effort than that
required by other disciplines, when it deals with the most profound explanation of reality. The
difficulty increases when philosophy deals with issues that require more than mere experience or
ordinary knowledge. For example, the philosophy of science as well as philosophical psychology
frequently requires reflection on knowledge supplied by other sciences. In these cases, mastery of
such knowledge becomes indispensable.

CHAPTER2PHILOSOPHY AS WISDOM

1.Wisdom in Human Existence

The desire for knowledge is something natural to man, and his happiness is closely linked to wisdom.
Wisdom enables him to discover the meaning of his life and to act in an upright way. Ignorance, in
contrast, is the source of disorder and errors in behavior which prevent him from attaining happiness.

One can attain true wisdom without studying philosophy. Spontaneous metaphysics of ordinary
knowledge suffices to make a person grasp the basic truths that govern human conduct.
Nevertheless, one needs a systematic study of these truths to attain wisdom in all its extension and
depth.
The term "wise man" is usually applied to a person who has a certain and well-founded knowledge of
the deepest truths, which enables him to guide and influence other people.

We can define wisdom in general terms as a certain knowledge of the deepest causes of
everything[11]

Commenting on Aristotle's thoughts about this matter, St. Thomas Aquinas says: 'The term wisdom is
applied to the most certain among the arts; knowing the first causes in a particular type of arts, they
serve as a guide for all the rest within a specific category, just as the architect guides manual workers.
In the same manner, we regard some people as the wisest among all, that is, not only with regard to
some type of beings, but also with regard to all. Just as the wise man in some kind of art possesses the
greatest certainty, wisdom in general(sapientia simplicity)is the most certain among the sciences,
since it reaches the first principles of beings".[12]

Thus,wisdom has a guiding and judging role with regard to other forms of knowledge,since perfect
judgment about something can be obtained only by taking into account its ultimate causes[13]

Although the term "wise man" is usually applied to a person who has distinguished himself in some
particular specialty, it is applied in the proper sense to a person who has a certain knowledge of the
most general causes of everything. It may happen that ordinary persons may truly be more wise (in
the strict sense) than a scientist who tackles issues outside his field of specialty with his usual
erudition, but in a superficial way.

2.Types of Wisdom

In the natural level, the most perfect wisdom is attained though metaphysics.This is so because
metaphysics studies the deepest causes of reality, in so far as they can be known by natural reason
(with respect to all creation, the most profound cause is God; within a more restricted scope, the
human soul, which is spiritual). Metaphysics provides the foundation for a proper perspective in
particular sciences and for the adequate interpretation of their findings; it is also the basis of natural
ethics. Although metaphysics does not go into a detailed analysis of all the sciences, it passes
judgment on the ultimate value and meaning of the specific knowledge they attain. Thus, it makes the
ordering of different types of knowledge and acts toward their true end possible.[14]

Particular knowledge attained in the sciences always presupposes some philosophical foundation,
which metaphysics studies in a systematic manner. This does not imply that scientists have to wait for
the final judgment of philosophers regarding matters of their respective competence. Nevertheless,
when they want to reveal expressly the metaphysics contained in their assumptions or findings, they
should proceed with metaphysical precision.

In a general way,wisdom studies all things in the light of their ultimate causes.Above all, it considers
them in relation to God, who is the origin and end of all creatures. In this way, it allows us to carry out
the task of passing judgment on them and of ordering them with regard to their ultimate end, which
is God.

If we consider ultimate causes in a relative way, with respect to different aspects of reality,we can
speak of wisdom concerning each one of these varied aspects. For example, we can refer to wisdom
with respect to particular sciences, which study specific aspects of reality; with respect to moral
philosophy, which studies free human acts; and with respect to the arts, which deal with the order
that man establishes in the artificial things he makes. The term "wisdom" is also applied to prudence,
which is the application of morals to particular cases.
3.Wisdom and Science

Wisdom is also science,since science is the knowledge of truths attained by means of demonstration,
starting from some principles. Philosophical wisdom adds to science the particular characteristic of
concern for ultimate causes (metaphysics), or of advancing further from the starting point of ultimate
causes. In this sense, philosophical wisdom is distinct from the wisdom proper to the particular
sciences, due to the maximum scope of its object, the causes under whose light it views reality, and
therefore, also due to its own methodology.

Metaphysics is both science and wisdom at the same time.There is no conflict between these two
aspects, since metaphysics is precisely wisdom by being the science which studies ultimate causes in
the natural order.

St. Thomas Aquinas states that "the science called wisdom is that which deals with first causes and
first principles;[15]he also asserts that "wisdom is not just any other science; rather it is the science of
the most noble and divine realities, thus, the head of all the sciences".[16]Indeed, "wisdom is science
in so far as it shares what is common to all sciences, that is, arriving at conclusions by demonstration,
starting from some principles. But it has something proper to it alone, which puts it above the other
sciences, since it passes judgment on all things, not only with regard to conclusion, but also with
regard to the "first principles. Hence, it is a virtue (an intellectual one) more perfect than science".[17]

4.Wisdom and Ignorance

Ifwisdom is of paramount importance in directing human existence towards its purpose or end,
ignorance, in turn, is the cause of the varied obstacles that hinder this task. Thus, ignorance inflicts
serious harm on individuals. Wisdom alone is not enough to make a person morally good;
nevertheless, it greatly facilitates the attainment of moral uprightness, and the happiness that comes
with it
 
Socrates is said to have equated virtue and knowledge. The period of Enlightenment highlighted this
relation of identity, affirming that science would suffice to make a person good.[18]Knowledge and
moral virtue exert a mutual influence, since moral uprightness demands prudence, and prudence
requires moral virtues.[19]Knowledge by itself does not suffice to make a person good and happy; but
ignorance regarding what is good makes upright living and happiness difficult to attain.
 
The study of particular sciences does not usually interfere with the subject's moral dispositions, at
least in matters which are not related to one's personal commitment, such as mathematical proofs, or
demonstrations in mathematical physics, or many sociological or historical issues.But when particular
sciences tackle issues that have repercussions on attitudes towards life, the objectivity of the science
concerned will also depend on his subjective dispositions:Thus, a person may exhibit an ignorance
clothed in scientific garb, and may take a stand that coincides with his personal preferences, in
disregard of objective considerations. This kind of pseudo-scientific ignorance is a serious hindrance in
the quest for an objective view of reality, and for true theoretical and moral wisdom.
 
For instance, an individual who accepts the historical laws Marxism upholds will tend to interpret
many historical events in the light of class struggle and the conflict of economic interests, although
there may be no facts supporting such interpretations, or even if the available data may show the
contrary.  Something similar happens when a materialist studies psychology. He will
have the tendency to view human behavior as determinist, in an arbitrary and anti-scientific manner.
One can easily see that in these and other similar cases, true wisdom gives rise to an independent and
objective attitude, and helps people discover the errors of various forms of pseudo-scientific
reductionism.
 
When a person comes face to face with wisdom, he finds himself confronted with truths that have a
deep bearing on his existence. Thus,ignorance and error in these matters are closely linked with the
moral uprightness of the subjectKnowledge concerning the deepest truths demands an upright will
that sincerely seeks what is good without allowing itself to be carried away by arbitrary preferences.
Hence,the exercise of human freedom plays an important role in the growth of
sapientialknowledge,which deals with ultimate causes and which fulfills a judging and ordering role
with regard to other forms of knowledge.
 
Speaking about doctrine, St. Thomas Aquinas says that "to be efficacious, it must find a soul
possessing good morals, disposed to welcome thegoodjoyfullyand detest what is evil The soil must be
well-tilled in order to make the seed bear fruitBut a person who lives according to his passions does
not hear with good dispositions the words of the person who corrects him.[20]Obviously, since
freedom plays a main role in these matters, a person's dispositions may not necessarily be constant;
there is always room for change. But it is dear that the determining factors in matters that fall within
the term "wisdom" are not merely theoretical ones, no matter how important they may be.
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1.The Scientific Nature of Philosophy
 
Philosophy is a science,and it is a science in an eminent way, that is, it is more sublime than other
sciences, as we ourselves can conclude after considering the two principal meanings of the term
"science."
 
First, in so far as science is a “certain knowledge through causes” philosophy can truly be considered
as a science. Besides, since it studies the deepest causes of reality, it is the first and most eminent
among all the sciences; the other sciences deal only with the more immediate or proximate causes of
reality.
 
Second, in so far as science is knowledge attained by way of demonstration, starting from some
principles, philosophy is truly a science since it attains knowledge in the same manner. One has to
note, moreover, that philosophy also studies the first or most basic principles of all knowledge, which
other sciences do not do. Hence, philosophy is truly a science, but it should be considered not simply
as one more among the other sciences, but as a science superior to all the rest.
 
Thediversity of opinionsin philosophy seems to be an obstacle to the acceptance of philosophy as a
science. In fact, some philosophers tried to construct a philosophical system that would do away with
that pluralism and achieve ageneral agreementon account of the method used.
 
Thus, Descartes assumed as a model for philosophy the clarity and precision of mathematics, and he
wanted to deduce all knowledge from indubitable evidence.[21]Kant's model was his own
interpretation of Newton's physics, whose precision he regarded as a definitive achievement; he
concluded that the universality of knowledge comes from the necessary use of some categories of
thought common to all men.[22]Other more recent attempts are those of Husserl, whose
phenomenological method exerted a great influence on 20th century philosophy,[23]and of the neo-
positivists of the Vienna Circle, who reduced all philosophy to the logical analysis of language.[24]
 
These approaches can only achieve a fictitious clarity, for they arbitrarily reduce philosophical issues
to some partial aspects.[25]
 
True precision can only be attained by employing correct reasoning, starting from experience, and
avoiding all forms of unilateral reductionism. The lack ofgeneral agreementshould not be traced to
philosophy itself, but to the shortcomings of those who do not study issues with the required rigor or
precision, and who try to explain reality by reducing it to some of its partial aspects, and also to the
difficulty entailed in thestudy ofprofound philosophical issues.
 
 
2.Unity and Multiplicity in Philosophy
 
Philosophy is really a science composed of different sciences.In spite of this fact we can still speak
ofaphilosophical science, since the different parts of philosophy are closely linked and are
characterized by the same perspective. The nucleus of philosophy is metaphysics, which studies the
basic aspects of reality (its "being") and its ultimate causes. The metaphysical perspective, applied in
the study of beings found in nature, gives rise to the philosophy of inanimate nature, the philosophy
of corporeal beings, and the philosophy of man.
 
Thus, when we speak of "philosophy" (in singular), we should not forget that the term denotes several
disciplines having the same basic perspective, which is metaphysical, that is, the study of reality in the
light of ultimate causes. That is why the differences between philosophy and particular sciences are
based mainly on the metaphysical perspective used by philosophy. Even though not all philosophy is,
strictly speaking, metaphysics, any philosophical study must always be characterized by a
metaphysical perspective.
 
Any specific aspect of reality can be the object of philosophical study. Hence, "philosophy of nature,"
"philosophy of man," "philosophy of law," and so on, are branches of philosophy, even though these
may be given other names. But a specific discipline cannot rightfully be considered as a philosophical
study simply because it has raised some general issues about a specific matter; it must have the
proper perspective, that is, it must gear itsstudy towards the "being" of the reality it tackles, and seek
its ultimate causes.
 
 
3. Philosophy and Particular Sciences
 
The differences between philosophy and particular sciencesare due mainly to a particular point
philosophy studies reality in its deepest or most radical aspect, and seeks its ultimate causes, while
particular sciences study specific aspects of reality, and seek more immediate or proximate causes.
The proper scope of particular sciences (whether they are natural sciences like physics and biology, or
human sciences like sociology and history) is limited to some particular aspects of reality; for instance,
they can be physical properties or human behavior. Particular sciences study these aspects, seeking
causes which do not go beyond that level; for example, they may try to find out how some physical
properties affect other properties, or how some forms of human behavior influence others. In
contrast, philosophy studiesallreality, and tries to discover the ultimate explanation of its verybeing.
 
In its search for the ultimate causes of reality, philosophy reaches the realm of spiritual realities and it
studies them as such. The knowledge of God, the knowledge of the human soul, and the knowledge of
the moral law are matters that properly and exclusively belong to philosophy. Besides, philosophy
deals with all aspects of reality in the light of ultimate explanations which are strictly metaphysical.
 
Scientismclaims that the method employed by experimental sciences is the only valid one in order to
know reality. This position is self-contradictory, since what it affirms cannot be proven through the
use of the scientific method.
 
Compared with the optimistic scientism of the 18th and 19th centuries, which considered scienceas
the solution to all human problems, contemporary scientism is usually pessimistic It acknowledges the
limits of science, and even exaggerates them, extending them to all fields of human knowledge, and
asserts that we can never affirm any truth with certainty.This,for instance, is the case in the positions
adopted by K.R. Popper and M. Bunge.
 
There is also a scientism that affects human sciences. For example, there is a "historicism" that seeks
the ultimate explanation of reality in historical factors governed by necessary laws. Hence, its
adherents arbitrarily deny the existence of other relevant factors, and, at least theoretically, of human
freedom.[26]
 
 
4.The Philosophical Foundation of Particular Sciences
 
Particular sciences study reality using their respective methods and perspectives, which are not
philosophical.But they are founded on metaphysics,in varying degrees. Indeed, they implicitly rely on
certain notions regarding the reality they seek to study, and explicitly reflecting on these ideas is a
philosophical task. For instance, physics starts from some general notions and principles regarding
bodies, space and time, as well as physical causality, which are studied by philosophy.
 
Hence, it is possible for a particular science to build upon an erroneous metaphysical foundation.Such
was the case of mechanistic physics, built upon a false doctrine stating that all the properties of
matter can be reduced to quantitative aspects. Similar to it is the case of a sociology that
acknowledges the existence of necessary laws in social behavior, andthe case ofabehavioristic
psychology. In spite of this, one can find correct statements, experiences and descriptions within such
erroneous particular sciences; nevertheless, they will also contain false statements, and transmit false
images of the aspects of reality that they study.
 
Mechanismperceives reality asamechanical machine, where everything can be explained by the
movement of material parts. This explanation of reality, which already finds serious scientific and
philosophical difficulties with respect to material bodies, at times attempts to include man, in all his
being, into its study. Obviously, some aspects of reality can be explained partially through mechanical
models, and these in turn may be used to defend a doctrine espousing total mechanism, which is not
acceptable.[27]
 
Marxismreduces human phenomena to economic factors and the necessary laws of history. Hence,
the partial truths it may contain are placed within a clearly erroneous context, which does not ac-
knowlegeany spiritual dimension that characterizes man essentially.[28]
 
Behaviorismpresupposes that everything in man can be reduced to material factors, alleging that
other factors (such as conscience, spirit, and freedom) cannot be subjected to the methods
usedbyexperimental sciences.[29]
 
These three positions are examples ofreductionistdoctrines, since they reduce the reality they study
to some aspects, and ignore the rest. They can attract minds because of their false clarity, attained by
arbitrarily simplifying objective data. In so far as they are usually presented as scientific conclusions,
they arepseudo-scientificdoctrines, in which some partial scientific truths are mixed with false
statements. Since their errors are usually presented with partial truths as forming just one single
doctrine, it is difficult to isolate the partial truths from the errors they contain.
 
The more sublime the object of a particular science is, the closer its link with philosophy will beSince
biology studies living beings, it has more metaphysical implications than chemistry. The sciences that
deal directly with man (like psychology, sociology, and history) will necessarily make use of
philosophical knowledge, and the truth of their conclusions will depend greatly on their use of a
correct metaphysical foundation.
 
For instance,evolutionist theoriesin biology cannot rightfully deny the divine creation of the universe,
since they should limit their study only to the possible origin of some beings from some other
preexisting beings. Neither can they lawfully deny the spirituality of the human soul, which, unlike
material realities, cannot be the object of scientific experimentation. If one tries to defend
materialism through biology, he will be guilty of a false and scientifically unjustified extrapolation.[30]
 
The tendency to use "particular sciences" and "positive sciences" as interchangeable terms, due to
the influence of positivism, leads to a great confusion. Actually,there is no such thing as a "positive"
science,if by that term we want to refer to a kind of knowledge that has no relation at all with
metaphysics; it would then simply be a mere pragmatic instrument without any use for knowing
reality, which is the primary objective of the sciences. The positivist view is historically false and it
cannot be applied in practice. The moment a science studies aspects of reality—and all sciences do so
—it must necessarily rely on a metaphysical base. When this is denied, the sciences actually get built
on implicit metaphysical foundations, with the constant danger of having unjustified philosophical
views being passed off as scientifically proven facts.
 
 
5.Autonomy of the Sciences
 
Particular sciences do not carry out a strictly metaphysical study.They make use of metaphysical bases
without adopting the perspective proper to philosophy.These sciences have their own autonomy:their
relations with philosophy do not prevent memfrom having their own methods of obtaining and
judging their own conclusions. With respect to them, philosophy has a guiding role of a higher order,
which does not interfere with their own autonomy.
 
Philosophyjudges and guidesthe rest of the sciences, because it has the function of judging the first
principles of all human knowledge and the value of scientific methods. Hence, its task includes
determining the proper object of every science and classifying the sciences according to a hierarchy,
taking into account their specific nature.
 
This does not affect in any way the autonomy of the sciences.Philosophy does not interfere withЛетin
their own respective fields, since its guiding role is exercised from a higher level.For instance,
philosophy does not provide the means to judge the truth of a physical or biological law, but it can
issue a warning that some statements made in the name of physics or biology are actually unjustified
extrapolations which lie outside the scope of their respective methods.
 
The conclusions of particular sciences are not "deduced" from philosophy, as Descartes in some way
tried to do. Nor are they totally "independent" from philosophy, as the positivists affirmed. These
conclusions are obtained through the methods proper to every science, but the judgment on the
validity of these methods requires philosophical considerations.[31]
 
From ancient times until the 18th century, philosophy was considered as the sum total of all
knowledge, including the particular sciences.Inmany cases, the relative autonomy of the particular
sciences was not respected.Incontrast, 19th century positivism reduced the task of philosophy to a
mere reflection on the findings of the "positive" sciences.Acorrect view of this matter has to take into
account the different perspectives of philosophy and the particular sciences, and at the same time,
their relationship, as previously explained.
 
In ancient times and in the MiddleAges, the scientific-experimental sciences were grouped, together
with the philosophical sciences, intonatural philosophy.Even Newton's principal work, a treatise on
physics in the modern sense, published in 1687, was titled "Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy."
 
The progress of experimental sciences since the 17th century, achieved without a precise
understanding of their methods, provoked a reversal of attitudes:for some, experimental science
seemed to be the only valid knowledge about nature,and the scope of philosophy was limited to
methodological reflections or to the study of scientific conclusions geared towards arriving at a
synthesis. Alongside these positivist attitudes, bannered especially by AugusteComte, opposite
exaggerated positions existed, which tried to relegate the sciences to a secondary role, far below
what their true advances dictated. Among these was the stand taken by the idealists. In general, the
relations between the sciences and philosophy until the 20th century have been characterized by
numerous irritants from either side, leading to misunderstanding and confusion.
 
