PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

Personality Psychology: The Basics provides a jargon-free and accessible

overview of the discipline, focusing on why not all individuals think,
feel, speak, or act the same way in the same situation.
The book offers a brief history of the area, covering a range of perspec-
tives on personality including psychodynamic, behaviourist, humanistic, and
cognitive approaches. Also featuring fascinating case studies to richly illustrate
the theories discussed, the text looks at influential theories and related
research within each of the major schools of thought in personality psych-
ology. Rigorously examining the fundamental principles of personality
psychology, the author concludes by outlining the future of the area in rela-
tion to cutting edge research and potential future trends.
Exploring the major personality theories that seek to explain why people
behave as they do in eight reader-friendly chapters, this is an essential introduc-
tion for students who are approaching personality psychology for the first time.

Stanley O. Gaines, Jr. (Senior Lecturer, Brunel University London)

specialises in the fields of relationship science and ethnic studies. He has
authored or co-authored more than 100 publications, including Personality
and Close Relationship Processes, winner of the Distinguished Book Award
from the International Association for Relationship Research in 2018.
Moreover, he has served as principal investigator or co-investigator for
studies that have been funded by organisations such as the American Psy-
chological Foundation, Ford Foundation, Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues, Fulbright Foundation, and the Economic and
Social Research Council in collaboration with UKAid.
THE BASICS

The Basics is a highly successful series of accessible guidebooks

which provide an overview of the fundamental principles of
a subject area in a jargon-free and undaunting format.
Intended for students approaching a subject for the first time, the
books both introduce the essentials of a subject and provide an
ideal springboard for further study. With over 50 titles spanning
subjects from artificial intelligence (AI) to women’s studies, The
Basics are an ideal starting point for students seeking to understand
a subject area.
Each text comes with recommendations for further study and
gradually introduces the complexities and nuances within a subject.
THE QUR’AN (Second Edition)
MASSIMO CAMPANINI

RESEARCH METHODS (Second Edition)

NICHOLAS WALLIMAN

SEMIOTICS
DANIEL CHANDLER

SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND DISABILITY (Third Edition)

JANICE WEARMOUTH

SPORT MANAGEMENT
ROBERT WILSON AND MARK PIEKARZ

SPORTS COACHING
LAURA PURDY

TRANSLATION
JULIANE HOUSE

TOWN PLANNING
TONY HALL

WOMEN’S STUDIES (Second Edition)

BONNIE G. SMITH

For a full list of titles in this series, please visitwww.routledge.com

/The-Basics/book-series/B
PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY
THE BASICS

Stanley O. Gaines, Jr.

First published 2020
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To my son, Luther Gaines-White: You exist;
therefore, I am.
 CONTENTS

List of boxes ix
Preface x

Introduction 1
1 An introduction to personality psychology 3

Classic schools of thought I 15

2 Psychodynamic perspectives on personality 17

Classic schools of thought II 59

3 Behaviourist perspectives on personality 61
4 Humanistic and existential perspectives on
personality 82

Current and emerging schools of thought 105

5 Trait perspectives on personality 107
6 Cognitive perspectives on personality 128
7 Biological perspectives on personality 140
viii CONTENTS

Conclusion 153
8 Concluding thoughts on personality psychology 155

References 167
Index 215
BOXES

1.1 Insight into one woman’s personality: Gordon All-

port’s Letters from Jenny (1965) 8
2.1 Altemeyer’s (1981) Right-Wing
Authoritarianism Scale 24
2.2 Umana-Taylor et al.’s (2004) Ethnic
Identity Scale 39
2.3 K. A. Brennan et al.’s (1998) Experiences in Close
Relationships Questionnaire 49
2.4 Raskin and C. S. Hall’s (1979) Narcissistic
Personality Inventory 53
3.1 M. C. Jones’s (1924a, 1924b) Behaviour
Modification Programme 67
3.2 Levenson’s (1974) Internality, Chance, and Powerful
Others Scales 77
4.1 Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale 92
4.2 Diener et al.’s (2010) Flourishing, Positive
Emotion, and Negative Emotion Scales 101
5.1 John et al.’s (1991) Big Five Inventory 115
5.2 P. M. Markey and C. N. Markey’s
(2009) International Personality Item
Pool-Interpersonal Circumplex Inventory 125
6.1 Holmes’s (2002) SABI Model 133
7.1 Zuckerman’s (1971) Sensation-Seeking Model 146
8.1 Paulhus and K. Williams’s (2002) “Dark Triad”
Model 161
 PREFACE

During the 1979-80 academic year, I was enrolled as a first-year stu-

dent at the University of Texas at Arlington (in the US). I was a pre-
dental student within the BSc Biology programme but harboured
dreams of pursuing a career in which writing would play a major role
(though my father had steered me away from such a career; I had
wanted to be a journalist prior to entering university). In the midst of
seeking answers concerning my personal and professional dilemmas,
I went to the main public library in Dallas and rummaged through
various index cards (during the pre-Internet era!), looking up books
in subjects such as Self and Identity. I found a book titled Man’s
Search for Himself, which Rollo May had published in 1953. May’s
book was already dated in many respects (e.g., the post-World War
II emphasis on the imminent threat of nuclear annihilation seemed
almost quaint, though admittedly unsettling). Although I did not
know it at the time, I had begun a quest – not just for answers to the
personal question of “Who Am I?” but also for a deeper understand-
ing of human personality in general – that is reflected directly in the
present book.
By the beginning of my third year in university, I had made
a permanent move away from home and had taken three optional
modules (or courses, as we would say in the US) in Psychology,
 PREFACE xi
thanks to the liberal education policies that govern much of
higher education in the US. The third (and, as I assumed at the
time, final) module was titled Psychology of Women, in which
the students and professor explored gender roles. That module
eventually convinced me to pursue psychology instead of dentistry
as a career. It appears that the profession of dentistry has survived
quite nicely without me! As for my eventually chosen profession,
I have been blessed to work as a social psychologist for nearly 30
years. My undergraduate mentor, William Ickes, was especially
important in helping me define myself as a social psychologist
who examines individual differences in interpersonal behaviour
(within and outside the context of close relationships).
As I write this Preface, I am taking a break from reading second-
year undergraduate essays in social psychology. I am struck by the
conviction with which most of the students proclaim that “the situ-
ation” inherently overwhelms “the person” in terms of influences
on individuals’ behaviour (although some of the students opt for an
interactionist approach that acknowledges the joint effects of per-
sonality and environment on individuals’ behaviour). I smile,
because the primarily situationist sentiment that I encounter in the
students’ essays is reminiscent of social-psychological findings on the
actor-observer effect, whereby individuals tend to attribute their own
behaviour to situational influences but tend to attribute other
people’s behaviour to personality influences (E. E. Jones & Nisbett,
1972). As actors, you and I are intimately aware of the myriad ways
that the social and physical environment facilitate or constrain our
behaviour. However, as observers, you and I are prone to conclud-
ing “That’s just the way he is/she is/they are” when we try to
understand why other people behave as they do (Molouki &
Pronin, 2015). In truth, situations vary in terms of their impact on
an individuals’ behaviour; and different individuals do possess differ-
ent personalities, as is evident when the situation is “weak” enough
to allow those differences to emerge (Snyder & Ickes, 1985).
This is the third book that I have written for Routledge (fol-
lowing Gaines, 1997, 2017), and the first book in which I have
been able to devote substantial attention to all of the major schools
of thought within personality psychology. I am indebted to Elea-
nor Reedy (Social Psychology Commissioning Editor, Routledge)
xii PREFACE

for encouraging me to develop the present book as part of the

Basics series at Routledge. Eleanor’s inspiration and guidance have
helped me greatly in writing a book on personality psychology
that (hopefully) is informative and accessible to A-level/high
school students, undergraduates, postgraduate students, and aca-
demics alike. In addition, I am grateful to Alex Howard (Editorial
Assistant, Routledge Psychology) for helping me keep on track
regarding the post-manuscript development process, and to Colin
Morgan and the production team at Swales & Willis for their
expert work on the final, publication-ready version of this book.
Finally, I appreciate the support that Routledge Books in general
have given to my scholarly work throughout my career.
At the beginning of this Preface, I alluded to the pivotal role that
Rollo May’s (1953) Man’s Search for Himself played in my personal
and professional development. As it happens, May was one of the
major American figures within the humanistic/existential school of per-
sonality psychology (which, as we will learn in Chapter 4, addresses
issues of being versus becoming). Moreover, in Love and Will
(1969) – May’s best-known work (Ewen, 1998) – one will find an
interesting twist on French philosopher Rene Descartes’s declaration,
“I think, therefore I am.” Rather than spoil the plot at this early
stage, I shall comment further on that particular twist in Chapter 8.
For now, I shall reveal that May’s version of existential psychology
(which contends that issues of being versus nonbeing are as important
as, if not more important than, issues on being versus becoming;
Medina, 2008) serves as the basis for my own twist on Descartes’s
dictum, which readers will find in my Dedication to my son.
As we embark on our tour of personality psychology, we shall
learn about several theories and lines of research from each of the
major schools within the field (i.e., psychodynamic, behaviouristic,
humanistic/existential, trait, cognitive, and biological). A cursory reading
of the present book is likely to reveal that no particular theorist or
researcher possesses a monopoly on The Truth (whatever that may
be). However, a detailed reading of the present book is likely to
reveal that each theory and line of research yields insight into the
amazingly complex human psyche. I hope that you will find this
intellectual journey to be thought-provoking, even challenging, no
matter what stage of personal and professional development you have
achieved (or wish to achieve). In spirit, I am with you.
INTRODUCTION
 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

Personality, it is said, is an individual’s unique way of perceiving his environ-

ment, including himself.
Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (1961/1963, p. 274)

One of the most important lessons that one learns from the his-
tory of social psychology (which is covered in Social Psychology:
The Basics; Frings, in preparation) is that interpersonal situations
can exert considerable influence on individuals’ thoughts, feel-
ings, and behaviour (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1968/1985). By the
same token, the history of social psychology acknowledges that
not all individuals necessarily think, feel, or behave the same
way in a particular interpersonal situation, at a particular point
in time (e.g., E. E. Jones, 1985/1998). Indeed, throughout the
history of social psychology, individual differences in attitudes
(i.e., individuals’ positive versus negative thoughts and feelings
toward various persons, places, things, and other entities; Blair,
Dasgupta, & Glaser, 2015) have been examined empirically as
predictors of interpersonal behaviour (Ross, Lepper, & Ward,
2010).
Gordon W. Allport was a pioneer in the field of social psych-
ology, especially regarding the conceptualisation and measurement
4 INTRODUCTION

of individuals’ stereotyped thoughts and prejudiced feelings as

potential influences on individuals’ behaviour toward members of
psychological outgroups (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1954/1979). In add-
ition, G. W. Allport was a pioneer in the field of personality psych-
ology (i.e., the study of the entire, functioning individual;
McAdams, 1997), especially concerning the conceptualisation and
measurement of traits (i.e., individuals’ descriptions of their own
psychological characteristics; Paunonen & Hong, 2015) and values
(i.e., individuals’ priorities in life as reflected in particular organised
sets of beliefs; McAdams & Manczak, 2015) as predictors of indi-
viduals’ behaviour toward members of psychological ingroups and
outgroups alike (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1937/1951, 1955, 1961/
1963). Thus, whether viewed from the vantage point of interper-
sonal relations (e.g., Gaines, 2016/2018) or intergroup relations
(e.g., Gaines, 2017), G. W. Allport’s psychology of the individual
(C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970) – including, but not limited to,
G. W. Allport’s trait theory (Ewen, 1998) – offers a broad, expan-
sive foundation for integrating various theories and results of
empirical studies on individual differences in thoughts, feelings,
and behaviour within particular social situations (see Funder &
Fast, 2010).
In the present book, G. W. Allport’s (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/
1963) psychology of the individual serves as the primary theoretical
framework for our review of the literature in personality psychology.
We are aware that, by emphasising G. W. Allport’s perspective on per-
sonality psychology, we run the risk of ignoring the conceptual road
less travelled – most notably, Ross Stagner’s Psychology of Personality,
which presents a comparatively behaviouristic and experimental view
of personality psychology across several editions (1937, 1948, 1961,
1974; see McAdams, 1997). However, G. W. Allport’s and Stagner’s
respective orientations share certain basic assumptions about the proper
subject matter of personality psychology. For example, the opening
quote from G. W. Allport (1961/1963, p. 274) concerning the defin-
ition of personality in terms of individual uniqueness – notwithstanding
G. W. Allport’s pre-Women’s Rights Era use of masculine pronouns
to refer to all of humanity – directly cites Stagner’s (1961) third edition
of Psychology of Personality as a source of inspiration. In any event, with
G. W. Allport as our conceptual guide, we shall strive to present
a concise (yet comprehensive) review of personality psychology.
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 5

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT BOOK

One of the most fascinating aspects of personality psychology is the
co-existence of several well-defined schools of thought, each of
which includes two or more wide-ranging theories that – according
to their respective creators – go a long way toward explaining why
individuals behave as they do (Ewen, 1998). Certain schools of
thought (i.e., psychodynamic, behaviourist, and humanistic/exist-
ential) are regarded as “classic” (Wiggins & Pincus, 1992); whereas
other schools of thought (i.e., trait, cognitive, and biological) are
regarded as “contemporary” or “emerging” (see Digman, 1990). In
Chapters 2 through to 7 of the present book, we will learn more
about the major schools of thought within personality psychology.
Readers of the present book will notice that we have “stacked
the deck” in terms of the amount of space that we devote to psy-
chodynamic theories that – following the lead of Sigmund Freud’s
(e.g., S. Freud, 1908/1925, 1931/1950) psychoanalytic theory –
assume that unconscious motives exert considerable influence on
individuals’ behaviour (see Millon, 1996). Our expansive coverage
of psychodynamic theories does not reflect a particular conceptual
bias or predisposition toward those theories. Rather, our interest
in psychodynamic theories can be understood in terms of the
sheer impact that those theories have made within personality
psychology (see also Ewen, 1998). Even Stagner – whose Psych-
ology of Personality (e.g., Stagner, 1937), as we have already men-
tioned, serves as a behaviouristic alternative to G. W. Allport’s
Pattern and Growth in Personality (1937/1951) – placed special
emphasis upon the psychodynamic school (e.g., Stagner, 1961).

EXAMPLES OF CORE CONSTRUCTS IN PERSONALITY

PSYCHOLOGY
In order to understand core constructs in personality psychology
from the standpoint of G. W. Allport’s (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/
1963) psychology of the individual, one must begin by examining
William James’s (1890/2010) seminal version of self-theory (see
C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). According to James, the self is an
individuals’ ongoing awareness that they are distinct from – yet
interconnected with – various aspects of the physical and social
6 INTRODUCTION

worlds that they inhabit (see Swann & Bosson, 2010). Having
been influenced by Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural selec-
tion, James (1890/2010) emphasised the biological origins of the
self (e.g., the self is a product of the mind – which, in turn, is
a product of the brain). However, James (1902) subsequently
encouraged readers to decide for themselves whether they believe
that the self ultimately is a product of biology or a product of div-
inity. (Within philosophy and theology, the older term of soul his-
torically was used to describe the self as a divinely ordained entity;
see Calkins, 1917, for a critique of the pre-psychology literature
on the soul.)
In turn, according to James (1890/2010), two major compo-
nents of the self can be identified – namely, (1) the pure Ego, or
self-as-knower; and (2) the empirical Me, or self-as-known
(G. W. Allport, 1955). G. W. Allport contended that the empir-
ical Me – which G. W. Allport preferred to label as the proprium –
is the aspect of the self that is directly accessible to individuals’
consciousness. Having sidestepped the problems that plague
James’s conceptualisation of the pure Ego (e.g., if the pure Ego
reflects upon the self, then what is the entity that presumably
reflects upon the pure Ego, and so on; C. S. Hall & Lindzey,
1970), in Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (1937/1951),
G. W. Allport promoted the empirical Me or proprium in Pattern
and Grown in Personality (1961/1963) as the component of the self
that encompasses and gives order to the wide array of traits,
values, and other constructs that are part and parcel of individuals’
personalities (Ewen, 1998).
Within the empirical Me or proprium, G. W. Allport (1955)
accepted James’s (1890/2010) further division into the material self
(i.e., individuals’ physical possessions, including their own bodies),
social self (i.e., the roles and relationships within which individuals
are embedded), and spiritual self (i.e., individuals’ intelligence and
personality characteristics). (The term “spiritual self”, which James
chose over potentially less soul-evoking terms such as “psychic
self”, does not appear to have been problematic for G. W. Allport,
who shared James’s (1902) interest in religion and spirituality; e.g.,
G. W. Allport, 1950.) G. W. Allport believed that, in everyday life,
individuals do not experience components of the proprium as dis-
tinct from each other (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Nevertheless,
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 7
G. W. Allport’s own programme of research – which included the
development of surveys to measure traits (e.g., G. W. Allport,
1928) and values (G. W. Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; see also
Vernon & G. W. Allport, 1931) – tended to prioritise aspects of the
spiritual self (see Ewen, 1998).
With regard to James’s (1890/2010) spiritual self, G. W. Allport
(1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) drew a distinction between indi-
vidual differences in intelligence (i.e., presumed cognitive ability)
and individual differences in personality (i.e., a variety of psycho-
logical attributes that lie outside the domain of presumed cognitive
ability; see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). As it turns out,
G. W. Allport’s psychology of the individual largely predates the
emergence of cognitive psychology, which currently addresses the-
ories and research on intelligence (see Gobet, in preparation). In
any event, G. W. Allport viewed intelligence as a construct that
should be considered separate from the subject matter of personal-
ity psychology (a view that is shared by many, but not all, of
G. W. Allport’s followers; see Ewen, 1998).
Unlike James (1890/2010), G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955,
1961/1963) wrote systematically about the relevance of several
modern-day personality constructs to the spiritual self (see
C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). For example, G. W. Allport’s psych-
ology of the individual includes traits, values, attitudes, and motives
(the latter of which can be defined as internal forces that direct
individuals’ behaviour; Sheldon & Schuler, 2015). In principle,
one could add affect (i.e., individual differences in feelings at
a particular point in time; Augustine & Larsen, 2015) – including
emotions (i.e., feelings that tend to be directed toward particular
entities) and moods (i.e., feelings that are not necessarily directed
toward any particular entity; R. Brown, 1965) – to the list of
major personality constructs. Nevertheless, G. W. Allport devoted
the bulk of his scholarly efforts toward understanding traits in all
of their complexity (Ewen, 1998).
Regarding traits, G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/
1963) made a distinction between common traits (which can be
found in varying degrees among large numbers of individuals
and are especially amenable to quantitative research methods)
and personal traits (which, in principle, might be found only
among one individual and are especially amenable to qualitative
8 INTRODUCTION

research methods; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). G. W. Allport

acknowledged that the field of personality psychology in general
might gravitate toward studies of common traits (as ultimately
proved to be the case during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury; McAdams, 1997). However, G. W. Allport’s psychology of
the individual emphasised personal traits, as the psychological
equivalent of fingerprints (i.e., no two individuals possess exactly
the same combination of personal traits; Ewen, 1998).
Finally, with respect to personal traits, G. W. Allport (1937/1951,
1955, 1961/1963) distinguished among cardinal traits (i.e., single traits
that essentially define the entire personalities of some individuals); cen-
tral traits (i.e., five to ten traits that go a long way toward defining the
personalities of most individuals); and secondary traits (i.e., an unspeci-
fied number of traits whose expression in the behaviour of some, if
not most, individuals is heavily dependent upon the presence versus
absence of situational influences; Ewen, 1998). G. W. Allport’s best-
known empirical work on traits (i.e., G. W. Allport, 1965) focused
on several central traits (e.g., aggressive, autonomous, sentimental,
self-centred) – or, alternatively, one cardinal trait (i.e., neurotic) – of
an older woman (“Jenny”) with whom a primary correspondent
(“Glenn”) was acquainted for more than twenty years, via more than
300 letters that the older woman had sent to the correspondent and
his wife (“Isabel”), during an interval that spanned more than
a decade after the correspondent’s stint as a university roommate of
the woman’s son (“Ross”; see Hall & Lindzey, 1970; for further
details on Letters from Jenny, see Box 1.1). Compared to cardinal traits
and central traits, G. W. Allport de-emphasised secondary traits in
practice (Zuroff, 1986).

B OX 1. 1 INSIGHT INTO ONE WOMAN’S

PERSONALITY: GORDON ALLPORT’S LETTERS FROM
JENNY (1965)
One of the most exhaustive, empirically orientated studies of
a particular individual’s personality was Gordon Allport’s Letters
from Jenny (1965; for a review, see Wrightsman, 1981). Although
authoritative reviews of Letters from Jenny (e.g., Ewen, 1998;
C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970) have tended to follow G. W. Allport’s
practice of referring to “Jenny’s” main letter-writing correspondent
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 9

as “Glenn” (and referring to the correspondent’s wife as “Isabel”),

Winter (1997) revealed that the name “Glenn” was a pseudonym
for Gordon Allport himself; and the name “Isabel” was
a pseudonym for Gordon Allport’s wife, Ada(!). In any event, the
letters in question served collectively as a treasure trove of insight
into “Jenny’s” personality – not just for Gordon Allport, but also for
successive generations of personality researchers (O’Dell, 1978).
In the hands of a less-capable researcher, Letters from Jenny
(G. W. Allport, 1965) might have functioned as a mundane,
unenlightening account of the final twelve years of “Jenny’s” life,
from middle to elderly adulthood. However, G. W. Allport’s mas-
tery of entire schools of thought within personality psychology is
evident in the ease with which G. W. Allport shifts from an exist-
ential perspective to a psychodynamic and, subsequently, trait
perspective in fleshing out the unique combination of psycho-
logical attributes that comprise “Jenny’s” personality (see
R. Brown, 1965, for a discussion of laypersons’ and scientists’
progression from describing individuals’ behaviour to drawing
conclusions with regard to individuals’ personalities). Moreover,
despite the increasingly paranoid content of “Jenny’s” letters
over time (especially in the years following the death of her son,
“Ross”), G. W. Allport stopped short of labelling “Jenny” as
psychotic. Instead, G. W. Allport opted to emphasise “Jenny’s”
basic dignity. Although we will not usually refer to G. W. Allport
as a humanist (at least in terms of allegiance to a given school
of thought), G. W. Allport’s overarching optimism concerning
human nature is obvious in the ultimately sympathetic portrait of
“Jenny” that one finds in G. W. Allport’s book (see also
J. F. Brennan, 2003, for a description of G. W. Allport as
a humanistic psychologist).

We hasten to add that G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/

1963) did not portray traits as the only constructs that were worth
studying within personality psychology (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970).
Nonetheless, G. W. Allport’s psychology of the individual does pro-
mote traits as the most relevant constructs for the development of
personality psychology as a distinct branch of psychology (Ewen,
1998). By the latter half of the twentieth century, an overwhelming
consensus among personality psychologists indicated that traits had
emerged as the core constructs within their field (A. R. Buss, 1989).
10 INTRODUCTION

EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT (BUT NOT-YET-CORE)

CONSTRUCTS IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY
So far, we have identified various core constructs within personal-
ity psychology, from the perspective of G. W. Allport’s (1937/
1951, 1955, 1961/1963) psychology of the individual. However,
we have not said much about important, but not-yet-core, con-
structs in personality psychology (notwithstanding their core status
in developmental psychology; e.g., C. R. Cooper & Denner,
1998). As a theoretical point of departure, we turn to Erik Erikson’s
(1959/1980, 1963/1995, 1968/1994) ego psychology, which serves as
a conceptual bridge between James’s (1890/2010) self-theory and
G. W. Allport’s psychology of the individual (see C. S. Hall &
Lindzey, 1970). Erikson is best-known for his writings on identity,
which Baumeister (1997) – drawing upon Erikson (e.g., Erikson,
1968/1994) – defined as “the [combination or aggregate of] defin-
itions that are created for and superimposed on the self” (p. 682).
Identity may be distinguished from the self-concept (i.e., individuals’
conscious reflection upon themselves; Baumeister, 1998), in that
identity is jointly constructed by self and society; whereas the self-
concept ultimately is constructed by one’s self (Baumeister, 1997).
In spite of G. W. Allport’s (1954/1979) panoramic view
regarding intergroup relations (Brewer & R. J. Brown, 1998),
G. W. Allport’s (1937/1951, 1955, 1961/1963) psychology of the
individual focused on personal identity (i.e., the aggregate of defin-
itions that are created for the self), rather than social identities (i.e.,
aggregates of definitions that are superimposed upon the self; see
Baumeister, 1997). However, Henri Tajfel’s (1981; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986) social identity theory incorporated elements of
G. W. Allport’s (1954/1979) psychology of the individual (and, to
a lesser extent, elements of Erikson’s [1968/1994] ego psych-
ology), in the process of arguing that self-esteem (i.e., individuals’
positive versus negative attitude toward themselves; Blascovich &
Tomaka, 1991) reflects the joint influence of individuals’ personal
and social identities (R. Brown, 1986). Thanks largely to Tajfel’s
efforts, social identity constructs have become increasingly prom-
inent within the literature on the self (for a review, see Swann &
Bosson, 2010).
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 11
Returning to Erikson’s (1959/1980, 1963/1995, 1968/1994) ego
psychology, Erikson’s progressively sharp focus on gender identity and
(especially) ethnic identity during the 1960s dovetails with the rise of the
post-1950s Women’s Rights and Civil Rights movements in the
United States (see R. Brown, 1986, for a synthesis of the respective
literatures on social identities and social movements). On the one
hand, research on gender identity – exemplified by Janet Spence and
Robert Helmreich’s studies of individual differences in gender-related
traits (e.g., Spence, Helmreich, & Holahan, 1979; Spence, Helmreich,
& Stapp, 1974), gender-role attitudes (e.g., Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp,
1973), and gender-role compliance (e.g., Spence, Helmreich, & Sawin,
1980), among other gender-related constructs – has not always
acknowledged the influence of Erikson’s ego psychology (see Frable,
1997). On the other hand, research on ethnic identity – exemplified
by Jean Phinney’s studies of individual differences in exploration (i.e.,
individuals’ thoughts about their ethnic groups) and commitment (i.e.,
individuals’ feelings about their ethnic groups; e.g., Phinney, 1992;
Phinney & Ong, 2007; R. Roberts et al., 1999) – clearly was influ-
enced by Erikson’s ego psychology, as interpreted by James Marcia
(1966, 1967).
With respect to aspects of individuals’ ethnic identity, Erving
Goffman’s (1963) interactionist role theory (see also Goffman, 1959)
drew upon Erikson’s ego psychology (without citing any specific
writings by Erikson) in distinguishing among racial, religious, and
national identities (referring to race-based, faith-based, and state-based
social identities, respectively; see Verkuyten, 2005). In turn, Stanley
Gaines and colleagues (Gaines, Marelich, Bunce, Robertson, &
Wright, 2013) acknowledged the influence of Erikson’s (1959/1980,
1963/1995, 1968/1994) ego psychology, as well as Goffman’s inter-
actionist role theory, on their research concerning individual differ-
ences in racial, religious, and national identities. Conceptually
speaking, Gaines (2012) has devoted special attention to minority
group members’ racial identity, which might be influenced by inter-
group processes, such as social perceivers’ expressions of stereotyp-
ing, prejudice, and discrimination (see also Fiske, 1998).
Finally, among aspects of individuals’ racial identity, Gaines
and Reed (1994, 1995; Reed & Gaines, 1997) emphasised Black
identity (i.e., African-descent persons’ psychological attachment
toward their racial group; Gaines, 2012) as an especially
12 INTRODUCTION

important type of racial identity within the United States (and,

arguably, throughout various Western nations). Drawing upon
Gaines and Reed’s writings, Roberts Sellers and colleagues (Sel-
lers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998) proposed
a multidimensional model of African American identity (including
racial centrality, racial ideology, racial regard, and racial salience as
components). Furthermore, Sellers and colleagues (Sellers,
Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997) conducted research
on individual differences in three of the four components of
African American identity (i.e., racial centrality, racial ideology,
and racial regard).
Before leaving the topic of important, but not-yet-core, con-
structs in personality psychology, we note that – in and of them-
selves – gender and ethnic group memberships are not personality
constructs. If one were to focus exclusively on individuals’ birth
sex and race (as was common in “differential psychology” during
the early twentieth century; for reviews, see Markus, 2008;
Unger, 1979), then one might argue that certain elements of
gender and ethnicity comprise part of individuals’ material selves
(which, in turn, comprise part of the empirical Me or proprium;
G. W. Allport, 1955; James, 1890/2010). However, if one were
to broaden one’s conception of gender and ethnicity beyond indi-
viduals’ birth, sex and race (e.g., Frable, 1997; Howard, 2000),
then one might contend that some elements of gender and ethni-
city comprise part of individuals’ social selves (which likewise
comprise part of the empirical Me/proprium). In any event,
gender and ethnic group memberships per se are best regarded as
influences on (but not equivalent to) individuals’ gender and
ethnic identities, respectively (Swann & Bosson, 2010). In add-
ition, gender and ethnic group memberships are linked to achieve-
ment-related motives (e.g., Helmreich & Spence, 1978) and
cultural values (e.g., Gaines et al., 1997a), in that order.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 2
Perhaps no other school of thought has stimulated as much popular
curiosity outside personality psychology, or generated as much schol-
arly controversy within personality psychology, as has the psycho-
dynamic school (which we defined earlier in the present chapter).
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 13
Representative theories include (in order of appearance) the psycho-
analytic theory of Sigmund Freud (1900/1965), which evolved from
S. Freud’s earlier work with Josef Breuer (e.g., Breuer & S. Freud,
[1895/1995]; the analytical psychology of Carl Jung [1912/1916];
the individual psychology of Alfred Adler [1927/1957]); the “social-
psychological” personality theories of Karen Horney (1922–37/
1966), Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), Erich Fromm (1941), and Wil-
helm Reich (1933/1980); the ego psychology theories of Anna
Freud (1936/1966), Heinz Hartmann (1939), David Rapaport
(1960), and Erik Erikson (1950); the object relations theories of
Melanie Klein (1927), Donald Winnicott (1931), Ronald Fairbairn
(1952), and Harry Guntrip (1969), as well as the attachment theory
of John Bowlby (1969/1997); the “return-to-Freud” psychoanalytic
theory of Jacques Lacan (1966/1977); the self-psychology theories of
Heinz Kohut (1971) and Otto Kernberg (1967), neither of which
should be confused with the aforementioned self-theory of James
(1890/2010); and the personology of Henry Murray (1938). In
Chapter 2, we shall examine psychodynamic theories, as well as
research that addresses those theories.
CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT I
 2

PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES
ON PERSONALITY

In Chapter 1 of the present book, we learned that William James’s

(1890/2010) self-theory addresses individuals’ consciously experi-
enced mental lives in detail. As it turns out, James also was inter-
ested in aspects of individuals’ subconscious mental lives (Taylor,
1999). Nevertheless, James’s self-theory generally is regarded as
a theory of consciousness (Poll & Smith, 2003). In fact, one of the
best-known post-Jamesian theories of the self – namely, William
Swann’s (1983) self-verification theory – is based on the assumption
that individuals are not only aware of their own self-conceptions
but prefer to maintain social and personal relationships with other
persons who affirm those self-conceptions, even if those self-
conceptions are negative (a prime example of the Consistency
Seeker mode or metaphor of self-perception, whereby individuals
presumably are motivated to seek information that is compatible
with prior beliefs about themselves; Robins & John, 1997).
Compared to James’s (1890) self-theory, psychodynamic theor-
ies historically have tended to prioritise unconscious (i.e., not readily
accessible via consciousness, and possibly inaccessible) aspects of
personality (Poll & Smith, 2003). Early psychodynamic theorists,
such as Josef Breuer and his then-protégé, Sigmund Freud, pro-
moted a “talking cure” that was meant to bring about catharsis or
18 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

emotional release (e.g., Breuer & Freud, 1895/1995) in a manner

that James’s cognitively orientated psychotherapy was not origin-
ally intended to accomplish (Taylor, 1999). Despite Breuer’s role
as a founder of the psychodynamic school in personality psych-
ology, Sigmund Freud eventually became world-renowned as the
standard bearer of the psychodynamic school of thought and the
closely associated therapeutic method of psychoanalysis (which
involved confronting clients with their own unwanted motives,
rather than releasing pent-up emotions per se; Tauvon, 2001).
In the present, “super-sized” chapter, we will review more
than a dozen psychodynamic theories that owe an intellectual debt
to Breuer’s (e.g., Breuer & Freud, 1895/1995) original conceptu-
alisation and application of the “talking cure” (see Millon, 1996).
Also, we will examine the rise of feminist critiques against the psy-
chodynamic school during the 1960s-era Women’s Rights Move-
ment in the United States and elsewhere, especially targeting the
“masculine psychology” of Freud (1900/1965; see Stevens, 2008).
Finally, we will consider attempts to reconcile feminism with psy-
chodynamic perspectives from the 1970s onward (Walsh, Teo, &
Baydala, 2014).
[NOTE: Some of the terminology in the present chapter
might be objectionable to some readers, especially under-18
readers. Especially when we cover Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965)
version of psychoanalytic theory, we will encounter certain sexu-
ally charged terms. The author apologises in advance for any dis-
comfort that readers might experience when such terms appear
in the text.]

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING

PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES
According to psychodynamic perspectives on personality, motives
(essentially, individuals’ answer to the question, “What drives you
to do what you do?” – with the caveat that individuals might not
be able to answer that question; Gaines, 2016/2018) are stable,
unconsciously experienced aspects of personality that may be
expressed in different behaviours across different individuals
(McClelland, 1985/1987). Exactly which motives are the central
drivers of individuals’ behaviour is a matter of debate among
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 19
psychodynamic theorists (Ewen, 1998). However, with the not-
able exception of Henry Murray (developer of a theory in 1938,
known as “personology”; Hall & Lindzey, 1957), psychodynamic
theorists generally agree that motives are highly similar across indi-
viduals (Millon, 1996).
Most (but not all) of the psychodynamic theorists whom we
cover in the present chapter were practising psychotherapists
(having been trained in the technique of psychoanalysis, even
though most of those theorists eventually rejected the controversial
assumption of infant sexuality that was central to the original psy-
choanalytic theory of Freud, 1900/1965; see Hall & Lindzey,
1957). The dominance of clinical practitioners within the psycho-
dynamic school helped lead to a close identification of personality
psychology with “abnormal” (subsequently re-labelled as clinical)
psychology during the early part of the twentieth century (see
McAdams, 1997). However, during the years that immediately
preceded World War II, personologist Henry Murray (1938)
championed a research-orientated approach that was credited for
promoting studies of motives in a manner that was analogous to
Gordon Allport’s (1937/1951) advocacy of research on traits
(Ewen, 1998).
During the course of the twentieth century, the psycho-
dynamic school split into various factions (for a review, see
Millon, 1996). For example, Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) ori-
ginal (and sometimes labelled as “orthodox”) version of psycho-
analytic theory faced early challenges from two of S. Freud’s
most prominent former students – namely, Carl Jung’s (1912/
1916) analytical psychology and Alfred Adler’s (1927/1957) indi-
vidual psychology (not to be confused with Gordon Allport’s
[1937/1951] psychology of the individual). In turn, Adler’s indi-
vidual psychology inspired challenges from more socially orien-
tated theories by three onetime followers – namely, Karen
Horney’s (1922-37/1966) feminine psychology, Harry Stack Sul-
livan’s (1953) interpersonal theory, and Erich Fromm’s (1941)
didactic humanism (the character analysis of Wilhelm Reich
[1933/1980] is also socially orientated but is not typically
viewed as bearing Adler’s influence; see Stevens, 2008). Mean-
while, Anna Freud (1936/1966) – Sigmund Freud’s daughter –
led a subschool of ego psychologists (including Heinz Hartmann,
20 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

1939; David Rapaport, 1960; and Erik Erikson, 1950) who

retained many elements of orthodox psychoanalytic theory but
highlighted the importance of the ego – rather than the id – to
personality and social development. In a direct challenge to
Anna Freud and other ego psychologists, Melanie Klein (1927)
led a rival subschool of object relations theorists (including
Donald Winnicott, 1931; Ronald Fairbairn, 1952; and Harry
Guntrip, 1969; as well as John Bowlby, who developed
a competing perspective that became known as attachment
theory, 1969/1997). Finally, additional perspectives such as Jac-
ques Lacan’s (1966/1977) version of psychoanalytic theory,
Heinz Kohut’s (1971) and Otto Kernberg’s (1967) versions of
self-psychology, and Henry Murray’s (1938) personology were
quite distinct from each other but remain recognisable as psy-
chodynamic perspectives on personality.

THE “BIG THREE” PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES

SIGMUND FREUD’S VERSION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Hoping to do for the then-fledgling science of psychology what

Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural selection had done for the
better-established science of biology, Sigmund Freud (1900/1965)
developed the original version of psychoanalytic theory, which proposes
that humans’ behaviour – like the behaviour of (other) animals – is
determined largely by the three “master motives” of sex, aggression and
anxiety reduction (McClelland, 1985/1987). S. Freud believed that all
motives reside within the id, which is present at birth and is an entirely
unconscious component of individuals’ personality structure (Ewen,
1998). From approximately one to three years of age, according to
S. Freud, the ego (essentially, the “I” or subjective self in the self-theory
of James, 1980/2010) emerges from the id and begins to act on behalf
of the id, extending across the unconscious, preconscious and con-
sciousness (and, thus, protecting individuals from fully comprehending
the role of motives in their own behaviour; Schellenberg, 1978).
Finally, from approximately three to five years of age, the superego arises
from the ego, similarly extending across the unconscious, preconscious,
and consciousness (and, thus, competing with the id for attention from
the ego by promoting internalised morality; Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 21
Following the humanitarian atrocities of World War I, Sig-
mund Freud (1927) eventually revised his version of psychoana-
lytic theory so that (1) the sex motive was recast as eros, or the
“life instinct”; and (2) the aggression motive was recast as thanatos,
or the “death instinct” (whereas the anxiety-reduction motive was
de-emphasised altogether; Ewen, 1998). Nevertheless, S. Freud
maintained his belief that all persons possess the same motives and
the same personality structure (Hall & Lindzey, 1957). In one of
his final, major revisions to psychoanalytic theory, S. Freud (1933/
1990) contended that individual differences in personality arise from
differences in the degree to which one or two components of per-
sonality structure (i.e., id, ego, and superego) become dominant
over the other component or components (e.g., dominance by the
id leads to an erotic type; dominance by the ego leads to
a narcissistic type; and dominance by the superego leads to
a compulsive type; Millon, 1996).
As Howard Jones (2015) noted, William James’s (1980/2010)
self-theory had promoted the concept of free will (or Volition, as
James put it), which grants individuals considerable leeway in
choosing their own attitudes and setting themselves on a course
toward mental health (versus mental illness). In stark contrast to
James’s self-theory, as Richards (1991) pointed out, Sigmund
Freud’s (1900/1965) psychoanalytic theory championed the con-
cept of psychic determinism, whereby individuals’ mental health
versus mental illness is not amenable to change via individuals’
conscious intentions. S. Freud believed that, beyond the age of
five or six (an interval during which caregivers possess the capacity
to shape individuals’ personalities to a substantial degree), individ-
uals’ personalities are set in stone for the most part (Schellenberg,
1978).
Freud’s (1905/1962) psychoanalytic theory includes a model that
identifies five psychosexual stages of personality development (sum-
marised in Ewen, 1998, p. 43). First, in the oral stage (from birth to
approximately 18 months of age), primary erotogenetic zones are
the mouth, lips, and tongue (with feeding as the source of conflict);
personality characteristics reflecting the enduring influence of the
oral stage during adulthood include smoking and eating, as well as
passivity and gullibility (and their opposites). Second, during the
anal stage of psychosexual development (from approximately 1 to 3
22 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

years of age), the primary erotogenetic zone is the anus (with toilet
training as the source of conflict); personality characteristics reflect-
ing the enduring influence of the anal stage in adulthood include
orderliness, parsimoniousness, and obstinacy (and their opposites).
Third, during the urethral stage (also from approximately 1 to 3
years of age), the primary erotogenetic zone is the urethra (with
bedwetting as the source of conflict); personality characteristics
reflecting the enduring influence of the urethral stage in adulthood
include ambition (and its opposite). Fourth, during the phallic stage
(from approximately 2 to 5 years of age), the primary erotogenetic
zones are the penis and clitoris (with the Oedipus complex signifying
opposite-sex sexual desires and same-sex aggressive desires in boys,
and the Electra complex signifying opposite-sex sexual desires and
same-sex aggressive desires in girls, as sources of conflict); personal-
ity characteristics reflecting the enduring influence of the phallic
stage in adulthood include vanity and recklessness (and their oppos-
ites). Finally (and following a latency phase from approximately 6 to
12 years of age, when no major milestones are experienced in terms
of personality development), during the genital stage (from adoles-
cence to early adulthood), the primary erotogenetic zones are the
penis and vagina (with the inevitable difficulties of life as the sources
of conflict); personality characteristics reflecting the enduring influ-
ence of the genital stage (the goal of normal development in
S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory) include a sincere interest in
others, effective sublimations, and realistic enjoyments.
The numerous controversies that surround Sigmund Freud’s
(1905/1962) psychoanalytic theory are the stuff of legend (Hall &
Lindzey, 1957). Consider S. Freud’s claim that gay men suffer
from “arrested development” (i.e., never progress as far as the
genital stage), ostensibly because they experienced such high levels
of love and affection from their mothers early in life that they
ended up rejecting women in general as potential romantic part-
ners, upon reaching adulthood (see McClelland, 1985/1987). One
might think that, by the time that the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation dropped homosexuality from its list of personality disorders
in 1980, followers of S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory would have
disavowed the claim about gay men’s “arrested development” (see
Millon, 1996). However, in a study of 90 gay men (most of
whom were recruited from gay bars) and 109 heterosexual men
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 23
(most of whom were recruited from university classes), Rubinstein
(2010a) concluded that gay men scored significantly lower on self-
esteem (i.e., individuals’ realistic evaluation of themselves, whether
positive or negative, which we covered in Chapter 1 of the pre-
sent book) and significantly higher on narcissism (i.e., individuals’
unrealistically positive evaluation of themselves; Swann & Bosson,
2010) than did heterosexual men – results that seemingly support
S. Freud’s (1905/1962) claim about gay men’s problematic devel-
opment. Rubinstein’s results are tainted by the fact that most of
the gay men, but none of the heterosexual men, were recruited
from bars (e.g., it is not clear whether bar-frequenting heterosex-
ual men would have scored differently from bar-frequenting gay
men on measures of self-esteem or narcissism; Drescher, 2010).
Interestingly, Rubinstein (2010b) responded to a separate critique
(Hartmann, 2010) by proclaiming that he is a “very gay-friendly
investigator and therapist” (p. 48) who was expecting nonsignifi-
cant group differences and who would welcome disconfirming
evidence regarding those differences.
Putting aside the issue of “arrested development” as a function of
individuals’ sexual orientation, for a theory that supposedly is rooted in
the biological sciences, Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) version of psy-
choanalytic theory is notably deficient (e.g., libido, or psychic energy
that ostensibly surges through individuals and is popularly associated
with id-directed sexual behaviour, currently lacks any basis in empirical
fact; Ewen, 1998). However, the contributions of S. Freud’s psycho-
analytic theory to the social sciences are numerous (Schellenberg, 1978).
For example, the authoritarian or prejudiced personality is a construct that
Theodor Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levin-
son, & Sanford, 1950) developed on the basis of S. Freud’s earlier con-
cept of identification with the aggressor (i.e., in response to aggressive
urges toward same-sex parents [as distinct from sexual urges toward
opposite-sex parents], individuals are presumed to redirect their aggres-
sive urges toward members of psychological outgroups within a given
society; Snyder & Ickes, 1985); in Box 2.1, we will encounter Bob
Altemeyer’s (1981) Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale,
which was influenced by Adorno et al.’s research. Furthermore, later in
the present chapter, we will elaborate upon narcissism (a construct that
also looms as important within the self-psychology theories of Kohut,
1971 and Kernberg, 1967). To put it simply, S. Freud’s version of
24 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

B OX 2 .1 ALTEMEYER’S (1981) RIGHT-WING

AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE
As Freeman (2008) pointed out, Adorno et al.’s (1950) The
Authoritarian Personality deals primarily with traditional Freudian
themes, such as the transmission of authoritarianism from fathers
to their resentful sons. In order to measure individual differences
in the authoritarian personality (also known as the prejudiced per-
sonality), Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950)
developed the 38-item California F (for pre-Fascist tendencies)
Scale (Allport, 1954/1979). Results obtained by Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) from a sample of 2000
participants in the United States indicated that scores on the Cali-
fornia F Scale tended to be significantly and positively correlated
with scores on anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and conservatism
(Snyder & Ickes, 1985). However, the California F scale was
plagued by methodological problems, especially acquiescence bias
(i.e., a tendency for individuals to answer “Agree” without neces-
sarily reading the content of specific items – a tendency that
raises basic questions about construct validity when all of the
items in a scale are worded such that “Agree” responses are
always interpreted as reflecting high levels of the construct in
question; Christie, 1991).
In order to overcome the methodological problems that beset
Adorno’s (1950) California F Scale, Bob Altemeyer (1981) devel-
oped the 30-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWS) Scale that
included equal numbers of negatively worded versus positively
worded items (see Adair, Paivio, & Ritchie, 1996). Consistent
with Adorno et al.’s original conceptualisation of the authoritar-
ian personality, Altemeyer (1998) contended that right-wing
authoritarianism reflects a combination of individuals’ submis-
sion to authority figures and acceptance of conventional norms
within a given society (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). More-
over, consistent with Allport’s (1954/1979) elaboration regarding
the authoritarian or prejudiced personality, Altemeyer (1994)
argued that right-wing authoritarianism is expressed via individ-
uals’ negative stereotyping and prejudice toward members of
socially defined groups who have been stigmatised within that
society (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Finally, Altemeyer (1988,
1996) found that individuals who score high on right-wing
authoritarianism are not only easily threatened but tend to react
strongly to perceived threats (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 25

Alongside social dominance orientation (SDO, or individuals’ atti-

tudes toward societal hierarchies that are based on demographic
characteristics such as biological sex, race, and age; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), right-wing authoritarianism as operationalised by
Altemeyer has helped to galvanise post-Civil Rights Era research
on intergroup relations (J. Jones, 1997).

psychoanalytic theory stands as the most influential theory of all time

within personality psychology (and, one might argue, across psychology
as a whole; Hall & Lindzey, 1957).