Major revolutionary discoveries in the sciences in the 20th century have contributed to a better
understanding of the nature of the experimental method. Nevertheless, the widespread influence of
positivist prejudices and the inadequacy of some of the more popular philosophical systems—of the
rationalist, existentialist, or materialist bent—-have given rise to considerable imbalances and
uncertainties. On one hand, "philosophy of science" has progressed greatly, and has posted
substantial achievements in some aspects, above all in methodological matters; on the other hand,
there is still a great scarcity of adequately profound and rigorous philosophical approaches with
regard to these matters[32]
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NONECHAPTER 4THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY
 
 
1.Continuity with Ordinary Knowledge
 
Philosophy carries out its endeavor, in continuity with ordinary human knowledge.It makes use of the
same means: it begins from sense experience, through which it obtains abstract universal knowledge
with the use of the intellect. It advances in knowledge by making use of inferences, whose
significance is ultimately determined by sensible or intellectual evidence. There is no faculty or power
of knowing that gives rise to a type of knowledge that is distinctly philosophical.
 
But this does not mean that philosophy should uncritically accept all opinions usually attributed to
"common sense." These opinions can contain some errors; philosophical reflection should thus be
applied to the study of their basis and validity.
Just as there is no infallibleinstinctfor "common sense," there is nointuitionproper to philosophy. In
both instances, we use our intellect, and we reason by means of it, relying on knowledge supplied by
the senses. There are nospecial facultiesof human nature for certain types of knowledge. Every
human knowledge is attained through our senses and our intellect.
 
Hence, it is not correct to say that philosophy is a task exclusively meant for people who possess some
special capacity for knowing.Philosophy makes use in a systematic way of all the means available to
human knowledge:sense experience, induction, reasoning;the value of its statements is based on
evidence,as in any other type of knowledge.
 
These statements make us see therelationship affecting "ordinary knowledge," the sciences, and
philosophy.In these three cases, the worth of knowledge is measured by the same standard—the
correct use of sense knowledge and intellectual reasoning, according to the rules studied in logic.
 
Ordinary knowledgeis based on common experience, which is accessible to everyone. It includes all
matters, theoretical as well as practical, that affect human existence. That is why it also tackles issues
that philosophy studies in a systematic manner.
 
Particular sciencesstudy in greater detail some specific aspects of reality, making use of
experimentation and diverse logical processes (such as the hypothetical-deductive method) in an
orderly and systematic manner. In doing so, they obtain conclusions that are beyond the reach of
ordinary knowledge.
 
Philosophystudies reality by seeking its ultimate causes. For this, it bases itself on ordinary and
scientific knowledge, examining the degree of certainty that they attain in each particular case.
Besides, in its inferences, it makes use of the power of reason, in accordance with the rules of logic
valid for all types of human knowledge.
 
 
2.Philosophy and Intellectual Evidence
 
Intellectual knowledge starts from sense data; however, the intellect is Meto reach the essences of
things,"whose externalaccidents are grasped by the senses. Universal judgments are known through
induction, by means of which the intellect grasps what is universal and necessary, which it abstracts
from singular cases. Thus, starting from sensible images, we obtain universal judgments. All the
sciences abstract the universal and necessary from the particular. But while the sciences rely in some
way onsense evidence,on what is shown by the senses, philosophy concentrates onintellectual
evidence.
 
Abstractionis that process by which the intellect grasps the essences of things, expressing them
throughideasorconcepts,such as man, plant, color, and so on. Starting from what is sensible and
individual, one finally obtains intellectual and universal concepts.
 
Ideas are universal,since they apply to many individuals. For example, the idea "man" is attributed to
every individual man.Images are individual,for they are sensible and concrete representations
produced by the imagination—for example, the image of "this" man. Making use of images, the
intellect obtains ideas, and when it considers individual beings, it relates universal ideas with
individual images (that is, when it considers material beings: there are no sensible images of spiritual
beings.)
 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas affirmed that speculative sciences are distinguished from one
another by the degree of "immateriality" of their respective objects. In the first place,natural
scienceorphysicsstudies what depends on matter in its being—material beings or natural bodies—,
which necessarily includes matter in its definition. In the second place,mathematicsstudies what can
be grasped without matter, although it cannot exist independently of matter. Examples of this are
lines and numbers. In the third place,metaphysicsstudies everything that does not depend on matter
in its being, either because it is spiritual (for instance, God) or because it can be found both inmaterial
and spiritual realities (for instance, substance and accidents, act and potency).[33]
 
This doctrine of thedegrees of abstractionrequires further explanation. First, the natural sciences, in
the modern sense, are not fully equivalent to the "natural science" St. Thomas Aquinas referred to. In
many cases, they are equivalent to what St Thomas Aquinas called "middle sciences," which make use
of mathematics in the study of nature. "Natural science" or "physics" in those olden times referred to
the study of naturefroma philosophical point of view.
 
Second, one should not expect perfect continuity in the "degrees" of abstraction. When metaphysics
studies the "being" of all things, it adopts a particular perspective. Its abstraction consists in
considering everything from the point of view of its "being." But since everything that is real has a
certain "being," metaphysical abstraction considers everything real (at least, in an implicit way). Since
it is the most "abstract" science, metaphysics is the only science that considers all things in their
entire reality; particular sciences leave out of their respective studies everything that does not form
part of their proper method and perspective.[34]
 
 
3.Philosophy and Experimental Proof
 
As philosophy seeks the deepest causes of reality, it frequently touches upon realities that are beyond
the reach of the senses. That is why it makes more frequent use ofintellectual evidence.Whoever tries
to base the value of all knowledge on sense evidence will run into serious difficulties, not only in
philosophy, but also in many aspects of ordinary knowledge referring to realities that cannot be seen
or imagined. The intellect; freedom, good and evil, are examples of such realities. When philosophy
relies on intellectual evidence, it simply strives to develop in a systematic way the capacity of the
intellect, applying it to the study of the deepest causes and aspects of reality.
 
Particular sciences also make use of intellectual evidence, but they also habitually rely
onexperimentsplanned in such a way that the results obtained guide or decide solutions to problems.
They frequently utilize the hypothetical-deductive method. Within this method, a person who tackles
a problem formulates hypotheses; then he deduces consequences that can be either verified or
refuted through experiments.[35]
 
Philosophy makes use of experience and it cannot afford to do away with itNevertheless, starting
from data supplied by experience, philosophy applies reasoning, and proceeds to the realm of
essential causes arising in a necessary way, and deduces from them equally necessary conclusions.
 
For example, when philosophy analyzes the different types of "changes" found in nature, it comes to
know thateverybeing subject to change must be composed of act and potency.
 
These general truths are presupposed by particular sciences, which study specific aspects of beings
and their proximate causes.[36]
 
Hence, it is not at all surprising that in philosophy, one can face thedifficulty of not having to rely on
the imaginationIn some instances, one may confuse "understanding" something with being able to
"imagine" it in a sensible way. That something cannot be sensibly representedbythe imagination does
not mean that it has not been understood.
 
The imagination can only represent material realities that have been grasped through the
senses.Spiritual realities are not imaginable.Nevertheless, they possess a more perfect being than
material things; this is the case with God, the angels, and the human soul.The metaphysical aspects of
reality are not imaginable either.For instance, man is a substance and his color is an accident, but one
cannot represent in an imaginative way what the substance or the accident is; these are aspects of
reality one grasps with certainty through intellectual knowledge.
 
There is continuity between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge.Throughabstraction,the
intellect penetrates the product of sense experience, and through theconversion to images,it relates
universal ideas to the specific corporeal reality.
 
Philosophical doctrines that deny or badlyinterpret this continuity, are incapable of explaining
howman knows reality as it really is, although he does so in a limited way. Pursued to their logical
consequences, these -doctrines lead to skepticism.[37]
 
 
4.The Specialized Study of Philosophy
 
The study of philosophy requires a certain familiarity withphilosophical terms.There is a need to grasp
their precision and the wealth of meaning they contain. This demands constancy and going back time
and again to sense experience, which provided the starting point in the formulation of philosophical
topics that should be studied.
 
Just as in any specialized field of study, there is, of course, a philosophical terminology. One who
wants to delve into philosophy must have a good grasp of it Besides, there is a need to master this
terminology in order to express concepts with precision and avoid long-winded explanations.
 
However, after achieving adequate familiarity with philosophical terminology, one has to watch out
against the danger of creating unreal problems. This can happen when a person relates several
concepts without referring to what is real. Moreover, one can commit abuses in terminology at the
expense of clarity.[38]
 
To understand philosophy, one should ask himself or herself before tackling a particular topic:What is
the real issue involved here?For this, one needs to constantly take into account the data supplied by
experience, and thus avoid falling into merely terminological discussions.
 
For instance, in studying the spirituality of the human soul, one should note that "this is not merely a
theoretical exercise, but rather an effort to remainfaithful to our human experience.The reality of
understanding, which we all experience, and which opens up to a world of ideas (understood not in
the Platonic sense, but in the real sense of assimilating some intelligible content), expresses best what
we understand as spiritual. While often making reference to the material world through its content,
and maintaining a constant link with the activity of a biological substratum, the reality of
understanding reveals to us characteristics which are incompatible with materiality"[39]
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NONEPart II: DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
 
 
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NONECHAPTER 1METAPHYSICS
 
 
1.What Metaphysics Is
 
Metaphysics is philosophy, understood in its strictest meaning, since it studies reality, seeking its
ultimate causes in an absolute sense. It seeks the most intimate aspect of every reality, that is,
itsbeing;it studies the causes that in the final analysis account for thebeingand the diversemanners of
beingof things.
 
The term "metaphysics," which in Greek means "beyond physics," is used to denote what Aristotle
called "first philosophy." While drawing up a list of Aristotle's works around the year 70 A.D.,
Andronicus of Rhodes named some of his books "metaphysics," since they came after his "physics "
The name, however, perfectly fits this field of study: since it seeks the ultimate cause of the being of
things, it has to rise above what is material and sensible and reach out to spiritual realities.
 
Metaphysics studies all reality, since everything real hasbeing.It is not limited to some type of beings,
unlike the other branches of philosophy and the particular sciences. Thus,the material object of
metaphysics is all reality.Only something that would have no being would lie outside the scope of
metaphysics; obviously, that would be nothing.
 
Since metaphysics studies reality from the point of view of its being,the formal object of metaphysics
is the bang of reality,thatis,the bang of things.
 
The term "being"(ensin Latin) denotes everything "that is."Itis something thathas(habet)anact of
being(esse),and has a specificmanner of being.Strictly speaking, God is nota"being," since Heishis
ownesseor act of being, and he is not limited to any particular or finite manner of being. Metaphysics
studies God as the First Cause of the act of being of all things.
 
As we describe what metaphysics is, two different aspects will come to the fore. One is
themetaphysical perspective,which is common to all philosophical disciplines; the other is thesubject
matter proper to metaphysics,which only metaphysics studies.
 
The metaphysical perspective consists in the study of reality in the light of its ultimate causes.This
perspective can be applied to all reality: all beings, material as well as immaterial, can be the object of
metaphysical study. The sciences which share this perspective are philosophical disciplines, while
those which adopt a more partial perspective, limited to immediate causes, areparticular sciences.
 
Every science feat is truly philosophical seeks the being of its object, and therefore has a direct
relation to metaphysics which studies being in all its aspects.
 
For instance, philosophy of nature studies fee being of bodies, and discovers in them a composition of
act and potency which metaphysics studies in a general way, since this composition exists not only in
corporeal beings, but also in spiritual substances.
 
The subject matter proper to metaphysics includes realities that do not depend on matter for their
being,either because theyare spiritual—such as God, or the human soul—or because they are aspects
of reality that can be found in material as well as spiritual beings—such as substance and accidents,
act and potency, and causality. When we speak of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline distinct
from other philosophical fields of study, we specifically refer to the study of these matters.
 
The study of the human soul as a spiritual being pertains to metaphysics, but it is included in
philosophy of nature in so far as the soul is the form of the body.
 
Aspects of reality that are found both in material and spiritual beings are studied from a specific point
of view by philosophy of nature, and then in a general way and in depthbymetaphysics. Philosophy of
nature studies them in so for as they are found in material beings.
 
 
2.Metaphysics and the Unity of Philosophy
 
Metaphysics isthenucleus of philosophy.It gives unity to philosophy. The other branches of philosophy
study their subject matter from the point of view or perspective of metaphysics, which Aristotle
rightly called "First Philosophy." Thus, the division of philosophy does not give rise to merely
juxtaposed philosophical disciplines related to one another only externally.
 
This does not mean that the rest of the philosophical disciplines are a mere application of
metaphysics in the study of specific types of beings. Metaphysics, in its study of the being of things in
a general way, discovers "laws of being" which are universally valid for all reality (the so-calledfirst
principles),obtains conclusions applicable to all beings (although they apply to them in varying ways
and degrees), studies in a direct manner the spiritual beings which bear a reference to being in all its
aspects, due to their intellect and will, and ultimately reaches God as the First Cause of the being of all
things. The other philosophical disciplines coincide with metaphysics in their search for ultimate
causes of reality. However, they limit their study to some type of beings which have a specific manner
of being, for instance, bodies, as well as living things. Thus, they do not arrive at the universal
conclusions reached by metaphysics. Neither do they tackle strictly metaphysical topics, even though
they provide the foundation for many metaphysical considerations and discover general laws applied
to the scope of beings that they study.[40]
 
 
3.Metaphysics, the Science of Being as Such
 
Particular sciences study different sectors of reality (such is the case of geology, astronomy, botany,
and other sciences), or certain aspects common to various sectors (such is the case of mathematics,
physics, and other related sciences). In contrast, metaphysics seeks the ultimate and most radical
component of reality. The most fundamental characteristic of all things is the fact that theyare,since
without the perfection of being, they would not be anything at all. Now, what does "being" mean?
What makes things "to be?" What are the principal manners or ways of being? These are some of the
questions that, in one way or another, all philosophers have asked through the centuries. They
constitute the object of metaphysics.
 
Parmenides is considered the first philosopher who raised directly metaphysical questions, although
he foiled to give adequate answers to them.
 
He observed that every change impliesapassage fromnon-beingtobeing,and that entails a problem:
How canbeingarise fromnon-being?
 
Plato left behind significant metaphysical considerations, but it was his disciple, Aristotle, who passed
on to posterityasystematic and substantially valid study of the nature of metaphysics, substance,
accidents, essence, act and potency, causes, and other metaphysical topics.
 
Aristotle's fourteen books of "First Philosophy" are still required reference material in metaphysics. St
Thomas Aquinas assimilated his ideas in a superior synthesis, in the light of the doctrine of theact of
being(esseoractusessendi).According to this doctrine, the essence, or the basic manner of being,
limits the act of being of each thing. This act of being is received from the Being that subsists by itself
(God). Thus, theact of being,the ultimate component of every thing, becomes the central point of
metaphysics, since it is the principle that allows us to understand all things in terms of their structure,
their perfection, their activity, and their finite-ness and dependence on God as the First Cause of their
being.[41]
 
The human being cannot remain satisfied with an ever more detailed and complete description of
reality by the particular sciences, because they leave inevitable questions unanswered. Why does the
universe exist? What is its meaning and purpose? Is there a First Cause? All these questions revolve
around a central nucleus, which is thebeingof things. For this reason, metaphysics can be defined as
the science which studies not just any type of beings but rather the being, as such, of all things.
 
Hence, metaphysics is the most universal science,since all reality is its object of study. For everything
is real in so far as it "is," that is, in so far as it has "being." Above all, metaphysics isthe most
fundamental science,since it considers the most basic or most radical perfection—being itself. In
comparison to it, all other perfections are nothing else but particular ways or manners of being.
 
For instance, the essence is the fundamental mode or manner ofbeingof a thing (of a man, or a plant,
or iron). Any accident (like size, color, or being in a place) is a non-essential mode ofbeing.A thing has
some specific actual perfections (such and such a thing is in act) and it may also have other
perfections in potency (it may become, that is, come tobewhat presently it if not). That is why St
Thomas Aquinas affirms that "the act of being is the most perfect of all, since it plays the role of act
with respect to all things. Indeed, a thing possesses a certain actuality only in so far as it is. Hence,
being is the actuality of all things and of all forms”.[42]
 
If the term "being"(ens)is used to refer to everything "that is,"metaphysics is the science of being as
being, or of being as such, hicontrast, particular sciences deal only with some specific type of beings.
Besides, they study their objects not in the light of their being, but in so far as they possess some
specific ways of being.[43]
 
 
4.Parts of Metaphysics
 
Summing up what has been previously explained, we can say that metaphysics studies reality in its
deepest aspect, that is, by looking at its "being" closely. This study leads to the knowledge of the
properties of being as such, the basic modes of being, the structure of limited beings, the First Cause
of being, and the relations of being with the powers of knowing or possessing it
 
In practice, the different aspects mentioned are usually the topics of various disciplines, which are
likeparts of metaphysics.
 
a)General metaphysics.It deals with being as being, and the modes and structure of being of things.
 
For instance, metaphysics studies the basic aspects of the being of things, that is, "the act of being"
and the "essence"; the general modes of being, that is, the "substance" and the "accidents"; the
composition of "act" and "potency" found in all limited beings; the structure of corporeal substances,
composed of "matter" and "form"; causality, that is, the influence exerted by some things on the
being of other things.
 
As we have earlier seen, some of these topics are studied in aparticular wayin philosophy of nature,
and then, in ageneral wayin metaphysics. Thus, a complete view of problems and their solutions can
only be obtained by putting together both approaches, thatis, by studying them in the light of
metaphysics. This is a consequence of the nature of philosophical knowledge, which considers reality
in a global manner—it studies its real being in an absolute manner, and not only in its partial aspects.
That is why metaphysics is intertwined with the other brandies of philosophy, which are mutually
dependent disciplines.
 
Metaphysics also studies being in so for as it relates to knowledge ("truth"), to the will ("goodness"),
and to the aesthetic sense ("beauty").
 
Truthandgoodness,together withunityand "being something" ("aliquid"), are properties of being as
such, and are therefore found in every thingByvirtue of the being that every thinghas, it is
"something"; it has an internal "unity"; it is called "true" in so far as it can be the object of knowledge;
it has certain specific perfections that make it desirable, hence "good"; and it is "beautiful" in so far as
considering it is pleasurable.
 
These perfections are calledtranscendental propertiesof being, precisely to indicate that they are
found in every thing(though in different degrees, according to each thing's perfection). They are thus
distinguished from those perfections that are found only in some specific type of beings. The name
indicates that they "transcend" the specific ways of being, since they extend to all beings.
 
These properties are found in God in an eminent way, since God is his own Being. God is the Truth
and the source of all created truth. He is Goodness itself, and is the cause of all participated good. His
Being is supremely One, since in him there is no composition whatsoever.
 
b)Natural Theology.This branch of philosophy studies God as Subsistent Being and First Cause of all
things.
 
Starting from the being of limited beings, we arrive at the knowledge of God, the infinite fullness of
Being, and the First Cause of the being of creatures.
 