CARL JUNG’S ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

At one time, Sigmund Freud viewed Carl Jung as the natural succes-
sor to lead psychoanalytic theory beyond the early part of the twenti-
eth century (Ewen, 1998). Instead, Jung became the first major
defector from psychoanalytic theory, strongly rejecting S. Freud’s
(1900/1965) emphasis on infant sexuality (Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
Afterward, Jung (1912/1916) developed his own analytic psychology as
a competing psychodynamic theory of personality (Millon, 1996).
Jung placed less emphasis on S. Freud’s “master motives” in general
and hinted at a different, largely unexplored need to fulfil one’s
potential; this latter need eventually became known as the self-
actualisation motive among proponents of humanistic psychology (see
Chapter 4 of the present book).
In terms of personality structure, Jung’s (1912/1916) analytical
psychology retained the constructs of id, ego, and superego from
S. Freud’s (1900/1965) psychoanalytic theory, although Jung
renamed the id as the personal unconscious; renamed the ego as the per-
sonal conscious, and renamed the superego as the persona or collective con-
scious (Ewen, 1998). Jung’s most original contribution to
understanding personality structure was the addition of the collective
unconscious, which is a repository of unconsciously experienced
images that all humans share (and, presumably inherit from pre-
human as well as human ancestors; Hall & Lindzey, 1957). The pri-
mary individual-difference construct in Jung’s analytical psychology is
a de-sexualised version of the libido (e.g., Jung, 1921/1971), which
26 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

can flow inward (thereby leading to introversion) or outward (thereby

leading to extraversion) with regard to a particular individual, at
a particular point in time (McClelland, 1985/1987).
Like S. Freud’s (1900/1965) version of psychoanalytic theory,
Jung’s (1912/1916) analytical psychology was promoted as
a biologically orientated psychodynamic theory – a claim that is at
odds with the lack of any empirical evidence that could trace the
existence of a “collective unconscious” that supposedly was passed
from pre-human species to Homo sapiens (Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
However, Jung’s (1921/1971) construct of introversion versus extra-
version survives intact as part of a personality typology that is meas-
ured via the huge popular Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI;
I. B. Myers, 1962), and in greatly modified form as one of a relatively
small number of major traits that are consistently measured by various
comprehensive questionnaires (as we will see in Chapter 5). All
things considered, Jung’s analytical psychology may be regarded
as second only to S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory in terms of influ-
ence within personality psychology (Ewen, 1998).

ALFRED ADLER’S INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

Like Carl Jung, Alfred Adler initially was a follower of Sigmund

Freud’s (1900/1965) psychoanalytic theory and rebelled against
S. Freud’s insistence that human beings act primarily on the basis of
sexual urges from birth onward (Millon, 1996). However, Adler’s
(1925) individual psychology differs from Jung’s analytical psychology
and S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory by focusing less on the structure
of personality (id, ego, and superego in Jung’s and S. Freud’s theories;
and collective unconscious in Jung’s theory), and more on the indi-
visibility of the individual’s psyche (Ewen, 1998). Nevertheless, one
can detect influences of Jung’s and S. Freud’s theories on Adler’s
theory (e.g., complexes, or combinations of unconsciously experienced
images that are unique to the id of each individual; and motives, or
unconsciously experienced psychological needs that exist within the
id of all individuals; Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
Adler’s (1925) individual psychology initially proposed that
S. Freud’s (1900/1965) psychoanalytic theory had placed too little
emphasis upon the aggression motive (i.e., a need to inflict physical
and/or psychological harm to other persons), relative to the sex
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 27
motive (i.e., a need to become physically intimate with other per-
sons; see McClelland, 1985/1987). Subsequently, Adler himself
de-emphasised the aggression motive and shifted his attention
toward the power motive (i.e., a need to exert influence over other
persons; Ansbacher, 1978). Finally, Adler de-emphasised the
power motive in favour of a social interest motive (i.e., a need to
act on behalf of the common good; P. R. Peluso, J. P. Peluso,
J. White, & Kern, 2004) that presumably was the “master motive”
for all human beings at birth. Interestingly, Adler believed that
individuals’ experiences with caregivers from birth until approxi-
mately the age of five or six determined whether individuals’ need
for social interest would remain high or would wane by adulthood
(Ansbacher, 1988).
Adler (1935) proposed a personality typology of “styles of life”,
based on individuals’ combination of need for social interest and activ-
ity level by adulthood (Massey, 1988) – a typology that has not been
very influential within personality psychology (despite attempts to
measure styles of life via surveys by a few of Adler’s followers; e.g.,
Curlette, Kern, & Wheeler, 1996; Wheeler, Kern, & Curlette, 1986).
Nevertheless, Adler’s (1932) individual psychology did popularise the
concepts of inferiority and superiority complexes via his writings on the
presumed effects of birth order on individuals’ personality characteris-
tics (Ewen, 1998). In turn, those complexes were central to Adler’s
“styles of life” typology (i.e., a ruling type was characterised by
a superiority complex; getting and avoiding types were characterised by
an inferiority complex; and an especially adaptive, socially useful type
was not characterised by any particular complex; Massey, 1988). All in
all, Adler’s (1925) individual psychology is widely regarded as a pivotal
theory that paved the way for even more overtly “social-
psychological” personality theories within the psychodynamic school
(Hall & Lindzey, 1957).

“SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL” PSYCHODYNAMIC
THEORIES

KAREN HORNEY’S FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY

At a time when Sigmund Freud (1923/1927) was writing about

women’s supposedly arrested development in terms of personality
28 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

(e.g., unable to progress to the “genital” or highest stage of psy-

chosexual development), Adler (1927/1957) was championing
women’s rights, such as the right to vote (Ewen, 1998). Further-
more, Adler developed the concept of masculine protest to refer to
women’s (as well as men’s) questioning of societal roles and
stereotypes that deem women inferior to men (Bitter, Robertson,
Healey, & Cole, 2009). Building upon (yet expanding beyond)
Adler’s concept of masculine protest, Karen Horney (1922-37/
1966) developed her theory of feminine psychology as a direct chal-
lenge to S. Freud’s “masculine psychology” (i.e., psychoanalytic
theory; Hirsch, 2005).
Early in her 1922–37 lecture series, Horney did not dispute
Sigmund Freud’s (1923/1927) controversial contention that
women suffer from “penis envy” – though Horney argued that,
conversely, men suffer from “womb envy” (O’Connell, 1980).
However, later in her 1922–37 lecture series, Horney rejected
S. Freud’s “anatomy is destiny” argument concerning gender and
personality, eventually embracing the view that societal discrimin-
ation (rather than biology) was the cause of those psychological
difficulties that women might experience to a greater degree than
did men (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Over time, Horney (1937)
developed a typology of responses to interpersonal anxiety (i.e.,
moving toward others, resulting in a “compliant” type; moving against
others, resulting in an “aggressive” type; and moving away from
others, resulting in a “detached” type; Ewen, 1998) that presum-
ably varied by gender as a function of societal influences (i.e.,
women were steered in the direction of moving toward others to
a greater extent than were men; whereas men were steered in the
directions of moving against others and moving away from others
to a greater extent than were women; Rendon, 2008).
Despite the intuitive appeal of Horney’s (1937) typology of
neurotic responses to interpersonal anxiety, no single, agreed-upon
measure of those constructs has emerged within personality psych-
ology (although some of Horney’s followers have tried to develop
such a survey; e.g., Coolidge, Moor, Yamazaki, S. E. Stewart, &
Segal, 2001). However, as the Women’s Rights Movement gained
momentum within the United States and elsewhere during the
late 1960s, Horney’s 1922–37 lecture series was (re)published as
the book, Feminine Psychology, in 1967 (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). In
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 29
turn, as Sandra Bem (1994) pointed out, that book helped inspire
a re-evaluation of the way that gender-related traits were concep-
tualised and measured within personality psychology (most obvi-
ously in the development of the Bem Sex Role Inventory and
gender schema theory by Bem, 1974, 1981; for details regarding
S. Bem’s work, see Chapter 5 of the present book). Taken as
a whole, Horney’s theory of feminine psychology was decades
ahead of its time in its full-throated affirmation of the basic dignity
of human beings, whether male or female (Ewen, 1998).

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN’S INTERPERSONAL THEORY

Like Horney’s (1922-37/1966) feminine psychology, Harry Stack

Sullivan’s (1953) posthumously published interpersonal theory high-
lights the importance of the anxiety-reduction motive to a greater
degree than do any of the “Big Three” psychodynamic theories
(i.e., the psychoanalytic theory of S. Freud, 1900/1965; the analyt-
ical psychology of Jung, 1912/1916; and the individual psychology
of Adler; 1927/1957; see McClelland, 1985/1987). Moreover,
both Horney’s feminine psychology and H. S. Sullivan’s interper-
sonal theory cast anxiety as inherently interpersonal (rather than
intrapersonal, as was the case in S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory;
Hall & Lindzey, 1970). However, Horney (1937) was more con-
cerned about the implications of interpersonal anxiety for feelings
of helplessness and danger; whereas H. S. Sullivan (1954) was
more concerned about the implications of interpersonal anxiety
for loss of self-esteem (Zerbe, 1990).
According to H. S. Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal theory, all
individuals possess a need for interpersonal intimacy – a multifaceted
need that is emotionally focussed at birth but eventually acquires
a sexual dimension as well, once individuals embark on their
developmental journey into adolescence (Hall & Lindzey, 1970).
However, given that other persons serve as the primary sources of
anxiety in individuals’ lives, an especially adaptive process regard-
ing humans’ personality development is the emergence of the self-
system (a structure that serves to reduce anxiety, not unlike the
function of the ego in the psychoanalytic theory of S. Freud,
1900/1965; see Westen, 1992). Ideally, the self-system should
enable individuals to distinguish among good-me (i.e., individuals’
30 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

acknowledgement of their own socially desirable personality char-

acteristics), bad-me (i.e., individuals’ acknowledgement of their
own socially undesirable personality characteristics), and not-me
(individuals’ acknowledgement of those personality characteristics
that they do not possess; Ewen, 1998). However, in practical
terms, the self-system might fail to distinguish between bad-me
and not-me, thus making it difficult for individuals to identify
those aspects of their personalities and corresponding social
behaviour that could benefit from therapeutic intervention (Sulli-
van, 1954).
Based on his observations of clients in psychotherapy,
H. S. Sullivan (1947/1966) developed a list of ten maladaptive
personality types (i.e., nonintegrative, self-absorbed, incorrigible, nega-
tivistic, stammering, ambition-ridden, asocial, inadequate, homosexual,
and clinically adolescent) – a list that never attracted much atten-
tion within personality psychology (in retrospect, the seemingly
arbitrary inclusion of gay men, lesbians, and stutterers within
a list of adaptive or maladapative types was not just “politically”
incorrect, but also scientifically incorrect; Millon, 1996). Never-
theless, H. S. Sullivan’s (1953) fundamental premise that all types of
personality is inherently interpersonal (Hall & Lindzey, 1970) served
as the primary inspiration for a circular or circumplex model of inter-
personal traits in particular (Leary, 1957) and an interpersonal circum-
plex theory of personality in general (Wiggins, 1991) that we will
examine further in Chapter 5 of the present book. All in all, not only
did H. S. Sullivan specifically advocate the establishment of a science
of interpersonal relations that would draw upon psychiatry and social
psychology; but H. S. Sullivan’s interpersonal theory arguably pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for conducting programmatic
research on personality and close relationship processes within such
a science (Gaines, 2007a, 2007b).

ERICH FROMM’S DIDACTIC HUMANISM

As we have seen, among two of the major neo-Adlerian personal-

ity theories – namely, Karen Horney’s (1923-37/1966, 1937) fem-
inine psychology and Harry Stack Sullivan’s (1953, 1954)
interpersonal theory – the inherently interpersonal nature of anx-
iety was a major theme. As it turns out, Erich Fromm’s (1941,
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 31
1957) didactic humanism was yet another neo-Adlerian, “social-
psychological” personality theory that focused on the interpersonal
basis of anxiety (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). However, as
T. Leary (1957) noted, Fromm’s didactic humanism is unique in
that it deals especially with the implications of interpersonal anx-
iety for individuals’ experience of isolation and weakness.
The dual themes of anxiety and alienation are evident in Erich
Fromm’s (1941) didactic humanism, reflecting the joint influence of
Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) theory of psychoanalysis and Karl
Marx’s (1932/1990) theory of alienation upon Fromm’s theory
(McLaughlin, 1998b). According to Fromm, all individuals eventu-
ally experience aloneness – not only with regard to their social
environment (i.e. other people), but also with regard to their phys-
ical environment (i.e., nature; Mann, 2000). In turn, Fromm’s
didactic humanism proposes that individuals ultimately develop one
or more escape mechanisms (akin to defence mechanisms in the psy-
choanalytic theory of S. Freud (1900/1965); for details regarding
defence mechanisms, see the upcoming section on the ego psych-
ology of Anna Freud, 1936/1966, in the present chapter) for deal-
ing with aloneness (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Fromm’s escape
mechanisms include authoritarianism, malignant aggression, and automa-
ton conformity; authoritarianism is the best-known example of the
escape mechanisms (serving as the impetus for Fromm’s ground-
breaking, yet initially unpublished, pre-World War II-era qualita-
tive research on the authoritarian personality; McLaughlin, 1999).
As McLaughlin (1998a) noted, Fromm’s (1941, 1957) didactic
humanism was rejected on ideological grounds by some psycholo-
gists during and after World War II, due to Fromm’s overt
embrace of Marxist philosophy. However, G. W. Allport (1954/
1979) praised Fromm’s didactic humanism for its attention to the
role that societies can play in shaping the development of authori-
tarian (i.e., prejudiced) versus tolerant (i.e., unprejudiced) person-
alities (e.g., by engaging versus refusing to engage in scapegoating
toward members of socially devalued groups). All in all, despite
the lack of acknowledgement in some circles (e.g., Adorno, Fren-
kel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Fromm’s theory of
didactic humanism and research on authoritarianism set the stage
for an explosion of interest in the authoritarian personality
32 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

throughout personality and social psychology after World War II

(Christie, 1991).

WILHELM REICH’S CHARACTER ANALYSIS

We have already seen that Karen Horney’s (1922-37/1966) femin-

ine psychology and Erich Fromm’s (1941) didactic humanism
questioned the premise (which one finds in the psychoanalytic
theory of Sigmund Freud, 1900) that society inevitably exerts
a constructive influence on individuals’ personality development
(as a counterpoint to individuals’ own motives as destructive influ-
ences; Hall & Lindzey, 1957). If one looks closely, then one will
notice that Harry Stack Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal theory also
questioned the assumption that society invariably plays
a constructive role in individuals’ personality development (par-
ticularly within the content of intergroup relations; Ewen, 1998).
However, Wilhelm Reich’s (1933/1980) character analysis goes
beyond the other “social-psychological” psychodynamic theories
in detailing the potentially destructive effects of society on personal-
ity development (Shapiro, 2002).
According to Reich’s (1933/1980) character analysis, internally
generated sexual tensions and externally generated political and eco-
nomic inequalities can combine to produce a rigid muscular armour
(i.e., a constricted manner in which individuals move their bodies, as
if constantly preparing for “fight or flight”; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala,
2014). Reich controversially proposed that the development of mus-
cular armour prevented individuals from releasing their orgone (a
sexualised type of bodily energy, somewhat akin to libido as originally
described by S. Freud, 1908/1925) – a condition that ostensibly
required clinical intervention via massage therapy, if not overt sexual
therapy (Stevens, 2008). Even Sigmund Freud’s sexually orientated
psychoanalytic theory never advocated such direct physical contact
between clinicians and clients (see Klee, 2005). In fact, Reich’s char-
acter analysis was so far outside the mainstream of psychodynamic
theories (let alone practices) that one might reasonably question
Reich’s sanity (Pietikainen, 2002).
Reich’s (1933/1980) character analysis has been lambasted as
thoroughly unscientific (e.g., lacking a basis for disconfirmable
hypotheses), even when compared with other psychodynamic
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 33
theories (Stevens, 2008). However, Reich’s character analysis is
strongly reflected in the concepts of oral, anal, and phallic characters
(corresponding to three of the four pre-genital stages on the psycho-
sexual development model of S. Freud, 1908/1925) that are generally
associated with Sigmund Freud’s version of psychoanalytic theory
(Millon, 1996). Moreover, Walsh and colleagues (Walsh, Teo, &
Baydala, 2014) regarded Reich’s character analysis as a political-
economic theory that rivalled Fromm’s (1941) didactic humanism or
“social-political theory” in the degree to which it fused Marxist and
(Sigmund) Freudian principles together.

EGO PSYCHOLOGY THEORIES

ANNA FREUD’S VERSION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

According to Sigmund Freud’s (1923/1927) psychoanalytic theory,

in the process of navigating between (1) the id’s promotion of sexual
and aggressive urges toward parents and (2) the superego’s prohib-
ition against those same urges toward parents, the ego typically
employs one or more defence mechanisms to try and reduce individuals’
anxiety (Tauvon, 2001). S. Freud focused primarily on the defence
mechanism of repression, or the ego’s attempts to banish unwanted
sexual and aggressive urges from consciousness (Baumeister, Dale, &
Sommer, 1998). However, S. Freud mentioned several additional
defence mechanisms in his writings, without attempting to provide
a single, comprehensive list (even though repression appeared to be
insufficient to manage anxiety on its own; Carlin, 2010). Fortunately,
for psychodynamic theorists and practitioners, Anna Freud (1936/
1966) brought together all of the defence mechanisms from
S. Freud’s varied writings into one coherent list, as part of A. Freud’s
ego psychology (Kernberg, 1994).
Unlike Sigmund Freud’s (1923/1927) psychoanalytic theory,
Anna Freud’s (1936/1966) ego psychology depicted the ego as
highly competent in navigating intrapersonal conflicts that
involved conflicting messages from the id and the superego (Millon,
1996). Anna Freud’s initial list of defence mechanisms employed
by the ego included (1) denial, (2) displacement, (3) intellectualisation,
(4) projection, (5) rationalisation, (6) reaction formation, (7) regression, (8)
repression, and (9) suppression; A. Freud subsequently added (10)
34 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

sublimation, (11) identification with the aggressor, and (12) altruism (the
latter three of which S. Freud had not explored in detail,
P. F. Kernberg, 1994). Westen and Chang (2000) pointed out that
A. Freud (1958) was especially concerned with the defence mech-
anisms that individuals use during adolescence, which is a time of
sexual awakening.
Notwithstanding Anna Freud’s (1936/1966) efforts toward docu-
menting all of the ways that the ego might reduce (and, perhaps, elim-
inate) individuals’ intrapersonal anxiety, no single, agreed-upon survey
exists that could measure most (if not all) of the defence mechanisms
(although a small number of A. Freud’s followers have attempted to do
so; e.g., Joffe & Naditch, 1977). However, to the extent that the rela-
tively new field of neuropsychoanalysis has revived academicians’ and
practitioners’ interest in defence mechanisms (including, but not limited
to, repression; Boag, 2006), the measurement of A. Freud’s complete
list of defence mechanisms remains a worthy conceptual and empirical
goal within the psychodynamic school of personality psychology (see
Davison & MacGregor, 1998). In summary, A. Freud’s ego psychology
functions as a viable alternative to “id psychology” (i.e., the psychoana-
lytic theory of S. Freud, 1900/1965) without requiring a full-scale
rejection of S. Freud’s core constructs (Millon, 1996).

HEINZ HARTMANN’S VERSION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

By definition, Anna Freud’s (1936/1966) version of ego psych-

ology is defensive in its orientation (i.e., focussed on the means by
which the ego manages individuals’ intrapersonal conflict; Kern-
berg, 1994). Comparatively speaking, Heinz Hartmann’s (1939)
version of ego psychology is more adaptive in its orientation (i.e.,
focussed on the degree to which the ego operates autonomously
from the id and ego, within a conflict-free sphere; Wallerstein,
2002). Furthermore, in H. Hartmann’s version of ego psychology,
the ego is present at birth (rather than emerging from the id at
1–3 years of age) and possess adaptive abilities (e.g., adapting to
internal as well as external reality; Redfearn, 1983).
According to H. Hartmann’s (1939) version of ego psychology,
various conflict-free capacities (e.g., visual perception, memory, motor
coordination, language, skills, talents) eventually develop into ego
functions that operate independently from the id drives of eros and
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 35
thanatos (Danzer, 2012). This is not to say that ego functions neces-
sarily are entirely disconnected from id drives; it is possible for id
drives to create intrapersonal conflict by disrupting the normal devel-
opment of ego functions (Blatt & Auerbach, 2000). Nevertheless,
given that ego functions are shaped partly by biological maturation
and partly by social (i.e., cultural and family) influences in
H. Hartmann’s ego psychology, constructive social influences may
counteract negative biological (e.g., id-based) influences on ego-
function development (Gammelgaard, 2003). In turn, entire societies
can play a role in directing constructive social influences on individ-
uals’ ego-function development (Mitchell & Harris, 2004).
Unlike the other psychodynamic theories that we have encoun-
tered so far, H. Hartmann’s (1939) version of ego psychology has
stimulated little (if any) empirical research on personality con-
structs (see Millon, 1996). However, Dixon-Gordon and col-
leagues (Dixon-Gordon, Turner, & Chapman, 2011) pointed out
that brief adaptive psychotherapy (a short-term, insight-based form of
therapy) is based on H. Hartmann’s ego psychology (especially
drawing upon H. Hartmann’s concept of adaptation). On a related
note, results of a study by Winston et al. (1994) indicated that
brief adaptive psychotherapy yielded significantly greater social
adjustment and a significant reduction in clients’ psychological
symptoms, compared to clients’ waiting for (but not yet receiving)
any type of treatment. Overall, Karasu (2001) concluded that psy-
chotherapy in the tradition of H. Hartmann’s (1939) version of
ego psychology can aid individuals (1) by bolstering individuals’
ego strength and (2) by bolstering individuals’ adaptation to
internal and external reality – a clear set of contributions to the
psychodynamic school, and to personality psychology as a whole.

DAVID RAPAPORT’S VERSION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

Initially, David Rapaport was known largely for his translation of

Heinz Hartmann’s Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1939)
from German to English, in 1958. Rapaport shared H. Hartmann’s
goal of developing an ego psychology theory that would serve as the
conceptual framework for a general, comprehensive science of human
behaviour (Kleiger, 1993). Eventually, Rapaport (1960) developed his
36 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

own version of ego psychology, incorporating elements of cognitive as

well as psychodynamic theories of personality (Holt, 2005).
Schafer (1999) pointed out that Rapaport’s (1960) version of
ego psychology was reflected in Rapaport’s approach to psycho-
logical testing, which focused on implications of test results for
understanding clients’ various ego functions (e.g., memory, per-
ception). For example, prior to Rapaport’s methodological innov-
ations, psychodynamically orientated clinicians frequently relied on
a single test – namely, the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach,
1924) – as a projective (i.e., indirect) means toward diagnosing indi-
viduals’ personality disorders (especially as reflecting the influence
of motives that presumably reside within the id; see Millon,
1996). However, Rapaport and colleagues (Rapaport, Gill, &
Schafer, 1945) introduced a series of tests – both objective (i.e.,
direct) and projective – to diagnose individuals’ faulty cognitive
processes (presumably arising from the ego) as well as personality
disorders (Marcus, 1999). By the mid-to-late 1980s, the resulting
“Rapaport Method” had become the standard test battery in psy-
chiatric hospital settings (Sweeney, Clarkin, & Fitzgibbon, 1987).
Kleiger (1993) noted that the “Rapaport Method” (Rapaport,
Gill, & Schafer, 1945) influenced John Exner’s development of his
own method, the Comprehensive Rorschach System (1986) –
a method that, ironically, has overtaken the “Rapaport Method”
in popularity among clinical psychologists. Interestingly, in
a small-scale study within the United States, Blais and colleagues
(Blais, Norman, Quintar, & Herzog, 1995) found that the “Rapa-
port Method” and the “Exner Method” produce different diagno-
ses of clients, despite the similarity in much of the Rorschach
(1924) material that is contained within the two methods. Never-
theless, the Rapaport system is distinguished by its compatibility
with a strong theory (i.e., the ego psychology of Rapaport,
1960) – a testament to the conceptual and methodological sophis-
tication of Rapaport’s work (Sugarman & Kanner, 2000).

ERIK ERIKSON’S VERSION OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

Like Heinz Hartmann (1939), Erik Erikson (1950) created a version

of ego psychology that emphasised ego development as occurring in
a more adaptive manner than Anna Freud (1936/1966) had assumed
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 37
(Danzer, 2012). In addition, like H. Hartmann’s earlier version,
Erikson’s version of ego psychology addressed direct societal influ-
ences on individuals’ ego development (rather than indirect influ-
ences via the superego), to a greater extent than Anna Freud’s
earlier version of ego psychology had done (Millon, 1996). How-
ever, unlike H. Hartmann’s earlier version, Erikson’s version of ego
psychology explicitly promoted a lifespan approach to ego develop-
ment, emphasising individuals’ potential for psychological growth
throughout their lives (Ewen, 1998).
Atalay (2007) contended that Erikson’s (1950) version of ego
psychology can be considered a “psychology of crisis”, because it
proposes that individuals either succeed or fail at resolving specific
crises during each of Erikson’s “Eight Stages of Man”. Capps (2012)
added that, in a refinement of the “(St)ages of Man”, Erikson
(1959/1980) identified eight virtues or sets of character strengths that
emerge from individuals’ successful crisis resolution: (1) Hope
(ideally, during individuals’ infancy), (2) will (preschool age), (3) pur-
pose (elementary school age), (4) competence (secondary school age),
(5) fidelity (adolescence), (6) love (young adulthood), (7) care (middle
adulthood), and (8) wisdom (elderly adulthood). Constantinople
(1969) devised the 60-item Inventory of Psychosocial Development
to measure individual differences in success (5 items) versus failure
(5 items) in resolving the first six psychosocial conflicts (i.e., establish-
ing interpersonal trust, establishing self-control, making further strides toward
independence, adjustment to schoolteachers’ demands, establishing a sense of
who they are as unique persons [i.e., identity], and establishing a sense of
who they are in relation to significant others) that Erikson (1950) had pro-
posed; subsequently, Whitbourne and Waterman (1979) expanded
Constantinople’s Inventory of Psychosocial Development to 80
items, adding success versus failure in resolving the final two conflicts
(i.e., mature enactment of societal roles that require caring for other persons,
and achieving a sense of peace and tranquillity concerning previous successes
and failures throughout life; Ewen, 1998).
Results of the aforementioned studies by Constantinople (1969)
and Whitbourne and Waterman (1979) – which were conducted
on the same set of participants, ten years apart – revealed that
Erikson’s (1950) model concerning individuals’ progression
through the eight stages of psychosocial development was sup-
ported for men, but not for women (Ewen, 1998). However,
38 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

both studies yielded individual differences in crisis resolution at

each stage (regardless of gender) as Erikson would have predicted,
leading Whitbourne and Waterman (1979) to conclude that crisis
resolution was influenced by societal change (as distinct from bio-
logical maturation) to a greater degree among women than was
the case among men. Furthermore, as we noted in Chapter 1 of
the present book, research on ethnic identity – a particular aspect of
identity that Erikson (1968/1994) discussed at length – has blos-
somed since the early 1990s (Frable, 1997). When one considers
the levels of interest that many cultural psychologists have dis-
played toward Erikson’s construct of ethnic identity as operational-
ised via the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) by
Phinney (1992; see Chapter 1 of the present book) and via the
Ethnic Identity Scale (EIS) by Umana-Taylor and colleagues
(Umana-Taylor, Yazedijan, & Bamaca-Gomez, 2004; see Box 2.2
of the present chapter), one realises that Erikson’s (1968/1994)
ego psychology remains highly relevant to contemporary psych-
ology, outside as well as within personality psychology (see
Umana-Taylor, 2012).

OBJECT RELATIONS AND ATTACHMENT THEORIES

MELANIE KLEIN’S VERSION OF OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

So far, every psychodynamic theory that we have reviewed in the

wake of Sigmund Freud’s version of psychoanalytic theory has
rejected S. Freud’s (1900/1965) initial premise that sexuality was
the primary motive underlying infants’ behaviour toward their
mothers. Melanie Klein’s (1927) version of object relations theory
continues the trend away from an emphasis on infant sexuality,
focusing on the quality of the mother-offspring relationship
(whereby the mother usually is the “object” of the offspring’s
emotions, and the pattern of interaction that develops between the
mother and the offspring over time constitutes “relations”; Lubbe,
2008). According to Klein’s object relations theory, the mother
can simultaneously be the target of her offspring’s love, and the
target of her offspring’s hate (with love and hate present in infants
at birth; Debbane, 2011). One recurrent (albeit controversial)
theme that one might detect from individuals’ from childhood to
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 39

BOX 2 .2 UMANA-TAYLOR ET AL.’S (2004) ETHNIC

IDENTITY SCALE
In Chapter 1 of the present book, we learned that Jean Phinney and
colleagues (Phinney, 1992; Phinney & Ong, 2007; Roberts et al.,
1999) drew heavily upon Erikson’s (1959/1980, 1963/1995, 1968/
1994) ego psychology as interpreted by Marcia (1966, 1967) in
developing their Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). In
a now-classic review article that preceded the wave of research
regarding ethnic identity during the 1990s, Phinney (1990) alluded
briefly to Henri Tajfel’s (1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) social identity
theory, which proposes that individuals’ self-esteem is influenced
jointly by (1) individuals’ unique or personal identity, as well as (2) one
or more aspects of individuals’ group-related or social identity (Verkuy-
ten, 2005). However, social identity theory was not strongly reflected
in the development of Phinney’s MEIM (Umana-Taylor, 2012).
In order to integrate concepts from Tajfel’s (1981; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) social identity theory with concepts from Erikson’s
(1959/1980, 1968/1994, 1963/1995) ego psychology within one
survey, Adriana Umana-Taylor and colleagues (Umana-Taylor,
Yazedjian, & Bamaca-Gomez, 2004) developed the 17-item Ethnic
Identity Scale (EIS; for a review, see Cokley, 2007). Umana-Taylor
and colleagues kept Phinney’s (1992; Phinney & Ong, 2007; Rob-
erts et al., 1999) cognitive construct of exploration, added the cogni-
tive construct of resolution (i.e., individuals’ conscious reflection
upon what their ethnicity means to them), and reframed Phinney’s
affective construct of commitment as affirmation (Umana-Taylor,
2012). Results of factor analyses yielded support for Umana-Taylor
et al.’s three hypothesised dimensions, although Phinney and Ong
(2007) observed an important methodological confound. All of the
affirmation items were worded in a negative direction; whereas all
of the exploration and resolution items were worded in a positive
direction (thus raising the possibility that Umana-Taylor et al.’s
hypothesised distinction between resolution and affirmation should
be re-interpreted as a negativity/positivity distinction; see Kim &
Mueller, 1978, concerning valence effects in factor analyses). Per-
haps the most balanced appraisal that one can make is that, just
as Phinney’s own MEIM was designed partly as a rebuttal to per-
ceived problems with pre-existing measures of ethnic identity (par-
ticularly racial identity; Helms, 2007), so too was Umana-Taylor
et al.’s EIS designed partly as a rebuttal to perceived problems with
the MEIM; further research (ideally conducted outside Umana-
40 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

Taylor’s research programme) will be needed so that personality

psychologists can properly evaluate the conceptual and empirical
potential of the EIS.

adulthood, from the standpoint of Klein’s (1927) theory, is the

splitting of conflictual pairs of emotions toward a particular object
(i.e., individuals’ love and hate toward their mothers, such as the
distinction between mothers’ “good breast” and “bad breast”;
Mandin, 2007).
Rusbridger (2012) noted that, in Klein’s (1927) version of
object relations theory, children may experience anxiety from id-
related conflict between (1) the “life instinct” of eros (which gives
rise to children’s love toward their mothers) and (2) the “death
instinct” of thanatos (which gives rise to children’s hatred toward
their mothers). Klein’s (1927) object relations theory emphasises
thanatos over eros, unlike Sigmund Freud’s (1920/1961) revised
psychoanalytic theory (in which eros is at least as important, if not
more important, in comparison to Thanatos; Juni, 2009). Klein
believed that thanatos is revealed in the destructiveness that one
commonly observes in children’s play; such destructiveness pre-
sumably reflects unconscious phantasy (not to be confused with
consciously experienced fantasy) on the part of the child (Grot-
stein, 2008). By the time that individuals reach adulthood, they
run the risk of developing the paranoid-schizoid position (a mental
state in which individuals erroneously perceive other persons as
part-objects, rather than whole persons); Millon (1996) noted that
the modern-day schizoid personality disorder (i.e., a psychological dis-
order that is marked by a sharp break between individuals’ percep-
tions and reality) is a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (i.e., DSM) category that bears the influence of Klein’s
object relations theory.
Klein’s (1927) version of object relations theory casts child psy-
choanalysis (with children’s play providing raw data) as analogous
to adult psychoanalysis (with free associations providing raw
data) – a stance that many of Klein’s onetime followers (most not-
ably Bowlby, 1969/1997) found difficult to accept (see H. Steele
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 41
& M. Steele, 1998). Post-World War II-era research has tended to
focus on adults’ (as opposed to children’s) object relations, such as
the development of the Quality of Object Relations Scale
(QORS) by Piper and colleagues (e.g., Azim & Piper, 1991;
Piper, Debbane, Bienvenu, & Garant, 1984). Nevertheless, van
Dijken and colleagues (van Dijken, van der Veer, van Ijzendoorn,
& Kuipers, 1998) noted that Klein’s (1927) version of object rela-
tions theory planted the conceptual seeds of John Bowlby’s (1969/
1997) attachment theory (which we will cover later in the present
chapter). Overall, Klein’s object relations theory has been praised
for (1) emphasising mother-child relationships and (2) expanding
the boundaries of child psychoanalysis beyond free associations and
the content of dreams (Millon, 1996).

DONALD WINNICOTT’S VERSION OF OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

According to Melanie Klein’s (1927) version of object relations

theory, individuals can adopt the “depressive position” (i.e.,
mature, realistic acceptance that other persons can trigger multiple,
even contradictory emotions) as a psychologically healthy means
toward neutralising the “paranoid-schizoid position” (which, as
we learned in the preceding subsection, results from individuals’
fragmentation of their mental representations concerning mothers;
Shulman, 2010). In turn, Donald Winnicott’s (1931) version of
object relations theory retains Klein’s “paranoid-schizoid position”
but recasts Klein’s “depressive position” (a term that was confus-
ing, because it did not actually refer to the chronic mood disorder
of depression) as capacity for concern (Nussbaum, 2006). Winnicott’s
concept of capacity for concern is more overtly interpersonal than
was Klein’s concept of the depressive position (which was essen-
tially intrapersonal; Chescheir & Schulz, 1989). However, Winni-
cott contended that individuals may lose their capacity for
concern, in the absence of sufficient nurturance from caregivers
(especially mothers) over time; this loss of capacity for concern
may serve as a precursor to the development of an antisocial ten-
dency (although Winnicott was not referring to antisocial personal-
ity disorder per se; Millon, 1996).
In Klein’s (1927) as well as Winnicott’s (1931) versions of
object relations theory, the ability to distinguish between internal
42 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

reality (e.g., individuals’ fragmented mental representations of their

mothers) and external reality (e.g., actual, whole mothers in the
world surrounding individuals) is a hallmark of individuals’ mental
health, among children (including infants) as well as adults
(Chescheir & Schulz, 1989). Particularly within Winnicott’s
(1931) version of object relations theory, external objects (e.g.,
actual mothers in the real world) can provide an essential holding
environment that includes psychological as well as physical nurtur-
ance for individuals (Stewart, 2003). According to Winnicott,
when infants experience a consistently supporting holding envir-
onment, infants’ true self not only develops but also thrives;
whereas the lack of a supportive holding environment can pro-
mote the development of a false self that acts as a protective, yet
dysfunctional, layer around (and blocking access to) the true self
(Parker & Davis, 2009).
Merkur (2010) pointed out that Winnicott’s (1931) version
of object relations theory has been embraced more readily by
clinicians than by academicians – a fact that might explain why
Winnicott’s version is not as well-known as Klein’s (1927) ver-
sion of object relations theory within personality psychology.
However, Millon (1996) pointed out that in Winnicott’s object
relations theory, schizoid personality disorder can be readily identi-
fied as a prime example of mental illness resulting from individ-
uals’ prolonged failure to distinguish between internal reality
and external reality. Furthermore, results of an academic study
of transitional objects (Winnicott’s term for teddy bears and other
toys that can serve as targets of children’s affection, at least over
the short term) by Eytan Bachar and colleagues (Bachar, Can-
etti, Galilee-Weisstub, Kaplan-DeNour, & Shalev, 1998) indi-
cate that individuals who reported attachment to transitional
objects during childhood promoted significantly higher levels of
optimal bonding with their mothers than did individuals who
reported lack of attachment to transitional objects during their
pre-adolescent years (although individuals who reported pro-
longed attachment to transitional objects during adolescence
experienced significantly lower general well-being, and signifi-
cantly more psychiatric problems, than did individuals who
reported lack of attachment to transitional objects during adoles-
cence). All in all, among many clinicians and academicians,
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 43
Winnicott’s (1931) version has emerged as the most highly
regarded post-Kleinian version of object relations theory (Spil-
lius, 2009).

RONALD FAIRBAIRN’S VERSION OF OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

Most of the psychodynamic theories that we have encountered

thus far (including all of the ego psychology theories and object
relations theories) have adopted the personality structure of id,
ego, and superego that Sigmund Freud’s (1923/1927) version of
psychoanalytic theory and Anna Freud’s (1936/1966) version of
ego psychology had proposed. However, William Ronald Dodds
(usually shortened to Ronald) Fairbairn’s (1952) version of object
relations theory does away with the concepts of id and superego,
arguing that the ego is the sole aspect of individuals’ personality
structure that exists at birth (Sherby, 2007). Having turned for
inspiration to Melanie Klein’s (1927) earlier version of object rela-
tions theory (which, as we noted earlier in the present section,
emphasised infants’ internal representation of significant others or
“objects”), Fairbairn casts infants’ psychic energy or libido (resid-
ing within the ego) as object-seeking – an interpretation that one
will not find in Klein’s theory (or, for that matter, the theories of
S. Freud or A. Freud; see Stephenson, 2012).
In Fairbairn’s (1952) version of object relations theory, the pri-
mary function of the ego is to meet individuals’ need to develop
and maintain satisfying relationships with other persons (Sherby,
2007). However, according to Fairbairn’s theory, it is easy for
caregivers to fail to meet (and difficult for caregivers to succeed in
meeting) infants’ need for developing and maintaining satisfying
relationships all (or even most) of the time; since infants cannot
tolerate having caregivers who fail to meet their need for satisfying
relationships, infants initially split caregivers (figuratively and
unconsciously, of course) into (1) good external objects and (2) bad
internal objects, subsequently splitting bad internal objects into (2a)
frustrating/rejecting objects and (2b) exciting/alluring objects (Celani,
2001). Finally, infants unconsciously split their own egos as fol-
lows: (1) A central ego, which relates to the external or ideal object;
(2) an antilibidinal ego, which relates to the rejecting object; and
(3) a libidinal ego, which relates to the exciting object – a process
44 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

that results in an endopsychic structure of personality (Grotstein,

1993).
Celani (2001) noted that Fairbairn’s (1952) version of object
relations theory paid special attention to schizoid personality, which
supposedly is a consequence of infants’ ego splitting but does not
necessarily lead to individuals’ experience of schizophrenia as
a personality disorder later in life – a controversial claim, due to
its implication that individuals might be “schizoid” but not at risk
for psychopathology. However, regardless of the lack of precision
with which Fairbairn used the term “schizoid”, Millon (1996)
credited Fairbairn’s version of object relations theory with helping
to establish contemporary psychiatrists’ and clinicians’ understand-
ing of schizoid personality disorder as an asocial type. Overall, Fair-
bairn developed a version of object relations theory that differed
markedly from Sigmund Freud’s (1927) psychoanalytic theory and
Klein’s (1927) earlier version of object relations theory (Grotstein,
1993).

HARRY GUNTRIP’S VERSION OF OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

As Crastnopol (2001) noted, Harry Guntrip was one of Ronald

Fairbairn’s most famous clients in psychotherapy; yet Guntrip did
not believe that Fairbairn was of sufficient help – a negative out-
come that eventually led Guntrip to become one of Donald Win-
nicott’s most famous clients(!). However, Klaif (1985) pointed out
that Harry Guntrip’s (1969) version of object relations theory (also
known as person ego theory) draws upon the object relations theories
of both Fairbairn (1952) and Winnicott (1931), as well as the ego
psychology of Erikson (1950). Guntrip is known especially for
adding a fourth component to Fairbairn’s endopsychic structure of
central ego, antilibidinal ego, and libidinal ego – namely, the
regressed ego (which does not relate to any object, whether internal
or external; Celani, 2001). Just as the ego as a whole can split, so
too can the libidinal ego split, with one portion evolving into the
regressed ego (Sussal, 1992).
In Guntrip’s (1969) version of object relations theory, the
regressed ego can lead to individuals’ disengagement from other
persons (Hartman & Zimberoff, 2004). Guntrip did not believe
that the formation of the regressed ego was part of individuals’
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 45
normal personality/social development; rather, Guntrip argued
that severe disappointment and trauma can trigger such abnormal
development (Sussal, 1992). In any event, according to Guntrip,
not only may the actions of the regressed ego lead to schizoid per-
sonality disorder; but schizoid personality disorder, in turn, can serve
as the basis for individuals’ development of additional personality
disorders (Steinberg, 2010). Guntrip himself had been diagnosed as
suffering from schizoid personality disorder; Guntrip was psycho-
analysed initially by Fairbairn, and subsequently by Winnicott
(Crastnopol, 2001). Guntrip viewed Winnicott as more “maternal”
than was Fairbairn – a personality difference between the two psy-
chotherapists that, in Guntrip’s opinion, accounted for the fact
that Fairbairn was unsuccessful, whereas Winnicott was successful,
in treating Guntrip (although Guntrip may have idealised Winni-
cott excessively; Slochower, 2011).
Some critics have depicted Guntrip’s (1969) version of object
relations theory as little more than an elaboration or amplification
of Fairbairn’s (1952) version of object relations theory (see Celani,
2001). However, over time, Guntrip managed to convince Fair-
bairn that Guntrip’s (1969) concept of regressed ego represented
a substantive addition to Fairbairn’s (1952) endopsychic structure
(Crastnopol, 2001). Ironically, due to Guntrip’s exceptional skills
as a writer, Guntrip’s version of object relations theory may have
been even more effective at capturing the psychodynamics of the
schizoid personality than was Fairbairn’s earlier version of object
relations theory (Millon, 1996).

JOHN BOWLBY’S ATTACHMENT THEORY

Klein’s (1927) version of object relations theory eventually com-

peted with Anna Freud’s (1927/1975) version of ego psychology
for dominance among psychodynamic theorists and practitioners
within the UK, after both Klein and Anna Freud emigrated to
London in the midst of World War II (and following the death of
Sigmund Freud; Chodorow, 2004). In fact, open hostility erupted
between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud within the British
Psycho-Analytical Society, with many members of the Society
feeling that they must choose sides (Prado de Oliviera, 2001).
Among those psychodynamic theorists and practitioners who
46 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

favoured Klein’s perspective over A. Freud’s perspective but did

not wish to be perceived as overtly rejecting A. Freud (which
conceivably could make them and their students vulnerable to
retaliation from ego psychologists), two relational perspectives
emerged within the resulting British Independent or “Middle
Group” during the years that followed World War II: (1) Post-
Kleinian object relations theories (e.g., Fairbairn, 1952; Guntrip,
1969; Winnicott, 1931); and (2) John Bowlby’s (1969/1997,
1973/1998a, 1980/1998b) attachment theory (Hall, 2007). Unique
among the theories that were developed by members of the Brit-
ish Independent Group, Bowlby’s attachment theory was influ-
enced jointly by ethology (i.e., the science of animal behaviour)
and psychoanalysis (MacDonald, 2001).
In an early version of his attachment theory, Bowlby (1953)
rejected Klein’s (1927) premise that thanatos (the “death instinct”)
governed infants’ behaviour toward mothers, instead arguing that
a need for emotional intimacy was the primary motive underlying
infants’ behaviour – a need that was somewhat akin to eros (the
“life instinct”) as championed by S. Freud (1920/1961), but with-
out the sexual connotations (H. Steele & M. Steele, 1998). Fur-
thermore, Bowlby rejected Klein’s insistence on interpreting
children’s play behaviour as an expression of children’s latent hos-
tility toward their mothers, instead opting to collect large-scale
empirical data on the negative effects of long-term separation from
mothers on children’s personality and social development (Van
Dijken, van der Veer, van Ijzendoorn, & Kuipers, 1998). Based
on the results of observational research with children in hospitals,
Bowlby proposed that (1) most caregivers consistently fulfil infants’
need for emotional bonding, which leads infants to become securely
attached to their caregivers; yet (2) some caregivers do not consist-
ently meet infants’ need for emotional bonding, which leads those
infants to become insecurely attached to their caregivers (Bretherton,
1992). Afterward, building upon Bowlby’s attachment theory,
Mary Salter Ainsworth and colleagues (Ainsworth, 1963, 1967;
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) developed the “strange
situation” experimental paradigm (whereby infants were briefly
separated from their mothers and, having been reunited with
mothers, displayed different behavioural responses to their
mothers) that led to the identification of three infant attachment
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 47
styles: (1) Secure (i.e., easily comforted following mothers’ return,
presumably due to mothers’ consistent provision of love and affec-
tion toward the infants); (2) anxious-ambivalent (i.e., alternating
between pulling toward and pushing away from mothers, an inse-
cure style that presumably is due to mothers’ inconsistent provi-
sion of love and affection); and (3) avoidant (i.e., rejecting
mothers, an insecure style that presumably is due to mothers’ con-
sistent failure to provide love and affection; Hazan & Shaver,
1994a, 1994b). Subsequently, Hazan and Shaver (1987) developed
a self-report measure of adult attachment styles (i.e., secure, or trust-
ing toward romantic partners; anxious-ambivalent, or distrustful
toward romantic partners because of concerns that their partners
will not display as much love or affection toward them, compared
to their displays of love and affection toward partners; and avoi-
dant, or distrustful toward romantic partners because of concerns
that the individuals themselves are unable or unwilling to display
love or affection toward their partners; Bartholomew, 1990).
Finally, Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) expanded the scope of
adult attachment styles to cover close relationships in general
(rather than romantic relationships in particular, which Hazan and
Shaver had covered), reconceptualised the anxious-ambivalent
attachment style as preoccupied, and distinguished between fearful
and dismissing forms of avoidant attachment styles (with the dis-
missing-avoidant style reflecting an insecure type because of indi-
viduals’ denial that they possess a need for emotional intimacy,
even though all individuals possess such a need; Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2016).
Initially, Bowlby’s (1953) attachment theory was rejected by
other psychodynamic theorists and practitioners – not just by
Klein (and, for that matter, A. Freud), but also by his fellow mem-
bers of the so-called “Independent” or “Middle Group” (Van
Dijken, van der Veer, van Ijzendoorn, & Kuipers, 1998). How-
ever, Bowlby’s (1969/1997, 1973/1998a, 1973/1998b) attachment
theory has been credited with exerting considerable influence
upon contemporary clinicians’ diagnoses of dependent personality dis-
order (a dysfunctional, submissive behavioural pattern; Millon,
1996). In addition, Bowlby’s theory emerged as the best-known
theory of personality development within the field of relationship
science (Finkel, Simpson, & Eastwick, 2017) and has inspired the
48 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

development of numerous surveys, most notably the Experiences

in Close Relationships (ECR) questionnaire (Brennan, Clark, &
Shaver, 1998) as a measure of attachment orientations (see Box
2.3 for details). In summary, Bowlby clearly charted a different
conceptual and empirical course than even his fellow Independent
Group members could have imagined concerning personality
development (e.g., Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1992).

OTHER MAJOR PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES

JACQUES LACAN’S VERSION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Thus far, in the present chapter, we have encountered numer-

ous English-language psychodynamic theories that – according
to Quinodoz (2010) – represent culturally “Anglicised” transla-
tions of Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) original, German-
language version of psychoanalytic theory. Similarly, one could
argue that French-language psychodynamic theories represent
culturally “Gallicised” translations of S. Freud’s theory (see
Kurzweil, 1981). Jacques Lacan’s (1966/1977) version of psycho-
analytic theory is the best-known French-language psychodynamic
theory (Stevens, 2008).
According to Lacan’s (1966/1977) version of psychoanalytic
theory, ego psychologists (e.g., Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann,
Erik Erikson) and object relations theorists (e.g., Melanie Klein,
Donald Winnicott, Ronald Fairbairn, Harry Guntrip) had strayed
too far from Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) original version of psy-
choanalytic theory (Cohen, 2005). In contrast, Lacan proposed
a “return to Freud” – not Anna Freud’s (1923) ego psychology,
but rather Sigmund Freud’s pre-1905 psychoanalytic theory (i.e.,
when Sigmund Freud was still concerned primarily with distinc-
tions among the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious; Walsh,
Teo, & Baydala, 2014). Lacan was especially interested in the
unconscious as the “ideal worker” within individuals’ personality
structures (e.g., the unconscious generates dreams as means toward
unthinking and unquestioning fulfilment of individuals’ desire, at
least while individuals are asleep; Rocha, 2012). Lacan believed
that the problem of the unconscious is the problem of discourse with
the Other (e.g., language does not perfectly convey individuals’
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 49

BOX 2 .3 K. A. BRENNAN ET AL.’S (1998) EXPERIENCES

IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS QUESTIONNAIRE
Earlier in the present chapter, we learned about the typology of
secure, anxious/ambivalent, and avoidant attachment styles that
Hazan and Shaver (1987) developed concerning adults’ personality
characteristics, in response to the three-group typology that Ains-
worth and colleagues (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) had
created regarding infants’ behavioural responses to reunion with
their mothers after having been separated for several minutes.
Also, we learned about the distinction between fearful-avoidant and
dismissing-avoidant attachment styles in adulthood that Bartholo-
mew and Horowitz (1991) proposed, following Bartholomew’s
(1990) four-category typology. Technically, Bartholomew and Horo-
witz promoted the measurement of each adult attachment style
along a continuum, which yields four separate scores (i.e., secure,
anxious-ambivalent/preoccupied, fearful-avoidant, and dismissing-
avoidant) – rather than the categorical approach of Hazan and
Shaver, which yields one score for each individual (see also Bar-
tholomew, 1994, for a critique of then-existing measures of attach-
ment styles).
By the late 1990s, several teams of researchers had concluded
that a minimum of two separate dimensions (i.e., attachment anx-
iety and attachment avoidance) emerged from factor analyses of
various attachment surveys that contained continuous items
(Holmes, 2000). Consistent with the movement toward continuous
surveys in adult attachment research, Kelly Brennan and colleagues
(K. A. Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) created the 36-item Experi-
ences in Close Relationships (ECR) Questionnaire, with each item
scored along a 7-point range (although the survey has undergone
several minor refinements over time; for a review, see Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2016). In general, when measured via the ECR and related
surveys, attachment avoidance is a significant negative predictor of
relationship-promoting behaviour, and a significant positive pre-
dictor of relationship-threatening behaviour; whereas attachment
anxiety is not consistently related to relationship-promoting or rela-
tionship-threatening behaviour (Gaines, 2016/2018). Particularly
when one considers the extent to which attachment avoidance
undermines aspects of interdependence or mutual influence within
close relationships (i.e., high attachment avoidance is reflected in
low levels of satisfaction with the relationship, high levels of per-
ceived alternatives to the relationship, low levels of investment in
50 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

the relationship, and low levels of accommodation toward partners’

destructive behaviour; Etcheverry, Le, Wu, & Wei, 2013), the ECR
displays enormous potential in enabling relationship scientists to
demonstrate the relevance of attachment orientations to precursors
of relationship stability over the long term (see Finkel, Simpson, &
Eastwick, 2017, for a conceptual rationale that links attachment
orientations with interdependence processes).

desire to other persons – partly because individuals do not fully

understand their own desire, and partly because language is an
inherently social medium that can lead to misunderstanding when
individuals attempt to communicate with other persons; Gillett,
2001).
Lacan (1966/1977) has been criticised for writing in such an
opaque manner that readers must struggle to decipher essential argu-
ments within his version of psychoanalytic theory (Stevens, 2008).
However, Jardim and colleagues (Jardim, Costa Pereira, & de Souza
Palma, 2011) successfully applied Lacan’s version of psychoanalytic
theory to understanding the origins of schizophrenia, interpreting
a case study (along with fictional examples from novels) in terms of
individuals’ failure to achieve an integrated ego from infancy onward.
Also, McSherry (2013) contended that various forms of personality dis-
order (including, but not limited to, schizophrenia) can be understood
readily in terms of Lacan’s theory. In conclusion, Lacan has been
hailed as “the French Freud” (Kurzweil, 1981) for his innovative
attempts to re-interpret Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965) earlier version
of psychoanalytic theory for post-World War II-era readers.

HEINZ KOHUT’S VERSION OF SELF-PSYCHOLOGY

As we noted earlier in the present chapter, ego psychologists from

Anna Freud (1936/1966) onward have depicted the ego as more
capable in handling id-superego conflicts that Sigmund Freud’s
(1923) “id psychology” (i.e., S. Freud’s version of psychoanalytic
theory; Ewen, 1998) had acknowledged. According to Heinz
Kohut (1971), the next logical step in the evolution of psycho-
dynamic perspectives on personality was to propose a self-
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 51
psychology that traces the development of the entire self (including,
but not limited to, the concepts of id, ego, and superego) from its
infantile state of fragmentation and fragility to its (optimally) adult
state of cohesion and resilience (Millon, 1996). Kohut’s version of
self-psychology elevates narcissism (a construct that we have
encountered on more than one occasion within the present book)
to the status of a key construct; in order for individuals to develop
in a psychologically healthy manner, it will be necessary for them
to transcend the immature, “I am the centre of the universe”
mindset that characterises narcissism, and to progress toward
a mature acceptance of the fact that the universe does not revolve
around them (Stevens, 2008). Part of the developmental challenge
for individuals will be to accept their actual position within the
universe without descending into debilitating doubt over the
meaning of their existence (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).
In his version of self-psychology, Kohut (1971) agreed with
Sigmund Freud’s (1914/1953) belief that narcissism is not an inher-
ently unhealthy attitude (and, thus, not automatically pathological;
Schipke, 2017). However, Kohut disagreed with S. Freud con-
cerning the origins of narcissism during childhood (i.e., Freud con-
tended that narcissism results from libido or psychic energy
flowing from the id to the ego, during the initial differentiation of
ego from id early in life; whereas Kohut argued that narcissism
results from parents’ failure to engage in mirroring, which would
involve displays of empathy toward young children’s struggle to
shift away from their original “centre-of-the-universe” position,
and toward a more realistic view of themselves; Rhodewalt,
2012). Furthermore, Kohut disagreed with S. Freud over psycho-
therapeutic treatment of narcissism during adulthood (i.e., S. Freud
believed that clinicians should force narcissistic clients to confront
their previously unconscious self-love; whereas Kohut thought
that clinicians should monitor narcissistic clients for potential
depression and should provide the empathy that parents had failed
to give the clients during childhood; Millon, 1996). Perhaps the
most far-reaching difference between Kohut’s and S. Freud’s per-
spectives was that (unlike S. Freud) Kohut offered hope for many
narcissistic clients who formerly had been dismissed as untreatable
by clinicians (Son, 2006).
52 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

Kohut’s (1971) version of self-psychology has been criticised for

assuming (incorrectly) that individuals’ failure to achieve a mature
sense of self invariably reflects high levels of narcissism (Afek,
2018). By the same token, Kohut’s version of self-psychology has
been praised for providing a more sophisticated portrait of narcis-
sism (distinguishing between the components of grandiosity concern-
ing self and idealisation of significant others) than S. Freud (1914/
1953) had offered (i.e., narcissism primarily as self-love; Meronen,
1999). Moreover, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) as
developed by Raskin and colleagues (e.g., Raskin & Hall, 1979;
Raskin & Terry, 1988) and profiled in Box 2.4, was based largely
on insights from Kohut’s theory (notwithstanding S. Freud’s the-
oretical contributions; Rhodewalt, 2012). Overall, Kohut’s version
of self-psychology paved the way for a renaissance in post-World
War II-era theorising, research, and clinical applications regarding
narcissism (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).

OTTO KERNBERG’S VERSION OF SELF-PSYCHOLOGY

As we saw in the preceding paragraphs, S. Freud’s (1914/1953)

version of psychoanalytic theory and Kohut’s (1971) version of
self-psychology have greatly influenced psychodynamic perspec-
tives on narcissism. Another psychodynamic theory that deserves
acknowledgement concerning its coverage of narcissism is Otto
Kernberg’s (1967) theory, which Walsh and colleagues (Walsh,
Teo, & Baydala, 2014) labelled as a separate version of self-
psychology. Given that O. Kernberg (e.g., Kernberg, 1975) and
Kohut (e.g., Kohut, 1977) increasingly formulated their respective
views in opposition to each other over time (Tonkin & Fine,
1985), perhaps it stands to reason that O. Kernberg’s theory
would be regarded as a version of self-psychology. However,
O. Kernberg’s theory defies a clear label, drawing upon ego
psychology theories (in the tradition of Freud, 1936/1966) as well
as object relations theories (in the tradition of Klein, 1927) while
distancing itself from Kohut’s version of self-psychology (Millon,
1996).
Otto Kernberg (1975) took issue with Kohut’s (1971) depiction
of narcissism as mostly a subclinical phenomenon (which had
implied that narcissism usually was not harmful to individuals or
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 53

BOX 2 .4 RASKIN AND C. S. HALL’S (1979)

NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY
According to Richard Robins and Oliver John (1997), several dis-
tinct modes or metaphors of self-perception can be found within
personality psychology. Especially relevant for the present chapter is
the Egoist metaphor, which presumes that human beings in general
possess a self-enhancement motive that leads them to seek posi-
tive information about themselves via social interaction (see also
Millon, 1996). In turn, the construct of narcissism arguably cap-
tures the essence of the Egoist metaphor more faithfully than does
any other personality construct (W. K. Campbell & S. M. Campbell,
2009). Sigmund Freud’s (1914/1953) version of psychoanalytic
theory, Heinz Kohut’s (1971) version of self-psychology, and Otto
Kernberg’s (1967) version of self-psychology all indicate that an
exaggerated sense of one’s positive qualities is central to the con-
struct of narcissism (Rhodewalt, 2012).
Shortly before the American Psychiatric Association formally
added narcissistic personality disorder to its list of mental disorders
in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-
III, 1980), Robert Raskin and Calvin S. Hall (1979) developed the
40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) to measure individ-
ual differences in narcissism (Millon, 1996). Subsequently, using
a principal components analysis of data from a very large US
sample, Raskin and Terry (1988) identified seven interrelated yet dis-
tinct components of narcissism measured by the NPI: (1) Authority,
(2) exhibitionism, (3) superiority, (4) vanity, (5) exploitativeness, (6)
entitlement, and (7) self-sufficiency. Despite Raskin and Terry’s identifi-
cation of seven components of narcissism, most researchers have
interpreted the NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1979) as a measure of a single
dimension (indeed, results of reliability analyses support calculation
of a single score; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). In terms of
predictive validity, narcissism as measured by the NPI consistently
emerges as a significant negative predictor of relationship-
maintaining behaviour, and as a significant positive predictor of
relationship-threatening behaviour (Gaines, 2018). Although one
may question the forced-choice nature of the items (whereby parti-
cipants must choose between two statements about themselves
for each item), the NPI currently is the most popular measure of
subclinical narcissism in personality and social psychology (Rhode-
walt, 2012).
54 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

significant others; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). Instead,

O. Kernberg’s version of self-psychology presents narcissism as
a frequent clinical phenomenon (Rhodewalt, 2012). Otto Kern-
berg’s conceptualisation of narcissism lends itself readily to the
DSM designation of narcissistic personality disorder, reflecting an ego-
istic pattern in which individuals place their own needs above the
needs of significant others (Millon, 1996). One reason for the dif-
ference between O. Kernberg’s and Kohut’s pathologising versus
normalising stances on narcissism apparently lies in the demo-
graphic differences between the populations whom the two ther-
apists served (i.e., O. Kernberg’s clients were more likely to be
institutionalised, and less likely to be employed in high-paying
professions, than were Kohut’s clients; Sperry, 2003).
Unlike Kohut (1977), Otto Kernberg was not cited as one of
Sigmund Freud’s intellectual “progeny” in an overview by Stevens
(2008). However, Millon (1996) credited O. Kernberg (1967,
1970) with developing one of the most original and influential con-
ceptual accounts of narcissistic personality disorder that one can find
among psychodynamic perspectives on personality. Furthermore,
O. Kernberg’s theory ranks alongside Kohut’s version of self-
psychology and S. Freud’s (1914/1953) version of psychoanalytic
theory in terms of influencing the development of the aforemen-
tioned Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall,
1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), with clinicians more likely to use the
NPI to diagnose narcissism as an outright disorder, and academi-
cians more likely to use the NPI to measure narcissism as an overly
positive self-attitude among nonclinical populations (Rhodewalt,
2012). All in all, O. Kernberg’s perspective is comparable to
Kohut’s theory in terms of the prominence that it gives to narcis-
sism as a personality construct (Sperry, 2003).

HENRY MURRAY’S PERSONOLOGY

So far, we have encountered a variety of psychodynamic theories

that propose a small number of major motives (usually no more
than 2–3 motives) that presumably are reflected in individuals’
behaviour. However, one might reasonably ask whether 2–3
motives really can explain human behaviour in all of its complexity
(McClelland, 1985/1987). According to Henry Murray’s (1938)
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 55
personology, individuals differ in more than 20 motive dimensions
(unlike other psychodynamic theories that assume individual similar-
ities in relevant motives; Hall & Lindzey, 1970); this large number
of motives reflects Murray’s interest in studying the whole person
(not unlike Allport, 1937/1951).
Ewen (1998) provided a list of Murray’s (1938) motives, which
includes (but is not necessarily limited to) abasement, achievement,
acquisition/conservance, affiliation, aggression, autonomy, blameavoidance,
construction, contrariance, counteraction, defendance, deference, dominance/
power, exhibition, exposition, harmavoidance, infavoidance, nurturance,
order, play, recognition, rejection, sentience, sex/erotic, similance, succor-
ance, and understanding/cognizance. Unlike Sigmund Freud’s (1900/
1965) version of psychoanalytic theory, Murray’s personology
focuses on psychological needs that were not assumed to be pre-
sent and functioning within individuals at birth but, rather,
emerged gradually over time (Hall & Lindzey, 1957). In addition
to motives or needs, situational influences (which Murray termed
collectively as press) must be taken into account; needs and press
work together to produce repeated behavioural sequences over
time (which Murray termed thema; McClelland, 1985/1987).
Despite Murray’s (1938) insistence that more than 20 motives
were required for researchers to do justice to the enormous vari-
ability in behaviour that one finds among individuals, personolo-
gists have devoted an inordinate amount of attention to the
achievement motive, or need for achievement (nAch) – a construct
that has proven to be controversial (e.g., unlike men, women as
a whole were initially deemed to be lacking in the need for
achievement; for examples, see McClelland, 1966; McClelland,
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). However, some personologists
have expanded the scope of their research to include the need for
power (Y axis) and need for intimacy (X axis) as higher-order motives
that incorporate eight of the lower-order motives from Murray’s
list within a circular or circumplex model (i.e., dominance, aggres-
sion, autonomy, rejection, infavoidance, abasement, nurturance, and affili-
ation, starting from the 12 o’clock position and working one’s way
anticlockwise at approximately 45-degree angles; e.g., Wiggins,
1997; Wiggins & Broughton, 1985). Although the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) was developed by Christiana Morgan
and Henry Murray (1935) as a projective measure of individuals’
56 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT I

motives in general, Dan McAdams and colleagues (e.g., McAdams,

1980; McAdams & Bryant, 1987) have opted to collect interview
data and code participants’ responses for the needs of power and
intimacy in particular (Gaines, 2016/2018). All things considered,
Murray’s personology offers a solid conceptual framework for con-
ducting research on individual differences in motives (though
methodological issues with the TAT remain problematic; Hyde &
Kling, 2001).

CRITIQUE OF PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES

Earlier in the present chapter, we learned that Sigmund Freud,
1953 held a negative attitude toward gay men, proclaiming that
they suffered from “arrested development” when compared to
heterosexual men. As it happens, S. Freud took a similarly dim
view toward all women, whether lesbian or heterosexual: Women
could either (1) admit that they harboured “penis envy” (thus
accepting their supposedly inferior status and making the best of
a bad situation by attempting to become mothers), or (2) deny
that they harboured “penis envy” (thus trying unsuccessfully to
become like men and rejecting their own femininity; Margolis,
1984). Obviously, S. Freud’s theory placed women in a catch-22
situation (i.e., damned if you do, damned if you don’t; Walsh,
Teo, & Baydala, 2014). We have already seen that Karen Horney
(1922–37/1966) actively challenged S. Freud’s “masculine psych-
ology” by promoting her own, feminine psychology. In addition,
Clara Thompson (1953) advocated a “psychology of women”
more than a decade before the modern-day Women’s Rights
Movement in the US and other Western nations sparked wide-
spread interest in such a topic among scholars and students (see
Enns, 1989).
One of the more intriguing responses to feminist critiques of
Sigmund Freud’s (1908/1925) psychoanalytic theory – and, to
a large degree, feminist critiques of the psychodynamic school in
general – has been the attempt by some writers to seek reconcili-
ation between feminism and psychoanalysis (Walsh, Teo, & Bay-
dala, 2014). One of the best-known feminist psychoanalysts is
Nancy Chodorow (1978), who argued that S. Freud and his fol-
lowers may have been right to call attention to girls’ negative
 PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 57
feelings toward their mothers and positive feelings toward their
fathers, but wrong to attribute those sets of feelings to an “Electra
complex” (in all fairness, a term that S. Freud did not particularly
like; Ewen, 1998). Rather, according to Chodorow, girls might
simply respond to well-established connectedness toward their
mothers by seeking greater levels of autonomy from their mothers
(which, in turn, might result in establishing greater connectedness
toward their fathers; Stevens, 2008). Thanks to efforts by Cho-
dorow and other feminist psychoanalysts, members of the psycho-
dynamic school of personality have become increasingly sensitised
toward their own gender biases in the post-Women’s Rights Era
(e.g., emphasising the quality of the mother-child relationship, to
the relative exclusion of other caregiver-child relationships; Mar-
golis, 1984).

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 3
Despite the differences that we have observed between William
James’s (1890/2010) self-theory and Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965)
version of psychoanalytic theory, both theories can be classified as
mentalist, due to their emphasis on conscious and unconscious
within-person influences on individuals’ behaviour (Kihlstrom,
2004). Conversely, the behaviourist school – which alternatively has
been depicted as part of personality psychology (e.g., Hall & Lind-
zey, 1978) or as an alternative to personality psychology (e.g.,
Ewen, 1998) – emphasises outside-person influences on individuals’
behaviour (Moore, 2013). Representative theories include (in
order of appearance) the reflexology of Ivan Pavlov (1926/1928),
the connectionism of Edward Thorndike (1911), the classical con-
ditioning theory of John B. Watson (1916), Edward Tolman’s
(1932) stimulus-stimulus theory, the drive reduction theory of
Clark Hull (1943), the operant reinforcement theory of
B. F. Skinner (1938), the stimulus-response theory of Neal Miller
and John Dollard (1941), the social learning theory of Julian
Rotter (1954), and the social learning theory of Albert Bandura
and Richard Walters (1963). In Chapter 3, we shall examine
behaviourist theories and relevant research in detail.
CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT II
 3

BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONALITY

Many (if not most) historians of science have concluded that Wilhelm
Wundt was the founder of modern-day psychology, during the late
1800s (J. F. Brennan, 2003). After all, Wundt published the ground-
breaking Principles of Physiological Psychology in 1874 (reprinted in
1910) and established the world’s first psychological laboratory in
1879 (Wade, Sakurai, & Gyoba, 2007). However, some historians of
science would assert that the real founder of modern-day psychology
was Ivan Pavlov, during the early 1900s (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala,
2014). In particular, Pavlov’s landmark publication of Lectures on Con-
ditioned Reflexes: Twenty-Five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Ner-
vous System in 1926 (reprinted in 1928) documented the evolution of
Pavlov’s own programme of research from a focus on digestive physi-
ology (for which he won the Nobel Prize in 1904) to an emphasis on
classical conditioning (a cornerstone of early behaviourism in psych-
ology; Todes, 1997).
Pavlov (1926/1928) initially viewed his physiologically orien-
tated “reflexology” (which dealt with dogs’ conditioned responses to
environmental cues regarding the imminent availability of food, as
built upon dogs’ unconditioned responses to the food itself) as dis-
tinct from psychology (J. F. Brennan, 2003) but eventually aligned
his reflexology with psychology (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).
62 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

Technically speaking, Pavlov’s reflexology is a forerunner to the

behaviourist school within personality psychology, rather than
a behaviourist theory of personality per se (Ewen, 1998). Never-
theless, Pavlov’s theory and research provided much of the con-
ceptual and methodological framework that led to the emergence
of the behaviourist school (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978).
In the present chapter, we will consider behaviourist perspec-
tives on personality, which are inspired to varying degrees by Pav-
lov’s (1926/1928) reflexology. We will learn that behaviourist
theories – especially B. F. Skinner’s (1938) operant reinforcement
theory, which reflects Skinner’s principle of environmental determin-
ism (i.e., throughout individuals’ lives, behaviour can be explained
completely by influences that exist outside the individuals; Schel-
lenberg, 1978) – have been criticised for their relative neglect of
within-person influences on behaviour. However, we will also
learn about certain neo-behaviourist responses – particularly Daryl
Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory – that acknowledge the use-
fulness of personality constructs as related to (but not necessarily
causing) individuals’ behaviour.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BEHAVIOURIST

PERSPECTIVES
A central premise among behaviourist perspectives on personality is
the conviction that, in order to understand why individuals speak
and act as they do, one must consider the impact of the social and
physical environments within which persons engage in particular
forms of speech and action (Ewen, 1998). At a minimum, behav-
iourist theories pose important conceptual challenges to Sigmund
Freud’s principle of psychic determinism (i.e., beyond the age of 5 or
6, the speech and action of individuals can be explained completely
by influences that exist within those individuals; Schellenberg,
1978). However, behaviourist theories vary in terms of their (de-)
emphasis on personality constructs as causes or antecedents of indi-
viduals’ speech and action (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978).
As noted by J. F. Brennan (2003), behaviourism developed partly
as a response to functionalism (concerned with the “how” and
“why” of consciousness, or individuals’ mental processes), which
was associated with the self-theory of William James (1890/2010)
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 63
and the instrumental pragmatism of John Dewey (1909). In turn,
functionalism had developed partly as a response to structuralism
(concerned with the “what” of consciousness, or individuals’
mental organisation), which was associated with the content psych-
ology of Edward Titchener (1902) and the content psychology of
Titchener’s mentor, Wilhelm Wundt (1911/1973). Both structural-
ists and functionalists identify the mind (which, of course, is not dir-
ectly observable) as the proper object of study for a science of
psychology; whereas behaviourists identify observable behaviour as
the proper object of study for a science of psychology (Walsh, Teo,
& Baydala, 2014).
One can make a broad distinction between (1) those behav-
iourist theories that address the impact of the physical environment
on individuals’ speech and action; and (2) those behaviourist the-
ories that address the impact of the social environment on individ-
uals’ speech and action (see Ewen, 1998). The connectionism of
Edward Thorndike (1911), the classical conditioning theory of
John B. Watson (1916), the stimulus-stimulus theory of Edward
Tolman (1932), and the drive reduction theory of Clark Hull
(1943) deal almost exclusively with the physical environment;
whereas the operant reinforcement theory of B. F. Skinner (1938),
the stimulus-response theory of Neal Miller and John Dollard
(1941), the social learning theory of Julian Rotter (1954), and the
social learning theory of Albert Bandura and Richard Walters
(1963) deal partly (if not primarily) with the social environment
(see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). In the present chapter, we will
review all of the aforementioned behaviourist theories from the
vantage point of personality psychology.

THEORIES THAT ADDRESS THE PHYSICAL

ENVIRONMENT

EDWARD THORNDIKE’S CONNECTIONISM

Like Ivan Pavlov’s (1926/1928) reflexology, Edward Thorndike’s

(1911) connectionism addresses relatively simple patterns of partici-
pants’ learning via the associations that they make regarding events
that occur close in time to each other, especially among animal
participants (Elkind, 1999). However, unlike Pavlov’s reflexology
64 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

(which is concerned primarily with the interval of time that

elapses between experimenters’ presentation of conditioned and
unconditioned stimuli to participants), Thorndike’s connectionism
focuses mainly on the interval of time that elapses between partici-
pants’ responses and the outcomes that those participants experience
(Wasserman & R. R. Miller, 1997). Consequently, Thorndike’s
connectionist theory and related research helped to establish the
field of comparative psychology (which examines similarities and dif-
ferences in the capacity for thinking across species; Blaser & Bel-
lizzi, 2014).
John Donahoe (1999) labelled Thorndike (1905) as
a “selectionist connectionist” (p. 451), emphasising the impact of
Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural selection upon Thorn-
dike’s theory. To the extent that an organisms’ response to
a particular stimulus is followed closely in time by reinforcement
(i.e., an event that yields pleasure), one would expect organisms to
emit that associated response again if/when the stimulus appears
again – a principle that is known as the law of effect (Thorndike
also proposed, but subsequently dropped the proposal, that punish-
ment exerted a similarly strong effect in preventing organisms from
emitting an associated response again; J. F. Brennan, 2003). Fur-
thermore, to the extent that response-reinforcement sequences
repeatedly occur across time, one would expect organisms’ associ-
ation between those events to be strengthened – a principle that is
labelled as the law of exercise (Thorndike also proposed, but eventu-
ally dropped the proposal, that lack of repeated response-
reinforcement sequences necessarily would lead to organisms’
weakened associations between those events over an extended
interval of time; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). Thorndike’s law
of effect and law of exercise influenced the development of
B. F. Skinner’s (1938) operant reinforcement theory, which we
will cover later in the present chapter (see also Sheehy, 2004).
Thorndike’s (1905, 1911) connectionism is hereditarian in its
assumption that members of certain so-called racial groups (i.e.,
persons of African descent) generally possessed a lower innate cap-
acity for learning, compared to members of other so-called racial
groups (e.g., persons of European descent) – a perspective that has
been criticised, not just as “politically incorrect”, but (perhaps
more importantly) as scientifically incorrect (see Popkewitz, 2011).
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 65
By the same token, Thorndike’s (1917) connectionist theory and
law of effect have been credited with helping to lay the concep-
tual foundation for modern-day educational psychology, which is
concerned with the methods by which teachers can help all stu-
dents learn effectively, regardless of students’ racial or other ethnic
group memberships (see Chase, 1998). Notwithstanding questions
about the status of Thorndike’s theory as a bona fide behaviourist
theory (e.g., J. F. Brennan, 2003), Thorndike’s connectionism has
been hailed as an important precursor to the behaviourist theories
of John B. Watson (1913) and B. F. Skinner (1938), both of
which we will cover shortly.

JOHN B. WATSON’S CLASSICAL CONDITIONING THEORY

Rilling (2000) noted that John B. Watson (1916) developed clas-

sical conditioning theory (which involves the acquisition of elicited
responses that originally occurred after the introduction of uncondi-
tioned stimuli but subsequently occur after the introduction of
conditioned stimuli as well; Kirsch, Lynn, Vigorito, &
R. R. Miller, 2004) largely as a response to Sigmund Freud’s
(1900/1965) psychoanalytic theory. J. B. Watson initially admired
S. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory but believed that individuals’
transference of emotions (an important process within clinical settings,
whereby clients may safely express emotions toward therapists after
having been made aware that the emotions in question were ori-
ginally experienced toward – but never had been expressed
toward – their parents or other caregivers earlier in life; T. Davis,
2007) could be explained by appealing to principles of conditioned
reflexes (associated with the reflexology of Ivan Pavlov, 1926/
1928), rather than defence mechanisms (see Arlow, 2002).
J. B. Watson was interested especially in the potential elicitation
and generalisation of the “free-floating fear” that is known as anx-
iety (see Field & Nightingale, 2009).
Guided by classical conditioning theory (e.g., J. B. Watson,
1916), John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner (1920) conducted one
of the most controversial experiments in the history of psych-
ology – namely, their conditioning of the approximately 11-
month-old infant known as “Little Albert” to experience anxiety
when presented with previously non-anxiety-inducing stimuli
66 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

(starting with a white rat and adding various white, furry objects
thereafter; LeUnes, 1983). As it turns out, J. B. Watson and
Rayner were not the first behaviourists to apply classical condi-
tioning techniques to a child (Windholz & Lamal, 1986). How-
ever, the ethical lapses in J. B. Watson and Rayner’s study (not
the least of which was the researchers’ apparent use of prior
knowledge that “Little Albert” reacted quite negatively to loud
noises, which would explain the researchers’ subsequent choice of
the repeated banging of a gong as their unconditioned stimulus;
see Sheehy, 2004) were so egregious – even by pre-World War II
standards – that this particular study is a standout because of its
precise application of behaviourist principles and its problematic
methodology (Beck, Levinson, & Lyons, 2009).
Perhaps the most regrettable aspect of J. B. Watson and Rayner’s
(1920) classical conditioning study was the fact that – having induced
anxiety in “Little Albert” regarding several harmless objects – the
researchers never attempted to de-condition the infant (who already
was suffering from a cognitive impairment at the time of their experi-
ment, as the researchers may have been aware; Fridlund, Beck,
Goldie, & Irons, 2012). One of J. B. Watson’s students, Mary Cover
Jones (1924a), eventually developed a behaviour modification proto-
col for use with another young child (Kornfeld, 1989); M. C. Jones’
pioneering work is profiled in Box 3.1. Perhaps the most neutral
evaluation that one can offer concerning J. B. Watson’s classical con-
ditioning theory (e.g., J. B. Watson, 1916) and related research (e.g.,
J. B. Watson & Raynor, 1920) is that J. B. Watson clearly imple-
mented a “behaviourist manifesto” (as originally presented by
J. B. Watson, 1913) but offered a version of behaviourism that is
questionable in terms of its ultimate benefit to science, especially
when one considers the physical and psychological stress that Watson
and Raynor inflicted upon “Little Albert” (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala,
2014).

EDWARD TOLMAN’S (1932) STIMULUS-STIMULUS THEORY

Pavlov’s (1926/1928) reflexology, Thorndike’s (1911) connection-

ism, and J. B. Watson’s (1913) classical conditioning theory col-
lectively served as precursors to Neal Miller and John Dollard’s
(1941) stimulus-response theory (to be reviewed later in the
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 67

BOX 3 . 1 M. C. JONES’S (1924a, 1924b) BEHAVIOUR

MODIFICATION PROGRAMME
After hearing John B. Watson give a lecture on classical condition-
ing theory and practice, Mary Cover Jones set out to remove the
“free-floating fear” of anxiety toward particular stimuli in the phys-
ical environment (i.e., rabbits) that already had been manifested by
a 3-year-old boy who was known as “Little Peter” (Malone, 2014).
With the blessing of J. B. Watson, M. C. Jones (1924a) conducted
the first known study of behaviour modification, whereby M. C. Jones
began by bringing a rabbit into the same experiment room as
“Little Peter” (but without allowing any contact between the rabbit
and the child) and subsequently guided “Little Peter” through
a series of progressively challenging scenarios (e.g., giving candy to
the child while the rabbit was in the room, allowing the rabbit to
nibble at the child) that ended with “Little Peter” touching the
rabbit without becoming anxious (Gieser, 1993). Over
time, M. C. Jones became known for her caring attitude and behav-
iour toward “Little Peter” and other research participants – a stance
that was consistent with her eventual nickname, “the mother of
behaviour therapy” (Mussen & Eichorn, 1988).
In a follow-up study, M. C. Jones (1924b) identified anxiety-
provoking stimuli in a sample of children and pursued an eclectic
range of techniques on a trial-and-error basis, with the effect that
some (but not all) techniques proved to be effective at eliminating
the children’s anxiety levels (see McClelland, 1985/1987). Among
the most successful techniques was systematic desensitisation, in
which other (and increasingly similar) stimuli were paired with the
originally anxiety-provoking stimuli across successive trials (Gieser,
1993). Due to the innovative methodology and oft-encouraging out-
comes of M. C. Jones’s behaviour modification programme, follow-
ers have adapted M. C. Jones’s techniques for use in measuring
behavioural avoidance among children (e.g., Castagna, T. E. Davis,
& Lilly, 2017), combining behaviour therapy with electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) feedback in rehabilitating former felons (e.g., von Hil-
sheimer & Quirk, 2006), and combining cognitive-behavioural
therapy with drug therapy in treating several personality disorders
(e.g., M. Davis, Barad, Otto, & Southwick, 2006), among many
applications. Overall, M. C. Jones’s behaviour modification pro-
gramme can be regarded as the logical extension (and impressive
complement) to J. B. Watson’s classical conditioning programme
(Fancher & Rutherford, 2017).
68 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

present chapter) – a theory that addresses within-organism events

that serve as intermediaries between environmental events and
organisms’ observable behaviour (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978).
However, according to Edward Tolman’s (1932) stimulus-stimulus
theory, the environmental events and within-organism events in
question are far more complicated than stimulus-response theory
and its precursors had realised (Still, 1986). At a minimum, organ-
isms (usually rats in Tolman’s research; e.g., Tolman, 1938) rou-
tinely encounter a series of environmental events in their daily
lives, each of which may trigger within-organism events (and, per-
haps, require outward behaviour from the individual along the
way; Mackintosh, 1986).
Combining portions of J. B. Watson’s (1913) classical condi-
tioning theory with aspects of Kurt Koffka’s (1935) Gestalt psych-
ology (which posits that the perceptual whole is greater than the
sum of its parts; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014), Tolman’s (1948)
stimulus-stimulus theory proposes that various organisms display
purposiveness (i.e., intentionality) in the process of responding to
a series of environmental events as problem-solving exercises
(Good & Still, 1986). Tolman’s (1932) stimulus-stimulus theory is
especially noteworthy for suggesting that rats, humans, and organ-
isms from many other species may construct internal “maps” over
time, enabling them to navigate their physical environments in
a manner that may or may not be rewarding over the short term
but can lead to rewards over the long term (D. E. Leary, 2004).
Although the concept of “maps” has led some reviewers to label
Tolman’s theory as “cognitive behaviourism” (J. F. Brennan,
2003), a more nuanced reading of stimulus-stimulus theory reveals
that the concept of demand (i.e., internal drive) – which can be
activated in organisms, via experimenter’s manipulation of the
environment in a way that creates deprivation (keeping in mind
ethical considerations for the species in question) – is as important
to Tolman’s theory as is cognition (and the cognitive capacity of
rats need not be presumed to equal the cognitive capacity of
humans; Feest, 2005).
Tolman (1924) selectively bred his laboratory rats in a manner
that may have produced an unusually intelligent strain (Dewsbury,
2000) – a practice that has been cited as anticipating the rise of
behaviour genetics (e.g., Innis, 1992), for better or worse (we will
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 69
cover this controversial area of personality psychology in more
detail, when we cover biological perspective in Chapter 7). On
a more overtly positive note, Tolman’s (1932) stimulus-stimulus
theory has been credited with anticipating the rise of cognitive
perspectives in psychology (J. F. Brennan, 2003). All things con-
sidered, Tolman’s theory stands as a major contributor to the lit-
erature on behaviour and learning, within and beyond personality
psychology (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978).