Human reason can get to know God'sexistence and his attributes (like infinity and omnipotence) and
acknowledge him as the ultimate purpose or end of man. This knowledge, which can be attained by
anyone, is rigorously examined by metaphysics. Starting from the being of things asitis grasped
through experience, the human mind reaches God as the Being that subsists by itself, and the Cause
of the being of tilings. Hence, metaphysicsisalso called "theology" or study of God. It is "natural
theology," and thus different from "supernatural theology" which starts from supernatural divine
revelation.
 
c)GnoseologyIt is a reflexive study of the scope of metaphysical knowledge itself and its relation to
being.
 
Thus, gnoseologystudies how being arises in knowledge, focusing its attention ontruth:it evaluates
sense and intellectual knowledge, the different degrees of certainty, and other matters. For this, it has
to rely on philosophical psychology, which deals with the knowing process.
 
In a way, gnoseologypasses judgment on the validity of metaphysics, since it examines the
foundations of knowledge. Actually, metaphysics itself, as the primary and universal science, passes
judgment on its own foundations. That is why gnoseologyis a part of metaphysics, not a science
distinct and previous to it. It cannot be otherwise, since metaphysics is the most basic science and
without it, all philosophy would lack the necessary foundation.
 
Since Descartes' time, problems of gnoseologyhave hugged the limelight in modern philosophy. This
turn of events is usually accompanied by an erroneous attitude. Some philosophers—Descartes in
some way, Kant in a rather explicit manner, and many others after them—viewed the "critique of
knowledge" as a study that has to be carried out before going into any philosophical inquiry. But since
that study requires metaphysical considerations, leaving the latter aside inevitably leads to distorting
metaphysics or ruling out its possibility.[44]
 
Thomisticauthors of our time have also been greatly preoccupied with these gnoseologicalproblems.
Some of them think that the so-calledcritical problem(a term derived from the "critique"
ofknowledge) is a solid feature of modern philosophy, and they have been trying to make the
metaphysics of being compatible with Cartesian or Kantian approaches.[45]This endeavor has proven
to be extremely problematic, since from the start, those philosophical approaches are characterized
by a perspective that is hardly compatible with the metaphysics of being.[46]
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NONECHAPTER 2PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
 
 
1.What Philosophy of Nature Is
 
When we speak of philosophy of nature, the term "nature" can take on two meanings:
 
a) First, the term may refer tonatureitself, that is, the sum total of corporeal beings. In this sense,
philosophy of nature is the philosophical study of corporeal or material beings.
 
b) Second, the term may refer tonatural beings,as distinct from artificial ones. A natural being is that
which possesses an internal principle of its being and activity,[47]while an artificial being is one which
has a man-made structure, produced through the use of natural beings.
 
The human being, as a corporeal being, is an object of study of philosophy of nature, notwithstanding
the fact that the spiritual soul is an object of study of metaphysics and philosophical psychology.
 
Other living beings are also the object of study of philosophy of nature, since they are also corporeal
beings. Nevertheless, because of their particular characteristics, they are oftentimes studied in
philosophical psychology.
 
For the sake of order and clarity, the following criterion will be applied in this study: the
termphilosophy of naturewill refer to the study of material beings—hence, to inanimate beings, and
also to living beings, taking into account those aspects they have in common with inanimate matter.
In the next chapter, we shall take up thephilosophy of living beings,which includes the study of the
particular characteristics of living beings, and of the human being.
 
The material object of philosophy of nature is the sum total of material natural beings.These beings
are also studied by the experimental sciences, but in the light of their proximate or immediate causes,
such as the laws that govern the movement or reaction of bodies, and the chemical structure of
material substances. Using a metaphysical perspective, philosophy of nature studies their being,
seeking their deepest causes. Thus,the formal object of philosophy of nature is the being of corporeal
things.[48]
 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas affirmed that the object of philosophy of nature is
thechangeable being[49]Indeed, the natural corporeal being ischaracterized by its capacity for
change: matter is always in potency to acquire new forms.
 
Philosophy of nature studies material bangs from a metaphysical perspective.For example, it looks
into the compositionofmaterial substances with regardtotheir being, that is, their structure in
different ontological levels, such as matter and form, substance and accidents, and essence and act of
being; it studies the accidents that affect them, such as quantity, and corporeal qualities; it seeks their
deepest causes, and thus prepares the metaphysical ascent to God. Hence, it differs from metaphysics
because it limits itself to the study of material reality.
 
 
2.Philosophy of Nature and "Cosmic View"
 
One might think that philosophy of nature, with rite help of the experimental sciences, seeks to come
out with "models of reality," such as theories about the structure of matter and the universe, physical
properties, and the like. Nevertheless, it is more correct to say that this task properly belongs to the
experimental sciences.
 
These types of studies require taking into account not only the results obtained from science, but also
the knowledge of methodology needed in order to interpret these results properly. Philosophy of
nature does not directly intervene in these matters; however, it is extremely useful in detecting
erroneous interpretations and in fitting scientific results within a proper context
 
For instance, if one seeks to know what the "basic particles" of physics are, philosophy will allow him
to realize that what is substantial does not necessarily have to be imaginable; it will also provide him
the adequate concepts of substance and accidents, which are needed in order to come up with a
reasonable answer. What is really important is to have a correct interpretation of the results and
methods of atomic physics.[50]
 
At times, philosophy helps in the elaboration of scientific hypotheses and in the correct interpretation
of the results obtained by the experimental sciences. But it would be an error to reduce philosophy of
nature to these heuristic and methodological functions, since its principal and direct objective is the
metaphysical study of the characteristics of natural beings. In many cases, this objective can be
attained with sufficient certainty by having recourse to ordinary experience alone; however, in some
more specialized questions, the results obtained by the experimental sciences must be taken into
account, and the degree of certainty attained will depend on the validity of such findings.
 
 
3.The Significance of Philosophy of Nature
 
In philosophy of nature, we can find three kinds of considerations, according to the degree of
certainty that can be attained.
 
a) First, there arecertain philosophical conclusions,based on certain knowledge supplied by ordinary
experience or by the experimental sciences.
 
This is the case, for instance, ofhylemorphism,which affirms that every material substance is
essentially composed of prime matter—a potential substratum capable of being actualized in various
ways—and substantial form—the actual element that determines the mode of being of the
substance.[51]Other examples are the many statements about thenatureand properties of
theaccidentsof the corporeal substance, such as quantity and quality.
 
b)Second, there arehypothetical considerations,based on less certain findings of science. They depend
partly on the level of scientific knowledge during a specific period of time; hence, they need to be
revised once new findings become available.
 
These considerations are oftentimes lumped together with some certain conclusions. Thus, it is
important to realize that their lack of permanent validity does not necessarily affect other aspects of
the philosophy of a specific author. For instance, in the works of Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas, one
finds some notions dependent on theories about the 1world which are nowpasse.Nevertheless, that
does not in any way invalidate their principal doctrines, based on certain data supplied by experience,
or on findings that science has later confirmed with even greater certainty.[52]
 
c)There are alsohypotheses about naturethat can serve as guide for scientific inquiry. In some cases,
they may later on be confirmed by science, and frequently prove to be useful for its progress.
 
For example, the philosophical atomism of the ancient philosophers was a false doctrine which
presupposed indivisible atoms and accepted mechanism. Nevertheless, it was helpful in the
nineteenth century in the formulation of the early atomic theories in chemistry, which in turn had to
be greatly modified.
This auxiliary function in the service of science is of little importance to philosophy of nature itself.
 
Obviously, those considerations belonging to the first category are the most important for philosophy
of nature, even though it must also devote some attention to more hypothetical matters, delimiting in
each case its degree of certainty.
 
 
4.Philosophy of Nature and the Experimental Sciences
 
We have previously examined the relationship between philosophy and the particular sciences.
[53]We shall now limit ourselves to some specific observations regarding philosophy of nature.
 
a) In general,the experimental sciences need philosophy of nature so as not to reduce all reality to
those aspects that they perceive according to their method.Philosophy of nature enables one to fit
the results obtained by these sciences in the context of the most profound philosophical knowledge,
thus avoiding the danger of various forms of "reduction-ism."[54]
 
Given the prestige enjoyed by science and the extensive coverage of the mass media, reductionist
doctrines, presented as scientific conclusions, or at least, as findings enjoying the trustworthiness of
the scientific method, reach a vast audience nowadays. This fact highlights the importance of fitting
scientific knowledge within a global context,forwhich philosophical considerations aredirely needed.
[55]
 
b)No matter how much the experimental sciences, using their own method, extend their field of
investigation, they cannot truly supplant philosophy of nature.Philosophy requires a perspective
different from that of the sciences.
 
Hence, it would be erroneous to deny the existence of realities studied by philosophy of nature,
alleging that such realities do not appear in the experimental science.
 
For instance, the significance of the concept of "substance" is sometimes downplayed nowadays,
because the concept allegedly does not have any place at all in physics or chemistry.[56]Nevertheless,
we have to say that these sciences necessarily presuppose the notion of substance (and also of
accident), since everything that exists in reality is either a substance or an accident. Now, the
experimental science, due to its proper perspective, does not carry out an explicit study of these
notions; this study is proper to philosophy of nature.
 
c)In order to use scientific knowledge correctly, one needs an ethical foundation,which cannot be
derived from the experimental-scientific method, but from metaphysics, which relies on philosophy of
nature. Without this foundation, scientific knowledge can be used against the real welfare of man.
The experimental sciences provide us with knowledge and enable us to produce instruments,
butthèethical question regarding the purposes for which these should be used falls beyond their
scope.
 
The problems in this field are getting to be more and more serious. One simply has to think about
atomic energy and forms of genetic manipulation, for instance, to realize the fact. These problems
require a proper perspective of science and of man, based in turn on philosophy of nature. Science
mustbe placed in the service of man, and used in accordance with ethical norms.[57]
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NONECHAPTER 3THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIVING BEINGS
 
 
1.The Philosophy of Living Beings and Natural Philosophy
 
In the world of natural beings, those beings endowed withlifeoccupy a prominent place. They are
characterized by a distinctive power of self-motion: by their very nature, they can assimilate external
substances and transform them into their own substance; they experience growth in various ways
while maintaining their individual unity; they possess a diversified capacity of self-regulation; and by
their reproductive power, they give rise to other individuals of the same species.
 
Because of these characteristics, as well as the fact that among living beings one can find man with his
rational and corporeal nature, the philosophy of living beings has always beat a specific object of
study since ancient times.
 
The study oflifein its varying degrees—vegetative, sensitive and rational—and of thesoulas the
substantial form of living beings, gives rise to questions that require particular attention.
 
We can cite as examples, among many others, the following topics: theobjective purpose or
end,which appears with special clarity in living beings, although it can already be perceived even in
inanimate nature;[58]thesense knowledgeof animals, which is a basic element for the understanding
of man; those topics related toevolution theories,which are frequently used to promote ideologies
that distort scientific data and conclusions.[59]
 
As we have already seen, even thoughthe philosophy of living beings forms part of the philosophy of
nature,it is highly preferable to make it the object of study of a specific discipline.
 
Hence, we will limit ourselves to saying thatthe observations and affirmations we have considered in
the section on philosophy of nature also apply to the philosophy of living beings.The distinctive
characteristic of the philosophy of living beings stems from the fact thatliving beings comprise its
material object
 
Thus, it has usually been calledpsychology(or treatise on the soul as principleoflife). There is nothing
wrong in the continued useofthat term. The termphilosophical psychologyis oftentimes used in order
to distinguish it from experimental psychology. "Psychology" is also used many times to designate the
study of man, which is also calledphilosophical anthropology.
 
Obviously, the conclusions reached by the philosophy of inanimate nature will also be appliedtoliving
beings, taking into account the particular characteristics derivedfromtheir special condition.
 
 
2.The Metaphysical Study of Man
 
Aside from those characteristics common to inanimate bodies, as well as those common to living
beings endowed with vegetative and sense life, man also possesses the traits of arational
being,enabling him to rise beyond the level of purely corporeal beings.
 
Thephilosophy of manstudies the strictly human operations of man, that is, acts of intellectual
knowledge and free will. Through them, it demonstrates that the human soul is spiritual, since it is the
root of operations that transcend the scope and possibilities of matter.
 
The human soul is the substantial form of man, who in turn isasingle substance in which the spiritual
and the material constituteasingle being (nevertheless, since the human soul is spiritual, it subsists
even after death; besides, it has to be created directly by God). Hence, the study of man requires
taking into account what is proper to corporeal beings and to lower living beings
 
Thus, the object of the philosophy of man is partly common to the philosophy of nature, and partly
common to metaphysics. It understandably provides a great deal of indispensable knowledge for the
study of ethics. Besides, it serves as a basis for natural theology, since what we are able to know
about God through reason is necessarily dependent on our knowledge of the human spirit—through
analogy, we can know some characteristics of the divine Being which is purely spiritual.
 
 
3.The Study of Man and Particular Sciences
 
Theexperimental sciencesstudy man in his material dimension, asacorporeal being. Even though they
cannot properly focus their attention on the human soul, asaconsequence of their methodology, they
nonetheless providesignificant facts that are extremely useful in obtaining a deeper knowledge of
some aspects of human activities.
 
For instance, recent advances in neurobiology are important in order to understand the processes
involved in understanding, in human emotions, and in the field of human behavior. Although the
brain is not properly speaking the "organ" of the mind or of the will—which are spiritual powers—it is
one of the physiological bases of their operations.
 
Advances in human biology at times give rise to reductionist views which extrapolate scientific
findings beyond the realm of possibility, and which ignore facts that lead to acknowledging the
spirituality of the human soul.
 
There have been many attempts to reduce man to something purely material. They originated in
ancient times, but they now want to find an ally in the sciences .[60]
 
A seemingly more acceptable but still contradictory position is that taken by proponents ofemergent
evolution.Advocates of this doctrine state that there are aspects in man that cannot be explained by
materialism. But since they deny the existence of the spirit, or at least want to maintain a scientific
"neutrality" with regard to the human soul, they affirm that what is strictly human has "emerged"
from matter in the course of evolution.[61]But this "emergence" is merely a name used to designate
some impossible change.
 
There have also been attempts to explain the nature of human intelligence through analogy
withartificial mindsallegedly capable of performing some activities just as well as, or even better than,
any man. But again, we have to point out that what is proper to man cannot be reduced to an artifact.
To grasp this point, it would be enough for us to realize that man's link with truth and evidence, for
instance, implies a capacity that goes beyond what is purely material.[62]
 
Thehuman sciencesstudy man under different aspects through sociological, psychological, or historical
methods which have their own validity and significance. But in order to havearight orientation, they
need to rely on the philosophy of man. They must haveacorrect metaphysical foundation.
 
For instance, sociology and history have to accept, as a basic fact, the existence of human freedom,
which is studied by the philosophy of man. Otherwise, false conclusions will be presented as scientific
ones, since there are really no determinist sociological or historical laws.
 
Non-philosophical psychology must rely, too, on the metaphysical view of man. Of course, this does
not mean that its conclusions will simply be derived from philosophy. Similarly, sociology needs a
metaphysical foundation, and it has to rely on ethics (which, in turn, is based on metaphysics) so as
not to reduce human behavior to external factors which cannot account for objective ethical norms.
 
The human sciences have particular characteristics that differentiate them from the experimental
sciences of nature, since in their object of study (man), freedom is found. Although they can employ,
in part, the experimental method (with respect to the more material aspectsofhuman behavior), they
have to rely on the "philosophyofman." When the sciences are presented as ideologically
"neutral,"people can be deceitfully led into accepting, as something scientific, an implicit philosophy
whose validity has not yet been clearly proven.
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NONECHAPTER 4ETHICS
 
 
1.Ethics, a Practical Science
 
We have so far considered the branches of theoretical or speculative philosophy, which seeks to know
reality as such. In contrast,ethics is a practical science,since it studies how human acts are directed
towards man's purpose or end. It does not stop at the contemplation of truth, but applies that
learning to human acts, providing the necessary knowledge so that man may act in a morally upright
way.
 
Ethics is a practical science, but not in the "technical" sense. Rather, it is a practical science because it
deals with human acts in so far as they are voluntary, and because it is a part of philosophy which
studies the ultimate explanation of the ends and means concerning human existence.
"Directing voluntary actions towards their end pertains tomoral philosophy.The ordering task carried
out by reason with reference to external things produced through human reason, pertains
tomechanical arts.Hence, the study of human acts in so far as they are ordered among themselves
and towards the end is an activity proper to moral philosophy".[63]
 
Ethics is the most important practical science,since it studies the last end of man which ensures his
happiness, as well as the means to attain it.
 
Indeed, we can say that ethics is the most important part of philosophy, since it helps man in a
specific way to attain his end.
 
At times, we hear people say that philosophy has no practical "use." We should not forget, however,
that when things are considered in a comprehensive way, ethics appears as the most "useful" rational
knowledge for man, since it leads him towards his ultimate end, whose possession constitutes his
happiness.
 
 
2. The Object of Study of Ethics
 
Ethics studies human acts from a moral perspective,that is, in so far as they are morally good or bad.
This is known by taking into account the last end of man: whatever leads him to his real end is good,
and whatever deviates him from that end is bad. The study of the last end of man, which is God, and
of the morality of human acts, is proper to ethics. Hence, it studies the natural moral law, its
application through the conscience, the factors that exert their influence on the morality of human
acts, the moral habits (virtues and vices), and the application of general moral principles to specific
problems, as well as to specific questions derived from man's social nature.
 
Human acts comprise the material object of ethics.These are voluntary acts which proceed from the
free will. Since they depend on man and do not arise in a necessary manner, they entail moral
responsibility."
 
The relation of human acts to man's last end is the formal object of ethics.Hence, ethics is based on
metaphysics; the latter studies God as First Cause and Ultimate End of all creation, and particularly, of
man.
 
Moral philosophy or ethics deals with"human actswhich proceed from man's will according to the
dictates of reason. Acts performed by an individual which are not subject to his will and reason are
not called strictly human acts but rather natural acts. This is the case of the acts of the vegetative
soul, which do not fall within the scope of moral philosophy. As the object of study of the philosophy
of nature is change, or the changeable being, analogously,the object of study of moral philosophyis
the human act directed towards its end, or man in so far as he acts willfully in view of an end".[64]
 
 
3.Parts of Ethics
 
Although ethics is one single science, for practical purposes, it is usually divided into two parts
 
a) One part isgeneral ethics,which studies the basic principles regarding the morality of human acts. It
deals with the last end of man, the moral law, conscience, sin, and virtues.
 
Hence, with regard to thelastend, general ethics proves that it can only be God, both in the objective
sense (as that end whose possession one has to seek) and in the subjective one (man's happiness). It
establishes that themoralityof human acts refers to their conformity with the ultimate end, and that it
is determined by taking into account their object, their end, and their circumstances. It considers
themoral lawas the objective norm of morality, and studies the kinds of moral laws and their
characteristics, such as the objective and universal nature of the natural moral law. It analyzes the
nature ofconscience,its binding character and the principles that must govern an upright moral
conduct. It studies the nature ofmoral habits(virtues and vices) and their relation with morality.
 
b) The second part issocial ethics.It applies the previously mentioned principles to the life of man as
member of society.
 
Among the various topics it studies are: thecommon goodof society; the relation
betweenindividualsandsociety;the role ofsocial authority;the binding character and morality ofcivil
laws;theprinciple of subsidiarity,which obliges authorities to respect and foster what individuals and
intermediate groups are capable of doing, and intervene in matters where its direct activity is
required; the nature, role and fundamental rights of thefamilyas the basic cell of society; the ends of
purposes ofmarriageand the obstacles that hinder their fulfillment.
 