CLARK HULL’S DRIVE REDUCTION THEORY

David McClelland (1985/1987) gave credit to Edward Thorn-

dike’s (1911) connectionism and Edward Tolman’s (1932) stimu-
lus-stimulus theory for exploring the survival value that
biologically based needs might confer to organisms’ learning pro-
cesses across a variety of species. In addition, McClelland cited
Clark Hull’s (1943) drive reduction theory (which argues that poten-
tial behaviour is the product of habit strength, inborn needs,
learned needs, external stimuli, and incentives; Walsh, Teo, &
Baydala, 2014) as a major advance in behaviourists’ attempts to
make their learning-orientated research as methodologically precise
as possible. Hull’s drive reduction theory (also known as hypotheti-
codeductive theory; J. F. Brennan, 2003) is mathematically driven,
employing algebraic formulae as testable sets of predictions con-
cerning the interplay between internal and external influences on
organisms’ behaviour (Sheehy, 2004).
One of the most novel constructs in Hull’s (1943) drive reduc-
tion theory is habit strength, or the degree to which individuals not
only have (1) developed and maintained associations between the
introduction of external stimuli and individuals’ behavioural
response but also have (2) received rewards for specific responses
to specific stimuli (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). According to
Hull, unless stimuli and responses follow each other closely in
time and are rewarded quickly, individuals are unlikely to form
a given habit in the first instance (J. F. Brennan, 2003). Once
individuals form particular habits, to the extent that individuals
experience an increase in rewards over time (following individuals’
response to the stimuli in question), individuals’ habit strength will
tend to rise; to the extent that individuals experience a decrease in
70 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

rewards over time, individuals’ habit strength will tend to fall

(Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).
Hull’s (1943) drive reduction theory has been criticised for
assuming (incorrectly, as it turns out) that all behaviour in all spe-
cies is as mindless (i.e., completely lacking in forethought and
insight) as is the behaviour of laboratory rats in tightly controlled
experimental scenarios (J. F. Brennan, 2003). Nevertheless, Hull’s
theory has received praise for offering a considerably more sophis-
ticated account of learning than John B. Watson’s (1913) better-
known theory of classical conditioning had offered (Walsh, Teo,
& Baydala, 2014). Especially as elaborated by Kenneth W. Spence
(1956) – who addressed many of the empirical shortcomings of
Hull’s theory in practice – drive reduction theory paved the way
for more explicitly social-psychological theories of behaviour, such
as Neal Miller and John Dollard’s (1941) stimulus-response theory
(which we will cover later in the present chapter).

THEORIES THAT ADDRESS THE SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENT

B. F. SKINNER’S OPERANT REINFORCEMENT THEORY

If J. B. Watson (1913) served as the primary proponent of “clas-

sical behaviourism” during the early 1900s, then B. F. Skinner
(1950) emerged as the main advocate of “radical behaviourism” by
the mid-1900s (Ewen, 1998). In contrast to all of the preceding
behaviourist theories that we have encountered so far, Skinner’s
(1938) operant reinforcement theory proposes that many (if not most)
behaviours that organisms emit are voluntary, even arbitrary – not
elicited by stimuli (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). In fact, some
behaviours (e.g., a pigeon’s pecking a bar) are often emitted before
stimuli (e.g., birdseed to be released by the bar) is presented to
organisms; yet stimuli may reinforce previously occurring behav-
iour (Clavijo, 2013). Furthermore, to the extent that an organism
experiences a stimulus that follows a response as rewarding, the
organism will continue to emit the response that yielded the
stimulus – an example of positive reinforcement (Schellenberg, 1978).
Accordingly, Skinner focused on operant conditioning, whereby
organisms can be guided toward acquiring entirely new sequences
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 71
of behaviour, depending on the degree to which organisms con-
tinue to experience stimuli as rewarding (Sheehy, 2004).
In terms of research, Skinner (1938) was known primarily for
his application of operant reinforcement theory to the manipula-
tion of pigeons’ and rats’ behaviour, respectively (Walsh, Teo, &
Baydala, 2014). However, in Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957)
attempted to explain the most uniquely human of all behaviours –
namely, speech – in terms of operant conditioning principles (Sal-
zinger, 2008). According to Skinner, individuals’ speech can be
rewarded by audience members (thus making individuals’ speech
more likely to occur in the future), versus not rewarded – or even
punished – by audience members (thus making individuals’ speech
less likely to occur in the future; Goddard, 2012). Thus, regardless
of the complexity of the behaviour in question (and regardless of
the species whose members’ behaviour is under consideration),
Skinner believed that the same mechanistic processes can be
observed across organisms (J. F. Brennan, 2003).
Schellenberg (1978) went so far as to proclaim that Skinner
(1953) was one of the “masters of social psychology” (as the title
of Schellenberg’s book indicates), alongside Sigmund Freud
(1922), George Herbert Mead (1934/1967), and Kurt Lewin
(1936). Actually, one might question whether S. Freud deserves to
be included in a list of “masters of social psychology” (given
S. Freud’s belief in psychic determinism), although S. Freud’s con-
cept of sublimation (a defence mechanism that ideally redirects
adults from the individually centred pursuit of sexual and aggres-
sive motives to the more socially centred pursuit of love-related
and work-related goals; see Sheehy, 2004) helps to explain why
S. Freud would appear on such a list. As for Skinner, if one
approaches social psychology primarily from a sociological standpoint
(prioritising the impact of entire societies on individuals’ behav-
iour), then one might reasonably conclude that Skinner should be
regarded as a “master of social psychology” (e.g., Homans, 1961);
but if one approaches social psychology primarily from
a psychological standpoint (prioritising the impact of specific others
on individuals’ behaviour), then one might justifiably exclude
Skinner from a shortlist of “masters of social psychology” (e.g.,
U. G. Foa & E. B. Foa, 1974). Of course, one need not impose
such a rigid distinction between sociological and psychological
72 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

social psychology (see Stryker & Statham, 1985); Skinner’s (1938)

operant reinforcement theory has been embraced by sociologists
and psychologists alike (see Berscheid, 1985).
Should B. F. Skinner (1957) be regarded as a personality psych-
ologist? If one assumes that individuals’ patterns of behavioural sta-
bility and behavioural change can be understood without recourse
to the self and its components (including personality constructs),
then one could readily include Skinner among the ranks of per-
sonality psychologists (e.g., C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978); but if
one assumes that individuals’ patterns of behavioural stability and
change cannot be understood without recourse to the self and its
components, then one would be hard-pressed to label Skinner as
a personality psychologist (e.g., Ewen, 1998). Unlike J. B. Watson
(1924), Skinner never expressed any interest in understanding the
antecedents of subjective states (e.g., presumed causes of individ-
uals’ anxiety; see Schellenberg, 1978). Given that Skinner is
widely recognised as the best-known intellectual descendant of
J. B. Watson (Clavijo, 2013), the thoroughness with which Skin-
ner’s radical behaviourism rejects “mentalism” is all the more strik-
ing (see Goddard, 2012). Perhaps the most accurate statement that
one can make regarding Skinner’s contributions to personality
psychology is that – for all intents and purposes, Skinner (1938)
believed that (1) behavioural stability is de facto personality stability;
and (2) behavioural change is de facto personality change (Butt,
2004).
We hasten to add that the fields of social psychology and per-
sonality psychology overlap to a substantial degree, in terms of
subject matter (following Gaines, 2016/2018). For example, in the
process of defining social psychology as the study of the influence
that actual, implied, or imagined others’ presence might exert
upon individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, G. W. Allport
(1968/1985) identified the personality construct of attitudes (as we
learned in Chapter 1 of the present book, individuals’ thoughts
and feelings toward a particular entity) as the major construct in
social psychology. Although Skinner (1957) did not advocate the
study of attitudes per se, intellectual followers such as Daryl Bem
(1965, 1967, 1972) have argued that individuals acquire attitudes
largely by reflecting upon their own behaviour (thus setting up
a counterintuitive scenario whereby attitudes are interpreted as
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 73
consequences, rather than antecedents, of individuals’ behaviour;
Schellenberg, 1978). We will comment further upon D. Bem’s
self-perception theory as a successor to Skinner’s operant
reinforcement theory, near the end of the present chapter.
Not only has Skinner’s (1957) operant reinforcement theory
been challenged on the grounds that it is inadequate as an explan-
ation for the production of human language in particular (e.g.,
Chomsky, 1959); but Skinner’s theory also has been challenged on
the grounds that it dismisses the usefulness of all personality con-
structs (including such consciously experienced constructs as traits,
values, and attitudes) as potential predictors of human behaviour
in general (a dismissal that arguably helped to fuel the cognitive
revolution in psychology; see Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017). By
the same token, even Skinner’s critics have acknowledged that
operant reinforcement theory seems to explain certain aspects of
language production (Goddard, 2012) and does not rule out the
possible existence of personality constructs (Clavijo, 2013). Not-
withstanding the provocative nature of Skinner’s (1974) radical
behaviourism, one can commend Skinner for retaining a sense of
optimism concerning human behaviour as largely amenable to
change via academicians’ application of operant reinforcement
principles (as distinct from clinicians’ and academicians’ application
of psychodynamic or other “mentalistic” principles; Butt, 2004).

NEAL MILLER AND JOHN DOLLARD’S STIMULUS-RESPONSE THEORY

During the interval between the First and Second World Wars,
the behaviourist school succeeded in prompting psychologists en
masse to re-define their discipline as the science of behaviour
(rather than the science of the mind; Hebb, 1960). However, by
the time that the Second World War had begun to wreak large-
scale havoc within and beyond academia, some behaviourists
already were seeking to re-incorporate certain “mentalistic” con-
structs within their theories (Mandler, 2002). One of the earliest
examples of the resulting neo-behaviourist perspective on person-
ality was Neil Miller and John Dollard’s (1941) stimulus-response
theory, which drew jointly upon Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965)
psychoanalytic theory and Ivan Pavlov’s (1927) reflexology (Ewen,
1998). According to stimulus-response theory, behaviour can be
74 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

understood as direct responses to within-individual influences,

which (in turn) can be understood as direct responses to outside-
individual influences (thus predicting that within-individual influ-
ences will mediate the impact of outside-individual influences on
behaviour; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978).
Probably the best-known aspect of Dollard and Miller (1950)
stimulus-response theory was the frustration-aggression hypothesis,
which holds that – when others are perceived as having prevented
individuals from achieving a particular goal – individuals’ drive
toward aggression (following the drive theory of Hull, 1943) will
be activated, leading the individuals to behave in an antisocial
manner toward the others in question (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977).
Dollard, Miller, and colleagues (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer,
& Sears, 1939) argued that (1) when one observes individuals
behaving in an antisocial manner, one can be reasonably confident
that the individuals have already concluded that they were frus-
trated by others; and (2) when individuals believe that they have
been frustrated by others, one can be reasonably confident that
individuals subsequently will behave in an antisocial manner
toward the others in question (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). Con-
sistent with the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Hovland and
Sears (1940) reported empirical support for the frustration-
aggression hypothesis in their secondary analysis of cotton prices
and anti-Black lynchings in the US South (i.e., as the price of
cotton went down over the years, Whites’ lynchings of Blacks
went up in the American South, suggesting that Black Americans
appeared to be scapegoats for some White Americans’ economic
frustration; see J. M. Jones, 1997).
In a re-analysis using modern-day statistical methods, Hepworth
and West (1988) found that the magnitude of the correlation
between cotton prices at one point in time and anti-Black lynch-
ings at a later point in time was smaller than Hovland and Sears
(1940) had initially calculated. In addition, Hepworth and West
uncovered a close-to-significant negative correlation between
cotton prices and Whites’ lynchings of other Whites that Hovland
and Sears (1940) had neither predicted nor detected (see
G. W. Allport, 1954/1979, p. 257, regarding “scapegoats for spe-
cial occasions”). Nevertheless, Hepworth and West did replicate
Hovland and Sears’s overall finding that regional economic
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 75
difficulties were reflected in Whites’ subsequent lynching of
Blacks, to a significant degree (a testament to the “prejudice prob-
lematic”, as described by Dixon & Levine, 2012). Overall, Miller
and Dollard’s (1941; Dollard & Miller, 1950) stimulus-response
theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis have (Dollard et al.,
1939) received considerable support (for a review, see Marcus-
Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000).

JULIAN ROTTER’S VERSION OF SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Miller and Dollard (1941) initially alluded to social learning as

a potential influence on individuals’ behaviour but did not make
social learning a major concept in their subsequent work (e.g.,
Dollard & Miller, 1950). To a large extent, Miller and Dollard
agreed with Hull’s (Hull, Hovland, Ross, M. Hall, Perkins, &
Fitch, 1940) perspective on social learning as a simple process of
association (e.g., “monkey see, monkey do”). In contrast, Julian
Rotter’s (1954) version of social learning theory – which draws
partly upon Miller and Dollard’s stimulus-response theory –
addresses the role that watching other people receive (or fail to
receive) reinforcement plays in individuals’ formation of beliefs
about the likelihood that their own behaviour will be reinforced
(C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). Funder (2001) noted that Rotter
(1954) identified expectancy or expectations about potential, future
reinforcement (rather than associations involving past reinforce-
ment) as one major influence on individuals’ behaviour. Weiner
(2010) added that the value attached by individuals to potential,
future reinforcement is the other major influence on individuals’
behaviour in Rotter’s version of social learning theory. As a result,
according to Rotter, expectancy x value = behaviour (i.e., indi-
viduals’ behaviour reflects individuals’ belief about future out-
comes, combined with the importance that individuals place upon
those outcomes; Strickland, 1989).
Rotter (1966) eventually concluded that individuals differ in
their beliefs about causality and control – that is, locus of control is
assumed to vary across persons (Lefcourt, 1991). Rotter contended
that individuals may be internal (i.e., perceive their successes or
failures in life as due to their own efforts) versus external (i.e., per-
ceive their successes or failures on life as due to external factors,
76 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

such as impersonal fate or powerful others) in their locus of con-

trol (Carton & Nowicki, 1994). Accordingly, Rotter (1966) devel-
oped the Locus of Control Scale to measure individual differences
in this construct, asking participants to answer a series of questions
in which they were required to agree with one of a pair of state-
ments (with one statement expressing an internal locus of control,
and the other statement expressing an external locus of control;
Strickland, 1989). Using a prototype of the Locus of Control
Scale, Gore and Rotter (1963) found that persons with an internal
locus of control were more likely than persons with an external
locus of control to commit themselves to the US Civil Rights
Movement (a finding that is consistent with the view that –
having learned about other Americans “making a difference” by
getting involved in the struggle for social equality – many individ-
uals apparently decided that they, too, could help to make social
change a reality, as would be expected from the social learning
theory of Rotter, 1954).
In a critique of Rotter’s social learning theory (1954) and con-
ceptualisation of locus of control (1966), Carton and Nowicki
(1994) pointed out that the causes or antecedents of individual dif-
ferences in locus of control are not well understood, other than
that “external” children report higher levels of stress than do
“internals” (possibly because that parents of “internals” are more
consistent than are parents of “externals”, in terms of offering
rewards when the children behave well and withholding rewards
when the children behave badly). Also, due to concerns about the
rigidity of Rotter’s internal-external dichotomy, Levenson (1974)
developed an alternative to Rotter’s (1966) Locus of Control Scale
that did not force participants to choose “external” over “internal”
items or vice versa (as we shall see in Box 3.2, a change that
allowed Levenson to identify three separate locus of control
dimensions). Nevertheless, Rotter’s original Locus of Control
Scale remains the most popular measure of this construct (Lef-
court, 1991) and has consistently yielded results concerning the
consequences of internal versus external locus of control (e.g.,
“internal” adults tend to perform significantly better on academic
assessments than do “external” adults; Carton & Nowicki, 1994).
All things considered, Rotter’s social learning theory has emerged
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 77
as one of the most influential neo-behaviourist theories of person-
ality (Funder, 2001).

BO X 3 . 2 LEVENSON’S (1974) INTERNALITY, CHANCE,

AND POWERFUL OTHERS SCALES
In spite of the popularity of Julian Rotter’s (1966) Locus of Control
Scale (undoubtedly owing to the simple, unidimensional nature of
the underlying construct), some critics have noted that Rotter never
conducted factor analyses of the scale (thus leaving questions
unanswered regarding the construct validity of the survey across
samples; e.g., West & Finch, 1997). Partly due to questions about
Rotter’s methodology, subsequent researchers have developed alter-
natives to the Locus of Control Scale (R. Brown, 1986). One of the
best-known alternatives is Hanna Levenson’s (1973a) multidimen-
sional version, which measures three distinguishable aspects of
locus of control: (1) Internality, (2) control by chance events, and
(3) control by powerful others (with the latter two dimensions repre-
senting external influences that have originated within individuals’
physical and social environments, respectively; Lefcourt, 1991).
In a series of studies, Levenson (e.g., Levenson, 1973a, 1973b,
1974) linked internality, control by chance events, and control by
powerful others to a variety of behavioural outcomes in the spheres
of work, politics, and interpersonal relations (with internality fre-
quently leading to psychologically adaptive outcomes, and control
by chance and powerful others frequently leading to psychologically
maladaptive outcomes; for a review, see Levenson, 1981). Moreover,
Walkey (1979) obtained independent support for Levenson’s intern-
ality, chance, and powerful others dimensions (scores on chance
and powerful others tend to be significantly and positively correl-
ated with each other; whereas scores on internality are not consist-
ently related to scores on the two external dimensions). However,
apparently disregarding Levenson’s results, Rotter (1975) continued
to conceptualise locus of control in terms of opposite (i.e., internal
versus external) types. Overall, Rotter’s unidimensional perspec-
tive emerged as the dominant view regarding locus of control
(R. Brown, 1986). Nevertheless, Levenson’s multidimensional
perspective on locus of control has been praised as a viable
alternative to Rotter’s view (Lefcourt, 1991).
78 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

ALBERT BANDURA AND RICHARD WALTERS’S VERSION OF SOCIAL

LEARNING THEORY

Compared to Miller and Dollard’s (1941) stimulus-response

theory, Rotter’s (1954) version of social learning theory represents
a move away from Sigmund Freud’s (1920/1961) version of psy-
choanalytic theory (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). As Grusec
(1992) noted, Albert Bandura and Richard Walters’s version of
social learning theory (1963) continued the move away from Freud-
ian constructs. W. F. White (1993) added that, according to Ban-
dura and Walters’s (1963) social learning theory, most of what
individuals learn is acquired from observing other persons’ behav-
iour (along with the rewards versus punishments that those other
persons receive). However, Bandura and Walters were not par-
ticularly interested in examining the construct of locus of control
that Rotter (1966) had popularised (see Funder, 2001). Rather,
Bandura and Walters cast their social learning theory as a direct
response to Miller and Dollard’s (1950) stimulus-response theory –
specifically, in testing the frustration-aggression hypothesis (as
articulated by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939).
Albert Bandura, Dorothea Ross, and Sheila Ross’s (1961) classic
study of the effects of modelling on children’s displaced aggression
(i.e., the “Bobo doll” study) was an important precursor to the
development of Bandura and Walters’s (1963) social learning
theory (Ewen, 1998). Children who not only were prevented
from playing with attractive toys (i.e., subjected to frustration, in
the terms of Miller & Dollard, 1941) but also had observed an
adult model reacting to frustration by acting aggressively toward
a large Bobo doll were significantly more likely to engage in
aggressive behaviour of their own toward the hapless Bobo doll
than were children who either (1) saw a model acting nonaggres-
sively in response to frustration or (2) did not see a model in
advance (Sheehy, 2004). Thus, contrary to Miller and Dollard
(1941) stimulus-response theory and frustration-aggression hypoth-
esis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), Bandura and
colleagues found that frustration did not lead inevitably to aggres-
sion (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). Indeed, as Markus and Zajonc
(1985) pointed out, Bandura and Walters’s version of social learn-
ing theory has been described as a stimulus-organism-response
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 79
theory, because of the importance that it places upon individuals’
capacity for consciously processing information from the environ-
ment before deciding on a course of action.
E. E. Jones (1985/1998) criticised Bandura and Walters’s (1963)
version of social learning theory (among other neo-behaviourist
theories) for failing to acknowledge the role that models often
play in deliberately seeking to shape observers’ behaviour. How-
ever, W. F. White (1993) credited Bandura and Walters for
attending to individuals’ capacity for self-rewards and self-
punishments as distinct from the rewards and punishments that
they may receive from other persons. Finally, in Bandura and
Walters’s version of social learning theory, children as well as
adults have the capacity to grasp the concepts of rewards and pun-
ishments (including self-rewards and self-punishments) – capacities
that Hull (1943) and Miller and Dollard (1941) had not anticipated
(see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). All in all, Bandura and Walters’s
theory helped set the stage for even more overtly cognitive theor-
ies of personality (e.g., the social-cognitive theory of Bandura,
1986, which we will cover in Chapter 6) in the aftermath of the
cognitive revolution in psychology (see Sheehy, 2004).

CRITIQUE OF BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES

Is it as easy for psychologists to banish the self and its contents
(e.g., all of the personality constructs that one will find in the pre-
sent book) from empirical consideration as some behaviourists
(especially Skinner, 1938) would have us believe? By and large,
personality psychologists would respond with an emphatic “No!”
to such a question (see Ewen, 1998). Surely human beings possess
selves (James, 1890/2010), however unaware individuals might be
regarding particular contents of their selves at a particular point in
time (S. Freud, 1900/1965). Surely the self and its contents are
linked to individuals’ behaviour (G. W. Allport, 1961/1963),
however dependent individuals’ behaviour might be upon situ-
ational influences (G. W. Allport, 1937/1951).
One of the most creative attempts to reconcile behaviourism
(most notably operant conditioning theory; Skinner, 1938) with
“mentalism” (most notably self-theory; James, 1890/2010) is Daryl
Bem’s (1965, 1967, 1972) self-perception theory (which proposes that
80 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

individuals infer their attitudes partly by speculating on the reasons

why they behave as they do toward specific physical and social
stimuli; Schellenberg, 1978). In practice, D. Bem’s self-perception
theory does not explain the formation of all attitudes (or the con-
sequences of all behaviours; S. T. Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991).
Nonetheless, D. Bem’s theory complements Leon Festinger’s
(1957) cognitive dissonance theory (which posits that discrepancies
between individuals’ attitudes and behaviour result in anxiety,
which individuals may seek to reduce by changing their attitudes
over time; Petty & Brinol, 2015) by explaining that no presump-
tion of prior discrepancy-generated anxiety is necessary for one to
understand how particular attitudes are formed (Molouki &
Pronin, 2015). More generally, D. Bem’s self-perception theory
embodies the Scientist mode or metaphor of self-perception (which
is based on the assumption that individuals are motivated to
acquire the most accurate information that they can acquire about
themselves; Robins & John, 1997) and might ultimately be applied
to other aspects of the self.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 4
In Societal Structures of the Mind, Uriel G. Foa and Edna B. Foa
(1974) contended that psychodynamic therapists (in the tradition
of S. Freud, 1900/1965) tend to deny respect (if not affection) to
their clients; whereas it is not clear whether behaviourist therapists
(in the tradition of Skinner, 1938) give or deny the interpersonal
resources of affection and respect to their clients. In stark contrast,
according to U. G. Foa and E. B. Foa, humanistic therapists (in the
tradition of Rogers, 1961) tend to give affection as well as respect
to their clients – a testament to the “Third Force” that Abraham
Maslow (1954) envisioned for humanism as a counterpoint to the
psychodynamic and behaviourist schools in personality psychology
(Sappington, 1989). Within the school of humanism include, rep-
resentative theories include (in order of appearance) the love-
oriented aspects of Erich Fromm’s (1957) didactic humanism (as
distinct from the hate-orientated aspects; e.g., Fromm, 1941); Kurt
Goldstein’s (1939) organismic psychology, Charlotte Buhler’s
(1968) version of humanistic psychology, Abraham Maslow’s
(1968) version of self-actualisation theory, and Carl Rogers’s
 BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 81
(1961) version of self-actualisation theory. [In addition, within the
related school of existentialism, representative theories include (in order
of appearance) Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1943/1956) version of existential
philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir’s (1947) version of existential philoso-
phy, Frantz Fanon’s (1952/1967) version of existential psychology, and
Rollo May’s (1953) version of existential psychology.] In Chapter 4,
we will examine these theories and associated research – alongside
alternative perspectives from the emergent positive psychology movement
(i.e., Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000b;
Ryff, 1989) – in greater detail.
 4

HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL

PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY

In Chapter 3, we referred to Erich Fromm’s (1941) social-

psychological personality theory as “didactic humanism” (follow-
ing C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957; see also Brookfield, 2002). How-
ever, Fromm preferred the term existential humanism as a label for
his theory (Cortina, 2015). The latter term captures Fromm’s
belief that – despite the allure of authoritarianism as a means
toward escaping the demands of freedom (with the negative con-
sequence of succumbing to hatred toward entire groups of stigma-
tised persons; G. W. Allport, 1954/1979) – individuals ideally
should embrace freedom by choosing to enter and maintain par-
ticular close relationships (e.g., Fromm, 1957). Fromm’s resulting
typology of ways of loving (i.e., individuals’ attitudes toward vari-
ous types of close relationships) is reflected in John Alan Lee’s
(1973) typology of colours of love (i.e., brotherly love, or friend-
ship love; motherly love, or selfless love; erotic love, or passionate
love; self-love, or love turned inward; and love of one’s Creator,
or religious love). In turn, J. A. Lee’s typology is reflected in
Clyde Hendrick and Susan Hendrick’s (1986; C. Hendrick,
S. S. Hendrick, Foote, & Clapion-Foote, 1984; C. Hendrick,
S. S. Hendrick, & Dicke, 1998) typology of love styles, or atti-
tudes toward love (i.e., eros, or passionate love; agape, or selfless
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 83
love; pragma, or practical love; storge, or friendship love; mania,
or obsessive love; and ludus, or game-playing love; see Djikic &
Oatley, 2004). With the exception of ludus (which clearly under-
mines pro-relationship behaviour), love styles either promote pro-
relationship behaviour (i.e., eros, possibly agape) or – at
a minimum – do not work against individuals’ relationship-
maintaining behaviour (i.e., pragma, storge, and mania; Gaines,
2016/2018).
Fromm’s (1941, 1957) didactic (or, alternatively, existential)
humanism ultimately emerged as a seminal influence on theories,
research, and practice in humanistic psychology and existential
psychology (D. Hoffman, 2003). Perhaps the most obvious
example of Fromm’s influence on the two (sub)fields was the role
that Fromm played as psychoanalyst and mentor for Rollo May,
who subsequently helped to introduce much of the English-
speaking world – especially the United States – to European exist-
entialist theories of philosophy (e.g., May, Angel, & Ellenberger,
1958; see Buxton, 2005). May’s knack for integrating constructs
from humanistic psychology and existentialist psychology
undoubtedly was nurtured by Fromm’s didactic/existential human-
ism (see Peng, 2011).
In the present chapter, we shall examine personality theories
from the perspectives of humanistic psychology and existential
psychology, respectively. Notwithstanding the differences
between the two perspectives (most notably concerning
humans’ awareness of their own mortality, which is emphasised
more prominently within existential psychology than it is
emphasised within humanistic psychology; C. S. Hall & Lind-
zey, 1970), we shall refer to “humanistic/existential psych-
ology” as a school of thought that is unified by the belief that
human nature essentially is positive or constructive (see Ewen,
1998). Along the way, we shall also consider contributions
from the modern-day positive psychology movement, which
has been cast as more empirically rigorous than humanistic/
existential psychology (e.g., Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,
2000) but nonetheless owes a considerable intellectual debt to
humanistic/existential psychology (e.g., K. J. Schneider,
2011b).
84 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING HUMANISTIC

AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES
According to humanistic/existential psychology, the whole person –
not the gene, cell, or even brain of the person – is the proper unit of
analysis for personality psychology (E. Taylor, 2000). Implicit in this
core belief is the assumption that human behaviour cannot be reduced
entirely to mechanistic processes involving individuals’ brains working
in isolation from individuals’ physical and social environments (the
latter of which typically includes interaction with other human beings;
see E. Taylor, 1991). Rather, in order to understand why humans
behave as they do, one must begin with the individual person and sub-
sequently consider information about the person’s behaviour as
a function of various forces within the person and various forces out-
side the person (E. Taylor, 2010).
Furthermore, just as the human mind is integral to the body
(especially the brain) within which it resides, according to human-
istic/existential psychology, so too is human consciousness an
essential aspect of the mind that gave rise to it (a stance that distin-
guishes the humanistic/existential school from the psychodynamic
and behaviouristic schools of thought within personality psych-
ology; K. J. Schneider, 2011a). Like freedom, consciousness is
never absolute; human beings operate within physical and psycho-
logical constraints that necessarily place limits on their awareness
of the world (Greening, 1992). Nevertheless, among mortal
entities on Earth, humans’ capacity for awareness of their physical
and social environments seems to be unrivalled (although some
critics might contend that human beings are not sufficiently aware
of [other] animals’ awareness to claim outright superiority in this
regard; e.g., Adams, 2010).
Finally, just as human consciousness is part and parcel of the
mind from which it arose, in the view of humanistic/existential
psychology, so too is the self a vital aspect of the consciousness
from which it was derived (a perspective that likewise distinguishes
the humanistic/existential school from the psychodynamic and
behaviourist schools; Slife & Barnard, 1988). Among human
beings, it is not just the case that individuals are aware of their
physical and social environments; individuals are aware that they
are the ones who possess such awareness (although the self may be
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 85
far more elusive than any other aspect of individuals’ daily experi-
ence; Puhakka, 2000). If any of the constructs that we have
covered so far in the present chapter qualifies as uniquely human,
then the self (and its by-product, the self-concept) would seem to
be such a candidate (Sleeth, 2006).
Before covering specific theories in detail, we acknowledge that
some critics (e.g., DeCarvalho, 1990) have distinguished between (1)
the process of “becoming” (part of the being versus becoming dichot-
omy) as determined by a self-actualisation motive, from the standpoint
of humanistic personality theories (e.g., Buhler, 1968; Goldstein, 1939,
1940; Maslow, 1962, 1968; Rogers, 1951, 1961); and (2) the process
of “becoming” as freely sought by individuals, from the standpoint of
existential personality theories (e.g., de Beauvoir, 1947; 1949/2009;
Fanon, 1952/1967; 1961/1963; May, 1953, 1969; Sartre, 1943/1956;
1953/1996). However, other critics (e.g., McDonald & Wearing,
2013) do not draw such a distinction between humanistic and existen-
tial theories. In any event, throughout the present chapter, we will pay
close attention to the manner in which “becoming” is described
within various humanistic and existential theories.

HUMANISTIC THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

KURT GOLDSTEIN’S ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY

According to Kurt Goldstein’s (1939) organismic psychology, unity

among the mind, body, and soul promotes individuals’ physical
and mental health; whereas discord among mind, body, and soul
places individuals’ physical and mental health at risk (Noppenney,
2001). Goldstein overtly drew upon William James’s (1890/2010)
self-theory – not just in promoting mind-body unity, but also in
emphasising the construct of soul (a controversial construct
throughout the history of psychology, as we observed in Chapter
1 of the present book). Having specialised in the rehabilitation of
former World War I-era German soldiers whose brain injuries had
resulted in aphasia (i.e., severe impairment in spoken and/or writ-
ten language; York, 2009), Goldstein (1940) proposed that all
human beings – whether brain-damaged or not – possess a motive
or psychological need toward self-actualisation (i.e., the need to
achieve or fulfil one’s own potential; Fisher, 1949).
86 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

Notwithstanding the universality of self-actualisation as

a psychological need among human beings, Goldstein’s (1939,
1940) organismic psychology does not assume that all humans are
equally successful in meeting that need (C. S. Hall, Lindzey, &
Campbell, 1998). Various aspects of individuals’ environment
(which Goldstein conceived as the objective world; C. S. Hall,
Lindzey, Loehlin, & Manosevitz, 1985) can enable or impede
individuals’ quest for self-actualisation. Details regarding the ways
in which the environment can influence individuals’ success versus
failure in striving to fulfil their innate potential are provided by
C. S. Hall and Lindzey (1978).
Goldstein (1939, 1940) has been criticised for basing an entire
theory of personality on the physical and psychological experiences
of a highly atypical group of individuals (i.e., former soldiers who
suffered from aphasia; C. S. Hall, Lindzey, Loehlin, & Manosevitz,
1985). By the same token, Goldstein’s organismic psychology in
general (and construct of the self-actualisation motive in particular)
is reflected directly in the subsequent self-actualisation theories of
Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1961) – both of which have been
applied to studies of non-clinical populations (see C. S. Hall, Lind-
zey, & Campbell, 1998). Furthermore, Goldstein’s theory helped
to revive psychologists’ interest in James’s (1890/2010) self-theory
at a time when James’s influence was in decline (e.g., James’s
focus on conscious experience had been criticised by psycho-
dynamic theorists and behaviourists alike; see E. Taylor, 1999).

CHARLOTTE BUHLER’S VERSION OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

From the standpoint of Charlotte Buhler’s (1968) version of

humanistic psychology, the entire self is amenable to development,
throughout individuals’ life span (DeRobertis, 2015). Although
Buhler (e.g., Buhler & Allen, 1972) acknowledged the influence
of Goldstein’s (1939) organismic psychology (DeRobertis, 2006),
Buhler’s version of humanistic psychology did not propose the
existence of a single, all-encompassing master motive (i.e., self-
actualisation). Compared to Goldstein, Buhler was more con-
cerned with individuals’ intentionality (i.e., the set of ideas that
individuals possess regarding the goals that they embrace, com-
bined with the set of ideas that individuals possess regarding the
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 87
ways that they might go about fulfilling those goals) – rather than
any particular motive – as a guiding force in individuals’ self-
development (see Jacobsen, 2007).
At first glance, one might detect a passing similarity between
Buhler’s (1968; Buhler & Allen, 1972) version of humanistic
psychology and Erikson’s (1959, 1963/1995; 1968/1994) ego
psychology in terms of a shared concern with individuals’ lifelong
personality development. Indeed, given the greater prominence of
Erikson’s ego psychology (e.g., Ewen, 1998; C. S. Hall & Lind-
zey, 1970), one might ask what (if any) unique insight Buhler’s
version of humanistic psychology has to offer regarding the self,
beyond the insight that Erikson’s ego psychology already offers. In
response, one is struck by Buhler’s attention to the entire, unified
self – not the oft-fragmented personality structure of id, ego, and
superego that appears so often in Erikson’s theory (DeRobertis,
2006).
Buhler’s (1968; Buhler & Allen, 1972) version of humanistic
psychology has been neglected, relative to other humanistic theor-
ies of personality (DeRobertis, 2006) – a situation that might lead
one to question the importance of Buhler’s theory. However, it
may be more plausible for one to speculate that Buhler’s status as
one of the few prominent women in humanistic psychology (see
E. Taylor, 2000) may have been responsible for personality psych-
ologists’ tendency to overlook Buhler’s conceptual contributions
to the field. Taken in its proper historical context, Buhler’s version
of humanistic theory serves as a solid bridge between humanistic
and existential perspectives on personality (DeRobertis, 2006).

ABRAHAM MASLOW’S VERSION OF SELF-ACTUALISATION THEORY

Abraham Maslow’s (1962, 1968) version of self-actualisation theory

proposes that the self-actualisation motive is the most prized, yet
least often fulfilled, of all human needs (Ewen, 1998). Unlike
Goldstein’s (1939, 1940) organismic psychology, Maslow’s version
of self-actualisation theory postulates the existence of several needs
(i.e., physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem/respect, and
self-actualisation) that individuals typically experience as hierarch-
ical (e.g., before one can satisfy one’s safety needs for shelter and
protection, one must attend to one’s needs for food and water).
88 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

Nevertheless, Maslow’s version of self-actualisation theory clearly

bears the influence of Goldstein’s organismic psychology
(C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970).
In order to identify individuals who (in his opinion) had ful-
filled their need for self-actualisation, Maslow (1954/1987)
amassed qualitative “data” (e.g., biographical information) from
historical as well as then-living public figures, in addition to his
observations regarding the personalities of several of his own
friends and acquaintances (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). This
unusual data set served as a primary basis for Maslow’s contention
that some individuals defy the odds and progress through the
entire hierarchy of needs over time (McClelland, 1985/1987).
Although one might readily question the objectivity of Maslow’s
“study” (e.g., the criteria for inclusion versus exclusion of particu-
lar individuals were not stated clearly in advance of data “collec-
tion”; Ewen, 1998), Maslow acknowledged the methodological
flaws in his own “research” and argued that detailed knowledge
about individuals’ personalities required unconventional as well as
conventional research methods (Wertz, 2015).
Guided by Abraham Maslow’s (1954) version of self-
actualisation theory, Everett Shostrom (1964) developed the Per-
sonal Orientation Inventory (POI) to measure individual differ-
ences in achieved self-actualisation. As Tosi and Lindamood
(1975) observed, the POI consists of 150 items, with 127 of those
items belonging to one subscale, termed inner-directedness (i.e., the
degree to which individuals live in a manner that reflects their
beliefs, even if it means placing individuals at odds with significant
others); the remaining 23 items belong to a second subscale,
termed time competence (i.e., the extent to which individuals live in
the here and now, rather than the past or the future; but see
Forest and Sicz, 1980, concerning errors in the scoring manual of
Shostrom, 1974, regarding time competence). Criticisms regarding
forced-choice format and high intercorrelations among supposedly
independent subscales of Shostrom’s POI were so frequent and so
consistent that Shostrom eventually developed a new survey, the
Personal Orientation Dimensions (POD; Shostrom, 1975). Never-
theless, Friedman (2008) noted that (despite its psychometric prob-
lems) Shostrom’s original POI remains the best-known measure of
individual differences in achieved self-actualisation.
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 89
More recently, Robert Taormina and Jennifer Gao (2013)
developed a 72-item inventory to measure individual differences
in satisfaction of all five of the needs within Maslow’s (1962) hier-
archy (12 items measuring satisfaction of the self-actualisation
need, 15 items apiece measuring satisfaction of the physiological,
safety, love/belonging, and esteem/respect needs). All five of
Taormina and Gao’s scales proved to be valid (in terms of con-
struct validity) and reliable (in terms of internal consistency)
within a large sample of individuals in China, even though the
scales initially were written in English. Taormina and Gao
obtained significant positive correlations among scores on all five
of the need satisfaction scales, with the highest correlations emer-
ging among pairs of needs that were closest to each other concep-
tually within Maslow’s need hierarchy. In addition, Taormina and
Gao reported that scores on family support, traditional values, and
life satisfaction were significantly and positively correlated with
satisfaction of all five of the needs within Maslow’s hierarchy.
Finally, Taormina and Gao found that neuroticism or emotional
instability was significantly and negatively correlated with satisfac-
tion of all five needs within Maslow’s hierarchy. [We will learn
more about neuroticism when we cover the trait school of
thought in Chapter 5.]
In one of the most novel (and, to some extent, controversial)
applications of Maslow’s (1962) version of self-actualisation theory,
Eli Finkel and colleagues (Finkel, Hui, Carswell, & Larson, 2014;
Finkel, Larson, Carswell, & Hui, 2014) presented and revised
a suffocation model of marriage in the United States, reimagining
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as “Mount Maslow”. Finkel et al.
contended that, from the mid-1800s to the present time, individ-
uals within the United States have placed increasing demands on
their marriages – shifting from an emphasis on satisfying individ-
uals’ lower-order needs (physiological, safety), to satisfying love/
belongingness and esteem/respect needs, to satisfying higher-order
needs (esteem, self-actualisation). Finkel and colleagues (Finkel,
Cheung, Emery, Carswell, & Larson, 2015) argued that the not-so-
good news is as follows: American marriages have never been at
a higher risk of breakdown, due to the demands for individuals’
higher-order need satisfaction that simply cannot be met in many (if
not most) instances – hence, Finkel et al.’s use of the term
90 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

“suffocation model” to describe contemporary marriages in the US.

Nevertheless, Finkel and colleagues (2015) concluded that the good
news is as follows: Those American marriages that do survive the
increased demands for individuals’ higher-order need satisfaction
tend to be more fulfilling than virtually any marriages in earlier eras.
Guest (2014) noted that Maslow (1969) had described a sixth
set of needs – that is, ego-transcendent needs that are spiritual, not
self-interested – in order to understand what might motivate those
lucky few individuals who had become self-actualised. Unfortu-
nately, Maslow died in 1970, before having a chance to develop
the concept of self-transcendent needs more fully. Few humanistic
psychologists seem to be aware of Maslow’s (1969) concept of
ego-transcendent needs, which could explain the lack of systematic
research on these latter needs. However, Koltko-Rivera (2006)
pointed out that Maslow’s evolving thoughts concerning ego-
transcendent needs (also known as “metaneeds”) led him to serve
as one of the founders of the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology.
At any rate, Maslow’s version of self-actualisation theory (includ-
ing the original hierarchy of needs) arguably is the best-known
and most influential of all theories within the humanistic/existen-
tial school of personality psychology (see Moss, 2015).

CARL ROGERS’S VERSION OF SELF-ACTUALISATION THEORY

In Carl Rogers’s (1951, 1961) version of self-actualisation theory, the

need for self-actualisation is the only master motive that individ-
uals possess at birth (Ewen, 1998). Unlike Goldstein’s (1939,
1940) organismic psychology, Rogers’s version of self-actualisation
theory also proposes that individuals acquire the need for positive
regard from others and the need for self-regard in the years following
infancy (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Nonetheless, like Maslow’s
(1962, 1968) version, Rogers’s version of self-actualisation theory
pays homage to Goldstein’s organismic theory (McClelland, 1985/
1987).
Rogers’s (1951, 1961) version of self-actualisation theory arose
from Rogers’s experience as a counselling psychologist (Warner,
2009). Based on his work with clients who were facing everyday
problems (as distinct from the clients whose cases involving mod-
erate-to-severe psychological impairment provided much of the
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 91
source material for psychiatrists and clinicians, especially within
the psychodynamic tradition; Millon, 1996), Rogers concluded
that most individuals already possess the social and psychological
tools that they need to resolve their own problems (C. S. Hall &
Lindzey, 1970). Moreover, Rogers became convinced that –
above all else – counsellors should provide unconditional positive
regard to their clients (thus helping clients meet their needs for
positive regard from others, self-regard, and self-actualisation;
Ewen, 1998). Consistent with Rogers’s belief in a clients’ ability
to work through their difficulties with little to no overt guidance
from counsellors, Rogers used terms such as client-centred therapy,
person-centred therapy, and nondirective therapy to describe his
approach to psychotherapy (Kensit, 2000).
One problem that arises for students of Rogers’s (1951, 1961)
version of self-actualisation theory is the lack of precision that
characterises some of Rogers’s writings (Tudor, 2010). For
example, the terms self and self-concept – which, as we learned in
Chapter 1 of the present book, are not identical (i.e., the self-
concept is individuals’ reflection on the self; Baumeister, 1997) –
often are used as if they are identical (see Ewen, 1998). However,
among all of the major theories within the humanistic/existential
school of personality psychology, Rogers’s version of self-
actualisation theory may have exerted the greatest influence on
quantitative research regarding self-esteem (undoubtedly due to
Rogers’s leading role as a “guardian of the self”; Morf & Mischel,
2012, p. 23). In Box 4.1, we review the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (variously labelled as the SES or the RSES; Rosenberg,
1965), which was inspired partly by Rogers’s version of self-
actualisation theory (Funder & Fast, 2010).

EXISTENTIAL THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE’S VERSION OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

Looming large over humanistic psychology in general is Aristotelian

philosophy (e.g., The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics;
Thomson, 1955), which defined the human mind as a set of psycho-
logical attributes that includes nutritive (i.e., appetite-orientated),
sensitive (i.e., emotion-orientated), and rational (i.e., reason-
92 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

BOX 4 .1 ROSENBERG’S (1965) SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

In their chapter on modes or metaphors of self-perception, Robins
and John (1997) contended that the Egoist metaphor (exemplified
by the self-enhancement motive, as we noted in Chapter 2) is evi-
dent in certain proto-humanist personality theories, especially
James’s (1890/2010) self-theory and G. W. Allport’s (1937/1951)
psychology of the individual; certain humanist personality theories,
especially Rogers’s (1959) version of self-actualisation theory; and
Rosenberg’s (1965) empirical research on self-esteem. Although the
Egoist metaphor might lead one to assume that self-enhancement
per se is maladaptive (e.g., unhealthy whether expressed via high
self-esteem or via high narcissism; Baumeister, 1998), it is worth
distinguishing between genuinely high self-esteem and the inflated
view of self that is properly termed as narcissism (which we covered
in Chapter 2 of the present book). The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(SES, also known as the RSES), developed by Morris Rosenberg in
1965, has emerged as the most widely used measure of individuals’
realistically high (versus low) levels of self-esteem within personality
and social psychology (G. MacDonald & M. R. Leary, 2012).
Funder and Fast (2010) identified a direct conceptual link
between Rogers’s (1951, 1961) concept of unconditional positive
regard (which therapists ideally should display toward clients;
Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014) and Rosenberg’s (1965) construct of
self-esteem as measured by the Self-Esteem Scale. Possibly the
best-documented result regarding the impact of self-esteem on
other personality constructs is the tendency for self-esteem to act
as a significant negative predictor of depression (Blascovich &
Tomaka, 1991). In addition, self-esteem is a significant positive pre-
dictor of life satisfaction and a significant negative predictor of anx-
iety (Rosenberg, 1989). All of these results can be explained by
Rogers’s version of self-actualisation theory, which identifies
a variety of adaptive functions of the self (Morf & Mischel, 2012).
Of course, self-esteem is not a panacea for all that ails individ-
uals (Baumeister, 1998). Nevertheless, the Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965) measures self-esteem in a manner that allows
researchers to propose and test a large assortment of hypotheses
regarding the effects of self-esteem on other personality variables
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). In fact, G. MacDonald and M. R. Leary
(2012) credited the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale with fuelling the
enormous rise in studies of self-esteem that occurred within person-
ality and social psychology during the 1960s and 1970s.
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 93
orientated) “souls” (Garcia-Valdecasas, 2005). Despite the historical
importance of Aristotelian philosophy to humanistic psychology
(Moss, 2015), philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1956) rejected
Aristotle’s basic premise that human beings possess “souls” at birth
(or ever; Quzilbash, 1998). Instead, Sartre developed a version of
existential philosophy that depicts individuals’ existence (i.e., the
ongoing process by which individuals make something of them-
selves) as necessarily preceding and giving rise to individuals’ essence
(i.e., that which individuals have made of themselves at any given
point in time; L. Hoffman, S. Stewart, Warren, & Meek, 2015).
In general, Sartre (1943/1956) cast his version of existential
philosophy as orientated toward human consciousness (Dolezal,
2012). However, Sartre (1953/1996) eventually attempted to com-
bine elements of his theory with Sigmund Freud’s (1900/1965)
version of psychoanalytic theory to produce existential psychoanalysis
(emphasising unconscious aspects of individuals’ existence via the
content of psychobiographies; Churchill & Wertz, 2015). Accord-
ing to Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis, an important task of self-
development is the excavation of personal material out of the
unconscious and into consciousness (Gilliam, 2017). As it turns
out, the existential psychoanalytic therapies of Medard Boss
(1963) and R. D. Laing (1960), among others, were influenced
by the psychoanalytic component of Sartre’s existential philoso-
phy (A. Jones, 2001).
Sartre’s (1943/1956) version of existential philosophy has
been criticised for logical inconsistencies concerning existence
and essence (e.g., Sartre considers the philosophical and theo-
logical construct of human nature to be part of individuals’
essence, yet human nature surely must exist at the time of indi-
viduals’ birth; Dolezal, 2012). However, if Sartre’s theory is
applied narrowly to psychological constructs such as self and
identity (e.g., the individual self exists at birth and subsequently
gives rise to identity development; see Gilliam, 2017), then Sar-
tre’s version of existential philosophy – or, perhaps more cor-
rectly, the component of Sartre’s theory that is known as
existential phenomenology (emphasising individuals’ subjective,
conscious experience of themselves as existing in the world;
Churchill & Wertz, 2015) – may qualify as logically consistent
after all (especially if one acknowledges the role of other
94 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

persons in co-creating individuals’ identities over time;

L. Hoffman, Stewart, Warren, & Meek, 2015). To sum it up,
Sartre’s version of existential philosophy – like Aristotle’s phil-
osophy (as we will learn later in the present chapter, when we
examine the positive psychology movement) – offers important
insight into individuals’ responsibility for their own character
development (Qizilbash, 1998).

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR’S VERSION OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

From the standpoint of Simone de Beauvoir’s (1947, 1949/2009)

version of existential philosophy, although human beings in general
possess the capacity for expression of their will (and, hence, seek
freedom as well as morality), not all groups of individuals are in an
equally advantaged position to act on the basis of their will
(Hekman, 2015). Unlike Sartre’s (1943/1956, 1953/1996) version
of existential philosophy, de Beauvoir’s version highlights the add-
itional societal-level as well as individual-level difficulties that
women (compared to men) must overcome in order to express
free will (Tantam, 2015). Nevertheless, de Beauvoir’s version of
existential philosophy reflects the joint influence of Sigmund
Freud’s (1900/1965) version of psychoanalytic theory and Sartre’s
version of existential philosophy (particularly Sartre’s [1953/1996]
existential psychoanalysis; Adkins, 2013).
Like Sartre, de Beauvoir was not a trained psychotherapist
(Tantam, 2015). However, unlike Sartre, de Beauvoir served as an
unofficial counsellor for many female students. Moreover, de
Beauvoir’s (1947, 1949/2009) version of existential philosophy has
been credited with helping psychotherapists offer practical advice
to those women whose (frequently male) partners expect them to
serve as relationship managers (e.g., Barker 2010). Finally, lest we
give the impression that de Beauvoir’s version of existential phil-
osophy is relevant only to women’s social-psychological function-
ing, de Beauvoir’s theory has been cited for its insight into the
roots of narcissistic personality disorder among men as well as women
(e.g., even individuals who possess unusually high levels of self-
love need relationship partners who are willing to affirm individ-
uals’ emotions; Gildersleeve, 2015).
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 95
A key criticism of de Beauvoir’s (1947, 1949/2009) version of
existential philosophy is the lack of a clear explanation regarding
ways that individual women can exercise their free will (e.g.,
Hekman, 2015). Nonetheless, de Beauvoir’s theory does suggest
that groups of women (as well as some men) should band together
to seek societal change that, in turn, would enable individual
women to express their will and seek freedom and morality
(Hekman, 2015). Perhaps the most obvious evidence concerning
the lingering impact of de Beauvoir’s version of existential phil-
osophy (outside, if not necessarily within, the male-dominated
school of humanistic/existential psychology during the mid-
twentieth century; Tantam, 2015) is the acknowledgement by
feminist Betty Friedan that de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1953/
2009) influenced Friedan’s own classic, The Feminine Mystique
(1963).

FRANTZ FANON’S VERSION OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY

According to Frantz Fanon’s (1952/1967, 1961/1963) version of

existential psychology, the existence (and, consequently, the essence) of
victims of colonialism is fundamentally different from the existence
(and essence) of perpetrators of colonialism throughout the world
(Omar, 2009). Like de Beauvoir’s (1947, 1949/2009) version of
existential philosophy – and unlike Sartre’s (1943/1956, 1953/1996)
version of existential philosophy – Fanon’s version of existential
psychology directly addresses the dehumanising effects of slavery on
enslaved persons and slave masters alike (as well as the descendants of
slaves and masters; Adkins, 2013). However, unlike either de Beau-
voir’s or Sartre’s versions of existential philosophy, Fanon’s version of
existential psychology focused on ethnicity (and especially race) as
the primary construct for viewing the role of society in promoting or
hindering individuals’ expression of free will (Bernasconi, 2000).
Despite the differences between Fanon’s version of existential psych-
ology and the existential philosophies of de Beauvoir and Sartre,
Fanon’s construct of the “White gaze” (literally and figuratively,
a means by which persons of European descent may objectify persons
of African descent; Zeiler, 2013) was derived from Sartre’s construct
of “the Look” (a means by which any individual may objectify
another person; see Pearce, 2011).
96 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

After World War II, Fanon was trained as a psychiatrist

(Clarke, 2000). Given that Fanon was well-versed in the methods
of psychoanalysis (e.g., free association, probing clients’ uncon-
scious via examination of the content of dreams), Fanon’s (1952/
1967, 1961/1963) version of existential psychology deals primarily
with the interpersonal anxiety that victims of colonialism experience
on a daily basis (e.g., African-descent persons’ negative affective or
emotional reaction to the “White gaze”; see Maldonado-Torres,
2017). Thus, Fanon’s version of existential psychology offers
a unique, practitioner-based twist on the existential psychoanalysis
that both Sartre (1943/1956, 1953/1996) and de Beauvoir (1947,
1949/2009) had advocated (Adkins, 2013).
Fanon’s (1952/1967, 1961/1963) version of existential psych-
ology – particularly as presented in Black Skin, White Masks
(1952) – has been criticised as sexist, due to its objectification of
women (Adkins, 2013). By the same token, in The Wretched of the
Earth (1961/1963), Fanon’s personal experience as a freedom
fighter in Algeria sensitised Fanon to the negative effects of colo-
nialism on men and women alike (Omar, 2009). All in all,
Fanon’s version of existential psychology has been credited with
influencing the development of Black/African psychology as an
interdisciplinary field, within and beyond the United States (Jami-
son, 2010).

ROLLO MAY’S VERSION OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In Rollo May’s (1953, 1969) version of existential psychology, the

dread that accompanies human beings’ awareness of their own
mortality – that is, their existential anxiety – emerges as a central
construct (E. Craig, 2008). Perhaps to a greater extent than does
any other theory within the humanistic/existential school, May’s
version of existential psychology challenges individuals to directly
confront (if not conquer) their existential anxiety over the short
term, because such confrontation is essential to individuals’ success
in achieving and maintaining well-being over the long term
(Kiser, 2007). Nevertheless, May’s version of existential psych-
ology clearly owes an intellectual debt to Sartre’s (1943/1956) ver-
sion of existential philosophy (Churchill & Wertz, 2015).
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 97
Following Sartre’s (1943/1956, 1953/1996) lead, May’s (1953,
1969) version of existential psychology casts love – which May fam-
ously defined as “a delight in the presence of the other person and an affirming
of [the other person’s] value and development as much as one’s own [value and
development] ” (1953, p. 206, emphasis in original) – as an emotion that
is sufficiently powerful to enable individuals to face their existential
anxiety in an authentic manner (Kiser, 2007). As a trained clinician,
May applied his version of existential psychology to clients’ dual con-
cerns with (1) being versus nonbeing (manifested in clients’ existential
anxiety toward the spectre of death) and (2) being versus becoming
(manifested in clients’ love toward significant others; Medina, 2008).
Subsequently, Pitchford (2009) – having been influenced by May’s
best-selling classic, Love and Will (1969) – reported the successful treat-
ment of a former soldier who had suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), via a direct appeal to the client’s love for his former
comrades (alongside the client’s love for himself).
May’s (1953, 1969) version of existential psychology has been
criticised for failing to stimulate quantitative research in humanistic
or existential psychology (a critique that has been directed toward
the existential psychology theories of Binswanger, 1963; and Boss,
1963; see C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). However, May’s “kinds of
love” (i.e., sex, or lustful love; eros, or passionate love; philia, or
friendship love; and agape, or selfless love) – described most expli-
citly in May’s Love and Will (1969) – directly influenced Lee’s
(1976) qualitative research on “colours of love” (described earlier in
the present chapter), which subsequently influenced C. Hendrick
and S. S. Hendrick’s (1986; C. Hendrick, S. S. Hendrick, Foote, &
Clapion-Foote, 1984; C. Hendrick, S. S. Hendrick, & Dicke,
1998) aforementioned quantitative research on love styles (Gaines,
2016/2018). Overall, May’s version of existential psychology argu-
ably stands as the best-known theory of personality within the exist-
ential tradition (Ewen, 1998).

POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE

TO HUMANISTIC/EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY(?)
In the preceding section, we noted that May’s (1953, 1969) ver-
sion of existential psychology elaborated upon love as a basis for
individuals’ ability to come to terms with a search for meaning in
98 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

their all-too-finite lives. In some of his later work, May (1981/

1999) distinguished between happiness (an emotion that is relatively
static, associated with contentment) and joy (an emotion that is
relatively dynamic, associated with excitement) as building blocks
for romantic love (Bradford, 2015). May was concerned that, over
time, individuals in romantic relationships may put considerable
effort into holding onto happiness but do not put comparable
effort into maintaining joy – a situation that might help explain
why the current “happiness craze” in the biological and social sci-
ences has been embraced more wholeheartedly within the
modern-day positive psychology movement (following Seligman
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) than it has been embraced within the
older humanistic/existential school of personality psychology (see
K. J. Schneider, 2015).
To some extent, the positive psychology movement is covering
the same conceptual ground regarding happiness and other con-
structs (e.g., the self, positive aspects of human nature) that the
humanistic/existential school already has covered, although posi-
tive psychologists do not consistently give due credit to their
humanistic/existential predecessors (Montuori & Purser, 2015). In
fact, some of the comments from positive psychologists (e.g.,
Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) toward the contributions of
humanistic and existential psychologists have been overtly dismis-
sive (K. J. Schneider, 2011b). Nonetheless, the positive psychology
movement may ultimately serve to complement, rather than deni-
grate or supplant, the humanistic/existential tradition. In the pre-
sent section, we shall review those perspectives from the positive
psychology movement (i.e., Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Ryan
& Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 2008) that show exceptional prom-
ise regarding integration with the humanistic/existential school of
personality psychology.

ED DIENER’S CONSTRUCT OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

Ed Diener and colleagues (e.g., Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003) define
subjective well-being as individuals’ cognitive (i.e., thought-based) and
affective (i.e., feeling-based) evaluation of their lives – basically, indi-
viduals’ positive versus negative attitude toward their lives (see
S. C. White, Gaines, & Jha, 2012). Diener and colleagues contend
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 99
that the cognitive component of subjective well-being is life satisfac-
tion (measured via the Satisfaction With Life Scale, or SWLS; Diener,
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985); whereas the affective components
of subjective well-being are positive moods and negative moods (meas-
ured via the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, or PANAS;
D. Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Thus, according to Diener
and colleagues, high subjective well-being represents a combination
of high levels of life satisfaction, high levels of positive moods, and
low levels of negative moods (e.g., D. G. Myers & Diener, 1995).
One of the most noteworthy sets of findings from Diener and
colleagues’ programme of research on subjective well-being (e.g.,
D. G. Myers & Diener, 1995) is that (1) on average, individuals in
economically rich nations report significantly higher levels of sub-
jective well-being than do individuals in economically not-rich
nations; yet (2) within the economically richest nation on Earth
(i.e., the United States), the positive effect of income on individ-
uals’ subjective well-being is statistically significant but practically
negligible (see Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Actually, within the
US, it appears that the impact of income on subjective well-being
is best understood as curvilinear (i.e., highest levels of subjective
well-being among individuals within the $100,000 to $250,000
bracket, lower scores of subjective well-being among individuals
whose incomes either fall below or fall above that range;
D. G. Myers & Diener, 2018), rather than linear. All things con-
sidered, Diener’s conceptualisation and measurement of subjective
well-being have largely defined the literature on well-being within
the positive psychology movement (see S. C. White, Gaines, &
Jha, 2012).

CAROL RYFF’S CONSTRUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING

Drawing partly upon Marie Jahoda’s (1958) theory of positive mental

health (a conceptual precursor to the contemporary positive psych-
ology movement, focusing on the presence of mental wellness,
not just the absence of mental illness; Peterson & Seligman, 2004),
Carol Ryff and colleagues (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998a, 1998b)
define psychological well-being as individuals’ achievement of fulfil-
ment and self-realisation in their lives (see S. C. White, Gaines, &
Jha, 2012). Ryff and colleagues (e.g., Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes,
100 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

1995) have identified six dimensions of psychological well-being

on conceptual and empirical grounds (i.e., self-acceptance, positive
relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life,
and personal growth). In Ryff’s view, psychological well-being
reflects a combination of high levels of all six dimensions (possibly
exemplifying individuals’ fundamental values and ideals; e.g., Ryff,
1995).
A major problem with Ryff’s (1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) psy-
chological well-being survey is the absence of published empirical
support for the internal consistency of her six scales, as assessed via
Cronbach’s alpha (a problem that also characterised Jahoda’s 1958
prototypical measures of processes that promote positive mental
health; see Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In fact, Ryff and col-
leagues have tended to publish descriptions of hypothetical low-
scorers and high-scorers on the six dimensions, rather than the
actual items that comprise the scales. Although Ryff and colleagues
(e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998a, 1998b) have offered a spirited defence
of their conceptualisation and measurement of psychological well-
being, the long-term success or failure of their survey will depend
heavily upon empirical demonstrations of the internal consistency
of the six scales (see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994, concerning the
importance of Cronbach’s alpha as an index of reliability in psy-
chometric analyses of scales). In the meantime, Ryff’s construct of
psychological well-being has emerged as the primary counterpoint
to Diener’s (e.g., Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) con-
struct of subjective well-being (S. C. White, Gaines, & Jha,
2012) – though Diener and colleagues (i.e., Diener et al., 2010)
have developed alternative measures of well-being, in response to
Ryff and colleagues’ critiques (see Box 4.2 concerning Diener
et al.’s newer measures of flourishing, positive emotions, and nega-
tive emotions).

RICHARD RYAN AND EDWARD DECI’S CONSTRUCT OF SUBJECTIVE VITALITY

Finally, within their self-determination theory (e.g., Ryan & Deci,

2001), Richard Ryan and Edward Deci (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Ryan & Deci, 2000b) define subjective vitality as individuals’ sense
that they are functioning in an optimal manner, not just experiencing
their lives in an optimal manner (S. C. White, Gaines, & Jha,
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 101

B OX 4 .2 DIENER ET AL.’S (2010) FLOURISHING,

POSITIVE EMOTION, AND NEGATIVE EMOTION
SCALES
In an edition of Psychological Inquiry that was constructed around
a target article by Ryff and Singer (1998b) on “The Contours of
Positive Human Health”, Diener, Sapyta, and Suh (1998, rebuttal)
and Ryff and Singer (1998a, rejoinder) clashed verbally over the
adequacy of subjective well-being (emphasising an hedonic or opti-
mal-experience perspective; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin,
1985) versus psychological well-being (emphasising an eudaimonic
or optimal-functioning perspective; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995)
as mental health constructs. Ryan and Deci (2001) tactfully
described the clash as “an engaging and instructive debate” (p. 146).
Although Ryan and Deci implied that Ryff and Singer (1998b) had
struck the first verbal blow, a careful reading of that target article
reveals that Ryff and Singer (1998b) had omitted (i.e., failed to cite)
Diener and colleagues’ prior work on subjective well-being. In
response to that omission, Diener, Sapyta and Suh (1998) not only
promoted their construct of subjective well-being but also claimed
that their construct was a better reflection of the content of everyday
persons’ daily lives than was Ryff and colleagues’ construct of psycho-
logical well-being. Subsequently, Ryff and Singer (1998a) directly chal-
lenged Diener’s hedonic construct by pointing to the ostensibly
superior real-world utility of their eudaimonic construct. At any rate,
Diener and Ryff clearly opposed each other’s views concerning the
conceptual operationalisation of well-being (although the differences
may have been overstated; see Lucas & Diener, 2015).
Diener et al. (2010) have attempted to reconcile their hedonic
perspective with Ryff’s (1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998b) eudemonic per-
spective on well-being, which Diener et al. labelled as “humanistic”
(an overly restrictive label, considering that Ryff drew on several
theories across the psychodynamic, humanistic/existential, and trait
schools of personality; e.g., Ryff & Singer, 2008). Diener et al.
developed the Flourishing Scale as a measure of psychological well-
being (consistent with Ryff and colleagues’ eudaimonic view of
well-being), as well as the Scale of Positive and Negative Experience
as a measure of the affective component of subjective well-being
(consistent with Diener and colleagues’ hedonic view of well-being).
Diener et al. found that flourishing was significantly and positively
correlated with all six of Ryff’s (1989; Ryff & Singer, 1995) psycho-
logical well-being dimensions (Diener et al. did not say whether
102 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

positive or negative feelings were significantly correlated with Ryff’s

dimensions). In retrospect, perhaps the Diener-Ryff debate has
been “engaging and instructive” after all(!).

2012). Consistent with self-determination theory, Ryan and Fred-

erick (1997) developed short-term and long-term versions of a scale
that measures individuals’ subjective vitality (Peterson & Seligman,
2004). According to Ryan and Deci, individuals’ subjective vitality
is high when three particular needs – specifically, autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness – have been fulfilled; whereas individuals’ sub-
jective vitality is low when those needs have been blocked or
thwarted (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000a).
Results of studies by Ryan, Deci, and colleagues (e.g., Reis, Shel-
don, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000) indicate that individuals’ fulfil-
ment of all three human needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, and
relatedness) are significant positive predictors of subjective vitality
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Ryan and Deci (2001) interpret the
results of their studies concerning human needs and subjective vitality
as affirming the same eudaimonic view of well-being (i.e., emphasis on
optimal functioning) that Ryff and colleagues (e.g., Ryff & Singer,
1998a, 1998b) have endorsed, as distinct from the hedonic view of
well-being (i.e., emphasis on optimal experience) that Diener and
colleagues (e.g., Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003) have endorsed. Sum-
ming it up, Ryan and Deci’s construct of subjective vitality shows
promise as one of the most theoretically driven and empirically verifi-
able constructs within the literature on well-being (see S. C. White,
Gaines, & Jha, 2012).

CRITIQUE OF HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL

PERSPECTIVES
From the first edition (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957) through the
third edition (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978) of their classic book,
Theories of Personality, Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey covered
humanistic and existential personality theories across three separate
chapters (two chapters on humanistic theories, one chapter on
 HUMANISTIC AND EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 103
existential theories). However, in Introduction to Theories of Personal-
ity, C. S. Hall and Lindzey (C. S. Hall, Lindzey, Loehlin, & Man-
osevitz, 1985) reduced the number of chapters to two (one
chapter apiece on humanistic and existential theories, respectively).
Afterward, in the fourth edition of Theories of Personality,
C. S. Hall and Lindzey (C. S. Hall, Lindzey, & Campbell, 1998)
offered a single chapter on humanistic theories (and no chapters
on existential theories). Given the diminished coverage that
C. S. Hall and Lindzey gave to humanistic and existential theories
over the course of the late twentieth century, one might reason-
ably conclude that the influence of humanistic and existential the-
ories within personality psychology is in the midst of an
irreversible decline (see E. Taylor, 2010).
In spite of the decreased coverage that C. S. Hall and Lindzey
(1957; 1970, 1978; C. S. Hall, Lindzey, & Campbell, 1998;
C. S. Hall, Lindzey, Loehlin, & Manosevitz, 1985) have afforded
to the humanistic/existential school over the years, it may be pre-
mature for personality psychologists to give up studying humanis-
tic and existential perspectives. Looking backward, one can find
precursors to the humanistic/existential school in various theories
that we have considered so far, including William James’s (1890/
2010) self-theory, Gordon Allport’s (1937) psychology of the indi-
vidual, and Henry Murray’s (1938) personology, among other
sources (for details, see E. Taylor, 2010). Looking forward, one
can detect the influence of the humanistic/existential school on
later cognitive theories, most notably George Kelly’s (1955) psych-
ology of personal constructs (which arguably could be classified as
a humanistic theory; Benjafield, 2008). All in all, the humanistic/
existential school has established itself firmly as a “third force” in
challenging the onetime dominance of psychodynamic and
behaviourist theories within and outside personality psychology
(E. Taylor, 2000).

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 5
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the trait school
(which, unlike the humanistic/existential school, emphasises indi-
viduals’ striving for accuracy – rather than positivity – in gathering
information about themselves; see Robins & John, 1997) gradually
104 CLASSIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT II

attained the status of a fourth major perspective in personality

psychology (Funder, 2001). The trait school (which is based on
the belief that individuals are fully aware of those aspects of their
personalities that are most relevant to their everyday behaviour;
Digman, 1990) currently is the most influential perspective within
personality psychology and has been championed primarily by
academicians (in contrast to the practitioners who largely have
promoted the humanistic and existentialist perspectives; see McA-
dams, 1997). Representative theories within the trait school
include (in order of appearance) G. W. Allport’s (1961/1963) trait
theory; the factor-analytic trait theories of Cattell (1946),
H. J. Eysenck (1947), Costa and McCrae (1985), J. P. Guilford
(1975), and Ashton and Lee (2001); Sandra Bem’s (1981) gender
schema theory; Spence’s (1993) multifactorial gender identity
theory; and Wiggins’s (1991) interpersonal circumplex theory. In
Chapter 5, we cover these theories and accompanying research in
detail.
CURRENT AND EMERGING
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
 5

TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONALITY

In Chapter 1, we learned about Gordon Allport’s (1937/1951,

1961/1963) psychology of the individual, including G. W. Allport’s
pioneering version of trait theory. Legend has it that G. W. Allport
developed trait theory largely as the result of an uncomfortable
encounter that he experienced with Sigmund Freud, who appar-
ently responded to G. W. Allport’s recounting of an incident that
he had just witnessed on a train ride (in which a little boy and the
boy’s mother seemed to be excessively concerned with keeping dirt
off the boy’s clothing) with the none-too-rhetorical question, “And
was that little boy you?” (Ewen, 1998). From that day onward,
G. W. Allport allegedly had little use for Freud’s “depth psych-
ology”, opting instead for a direct approach to learning about the
core aspects of individuals’ personalities: Just ask individuals what
they are like (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
In principle, G. W. Allport and Odbert’s (1936) exhaustive
reading of an unabridged English-language dictionary yielded a list
of approximately 18,000 trait terms, which could be narrowed to
“only” 4,500 or so terms after synonyms and antonyms are taken
into account (Ewen, 1998). However, in practice, G. W. Allport
(1928) developed a survey to measure only one trait – specifically,
“ascendance/submission”, which corresponds roughly to dominance
108 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

(i.e., individuals’ tendency to behave in a manner that is intended

to benefit themselves; Wiggins, 1979). In retrospect, G. W. Allport
chose his construct well; every trait survey that we will review in
the present chapter includes either “pure” dominance or, arguably,
a blend of dominance with another trait (typically nurturance, or
individuals’ tendency to behave in a manner that is intended to
benefit persons other than, or in addition to, themselves; see
Gaines, 2016/2018).
In the present chapter, we will consider trait perspectives on
personality, in the tradition of G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1961/
1963). As we will see, trait perspectives were subjected to wither-
ing criticism during the 1960s – most notably from Walter Mis-
chel (1968), who contended that a particular trait usually explains
no more than 9–10% of variance in behaviour across individuals
(Snyder & Ickes, 1985). By the same token, we will learn about
various strategies that trait theorists have pursued in order to
address (and, in some instances, to overtly refute) challenges from
Mischel and other critics concerning the traditional (i.e., disposi-
tional) approach to personality and social behaviour (Ickes, Snyder,
& Garcia, 1997; Snyder & Cantor, 1998).

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING TRAIT

PERSPECTIVES
According to trait perspectives on personality, one can regard traits
(essentially, individuals’ answer to the question, “How would you
describe yourself”; Gaines, 2016/2018) as stable, consciously
experienced aspects of personality that tend to be reflected in
cross-situational consistency in individuals’ behaviour across time
(although the concepts of stability, consistency, and length of time
as applied to trait-behaviour covariance are not absolute; Snyder &
Ickes, 1985). Compared to motives (which, as we learned in
Chapters 2 and 4, are emphasised in psychodynamic and humanis-
tic/existential perspectives), traits presumably are more accessible
to consciousness and are more likely to be manifested consistently
across a variety of situations (McClelland, 1985/1987). Neverthe-
less, both motives and traits appear to be relatively stable, at least
throughout individuals’ adult years (McAdams, 1997).
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 109
G. W. Allport defined traits as “neuropsychic structure[s]
having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent,
and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent)
forms of aptitude and expressive behaviour” (1961/1963, p. 347).
Does the term “neuropsychic structure” imply that G. W. Allport
viewed traits as biologically given (i.e., inherited) within individ-
uals? Not necessarily: In G. W. Allport’s view, the building blocks
of traits are habits (i.e., repeated sequences of behaviour that even-
tually may characterise individuals over time; e.g., G. W. Allport,
1927), rather than genes. Unlike genes, habits tend to be learned
(see F. H. Allport & G. W. Allport, 1921). However, the relative
influence of “nature versus nurture” on the development of indi-
viduals’ traits en utero and across the life span has been debated
throughout the history of personality psychology (Deary, 2009).
Broadly speaking, those trait perspectives that have been con-
cerned with identifying all of the major traits along which individ-
uals differ (e.g., the factor-analytic trait theories of Cattell, 1946;
H. J. Eysenck, 1947; J. P. Guilford, 1975; Costa & McCrae,
1985) have been especially receptive to appeals toward nature as
a primary influence on trait development (but see the factor-
analytic trait theory of Ashton & K. Lee, 2001, for a notable
exception); whereas those trait perspectives that have been con-
cerned with identifying a limited set of salient traits along which
individuals differ (e.g., the gender schema theory of Sandra Bem,
1981; the multifactorial gender identity theory of Spence, 1993;
and the interpersonal circumplex theory of Wiggins, 1991) have
been especially receptive to appeals toward nurture as a primary
influence on trait development (see Gaines, 2016/2018). Given
the lack of solid genetic evidence outside the realm of modern-
day psychiatry (where, for example, specific chromosomes have
been repeatedly implicated in the development of the “abnormal”
trait of schizophrenia, which formerly was known as “madness”; see
Walker, Kestler, Bollini, & Hochman, 2004; but see also Wahl-
sten, 1999, in Chapter 7 of the present book, regarding a re-
evaluation of results concerning schizophrenia), we do not attempt
to resolve the thorny issue of nature versus nurture (following
Deary, 2009). Instead, we will keep this issue in mind as we
review major theories and relevant studies among trait perspectives
on personality.
110 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

THEORIES PROPOSING COMPREHENSIVE LISTS OF

TRAITS

RAYMOND CATTELL’S VERSION OF FACTOR-ANALYTIC TRAIT THEORY

As we noted earlier in the present chapter, G. W. Allport and

Odbert (1936) tried valiantly to reduce their 18,000-term trait tax-
onomy to a more manageable size. Unfortunately, their remaining
list of roughly 4,500 trait terms was still too unwieldy for empirical
or conceptual purposes (e.g., conducting research, achieving parsi-
mony; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). Thus, Raymond Cattell (1946)
took it upon himself to apply the relatively new technique of factor
analysis (a psychometric analysis that examines correlations among
scores on measured variables within a particular sample, with the
intention of uncovering a smaller number of latent or unmeasured
variables that presumably explain individual differences in the
scores; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) to data from an already-
reduced taxonomy of 160 trait terms (Ewen, 1998). Cattell’s result-
ing trait perspective is known as a version of factor-analytic trait theory
(or factor theory, for short; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
On the basis of results from factor analyses, Cattell (1950) even-
tually condensed G. W. Allport and Odbert’s (1936) trait tax-
onomy to 16 terms (perhaps rising to 23 terms, if data from
clinical samples were included alongside data from more com-
monly used, nonclinical samples; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
Although Cattell was fond of creating his own, somewhat idiosyn-
cratic terminology, Ewen (1998) noted that Cattell’s list of traits
could be interpreted as intellect, warmth, emotional stability, domin-
ance, liveliness, rule-consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, vigilance,
abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance,
perfectionism, and tension. From the outset, Cattell’s inclusion of
“intellect” or intelligence (which usually is regarded as individuals’
presumed cognitive ability; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957) as a trait
was controversial. Even more controversially, Cattell assumed that
approximately half of the variance in “intellect” and (other) traits
across individuals was a function of heredity – an assumption that
was commonplace throughout World War II-era differential
psychology but was undermined largely by the revelation that
Cyril Burt (one of the earliest and best-known proponents of the
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 111
50%-heritability dictum concerning psychological attributes; e.g.,
Burt, 1966) had fabricated individual-differences data (Fairchild,
Yee, Wyatt, & Weizmann, 1995; Yee, Fairchild, Weizmann, &
Wyatt, 1993). Nevertheless, Cattell succeeded in creating
a taxonomy (as well as a survey, the Sixteen Personality Factor
Questionnaire, or 16PF; Cattell, 1970) that was empirically and
conceptually viable as a means toward measuring individual differ-
ences in all of the major traits (Digman, 1990).
Notwithstanding the controversial aspects of Cattell’s (1946)
factor-analytic trait theory, some of Cattell’s psychometric choices
are questionable. For example, with regard to construct validity
(i.e., the extent to which a survey actually measures the
construct[s] that the survey was designed to measure; Nunnally
& Bernstein, 1994), Cattell’s use of a particular type of factor
analysis that tends to produce a large number of interrelated
latent variables (i.e., oblique factor analysis) probably led him to
overestimate the minimum number of traits that should be iden-
tified (Digman, 1990). In addition, Cattell himself (e.g., Cattell,
1973) raised the possibility that the subscales underlying the 16PF
lacked internal consistency (i.e., lack of measurement error; Nunn-
ally & Bernstein, 1994) as measured by Cronbach’s alpha reliabil-
ity coefficient (although Cattell might have been unduly critical
of his own survey in that regard; see Saville & Blinkhorn, 1981).
Then again, G. W. Allport (1961/1963) – whose taxonomy
(G. W. Allport & Odbert, 1936) had served as the inspiration for
Cattell’s 16PF – credited Cattell with helping to bring the statis-
tical analysis of trait data into the then fledgling computer era
(see also Digman, 1990).

HANS EYSENCK’S VERSION OF FACTOR-ANALYTIC TRAIT THEORY

Just as Cattell (1946) had argued that G. W. Allport and Odbert’s

(1936) list of 4,500 traits was too large for practical purposes, so
too did Hans J. Eysenck (1947) contend that Cattell’s own list of
16 traits was too unwieldy (Ewen, 1998). Like Cattell,
H. J. Eysenck believed that factor analysis was the optimal means
toward identifying a minimum number of major traits – hence, the
labelling of Eysenck’s trait as another version of factor-analytic trait
theory. However, unlike Cattell (who drew upon the trait theory of
112 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

G. W. Allport, 1937/1951), H. J. Eysenck was influenced pri-

marily by behaviourist theories (i.e., the classical conditioning
theory of Pavlov, 1927; and the drive reduction theory of; Hull,
1943) that suggested as few as two traits that needed to be meas-
ured – namely, extraversion (i.e., outgoingness) and neuroticism
(i.e., emotional instability), respectively (C. S. Hall & Lindzey,
1957).
Using the psychometric technique of orthogonal factor analysis
(which tends to identify a relatively small number of latent vari-
ables that are independent of each other; Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994), H. J. Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck (1968) eventually
obtained evidence from their 57-item Eysenck Personality Inven-
tory (EPI) that yielded evidence for extraversion and neuroticism
as the two major traits (Ewen, 1998). In addition to reducing Cat-
tell’s (1946) trait list considerably, H. J. Eysenck and
S. B. G. Eysenck omitted “intellect” or intelligence from Cattell’s
list – a change that was consistent with the view that intelligence
really constituted part of the subject matter for the emerging field
of cognitive psychology, rather than personality psychology
(Ewen, 1998). However, like Cattell, H. J. Eysenck and
S. B. G. Eysenck agreed with Cattell that the major traits were
likely to be 50% heritable (C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970).
Even if we set aside H. J. Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck’s
(1968) controversial assertions regarding the heritability of extra-
version and neuroticism, one might challenge the empirical evi-
dence for the biological systems (i.e., limbic system and ascending
reticular activation system, in that order) that, according to
H. J. Eysenck (1967), gave rise to the respective traits (although
Gray, 1981, offered plausible alternatives to the biological systems
that H. J. Eysenck had proposed; Pickering, Cooper, Smillie, &
Corr, 2013). Also, despite H. J. Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck’s
(1975) assertion that their newer, 100-item Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (EPI) included a third scale that measured psychoti-
cism (i.e., severe psychological impairment), H. J. Eysenck did not
offer any detailed description of a specific biological system that
might have been responsible for individual differences in that trait
(and “psychoticism” actually seems to represent a combination of
low levels of the “Big Five” traits of friendliness and conscien-
tiousness, as noted by Digman, 1990; see the next subsection of
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 113
the present chapter regarding the “Big Five”). Nevertheless,
H. J. Eysenck’s success in extracting extraversion and neuroticism
as major traits foreshadowed findings of all subsequent studies on
comprehensive lists of traits (Ewen, 1998).

PAUL COSTA AND ROBERT MCCRAE’S VERSION OF FACTOR-ANALYTIC TRAIT

THEORY

By the 1970s, several independent teams of researchers (e.g.,

Banks, 1948; Borgatta, 1964; D. W. Fiske, 1949; Smith, 1967;
Tupes & Christal, 1961) had concluded that Cattell’s (1946) 16PF
Questionnaire – which, as the name implies, supposedly measured
16 traits (if one counts “intellect”) – actually measured no more
than five major traits (Digman, 1990). The five resulting traits –
which Paul Costa and Robert McCrae (1985) subsequently
labelled as openness to experience (i.e., broad-mindedness; formerly
known as Cattell’s “intellect” factor), conscientiousness (i.e., reliabil-
ity), extraversion (i.e., outgoingness), agreeableness (i.e., friendliness),
and neuroticism (i.e., emotional instability) – included, yet were
extended beyond, H. J. Eysenck’s (1947) “Big Two” traits of
extraversion and neuroticism (Wiggins & Pincus, 1992). Costa and
McCrae’s version of factor-analytic trait theory (i.e., the “enduring
dispositional view of the Big Five”, according to Wiggins & Trap-
nell, 1997, p. 745) proposes that those particular five traits consist-
ently emerge for a reason: Human beings want to know where
potential comrades or adversaries stand on those particular traits
(and we humans are aware that other persons want to know
where we stand on those particular traits; see Funder & Fast,
2010).
Like H. J. Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck (1968), Costa and
McCrae (1985) used orthogonal factor analysis to extract latent
variables (thus optimising the likelihood of extracting truly inde-
pendent dimensions; Digman, 1990). However, unlike
H. J. Eysenck or S. B. G. Eysenck, Costa and McCrae essentially
performed second-order factor analyses (e.g., taking an initial,
lower-order set of factors and then conducting another, higher-
order factor analysis) on the scales from the Neuroticism-
Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory, Revised Version
(NEO-PI-R; conscientiousness and agreeableness emerged as two
114 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

unexpected dimensions; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). In any event,

Costa and McCrae developed a version of factor-analytic trait
theory that provided an acceptable middle ground between Cat-
tell’s (1946) insistence on a minimum of 16 traits and
H. J. Eysenck’s (1947) insistence on a minimum of two traits
(Ewen, 1998).
Costa and McCrae (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1986) did not ori-
ginally claim that the “Big Five” traits (which can be memorised
via the acronym, OCEAN) were largely inherited (Cervone,
2005). However, with the passage of time, Costa and McCrae
(e.g., McCrae, 2009; McCrae & Costa, 1989) increasingly have
made such a claim – a problematic stance, given that the evidence
at hand does not identify which particular genes supposedly are
linked to individual differences in scores on the “Big Five” traits
(Deary, 2009). Nevertheless, unlike Cattell (1946) or
H. J. Eysenck (1947), Costa and McCrae have not asserted that
individuals’ trait scores are linked to the same genes that are impli-
cated in individuals’ racial group membership (e.g., McCrae &
Costa, 1997). Overall, Costa and McCrae’s version of factor-
analytic trait theory has emerged as the dominant view among
trait perspectives on personality (Ewen, 1998). Given that the
NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1985, 1989, 1992) is only available
commercially, we shall comment at greater length upon a freely
available measure of the “Big Five” traits (i.e., the Big Five Inven-
tory, or BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) in Box 5.1.

JOY PAUL GUILFORD’S VERSION OF FACTOR-ANALYTIC TRAIT THEORY

The rise of the “Big Five” trait perspective in personality (espe-

cially as proposed and measured by Costa & McCrae, 1985)
brought renewed attention to Joy Paul Guilford’s (1975) earlier
version of factor-analytic trait theory, which could be interpreted as
generating research findings in support of four of the “Big Five”
traits (i.e., conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neur-
oticism; Digman, 1990). It turns out that J. P. Guilford had devel-
oped one of the earliest factor-analytic approaches to studying
traits (specifically, when examining the trait of extraversion;
J. P. Guilford & R. B. Guilford, 1934). However, J. P. Guilford
(1975) identified at least ten first-order traits: (1) General activity vs.
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 115

BOX 5 . 1 JOHN ET AL.’S (1991) BIG FIVE INVENTORY

The current (i.e., 240-item) version of Costa and McCrae’s (1992)
NEO-PI-Revised Edition is not available within the public domain.
Thus, in order to gain access to the NEO-PI-R, we would need to
purchase Costa and McCrae’s survey. Alternatively, we could obtain
freely available copies of various versions of the Big Five Inventory
(BFI), which was developed by Oliver John and colleagues (e.g.,
John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; Soto & John, 2014). Like the NEO-
PI in its multiple forms, all versions of the BFI were designed to
measure the “Big Five” traits of openness to experience, conscien-
tiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Cervone,
2005).
The original, 44-item BFI (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) was
published commercially in English but subsequently was published
within the public domain by Benet-Martinez and John (1998), in
Spanish as well as English versions (see Kwan & Herrmann, 2015).
Afterward, the 60-item Next Big Five Inventory (BFI-2; Soto & John,
2014) was published within the public domain, in English (Ashton,
K. Lee, & Visser, 2019). Unlike the original BFI (which retained the
same labels for the “Big Five” traits as Costa & McCrae, 1985;
1989, 1992 had used in their versions of the NEO-PI), the BFI-2
relabelled neuroticism as negative emotionality and openness to
experience as open-mindedness. Nevertheless, the original and
revised versions of the BFI apparently yield comparable levels of
construct validity (as established via orthogonal factor analyses)
and internal consistency (as established via reliability analysis; see
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Whether measured by versions of the BFI (John, Donahue, &
Kentle, 1991; Soto & John, 2017) or by versions of the NEO-PI
(Costa & McCrae, 1985, 1989, 1992), two of the “Big Five” traits
consistently have been linked to individuals’ behaviour within the
context of close relationships (see Campbell & Simpson, 2013;
Simpson & Campbell, 2013). Specifically, extraversion tends to pro-
mote individuals’ relationship-maintaining behaviour; whereas neur-
oticism tends to undermine individuals’ relationship-maintaining
behaviour (for a review, see McNulty, 2013). The other “Big Five”
traits are not consistently reflected in individuals’ relationship-
maintaining behaviour, although agreeableness occasionally has
emerged as a significant positive predictor (see Gaines, 2016/
2018). Overall, more research is needed concerning the predictive
ability (i.e., ability to explain individual differences in behaviour;
116 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) of the “Big Five” traits (for a broader
critique of predictive ability within personality psychology, see
Funder, 2001).

slowness and lacking in energy; (2) restraint and seriousness vs. rhathymia
and impulsiveness; (3) ascendance and social boldness vs. submissiveness
and timidity; (4) sociability and social interest vs. seclusiveness and shy-
ness; (5) emotional stability and optimism vs. instability and depression;
(6) objectivity vs. subjectivity and hypersensitivity; (7) friendliness and
agreeableness vs. hostility and belligerence; (8) thoughtfulness or reflective-
ness vs. unreflectiveness; (9) good personal relations and cooperativeness vs.
criticalness and intolerance; and (10) masculinity of interests and emotions
vs. femininity. Amelang and Borkenau (1982) suggested re-
interpreting and re-analysing J. P. Guilford’s data in such a way
that the equivalents of conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeable-
ness, and neuroticism could be extracted as higher-level dimen-
sions via orthogonal factor analyses (cf. Digman, 1990).
J. P. Guilford and Wayne S. Zimmerman (1949) developed the
Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey to measure the ten afore-
mentioned, lower-order traits that eventually would become the core
dimensions in Guilford’s (1975) version of factor-analytic trait theory
(Digman, 1990). The term “temperament” in the Guilford-
Zimmerman Temperament Survey reflects the belief that certain bio-
logically hardwired precursors to traits are present at birth, manifested
in individual differences in behaviour from infancy onward (see Shiner,
2015) – a belief that also is reflected in the term “temperamental traits”,
as promoted by Cattell (1965); see also Rutter and Silberg (2002). Put-
ting aside the question of temperamental precursors to traits, Goldberg
(1981) – who apparently coined the term “Big Five” prior to Costa
and McCrae’s (1985, 1989, 1992) popularisation of the term (Digman,
1990) – concluded that J. P. Guilford and Zimmerman had not meas-
ured more than five traits (and, as we have seen, four factors were
extracted by Amelang & Borkenau, 1982). Thus, as a measure of ten
distinct traits, the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey is ques-
tionable in terms of construct validity (for a discussion of the extent to
which acceptance of J. P. Guilford’s ten factors is based upon the per-
suasiveness of theoretical arguments rather than scientific data, see
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 117
C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1978). As for internal consistency, independent
reviewers rarely (if ever) comment upon the reliability of the scales that
underlie the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (as assessed
via Cronbach’s alpha; e.g., Schuerger, Zarrella, & Hotz, 1989).
Unlike the other factor-analytic trait theories and relevant surveys
that we have covered so far, one will not find any acknowledgement
of J. P. Guilford’s (1975) version of factor-analytic trait theory or the
Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (J. P. Guilford & Zim-
merman, 1949) in Ozer and Reise’s (1994) review of the literature on
personality assessment (which, in turn was designed to complement
the emphasis on personality structure in an earlier review by Wiggins
& Pincus, 1992). Similarly, one will not find any mention of
J. P. Guilford’s factor theory and trait survey within the fifth edition of
Ewen’s An Introduction to Theories of Personality (1998). Nevertheless,
in the third edition of Theories of Personality, C. S. Hall and Lindzey
(1978) regard the influence of J. P. Guilford’s theory and survey upon
the field of personality psychology as comparable to the influence of
H. J. Eysenck’s factor theory (e.g., H. J. Eysenck, 1947) and trait
survey (e.g., H. J. Eysenck & S. B. G. Eysenck, 1968). Perhaps
J. P. Guilford’s contributions to personality psychology are best sum-
marised as (1) pioneering the use of factor analysis to identify
a manageable set of major traits, (2) developing a coherent theory to
account for those theories, and (3) creating a trait survey that has stood
the test of time – a set of accomplishments that, at a minimum, support
the inclusion of J. P. Guilford’s theory and survey in historical over-
views of trait perspectives in personality (Digman, 1990).