 
4.Ethics and Metaphysics
 
Ethics finds its foundation in metaphysics.In order to determine the conformity of human acts to
man's end, one has to consider basic truths about God, creation, the spiritual nature of man and his
freedom, and these are topics studied by metaphysics. Without this necessary foundation, one cannot
get to know the moral order that ought to be observed, and ethics would be emptied of any real
content.
 
Ethics begin its scientific study by acquiring a valid notion of thegood,and this requires a directly
metaphysical perspective. If one does not perceive the good as an objective aspect of reality, he will
inevitably turn to subjective motives which can never vouch for the objective moral order that can
and should be observed.
 
There have been modern attempts to construct ethical systems on inadequate foundations: Kant, for
instance, tried to do so. In his work,Critique of Pure Reason,he denied the possibility of knowing God
through human reason, and in hisCritique of Practical Reason,he drew up a moral system based on
dictates of conscience without any objective basis.[65]Max Scheleraffirmed the objective reality of
values and the spirituality of die human person, but he placed these valid aspects within an
inadequate metaphysical framework.[66]Marxism rejected the metaphysical foundation necessary to
make ethics meaningful.
 
These and other varied attempts to elaborate an ethical system without God may at times contain
some partial truths. However, they will necessarily lack an adequate foundation, for they cannot
account for the genuine meaning of human life.[67]
 
Ethics has close links with psychology (understood as "philosophy of man") which in turn, as we have
previously seen, pertains in some way to metaphysics.
 
Ethics is a science distinct from psychology.Although psychology also studies human acts, it
nonetheless considers them as such, specifying their nature and characteristics. Ethics, on the other
hand, considers them in the light of their morality, which is a different perspective. Of course, in its
study of numerous topics, ethics will make use of the knowledge supplied by psychology as a starting
point. From there, it will move on to questions of morality.
 
For instance, ethics has to rely on the studies of the philosophy of man about the spirituality of the
human soul, intellectual and sense knowledge, the will and human freedom.
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NONECHAPTERPAGE5LOGIC
 
 
1.What Logic Is
 
Man gets to know reality in a partial, step-by-step manner. He proceeds from what is sensible to what
is intelligible, from some aspects of reality to others by way of reasoning. His knowledge does not
encompass reality all at once and in a complete way.
 
Reasoning would not be necessary if we had a perfect, once-and-for-all knowledge of reality.
However, the limits of our knowledge demand the use of reasoning, so that with the use of our mind
and starting from some previously acquired knowledge, we can attain further knowledge.
 
Hence, throughinduction,we obtain universal knowledge by considering some particular cases. For
instance, from the repeated experience of seeing bodies fall towards the ground, we induce that this
is common to all bodies. Throughdeductionwe proceed from universal knowledge to individual cases.
For instance, if we know that all bodies tend to fall, we deduce that when we throw a specific body
upward, it will fall to the ground.
Logic studies the laws that apply to different types of reasoning, that is, the conditions that must be
met to make them valid.
 
Logic studies our mental processes,to make sure that they are correct and that they lead to the
truth.Logic is distinct from psychology.Psychology studies the acts of human reason in themselves, as
characteristics of man, and seeks to define their nature. It considers human acts as part of reality. In
contrast, logic deals wife intellectual processes in so far as they relate some knowledge with others,
or with the reality they signify.
 
For instance, psychology studies the nature of the intellect and its operations: its immateriality, its
capacity to know, and so on. Logic deals with the "products" of intellectual activity, such as concepts,
propositions, syllogisms, and specifies the conditions that must be met so that they can be correctly
used.
Obviously, logic relies on the knowledge supplied by psychology as well as by gnoseology, regarding
the nature of knowledge and of truth. However, it adopts its own perspective, focusing its study
onthe conditions that must be met for a valid reasoning process.
 
There is a spontaneous logic which every human being possesses in varying degrees of mastery,
through which an individual reasons out correctly. But if we want to make sure that our processes of
knowing are correct, we need to study the science of logic or scientific logic and examine explicitly
and systematically the norms of validity applicable to intellectual knowledge.
 
 
2. Logic and Metaphysics
 
Logic deals with beings of reason,which exist only in the mind. Specifically, it studies the relations the
mind establishes among different products or contents of intellectual knowledge.[68]
 
If we say, for example, that 'Peter is tall," we refer to Peter as an individual to whom we attribute a
real property (being tall). But if we say that "Peter is the subject of the proposition, 'Peter is tall,'" we
consider Peter as a noun with a specific function in that proposition, that is, as its subject "Peter" and
"tall" can be considered as directly referring to reality, and also as terms of propositions about reality.
In the second case, "Peter," "tall," and the relations between them, exist only in the mind, that is,
they arebeings of reasonand notreal beings.The same thing applies topropositions(which express
"judgments") andsyllogisms(which relate some propositions with others). Propositions and syllogisms
have no existence outside the mind.
 
If we take the preceding observations into account, we will realize thatlogic is different from
metaphysics.The latter always deals with real beings that exist outside the knower; at the same time,
it is distinct from all the other sciences that deal with real beings. Nevertheless,logic has its
foundation in metaphysics,for the relations that the mind establishes among the products of
intellectual knowledge ought to reflect the order existing in reality; otherwise, the mental processes
will be incorrect and will not lead to the truth. Logic is not an absolutely autonomous science. It
cannot be totally isolated from metaphysics.
 
Some authors refuse to acknowledge the link between logic and metaphysics. E. Nagel, for instance,
affirms that the choice of logical principles should not be based on an alleged greater
inherentnecessity of a particular system over others, but on the relatively greater aptitude one of
them has to fill the role of an instrument when one wants to obtain some systematization of
knowledge.[69]
 
In the final analysis, his reasoning can be summarized as follows: "I know no other method that will
make the necessary anda prioricharacter of logical principles compatible with the demands of a
consistent experimentalism concerned about all existential issues".[70]
 
Obviously, one can devise different logical rules and systems—and in fact, this is being done—for
there is a wide variety of possibilities that can exist in the human mind. However,the basic principles
of logic are not arbitrary.In so far as knowledge is directed to reality, it is subject to metaphysical laws.
Thus, for instance, logic must abide by the principle of non-contradiction, which states that something
cannot "be" and "not be" at the same time and in the same respect; otherwise, one falls into an
absurd or meaningless chatter, as what happens with Marxist-leaning philosophies based on the
reality of "contradiction."
 
The necessary character of logical laws proceeds from the necessary character of metaphysical
laws,and not from thea priorinature of the former.Experience will never be able to contradict true
logical laws, since these conform withthe necessary laws of reality.
 
 
3.LogicandHumanKnowledge
 
Logic is applicable to all human knowledge, whether ordinary or scientific. The study of logic ispart of
philosophy.Although logic does not study reality directly, it seeks to know the conditions for valid
knowledge; hence, it is an instrument that in a general way affects all rational knowledge of reality.
 
Logic is philosophical because the very acts of reason, whose laws the science seeks to establish,
constitute its object of study. Hence, logic has a directing role with regard to all other types of
knowledge, and shows how the mind has to proceed in an orderly and error-free manner.[71]It has a
universal scope, just like metaphysics. Just as metaphysics deals with everything that is real, so too,
logic deals with everything in so far as it can be the object of rational inquiry.[72]
 
In so far as it deals only with "beings of reason," logic can be more fittingly considered as an
introductory and necessary science with respect to philosophy and the other sciences (rather than a
philosophical science itself).[73]
 
Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to obtain all knowledge by explicitly observing the rules of logic. It
may not always be possible and recommendable, besides, to maintain this procedure. In practice, in
the case of both ordinary and scientific knowledge, we direct our attention first towards reality, and
only afterwards, at a later moment, do we turn to logical structures, especially when we discover
some errors or entertain some doubts.
 
Logical systematization is a means, not an end in itself.Creating "artificial languages" which explicitly
show a strictly logical rigor gives rise to important observations. Nevertheless, it will spawn
tremendous complications when applied to ordinary language, whether scientific or philosophical.
 
There have been attempts in the past to limit the role of philosophy exclusively or principally to the
study of logic. A relatively recent one is the so-called neo-positivism—also known as logical
empiricism—of the Vienna Circle. Proponents of this error state that the sole objective philosophy can
have is to establish logical clarity in the meaning of language. Among the many shortcomings of this
doctrine is its self-contradictory position, since its principal thesis about the role of philosophy does
not arise from the logical analysis of language[74]
 
 
4.Parts of Logic
 
Logic studies concepts, propositions, and syllogisms.
 
The object of study of logic is human knowledge in so far as it represents reality. We can distinguish
three basic operations in our process of knowing:1)simple apprehension,which is the first and most
basic operation of the mind; its end result is theconcept,such as the concept "man", or "dog";2)the
operation of judging, through which we put concepts together; its end result is called "judgment" or
"proposition," such as "Man laughs ";3)the operation called reasoning, by which the mind combines
several judgments or propositions in order to arrive at a previously unknown judgment; its end result
is calledsyllogism,such as "He who breathes is alive; Peter breathes; therefore, he is alive." Hence,
there are three general parts of logic:logic of concepts, logic of judgment or of the proposition, and
logic of reasoning or of the syllogismThere is another part usually considered as the fourth part of
logic. It is calledepistemologyor thephilosophy of science,which deals with the process of knowingon
the scientific level; it focuses on methodology, principles of the sciences, the branches of scientific
knowledge, and other related themes.
 
Thephilosophy of science,also frequently called "methodology" in so far as it is a logical study of
scientific methods and their scope, is a part of logic, even though it is closely related to gnoseologyor
the metaphysical study of knowledge. (Logic also reflects on knowledge.) Without a metaphysical
foundation, it is impossible to determine the nature of scientific knowledge and of knowledge in
general.[75]
 
Another traditional division of logic is made by distinguishing betweenmaterial logicandformal logic.
Material logicis the study of the main philosophical problems taken up in logic, such as the problem of
the universals, of abstraction, and of induction. It is philosophical logic, properly speaking.Formal
logic,in contrast, studies the operations of the mind from the point of view of correct thinking, leaving
out their content and then philosophical foundations. It can study, for instance, the theory of the
syllogism. It is principally applied to the logic of reasoning or of the syllogism.Modern symboliclogicisa
typeof formal logic[76]
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NONECHAPTER 6HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
 
 
1.Philosophical Significance of History of Philosophy
 
Histories of particular sciences usually occupy a place of least importance in the study of these
respective fields of knowledge. This is true, above all, in the experimental sciences, which focus their
attention on scientific results obtained. In the human sciences, the historical view of problems and
solutions is of greater interest, since many doctrines and viewpoints are better understood in the light
of historical circumstances. The same thing is true, but to a much greater extent, in the field of
philosophy.
The history of philosophy cannot be reduced to a mere grouping of facts regarding philosophers and
their statements. In order to grasp the thought of a philosopher, one should take into consideration
how he brings up and resolves philosophical issues, and this is already a philosophical task. Besides,
when one strives to obtain a historical view of different philosophical systems and philosophical
solutions to problems raised, he will necessarily work at a philosophical level. Hence,history of
philosophy is a part of philosophy.
 
The search for truth becomes a complex task when one confronts issues in depth, which is the case in
philosophy. That is why the study anddiscussion of viewpoints presentedbyother philosophers
in the past is a characteristic common to the most profound philosophers. It is a guarantee, too, of
greater proximity to the truth.
 
Aristotle, for instance, employed this method in trying to resolve philosophical issues, and he would
lament the lack of adequate treatment of some matter on the part of earlier philosophers.[77]St
Thomas Aquinas showed a striking example of love for truth, regardless of who said it;[78]thus, he
studied all kinds of opinions and tried to make use of them as much as possible .[79]
 
History of philosophy is significant mainlybecauseit facilitates our access to the truth;it informs us
about what others in the past have said regarding issues similar to contemporary ones we now have
to confront.[80]The originality some people seem to seek, even if they may have to resort to arbitrary
simplifications, goes against a sincere quest for truth.
 
Nevertheless, there is the danger of exaggerating the importance of historical factors. This can
happenwhenone denies the possibility of finding permanent solutions tophilosophical problems, and
the study of philosophy thus becomes limited to the study of different philosophical views that have
been advanced throughout history. We need to state clearly thatmetaphysical knowledge attains
perennial truthsconcerning God, man and nature, even though they may have been grasped within a
specific historical setting and are still capable of receiving further enrichment, through the study of
some new facets.
 
One of the greatest threats in our time isrelativism,a philosophical doctrine which rejects the
perennial significance of any human knowledge. Some people show their adherence to this doctrine
at times by saying that even the doctrines considered as most certain in history have finally been
shown to be partial or erroneous. By alleging that philosophers' affirmations and philosophical
doctrines contained some errors, they mistakenly do away with all certainty. They adopt a supposedly
"objective" stand, vainly seeking a basis of certainty, so that they could keep on referring to
"objectivity" and "truth".[81]
 
 
2. The Study op History of Philosophy
 
For a profound philosophical knowledge, the study of the great philosophers who have raised
particularly profound issues, is of great importance. This should not simply beaquest for erudite
learning, orapurely historical knowledge; rather, it should beahelp in order to attain knowledge of
truth.[82]This study must be accompanied byacritical evaluation. Otherwise, one will not be able to
distinguish the valid contributions from the errors committed, and he will hardly get away from
skepticism as he considers the wide variety of views and solutions concerning specific philosophical
problems. It should therefore be a study that allows one to grasp and evaluate the various ways
philosophical issues have been drawn up, and the divergent ways of resolving them, proposed
throughout history.
 
Obviously, a philosopher's doctrine will depend in part on the theconditions prevailing during his
time. Philosophical issues are raised within a specific context subject to change.
 
However, philosophers are not mere "products" of their own time. They somehow transcend their
respective historical eras, and they exert a real influence on the development of human thought, and
therefore on the march of history. Hence, familiarity with the more influential philosophers in the
past is always of current relevance. There are no necessary laws of history, and the turn of history
greatly depends on the ideas of the most outstanding thinkers.
 
The study of history allows us to realize thatdifferent philosophical doctrines revolve around some
basic questions.Besides, the proposed solutions to such problems can ultimately be reduced in turn
tovarious basic lines of thoughtthat have been drawn up all throughout history, and which are closely
linked with all the possible attitudes before crucial problems of human existence. We can also
frequently trace the origin of some philosophical positions to reactions against the excesses of
opposed doctrines. All these enable us tocounteract the perplexity that may confront us as we survey
the great variety of doctrinesin the history of philosophy, and to avoid relativist and skeptical
conclusions.
 
Ingnoseology,for instance, we find extreme positions of "empiricist" and "rationalist" bent, which
emphasize the significance of sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, respectively. We also
find"realist'positions which make the role of the senses and of the intellect compatible, and
"skeptical" doctrines which cast doubts on the validity of knowledge and even reject it outrightly
 
Something similar happens inmetaphysics,with the proliferation of "materialist," "idealist," and
"dualist" doctrines; inethics,with "pragmatism," "subjectivism," and "objectivism" (the latter
acknowledges the existence of objective ethical values); and innatural theology,with "atheism,"
"pantheism," "theism," and "agnosticism."
 
Besides, these tendencies are usually interrelated. For instance, a specific doctrine can frequently
contain elements of empiricism, materialism, pragmatism, and atheism. Furthermore, a doctrinal
tendency is frequently portrayed as a reaction against of the further perfection of another.
 
 
3.Progress inPhilosophy
 
The foregoing considerations allow us to finally give a reply to a question: Can there be real progress
in philosophy?
 
We cannot speak of progress in philosophy in the same way we acknowledge advances in the sciences
or technical studies that facilitate human dominion over nature.Progress in philosophy does not
depend on the appearance of new doctrines, but on achieving greater proximity to the truth.This can
happen in any historical period.
 
Philosophy will always confront new problems and data that did not appear in the past. It will simply
have to study them and take them into account. With respect to basic issues, however, it could
happen that the most valid approach up to the present had been drawn up a long time ago, perhaps
even centuries ago, even though it may need updating in some minor details.
 
The study of the ancient Greek thinkers, for instance, has always been greatly significant, for they
were the ones who raised many of the important philosophical issues, and came up with the main
possible solutions.
 
Progress in philosophy is neither linear nor cumulative.There have been advances, retrogressions, and
highly remarkable contributions that have not been surpassed up to the present
 
Scientific and technical progress may not necessarily be accompanied by philosophical progress.At
times, some people may use scientific and technical advances as a convenient excuse in order to cast
aside or reject the most profound philosophical approaches, alleging that these advances have
essentially altered the basic issues and their solutions.
 
 
4.Principal Periods in the History of Philosophy
 
The study of history of philosophy is usually divided into four main periods:
 
a)Ancient philosophy,which covers the period starting from the early Greek philosophers, and
extending up to the MiddleAges. The ancient Greek thinkers posed the main questions in philosophy
and also drew up the answers to than. These answers would later appear and re-appear in many
variant forms. Plato and Aristotle were the towering figures of this period.
 
Aristotle worked out a remarkable synthesis of the questions studied by his predecessors, such as the
pre-Socratics, the sophists, Socrates, and Plato. He systematized answers which, in great part, enjoy
perennial significance. Undoubtedly, part of his works has been made obsolete by later scientific
discoveries. Nevertheless, even in those aspects, and especially in the strictly philosophical ones, his
works "contain the seed—completely formed and endowed with unlimited possibilities—of all human
wisdom. We can say that up to Aristotle, philosophy was in the stage of embryonic formation. But
once formed, it would henceforth be capable of indefinite future development''.[83]
 
b)Medieval philosophy,which includes all the centuries of the MiddleAges. Outstanding contributions
were made during this period by the Arab philosophers and, above all, by Christian scholasticism,
which closely linked philosophy with theology. Its culminating achievement lies in the doctrine of St
Thomas Aquinas, who gathered together in an original synthesis the main contributions of classical
philosophy and harmoniously integrated them into Christian theology.
 
At times, the Middle Ages is considered as an "obscure" period, in which human thought was veiled
byashroud of barren pedantry. Modern historiography, however, gives usavery different picture of
this period. "There is no truth in the allegation that medieval philosophy is an episode that ends in
itself, and that one can commit it to oblivion as he traces the history of ideas. The MiddleAges gave
rise to the philosophical and scientific ideas that some people are using in order to suppress that
period itself. The medieval age was the first to employ a philosophy free from all authority, even
human authority. Thus, that tale about a renaissance of thought after centuries of slumber, darkness
and error, has to be relegated to the realm of legends. Modern philosophy did not have to wage war
in order to acquire the rights of reason against the Middle Ages. The truth is that the MiddleAges won
them for modern philosophy.[84]
 
Indeed,medieval philosophy found one of its main inspirations in the Christian faith. Tins did not
prove to be an obstacle, but rather a stimulus to reason."As filings turned out it appeared that the
Jewish-Christian revelation truly became a religious source of philosophical progress. The Latin Middle
Ages was the witnesspar excellenceof this historical development Somepeople may dismiss this
affirmation outright for being apologetic in nature. But if it is true, file fact that it can serve apologetic
ends does not hinder it from being true. If it is false, it is not because it can be used for such ends. The
pith of the matter, then, is to know whether itistrue, with each individual retaining the freedom to use
it as he pleased.[85]
 
c)Modern philosophy,which began withDescartes.Descartes was responsible for the sharp turn in
philosophy that would exert a decisive influence on all philosophers after him. He was undoubtedly
the fatherof modemphilosophy. From his attempt to base allknowledgeon "subjective evidence", and
to develop it into a"system," therationalismandempiricismof the 17th and 18th centuries would arise.
The unanswered questions that bothsystemsof thought raised led to the Kantian approach,which in
turnwould strongly influence the further development of philosophical thought.
 
Kantian philosophy gave rise toidealism,which found its strongest advocate in Hegel
Hegelianphilosophy, withadded materialist ingredients, would in turn give rise to the philosophy of
Marx.
 
J.P.Sartre significantly affirmed that three historical moments in philosophy are naturally interlinked,
and delimit the "necessary horizon of culture": 1) Descartes-Locke,2) Kant-Hegel,and3)Marx.[86]Here
we are undoubtedly dealing with doctrines that condition—and in many ways, negatively—
subsequent philosophicalthinking.
 
Although it is possible to acknowledge the positive significance somepartialaspects of these doctrines
may have, it will hardly be an exaggeration to say that on thewhole,they contain serious errors and
eventuallygiverise to even greater deviations.[87]
 
The positivism of A. Comte represents a line of thought which, though imbued with post-Cartesian
influence, concentrates especially on social reform, based on allegedly "scientific" considerations.
[88]This "scientific politics" of the Utopianvarietyalso throbs in Marxist philosophy, but it has been
elaborated along different lines. In more recent times,many relatedtendencies will simply be varied
forms ofpositivism andMarxism. They will prove prevalent not onlyin the arena of contemporary
philosophical thought, but also in political circles, spawning many negative consequences.
 
d)Contemporary or 20th century philosophy,which features many influential thinkers, as in any other
historical period, and some especially well-known lines of thought, such as:
 
—Marxist doctrine,divided into "orthodox" and "heterodox" positions, applied to political reality;
 
— Analytic philosophy,prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world, and focusing on linguistic analysis;
 
— Philosophy of science,frequently linked with analytic philosophy and usually conditioned by
scientisticand positivist tendencies;
 
— Phenomenology,as expounded byE.Husserl and his disciples;
 
— Existentialism,in its variant forms, such as those of Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers;
 
— Metaphysics of being,especially along Thomisticlines, viewed from varied perspectives and
expounded by many different authors.
 
Our time can be characterized by a certainfunctionalism.Hardly any importance is given to theoretical
systems, great stress is laid on solving problems of daily existence, and scientific and technical
advances are tremendously admired. These attitudes are widely reflected in contemporary
philosophical thought. They provide some explanation for the widespread influence ofMarxist
doctrines,whose popularity lies not in their theoretical side but in their practical efficacy, and in the
pseudo-religious ideas they offer to shed some meaning on life, and ofanalytic philosophy,which is
more academic in nature and is frequently linked with a skeptical and pragmatic view of human
existence.
 
But with the increasingly urgent need to find more profound answers to vital questions, there is also a
presently strong current of interest in the study of theclassicalphilosophers, especially of Aristotle,
and a renewal ofmetaphysical thought,cultivated by what has been called "perennial philosophy."
Finding its most profound expression in the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, it seeks to defend the
permanent and definitive validity of basic metaphysical doctrines.[89]
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NONEPart III: PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY
 
 
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NONECHAPTER1THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE
 
 
1.Reason and Faith
 
We have to state, in the first place, that"faith does not destroy reason; rather, it goes beyond it and
gives fullness or perfection toif'.[90]Faith is "a supernatural virtue by which, we, inspired and helped
by God's grace, believe as true what God has revealed, not because of the intrinsic truth of things
perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself revealing them,
who can neither deceive nor be deceived".[91]The Christian faith leads to a firmer assent to truths
that can be known by reason, such as those about God, the human soul, and the natural law,
andbesides,to the acceptance of truths that the human mind cannot attain through its natural power.
 
"Faith in revelation does not end up destroying the rationality of our knowledge. Rather, it allows it to
develop more fully. Just as grace does not destroy nature, but rather heals and perfects it and renders
it fruitful, so too, faith, through the influence it exerts from above on reason as such, allows the
development of a more fruitful and genuine rational activity".[92]
 
Faithpresupposes reason.If a person did not have the capacity to attain intellectual knowledge, he
could not be raised to the knowledge of supernatural truths. Besides, these supernatural truths are
beyond reason, but not contrary to it. They somehow rely on rational knowledge, since a person gets
a glimpse of them through rational concepts. For instance, without a rational knowledge of the
meaning of concepts such as "person," "nature," and "God," a person would not be able to
understand anything about the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation. Nevertheless, we
have to say, too, thatreason is healed and elevatedbyfaith.Faith illumines the darkness in which
reason dwells as a consequence of sin. It also makes it easier for reason to know the basic truths it
can attain by itself, and raises it to the knowledge of supernatural truths that are completely beyond
its natural power.
 
These two levels of knowledge are present in the believer, even though they are distinct and
separable, as one can see when a person loses his faith.
 
Through the use of reason, a person can knowaset of truths calledpreambles of faith,because they
serve asabasis for revealed supernatural truths. They include the existence of God, the spirituality and
immortality of the human soul, human freedom and the natural law.
 
Although these truths can be known through the use of natural reason, God revealed them as well, so
that they may be known by "everyone, even in the present state of the human race, with ease, with
solid certitude, and with no trace of error".[93]Hence, compared with an unbeliever, the believer is in
a better position to make good use of reason in tackling the basic problems of human existence,
whose inherent difficulties are heightened by the consequences of sin. Since revealed truths are
backed by God's authority, they offer a greater certitude than that attained through merely natural
truths.
 
However,the misuse of reason can kinder the acceptance of faith.This may happen, for instance,
when a person erroneously strives to derive from the sciences arguments contrary to revealed truths.
In these cases, the right use of reason will suffice to show that those alleged difficulties are baseless.
The truth is that reason is helped and guided by faith in its task, and faith clearly points out to it
where errors lie. It is important to note that aside from those errors directly contrary to the truths of
faith, there are others which are indirectly contrary to them, through their consequences. This is the
case of doctrines which give rise to conclusions incompatible with the faith when they are coherently
led to their ultimate consequences. Examples of these are: philosophical positions affirming that man
can never have certainty in his knowledge of reality, or that he cannot know reality as it really is.
 
Materialist evolutionism, for instance, is contrary to the faith. Nevertheless, it is easy to prove that
materialism cannot be based on science or on any rational grounds.
 
Kantian doctrines are indirectly against the faith. By ruling out the possibility of knowing reality as it
really is, they destroy the rational basis of the faith.
 
At times, the alleged difficulties in accepting the faith come from more sweeping general attitudes.
For instance, some people say science progresses by taking hold of fields that were previously
entrusted to faith. In the case of the Christian faith, this stand is outrightlyerroneous. There is no
single truth contained in Catholic doctrine that has been or can possibly be suppressed by scientific
progress.[94]
 
 
2.What TheologyIs
 
Theology is the science of the faith.It is the science which deals with God and creatures in so far as
they refer to God, in the light of divine revelation.
 
When we speak of "theology" in this chapter, we obviously refer to supernatural theology whose
starting point is faith in divine revelation. We have already seen that natural theology, which studies
what can be known about God through reason, is a part of metaphysics, and therefore, of philosophy.
 
Thesubject matter of theology,therefore, includes:
 
— God in Himself: His existence, essence and attributes (such as infinity, providence), as well as the
Trinity of Persons in God;
 
— andthe works of God: creation and created beings, the elevation of man to the supernatural level,
the Incarnation and Redemption, the Church, the sacraments
 
Theology studiesall realityin the light of divine revelation,from the most profound perspective mm
can have,that is, the supernatural light of the faith. Hence, it is the science that fully represents the
concept ofwisdom.As supreme wisdom, theology has the right to judge and guide all the otter
branches of knowledge, without making them lose their own autonomy.
 
All these topics are studied in theology by using reason enlightened by revelation.The source of
theological knowledge is revelation,transmitted through Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and
safeguarded and interpreted in an authentic way by the Magisterium of the Church.
 
Therefore,faith is the starting point, the foundation and norm of theology.A statement contrary to the
faith would be unacceptable, even though it might be expressed with the trappings of theological
terminology. A theological doctrine contrary to the Magisterium of the Church would be
automatically erroneous. Theological study and research demands adequate personal dispositions,
especially those related to the faith and to fidelity to the mission of the Church in union with its
authentic Magisterium.
 
“The essential link between theology and faith, based and focused on Christ, illumines with great
clarity the bond existing between theology and the Church with its Magisterium. One cannot believe
in Christ without believing in the Church, the 'Body of Christ.' One cannot have a Catholic belief in the
Church without believing in its irrenounceableMagisterium... Hence, the ecclesial Magisterium is not
something alien to theology, but rather something intrinsic and essential to it. If a theologian is
basically and above all a believer, and if his Christian faith is faith in the Church of Christ and in the
Magisterium, his theological effort will certainly remainfaithfully linked to his ecclesial faith, whose
authentic and binding interpreter is the Magisterium”[95]
 
The correct use of reason allows us to go deeper into the content of revealed truths. However,
through the natural power of reason alone, we cannot attain the knowledge of supernatural
mysteries and accept them. Neither can we proceed to demonstrate them once they have been
known.
 
“The theological process should not be regarded as some sort ofcentrifugal movementthrough which,
starting from an essential nucleus of the faith, one derives conclusions which are progressively distant
from the center and increasingly irrelevant from the perspective of Christian living. It should rather be
seen as acentripetal movement,for its task is to bring towards its center all truth and knowledge in
order to illumine them. Theology issomething that internally belongs to the faith; it is based on faith
and serves it”.[96]
 
Thus, theology is not a form of knowledge dissociated from Christian living. Its mission is to illumine
the most varied practical problems through the light provided by an in-depth view of the truths of the
faith. The Christian faith presupposes both an objective content and personal proximity to God.
Hence, as a science of the faith, theology seeks to help the person get closer to God, by giving him a
better knowledge of God Himself and of the truths He has revealed, and illumining with that
knowledge the problems and concerns of human existence.
 
 
3.The Role of Reason in Theology
 
In line with what we have previously seen, we should state thatin theology toe make use of reason
enlightened by faith.Reason and faith are two distinct sources of knowledge. They are not mutually
opposed; rather, they complement one another.
 
The role of reason in theologyis not to demonstrate the supernatural truths of faith, but to attain a
greater understanding of them. For this, it has recourse to analogies found in the natural order of
things, and takes into account the interconnection of divine mysteries and their relation to man's last
end. Even though we may draw up some rational explanation of the truths of faith, it is quite clear
that they will continue to be mysteries for us.
 
Theological errors oftentimes arise asaconsequence of wanting to make supernatural truths more
"understandable." For example, from a purely natural point of view, it might seem more "reasonable"
to reduce the Eucharist to a symbol through which God works inaspecial manner, or to affirm that
Jesus Christ isahuman person in whom God acted inaunique way. However, doing so will not be a way
of expoundingatrue Christian theology. It would mean deforming and mutilating the content of the
faith, and in the final analysis, reducing the theological endeavor to a useless, meaningless and, above
all, false activity.
 
Through the correct use of reason enlightened byfaith, theology carries out the following tasks:
 
(a) The demonstration of the "preambles of faith," in the theoretical aspect (the existence of God and
of the human soul, for instance), in the historical aspect (the authenticity of Sacred Scripture, the
Catholic Church as the Church founded by Christ, for example), and in the personal aspect (analysis of
the faith, its rational foundation, for instance). This task is carried out by "Fundamental Theology."
 
Reason provides for this task arguments that are truly demonstrative at times. At other times,
however, these arguments only show the conformity of faith with the demands of human nature. For
these purposes, one may rely on philosophy, history and psychology, and secondarily, on other
sciences.[97]
 
(b) The systematic study of Sacred Scripture, with the help provided by human sciences. This is carried
out by "Exegesis of Sacred Scripture."
 
Historical as well as linguistic knowledge is widely employed in this field. Nevertheless, one has to
bear in mind that Sacred Scripture must be interpreted according to its own nature, hence, in the light
of faith. This has important consequences. For instance, the unity and truthfulness of scriptural texts,
in accordance with their respective literary forms, should be regarded as a given fact, and not a
conclusion that still has to be reached.[98]
 
(c) The systematic study of Tradition. "Patrology" is the study of the doctrine that the Fathers of the
Church have left us as a legacy.
 
The study of Tradition necessarily complements the exegesis of Sacred Scripture, for the guarantees
concerning Scripture and its correct interpretation come from Tradition.
 
(d) The study of the truths of faith, which seeks to grasp their content, examine the relationships
existing among them, and facilitate our understanding of them through analogies taken from the
natural order of filings. This is done by "Dogmatic Theology."
 
In order to carry out these tasks, theology makes use of reason and of philosophical doctrines, which
enable a person to rigorously deepen his understanding of revealed truths. Obviously, doctrines such
as immanentism, existentialism, and historicism are hardly suitable for theological use.[99]Theology
understandably demands philosophical foundations in conformity with common sense and
objectivity, which faith presupposes, and these foundations are not automatically present in just any
type of philosophy.
 
(e) The study of the application of revealed truths to the moral dimension of human lives. This is
carried out by "Moral Theology."
 
Supernatural morality is founded on natural ethics. Hence, the conclusions reached in philosophical
ethics will have repercussions in moral theology.[100]
 
(f) The study of different facets of the life of the Church, such as "Liturgy" and "History of the Church."
 
Historical accuracy is particularly necessary in modern times. There are some doctrines which seek to
change important elements of the Christian faith by appealing to changing needs of the times.[101]
 
(g) The defense of the faith, by showing that the attacks waged against it are based on false or
inconclusive arguments. This is an integral part of the previously mentioned tasks theology carries
out.
 
The use of human reason suffices for this task. One does not have to make use of faith in this regard,
for those attacks against the faith stem from supposedly rational arguments and must
thereforebescrutinized through the natural use of reason.
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NONECHAPTER 2PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
 
 
1.The Role of Philosophy in Theology
 
Taking into account what we mentioned in the preceding chapter regarding the role of reason in
theology, and the fact that philosophy is simply the systematic actualization of the capacity to know
reality through natural reason, we can easily conclude thatphilosophy plays an important role in
theology,and thatthat role is only an instrumental one,since the source and norm of theology is faith
and not reason.
 
It would be a mistake to try to make theology do away with philosophy, under the pretext of freeing
divine revelation from all conditioning influences of human perception. It would be equally wrong to
make theology depend on some particular philosophical systems, as if that were the only way it could
adapt to the real needs of every historical period.
St. Thomas Aquinas clearly states thattheology does not need philosophy,since its principles (revealed
truths) are above any other science.Theology makes use of philosophy,not because it cannot stand by
itself, but because of the limits of human reason: by means of what an individual comes to know
through the use of natural reason, he can more easily deepen his understanding of supernatural
truths.[102]
 
One should note that this particular perspective successfully avoids the pitfalls laid by the two
previously mentioned extreme attitudes. Indeed,the Church does not adhere to particular
philosophical systems; it makes use of philosophical notions coherent with the faith.
 
In our discussion of philosophy of nature, we referred tothe continuity that must exist between
spontaneous natural knowledge and philosophical knowledge.Philosophy presupposes this
spontaneous knowledge and it should perfect it. It carries out this task by clarifying vague notions,
explicitly and systematically taking up matters that require careful study, examining the basis of
different kinds of knowledge, and proceeding to a critical study of false presumptions that could have
crept into a generally accepted and prevailing mentality. This correct philosophical perspective is
made easily accessible to the believer by his faith. Faith clearly points out to him the truths about the
meaning of human life that natural reason can attain, and thus makes it easier for him to perceive the
continuity that exists between philosophy and the correct spontaneous use of reason.
 
We have to state, however, that although faith points to the truth of some knowledge accessible to
reason, the latter can ultimately be satisfied only by evidence. Faith does not spare reason the effort
needed to acquire such knowledge. Here we are dealing with two distinct levels with regard to the
way of arriving at the truth.[103]
 
Hence, just like reason, philosophy is an instrument of theology, for philosophy systematically
actualizes the possibilities of natural reason. One may say thatphilosophy is a necessary instrument of
theology,since the scientific exposition of the faith is not possible without relying on the scientific use
of natural reason. In fact, one can easily observe that theological explanations make use of
philosophical thought.
 
We have already touched upon the precise meaning of thenecessityof philosophy for theology. We
are dealing here withinstrumentalnecessity in varying degrees, according to the different branches of
theology that may be considered.[104]
 
 
2. "Christian Philosophy"
 
Historically, the study of theology has been carried out by starting from faith and making use of
philosophy as an instrumentWith the help of the faith, the Fathers of the Church fashioned a
philosophical instrument in harmony with faith, and this has been called "Christian philosophy." This
philosophy takes Christian dogmas into account, but it proceeds in the study of its subject matter by
using arguments drawn up by reason. It is not theology, therefore; nevertheless, it facilitates
theological study. It has been enriched all throughout history by significant contributions; it reached
its summit with the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas.
 
The term "Chjristianphilosophy'' has given rise to controversies involving many authors.[105]
E.Gilson, a main protagonist, states: "Before everything else, I would simply like to issue a reminder:
before, the term "Christian philosophy" had nothing more than a historical meaning. Itreferred to the
immense work of philosophical speculation integrated by the Fathers of the Church and the
Scholastics into their theological endeavor. This contribution exists, it is of such importance that one
cannot write the history of philosophy without taking it into account".[106]
 
In the end, the real question that has to be asked is: "Can we call real philosophy a system of thought
that from the very start already includes acceptance, influenced by the faith, of solutions to many
significant philosophical problems? Or, expressed in another way: Is it possible to philosophize
without putting one's faith aside?
A convincing reply can be found by going over the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, the most preeminent
Christian philosopher. It is quite dear that his main concern for theology did not prevent him from
studying philosophical issues with scientific rigor.In his philosophical works, and in the philosophical
discussions included in his theological works, his reasoning exclusively relies on strictly rational
arguments.Undoubtedly, the certitude of faith served as a firm support for him in tackling basic
philosophical issues. But it was like a stimulus that inspired reason in its intellectual work, never a
form of suppression of rational thought. If he managed to achieve an outstanding harmony between
philosophy and theology, he did not accomplish the feat at the expense of philosophical precision. He
did it precisely by paying heed to the truth.
 
This can easily be confirmed. One can make use, for instance, of the arguments St. Thomas Aquinas
employs regarding the existence of finality in nature. This is an important philosophical issue that is
especially relevant in our time. St. Thomas expressly links it with one of his proofs to establish the
truth of God's existence. The pagan philosopher Aristotle dealt with this matter deeply.[107]St.
Thomas Aquinas studies Aristotle's reasoning rigorously,[108]and makes use of his conclusion to
argue in favor of the existence of a provident God.[109]There is nothing in this process that is not
strictly rational. This also applies to other philosophical issues. For instance, the problems and
solutions presented by St. Thomas Aquinas in connection with his doctrine about the "act of being"
are perfectly in line with natural and supernatural theology; nevertheless, they are always backed by
rational arguments, and they can be assessed and accepted by any person, regardless of his attitude
towards the Christian faith.
 