MICHAEL ASHTON AND KIBEOM LEE’S VERSION OF FACTOR-ANALYTIC

TRAIT THEORY

So far, we have regarded the “Big Five” trait approach (espe-

cially as reflected in the factor-analytic trait theory and survey
of McCrae & Costa, 1985, 1989, 1992) as invariant across cul-
tural groups (currently the consensus view within personality
psychology; e.g., Caspi, Roberts & Shiner, 2005). However, in
2000, A. Timothy Church concluded that – if one broadens one’s
conceptual and methodological focus from participants in Euro-
pean-language (typically, but not always, English-language)
nations to participants in Asian-language nations – then a trait that
118 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Church labelled as “Chinese tradition” is conspicuously missing

from ostensibly comprehensive surveys (Kwan & Herrmann,
2015). In turn, drawing partly upon the results of studies by
Church and colleagues (e.g., Church, Katigbak, & Reyes, 1998;
Church, Reyes, Katigbak, & Grimm, 1997; see also Church &
Lonner, 1998) and the results of their own studies (e.g., Ashton,
1998; Ashton, Jackson, Helmes, & Panounen, 1998; Ashton,
K. Lee & Son, 2000; Ashton, Panounen, Helmes, & Jackson,
1998), among other sources, Michael Ashton and Kibeom Lee
(2001) proposed that the often-omitted trait of “Chinese trad-
ition” is best interpreted as honesty/humility (Gaughan, Miller, &
Lynam, 2012). In the process of incorporating honesty/humility
into their version of factor-analytic trait theory, Ashton and K. Lee
proposed a six-factor model with the acronym of HEXACO (i.e.,
Honesty/humility, Emotionality/neuroticism, eXtraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to experience;
Hough, Oswald, & Ock, 2015).
K. Lee and Ashton (2004) developed the original, 192-item
HEXACO Personality Inventory (HEXACO-PI) to measure the six
dimensions within their (Ashton & Lee, 2001) version of factor-
analytic trait theory (see DeYoung, 2015). Subsequently, K. Lee and
Ashton (2006) published a 200-item version of their survey, labelled as
the HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised Version (HEXACO-PI
-R; Gaughan, Miller, & Lynam, 2012). Both the HEXACO-PI and
HEXACO-PI-R yield acceptable levels of construct validity (as assessed
via orthogonal factor analyses) and internal consistency (as assessed via
reliability analyses; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Moreover, results
of a direct comparison between the psychometric properties of the
HEXACO-PI-R (K. Lee & Ashton, 2004) and the most recent version
of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) indicate that the two sur-
veys are similarly high in construct validity and internal consistency,
with the six HEXACO traits combining to explain significantly more
variance in individuals’ levels of psychopathology than do the “Big
Five” traits (primarily because of the inclusion of honesty/humility
within the HEXACO-PI-R; Gaughan, Miller, & Lynam, 2012).
Certain problems have arisen regarding comparisons between the
content of the six HEXACO traits (as measured by K. Lee & Ashton,
2004, 2006) and the content of the “Big Five” traits (as measured by
Costa & McCrae, 1985, 1989, 1992). For example, K. Lee and
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 119
Ashton’s emotionality trait is limited to internally directed negative
emotions (whereas Costa and McCrae’s neuroticism trait included
externally as well as internally directed negative emotions); and K. Lee
and Ashton’s honesty/humility trait overlaps substantially with their
own agreeableness trait (whereas Costa and McCrae likely would sub-
sume honesty/humility within their agreeableness trait; Gaughan,
Miller, & Lynam, 2012). However, it is worth noting that Costa and
McCrae’s own “Big Five” traits are not as empirically distinct from
each other as their version of factor-analytic trait theory would suggest
(see Funder, 2001). In any event, Ashton and K. Lee’s factor theory
and survey have emerged as viable alternatives to Costa and McCrae’s
earlier factor theory and survey (Paunonen & Hong, 2015).

THEORIES PROPOSING LIMITED SETS OF SALIENT

TRAITS

SANDRA BEM’S GENDER SCHEMA THEORY

In a review of the literature on gender and personality, Anne

Constantinople (1973) concluded that then-existing measures of
gender-related personality traits (most notably Terman & Miles,
1936) tended to constrain individuals to score either as “masculine”
(i.e., possessing psychological attributes that stereotypically are
associated with males in a particular society) or as “feminine” (i.e.,
possessing psychological attributes that stereotypically are associated
with females in a given society), possibly leading to an exagger-
ation of gender differences in those traits. Subsequently (though
not specifically mentioning Constantinople’s review), Sandra Bem
(1974) published the appropriately-named Bem Sex Role Inven-
tory (BSRI), which contained separate scales measuring “masculin-
ity” (20 items) and “femininity” (20 items). Finally, having shown
that some (but not most) men and women are “androgynous”
(i.e., possess “masculine” as well as “feminine” personality charac-
teristics), S. Bem (1981) proposed a gender schema theory that pro-
moted the ideal of “androgyny” (reflecting individuals’ refusal to
create mental constructions of themselves and the world in rigid,
“masculine” versus “feminine” terms) as an index of mental well-
being (Lenney, 1991).
120 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

In terms of psychometric analyses, S. Bem (1974) reported

that the internal consistency of the masculinity and femininity
scales was satisfactory (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas consistently > .70;
see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). However, S. Bem did not
report results of factor analyses, which would have allowed
readers to evaluate the construct validity of the masculinity and
femininity scales. As it turns out, results of orthogonal factor
analyses by subsequent researchers revealed that (1) the term
“masculine” does not fit with the rest of the items (e.g., “acts as
a leader”, “self-sufficient”) within the so-called “masculinity”
scale; and (2) the term “feminine” does not fit with the rest of
the items (e.g., “affectionate”, “gentle”) within the so-called
“femininity” scale (R. Brown, 1986). Thus, some critics (most
notably Spence, 1985) have concluded that – despite S. Bem’s
(e.g., S. Bem, 1985) assertions to the contrary – the BSRI does
not measure general “sex role orientations” but, rather, measures
the specific, gender-related traits of instrumentality (essentially,
dominance as defined earlier in the present chapter) and expres-
sivity (basically, nurturance as defined in the present chapter; see
Wiggins, 1991).
Perhaps the most controversial assertion within S. Bem’s
(1981) gender schema theory is the claim that individuals’ psy-
chological “androgyny” (i.e., simultaneous possession of instru-
mental and expressive traits) covaries with individuals’ sexual
“androgyny” (i.e., bisexuality, or attraction toward both men and
women as potential sexual partners; Spence & Helmreich,
1978). The available evidence does not support S. Bem’s
assumption that individuals’ personality traits and sexual orienta-
tion are empirically linked (R. Brown, 1986). Nevertheless,
S. Bem’s gender schema theory and BRSI have emerged as the
most influential theory and gender-related trait survey, respect-
ively, in the post-1960s literature on gender and personality
(Lenney, 1991).

JANET SPENCE’S MULTIFACTORIAL GENDER IDENTITY THEORY

During the same year that S. Bem (1974) published the aforemen-
tioned BSRI, Janet Spence and colleagues (Spence, Helmreich, &
Stapp, 1974) released their own survey – namely, the 24-item
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 121
Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) – that was designed to
measure “masculinity” and “femininity” as separate dimensions
(Lenney, 1991). Like S. Bem, Spence et al. concluded that some
men and some women are psychologically “androgynous” (i.e.,
score relatively high in “masculine” and “feminine” traits). How-
ever, unlike S. Bem, Spence and colleagues never assumed that
the PAQ (or the BSRI, for that matter) measured individuals’
sexual orientation (R. Brown, 1986). Indeed (as noted in Chapter
1 of the present book), Spence et al. eventually developed surveys
that not only measured gender-related traits (e.g., Spence, Helm-
reich, & Holahan, 1979) but also gender-related attitudes (e.g.,
Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973) and achievement-related
motives that have been linked empirically to gender (e.g., Helm-
reich & Spence, 1978) – an eclectic approach that led to the
development of Spence’s (1993) multifactorial gender identity theory
(Frable, 1997).
Having reflected upon the content of S. Bem’s (1974) BSRI
and their own PAQ (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974), Spence
and Helmreich (1978) concluded that they (and S. Bem) had pri-
marily (and, in the case of the PAQ, exclusively) measured socially
desirable or positive aspects of “masculinity” and “femininity”.
Afterward, Spence and colleagues (Spence, Helmreich, & Hola-
han, 1979) developed the 40-item Extended Personal Attributes
Questionnaire (EPAQ) to measure negative as well as positive
aspects of “masculinity” and “femininity”. Finally, Spence and col-
leagues (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 1981) published results
regarding the psychometric properties of the original PAQ and the
EPAQ. Not only did oblique factor analyses identify positive and
negative aspects of “masculinity” and “femininity” as distinct
dimensions; but – with the notable exception of negative “femin-
inity” in the EPAQ (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas below .50) – the
internal consistency of the PAQ and EPAQ scales proved to be
satisfactory (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas near or above .70; Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994).
Spence’s (1993) multifactorial gender identity theory and two
versions of the PAQ (Spence, Helmreich, & Holahan, 1979;
Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974) have not enjoyed quite the
same popularity that S. Bem’s (1981) gender schema theory and
BSRI (Bem, 1974) have enjoyed within the literature on gender
122 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

and personality (see Wood & Eagly, 2010). However, both

Spence and S. Bem have made major contributions to the litera-
ture, consistently obtaining modest-but-significant gender differ-
ences on scores on the separate dimensions of “masculinity” (with
men scoring higher than women) and “femininity” (with women
scoring higher than men; Helgeson, 2015). Moreover, Spence and
colleagues (e.g., Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985) have led the
way toward replacing the overloaded trait terms of “masculinity”
and “femininity” with the more limited (and arguably more accur-
ate) trait terms of instrumentality and expressivity (R. Brown,
1986). All in all, Spence’s multifactorial gender identity theory and
relevant research clearly are reflected in Deaux and LaFrance’s
(1998) conclusion that – where personality is concerned – gender
is “part of the ‘air [that] we breathe’” (p. 788).

JERRY WIGGINS’S INTERPERSONAL CIRCUMPLEX THEORY

In Chapter 2 of the present book, we learned that Harry Stack

Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal theory (a “social-psychological”
theory of personality; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1957) emphasised the
importance of target persons’ behaviour toward significant others
(with therapists potentially qualifying as clients’ “significant
others”; see Sullivan, 1954) as the data that ideally serve as bases
for social perceivers’ attributions concerning target persons’ per-
sonality characteristics (Ewen, 1998). Subsequently, based on his
interpretation of Sullivan’s interpersonal theory and his own ana-
lysis of clinical data via the Kaiser Foundation, Timothy Leary
(1957) concluded that dominance and nurturance (described earlier in
the present chapter) are the two major interpersonal traits along
which individuals differ (Millon, 1996). In turn, building upon
T. Leary’s circumplex model of interpersonal traits, Maurice Lorr
and Douglas McNair (1965) obtained reports from clinicians
regarding clients’ behaviour, extracting T. Leary’s constructs of
dominance and nurturance as interpersonal traits. Finally, Jerry
Wiggins and Ana Holzmuller (1978) collected self-reported data
from non-clinical samples and (like T. Leary, 1957; as well as
Lorr & McNair, 1963) identified dominance and nurturance as
the two major interpersonal traits that differ across individuals.
Wiggins (1991) ultimately developed a wide-ranging interpersonal
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 123
circumplex theory that identifies agency as an intrapersonally dir-
ected aspect of the human condition (including, but not limited
to, the trait of dominance) and communion as an interpersonally dir-
ected aspect of the human condition (including, but not limited
to, the trait of nurturance; Gaines, 2016/2018).
In an effort to measure interpersonal traits in all of their com-
plexity, Wiggins (1979) developed the 128-item Interpersonal
Adjective Scales (IAS), which included eight lower-order traits
(i.e., assured-dominant, arrogant-calculating, cold-quarrelsome, aloof-
introverted, unassured-submissive, unassuming-ingenuous, warm-agreeable,
and gregarious-extraverted) with intercorrelations that allowed
researchers to plot those traits in a circular or circumplex order
around the underlying, higher-order traits of dominance (the
Y axis) and nurturance (the X axis; Millon, 1996). Afterward,
Wiggins and colleagues (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988) pub-
lished the 64-item Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scales (IAS-R),
which preserved the statistical properties of the original IAS (i.e.,
starting at the 12 o’clock position and working one’s way anticlock-
wise through the set of lower-order traits that are listed above, at
approximately 45-degree angles, one begins with the assured-
dominant trait and ends with the gregarious-extraverted trait;
Gaines, 2016/2018). Using an independent or orthogonal version
of principal components analyses (which are similar, though not
identical to, factor analyses; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), Wiggins
et al. consistently obtained support for dominance and nurturance
as underlying dimensions (Fabrigar, Visser, & Browne, 1997).
Although some critics (e.g., Gaines et al., 1997b) have questioned
the precision by which the IAS and IAS-R measure interpersonal
traits within a two-dimensional grid, the consensus view (e.g.,
Gurtman & Pincus, 2000) is that the IAS and IAS-R provide opti-
mal measures of interpersonal traits (Acton & Revelle, 2002).
The most persistent criticism of the original and revised ver-
sions of the original and revised versions of the IAS (Wiggins,
1979; Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988) may be that – despite
high levels of construct validity (at least when using scores on the
eight lower-order traits to extract dominance and nurturance as
higher-order dimensions via principal components analyses) and
high levels of internal consistency (as assessed via Cronbach’s
alpha; e.g., Wiggins, 1995; Wiggins, Steiger, & Gaelick, 1981) –
124 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Wiggins and colleagues have relied too heavily upon obscure syn-
onyms and antonyms (e.g., “unbold”, “ironhearted”) in order to
generate nearly-perfect circumplex patterns of lower-order trait
correlations (e.g., Benjamin, 2011). In an effort to resolve the lin-
guistic problems that underlie the IAS and IAS-R,
Patrick M. Markey and Charlotte N. Markey (2009) have devel-
oped the everyday-language International Personality Item Pool-
Interpersonal Circumplex (IPIP-IPC) survey (which is profiled in
Box 5.2). Notwithstanding empirical issues concerning Wiggins
et al.’s measurement of interpersonal traits, Wiggins’s (1991) inter-
personal circumplex theory has gained prominence due to the ease
with which it allows researchers to incorporate the gender-related
traits of positive “masculinity” (i.e., high end of the dominance
axis), positive “femininity” (high end of the nurturance axis),
negative “femininity” (low end of the dominance axis), and nega-
tive “masculinity” (low end of the nurturance axis) – as well as
the “Big Five” traits of extraversion (combination of high domin-
ance and high nurturance) and agreeableness (combination of low
dominance and high nurturance) – within one circular model of
interpersonal traits (Helgeson, 2015).

CRITIQUE OF TRAIT PERSPECTIVES

Given the current pre-eminence of trait perspectives within person-
ality psychology (Funder & Fast, 2010), one might be surprised to
learn that the practical (if not statistical) significance of trait measure-
ment was a point of contention during the late 1960s, particularly by
Walter Mischel (1968). However, Mischel helped to instigate a crisis
throughout personality psychology by asserting that traits did not
explain nearly as much variance in individuals’ behaviour as trait the-
ories (going as far back as Allport, 1937/1951, 1961/1963) would
suggest (for an analogous critique concerning attitudes as predictors
of behaviour within social psychology, see Wicker, 1969). Although
some trait theorists may find it tempting to cast Mischel as the “bad
guy” in contrast to Allport as the “good guy” in the debate over the
practical value of traits (Wiggins & Pincus, 1992), Mischel did have
a point regarding the possibility that personality psychologists gener-
ally had placed excessive emphasis on construct validity, as opposed
to predictive validity (Snyder & Ickes, 1985).
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 125

BOX 5 . 2 P. M. MARKEY AND C. N. MARKEY’S (2009)

INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY ITEM POOL-
INTERPERSONAL CIRCUMPLEX INVENTORY
Notwithstanding its widespread popularity (Locke, 2011), the IAS
(Wiggins, 1979; Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988) has been criti-
cised for its use of terms that are so infrequently used that Wig-
gins and colleagues have found it necessary to make English-
language dictionaries available to their participants (see Benja-
min, 2011). Influenced by Wiggins’s (1991) interpersonal circum-
plex theory, Patrick M. Markey and Charlotte N. Markey (2009)
published the 32-item International Personality Item Pool-
Interpersonal Circumplex (IPIP-IPC). However, unlike Wiggins
and colleagues (who drew largely upon the 4,500-word, diction-
ary-driven taxonomy of Allport & Odbert when constructing the
IAS; e.g., Wiggins, 1979), P. M. Markey and C. N. Markey used
commonly used words and phrases from the general IPIP, as
developed by Goldberg (1999).
Relying primarily (though not exclusively) upon orthogonal ver-
sions of principal components analyses of scores from the eight
lower-order traits of assured-dominant, arrogant-calculating, cold-
quarrelsome, aloof-introverted, unassured-submissive, unassuming-
ingenuous, warm-agreeable, and gregarious-extraverted, P. M. Markey
and C. N. Markey concluded that the IPIP-IPC possessed satisfactory
construct validity as a measure of the higher-order traits of dominance
and nurturance. However, internal consistency across the eight sub-
scales within the IPIP-IPC varied dramatically, with Cronbach’s alphas
ranging from highs of nearly .80 (highly impressive, especially for
4-item subscales) to lows of .50 (not impressive, even for subscales
with only four items; see Cortina, 1993). Thus, the measurement error
for certain subscales of the IPIP-IPC is potentially problematic (see
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
In a direct comparison of the IPIC-IPC (P. M. Markey &
C. N. Markey, 2009) and the IAS-R (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips,
1988), DeYoung and colleagues (DeYoung, Weisberg, Quilty, &
Peterson, 2013, Study 3) concluded that the two surveys possess
adequate construct validity. However, it is not clear whether either
survey possesses predictive validity, with regard to individuals’ rela-
tionship behaviour (see Gaines, 2016/2018). The most relevant evi-
dence comes from the literature on gender-related traits, whereby
nurturance/positive “femininity” (typically as measured by the BSRI
of S. Bem, 1974; or the PAQ of Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974)
126 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

tends to promote individuals’ relationship-maintaining behaviour;

whereas dominance/positive “masculinity” (again, typically as
measured by the BSRI or PAQ) is not consistently related to indi-
viduals’ relationship-maintaining behaviour (Ickes, 1985). Clearly,
more research is needed regarding the IPIP-IPC as well as the IAS-
R when it comes to prediction of interpersonal behaviour.

According to Ickes, Snyder and Garcia (1997), constructive

responses on the part of personality psychologists regarding chal-
lenges to the traditional, “dispositional” approach to personality and
social behaviour (exemplified by the trait theory of Allport, 1937/
1951, 1961/1963) include the development of a statistical version of an
interactionist approach (whereby greater attention was paid to specify-
ing which traits, behaviours, persons, and situations would be more
versus less likely to yield trait-behaviour covariance that was practic-
ally as well as statistically significant) as well as a dynamic version of an
interactionist approach (whereby greater attention was paid to individ-
uals’ relative freedom to choose the situations within which their
traits and behaviour are examined; see also Funder, 1991). Further-
more, according to Snyder and Cantor (1998), personality psycholo-
gists increasingly have articulated a functionalist approach to personality
and social behaviour (whereby features of persons and features of
situations are conceptualised as influences on intrapersonal, social,
relational, and group agendas; see Gaines, 2016/2018). Overall, per-
sonality psychologists have succeeded in defending trait perspectives
from conceptual and empirical challenges by Mischel (1968) and
other critics (for a review, see Zuroff, 1986).

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 6
By the end of the twentieth century, a fifth major school of
thought had emerged within personality psychology – namely, the
cognitive school (which emphasises individuals’ information-
processing and other higher-order thought processes as influences
on behaviour; Butt, 2004). Initially, Funder (2001) referred to this
school of thought as social-cognitive – an overt nod to the legacy of
the social learning theories of Rotter (1954) and the team of
 TRAIT PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 127
Bandura and Walters (1963) that we reviewed in Chapter 3 of the
present book (see also Gaines, 2016/2018). However, Funder and
Fast (2010) labelled the school simply as “cognitive” – a term that
is sufficiently inclusive to accommodate contributions from cogni-
tive psychology (see Gobet, in preparation), as distinct from social
psychology (Frings, in preparation). Representative theories within
the cognitive school include (in order of appearance) Kelly’s
(1955) personal construct theory, Mischel’s (1973) version of
social-cognitive theory, Bandura’s (1986) recasting of his earlier social
learning theory (Bandura & Walters, 1963) as a separate version of
social-cognitive theory, Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory, and
Baldwin’s (1992) relational schema theory. In Chapter 6, we shall
examine cognitive theories of personality in greater detail.
 6

COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONALITY

Even as post-World War II-era personality psychologists focussed

heavily upon the conceptualisation and measurement of traits (and,
to a large degree, obtaining consensus on a middle ground
between the sixteen-factor trait theory of Cattell, 1946; and the
two-to-three-factor trait theory of Eysenck, 1952/1970), the field
of cognitive psychology was emerging from the methodological
shadows of experimental psychology (see Robinson & Wilkowski,
2015). By the late 1990s, several cognitive theories had gained
prominence within the field of personality psychology (Fleeson,
2012). Indeed, an entire book was devoted to “the coherence of
personality” (edited by Cervone & Shoda, 1999b), showcasing
a variety of social-cognitive perspectives (for an overview, see
Funder, 2001).
One of the earliest cognitive theories of personality was George
Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory, which asserts that each indi-
vidual’s “personality” is nothing more (and nothing less) than the
unique set of general theories and specific hypotheses about self
and the world that he or she possesses (C. S. Hall & Lindzey,
1970). Kelly’s personal construct theory exemplifies the Scientist
mode or metaphor of self-perception as clearly as does any of the
trait theories that we covered in Chapter 5 (see also Robins &
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 129
John, 1997). However, Kelly’s personal construct theory abandons
the core personality constructs that we have encountered through-
out the present book (e.g., traits, motives; see also Ewen, 1998).
Instead, Kelly placed the construct of cognitive complexity (i.e., the
extent to which individuals’ theories and hypotheses concerning
self and the world reflect individuals’ active testing, refinement,
and potential rejection on an ongoing basis; Mischel, 2004) at the
forefront of his personal construct theory and within the method-
ology of his instrument for personality assessment (i.e., the Role
Repertory or REP Test; see Tiedemann, 1989).
In the present chapter, we shall review several cognitive theor-
ies of personality that implicitly build upon insights from Kelly’s
(1955) personal construct theory (even though Kelly’s theory is
not typically cited as a direct influence; see Funder, 2001). We
will learn that, to the extent that cognitive perspectives on person-
ality invoke the Scientist mode or metaphor of self-perception (as
well as the Consistency Seeker mode/metaphor, which we
encountered briefly in Chapter 2 of the present book), those per-
spectives are vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that they fail
to capture “ordinary personology” (i.e., laypersons’ actual attempts
to understand themselves and the world that they inhabit, as dis-
tinct from personality psychologists’ often-idealised version of lay-
persons’ attempts; Gilbert, 1998). By the same token, we will
learn that – in the wake of the cognitive revolution that swept
through psychology as a whole (Mischel, 2004) – various post-
1960’s-era cognitive theories of personality contain adaptive
responses to such criticism (see S. T. Fiske & S. E. Taylor, 1991).

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING COGNITIVE

PERSPECTIVES
According to cognitive perspectives on personality, higher-order
thought processes such as the encoding, storage, retention, and
retrieval of information give rise to consciousness (including self-
consciousness) among human beings (M. Leary & Tangney, 2012).
Furthermore, higher-order thought processes not only may mod-
erate links between individuals’ personality characteristics and
behaviour (Robinson & Wilkowski, 2015) but also may directly
or indirectly influence individuals’ behaviour (in some instances,
130 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

by facilitating the development of personality characteristics; Yar-

koni, 2015). Although higher-order thought processes are fre-
quently cast as functional, “rational” antidotes to individuals’
experience of dysfunctional, “irrational” emotions at a particular
point in time (e.g., the rational-emotive behaviour therapy and
theory of Ellis, 1962), certain thought processes may prove to be
dysfunctional over time (e.g., when unduly negative views about
self and the world place individuals at risk for developing depres-
sion as a mood disorder; e.g., the cognitive therapy and theory of
A. T. Beck, 1967).
As noted by S. T. Fiske and S. E. Taylor (1991), cognitive per-
spectives on personality clearly are compatible with constructs
such as values (i.e., individuals’ organised sets of beliefs – basically,
individuals’ answer to the question, “What do you believe in?”)
and attitudes (i.e., individuals’ combination of thoughts and feelings
toward a particular entity – in order words, individuals’ answer to
the question, “How would you evaluate that person/place/
thing?”). However, cognitive perspectives also are compatible with
the construct of traits (especially the “Big Five” trait of openness
to experience; DeYoung, 2015). Finally, although cognitive per-
spectives may not be directly compatible with the construct of
motives (given that individuals are not necessarily aware of the
impact of motives on their own behaviour; McClelland, 1985/
1987), some of the goals that enable individuals to fulfil their
motives may be consciously experienced (e.g., self-image goals
that serve power-related motives and compassionate goals that
serve intimacy-related motives; see Crocker & Canevello, 2015).
Among cognitive perspectives on personality, one can make
a broad distinction (e.g., Funder, 2001) between (1) “grand theor-
ies” that are sweeping in scope and demonstrate potential for uni-
fying the cognitive school as a whole (e.g., the separate versions of
social cognitive theory that were developed by Mischel, 1973 and
Bandura, 1986); and (2) “mini-theories” that are limited in scope
and never were intended to unify the cognitive school per se (e.g.,
the self-discrepancy theory of Higgins, 1987; and the relational
schema theory of Baldwin, 1992). Not coincidentally, one of the
“grand theories” that we will consider (i.e., the social-cognitive
theory of Mischel, 1973) was influenced indirectly by Kelly’s
(1955) wide-ranging theory of personal constructs (although
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 131
Mischel’s theory was influenced more directly by the social learn-
ing theory of Rotter, 1954; see Endler, 2000). We shall examine
the contributions of “grand theories” and “mini-theories” alike to
understanding the interplay between cognition and personality
(consistent with Funder, 2001).

GRAND THEORIES OF COGNITION

WALTER MISCHEL’S VERSION OF SOCIAL-COGNITIVE THEORY

In Chapter 5 of the present book, we learned that Walter Mischel

(1968) helped to bring about a crisis throughout personality psych-
ology by questioning the practical significance of covariance
between individuals’ scores on traits and behaviour (Snyder &
Ickes, 1985). As Mischel (2004) acknowledged in later years, one
of the most promising responses within the field was personality
psychologists’ collective adoption of a statistical version of an
interactionist approach to personality and social behaviour (e.g.,
taking into account joint effects of individual-difference and
social-psychological variables on individuals’ behaviour) – an
approach that Mischel credited to Magnusson and Endler (1977)
in particular. However, Mischel also identified an alternative
approach that he had advocated as early as 1973 – specifically, the
adoption of an early version of social-cognitive theory that acknow-
ledged the impact of individual differences in the construal of
social situations (e.g., through specific encoding and appraisal pro-
cesses) on individual differences in behaviour (see Funder & Fast,
2010).
As Funder (2001) observed, Mischel and Shoda (1995) devel-
oped the cognitive-affective personality system, or CAPS, model as
an extension of Mischel’s (1973) version of social-cognitive
theory. In particular, “if-then” behavioural profiles or behav-
ioural signatures are key concepts in Mischel and Shoda’s CAPS
model (Holmes, 2002). These behavioural profiles or signatures
specify what a given individual will do in each particular situ-
ation that he or she encounters (Endler, 2000). In the process
of elaborating upon the CAPS model, Mischel (2004) alluded
to one hypothetical example of behavioural signatures in
action – specifically, considering two children who score equally
132 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

high on a trait measure of aggressiveness, but who show different

behaviours across different social situations (i.e., Child A might dis-
play aggressive tendencies on the playground, but not in the class-
room; whereas the reverse might be true for Child B).
In a critique of Mischel’s (1973) version of social cognitive theory
in general and Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) CAPS model in particular,
Funder (2001) argued that the usefulness of Mischel’s model is
limited by the fact that no clear, simple system exists for classifying
those situations that will yield particular if-then profiles. By the same
token, Funder and Fast (2010) concluded that Mischel’s (1973) ver-
sion of social-cognitive theory successfully incorporates the diverse
array of models and studies that reflect cognitive approaches to per-
sonality. Furthermore, as we note in Box 6.1, John Holmes (2002)
used Mischel and Shoda’s CAPS model as the conceptual framework
for his own situation-Partner A-Partner B-interaction (SABI) model
of interdependence between individuals in close relationships (see
also Gaines, 2016/2018). Thus, it may be safe to say that Mischel is
no longer a “villain” in personality psychology (to the extent that he
ever deserved that dis-honour; McAdams, 1997).

ALBERT BANDURA’S VERSION OF SOCIAL-COGNITIVE THEORY

As we learned in Chapter 3 of the present book, Albert Bandura

and Richard Walters’s (1963) version of social learning theory fol-
lowed the lead of Julian Rotter’s (1954) earlier version of social
learning theory in moving away from neo-Freudian perspectives
on drives as presumed predictors of behaviour (see also
C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970). As it happens, Bandura (1978)
elaborated upon Bandura and Walters (1963) version of social
learning theory, noting that factors within individuals, together
with factors within the environment, were reflected in individ-
uals’ behaviour at one point in time (indeed, one can conceive
of individuals’ personalities, situational contexts, and behaviour
influencing each other; Ewen, 1998). Subsequently, Bandura
(1986) introduced his version of social-cognitive theory (which is
concerned explicitly with humans’ capacity to reflect on their
own personalities, their own behaviour, and the environment
that they inhabit) as an extension of Bandura and Walters’s ver-
sion social learning theory (Funder, 2001).
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 133

BO X 6 . 1 HOLMES’S (2002) SABI MODEL

Prior to the cognitive revolution within psychology, Kurt Lewin
(1936) developed field theory, which argues that a given person’s
behaviour (B) can be understood as a joint function of the person
(P) and the environment (E; for a review, see Schellenberg, 1978).
Although field theory is an individual-differences theory (C. S. Hall
& Lindzey, 1957), Lewin’s theory served as a basis for John Thibaut
and Harold Kelley’s (1959; Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978)
social-psychological interdependence theory (which contends that
close relationships are defined by the extent to which partners influ-
ence each other’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour; Van Lange &
Balliet, 2015). Subsequently, John Holmes (2002) combined elem-
ents of field theory and interdependence theory with elements of
Mischel’s (1973) version of social-cognitive theory (especially the
aforementioned CAPS model of Mischel & Shoda, 1995) and Bald-
win’s (1992) relational schema theory (which we shall encounter
later in the present chapter) to produce the SABI model (see Rus-
bult & Van Lange, 2003).
According to Holmes (2002), interpersonal situations vary in the
degree to which they make particular aspects of individuals’ person-
alities relevant to individuals’ interactions with relationship partners
(see also Holmes, 2000). Furthermore, Holmes’s SABI model sug-
gests that certain interpersonal situations may reveal the extent to
which particular personality constructs are manifested in individ-
uals’ interpersonal behaviour (see Reis, Capobianco, & Tsai, 2002).
Holmes’s model identifies six dimensions of situations (i.e., degree
of interdependence, mutuality of interdependence, correspondence of
outcomes, basis of control, temporal structure, and degree of uncer-
tainty), each of which logically calls for the expression of one or
two relevant interpersonal dispositions (thus affirming the role of
cognition in activating certain aspects of individuals’ personality
repertoire within close relationships; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).
Holmes’s (2002) SABI model was instrumental to the develop-
ment of a taxonomy of twenty interpersonal situations by Kelley,
Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, and Van Lange (2003) – an accomplish-
ment that, so far, has not been accompanied by a corresponding tax-
onomy of interpersonal dispositions (Gaines, 2016/2018). However,
as the field of relationship science progresses from “greening”
(Berscheid, 1994) to “ripening” (Reis 2007) to “blossoming” (Camp-
bell & Simpson, 2013), researchers increasingly seek to identify those
personality constructs and interpersonal goals that are most relevant
134 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

to particular relationship contexts (see Finkel, Simpson, & Eastwick,

2017). Overall, Holmes’s SABI model demonstrates potential as
a cognitive account of personality and behaviour in close relation-
ships (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).

In his version of social-cognitive theory, Bandura (1986)

explained that because of their capacity for active reflection,
humans possess agency (i.e., individuals’ ability to exert control
over their personalities, behaviour, and environment; Ewen,
1998). Furthermore, Bandura identified self-efficacy (i.e., the belief
that one can exert control over the events that affect one’s life,
with the caveat that individuals differ in this belief) as a key per-
sonality construct within his social-cognitive theory (Funder,
2001). Some followers of Bandura (e.g., Kihlstrom & Harackie-
wicz, 1990) have argued that self-efficacy is best understood as
a state (i.e., unstable, dependent upon the situation); whereas other
followers of Bandura (e.g., Schunk, 1991) have contended that
self-efficacy is best understood as a trait (i.e., stable, independent of
the situation). In any event, at least when one considers the aca-
demic domain, individuals’ academic self-efficacy is a significant
positive predictor of individuals’ academic performance over time
(Funder & Fast, 2010).
Lefcourt (1991) questioned whether Bandura’s (1986) con-
struct of self-efficacy is different from Rotter’s (1966) construct
of locus of control (which we covered in Chapter 3) or Rosen-
berg’s (1965) construct of self-esteem (which we covered in
Chapter 4). However, unlike locus of control, self-efficacy does
not address individuals’ expectations regarding success or failure
(see Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Also, unlike self-esteem, self-
efficacy does not address individuals’ feelings about themselves
(see Brewin, 1996). Overall, the construct of self-efficacy is cen-
tral to Bandura’s version of social-cognitive theory, which (like
Mischel, 1973 version of social-cognitive theory) provides
a useful conceptual bridge between personality psychology and
other areas of psychology (e.g., cognitive, social; Kihlstrom &
Harackiewicz, 1990).
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 135

MINI-THEORIES OF COGNITION

E. TORY HIGGINS’S SELF-DISCREPANCY THEORY

Cognitive consistency theories (invoking the Consistency Seeker

mode/metaphor to which we alluded to earlier in the present
chapter) have tended to (1) ignore individuals’ specific affective
states for the most part (e.g., the balance theory of Heider, 1958)
or (2) acknowledge the conceptual importance of specific affective
states (e.g., anxiety) to individuals’ consistency-seeking processes,
yet fail to generate empirical research that directly assesses those
affective states (e.g., the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger,
1957; for a review, see Robins & John, 1997). In contrast to most
cognitive consistency theories (and, we would add, in contrast to
the other cognitive theories of personality that are highlighted in
the present chapter), E. Tory Higgins’s self-discrepancy theory places
individuals’ particular affective states at the forefront of
a conceptual framework that lends itself readily to empirical
research (Funder, 2001). Specifically, Higgins’s self-discrepancy
theory predicts that individuals’ failure to be whom they should be
(i.e., ought-self discrepancy) can place individuals at risk for anx-
iety and “agitation emotions”; whereas individuals’ failure to be
whom they want to be (i.e., ideal-self discrepancy) can place indi-
viduals at risk for depression and “dejection emotions” (Silvia &
Eddington, 2012).
As Karniol and Ross (1996) pointed out, Higgins’s (1987) self-
discrepancy theory proposes that individuals possess (1) an ought-
self regulatory system that directs individuals to avoid situations in
which they anticipate negative outcomes, and (2) an ideal-self regu-
latory system that directs individuals to approach situations in which
they anticipate positive outcomes, during the course of their daily
lives. Over time, according to Higgins’s theory, individuals
develop and pursue goals that enable individuals to act in accord-
ance with their regulatory systems (Cervone, 2005). Furthermore,
Higgins has conducted a programme of research that documents
a variety of negative versus positive cognitive, affective, and
behavioural consequences of individuals’ resulting avoidance-
related versus approach-related activities (Funder, 2001). Higgins’s
self-discrepancy theory and related research represent marked
136 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

departures from much of the conceptual and empirical literature

on social cognition that characterised the mid-1980s (during
which emotions were commonly regarded as “hot cognitions”;
Markus & Zajonc, 1985).
In a critique of Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory, Silvia
and Eddington (2012) noted that scores on ought-self and ideal-
self discrepancies are so highly correlated (sometimes exceeding
+.70 in value, which would suggest that the two forms of self-
discrepancy share 50% or more of their variance across individuals,
especially if measurement error is taken into account; see Nunnally
& Bernstein, 1994). Such high intercorrelations between the inde-
pendent variables make it difficult (though not necessarily impos-
sible) for researchers to confidently state how much variance in
depression, anxiety, and other specific affective states can be
explained separately by ought-self versus ideal-self discrepancies
(see J. Cohen, P. Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Nevertheless,
Higgins’s conceptual distinction between ought-self and ideal-self
regulatory systems has proven to be useful within Daniel Cer-
vone’s (2004) knowledge-and-appraisal personality architecture (KAPA),
a model of within-individual personality structures and processes
that is based largely upon the assumption that individuals possess
separate-yet-interrelated cognitive structures or schemas about
ought, ideal, and actual selves (e.g., Shadel, Cervone, Niaura, &
Abrams, 2004).

MARK BALDWIN’S RELATIONAL SCHEMA THEORY

In Chapter 2 of the present book, we learned that Bowlby’s

(1969/1997, 1973/1998a, 1980/1998b) attachment theory made
a broad distinction between secure and insecure forms of attach-
ment – a distinction that is reflected in Bartholomew and Horo-
witz (1991) measurement of one secure attachment style and three
insecure attachment styles (i.e., preoccupied/anxious-ambivalent,
fearful-avoidant, and dismissing-avoidant). However, Bartholomew
and Horowitz’s research also reflects Bowlby’s concept of internal
working models of self and other (i.e., individuals’ internal representa-
tion of themselves, as well as individuals’ internal representation of
their significant others in general, in relation to each other; Bar-
tholomew, 1990). Drawing partly upon Bowlby’s attachment
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 137
theory, Mark Baldwin (1992) proposed a relational schema theory in
which (1) Bowlby’s internal working model of self was reconcep-
tualised as a self-schema; (2) Bowlby’s internal working model of
other was reconceptualised as a partner-specific other-schema; and
(3) a script for anticipated sequences of interaction between self
and partner was added and conceptualised as an event schema
(Berscheid, 1994).
According to Baldwin (1992), the cognitive structures of self-
schema, other-schema, and event schema are incorporated into an
overarching cognitive structure or relational schema for each close
relationship in which a particular individual is involved (Holmes,
2000). To the extent that relational schemas reflect individuals’
inferences concerning the causes of their own behaviour, rela-
tional schemas can be interpreted as individual-difference vari-
ables (Funder, 2001). However, to the extent that relational
schemas reflect individuals’ inferences regarding the causes of par-
ticular significant others’ behaviour, relational schemas also can
be interpreted as social-psychological variables (Berscheid, 1994).
Finally, to the extent that both partners in a given relationship
bring their separate relational schemas to bear upon their behav-
iour toward each other, the potential for conflict can be consid-
erable – an interpersonal scenario that can provide important
challenges for clinical and counselling psychologists who seek to
reduce (if not eliminate) conflict among distressed couples (Finc-
ham & Beach, 1999).
Just as Charles Cooley’s (1902) version of self-theory has been
criticised for fragmenting William James’s (1890/2010) construct
of the self beyond recognition (i.e., by championing a “looking-
glass self” that adds a new vantage point for every new member
who joins the target person’s audience; Swann & Bosson, 2010),
so too has Baldwin’s (1992) relational schema theory been criti-
cised for fragmenting Allport’s (1937/1951, 1961/1963) construct
of personality beyond recognition (see Funder, 2001). Neverthe-
less, John Holmes has pointed out areas of compatibility between
Baldwin’s relational schema theory and the aforementioned CAPS
model of Mischel and Shoda (1995), as well as areas of compatibil-
ity between Baldwin’s relational schema theory and Holmes’s own
SABI model (Holmes, 2002). All in all, Baldwin’s relational
schema theory serves as a consciously orientated counterpoint to
138 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Bowlby’s (1969, 1973, 1980) attachment theory (the latter of

which relies heavily upon nonconscious, if not overtly uncon-
scious, personality processes; Bugental & Johnston, 2000).

CRITIQUE OF COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES

In a review of the literature on social cognition, S. T. Fiske and
S. E. Taylor (1991) criticised the Scientist mode or metaphor of
self-perception (exemplified by the personal construct theory of
Kelly, 1955 in the present chapter) and the Consistency Seeker
mode or metaphor of self-perception (exemplified by the self-
discrepancy theory of Higgins, 1987 in the present chapter) as fail-
ing to adequately account for the information-processing steps that
mediate between everyday persons’ perceptions and responses to
social stimuli (which include other persons as well as themselves;
Gilbert, 1998). On the one hand, everyday persons routinely
make mistakes in person perception, especially under conditions in
which they experience information overload (Robinson & Wilk-
owski, 2015) – a fact that led to the emergence of the Cognitive
Miser variation on the Scientist metaphor (see Robins & John,
1997). On the other hand, everyday persons can reduce mistakes
in person perception to the extent that they choose among various
social-psychological strategies on the basis of goals (and, perhaps,
underlying motives; Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010) –
a fact that led to the emergence of the Motivated Tactician vari-
ation on the Cognitive Consistency metaphor.
To what extent do cognitive perspectives on personality retain
outdated versions of Scientist and Consistency Seeker modes or
metaphors of self- and other-perception? According to Cervone
(1999), Kelly’s (1955) classic theory of personal constructs
acknowledges potential errors in person perception (e.g., cognitive
simplicity can lead individuals to adopt inaccurate stereotypes;
Epting & Paris, 2006), thus hinting that Kelly’s theory is compat-
ible with the Cognitive Miser metaphor. In addition, according to
Cervone and Shoda (1999), updated versions of Mischel’s (1999)
version of social-cognitive theory, Bandura’s (1999) version of
social-cognitive theory, Higgins’s (1999) self-discrepancy theory,
and Baldwin’s (1999) relational schema theory all acknowledge the
potential impact of goals and motives on person perception (e.g.,
 COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 139
goals can direct individuals to perceive relationship partners and
themselves as possessing more desirable characteristics than object-
ively can be documented, thus helping to preserve relationships in
the process; Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010), thus suggest-
ing that these contemporary cognitive perspectives on personality
are compatible with the Motivated Tactician metaphor. In sum-
mary, the cognitive theories of personality that we have covered
in the present chapter do not appear to be outdated after all
(Funder & Fast, 2010).