Hence, the so-calledChristianphilosophyistrue philosophy in the strict sense.The term "Christian"
points to its inspired origin and its continuity, which do not go against its strictly rational nature.
 
 
3.Philosophy and Dogmatic Statements
 
The Magisterium of the Church has made use of philosophical terms in formulating dogmas.This does
not mean that the Magisterium makes dogmas depend on some concepts found in the most
outstanding philosophical systems, since that would entail subordinating the faith to a form of human
thought, which is always limited. In its doctrinal formulations, the Magisterium of the Church
usesphilosophical terms which representamoreprécisecontinuation of correct spontaneous
knowledge.This happens, for instance, when the Magisterium uses terms such as "person" and
"nature" in connection with the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation, or "substance" in
connection with the Eucharist, in order to define transubstantiation. Thus, Church Magisterium strives
to clearly expound the meaning of the truths of faith and defend it against all errors. This also
makesus realize that abandoning the useofsuch terms carries with it the riskoffalling once again into
the errors that provoked the need to devise those terms.[110]
 
Referring to concepts usedbyCatholic doctrine, Pope Pius XII teaches: "No one denies that the terms
used, in the teaching of theology as well as of the Magisterium of the Church itself, in order to express
the corresponding concepts, can be perfected and made more precise... It is also obviously true that
the Church cannot adhere to any ephemeral philosophical system. Nevertheless, the ideas and terms
that generally accepted Catholic teachers have been accumulating...are truly based on principles and
notions deduced from real knowledge of created things, in the light of revealed truth.... Hence, it is
not at all surprising that some of those concepts were not only used, but also approved,byecumenical
councils in such a way that it would not be lawful to deviate from them".[111]
 
The real issue we are facing here is thesafeguarding of the content of the Christian faith.There is
always the possibility of a greater understanding andabetter expression of that content, but these
should not be achieved at the expense of the truth. Genuine advancement in this matter will never
involvearejection or a watering down of content found in the formulations of the faith used by the
Magisterium of the Church.
 
Pope PaulVIwrote: "The norm of expression that the Church, in its sustained effort through the
centuries, has established with the help of the Holy Spirit, and which it has confirmed by the authority
of the councils... should be faithfully observed... For those formulas, like all the rest which the
Churchmakes use of topropound dogmas of faith, express concepts which are not tied toaparticular
form of culture, oraspecific period of scientific progress, or any theological school; rather, they
manifest what the human mind perceives in reality through universal and necessary experience, and
they express it through adequate and specific words taken from either common or cultural parlance.
Hence, they are suitable to all men, in varied circumstances of time and place.[112]
 
Theological errors are frequently the result of using an erroneous philosophy.Thus, the correct use of
philosophy enables us to pinpoint in many instances the root causes of those errors and correct
flawed perspectives, and it provides a great help—more than what mere abundance of data offers—
to discern truth and error in theology. An individual who has a vast knowledge of the life and history
of the Church, for instance, may easily fall into errors in theology if he does not have a solid training in
philosophy. He may easily fit and interpret the facts he has obtained within excessively partial
systems of thought, subject to intellectual or practical tendencies in vogue.
 
 
4.Philosophy, anInstrument ofTheology
 
We must stress, however, thatphilosophy is used by theology only as an instrument,since faith is
always the norm or standard of theology. If this truth is not taken into account, faith may be relegated
to the level of knowledge that man can acquire through the use of natural reason alone. Besides,
there would be the risk of accepting erroneous doctrines presented as seemingly indispensable by
false philosophical systems.
 
When we say that philosophy is aninstrumentof theology, we are not rejecting the autonomy of
philosophy within its proper order, nor are we stating that it is really nothing outside being a mere
instrument of theology. Far from being outrightlydegraded, philosophy is rather ennobled by its use in
theology, the supreme human wisdom.
 
Thus, there are two ways of studying philosophy. First, it can be studied mainly for its own sake; and
second, in view of its role as an instrument of theology. Obviously, these are not two opposing
perspectives, and they can even coincide. Nevertheless, when an individual studies philosophy mainly
because of its significance in theological doctrine, he will have no need to tackle many issues which
would, in contrast, be useful and even indispensable for someone who pursues philosophy as an
autonomous science in itself, or as his professional expertise. This does not in any way mean that a
superficial dabbling in philosophy already qualifies as a theological instrument It simply means that
whoever is primarily interested in the doctrinal angle can skip matters that have little or no relation
whatsoever with it.
 
Even though comparisons may not be that exact, we can nonetheless draw up illustrative analogies
concerning this matter. For instance, the physicist makes use of mathematics as an instrument,
without rejecting its proper autonomy. This use of mathematics makes it even more important. The
physicist does not usually have to confront problems with the technical rigor of the mathematician.
But this does not mean that he should be satisfied with a superficial knowledge of mathematics, or
that he can make use of it as he likes. It simply means that many legitimate requirements of purely
mathematical demonstrations have no practical application for problems in physics.
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NONECHAPTER 3PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY
 
 
1.PhilosophyinEarlyChristianity
 
In theearly centuriesof the history of the Church, theology arose for the two-fold purpose of
defending the faith against two dangers that threatened it, namely, criticism coming from pagans, and
the heresies that originated within the Church. Theology made use of classical philosophy as an
instrument. Whatever truth could be found in ancient philosophy was accepted in order to defend the
humanly reasonable elements of the faith against pagan attacks, and to express the truths of the faith
in a way that precluded heretical interpretations.
 
The "apologists" defended Christianity against pagan criticism. At times, they even addressed their
writings to the Roman emperor himself. St. Justin loomed as an outstanding figure among them. He
embraced Christianity after having sought the truth in the most diverse ancient philosophies. In the
"apologies" written during this period, the stress was understandably on what could be known by the
use of reason.
 
Clement of Alexandria, likewise a convert, exerted a great influence in Alexandria, which was an
important center of culture in antiquity. He combined the tasks of philosophy and theology. Origen
was to become his prominent successor.
From the very start, the Church opposed heresies like gnosticism. Nevertheless, when the
persecutions against Christians finally ceased in the year 313, a new doctrinal era began. The Fathers
of the Church and the early Councils would experience the need to make doctrinal formulas precise,
dictated by the serious effort to acquire greater understanding, and by the difficulties raised by new
heresies.[113]
 
Christians of those times had the full awareness of the superiority of revealed doctrine over any
discovery made by human reason. Revelation gave importance to truths that were unknown or
neglected in pagan philosophies, as well as other truths that were previously dealt with in a
fragmentary way, thus bringing strictly supernatural elements together with philosophical truths.
Christianity clearly taught truths like the existence of a personal God, the creation of the universe, the
spirituality and immortality of the human soul, and the existence of human freedom, sin and objective
morality. All these entailed superiority, even in the natural level, over pagan philosophies.
 
Christianity made use of classical philosophy, after having corrected it in the light of faith. Such
philosophy contained doctrinal and practical errors, mixed with partial natural truths, and this fact
justified a general attitude of caution before it. The heresies that cropped up were many times the
result of an uncritical use of totally or partially erroneous philosophies in the study of revealed
doctrine.
 
Thus, a body of natural truths gradually and laboriously emerged. It constituted a Christian
philosophy, on account of its origin and its purpose. It took its inspiration mainly from revealed truths,
and it sought to defend them, making use of arguments of reason and of whatever truth there was in
ancient philosophies. St Augustine played a particularly significant role in the development of
Christian philosophy.
 
The path that led St Augustine to his conversion is linked with different philosophical systems,
especially those marked by Platonic influence. In his numerous writings, St. Augustine dealt with all
kinds of philosophical and theological matters. Due to the power of his thought and the richness of his
spirituality, theologians of subsequent historical periods would look up to him as the great master of
theological science.[114]
 
 
2.TheMedievalSynthesis
 
Christian theology, together with philosophy, was developed and systematized during the
MiddleAges. Its summit is represented by the original synthesis worked out by St. Thomas Aquinas,
which features a deep harmony between reason and faith.
 
In this process of development, some individuals and events proved significant. We should
acknowledge the contributions of authors like ScotusEriugena, St Anselm of Canterbury, Peter
Abelard, Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great, and St. Bonaventure; the importance of schools of
learning such as Chartres and Oxford and the foundation of universities; and the role played by Jewish
and Arab philosophers, who also served as transmitters of ancient Greek philosophy.[115]
 
St. Thomas Aquinas successfully drew up a profound and coherent philosophical doctrine. His
philosophy assimilated the valid elements of earlier philosophies (Platonism, Aris-totelianism, Arabic
philosophy, Christian philosophical tradition). St. Thomas Aquinas made use of this philosophy to
delve deeper into Catholic doctrine, in full conformity with Sacred Scripture and Tradition—to which
he constantly referred—and with the Magisterium of the Church. The perennial significance of his
work can be explained in part by his total openness to the truth, which enabled him to include in his
harmonious synthesis the valid elements of many centuries of philosophical and theological thought.
[116]
 
The works of St. Thomas Aquinas can be divided into two general classifications:[117]
 
a)Commentarieson books of the Old and New Testaments, and on different works, such as
the /'Books of Sentences" of Peter Lombard, and the twelve works of Aristotle. There are a total
of42commentaries written by St. Thomas Aquinas.
 
b)Personal works,which include the "Summa Theologiae" and the "Summa Contra Gentiles," the
"QuaestionesDisputatae" and the "QuaestionesQuodlibetales," lectures and homilies, and minor
theological and philosophical writings. All in all, there are 88 personal works of St. Thomas Aquinas.
 
The philosophical doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas can be found in his commentaries on philosophers
(especially Aristotle), in some of the "quaestiones" regarding philosophical matters, in his shorter
philosophical works, and in scattered fashion, also all throughout his theological writings.
 
The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is a profound synthesis of permanent value, because of its
correct use of philosophical elements in conformity with properly fostering the development of
natural reason, and because of its coherence with Catholic doctrine. Obviously, it has room for further
perfection and development. It cannot be expected to provide solutions to all the issues that have
cropped up in subsequent periods. In some particular topics, linked in a special manner with the
scientific knowledge during the time in which St Thomas Aquinas lived, the doctrine has become out
of date. Nevertheless, the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas continues to provide a valid view of
fundamental philosophical issues. With regard to its basic principles and conclusions, it can be
described as perennially valid.[118]
 
Thus, anyone can readily see why the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas has been widely used by the
Magisterium of the Church, and why the Magisterium has expressly and repeatedly endorsed it up to
our time, presenting it as a sure and indispensable guide for philosophical and theological studies.
[119]
 
This can be gleaned from the following official documents issued by the Church in the past100years:
 
— Encyclical "AetemiPatris," issued by Pope LeoXinon August4, 1879:it vigorously recommends
fidelity to thomisticdoctrine;
— Motuproprio"DoctorisAngelica," issued by Pope PiusXon June29, 1914;
— The1917Code of CanonLaw;canon1366stipulates the use of the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas in
ecclesiastical studies;
— Encyclical "StudiorumDucem," issued by Pope Pius XI on June29, 1923;
— Encyclical "HumaniGeneris," issued by Pope Pius XII on August12, 1950;
— Address "SingulariSane," delivered by Pope John XXIII on September16, 1960;
— Letter "Lumen Ecclesiae," issued by Pope Paul VI on November20,1974;
— Decree "OptatamTotius," nos.15and16,issued by the Second Vatican Council (and the reply given
by the Congregation for Seminaries and Universities, dated December20,1965,in connection with
no.15);Vatican II Declaration "GravissimumEducationis," no.10.
— Pope John Paul II, Address delivered at the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas on
November17, 1979;Address delivered at the 8th International ThomisticCongress on September
13,1980;[120]
— The1983Code of Canon Law; canon 252 states that students of dogmatic theology are to have "St
Thomas in particular as their teacher."
 
In its documents endorsing the philosophical and theological doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas, the
Magisteriumofthe Church expressly highlights the perennial validityofhis metaphysics, its capacity to
integrate whatever truth proceeds from ancient and modern philosophies, its fidelity to Catholic
doctrine, and its capacity to safeguard the truth inthe face of error, and to serve as a sure guide for
study and research. It also encourages a direct reading of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, stresses
that the basic points of his philosophy are certain truths and not mere debatable opinions, and points
to the need to tackle newer issues in conformity with Thomisticprinciples, with the openness to the
truth that was so characteristic of St Thomas Aquinas.
 
 
3.ChristianityandModernPhilosophy
 
The direction Western philosophy has taken inmoderntimesis conditioned in great part by currents of
thought that separate faith and reason and many times pit one against the other. Rooted in medieval
nominalism, this rupture finds its way into theology mainly through the influence of Luther, who
affirmed that human nature is essentially corrupt; and ended up disdaining reason. It finds its way
into philosophy through the influence of Descartes, who made the truth depend on subjective
certitude. Once the harmony between reason and faith is broken, the way is clear for philosophical
systems espousing radical views and leading to most varied errors. Thus, the moral necessity of the
revelation of the principal natural truths appears. Without the help of faith, reason easily goes astray,
and an erroneous reason, in turn, deforms the content of the faith.
 
The Magisterium of the Church has insistently issued warnings about the errors of different systems
of thought.[121]It would be erroneous to conclude that this way of acting reflects an attitude of
hostility or mistrust toward anything "modern." The Church has constantly exerted the effort to
pinpoint the truths these systems may contain, separating them from the rest.[122]Obviously,
however, this task is fraught with serious difficulties, since many times, the errors proceed from false
foundations.[123]
 
In the field of philosophy, the errors referred to arise from materialist, scientistic, pragmatist and
subjectivist tendencies, which dash with the faith and frequently lead to explicit or implicit atheism.
These perspectives have influenced theology and have led to positions seriously harmful for the faith,
such as modernism and neo-modernism. In the cultural field, they have spawned a prevalent attitude
of using reason to embark on a malignant criticism, leaving no room for fundamental metaphysical
truths; isolated from all natural truths, faith is thus reduced to mere subjective sentiment.[124]
 
Obviously, not everything is false in modern philosophy. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the previously
mentioned factors exercise a powerful and negative influence on philosophical and theological
perspectives. The development of modern thought in these past centuries offers some positive
elements and partial truths of considerable interest, but it would take a heavy dose of discernment to
make good use of them.
 
 
4.ContinuityinChristianPhilosophy
 
Christian philosophyhas been continuously developingupto the present time, even though it has, on
not a few occasions, suffered from the negative influence exerted by some philosophies incompatible
with the faith. For this reason, the Magisterium of the Church, especially after the encyclical
"AeterniPatris" issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1879, has constantly affirmed the need to foster the study of
Thomisticphilosophy, for it still represents the summit of Christian thought.
 
The study of Thomism declined in the 17th and 18th centuries, even though during that period, there
were also Thomisticphilosophers. In the second half of the 19th century, there was a resurgence of
Thomisticstudies; worthy of mention were the efforts of the Italian Sanseverino, of Naples; the
magazine "La CiviltaCattolica," founded by RrCurci, a Jesuit; and Cardinal Zigliarain Rome. In Spain, the
Dominican cardinal CeferinoGonzalez exerted a considerable influence. In Germany, the leading figure
of Thomisticthought was the Jesuit Fr. Joseph Kleutgen, who had a hand in the preparation of the
encyclical "AeterniPatris."
 
Pope Leo XIII's encyclical was a big boost to Thomism and it gave rise to a wide-based movement that
has been called "neo-Thomism" or "neo-Scholasticism." Among the outstanding figures of this revival
were Cardinal Mercier (especially during the early years), founder of the school of Louvain, and a host
of very different personalities like Louis de Raeymaeker, Francesco Olgiati, Cornelio Fabro, Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange, Martin Grabmann, Josef Pieper, Antonin-DalmaceSertil-langes, Regis Jolivet, and
two authors who have exerted a vast influence up to our present time— the French philosophers
Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson.[125]
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NONECHAPTER 4THE CHRISTIAN BEFORE PHILOSOPHY
 
 
1.Faith and Philosophical Study
 
Since philosophy deals with truths that can be known through reason, and some of these truths are
contained in revelation, obviously,faith has important consequences for a Christian who studies
philosophy.These specific consequences are as follows:
 
a) God has revealed the most sublime natural truths (the existence of God and His attributes, the
immortality of the human soul, the natural law, among others) so that they may be known by all
human beings more firmly, more easily, and without any trace of error. Hence, a Christian knows
these truths by faith. This prevents him from falling into errors regarding them, and helps him attain
knowledge of them through the use of reason.
 
In this sense, a Christian finds himself in an advantageous position, since through his faith,he knows
more(in terms of supernatural truths) andbetter(due to the certitude he has, concerning natural
truths). Of course, he does not enjoy, on account of this, any advantage with regard to the specific
knowledge provided by the sciences, which may bear no relation to revealed truths. "Faith is
advantageous to reason, because it perfects it without obliging it to renounce what is proper to it.
[126]
 
(b) In the study of philosophy, one should not momentarily cast aside the knowledge of natural truths
that faith brings, or totally disregard it. Faith heals the intellect darkened by sin, thus making its
correct spontaneous and philosophical use possible. Besides, in this manner, one can avoid
presumption, which is a source of errors, and preclude a false attitude that tends to make everything
problematic in an indefinite way.[127]
 
There is no danger of producing a spurious philosophy, since only what has been rationally founded
will be acknowledged in the philosophical plane.[128]
 
c) The help provided by the faith does not suppress the natural development of the intellect and the
effort exerted by reason to attain the most sublime truths.
 
Faith is a stimulus that demands more from reason, since it presents higher goals to it, without
sparing it the consequent effort needed to achieve them. It fulfills its role as a guiding light by
specifying goals that demand a more rigorous and careful study of the rational process. Thus, it is
against the paralyzationof rational activity.
 
d) A Christian passes judgment on philosophical doctrines in the light of faith. Later on, by using
philosophy, he can pinpoint the root causes of the possible errors contained in such doctrines.
 
Just like other previously mentioned cases, the scrutiny of such doctrines in the field of natural reason
requires full philosophical rigor.
 
e) Pre-Christianphilosophers erred in basic points, indispensable for the task of leading human life
towards its end. This makes us realize that the revelation of the highest natural truths was morally
necessary, although by itself it was not absolutely indispensable. Later on, philosophers who turned
away from the faith they had already known, fell intoevengreater errors. This becomes
understandable when we consider that the sin of apostasy leads to consequences that are more
serious than those brought about by mere ignorance.
 
Wecan perceive, without any special difficulty, that not a few doctrines incompatible with the faith
can be described as pseudo-religious. They advocate, as substitutes for religious truths, inadequately
founded ideologies which provide a global view of human problems by transforming into absolute
factors some partial aspects of reality or of human experience.[129]
 
f) Faith puts man in touch with spiritual realities studied in metaphysics, thus making it easier for
reason to acquire knowledge concerning these realities.
 
g) As in the case of faith, proper dispositions are also required for correct philosophical knowledge,
for man is free in the use of his intellect. The attitude that accompanies faith facilitates the acquisition
of these dispositions. Hence, for instance, a person with faith is helped to avoid considering himself as
the measure of reality and falling into subjectivist errors.
 
The relations between freedom and thought—so lightly-knit when it comes to matters touching upon
the meaning of human existence—explain why there can be many philosophical errors. Faith leads
the human being to see God, the sole Absolute Being, as the center of all reality. Thus, faith frees him
from improper generalizations and false theories arising from a subjective and self-serving view of
reality, allegedly resting on objective bases—a claim which may be either partially valid or totally
unrealistic.[130]
 
In summary, we can say that the present state of human nature—redeemed but with a weakened
intellect and will due to the consequences of original sin and personal sins— explains why the faith
performs an important service to reason as the latter carries out tasks proper to itself, and why the
absence of faith can enable errors to crop up more easily even in the natural level. Faith helps reason
know the principal natural truths, but without sparing it theeffortit must exert in order to attain these
truths through the rational process.
 
 
2. Philosophy and Christian Living
 
The study of philosophy enhances the coherence of Christian living.
 
a) Since philosophy serves as an instrument of theology, the study of philosophy enables us to acquire
abetter knowledge of Christian doctrine.
 
(b) Faith and theology mustshed light on the knowledge acquired by particular sciences and its
applications.This is carried out better through philosophy, the highest wisdom in the natural level.
 
In thenatural sciences,this link is verified above all, in some assumptions and in the interpretation of
results (in reflections on the scientific method and truth, or in statements about the being of the
material universe, for instance). In thehuman sciences,the link is more strongly significant,
sincephilosophical doctrines exerciseadecisive influence on the ideaaperson has of man, thus greatly
affecting the basic approaches used in history, sociology, psychology, and other related sciences.[131]
 
c) Philosophy must be of help to the faith.There can be no absolute separation or mutual opposition
of philosophical thought and Christian faith.Hence, knowledge of Christian philosophy is extremely
useful.
 
An evident danger arises from inadequate philosophical knowledge. It lies in not realizing the relation
between the faith and specific ideologies— arrayed in scientific garb—which are really incompatible
with it, such as Freudian, Marxist, agnostic or scientistictheories. In such cases, a Christian would
actually possess an erroneous idea about the faith and natural knowledge. Although he may sincerely
practice his faith, he will inevitably suffer from the negative effects such confusion necessarily causes,
leading him to incoherent attitudes.[132]
 
d) Catechetical teaching, and in general,every form of expounding Christian doctrine is necessarily
accompanied by philosophical conceptsat different levels. Thus, even in this field, knowledge of
Christian philosophy is of great help, since it facilitates the understanding of doctrine. Besides, it
enables an individual to appreciate the value of the Christian cultural heritage, acquired through the
effort of many generations and destined to achieve further development in continuity with already
attained truths. Furthermore, it helps one see the importance of terminological precision in the
explanation of Catholic doctrine.
 
All these should be kept in mind so as to refute false charges ofopposition between what is
"doctrinal”and what is "vital"Philosophical depth is not averse to practical problems.Itrather helps us
discover their real meaning and the proper approach to them. Superficiality prevents us from seeing
the connection between life and the doctrinal truths that give meaning to it.Ifthis happens, there will
be problems that may seem practically impossible to solve, simply because they are seen from an
erroneous perspective.[133]
 
 
3.Church Magisterium and Philosophy
 
The following are among the most significantteachings and instructions on philosophy, given by the
Magisterium of theChurch:
 
a) It is important tosubordinate reason to faith, and philosophy to theology.The Magisterium has
constantly emphasized this highly significant point, and this insistence becomes understandable when
we realize that many theological errors have arisen as a consequence of not seriously taking this
matter into account Besides, faith is a superior norm which never contradicts truths attained by
reason. Faith neither limits nor does violence to reason; rather, faith elevates it
 
"Although faith is above reason, there can never be a real discrepancy between faith and reason,
since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the
human mind, and God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth. The deceptive
appearance of such a contradiction is mainly due to the fact that either the dogmas of faith have not
been understood and expounded according to the mind of the Church, or that uncertain theories are
taken for verdicts of reason. Thus, 'we define that everyassertion that is opposed to enlightened faith
is utterly false' (Fifth Lateran Council)".[134]
 
"After due corrections and adaptations, the doctrine of Aristotle as well as those of other
philosophers could be and can be accepted by virtue of the universal value of their principles, their
respect for objective reality, and their acknowledgment of a God distinct from the world. The same
thing cannot be said of philosophies and scientific theories whose basic principles are incompatible
with religious faith because they are based on monism, or because they deny transcendence, or
because they advocate subjectivism or agnosticism. Unfortunately, there are many modern doctrines
and systems of thought which are radically irreconcilable with Christian faith and theology".[135]
 
(b)The Magisterium recommends the study and teaching of the philosophy and theology of St.
Thomas AquinasThe pronouncements of the Magisterium regarding this matter continue being
applicable in our time. This is not equivalent to belittling the importance of other valid expressions of
philosophical thought, or to suppressing an individual's legitimate freedom in debatable issues, or to
refusing to acknowledge the existence of new difficulties and situations that require further advances
in doctrinal studies.
 
"The capital theses in the philosophy of St. Thomas are not to be placed in the category of opinions
capable of being debated one way or another, but are to be considered as the foundations upon
which the whole science of natural and divine things is based; if such principles are once removed or
in any way impaired, it must necessarily followthat students of the sacred sciences will ultimately fail
to perceive so much as the meaning of the words in which the dogmas of divine revelation are
proposedbythe Magisterium of the Church. We therefore desired that all teachers of philosophy and
sacred theology should be warned that if they deviate so much as a step, in metaphysics especially,
from Aquinas, they will expose themselves to grave risk".[136]
 
The Second Vatican Council, too, recommended to Catholic schools, on two separate occasions, the
study of the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, while tackling the issue of priestly training, the
Council said: 'In order to throw as full a light as possible on the mysteries of salvation, the students
should learn to examine more deeply, with the help of speculation and with St Thomas as teacher, all
aspects of these mysteries, and to perceive their interconnection' (DecreeOptatamTotius,no. 16). The
same ecumenical Council, in its Declaration on Christian Education, exhorted schools of higher
education to work for the fulfillment of their objective in such a way that'bya careful attention to the
current problems of these changing times and to the research being undertaken, the convergence of
faith and reason in the one truth may be seen more clearly,' and right after this, it affirmed that to
achieve such an end, there is a need to follow the tradition of the Doctors of the Church, and
especially St Thomas Aquinas (cf. DeclarationGravissimumEducationis,no. 10).«. There is no real and
fruitful fidelity if the principles enunciated by St Thomas Aquinas are not accepted—received, in some
way, from his own hands".[137]
 
(c)The Magisterium of the Church has clearly pointed out the errors of different philosophical
systemsthat are incompatible with the faith, and has also issued warnings against other systems of
thought which lead to doctrinal errors when they are allowed to reach conclusions coherent with
their principles. For instance, it has rejected doctrines like immanent-ism, idealism, materialism and
pragmatism, firmly noting that attempts to make Catholic doctrine compatible with such doctrines
lead to serious errors.
 
Pope Pius XII referred to those who scorned perennial philosophy and at the same time praised
"other philosophies—ancient or modern, eastern or western—, seemingly insinuating that any
debatable philosophy or doctrine, duly corrected or enhanced whenever necessary, can be made
compatible with Catholic dogma. However, no Catholic can entertain doubts regarding the falsity of
this attitude, especially when the philosophies involved are systems likeimmanentism, idealism,
materialism—whether historical or dialectic—andexistentialism—whether it defends atheism or
rejects the significance of reason in the field of metaphysics".[138]
The Second Vatican Council explains in a positive light the Catholic doctrine concerning man, explicitly
highlighting numerous truths affirmed by perennial philosophy, such as the composition of body and
soul, the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, the dignity of man as a being superior to the
material universe, the human capacity to grasp reality with certainty through the use of the intellect,
the natural law written in man's conscience, human freedom and the need to overcome one's
passions in order to act in accordance with human dignity.[139]At the same time, it discusses several
doctrines contrary to the truth, such as communism and scientism.[140]It affirms that "the Church, as
given over to the service of both God and man, cannot cease from reproving, with sorrow yet with the
utmost firmness, as she has done in the past, those harmful teachings and ways of acting which are in
conflict with reason and with common human experience, and which cast man down from the noble
state to which he is born".[141]Lastly, it teaches that "these drawbacks are not necessarily due to
modern culture and they should not tempt us to overlook its positive values".[142]
 
Every Catholic has to carefully observe these pronouncements of the Magisterium in activities related
to doctrinal formation, teaching and research.Theyconstitute an indispensable requirement in order
to obtain fruitful results. Confusion in doctrinal and practical matters, against which the Magisterium
of the Church has forewarned the faithful in times past as well as in our present era, arises from die
attitude of ignoring these pronouncements. Their acceptance and observance, in contrast, constitute
a firm guarantee of doctrinal and moral integrity, allowing a Catholic to share in the task of finding the
right approaches and solutions tomany human conflicts and difficulties.
 
In our days, the Magisterium of the Church has constantly expressed the need for anew
humanismbased on an integral view of man, thatwill be capable of going beyond the inevitable
negative consequences of functionalist and pragmatist currents of thought.[143]For this, man can rely
above all on the help of his supernatural faith. However, many elements of this humanism are
accessible to human reason; establishing its rational foundation is precisely the task of philosophy.
The teachings and pronouncements of the Magisterium of the Church regarding philosophy tend
toward a clear objective: to serve man in his quest for truth and the meaning of his life, illumining his
way with the light that God Himself has entrusted to the Church.
 