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 7
The end of the 1990s marked the emergence of a sixth major
school of thought within personality psychology – namely, the bio-
logical school (which emphasises “organic” influences on individuals’
behaviour; Funder & Fast, 2010). To some extent, one can trace
the origins of the biological school to the trait perspective in per-
sonality (Funder, 2001). Moreover, we have already encountered
one prominent personality theory that is largely biological in orien-
tation (see Chapter 5 of the present book) – namely,
H. J. Eysenck’s (1947) version of factor-analytic trait theory (which,
at its core, is a physiological theory of arousability; Geen, 1997).
However, given that psychophysiologists have noted a lack of
empirical support for (and, to some extent, significant results in the
opposite direction to) key predictions from H. J. Eysenck’s theory
(Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017), we will not highlight that theory
in Chapter 7 of the present book. Instead, for our purposes, repre-
sentative theories within the biological school include (in order of
appearance) Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural selection; Galton’s
(1869) theory of eugenics; J. A. Gray’s (1970) reinforcement sensi-
tivity theory; Cloninger’s (1987) version of neurotransmitter
theory; Depue’s (1995) version of neurotransmitter theory;
A. H. Buss and Plomin (1975) temperament theory of personality
development; Trivers’s (1972) theory of parental investment; and
D. M. Buss and Schmitt (1993) sexual strategy theory.
 7

BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONALITY

Throughout the present book, we have encountered several pass-

ing references to Charles Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural selec-
tion. At this point in the present chapter, we shall add a few
details about Darwin’s theory of natural selection as a forerunner
to modern-day theories and research within the biological school
of personality (consistent with Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017).
According to Darwin’s theory, to the extent that organisms within
any species possess biological (and, at least among humans and
[other] great apes, cognitive) characteristics that enable them to
survive long enough to reproduce within a particular environ-
ment, the descendants of those organisms will tend to possess char-
acteristics that are comparable – yet not necessarily identical – to
the organisms in question (see Gross, 2010). Although Darwin
(e.g., Darwin, 1871) developed his theory around the time that
Alfred Russell Wallace (e.g., Wallace, 1869) developed his own
theory of natural selection (which Wallace initially labelled as
a theory of organisms’ “struggle for existence”; Benton, 2010),
Darwin’s version emerged as the default theory of natural selection
(Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). Indeed, no chapter on biological
perspectives on personality would be complete without a nod to
Darwin’s seminal contributions (Gangestad, 2012).
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 141
Sir Francis Galton (1869)’s theory of eugenics (which proposed
that governments should decide who was or was not “fit” to
reproduce, based on individuals’ measured physical and/or mental
characteristics; Fancher, 2009) was influenced by Darwin’s (1859)
theory of natural selection (perhaps not surprisingly, given that
Galton and Darwin were half-cousins; Prager, 2011). However,
Galton’s eugenics arguably should be labelled as a theory of artifi-
cial selection, due to Galton’s belief that powerful human beings
(rather than nature) should be the ultimate arbiters of individuals’
“fitness” for propagating Homo sapiens (Fancher, 2009). Many con-
temporary psychologists may be unaware that Galton developed
a variety of statistical tools (e.g., prototypes of correlation and
regression analyses) in order to test contentious ideas about race
and psychological characteristics (e.g., Galton believed – falsely –
that individuals’ race somehow determines individuals’ skull size,
which in turn supposedly determines individuals’ intelligence; see
Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). In any event, Galton’s attempts
to quantify individual differences in psychological characteristics
(e.g., Galton, 1869) helped to lay the groundwork for method-
ology in differential psychology (including personality psychology;
see Riegel, 1972).
In the present chapter, we will examine several biologically orien-
tated personality theories that bear the marks of Darwin’s (1859) theory
of natural selection and – to a lesser extent – Galton’s (1869) theory of
eugenics. We shall learn that, according to biological theories of per-
sonality, individual differences are largely – if not primarily – heritable
(a controversial assumption, especially when one considers that seem-
ingly robust results concerning genetic markers for “abnormal” person-
ality traits such as schizophrenia have been exposed as “false positives”;
Wahlsten, 1999). In addition, we shall learn that behaviour geneticists
in particular have claimed heritability coefficients approaching 50% for
the Big Five traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extra-
version, agreeableness, and neuroticism (as identified by McCrae &
Costa, 2008; see also Chapter 5 of the present book), while defining
“environment” so narrowly that culture (i.e., the human-made part of
the environment; Herskovits, 1955) is excluded from consideration in
studies of the Big Five traits (South, Reichborn-Kjennerud, Eaton, &
Krueger, 2015); whereas cultural psychologists have commented on
variability in the number and content of major personality traits across
142 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

nations (i.e., the Big Five model is less “universal” than many biologic-
ally orientated psychologists had assumed; Kwan & Herrmann, 2015).
Finally, we will learn about attempts by evolutionary psychologists to
reconcile evolutionary and cultural perspectives on personality
(D. M. Buss & Kenrick, 1998).

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BIOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES
In order to appreciate the importance of biological perspectives to
contemporary personality psychology, one needs to understand the
importance of the scientific revolution (i.e., the gradual shift from
faith-based to data-based assumptions about the workings of
nature, including the workings of humanity, from the 1400s to
the 1700s; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014) as the disciplines of biol-
ogy and psychology emerged from the shadows of “natural phil-
osophy” during the 1800s. In an epochal declaration that helped
to give rise to the scientific revolution, Nicolaus Copernicus pro-
posed that the Earth revolved around the Sun (and not vice
versa) – thus articulating an early version of heliocentric theory (Mila-
vec, 2006). Three centuries later, Alfred Russell Wallace (1869)
and Charles Darwin (1859) surmised independently that – just as
humankind’s home planet had been proven to occupy
a nondescript position within the cosmological order – so too had
humankind itself been shown to occupy an unexceptional role
within the biological order (see Lerwill, 2009). Both Wallace and
Darwin contended that humans’ bodily evolution obeyed the laws
of nature; whereas Darwin departed from Wallace by arguing that
humans’ cognitive evolution similarly followed laws of nature
(rather than laws of divinity; Gross, 2010).
In his theory of natural selection, Darwin (1859) struggled to
account for the development of human consciousness
(C. U. M. Smith, 2010). Not only are humans aware of the phys-
ical and social environments that they inhabit, from post-infancy
childhood onward; but humans also are aware of their own aware-
ness concerning their physical and social environments (a major
tenet of self-theory as conceived by James, 1890/2010). One hall-
mark of biological theories of personality, undoubtedly owing to
their Darwinian roots, is a de-emphasis on humans’ uniquely high
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 143
levels of consciousness, in favour of an emphasis on nonconscious
internal influences on individuals’ behaviour (though we hasten to
add that automated “nonconscious” processes are not necessarily
synonymous with the motive-laden “unconscious” processes that
were depicted in numerous psychodynamic theories of personality
that we encountered in Chapter 2 of the present book). In any
event, biological perspectives on personality are compatible with
theoretical and empirical developments within the modern-day
field of animal psychology (see Gosling & Harley, 2009).
One can distinguish broadly between two classes of biologically
orientated personality theories: (1) Anatomical and physiological theor-
ies that focus on the impact of person-level brain structure and
function on personality characteristics across individuals (e.g., the
reinforcement sensitivity theory of J. A. Gray, 1970; and the
neurotransmitter theory of; Depue, 1995); and (2) behaviour genetics
and evolutionary psychology theories that focus on species-level herit-
ability of differences and similarities in personality characteristics
across individuals (e.g., the temperament theory of personality
development by A. H. Buss & Plomin, 1975; and the sexual strat-
egy theory of D. M. Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Within these broad
groupings (following Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017), one can
make further distinctions (a) between anatomical and physiological
theories (see Cervone, 2005) and (b) between behaviour genetics
and evolutionary psychology theories (Funder, 2001). Thus, we
shall review examples of anatomical, physiological, behaviour gen-
etics, and evolutionary psychology theories in turn (following
Funder & Fast, 2010).

ANATOMICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES

JEFFREY GRAY’S REINFORCEMENT SENSITIVITY THEORY

One of the more curious theories from pre-Scientific Revolution

Era medicine was humourism (i.e., the belief that imbalances
among the proportions of individuals’ bodily fluids give rise to
various mental and physical disorders; J. F. Brennan, 2003). Dating
as far back as ancient Greece (if not earlier), practitioners of
humourism pointed to an internal balance among (1) “black bile”
(which, in excessive amounts, leads to a melancholic or depressive
144 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

temperament); (2) “yellow bile” (which, in excessive amounts, leads

to a choleric of quick-tempered temperament); (3) phlegm (which,
in excessive amounts, leads to a “phlegmatic” or calm-yet-sluggish
temperament); and (4) blood (which, in excessive amounts, leads to
a sanguine or cheerful temperament) as essential to individuals’
physical and mental health (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014). One
might be surprised to learn that echoes of humourism reverberate
through Pavlov’s (1927) reflexology (which we covered in Chap-
ter 3, though we did not refer to humourism in that chapter), via
Pavlov’s typology of individuals’ nervous systems: (1) Weak (analo-
gous to melancholic temperament); (2) strong, yet unbalanced (analo-
gous to choleric temperament); (3) strong and balanced, yet slow
(analogous to phlegmatic temperament); and (4) strong, balanced,
and mobile (analogous to sanguine temperament; Haslam, Smillie,
& Song, 2017). Furthermore (and especially relevant to the present
chapter), one can detect traces of humourism in H. J. Eysenck’s
(1967) version of factor-analytic trait theory, in the form of
Eysenck’s typology of personality traits: (1) Neurotic introversion
(analogous to melancholic temperament); (2) neurotic extraversion
(analogous to choleric temperament); stable introversion (analogous
to phlegmatic temperament); and (4) stable extraversion (analogous
to sanguine temperament; Sheehy, 2004).
In his reinforcement sensitivity theory, Jeffrey A. Gray (1970) –
a former student of H. J. Eysenck – literally overhauled Eysenck’s
(1967) version of factor-analytic trait theory from top-bottom to
bottom-up (Corr, 2009). Rather than begin with a priori hypoth-
eses concerning the existence of particular traits (i.e., neuroticism
and extraversion) and then develop a posteriori hypotheses concern-
ing the brain structures that might give rise to those traits,
J. A. Gray (1972, 1981) began by postulating three brain structures
(i.e., the Fight/Flight/Freeze System, or FFFS, that is associated
with individuals’ specific emotion of fear; the Behavioural Inhibition
System, or BIS, that is associated with individuals’ generalized
emotion of anxiety; and the Behavioural Approach System, or BAS,
that is associated with individuals’ motivation toward fulfilling
their desires) that are most likely to be implicated in personality
traits (Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017). Having identified specific
brain structures, J. A. Gray (e.g., J. A. Gray & McNaughton,
2000) settled on punishment sensitivity (reflecting the chronic
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 145
activation of individuals’ FFFS and/or BIS) and reward sensitivity
(reflecting the chronic activation of individuals’ BAS) as the result-
ing traits, which in principle can be measured by existing inven-
tories of anxiety and impulsivity, respectively (although, in practice,
anxiety is not empirically separable from neuroticism; and impul-
sivity is not empirically separable from extraversion; DeYoung &
J. R. Gray, 2009). Notwithstanding critiques about the oversimpli-
fied nature of theories of arousability, such as J. A. Gray’s
reinforcement stimulus theory (as well as the version of factor-
analytic theory by H. J. Eysenck, 1967; see Geen, 1997),
J. A. Gray’s theory arguably has breathed new life into an area of
research that had been in decline (partly due to the inconsistency
of results from previous studies that had been driven by
H. J. Eysenck’s theory; see Sheehy, 2004). Moreover, J. A. Gray’s
theory (alongside H. J. Eysenck’s theory) helped to pave the way
for Marvin Zuckerman’s (1971) model and research concerning
sensation-seeking as a trait, which we shall review in Box 7.1.

RICHARD DEPUE’S VERSION OF NEUROTRANSMITTER THEORY

In the wake of J. A. Gray’s (1970), 1972, 1981) reinforcement

stimulus theory, C. Robert Cloninger (1987) developed a version
of neurotransmitter theory that essentially retained two of the brain
structures (i.e., the BIS and the BAS) from Gray’s theory, dropped
the third brain structure (i.e., the FFFS) from Gray’s theory, and
added a new brain structure (i.e., the Reward Dependence System, or
RDS; Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017). According to Cloninger’s
theory, (1) the BIS promotes the production of serotonin (involved
in emotion regulation) as a neurotransmitter, which in turn pro-
motes the chronic expression of harm avoidance as a temperament;
(2) the BAS promotes the production of dopamine (involved in the
experience of reward) as a neurotransmitter, which consequently
promotes the chronic expression of novelty seeking as
a temperament; and (3) the RDS promotes the production of nor-
epinephrine (also known as noradrenaline, involved in the “fight or
flight” response) as a neurotransmitter, which subsequently pro-
motes the chronic expression of reward dependence as
a temperament (Yarkoni, 2015). However, not only is the pre-
dicted one-to-one correspondence between neurotransmitters and
146 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

BOX 7. 1 ZUCKERMAN’S (1971) SENSATION-SEEKING

MODEL
As we noted in Chapter 1 of the present book, despite the consider-
able influence that social situations can exert upon individuals’
behaviour, not all individuals behave the same way in the same
situation (see also Funder & Fast, 2010). A case in point involves
research on individuals’ responses to sensory deprivation: Not all
persons are equally likely to pursue physical or psychological stimu-
lation in a particular situation (Zuckerman, 1969). After reviewing
results from previous sensory deprivation studies, Marvin Zucker-
man (1971) developed the trait construct of sensation-seeking (Geen,
1997). Both the name and the content of Zuckerman’s sensation-
seeking trait are similar (though not identical) to C. Robert Clonin-
ger’s (1987) novelty-seeking temperament (e.g., Zuckerman & Clo-
ninger, 1996), the latter of which we will cover shortly in the
present chapter.
As measured by the Sensation-Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman,
S. B. G. Eysenck, & H. J. Eysenck, 1978), sensation-seeking com-
prises four interrelated dimensions: (1) thrill/adventure-seeking, (2)
experience-seeking, (3) boredom susceptibility, and (4) disinhibition (Geen,
1997). The thrill/adventure-seeking and disinhibition dimensions have
been studied most intensively, with scores on those two dimensions
correlating significantly and positively with individuals’ skin conduct-
ance responses to sensory stimuli (e.g., Feji, Orlebeke, Gazendam, &
Van Zuilen, 1985; T. N. Robinson & Zahn, 1983). Some researchers
have obtained similar results with total scores on sensation-seeking
(e.g., Neary & Zuckerman, 1976; but see also Ridgeway & Hare, 1981,
for nonsignificant results regarding total scores on sensation-seeking).
Zuckerman (1984, 1990) proposed an elaborate model concern-
ing the biological origins and functions of sensation-seeking that is
beyond the scope of the present book (see also DeYoung & Gray,
2009). Suffice it to say that – within limits – Zuckerman viewed
sensation-seeking as an adaptive trait that presumably enabled
humans’ ancestors to explore a wide variety of often-challenging
environments (with the effect – though not necessarily the intent –
of dispersing members of the species across the globe and, thus,
maximizing access to food and other resources; see Geen, 1997).
Zuckerman’s model of sensation-seeking (like the factor-analytic
trait theory of H. J. Eysenck, 1967; and the reinforcement sensitivity
theory of J. A. Gray, 1970) has been criticised as unduly simplistic
in its depiction of arousal (with some of Zuckerman’s own results
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 147

failing to support the hypothesis that chronic under-arousal leads

to sensation-seeking; e.g., Carroll, Zuckerman, & Vogel, 1982).
However, some independent results (e.g., individuals who score
high on sensation-seeking tend to possess low levels of cortisol,
a key “fight-or-flight” hormone; e.g., Beaton et al., 2006) indicate
that Zuckerman’s original predictions may have been correct after
all (see Funder & Fast, 2010).

temperaments unsupported by evidence; but Cloninger, Svrakic,

and Przybeck’s (1993) own Temperament and Character Inventory
(TCI) apparently measures the Big Five traits of openness to experi-
ence, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism –
not the three temperaments of harm avoidance, novelty seeking, or
reward dependence (or, for that matter, the additional temperament of
persistence; let alone the “character dimensions” of self-directedness,
cooperativeness, or self-transcendence; DeYoung & Gray, 2009).
Following the publication of Cloninger’s (1987) version of
neurotransmitter theory, Richard Depue (1995) offered his own
version of neurotransmitter theory that deals primarily with the traits
of “agentic extraversion” (akin to the Big Five trait of extraversion),
affiliation (akin to agreeableness), and constraint (akin to conscien-
tiousness; Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017). Depue generally has
used the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ;
Tellegen, 1982) in measuring the three traits in question
(S. T. Smith & Guller, 2015). At the heart of Depue’s theory is
the premise (e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999) that individual differ-
ences regarding activities of the mesolimbic dopamine pathway (which
promotes reward-seeking behaviour) are reflected in individual
differences regarding the expression of agentic extraversion –
a premise that has received substantial empirical support (Yarkoni,
2015). Depue’s theory is not nearly as detailed regarding links
between specific neurotransmitters and the other traits that he has
measured (although serotonin has been associated with constraint;
Carver, 2015). Nevertheless, Depue’s version of neurotransmitter
theory has emerged as the best-known alternative to Cloninger’s
version (DeYoung & Gray, 2009).
148 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

BEHAVIOUR GENETICS AND EVOLUTIONARY

PSYCHOLOGY THEORIES

ARNOLD BUSS AND ROBERT PLOMIN’S TEMPERAMENT THEORY OF

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

At the time that he published his theory of natural selection,

Darwin (1859) was not aware that an unassuming monk, Gregor
Johann Mendel, already had begun a programme of then-
unpublished botanical research that eventually would serve as the
cornerstone of modern-day genetics (Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).
Although Darwin had referred to hypothetical “pangens” (the term
that would be recast as genes) as “factors” that somehow must be
passed from parents to offspring, it was Mendel’s work that would
provide the definitive account of biological inheritance (Gangestad,
2012). Indeed, Mendel’s results helped to reinforce the empirical
foundation underlying Darwin’s theory (J. F. Brennan, 2003).
Following the establishment of genetics within the discipline of
biology, several biologically orientated psychologists contributed to
the development of behaviour genetics – a misnomer, since “behav-
iour geneticists” typically are not trained in genetics (Cervone,
2005) and tend to study personality characteristics, not behaviour
(Funder, 2001). At any rate, one of the best-known theories
within behaviour genetics is Arnold H. Buss and Robert Plomin’s
(1984) temperament theory of personality development (Rowe, 1997).
According to A. H. Buss and Plomin, temperament refers to indi-
vidual differences in stable traits that are observable from birth
onward (although one could argue that “temperament” might be
defined more precisely as individual differences in unstable emotions
at birth that, if experienced repeatedly over time, may serve as the
bases for the development of individual differences in stable traits;
e.g., Goldsmith, A. H. Buss, Plomin, Rothbart, Thomas, Chess,
Hinde, & McCall, 1987). A. H. Buss and Plomin (1975) originally
proposed four temperaments (i.e., emotionality, activity, sociability,
and impulsivity) but subsequently dropped impulsivity after con-
cluding (on the basis of scores that mothers gave to identical
versus fraternal twins on the Emotionality, Activity, Sociability,
and Impulsivity [EASI] Temperament Inventory; A. H. Buss,
Plomin, & Willerman, 1973) that twins’ heritability estimates
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 149
across all temperaments except impulsivity exceeded 50%
(although some behaviour geneticists have advocated re-inclusion
of impulsivity, on the grounds that A. H. Buss and Plomin’s cri-
teria for inclusion were overly restrictive; e.g., Shiner, K. A. Buss,
McClowry, Putman, Saudino, & Zentner, 2012). Like other the-
ories within behaviour genetics, A. H. Buss and Plomin’s theory
has not been supported by any evidence concerning actual genes
or combinations of genes that ostensibly are reflected in tempera-
ments (see Haslam, Smillie, & Song, 2017). Perhaps the fairest
way to evaluate A. H. Buss and Plomin’s theory would be to con-
clude that – as long as one acknowledges that the impact of actual
genes, gene x gene interactions, and gene x “environment” inter-
actions likely will be no more than a fraction of the aforemen-
tioned 50% heritability estimate (see Munafo, 2009) – the
temperament theory of personality development remains viable
(Shiner, 2015).

DAVID BUSS AND DAVID SCHMITT’S SEXUAL STRATEGY THEORY

So far, we have commented extensively upon Darwin’s (1859) ori-

ginal theory of natural selection – a logical starting point for any dis-
cussion of evolutionary influences on the personality characteristics
that distinguish humans from members of other species (D. M. Buss,
1997). However, in The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to
Sex, Darwin (1871) delved more deeply into sexual selection among
humans – a topic that addresses within-sex and between-sex differ-
ences in personality (D. M. Buss & Kenrick, 1998). According to
Darwin’s theory, to the extent that individuals survive long enough
to reproduce, those individuals are likely to have benefited from
a millennia-long set of adaptive characteristics that enable them to
compete successfully against members of the same sex, en route to
mating with members of the opposite sex, while contending with
various environmental pressures (see Figueredo, Gladden, Vasquez,
Wolf, & D. N. Jones, 2009). A century later, Darwin’s ideas about
sexual selection inspired Robert Trivers (1972) to develop his theory
of parental investment, which holds that men and women seek differ-
ent, albeit complementary, personality and social characteristics from
potential mates (e.g., men are more likely to value fidelity in their
partners than are women; whereas women are more likely to value
150 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

upward mobility in their partners than are men; D. M. Buss &

Penke, 2015).
In general, evolutionary psychology applies Darwin’s (1859, 1871)
theory of natural selection to human behaviour (Gangestad, 2012).
One of the most influential of the evolutionary psychology
approaches to personality has been D. M. Buss and Schmitt (1993)
sexual strategy theory, which draws upon Darwin’s theory (as well as
the theory of parental investment by Trivers, 1972) in asserting
that differing concerns regarding paternity versus maternity lead
men and women to pursue different (yet complementary) strat-
egies for short-term and long-term mating (Hazan & Diamond,
2000). D. M. Buss (son of A. H. Buss, whose temperament theory
of personality development we reviewed earlier in the present
chapter; i.e., A. H. Buss & Plomin, 1975, 1984) and Schmitt have
amassed an impressive amount of evidence (e.g., D. H. Buss’s,
1989b study across 37 nations and more than 10,000 participants)
in support of their theory (see Funder, 2001). However,
D. H. Buss and Schmitt’s theory has been criticised for invoking
outdated stereotypes about “typical” men’s and women’s personal-
ity characteristics (see Funder & Fast, 2010). To their credit,
D. M. Buss and Schmitt (2011) have demonstrated their willing-
ness to debate their theory with feminist critics (e.g., Pedersen,
Putcha-Bhagavatula, & Miller, 2011; Smiler, 2011), although Tate
(2013) subsequently pointed out that D. M. Buss and Schmitt had
placed the burden of proof upon their critics to disconfirm sexual
strategy theory. All things considered, D. M. Buss and Schmitt
(1993) theory shows promise as an evolutionary theory of person-
ality, particularly within the field of relationship science (see Ken-
rick, Neuberg, & A. E. White, 2013).

CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

In a chapter on the future of personality psychology, Veronica
Benet-Martinez and colleagues (Benet-Martinez et al., 2015) not
only expressed optimism regarding increased attention toward gen-
eric “environmental” influences on personality but also pointed
toward the need for more research regarding specific cultural influ-
ences on personality. When one considers the default stance of
many behaviour geneticists within the biological school of
 BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 151
personality (e.g., South, Reichborn-Kjennerud, Eaton, & Krueger,
2015) concerning “environmental” influences on the Big Five traits
(McCrae & Costa, 2008), Benet-Martinez et al.’s cautious optimism
is understandable: “Genes” and “environment” are presumed to
jointly influence personality; yet actual “genes” or combinations of
genes tend not to be identified, and the “environment” – which
includes “shared” aspects (e.g., siblings’ having been raised in the
same home) and “nonshared” aspects (e.g., siblings’ belonging to dif-
ferent peer groups) – tends not to include measures of cultural vari-
ables (Kwan & Herrmann, 2015). Especially when one takes the
non-infrequent lack of generalisability concerning trait dimensions
across nations, claims about the heritability of Big Five traits may be
greatly overstated (see also D. M. Buss & Penke, 2015).
Within the biological school of personality, some evolutionary
psychologists (e.g., D. M. Buss & Kenrick, 1998) have suggested
ways to reconcile evolutionary and cultural perspectives on per-
sonality. For example, A. P. Fiske and colleagues (1998) expanded
Markus and Kitayama (1991) self-construal model (which originally
was limited to the constructs of independent self-construal, or individ-
uals’ mental representation of themselves as separate from signifi-
cant others, popularly associated with persons from Western
nations; and interdependent self-construal, or individuals’ mental rep-
resentation of themselves as bound together with significant
others, popularly associated with persons from Eastern nations)
into a full-fledged theory of antecedents (i.e., collective reality,
sociopsychological processes, and individual reality) and conse-
quences (i.e., actions) of self-construals and other psychological
tendencies (see Matsumoto, 1999). Given that A. T. Fiske et al.
incorporate “universal” as well as cross-culturally variant influences
on psychological tendencies into their theory, such a perspective –
combined with measures of actual genetic variance – could pro-
vide the reconciliation that some evolutionary psychologists
(alongside some cultural psychologists) have sought.

PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 8
Having surveyed each of the major schools of thought regarding
personality, we are struck by many personality psychologists’ lack
of attention to individuals’ intentionality – a concept that is
152 CURRENT AND EMERGING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

associated primarily with the humanistic/existential school (see

Chapter 4 of the present book). In order to understand why
human beings behave as they do, one must account for human
beings’ exceptional capacity for setting goals for themselves and for
acting upon those goals (Funder & Fast, 2010). Even within the bio-
logical school – which, at times, can be so deterministic in proclaim-
ing genetic influences on behaviour that it runs the risk of rendering
key hypotheses immune to disconfirmability (a fundamental requirement
for scientific theories, within and outside personality psychology;
Funder, 2001) – one can find acknowledgements of humans’ unique-
ness concerning (1) a keen sense of selfhood (e.g., A. H. Buss, 1997b)
that makes intentionality possible, and (2) an enhanced ability to bene-
fit from past experience (e.g., D. M. Buss, 1997b) that enables humans
to modify behaviour as needed to achieve sought-after goals in the
future (for details regarding humans’ agenda-setting capabilities and
behavioural outcomes, see Snyder & Cantor, 1998). In Chapter 8, we
shall revisit the concept of intentionality as we offer a road map for
future theorising and research that incorporates the self more fully than
has been the case throughout much of post-Cognitive Revolution-era
personality psychology (see Cervone, 2005).
CONCLUSION
 8

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

In Chapter 1 of the present book, we learned that the self (which

comprises all of the personality constructs that we have covered, as
well as many additional personality constructs that space restric-
tions have prevented us from covering) is characterised partly by
an awareness of its own awareness (i.e., reflexive consciousness) and
partly by its ongoing existence within a social context (i.e., inter-
personal being; see Baumeister, 1997). However, as Baumeister
(1998) noted, the self is also characterised partly by its decision-
making and behaviour-initiating capacities (i.e., executive function) –
a set of capacities that personality psychologists within the human-
istic/existential school have labelled as intentionality (which we
associated primarily with the humanistic psychology of Buhler,
1968, in Chapter 4). Although Baumeister suggested that existen-
tialist philosophers such as Sartre (1943/1956) had overestimated
the extent to which individuals’ executive function is engaged on
a daily basis, one could counter that – outside the humanistic/
existential school – personality psychologists have tended to under-
estimate individuals’ attempts to act in a manner that reflects their
intentionality (see Ewen, 1998).
Wegner and Bargh (1998) contended that individuals’ displays of
intentionality reflect an underlying need for control – a construct that
156 CONCLUSION

Baumeister (1998) viewed as the motive that underlies individuals’

self-regulatory behaviour (see Swann & Bosson, 2010). The construct
of self-regulation has been especially influential within the cognitive
school of personality psychology, as exemplified by its prominence
within Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory (which we covered
in Chapter 5 of the present book). Nevertheless, one might reason-
ably wonder whether cognitive constructs such as self-regulation fully
capture individuals’ day-to-day experience of intentionality (see
Kuhl, Quirin, & Koole, 2015). For example, some of Baumeister’s
writings (e.g., an allusion to “the self lost and found” at the beginning
of a chapter on the self-concept, self-esteem, and identity; Baumeis-
ter, 1997, p. 681) hint toward individuals’ desire to discover their
selves – a desire that existential psychologists such as May (author of
Man’s Search for Himself [1953]) would view as more fundamental to
understanding the human condition than is a need for control per se
(Strohl, 1998).
In this concluding chapter, we shall elaborate upon intentional-
ity (especially as articulated by May, 1969) as we attempt to weave
together diverse conceptual strands across the major schools of
personality. By design, the present chapter is more integrative and
forward-looking than were the previous chapters (following
Benet-Martinez et al., 2015), even as we continue to acknowledge
the distinctive contributions of theorists and researchers within the
major schools of thought (consistent with Funder & Fast, 2010).
Along the way, we will examine personality characteristics that
may reflect intentionality gone awry – namely, the “Dark Triad”
of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (Paulhus &
K. Williams, 2002). Finally, we return to G. W. Allport’s (1937/
1951, 1961/1963) psychology of the individual as we revisit the
intellectual boundaries of personality psychology (following McA-
dams & Manczak, 2015).

INTENTIONALITY: A QUINTESSENTIALLY
EXISTENTIALIST CONSTRUCT
In Love and Will, May (1969) devoted two chapters to the construct
of intentionality. First, May offered an academic conceptualisation of
intentionality, transforming Rene Descartes’ famous dictum of “I
think, therefore I am” into “I conceive – I can – I will – I am” (p.
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 157
243). Second, May commented on the clinical implications of inten-
tionality, noting that Descartes’s dictum prioritises human cognition
over human affect – an ironic prioritisation on Descartes’s part, given
that Descartes developed an entire theory regarding emotions as “pas-
sions of the soul” that ostensibly direct the “rational soul” or mind
toward particular objects, energising individuals to approach or avoid
those objects (Greenberg, 2007). In any event, we shall cover May’s
academic and clinical observations concerning intentionality, in that
order.
According to Damasio (1994), Descartes introduced the mind-
body problem (i.e., the question of how a supposedly immortal
“rational soul” or mind manages to co-exist, let alone interact,
with a mortal body) into natural philosophy and, consequently,
into modern psychology. One might question the assumption
(articulated by Damasio, 2001, among others) that Descartes had
incorrectly depicted thinking as an activity that was separate from
the body (e.g., see Kirkeboen, 2001). Nevertheless, from the
standpoint of the existentialist perspective (e.g., May, Angel, &
Ellenberger, 1958), Descartes’s mind-body dualism does not
adequately capture humans’ lived experience (Buxton, 2005). May
(1969) in particular challenged the premise of Descartes’s mind-
body problem by emphasising core aspects of humans’ inten-
tionality (e.g., consciousness as experienced toward something or
someone, not as occurring in a social-psychological vacuum;
action as reflecting individuals’ active decision-making processes,
not as passively responding to emotional states; see Eliason,
Grafton, Samide, G. Williams, & Lepore, 2010).
One need not embrace May’s (1969) conceptualisation of
intentionality (or, more generally, May’s theory of existential
psychology) in order to appreciate May’s practical contributions to
psychotherapy (e.g., see A. H. Craig, 1995). However, Eliason
and colleagues (2010) hinted that May’s view of therapists as co-
creators of genuine relationships with clients (rather than dispas-
sionate dispensers of advice to clients) reflects May’s belief in
intentionality as a human capacity that transcends social roles (a
belief that also is reflected in the neo-Freudian interpersonal
theory of Sullivan, 1953; see Shahar, 2011). Interestingly, Milton
(1993) argued that May’s advocacy of authenticity among therap-
ists and clients alike (within the context of therapist-client
158 CONCLUSION

relationships) was compatible with Descartes’s prioritisation of

consciousness over the unconscious (a stance that would place
May at odds with the orthodox, unconscious-oriented psycho-
analysis of S. Freud, 1900/1965). Thus, perhaps May’s intentional-
ity construct as applied to therapy settings is not inherently anti-
Cartesian after all (see also Rowan, 2000).

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INTENTIONALITY, WITHIN

AND (POSSIBLY) BEYOND THE HUMANISTIC/
EXISTENTIAL SCHOOL
Considering the status of Love and Will (1969) as a bestseller, May
receives surprisingly little credit for promoting the construct of
intentionality (for an exception, see DeCarvalho, 1990). Neverthe-
less, the attention that May and colleagues (e.g., May, Angel, &
Ellenberger, 1958) have paid to intentionality attests to the
importance of the construct (see Berke & S. Schneider, 2006). All
in all, May’s commentary on intentionality has helped earn him
a place alongside Maslow (1954) and Rogers (1961) as the “Big
Three” humanistic/existential psychologists (Ewen, 1998). More-
over, notwithstanding Buhler’s (1968) contributions to personality
psychologists’ understanding of intentionality (as summarised in
Chapter 4 of the present book), May’s (1953) positioning of inten-
tionality as a precursor to love makes May’s existential psychology
especially relevant to theories and research within the field of rela-
tionship science (see DeCarvalho, 1992).
Although much of Dan McAdams’s early research on motives
regarding power and intimacy (e.g., McAdams, 1980; McAdams &
Bryant, 1987; McAdams & Powers, 1981) reflects the influence of
Murray’s (1938) personology within the psychodynamic school
(McClelland, 1985/1987), McAdams’s more recent research on
life stories (e.g., McAdams et al., 2008; McAdams, Diamond, de
St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis,
Patten, & Bowman, 2001) overtly draws upon May’s (1969) ver-
sion of existential psychology, especially May’s conceptualisation
of intentionality (for a review, see McAdams, 2010). According to
McAdams and colleagues, part of individuals’ quest to answer the
question of “Who am I?” involves individual’s ongoing construc-
tion of narrative identity (an autobiographical, though not
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 159
necessarily recorded, account of individuals’ lives that reflects key
events that helped shape individuals’ past, present, and possible
future selves; McAdams & Manczak, 2015), starting from the years
of late adolescence and early adulthood. McAdams’s research on
life stories is unusual in its combination of intensive, qualitative
data collection from each individual (i.e., the idiographic approach,
pioneered by G. W. Allport, 1965) with quantification of the data
across large numbers of individuals (i.e., the nomothetic approach,
likewise pioneered by G. W. Allport, 1928). Although McAdams’s
past and present research methods tend to be associated with the
trait school (founded by G. W. Allport, 1937/1951, 1961/1963),
McAdams treats Allport’s psychology of the individual (which,
after all, addresses the entire person; e.g., McAdams, 1997) as
compatible with May’s version of existential psychology.
In principle, May’s (1969) conceptualisation of intentionality
could be (but is not) explored in research on a variety of relevant
constructs beyond the humanistic/existential school of personality.
For example, within the psychodynamic school, Bowlby’s (1969/
1997, 1973/1998a, 1980/1998b) attachment theory led to thou-
sands of studies on attachment styles (following the lead of Hazan
& Shaver, 1987; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) that presum-
ably reflect internal working models or mental representations of (1)
self in relation to significant others and (2) significant others in
relation to the self, from infancy onward (and long before individ-
uals’ consciousness is well-developed; Bartholomew, 1990); yet
caregiver styles (i.e., individual differences in proximity versus dis-
tance, sensitivity versus insensitivity, cooperation versus control,
and compulsive caregiving; Kunce & Shaver, 1994) – which like-
wise reflect internal working models but are manifested primarily
during adolescence and adulthood, when consciousness is highly
developed and individuals presumably have developed attitudes
toward (1) self in relation to significant others and (2) significant
others in relation to self (e.g., Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994) – are
vastly understudied by comparison (see B. C. Feeney & Wood-
house, 2016). Also, within the (neo)behaviourist school, Rotter
(1966) is known mostly for his research on locus of control,
which reflects individual differences in reinforcement-based
expectations about the successes versus failures of their actions (see
Chapter 3 of the present book); yet Rotter’s (1967) work on
160 CONCLUSION

interpersonal trust (i.e., differences among individuals’ reinforce-

ment-based expectations that they can rely upon other persons
and groups, whether the persons in question are significant others
or not) has been relatively neglected, even though both constructs
reflect Rotter’s (1954) version of social learning theory (see
Wrightsman, 1991). In addition, within the trait school, Spence
and colleagues are known to a considerable extent for their
research on positive masculinity and positive femininity
(J. T. Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974) and, to a lesser extent,
negative masculinity and one aspect of negative femininity that is
known as negative communion (J. T. Spence, Helmreich, & Hola-
han, 1979; see Chapter 5 of the present book); yet trait theorists
(ironically, including Spence and colleagues) have ignored
a second aspect of negative femininity that J. T. Spence, Helm-
reich, and Holahan (1979) identified as verbal passive-aggressiveness
(akin to introversion, but not assumed to be determined by genes),
despite the fact that all five gender-related traits can be understood
within J. T. Spence’s (1993) multifactorial gender identity theory
(see Deaux & Lafrance, 1998). Finally, as we will see in Box 8.1,
the “Dark Triad” of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy
(Paulhus & K. Williams, 2002) might reveal important ways that
individuals’ intentionality can go awry in terms of personality
development.

INTENTIONALITY AND BEYOND: A MATTER OF WILL

One construct that May (1969) regarded as intimately connected
to intentionality is will, or “the capacity to organize one’s self so that
movement in a certain direction or toward a certain goal may take
place” (p. 218, emphasis in original). At times, May described
intentionality and will as if they were interchangeable constructs
(see also May, 1950/1996). However, one can distinguish between
(1) will as involving the development of the self (an active process
that is predominantly internal); and (2) intentionality as involving
the engagement of the self with the physical and social environment
(a similarly active process that is external as well as internal; see
Moss, 2015). Perhaps the clearest distinction between intentional-
ity and will can be found in May’s The Discovery of Being (1983/
1994): “The acorn becomes an oak regardless of any choice, but
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 161

BOX 8 .1 PAULHUS AND K. WILLIAMS’S (2002) “DARK

TRIAD” MODEL
In an elaboration of personality systems interactions theory (which postu-
lates that the self, reason, intuitive behaviour control, and object recog-
nition system all contribute to the structure of individuals’ personalities;
Kuhl, 2000), Julius Kuhl and colleagues (Kuhl, Quirin, & Koole, 2015)
contended that individuals can achieve intentionality via the develop-
ment of an integrated self as a combined cognitive and neuropsycho-
logical system (although such development is not entirely conscious;
see Farmer & Maister, 2017). According to Kuhn et al., intentionality
ideally is facilitated by the development of situation-specific goals that
are consistent with individuals’ generic (i.e., cross-situational) goals –
a process that can be derailed when individuals experience high levels of
stress (Kuhl & Quirin, 2011). Kuhl and colleagues surmised that effective
responses to stress involve self-activation (i.e., a process by which indi-
viduals draw upon their long-term life stories to ward off short-term
threats to their self-esteem; Koole & Kuhl, 2003).
Kuhl, Quirin, and Koole (2015) did not mention Delroy Paulhus
and Kevin Williams’s (2002) Dark Triad or socially undesirable, cov-
arying personality characteristics of narcissism (an inflated attitude
toward the self, measured via the Narcissistic Personality Inventory,
or NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988), Machiavellianism (a manipulative atti-
tude toward other persons, measured via the Machiavellianism, or
Mach, Scale; Christie & Geis, 1970), and psychopathy (an antisocial
behavioural trait, measured via the Psychopathic Personality Inventory,
or PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) in their article on the integrated
self. However, our review of Kuhl et al.’s functional characteristics of
the integrated self suggests that the dimensions of the Dark Triad can
be understood within the context of Kuhl’s (2000) personality systems
interactions theory: (1) Narcissism reflects a low level of extended self-
development (i.e., integrative competence); (2) Machiavellianism
reflects a low level of extended trust (i.e., self-positivity and inner secur-
ity); and (3) psychopathy reflects a low level of extended resilience (i.e.,
turning vulnerabilities into strengths). Our interpretation of the Dark
Triad is consistent with the findings that (1) narcissism is significantly
and negatively associated with accommodation (i.e., refraining from
reciprocating relationships partners’ anger or criticism over the short
term, instead responding with behaviours that are intended to main-
tain relationships over the long term; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik,
& Lipkus, 1991) among women and men (W. K. Campbell & Foster,
2002; but see also Brewer et al., 2018, concerning null effects for
162 CONCLUSION

women in a separate study); (2) Machiavellianism is significantly and

negatively associated with accommodation among women (Brewer
et al., 2018; data were not collected from men); and (3) psychopathy is
significantly and negatively associated with accommodation among
women (Brewer et al., 2018; data were not collected from men).
Kuhl, Quirin, and Koole’s (2015) functional characteristics of the
integrated self do not offer the only conceptual means toward inter-
preting the negative interpersonal consequences of the Dark Triad.
For example, returning to Robins and John (1997) modes of metaphors
of self-perception that we have explored throughout the present book,
(1) we have already identified narcissism with the Egoist metaphor (con-
cerned with obtaining positive information about the self); (2) Machia-
vellianism can be associated with the Politician metaphor (which we had
not covered up to this point, concerned with making positive impres-
sions on other persons); and (3) on a more speculative note, psychop-
athy might be associated with the Cognitive Miser variation on the
Scientist metaphor (concerned with collecting information about them-
selves that fits individuals’ attributional biases and errors; see S. T. Fiske
& S. E. Taylor, 1991). At any rate, the Dark Triad may comprise one of
the most consequential sets of characteristics within personality
psychology.

man cannot realize his being except as he wills it in his encoun-

ters” (p. 77). Thus, in May’s version of existential psychology, will
is a prerequisite for intentionality (keeping in mind that will is
more purely conscious, whereas intentionality is partly conscious
and partly unconscious; Ewen, 1998).
May’s (1969) conceptualisation of will as a precursor to
intentionality can help us appreciate the richness of Snyder and
Cantor’s (1998) functionalist approach to personality and social behav-
iour (which we encountered briefly in Chapter 5). First, let us sup-
pose that various features of persons (e.g., personality characteristics)
and various features of situations initially lead individuals to formulate
a series of agendas (at the intrapersonal, social, relational, and group
levels), all of which individuals may pursue in order to achieve
desired behavioural outcomes (again, at the intrapersonal, social, rela-
tional, and group levels) – a process that May (1950/1996) might
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 163
summarise as willing. Next, let us suppose that individuals’ personality
characteristics subsequently lead them to identify and choose those
situations that are more versus less likely to enable them to achieve
their agendas via desired behavioural outcomes – a process that May
(1969) might summarise as intending. Thus, to the extent that individ-
uals’ entry into (or, alternatively, exit from) certain situations serves as
a means toward the end of achieving goals via interpersonal behav-
iour, one can ascertain that willing and intending have occurred
(although we do not rule out the possibility that some individuals
may seek situations that will propel them toward change in their
selves; Ickes, Snyder, & Garcia, 1997; Snyder & Ickes, 1985).
May (1969) and Snyder and Cantor (1998) acknowledged the
influence of William James’s (1890/2010) self-theory on their
respective depictions of self as manifested strategically in interpersonal
behaviour. As it happens, James offered considerable insight into will
(although James’s observations on will have been neglected through-
out most of the history of personality psychology; May, 1983/1994).
In a panoramic chapter that spanned more than 100 pages of The
Principles of Psychology (1890/2010, Vol. 2), James engaged in introspec-
tion (a systematic, trained version of self-observation, historically asso-
ciated with the content psychology of Wundt, 1874/1910; see Zehr,
2000) regarding his own consciousness. James concluded that attention
is a key attribute of will, orientating individuals toward a specific
object (e.g., person, place, or thing) and enabling individuals to adopt
a course of action versus inaction toward that object. Although May
criticised James for failing to discuss intentionality by name, a close
reading of Principles of Psychology reveals that James distinguished
between deliberations and actions – a distinction that, one could
argue, is consistent with May’s own distinction between will and
intentionality. In any event, James’s self-theory allows us to draw
meaningful parallels between the existential psychology of May
(1969) and the functionalist approach of Snyder and Cantor (1998).