Pope John Paul II affirmed that "now, more than ever, there is a need to sow the good seed of
metaphysical truth above all. Confusion in theology and crisis in morality are generally caused by a
crisis in philosophy".[144]Philosophy has a social role of tremendous importance, for man's path
leading to his end passes through it. This explains why the Church is so keen about safeguarding the
integrity of philosophy.
 Francis B. OngkingcoFrancis B. Ongkingco222015-07-03T14:39:00Z2015-07-
03T14:39:00Z7526667152003126635617831415.00CleanCleanfalsefalsefalsefalseEN-USX-NONEX-
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FRAILE, G.,Historia de la filosofía,BAC, Madrid, 1956.
GAMBRA, R.,Historia sencilla de la filosofía,Rialp, Madrid, 1973.
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PIEPER, ].,Eldescubrimientode larealidad,Rialp, Madrid,2974.Elocioy lavidaintelectual,Rialp,
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SIMARD, E.,Naturaleza y alcance del método cienífico,Gredos, Madrid, 1961.
TRESMONTANT, C,Les idées maîtresses de la métaphysique chrétienne, Editions du Seuil,Paris,1962.
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[1]Cf.TusculamaeDisputationes,V, 3, 8.
[2]lnMetaphys.,1, 3 (56).
[3]Philosophy is "ultimate" knowledge in the natural level, with regard to both theoretical and
practical questions. Over and above philosophy, in the absolute sense, is supernatural theology.
[4]Cf. Los principios de la filosofia,I,1-6.Descartes extends his doubt, for instance, to the existence
itself of things perceived by our senses (no. 4). With this, Descartes closes the way to the truth, since
our knowledge necessarily begins from the senses. If at times we get deceived in matters of sense
knowledge, we simply have to find out the possible sources of error. But it is not reasonable to doubt,
as Descartes did, the validity of sense knowledge in general.
[5]St Thomas states literally, thatartis the "right reason of things to be done" (S. Th.,M, q. 57, a3,
crectaratio factibilium).The term coincides with what is usually called "technique." The
verbfacereindicates an action exercised upon some external object, that is, a "making" or "doing
something," such as constructing, cutting, and the like. In contrast, the wordageredenotes actions
that remain in the subject itself, such as seeing or willing; hence,prudenceis defined asrecta ratio
agibilium(ibid.).While art refers to the production of man-made things, prudence refers to voluntary
human acts.
[6]See, nevertheless, the text from Aristotle quoted in footnote 9.
[7]St. Thomas explained that what is proper of every science is to arrive, by demonstration, at
conclusions, starting from some principles (cf.S. Th., I'll,q.57,a.2 ad 1). The so-calledparticular
sciencespresuppose the validity of some indemonstrable principles. Philosophy, on the other hand,
must go into the study of all kinds of knowledge; that is why it is the "first" and "universal" science.
[8]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,In Metaphys.,II, 2 (290).
[9]9Aristotle points out that "experience does not seem to be inferior to art at all; for experienced
people are more successful than non-experienced persons who possess theoretical knowledge. This is
due to the fact that experience is the knowledge of particular things, while art is the knowledge of
universal things... Nevertheless, we believe that knowledge and understanding pertain more to art
man to experience, and we consider knowers of art wiser than those who possess experience...
because the former have knowledge of the cause, and the latter do nor*(Metaphysics,1,1/ 981 a 14-
26).
[10]J.J. SANGUINETI,La filosofía de la ciencia según Santo Tomás,EUNSA, Pamplona,1977, pages355-
359.This work clearly shows that many advances in modern science have been accompanied by faulty
philosophical perspectives; these can more easily become widespread when they are presented as an
integral part of the respective science and when they appear to be vouched for by reported scientific
breakthroughs. The adequate solution to this problem depends, in great part, on men of science, not
on philosophers.
[11]Q. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,In Metaphys1,2.
[12]In Ethic.,VI,5(1180-1181).
[13]Cf.ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, S.Th.,I-II, q. 57, a.2, c
[14]Cf.ARISTOTLE,Metaphysics,I,2.Commenting on this passage, St. Thomas Aquinas concludes that
metaphysics is a science that is also wisdom, since it is a theoretical science which deals with the first
principles and causes
ofreality: cf.InMetaphys.,1,2 (51).
[15]In Metaphys. I, 1 (35)
[16]InEthic.,VI,6(1184).
[17]S. Th.,I-II, q.57, a.2, ad 1.
[18]Socrates may have stressed above all that the morality of a human act is proportional to its
voluntariness (and therefore, to the knowledge that the subject has), which is correct. The sources
about this matter are Plato's dialogues. TheHippias Minoris difficult to interpret, and the phrase "the
wise man is good" is a question posed in the midst of a dialogue contained inThe Republic(I, 350b).
With respect to the Enlightenment, the main idea is to consider human progress under the light of a
scientisticrationalism that supersedes metaphysics and Christianity, and presents as ideals the notions
of "progress" and "science" and their mutual relationship.Regardingthispoint, cf. J. A.
RIESTRA,Condorcet:Esbozo de un cuadro histórico de iosprogresos del espíritu humano,Emesa,
Madrid,1978.
[19]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,In Ethic,VI, 11 (1285). Referring to the opinion that Aristotle attributes
to Socrates, St Thomas Aquinas underlines the mutual dependence between prudence and moral
virtue.
[20]In Ethic.,X,14(2146).
[21]Cf. E. GILSON,La unidad de la experiencia filosdfica,Rialp, Madrid, 1973 pp. 147-176; C
CARDONA,RentDescartes: Discurso del metodo,Emesa, Madrid, 1978.
[22]Cf.R. VERNEAUX,JmmanuelKant: Critica de la razonpura, Emesa,Madrid, 1978.
[23]Cf. J.S. PEREIRA DE FREITAS, E.Husserl: la filosoffacomo ciencia rig, urosa,Emesa, Madrid, 1979.
[24]Cf. M. ARTIGAS,Karl Popper: Busquedasin termino, Emesa,Madrid, 1979, pp. 87-105.(Popper is
not a neo-positivist)
[25]For a suitable historical and thematic discussion of this topic, see E. GILSON,El sery los
filosofos,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1979.
[26]Forananalysisof somescienristicdoctrines, seeJ.A. RIESTRA,Con-dorcet:Esbozo de un cuadro
histórico de los progresos del espíritu humano, op. cit.;JJ. SANGUINETI,AugustoComte: Curso de
filosofíaposition,Entesa, Madrid,1977;M. ARTIGAS,Karl Popper:Búsqueda sin término, op. cit.
[27]Cf. S.L. JAKI, Brain, Mind and Computers,Gateway, South Bend (Indiana), 1978. Ibis work offers an
interesting scientific discussion of mechanism as an explanation of human knowledge.
[28]Cf. F. OCARIZ,El marxismo,Palabra,Madrid, 1975.This work offers a comprehensive view of this
topic
[29]An excellent presentation of modern psychology can be found in J.L. PINILLOS,Introduccióna la
psicologíacontemporánea,CSIC Madrid, 1962. In miswork, the tumor shows the need to study
psychology from the standpoint of man in his totality.
[30]Cf., forexample, P. JORDAN,Creacionymisterio,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1978.
[31]Cf. J. MARITAIN,Introduction general a la filosoffaClub de lectores, Buenos Aires, 1945, pp. 89-
100. Man tainrightly concludes that "to advance in the sciences, one does not have to be a
philosopher," and that "when scientists devote themselves to their sciences, they need not ask for
advice from philosophy or strive to be philosophers." But he also points out that without philosophy,
the scientist will not be able "to take cognizance of the place or the scope of his field of specialization
within the over-all framework of human knowledge," nor will he be able to know adequately the
foundations of his own science. Maritain also says that whenever philosophy does not adequately
exercise its guiding role, we find ourselves faced with lethal chaos and a general decline of the
intellect(Ibid.,p. 93).
[32]For a clear and rigorous treatment of this issue from a methodological standpoint cf. E
SIMARD,Naturalezayalcanadel waHodocientffieo,Credos, Madrid, 1961, and J.J.
SANGUINETI,Ugica,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1932 (cuartaparte: "El conodmientocientffieo"). For an
extensive historical and critical analysis, accompanied by abundant references, see S.L JAW,The Road
of Science and theWaysto God,University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978.
[33]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, In Phys.,I,1(2-3);in Boet, de Trin.,q. V, a.l
[34]Cf. J.J. SANGUINETILógica, op. cit.,pp. 162-167."For St Thomas Aquinas, only the levels of physics
and mathematics would represent types of abstraction (in the sense ofmerited
separation).Metaphysical concepts, in contrast, would be used within the context ofseparatioor real
judgment, in so far as they separate from matter what isreallyseparable or separated from matter. In
any case, there is nothing objection able in considering as abstractive also the third level of
immateriality, at long asabstractionis understood not in the sense of grasping partial aspects—
particular sciences are abstract in this sense—, but ratherinthe sense of going beyond materiality"
(Ibid., p. 166).
[35]Nevertheless, the scientific method cannot be reduced only to the hypothetical-deductive
method. The latter presupposes mat we can attain certain knowledge about reality; therefore, it
presupposes the validity of many forms of knowledge which are not hypothetical. Otherwise, it would
not even make sense to formulate problems, conduct experiments, and interpret their results, which
would make it impossible to make use of the hypothetical-deductive method.
[36]Hence, when philosophical reasoning concludes that man has a spiritual soul, the conclusion is a
necessary one, reached after the analysis of some facts, which in this case are man's intellectual
knowledge and his free will Here we are not dealing with something that can be "experimentally
proven,'* since the human soul, due to its spirituality, cannot be subjected to experimentation, unlike
material realities. The same thing can be said of metaphysical reasoning that leads to acknowledging
God's existence.
[37]A typical case is that of Kant, who affirmed that intellectual concepts area prioricategories,
independent of experience, which are applied to the material supplied by the senses (cf.Critique of
Pure Reason,Transcendental Analytics, book 1, chapter 1, third part, 10). His conclusion was that we
cannot know reality as it is; we can only apply "our" categories to a reality that is in itself inaccessible.
This position, which is a continuation of what Descartes started, exerts a harmful influence on a great
part of modern philosophy. It leads to subjectivist doctrines, and, at least implicitly, to skeptical or
pragmatic positions. For a serious and detailed discussion of this matter, see C
CARDONA,Metafisicade la option intelectual,Rialp, Madrid, 1973.
[38]The neo-positivists advocated logical rigor and clarity in philosophy. It was not difficult for them to
rind a target for their critical remarks. For instance,R.Carnapquoted some texts fromM.Heidegger like
the following: *Does Nothingness exist only because the No, that is. Negation exists?Oris it the other
way around? Do Negation and the No exist only because Nothingness exists? (~.) We affirm:
Nothingness is more original than theNoand Negation... What is Nothingness' prevailing condition?
Nothingnessitself comesto nothing.* Nevertheless, when they arbitrarily rejected all metaphysics,
they launched themselves into an impossible enterprise, and their successive attempts to justify their
affirmations led to explanations no less abstruse than the quoted text.
[39]N.A. LUYTEN,Spiritualisme, et dualisme,inLe mental et le corporel,several authors, Office
international de librairie, Brussels, 1982,pp. 287-288
[40]Cf. G. FRAILE,Historia de la filosofia,I, BAC, Madrid, 1956, sectionon"Nocionde filosofia", pp.3-49.It
seems better to avoid using the term "special metaphysics,” utilized by many authors after Wolff, to
denote the .branches of philosophy, like philosophy of nature and psychology, because this can be
misleading and because it reflects the rationalist approach: they are not strictly speaking parts of
metaphysics, nor are they deduced logically from it since they study some specific aspects of reality
and exclude the rest.
[41]Cf. T. ALVIRA, L CLAVELL, AND T. MELENDO,Metaffsica,EUNSA,Pamplona, 1982, pp. 116-117.
[42]ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,S.Th.,I, q.4,a.l, ad3.
[43]Cf.ST.THOMASAQUINAS,In Metaphys.,IV, 5(593); 1H, 4 (384).
[44]SeeCCARDONA,Metafísica de la opción intelectual, opcit.
[45]Oneof the most influential attempts waslaunched by J.MARECHAL(cf.Elpuntodepartidade la
metafisica,Gredos,Madrid,1957),who tried to make Kantian principles compatible with
themetaphysicsofbeing.
[46]Cf. EGILSON,EIréalisme metâdico,Rialp, Madrid, 1974;Réalismethomiste etcritiquede la
connaissance,Vrin, Paris,1947.
[47]Aristotle defined nature as the "principle and cause enabling that which it primarily constitutes to
move and to attain rest, by itself and not by an accidentalform"(Physics,ii, 1,192b 20).
[48]There have been different interpretations regarding the proper perspective of philosophy of
nature. One of the most popular is that of J. MARI-TAIN (cf.Filosofíade la naturaleza,dub de lectores,
Buenos Aires, 1967, andLos gradosdel saber,I, Desclée, Buenos Aires, 1947). For a lengthy discussion
of this topic, see J.J. SANGUINETT,La filosofiade la cienciasegunSanto Tomas, op. cit.,chapter III.
[49]Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physics, II, 1 & 2; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, In Phys.,I, 1; II, 1-4. Interesting
observations regarding this matter can be found inJ.M.PETIT,Lafilosofiade la naturalezacomosaber
filosofico,Acervo, Barcelona, 1980.
[50]Cf.F.SELVAGGIScienza e metodologia,UniversitàGregoriana,Rome,1962.
[51]Discussionson this topic arise from the applicability of the notion of substance in the inorganic
world: cf. M. ARTIGAS and J.J.SANGUINETI,Filosofia de lanaturaleza,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1984, Part I,
chapters 2 & 3.
[52]Recent problems of this type are, for instance, causality and indetermin-ism in quantum physics
(cf. F.SELVAGGI,Causalità eindeterminismo,UniversitàGregoriana,Rome,1964), and specific questions
about space and time in Einstein's theory of relativity.
[53]lnchapter3of Part I.
[54]Cf. examples in the chapter mentioned, section4.
[55]Anapplicable example is the spread of a materialist ideology, superficially and falsely presented as
something backed up by scientific progress. Thus, the physicist C Sagan publicly affirmed:1am a
conglomeration of water, calcium and organic molecules named Carl Sagan. You areaconglomeration
of almost identical molecules, with a different collective name. But is that all? Is there anything else
aside from molecules? There are some who find this idea somewhat degrading of human dignity. For
me, it isasublime truth that our universe allows the evolution of very intricate and subtle molecular
machines like ourselves"(Cosmos,Planeta, Barcelona,1980,p.127).
[56]Cf., forinstance, AS. EDDINGTON,La naturaleza del mundofisico,Sudamericana,Buenos Aires, 1938,
pp. 15 and 308.
[57]Çf. S.L.JAKI,Scientific Ethics mi EtiiiadScience,inPhilosophy and Humanistic Literature,Hellenic
Society for Humanistic Studies, Athens, 1974, pp. 39-53; M. ARTIGAS,El doblecompromisode la
ciencia,ScriptáTheologica,XIV,2, 1982,pp.615-637.
[58]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,InPhys.,II, 13(259).
[59]Thishappens in the case ofmaterialistideologies which have nothing to do with true science, as
well as in socio-biologyof "aristocratic" and racist tendencies.
[60]The inadequacy of materialism is acknowledged, too, by agnostic authors, like K.R. Popper.
[61]This is the position , for instance, assumed by Popper, who wants to go beyond materialism by
advocating the theory of a creative emergent evolution that springs from matter alone (cf. K.R.
POPPER & J.C ECCLES,El yoуsucerebro,Labor,Barcelona,1980, pp. 3-40.
[62]Cf. thequoted work of S.L. JAKI,Brain,Mind andComputers.
[63]ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, InEthic,I, 1 (2).
[64]STTHOMAS AQUINAS,In Ethic.,I,1 (3).
[65]Cf. A. RODRIQUEZ,Immanuel Kant: Fundamentacionde la metafísica de las
costumbres,Emesa,Madrid, 1977.
[66]Cf.O.N.DERISI,Max Scheler: Eticamaterial de los valores,Emesa, Madrid,1979.Derisishows how to
make acceptable use of Sender's valid observations.
[67]Cf. O.N. DERISI,Los fundamentos metafísicasdelordenmoral,CSIG, Madrid, 1969.
[68]The importance of logic in the study of philosophy and of any other science is quite evident
Nevertheless, one should not forget that it is an instrument: it does not study reality directly; rather, it
focuses on our way of knowing reality.
[69]E NAGEL,La logicasin metafisica,Tecnos, Madrid, 1974, p. 78.
[70]Ibid.,p. 96.
[71]Cf.ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,In Post Anal.Proem. (1-2, 6).
[72]Cf.Ibid.,I, 20 071).
[73]Cf.IbidvProem. (3);In Metaphys.,I,1(32); I, 3 (57).
[74]Cf.:J.G. COLBERT,La evolution de la Idgicasimbolicay susimplicacionesfilosoficas,EUNSA,
Pamplona, 1968, which deals with the studies of Wittgenstein, Camap, and others (chapters 4
and5).Neo-positivism's principal thesis is dearly indefensible, and it was criticized from the start even
by authors who shared common viewpoints with members of the Vienna Circle, such as K.R. Popper.
[75]Cf. J.J. SANGUINETI,La filosofía de la ciencia según Santo Tomás, op. cit..,chapters1 & 2;E
SIMARD,Naturaleza y alcance del método científico, op. cit.,pp. 15-32.
[76]Cf. J.G.COLBERT,La evolución de la lógica simbólica y sus implicaciones filosóficas, op. cit.,pp. 15-
42.
[77]Cf. ARISTOTLE,Physics,IV,1, where he cites as one source of difficulty in the studyof"place" thelack
ofdiscussion about the matter among ancient philosophers.
[78]St Thomas Aquinas states that "regardless of who utters it, the truth comes from theHoly
Spirit,who infuses the natural light and prompts the intellect to understand and express thetruth" (S.
Th,HI, 109,1,ad1).
[79]Cf.De Caelo,1,22 (225), where St Thomas Aquinas talks about "those who, out of mere hatred,
adversely criticize what others have said; out is not proper to philosophers, who claim to be seekers
of truth. Those who wish to adequately pass judgment onthetruth should not act as enemies of those
whose doctrines they seek to judge; rather, they should act as arbiters and rigorously objective
scrutinizers of contending sides."
[80]The study of philosophy is carried out in order to know, not the opinions of men, but the truth
regarding realityIbid.,(228). This quotation from St Thomas Aquinas, and the other two texts
appearing in the preceding footnotes, dearly point out me purpose of history of philosophy and the
attitude one must have in tackling this specific field of study.
[81]Cf. forinstance, S. TOULMIN,La comprensión humana,I, Alianza, Madrid, 1977, pp. 17-45 and 479-
503.Toulminrelates the significance of human concepts to specific "collective undertakings" carried
out in history, in such a way that he denies the existence of a permanent truth. Hence, his attempt to
defend an "objective rationality" is not feasible. It is worth noting that just like other authors, he
identifies the "objective truth" that cannot be attained with the basic doctrine of Descartes and Locke.
Certainly, the criticism levelled at these philosophers is valid, but obviously it does not affect—or if it
does, only in a tangential way, at best—a non-rationalist or non-empiricist philosophy. Descartes and
Locke did not exhaust the truth in philosophy. Rather, they established highly deficient philosophical
systems.
[82]Cf. footnote no.4of this chapter.
[83]J. M ARITAIN,Introduccióngeneral ala filosofía,op. ext.,p. 64.It does not seem fair to blame
Aristotle's influence for the failure of experimental science to attain rapid systematic development,
which would come many centuries later. Aristotle's thought was directed, with evident fidelity, to
logic and experience.
[84]E. GILSON,La filosofía en la EdadMedk,Gredo»,Madrid, 1972,p.702.
[85]E. GILSON,Elespíritu de la filosofía medieval,Rialp, Madrid,1981,p.371. Cf. J. CHEVALIER,Hiitoriadel
pensamiento, U,Aguilar, Madrid, 1967.
[86]Cf.Question de methode,Gallimard,Paris, I960, p. 17.
[87]For instance, J.Chevalier says that Kant "was led to mutilate the human intellectandto deprive it
otall its power of grasping what is real" (Historiadel pensamiento, III, Aguilar, Madrid, 1963, p. Sfr4).
[88]Q.J.M.PETIT,Filosofia, politica,yreligionen Augusto Comte,Acervo, Barcelona1971.
[89]Regardingdifferentphilosophicaldoctrines, cf. I.M. BOCHENSKI,la filosofiaactual,FCE, Mexico, 1969;
R. VERNEAUX,Historia de la filosofiacontemporanea,Herder, Barcelona, 1971.
[90]ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,De Veritate,q. 14, a.10, ad9.
[91]FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL,Constitution on the Catholic Faith;chapter 3.
[92]E .GILSON,Tomismo,Desclee, Buenos Aires, 1951, pp. 35- 36.
[93]FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL,Constitution on the Catholic Faith,chapter2.(On this point it reflects the
thinking of St Thomas Aquinas; cf.S.Th,I,q.l a.l, c).
[94]The continuity of Catholic doctrine, through different periods and cultures, is in itself a strong
motive of credibility.
[95]POPE JOHN PAUL  II,Address to TheologiansinSalamanca,November1,1982.a.SECOND
VATICAN COUNCIL, Dogmatic ConstitutionVerbum Dei,nos. 10 and 12.
[96]J.L. ILLANES,SobreAsaber teoldgico,Rialp, Madrid, 1978, p.66.
[97]Cf. A. LANG,TeologiaFundamental,I,Rialp, Madrid, 1966, pp. 3-41.
[98]Cf. M.A. TABET,Unaintroducciónala Sagrada Escritura,Rialp, Madrid, 1981, pp. 111-162.
[99]Cf. POPE PIUS XII, EncyclicalHumaniGeneris,August 12, 1950, nos. 3 and 9.
[100]Cf.R. GARCIA DE HARO & I. DE CELAYA,La moral cristiatta, opck.,pp.114-150.
[101]Cf. J.L ILLANES,Cristiansmo, historia, mundo,EUNSA, Pamplona,1973.
[102]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,S. Th,,I, q.l,a.5, ad2.
[103]Cf. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, S. Th..,Iq.l,a.1,ad2.
[104]Cf. L. CLAVELL, "La metafisicacomo instrumento de la cieciateologica",inVeritas
etSapientia(severalauthors), EUNSA, Pamplona, 1975, pp. 231-247.
[105]A detailed discussion of this matter can be read in A. LIVI,Etienne Gilson. Filosofiacristianae idea
del limitecritico,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1970.
[106]Prefaceof A. LIVI's book,op. cit.,p. 11.
[107]Cf. ARISTOTLE,Physics,II, 8.
[108]Cf.InPhys., II, 12-14.
[109]Cf. S.Th.,I,q2,a3, c (the "fifth way*). The argument was already hinted inInPhys.,II, 12 (250).
[110]For a detailed treatment of the subject, see R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,El sentidocomúnLa
filosofía del serylas fórmulas dogmáticas,Desclée, BuenosAires,1945, pp. 235-328.
[111]EncyclicalHumaniGeneris,August 8, 1950, no. 10.
[112]EncyclicalMysteriumFidei,September 3, 1965. In this document besides alluding to the dogmatic
formulas concerning the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation, Pope Paul VI thoroughly stressed that
the eucharisticdoctrine of "transubstantiation," as explained by the Council of Trent, must be
maintained.
[113]Regarding this matter, cf. J. QUASTEN,Patrología,BAC, Madrid, 1961, volume I, and 1962, volume
II; J. CHEVALIER,op. cit.,II, pp. 3-111; S. VANNI-ROVIGHI, "La filosofíapatrísticay medieval" inHistoriade
la filosofía,C. FABRO (Ed), t Rialp, Madrid, 1965, pp. 195-227.
[114]Besides the works mentioned in the preceding footnote;,see J. HIRSCHBERGER,Historiade la
filosofia,I,Herder, Barcelona, 1973, pp. 291-313.
[115]Cf. E GILSON, La fUosofiaen la Edad Media, op. cit.,chapters3-8; J. CHEVALIER,Historia del
pensamienlo,II, op. cit.,chapters3-6; S. VANNI-ROVIGHI,op. cit.,chapters2 and 3.
[116]ForstudiesonSt. Thomas Aquinashimself, seeS. RAMIREZ,IntroducciónaTomás deAquino,BAC,
Madrid, 1975; G.K. CHESTERTON,SantoTomás deAquino,Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1973.
[117]Cf. S. RAMIREZ,opcit,pp. 93-99; CFABRO,Introducción al tomismo,Rialp, Madrid, 1967, pp. 17-28.
[118]Asynthesisof thephilosophicalthoughtof St. Thomas Aquinascan be found, forinstance, in E
GILSON,Eltomismo,op. cit.;J. RASSAMIntroducciónala filosofía deSantoTomás deAquino,Rialp, Madrid,
1980; F. OCARIZ,Rasgos fundamentalesdelpensamiento deSantoTomás,inlas razones del tomismo,
(severalauthors), EUNSA, Pamplona, 1980, pp. 47-89.
[119]Cf. S. RAMIREZ,op. cit.rpp. 161-291; SEVERAL AUTHORS,la encíclica"AeterniPatris": I
centenario,in "ScriptaTheologica," XI,2,1979 (monographic issue).
[120]Cf. P. RODRIGUEZ,La encíclica"AeterniPatria",de LeónXIII,en elMagisterio de Juan Pablo II,in
"ScriptaTheologica," XII, 3, 1980,pp.719-759.
[121]Regarding agnosticism and immanentism, cf. POPE PIUS X, EncyclicalPascendi,dated September
8, 1907; regarding communism, seeЮРЕPIUS XI, EncyclicalDiviniRedemptoru,dated March 19, 1937;
regarding various errors, cf.ГОРЕPIUS XII, EncyclicalHumaniGeneris,dated August 12,195aSee also THE
SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, Pastoral ConstitutionGaudiumel Spes,dated December 7, 1965, nos. 19-
21, regarding various forms of atheism and their root causes.
[122]Cf. for instance,ЮРЕJOHN PAULП,Address delivered at the 8th international
ThomisticCongress,September 13, 1980, no. 3.
[123]This is the case of numerous doctrines that start from materialist, scientisticor
immanentistprinciples.
[124]For a detailed analysis of different currents of thought that have exercised a negative influence
in theology due to misleading philosophical doctrines, see R. GARCIA OB HARO,Historiateologicadel
modernismo,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1972;СFABRO,Introduzioneall'ateismomoderno,Stu-diurn, Rome,
1969; J.L. ILLANES,Hablarde Dios,Rialp, Madrid, 1969;Sobreel saber teologico, op. cit.For a vivid
account of various philosophical and theological crises, see J.
MARITAIN,ElcampesinodelGarona,Desclee, Bilbao, 1967.
[125]Cf.A. LIVI,La enciclica''AeterniPatris" y el movimiento neotomistainLas razones del tomismo,
(severalauthors),op. cit. pp. 117-137.
[126]T.ALVIRA andT.MELENDO,Lafeylaformaciónintelectual,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1979, p. 130.
[127]Cf. Ibid.,pp. 74-81.
[128]CfE. GILSON,El amorala sabiduría,Ayse, Caracas, 1974,pp.87-95.
[129]Cf. J.M.PERO-SANZ,Ateismo, hoy,Palabra,Madrid, 1980.
[130]Cf. C.CARDONA,Metafísica de la opción intelectualopcit.
[131]Cf- J.J, SANGUINETI,La filosofía de la ciencia según Santo Tomás, opcit,pp. 319-352.
[132]Cf. T. ALVIRA and T. MELENDO,La fe y la formación intelectual, op. cit.,pp. 57-64and104-141.
[133]Cf. P. RODRIGUEZ Fe y vida de fe,EUNSA, Pamplona, 1974.
[134]FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL,Constitution on the CatholicFaith,chapter4(On Faith and Reason).
[135]POPE PAUL VI, LetterLumen Ecclesiae,dated November 20, 1974, no. 18.
[136]POPE PIUS X, MotuproprioDoctorisAngelici,dated June 29, 1914.
[137]POFE PAUL VI, LetterLumen Ecclesiae,dated November 20,1974, nos24 and 29.
[138]POPE PIUS XH, EncyclicalHumaniGeneris,dated August 12,1950, no. 26.
[139]Cf. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, Pastoral ConstitutionGaudiumetSpes,nos. 14-17.
[140]Cf.Ibid.,nos. 20-21, and 57.
[141]Ibid.,no. 21.
[142]Ibid.,no. 57.
[143]POPE JOHN PAUL II frequently talks about these matters.Cf.M.ARTIGAS,Eldoblecompromisede
laciencia. Estudio a la luz delMagisterio de Juan Pablo B, op. cit.
[144]Juan Pablo II y el orden social,editedbyU. FERRER, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1981, p. 109.