BACK TO THE SELF AND PERSONALITY

As our extended discussion of concepts from May’s Love and Will
(1969) indicates, May had a great deal to say about aspects of the
self. Furthermore, in Man’s Search for Himself, May (1953) offered
one of the most profound, yet concise, definitions of self that one
164 CONCLUSION

will find within personality psychology: “The self is the organizing

function within the individual and the function by means of
which one human being can relate to another [human being]” (p.
79). Nevertheless, as Ewen (1998) noted, May’s version of existen-
tial psychology does not make any direct contributions to the
ever-expanding catalogues of personality traits, motives, values,
attitudes, emotions, and moods (although May’s “kinds of love”
are reflected indirectly in the “love styles” of C. Hendrick and
S. S. Hendrick [1986], as we learned in Chapter 4 of the present
book). Perhaps May’s de-emphasis of the Me or self-as-object
(within which personality constructs presumably reside, according
to the self-theory of James, 1890/2010) is responsible for the lack
of such direct contributions (e.g., May, 1983/1994).
According to DeRobertis (2015), May’s (1991) version of exist-
ential psychology and G. W. Allport’s (1954/1979) psychology of
the individual share an interest in individuals’ life stories (which
helps explain the ease with which McAdams (1997, 2010) navi-
gates between the two theories). However, May and Allport do
not appear to have been substantively influenced by each other’s
work (notwithstanding the fact that May and Allport were among the
A-list attendees at the Old Saybrook Conference in 1964, which gave
enormous impetus to the formal development of the humanistic/exist-
ential school within personality psychology; DeCarvalho, 1992).
Moreover, unlike May’s existential psychology, G. W. Allport’s psych-
ology of the individual readily incorporates major personality con-
structs – such as traits, values, and attitudes – within the self (or, at
least, within the proprium; see Chapter 1 of the present book). Thus, as
we approach the end of the present book, we return to
G. W. Allport’s perspective on the self and personality (including, but
not limited to, trait theory; C. S. Hall & Lindzey, 1970).
According to G. W. Allport (1955), the proprium in general
seeks expression on a consistent basis, even though certain societal
agents (e.g., family members, educational institutions, religious
institutions, mass media) may try to keep such expression in check
(Langle & Kriz, 2015). Moreover, all of the personality dimensions
that are housed within the proprium are candidates for expression
as individuals engage in the daily task of affirming their person-
hood in a society that may be indifferent (if not overtly hostile) to
such pursuits (Polkinghorne, 2015). Although May (1983/1994)
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 165
criticised Allport for devoting too much attention to issues of
“being versus becoming” (and, conversely, too little attention to
“being versus nonbeing”), one is struck by the similarity between
May’s and Allport’s respective emphases on individuals’ conscious
self-strivings (see also DeCarvalho, 1991). Given the level of self-
affirmation that one finds within May’s (1953, 1969) existential
psychology as well as G. W. Allport’s (1937/1951, 1961/1963)
psychology of the individual, one can understand why some histor-
ians of psychology (e.g., J. F. Brennan, 2003) place G. W. Allport
alongside May as founders of the “third force” movement.

A FINAL WORD
In their chapter on the future of personality psychology, Benet-
Martinez et al. (2015) offered an eclectic set of recommendations
and aspirations concerning conceptual and empirical trends in the
field. For the sake of brevity, we shall limit our own “wish list” for
the future of personality psychology to a single (albeit multifaceted)
request: Building upon the promise of Wiggins’s (1991) interpersonal
circumplex theory (which we reviewed in Chapter 5 of the present
book), apply a laser-like focus to those dimensions of personality that
are especially likely to be reflected in individuals’ behaviour toward
significant others (following Gaines, 2016/2018). For example,
within the context of heterosexual romantic relationships, the inter-
personal trait of nurturance (see Wiggins, 1979) generally emerges as
a significant positive predictor of individuals’ giving of interpersonal
resources (i.e., affection and respect; U. G. Foa & E. B. Foa, 1974)
toward their partners (see Gaines, 1996); but will future researchers
obtain similar results for the interpersonal value of altruism (equivalent
to the communal value; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012), the interpersonal
attitude of positivity toward significant others in relation to self (frequently
labelled as positive working model of other; Griffin & Bartholomew,
1994), or the interpersonal motive of intimacy (also known as the need
for tenderness; Sullivan, 1953)? Such research could simultaneously
assess the construct validity (i.e., the extent to which scales measure the
dimensions that they were designed to measure) and predictive validity
(i.e., the extent to which scores on psychological dimensions are
reflected in scores on outcome measures, such as behaviour; Car-
mines & Zeller, 1979).
166 CONCLUSION

Although G. W. Allport (1937/1951, 1961/1963) was not

a relationship scientist, his psychology of the individual encompasses
many constructs across personality and social psychology (Snyder &
Ickes, 1985) – a quality that lends Allport’s theory to the study of
close relationships (Snyder & Cantor, 1998). In addition, although
the present book is not primarily a monograph about personality and
close relationship processes (see Gaines, 2016/2018, for such a book),
we have seen that much of the literature in personality psychology is
relevant to understanding individuals’ behaviour in close relation-
ships. In closing, perhaps the most exciting frontiers for personality
psychology will be the expanding domains of theorising and research
concerning the role of personality in individuals’ choosing the situ-
ations in their lives (see Ickes, Snyder, & Garcia, 1997), within and
outside the context of close relationships.
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 INDEX

accommodation 161–162 Ainsworth, Mary Salter

achievement motive 55 46, 49
activity 148 alienation 31
Adler, Alfred 13, 19, 26–27, 28 Allport, Gordon W. 5, 10, 125;
adolescence 34, 42 attitudes 72; authoritarian
Adorno, Theodor 23, 24 personality 24; Fromm’s didactic
affect 7 humanism 31; humanistic and
African Americans 12, 74–75 existential theories 103; idiographic
agency 123, 134 and nomothetic approaches 159;
aggression: Adler’s individual Letters from Jenny 8–9; personal
psychology 26–27; Freud’s identity 10; proprium 6, 164;
psychoanalytic theory 20, 21, 23, psychology of the individual 3–4,
26, 33; frustration-aggression 92, 164–165, 166; relational
hypothesis 74–75, 78; malignant schema theory 137; spiritual self
31; personology 55; social learning 6–7; traits 7–9, 19, 104, 107–110,
theory 78 111–112, 124, 126, 164
agreeableness: Big Five Inventory aloneness 31
115; Costa and McCrae 113–114, Altemeyer, Bob 23, 24–25
119; Guilford 114, 116; heritability altruism 165
141; HEXACO model 118, 119; Amelang, M. 116
interpersonal circumplex theory American Psychiatric Association 53
124; neurotransmitter theory 147; anal stage 21–22
relationship-maintaining behaviour analytical psychology 19, 25–26
115; Temperament and Character androgyny 119, 120, 121
Inventory 147 antilibidinal ego 43
216 INDEX

anxiety: classical conditioning 65–66, behaviour: biological theories 143;

67; didactic humanism 31; ego cognitive theories 129–130; field
psychology 34; existential 96–97; theory 133; future research 165;
feminine psychology 28; Freud’s humanistic and existential theories
psychoanalytic theory 20, 21, 33; 84; interactionist approach 126,
interpersonal theory 29; object 131; psychodynamic theories
relations theory 40; reinforcement 18–19; relational schema theory
sensitivity theory 145; 137; social-cognitive theory 132
self-discrepancy theory 135, 136; behaviour genetics 68, 141, 143,
self-esteem 92; victims of 148–149, 150–151
colonialism 96 behaviour modification 66, 67
anxious-ambivalent attachment Behavioural Approach System (BAS)
46–47, 49, 136 144–145
Aristotelian philosophy 91–93, 94 Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS)
arousal 146–147 144–145
Ashton, Michael C. 104, 109, behavioural signatures 131–132
117–119 behaviourism 5, 57, 61–80; Bandura
Atalay, M. 37 and Walters’s social learning theory
attachment theory 13, 20, 41, 45–48, 78–79; basic assumptions 62–63;
49–50, 136–138, 159 critique of 79–80; dominance of
attention 163 103; Hull’s drive reduction theory
attitudes 3, 7, 72–73, 79–80, 69–70; influence on Eysenck 112;
130, 164 Miller and Dollard’s
authoritarian personality 23, 24, stimulus-response theory 73–75;
31–32 Rotter’s social learning theory
authoritarianism 23, 24–25, 31, 82 75–77; Skinner’s operant
automaton conformity 31 reinforcement theory 70–73;
autonomy 102 Thorndike’s connectionism 63–65;
avoidant attachment 46–47, 49, 136 Tolman’s stimulus-stimulus theory
Azim, H. F. A. 41 66–69; Watson’s classical
conditioning theory 65–66
Bachar, Eytan 42 being 97, 164–165
balance theory 135 Bem, Daryl 62, 72–73, 79–80
Baldwin, Mark W. 127, 130, 133, Bem, Sandra 28–29, 104, 109,
136–138 119–120, 121–122
Bamaca-Gomez, M. 38, 39 Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI)
Bandura, Albert 57, 63, 78–79, 119–120, 125
126–127, 130, 132–134, 138–139 Benet-Martínez, Veronica 115,
Bargh, J. A. 155–156 150–151, 165
Bartholomew, K. 47, 49, 136 BFI see Big Five Inventory
BAS see Behavioural Approach Bienvenu, J. P. 41
System Big Five Inventory (BFI) 114, 115
Baumeister, R. F. 10, 155–156 “Big Five” personality traits 112,
Baydala, A. 52 113–114, 115–116, 117; cognitive
Beck, A. T. 130 theories 130; cultural psychology
becoming 85, 97, 164–165 142; environmental influences 151;
 INDEX 217
heritability 141, 151; HEXACO CAPS see cognitive-affective
model comparison 118–119; personality system
interpersonal circumplex theory cardinal traits 8
124; Temperament and Character caregiver styles 159
Inventory 147 Carswell, K. L. 89–90
biological theories 5, 139, 140–152; Carton, J. S. 76
basic assumptions 142–143; Buss Cattell, Raymond B. 104, 109,
and Plomin’s temperament theory 110–111, 112, 113–114,
148–149; Buss and Schmitt’s sexual 116, 128
strategy theory 149–150; critique Celani, D. P. 44
of 150–151; Depue’s central ego 43
neurotransmitter theory 145–147; central traits 8
Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity Cervone, Daniel 136, 138
theory 143–145 Chang, C. 34
birth order 27 Chapman, A. L. 35
BIS see Behavioural Inhibition System character analysis 19, 32–33
bisexuality 120 Chavous, T. M. 12
Black identity 11–12 Cheung, E. O. 89–90
Blais, M. A. 36 children 38–40, 41–42, 43–44;
Blehar, M. C. 46–47, 49 attachment theory 46; behaviour
“bobo doll” study 78 modification 67; “Little Albert”
Borkenau, P. 116 experiment 65–66; locus of control
Boss, Medard 93 76; social learning theory 78, 79;
Bowlby, John 13, 20, 41, 45–48, see also mother-infant relationship
136–138, 159 Chinese tradition 117–118
brain structures 143, 144–145 Chodorow, Nancy 56–57
Brennan, J. F. 62 Church, A. Timothy 117–118
Brennan, Kelly 49 Clark, C. L. 49
Breuer, Josef 13, 17–18 classical conditioning 57, 61, 63,
brief adaptive psychotherapy 35 65–66, 67, 68, 70, 112
British Independent Group 46, client-centred therapy 91
47, 48 clinical psychology 19
British Psycho-Analytical Society 45 Cloninger, C. Robert 139, 145–147
BSRI see Bem Sex Role Inventory cognitive-affective personality system
Buhler, Charlotte 80, 86–87, 155, 158 (CAPS) 131–132, 133, 137
Burt, Cyril 110–111 “cognitive behaviourism” 68
Buss, Arnold H. 139, 143, cognitive complexity 129
148–149, 150 cognitive consistency theories 135
Buss, David M. 139, 143, cognitive dissonance theory 80, 135
149–150, 151 Cognitive Miser metaphor 138, 162
cognitive psychology 7, 69, 79, 112,
California F Scale 24 127, 128
Canetti, L. 42 cognitive theories 5, 103, 126–127,
Cantor, M. 126, 162–163 128–139, 156; Baldwin 136–138;
capacity for concern 41 Bandura 132–134; basic
Capps, D. 37 assumptions 129–130; critique of
218 INDEX

138–139; Higgins 135–136; Damasio, A. R. 157

Mischel 131–132 “Dark Triad” 160, 161–162
collective unconscious 25, 26 Darwin, Charles 6, 20, 64, 139,
colonialism 95, 96 140–141, 142, 148, 149–150
common traits 7–8 de Beauvoir, Simone 81, 94–95, 96
communion 123, 160 de Souza Palma, M. 50
comparative psychology 64 death instinct 21, 40, 46
competence 102 Deaux, K. 122
complexes 26, 27 Debbane, E. G. 41
Comprehensive Rorschach Deci, Edward 100–102
System 36 defence mechanisms 31, 33–34, 71
compulsiveness 21 demands 68
conditioning: classical 57, 61, 63, dependent personality
65–66, 67, 68, 70, 112; operant disorder 47
70–71, 79 depression 51, 92, 130, 135, 136
connectionism 57, 63–65, 66, 69 depressive position 41
conscientiousness: Big Five Inventory Depue, Richard A. 139, 143,
115; Costa and McCrae 113–114; 145–147
Eysenck 112; Guilford 114; DeRobertis, E. M. 164
HEXACO model 118; Descartes, Rene 156–158
neurotransmitter theory 147; determinism: biological theories
Temperament and Character 152; environmental 62; psychic
Inventory 147 21, 62
consciousness: biological theories Dewey, John 62–63
142–143; cognitive theories 129; DeYoung, C. G. 125
Descartes 158; Freud 20, 48; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Guilford 116; heritability 141; Mental Disorders (DSM) 40,
humanistic and existential theories 53, 54
84, 93; intentionality and will 162; didactic humanism 19, 30–32, 33, 80,
reflexive 155; self-theory 17; 82, 83
traits 108 Diener, Ed 98–99, 100, 101–102
consistency 108, 135 Digman, J. M. 112
Consistency Seeker metaphor 17, discrimination 11, 28
129, 135, 138 dispositions 108, 126, 133
Constantinople, Anne 37, 119 Dixon-Gordon, K. L. 35
construct validity 111, 116, 118, 120, Dollard, John 57, 63, 66–68, 70,
123–124, 125, 165 73–75, 78, 79
Cooley, Charles 137 dominance 107–108, 120, 122–124,
Copernicus, Nicolaus 142 125–126
Costa, Paul 104, 109, 113–114, Donahoe, John 64
115, 119 Doob, L. W. 74
Costa Pereira, M. E. 50 dopamine 145, 147
Crastnopol, M. 44 drive reduction theory 57, 63, 69–70,
crisis resolution 37–38 74, 112
culture 117–118, 141–142, DSM see Diagnostic and Statistical
150–151 Manual of Mental Disorders
 INDEX 219
ECR see Experiences in Close Ethnic Identity Scale (EIS) 38, 39–40
Relationships questionnaire ethnicity and race 11–12, 64, 74–75,
Eddington, K. M. 136 95, 114, 141
educational psychology 65 eudaimonic well-being 101, 102
ego: Anna Freud 33–34; ego eugenics 139, 141
psychologists 20, 50; Erikson event schemas 137
36–37, 87; Fairbairn 43–44; evolutionary psychology 143,
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory 150, 151
20–21, 29, 33, 43; Guntrip 44; Ewen, R. B. 55, 117, 164
Hartmann 34–35; James 6; Jung executive function 155
25; self-psychology 51 existential theories 5, 81, 83, 91–97;
ego psychology 13, 19–20, 33–38; Allport 9; basic assumptions 84–85;
Anna Freud 33–34, 52; Erikson 10, critique of 102–103; de Beauvoir
11, 36–38, 39, 44, 87; Hartmann 94–95; Fanon 95–96; May 96–97,
34–35; Lacan’s critique 48; 156–158, 160–162, 163–165;
Rapaport 35–36 positive psychology 98; Sartre
ego-transcendent needs 90 91–94, 155
Egoist metaphor 92, 162 Exner, John 36
EIS see Ethnic Identity Scale expectancy 75
Electra complex 22, 57 Experiences in Close Relationships
Eliason, G. T. 157 (ECR) questionnaire 47–48,
elicited responses 65 49–50
Emery, L. F. 89–90 expressivity 120, 122
emotional stability 116 Extended Personal Attributes
emotionality 118–119, 148 Questionnaire (EPAQ) 121
emotions 7; as “hot cognitions” 136; extraversion: Big Five Inventory 115;
self-discrepancy theory 135; Costa and McCrae 113; Eysenck
temperament 148; transference 65 112–113; Guilford 114, 116;
empathy 51 heritability 141; HEXACO model
empirical Me 6, 12 118; humourism 144; interpersonal
Endler, N. S. 131 circumplex theory 124; Jung
endopsychic structure 43–44 25–26; neurotransmitter theory
environmental determinism 62 147; reinforcement
environmental factors 150–151; field sensitivity theory 145;
theory 133; physical environment relationship-maintaining behaviour
63–70; social environment 63, 115; Temperament and Character
70–79 Inventory 147
EPAQ see Extended Personal Eysenck, Hans J. 104, 109, 111–113,
Attributes Questionnaire 114, 117, 128, 139, 144, 145
EPI see Eysenck Personality Inventory Eysenck Personality Inventory
Erikson, Erik 10–11, 13, 19–20, (EPI) 112
36–38, 39, 44, 48, 87 Eysenck, S. B. G. 112
eros 21, 34–35, 40, 46
eroticism 21 factor-analytic trait theories 104, 109;
escape mechanisms 31 Ashton and Lee 117–119; Cattell
ethnic identity 11, 12, 38, 39–40 110–111; Costa and McCrae
220 INDEX

113–114; Eysenck 111–113, 139, Friedman, H. 88

144; Guilford 114–117 Fromm, Erich 13, 19, 30–32, 33, 80,
Fairbairn, Ronald 13, 20, 43–44, 82, 83
45, 48 frustration-aggression hypothesis
false self 42 74–75, 78
Fanon, Frantz 81, 95–96 functionalism 62–63, 126, 162–163
fantasy 40 Funder, D. C. 75, 92, 126–127,
Fast, L. A. 92, 127, 132 131–132
feminine psychology 19, 27–29, 30,
32, 56 Gaines, Stanley 11–12
femininity 119–120, 121–122, 124, Galilee-Weisstub, E. 42
125–126, 160 Galton, Francis 139, 141
feminism 18, 56–57, 150 Gao, Jennifer 89
Festinger, Leon 80, 135 Garant, J. 41
field theory 133 Garcia, S. 126
Fight/Flight/Freeze System (FFFS) gay men 22–23, 30, 56
144–145 gender 28–29; see also women
Finkel, Eli 89–90 gender identity 11, 12; multifactorial
Fiske, A. P. 151 gender identity theory 104, 109,
Fiske, S. T. 130, 138 120–122, 160
Flourishing Scale 101–102 gender schema theory 104, 109,
Foa, Edna B. and Uriel G. 80 119–120
Frederick, C. 102 genes 114, 148, 149, 151; see also
free will 21, 95 behaviour genetics
Freeman, T. 24 genital stage 22
Frenkel-Brunswik, E. 24 Gestalt psychology 68
Freud, Anna 19–20, 33–34, 36–37, Gill, M. 36
43, 45–46, 47, 48, 50 goals 86–87, 130, 138–139,
Freud, Sigmund 5, 13, 17–18, 26; 152, 161
Allport’s experience with 107; Goffman, Erving 11
critiques of 56–57; de Beauvoir’s Goldberg, L. R. 116, 125
existential philosophy 94; defence Goldstein, Kurt 80, 85–86, 87–88, 90
mechanisms 33–34; eros 46; Gore, P. M. 76
existential psychoanalysis 93; Gray, Jeffrey A. 139, 143–145
factional splits 19; Fromm’s Grusec, J. E. 78
rejection of 31; “id psychology” Guest, H. S. 90
50; infant sexuality 38; Lacan on Guilford, Joy Paul 104, 109,
48, 50; narcissism 51, 52, 53, 54; 114–117
psychic determinism 62; Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament
psychoanalytic theory 20–25, 29, Survey 116–117
32–33, 40, 43, 44, 48, 57, 78; Guntrip, Harry 13, 20, 44–45, 48
social psychology 71;
stimulus-response theory 73; the habits 69–70, 109
unconscious 158; Watson’s Hall, Calvin S. 52, 53, 86,
response to 65; on women 27–28 102–103, 117
Friedan, Betty 95 happiness 98
 INDEX 221
harm avoidance 145, 147 IAS see Interpersonal Adjective Scales
Hartmann, Heinz 13, 19–20, IAS-R see Revised Interpersonal
34–35, 48 Adjective Scales
Hazan, C. 47, 49 Ickes, W. 126
hedonic well-being 101, 102 id: Adler’s individual psychology 26;
Heider, F. 135 ego psychology 34–35, 50, 87;
Helmreich, Robert 11, 120–121, Freud’s psychoanalytic theory 20,
122, 125, 160 21, 33, 43; Jung’s analytical
Hendrick, Clyde and Susan 82, psychology 25; object relations
97, 164 theory 40; self-psychology 51
Hepworth, J. X. 74–75 ideal-self 135–136
hereditarianism 64 identity 10–12; narrative 158–159;
heritability 110–111, 112, 114, 141, Sartre’s existential philosophy 93;
143, 148–149, 151 see also gender identity; self
Herzog, D. B. 36 idiographic approach 159
HEXACO model of personality impulsivity 145, 148–149
118–119 individual differences: biological
hierarchy of needs 87, 89 theories 141; differential
Higgins, E. Tory 127, 130, 135–136, psychology 12, 110, 141; Freud’s
138–139, 156 psychoanalytic theory 21; Jung’s
Holahan, C. K. 160 analytical psychology 25–26; need
holding environment 42 satisfaction 89; social-cognitive
Holmes, John 132, 133–134, 137 theory 131; temperament 148;
Holzmuller, Ana 122 traits 110–111
homosexuality 22–23, 30, 56 individual psychology 19, 26–27
honesty 118, 119 infant sexuality 19, 38
Horney, Karen 13, 19, 27–29, 30, inferiority complex 27
32, 56 instrumentality 120, 122
Horowitz, L. M. 47, 49, 136 integrated self 161–162
Hovland, C. I. 74–75 intelligence/intellect 7, 110, 112
Hui, C. M. 89 intentionality 86–87, 151–152,
Hull, Clark 57, 63, 69–70, 74, 75, 155–163
79, 112 interactionist approach 126, 131
humanistic theories 5, 80, 83, 85–91, interactionist role theory 11
158; basic assumptions 84–85; interdependence theory 133
Buhler’s humanistic psychology intergroup relations 4, 10, 25
86–87; critique of 102–103; internal consistency 111, 117, 118,
Fromm’s didactic humanism 19, 120, 121, 123, 125
30–32, 33, 80, 82, 83; Goldstein’s internal working models 136–137, 159
organismic psychology 85–86; International Personality Item
Maslow’s self-actualisation theory Pool-Interpersonal Circumplex
87–90; positive psychology 98; (IPIP-IPC) survey 124, 125–126
Rogers’s self-actualisation theory Interpersonal Adjective Scales (IAS)
90–91; well-being 101 123–124
humility 118, 119 interpersonal circumplex theory 30,
humourism 143–144 104, 109, 122–124, 165
222 INDEX

interpersonal relations 3–4, 30, 133 on Kernberg 52; Lacan’s critique

interpersonal theory 19, 29–30, 32 48; Winnicott compared with
intimacy 29, 46, 47, 55–56, 165 41–42
introversion 25–26, 144 knowledge-and-appraisal personality
Inventory of Psychosocial architecture (KAPA) 136
Development 37 Koffka, Kurt 68
IPIP-IPC see International Personality Kohut, Heinz 13, 20, 23, 50–52,
Item Pool-Interpersonal 53, 54
Circumplex survey Koltko-Rivera, M. E. 90
Koole, S. L. 161–162
Jahoda, Marie 99, 100 Kuhl, Julius 161–162
James, William 5–7, 10, 13, 57, 79, Kuipers, H.-J. 41
137, 164; cognitive orientation 18;
consciousness 17; Egoist metaphor Lacan, Jacques 13, 20
92; free will 21; functionalism LaFrance, M. 122
62–63; Goldstein’s organismic Laing, R. D. 93
psychology 85, 86; humanistic and language 48–50
existential theories 103; Larson, G. M. 89–90
intentionality 163; self-awareness latency stage 22
142; subjective self 20 law of effect 64
Jardim, L. L. 50 law of exercise 64
John, Oliver P. 53, 92, 115, 162 Leary, M. R. 92
Jones, E. E. 79 Leary, Timothy 31, 122
Jones, Howard 21 Lee, John Alan 82, 97
Jones, Mary Cover 66, 67 Lee, Kibeom 104, 109, 117–119
joy 98 Lefcourt, H. M. 134
Jung, Carl 19, 25–26 Levenson, Hanna 76, 77
Levinson, D. J. 24
KAPA see knowledge-and-appraisal Lewin, Kurt 71, 133
personality architecture libidinal ego 43
Kaplan-DeNour, A. 42 libido 23, 25–26, 32, 51
Karasu, T. B. 35 life instinct 21, 40, 46
Karniol, R. 135 life satisfaction 98–99
Kelley, Harold 133 life stories 158–159, 161, 164
Kelly, George 103, 127, 128–129, lifespan approach 37
130, 138 Lindamood, C. A. 88
Kenrick, D. T. 151 Lindzey, Gardner 86, 102–103, 117
Kernberg, Otto 13, 20, 52–54 “Little Albert” experiment 65–66
Kerr, N. L. 133 locus of control 75–77, 134, 159
Keyes, C. L. M. 99–100 Lorr, Maurice 122
Kitayama, S. 151 love 82–83, 97–98, 158, 164
Klaif, C. H. 44
Kleiger, J. H. 36 MacDonald, G. 92
Klein, Melanie 13, 20, 45–46; Machiavellianism 160, 161–162
attachment theory 47; Fairbairn Magnusson, D. 131
compared with 43, 44; influence malignant aggression 31
 INDEX 223
“maps” 68 Motivated Tactician metaphor
Marcia, James 11, 39 138, 139
Markey, Charlotte N. 124, 125 motives 7, 12; Adler’s individual
Markey, Patrick M. 124, 125 psychology 26–27; cognitive
Markus, H. 78–79, 151 theories 130, 138–139; Freud’s
marriage 89–90 psychoanalytic theory 20–21;
Marx, Karl 31 Jung’s analytical psychology 25;
Marxism 31, 33 Murray’s personology 54–55;
masculine protest 28 psychodynamic theories 5, 18–19;
masculinity 119–120, 121–122, 124, stability 108
125–126, 160 Mowrer, O. H. 74
Maslow, Abraham 80, 86, 87–90, 158 Multidimensional Personality
material self 6 Questionnaire (MPQ) 147
May, Rollo 81, 83, 96–97, 98, multifactorial gender identity theory
156–158, 159, 160–165 104, 109, 120–122, 160
MBTI see Myers-Briggs Type Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure
Indicator (MEIM) 38, 39
McAdams, Dan 56, 158–159, 164 Murray, Henry 13, 19, 20, 54–56,
McClelland, David 69 103, 158
McCrae, Robert R. 104, 109, muscular armour 32
113–114, 115, 119 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
McLaughlin, N. G. 31 (MBTI) 26
McNair, Douglas 122
McSherry, A. 50 narcissism 21, 22–23, 51–54, 92, 160,
Mead, George Herbert 71 161–162
MEIM see Multigroup Ethnic Identity narcissistic personality disorder 54, 94
Measure Narcissistic Personality Inventory
Mendel, Gregor Johann 148 (NPI) 52, 53, 54
mentalism 57, 72, 73, 79 narrative identity 158–159
Merkur, D. 42 national identity 11
mesolimbic dopamine pathway 147 natural selection 20, 139, 140–141,
Miller, Neal 57, 63, 66–68, 70, 149; evolutionary psychology 150;
73–75, 78, 79 genetics 148; human consciousness
Millon, T. 40, 42, 44, 54 142; influence on James 6;
Milton, M. J. 157–158 Thorndike’s connectionism 64
mind-body problem 157 “nature versus nurture” debate 109
mirroring 51 need for achievement 55
Mischel, Walter: critique of trait need for control 155–156
perspectives 108, 124, 126; needs 87–89, 90
relational schema theory 137; neo-behaviourism 62, 76–77, 79, 159
social-cognitive theory 127, 130, neuroticism: Big Five Inventory 115;
131–132, 133, 138–139 Costa and McCrae 119; Eysenck
moods 7, 99 112–113; Guilford 114, 116;
Morgan, Christiana 55–56 heritability 141; HEXACO model
mother-infant relationship 38–40, 41, 118; Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
46–47, 57 89; reinforcement sensitivity
224 INDEX

theory 145; Temperament and PANAS see Positive and Negative

Character Inventory 147 Affect Schedule
Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness PAQ see Personal Attributes
Personality Inventory, Revised Questionnaire
Version (NEO-PI-R) 113–114, paranoid-schizoid position 40, 41
115, 118 parental investment 139, 149–150
neurotransmitter theory 139, 143, Paulhus, Delroy 161
145–147 Pavlov, Ivan 57, 61–62, 63–64, 65,
nomothetic approach 159 66, 73, 112, 144
nonbeing 97, 164–165 penis envy 28, 56
nondirective therapy 91 person-centred therapy 91
norepinephrine 145 person ego theory 44
Norman, D. K. 36 persona 25
novelty-seeking 145, 146, 147 Personal Attributes Questionnaire
Nowicki, S. 76 (PAQ) 120–121, 125
NPI see Narcissistic Personality personal constructs 103, 127,
Inventory 128–129, 130, 138
nurturance 108, 120, 122–124, Personal Orientation Inventory
125–126, 165 (POI) 88
personal traits 7–8
object relations 13, 20, 38–45; personal unconscious 25
Fairbairn 43–44; Guntrip 44–45; personality: behaviourist theories
Klein 38–41, 52; Lacan’s critique 61–80; biological theories 139,
48; post-Kleinian 46; Winnicott 140–152; cognitive theories
41–43 128–139; core constructs 5–9;
Odbert, H. S. 107, 110, “Dark Triad” 160, 161–162;
111, 125 definition of 4; endopsychic
Oedipus complex 22 structure 43–44; Freud’s
Ong, A. D. 39 psychoanalytic theory 20–22;
openness to experience: Big Five humanistic and existential theories
Inventory 115; cognitive theories 82–103; important constructs
130; Costa and McCrae 113; 10–12; intentionality 155–163;
heritability 141; HEXACO model psychodynamic theories 17–57;
118; Temperament and Character society’s role in shaping 32;
Inventory 147 Sullivan’s interpersonal theory 30;
operant reinforcement 57, 62, 63, 64, trait theories 103–104, 107–126
70–73 personality systems interactions
oral stage 21 theory 161
organismic psychology 80, 85–86, personology 13, 19, 20, 54–56, 103,
87–88, 90 129, 158
orgone 32 Peterson, J. B. 125
other-schemas 137 phallic stage 22
ought-self 135–136 phantasy 40
outgroups 23 phenomenology 93–94
Ozer, D. J. 117 Phillips, N. 123, 125
 INDEX 225
Phinney, Jean 11, 38, 39 relations theory 44–45; Hartmann’s
physical environment 63–70, 84 ego psychology 34–35; Horney’s
Piper, W. E. 41 feminine psychology 27–29; Jung’s
Pitchford, D. B. 97 analytical psychology 25–26;
Plomin, Robert 139, 143, 148–149 Kernberg’s self-psychology 52–54;
POI see Personal Orientation Klein’s object relations theory
Inventory 38–41; Kohut’s self-psychology
Politician metaphor 162 50–52; Lacan’s psychoanalytic
Positive and Negative Affect theory 48–50; Murray’s
Schedule (PANAS) 99 personology 54–56; object
positive psychology 83, 97–102; relations theories 38–45;
Diener 98–99; Ryff 99–100; Rapaport’s ego psychology 35–36;
subjective vitality 100–102 Reich’s character analysis 32–33;
post-traumatic stress disorder “social-psychological” theories
(PTSD) 97 27–33; Sullivan’s interpersonal
power 27, 55–56 theory 29–30; Winnicott’s object
pragmatism 62–63 relations theory 41–43
preconscious 20, 48 psychological testing 36
predictive validity 115–116, 124, psychological well-being 99–100, 101
125–126, 165 psychopathy 160, 161–162
prejudice 11, 24, 31 psychosexual stages 21–22, 33
prejudiced personality 23, 24 psychosocial development 37–38
projective tests 36 psychotherapy 35, 91, 157–158
proprium 6, 12, 164 psychoticism 112
Przybeck, T. R. 147 punishment 64, 78, 79, 144–145
psyche 26 pure Ego 6
psychic determinism 21, 62
psychoanalysis 18, 19; existential 93, Quality of Object Relations Scale
96; Fanon 96; feminism 56–57; (QORS) 41
Freud’s theory 20–25, 29, 32–33, Quilty, L. C. 125
40, 43, 44, 48, 57, 78; Klein’s Quinodoz, J.-M. 48
theory 40–41; Lacan’s theory Quintar, D. 36
48–50; see also object relations Quirin, M. 161–162
psychodynamic theories 5, 12–13,
17–57; Adler’s individual race and ethnicity 11–12, 64, 74–75,
psychology 26–27; Allport 9; Anna 95, 114, 141
Freud’s ego psychology 33–34; racial identity 11–12
basic assumptions 18–20; Bowlby’s Rapaport, David 13, 19–20, 35–36
attachment theory 45–48, 159; Raskin, Robert 52, 53
critique of 56–57, 80; dominance Rayner, Rosalie 65–66
of 103; ego psychology 33–38; RDS see Reward Dependence
Erikson’s ego psychology 36–38; System
Fairbairn’s object relations theory Reed, E. S. 11–12
43–44; Freud’s psychoanalytic reflexive consciousness 155
theory 20–25; Fromm’s didactic reflexology 57, 61–62, 63–64, 65, 66,
humanism 30–32; Guntrip’s object 73, 144
226 INDEX

regressed ego 44–45 Sapyta, J. J. 101

Reich, Wilhelm 13, 19, 32–33 Sartre, Jean-Paul 81, 91–94, 96, 155
reinforcement 57, 62, 63, 64, 70–73 Satisfaction with Life Scale
reinforcement sensitivity theory 139, (SWLS) 99
143–145 Scale of Positive and Negative
Reis, H. T. 133 Experience 101–102
Reise, S. P. 117 scapegoating 74
relatedness 102 Schafer, R. 36
relational schema theory 127, 130, Schellenberg, J. A. 71
133, 136–138 schizoid personality disorder 40, 42,
relationships 47–48, 49–50, 115, 44, 45
125–126, 133, 161, 165–166 schizophrenia 44, 50, 109, 141
religious identity 11 Schmitt, David P. 139, 143,
REP Test 129 149–150
repression 33 scientific revolution 142
Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scientist metaphor 80, 128, 129,
Scales (IAS-R) 123–124, 125, 126 138, 162
reward dependence 145, 147 Sears, R. R. 74–75
Reward Dependence System secondary traits 8
(RDS) 145 secure attachment 46–47, 49, 136
rewards 71, 78, 79, 144–145 self 5–6, 84–85, 155; Buhler’s
Richards, G. 21 humanistic psychology 87;
Right-Wing Authoritarianism definition of 163–164; integrated
(RWA) Scale 23, 24–25 161–162; intentionality and will
Robins, Richard W. 53, 92, 162 160; Rogers’s self-actualisation
Rogers, Carl 80–81, 86, 90–91, theory 91; Sartre’s existential
92, 158 philosophy 93; see also identity
Role Repertory 129 self-activation 161
romantic partners 47 self-actualisation 25, 80–81, 85–86,
Rorschach Inkblot Test 36 87–91, 92
Rosenberg, Morris 91, 92, 134 self-concept 10, 85, 91
Ross, Dorothea 78 self-construal model 151
Ross, M. 135 self-determination theory 102
Ross, Sheila 78 self-discrepancy theory 127, 130,
Rotter, Julian 63, 75–77, 78, 126, 135–136, 138–139, 156
131, 132, 134, 159–160 self-efficacy 134
Rowley, S. A. J. 12 self-esteem: gay men 22–23; Rogers’s
Rubinstein, G. 22–23 self-actualisation theory 91;
Rusbridger, R. 40 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 91,
Rusbult, C. E. 133 92; self-efficacy comparison 134;
Ryan, Richard 100–102 social identity theory 10, 39;
Ryff, Carol 99–100, 101–102 Sullivan’s interpersonal theory 29;
threats to 161
SABI see situation-Partner A- Partner self-perception metaphor 128, 129,
B-interaction 138, 162
Sanford, R. N. 24 self-perception theory 62, 79–80
 INDEX 227
self-psychology 13, 20; Kernberg social dominance orientation (SDO)
52–54; Kohut 50–52; narcissism 23 25; see also dominance
self-regulation 155–156 social environment 63, 70–79, 84
self-schemas 137 social identity theory 10, 39
self-system 29–30 social interest 27
self-theory 5–6, 10, 13, 20, 57, 79, social learning theory: Bandura and
164; consciousness 17; Cooley Walters 57, 63, 78–79, 126–127,
137; Egoist metaphor 92; free will 132; Rotter 57, 63, 75–77, 126,
21; functionalism 62–63; 131, 132, 159–160
Goldstein’s organismic psychology “social-psychological”
85, 86; humanistic and existential psychodynamic theories 27–33
theories 103; intentionality 163; social psychology 3, 71–72
self-awareness 142 social self 6
self-verification theory 17 soul 6, 85, 93, 157
Sellers, Robert 12 speech 71
sensation-seeking 145, 146–147 Spence, Janet 11, 104, 109, 120–122,
serotonin 145 125, 160
sex 20, 21, 26–27, 33 Spence, Kenneth W. 70
sexism 96 spiritual self 6–7
sexual desire 22 splitting 38–40, 43–44
sexual orientation 22–23, 120, 121 stability 108
sexual strategy theory 139, 143, Stagner, Ross 4, 5
149–150 Stapp, J. 120–121, 125, 160
sexuality, infant 19, 38 stereotyping 11, 24
Shalev, A. Y. 42 stimulus-response theory 57, 63, 64,
Shaver, P. R. 47, 49 66–68, 70, 73–75, 78
Shelton, J. N. 12 stimulus-stimulus theory 57, 63,
Shoda, Y. 131–132, 133, 66–69
137, 138 “strange situation” 46–47
Shostrom, Everett 88 structuralism 63
Silvia, P. J. 136 “styles of life” 27
Singer, B. 100, 101 subjective vitality 100–102
situation-Partner A- Partner subjective well-being 98–99, 100, 101
B-interaction (SABI) model 132, sublimation 71
133–134, 137 suffocation model of marriage
Sixteen Personality Factor (16PF) 89–90
questionnaire 111, 113 Suh, E. 101
Skinner, B. F. 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, Sullivan, Harry Stack 13, 19, 29–30,
70–73, 79 32, 122, 157
Smith, M. A. 12 superego: ego psychology 50, 87;
Snyder, M. 126, 162–163 Freud’s psychoanalytic theory 20,
sociability 116, 148 21, 33, 43; Jung’s analytical
social-cognitive theory: Bandura 79, psychology 25
127, 130, 132–134, 138–139; superiority complex 27
Funder 126–127; Mischel 127, Svrakic, D. M. 147
130, 131–132, 133, 138–139 Swann, William 17
228 INDEX

SWLS see Satisfaction with Life Scale 122–124; see also “Big Five”
systematic desensitisation 67 personality traits
transference 65
Tajfel, Henri 10, 39 transitional objects 42
“talking cure” 17–18 Trapnell, P. 123, 125
Taormina, Robert 89 trauma 45
Tate, C. C. 150 Trivers, Robert L. 139, 149–150
Taylor, S. E. 130, 138 true self 42
temperament 116–117, 139, 143, trust 159–160
148–149 Turner, B. J. 35
Temperament and Character
Inventory (TCI) 147 Umana-Taylor, Adriana 38, 39–40
Teo, T. 52 unconditional positive regard 91, 92
Terry, H. 52 the unconscious 20, 48–50, 93, 158
tests 36 unconscious processes 17
thanatos 21, 34–35, 40, 46 urethral stage 22
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
55–56 values 4, 7, 12, 130, 164
Thibaut, John W. 133 Van der Veer, R. 41
Thompson, Clara 56 Van Dijken, S. 41
Thorndike, Edward L. 57, 63–65, Van Ijzendoorn, M. 41
66, 69 Van Lange, P. A. M. 133
thought processes 129–130 virtues 37
Titchener, Edward B. 63
Tolman, Edward C. 57, 63, 66–69
Tosi, D. J. 88 Walkey, F. H. 77
traits 5, 103–104, 107–126; Allport 4, Wall, S. 46–47, 49
7–9, 19, 107–108, 109, 110, Wallace, Alfred Russell 140, 142
111–112, 124, 126, 164; Ashton Walsh, R. 33, 52
and Lee 117–119; basic Walters, Richard 57, 63, 78–79,
assumptions 108–109; Bem’s 126–127, 132
gender schema theory 119–120; Waterman, A. S. 37–38
Cattell 110–111; cognitive theories Waters, E. 46–47, 49
130; Costa and McCrae 113–114; Watson, John B. 57, 63, 65–66, 67,
critique of trait perspectives 68, 70, 72
124–126; cultural psychology Wegner, D. M. 155–156
141–142; definition of 109; Weiner, B. 75
Eysenck 111–113, 139, 144; Weisberg, Y. J. 125
gender-related 11; Guilford well-being: eudaimonic 101, 102;
114–117; Myers-Briggs Type hedonic 101, 102; psychological
Indicator 26; Spence’s 99–100, 101; subjective 98–99,
multifactorial gender identity 100, 101
theory 120–122, 160; Sullivan’s West, S. G. 74–75
interpersonal theory 30; Westen, D. 34
temperament 148; Wiggins’s Whitbourne, S. K. 37–38
interpersonal circumplex theory White, W. F. 78, 79
 INDEX 229
Wiggins, Jerry S. 104, 109, 122–124, achievement 55; parental
125, 165 investment 149–150; psychosocial
Wilhelm, J. A. 121 development 37–38; sexual strategy
will 160–163 theory 150
Williams, Kevin 161 Women’s Rights Movement 11, 18,
Winnicott, Donald 13, 20, 41–43, 44, 28, 56
45, 48 Wundt, Wilhelm 61, 63, 163
Winston, A. 35
womb envy 28 Yazedijan, A. 38, 39
women: Buhler 87; critiques of Freud
56–57; “Dark Triad” 161–162; de
Beauvoir’s existential philosophy Zajonc, R. B. 78–79
94–95; Fanon’s existential Zimmerman, Wayne S. 116
psychology 96; Horney’s feminine Zuckerman, Marvin 145,
psychology 27–29; need for 146–147