Indian Economic Review

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41775-023-00193-w

ARTICLE

Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:

analysing outcomes of the 2023 Indian Premier League
auctions

Vani K. Borooah1

Accepted: 13 August 2023

© The Author(s) 2023

Abstract
The amount that players are paid in professional cricket is mostly derived from sal-
ary not, as in golf and tennis, from prize money and outside endorsements. Con-
sequently, their pay is dependent on the remuneration system in operation which,
in most cases, are administered set by their employers. Such prices embody severe
gender inequalities with, for example, the lowest paid man being paid more than
the highest paid woman in England’s iconic Hundred competition. In contrast, in
the Women’s Premier League (WPL) and the Indian Premier League (IPL) auc-
tions, prices are determined by the market with each player’s pay being determined
by the highest bidder. From a detailed analysis of data from these two auctions for
December 2022 (IPL) and March 2023, I show that the market system goes some
way towards ameliorating the gender inequalities embedded in administered prices.
After decomposing inequality in sale prices, I show that the main driver of inequal-
ity under these auctions was not gender but whether the candidates were domestic or
overseas players.

Keywords Cricket Gender Auction Inequality

JEL Classification J31 · J33

1 Introduction

The issue of the unequal treatment of women vis-à-vis men is a live issue in sport,
as it is in most walks of life. In many instances, the rewards to male and female
sports persons are the result of “administrative” decisions: committees of the great

This paper has benefitted greatly from comments by an anonymous referee though, naturally, I
remain solely responsible for any residual errors of either commission or omission.

* Vani K. Borooah
VK.Borooah@ulster.ac.uk
1
School of Economics, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland BT37 0QB, UK

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 V. K. Borooah

and good, mostly middle-aged men, meet to decide how much should be paid to
women relative to their male counterparts.1 They hazard guesses about the popu-
larity of the men’s and women’s games, the size of the audiences they are likely
to attract, the interest of broadcasters and pay men and women accordingly. Pay is
dependent on the remuneration system set by their employers and gender disparity is
built into the contracts. This disparity affects not just rewards for representing one’s
country but also for players in franchise cricket. Against this background, this paper
examines gender differences in pay in franchise cricket with respect to the Indian
Premier League’s system of establishing player values through auction.
In franchise cricket, a national cricket association establishes a league-based tour-
nament—culminating in play-offs between the highest placed teams in the league to
determine the champion—based (so far) on T20 matches. It sells this tournament to
franchise holders who expend money in forming teams to compete in this tourna-
ment, the composition of the teams consisting of both national and overseas players.
The franchise holders recoup their investment through ticket and merchandise sales
and through their share of income from broadcasting rights.2
Relevant examples of administrative pay-setting in franchise cricket are the Big
Bash League (BBL) and the Women’s Big Bash League (WBBL) in Australia and
Hundred in England which premiered in July 2021.3 The former offered in 2021,
contracts with a minimum retainer of AUS$40,604 (US$29,000) for men and
AUS$11,584 (US$8300) for women.4 In the latter, under contracts offered by the
English Cricket Board (ECB), female players earned between £3600 and £15,000
for the five-week period that they were part of their Hundred squads while their
male counterparts earned between £24,000 and £100,000. Thus, on these pay scales,
the lowest paid man in the Hundred earned significantly more than the highest paid
woman.5
There is a crucial distinction in sport between prize money and pay. In tennis, for
example, where players are essentially self-employed—having to cover their own
transportation, equipment, coaching, and accommodation costs—obtaining a share
of the prize money from playing in tournaments is their only source of income from
playing tennis.6 The difference between cricket and tennis (or golf) tennis is that
professional cricketers are not self-employed but are employees of their national

1
The various national cricket boards or, in the case of franchise cricket, the Australian Big Bash League
(BBL) and Women’s Big Bash League (WBBL) and England’s The Hundred.
2
At the time of writing, practically all the major cricket playing countries have franchise cricket—the
Bangladesh Premier League, Caribbean Premier League, South Africa’s Mzansi Super League, the Paki-
stan Super League, the Australian Big Bash League for men and also, separately, for women, the English
“Hundred” competition (for men and also, separately, for women), and, the earliest and richest of all
franchises, the Indian Premier League for men and, since 2023, separately for women.
3
As the name implies, each innings in the Hundred comprises 100 balls, bowled in bunches of 10 balls,
in contrast to the 20 six-ball overs of traditional T20 competitions.
4
The figures quoted are from Jolly (2021).
5
Nor was it possible to plead a lack of money to justify this anomaly: 11 Australian women cricketers in
2021 were each offered £10,000 each as ‘disturbance money’, in addition to their salaries of £15,000, to
entice them to play in the Hundred—an offer which, as it happened, they declined.
6
Other sources of income might be endorsements of products and/or coaching.

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Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

cricket associations or, in the case of franchise cricket, of the cricketing franchises
they play for.
The low salaries offered to women cricketers particularly affected those who were
not professional cricketers and who, therefore, had to combine playing cricket with
holding down a regular job. These part-time cricketers—of whom there were at least
five in England—had to take their five weeks at the Hundred as annual leave or else
had to ask their employers for additional time off. For such cricketers there was a
genuine dilemma between playing cricket or working for a living (Westbury, 2021).
In contrast to administered pay scales, are the market-determined prices for indi-
vidual cricketers as exemplified by the Indian Premier League’s (IPL) auctions.
Recently the IPL, which had been going since 2007 as an exclusively male tourna-
ment, established a women’s tournament, along the same lines as that for men and
with a subset of the same franchises, and dubbed it the Women’s Premier League
(WPL). The auction of players for this was held in Mumbai in February 2022 and
the three-week tournament premiered on 4 March 2023. The WPL games were
to be followed, between 31 March and 28 May 2023, by the IPL tournament with
the players’ auction for the latter having been completed on 23 December 2022 in
Kochi. Taken together, the auction results constitute a natural experiment for quasi-
market determined gender differences in cricketers’ earnings.
This paper analyses the outcomes of these two auctions, the first for men in
December 2022 and the second for women in February 2023, separated by 2 months
and held under the ambit of identical institutional structures. It examines the rela-
tionship between the base prices that players set for themselves and the markup
they receive in terms of their sale price. This analysis is not just in terms of gender
differences but also for differences emanating from whether players were overseas
or domestic players. Then it uses the methodology of inequality decomposition to
establish how much of inter-player inequality in auction prices could be explained
by gender and how much by players’ overseas/domestic status. Lastly, using the
seminal work of Atkinson (1970), it establishes a link between inequality in IPL
auction outcomes and IPL social welfare.

2 Women and remuneration

The unequal treatment of women relative to men in terms of pay is an entrenched

(and unsavoury) feature of the social and economic life of many countries. The Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that, in a global context, women’s
earnings in 2015 were 77% of those of men and that, at prevailing rates of decline,
it would take 70 years for the gender gap to narrow appreciably (ILO, 2015). Much
of this gap was because women were overrepresented in low-paid occupations (a
universal characteristic of labour markets) and the fact that they have increased
their presence in higher-paid jobs in managerial and professional positions has not
been enough to offset this. Even within high-paid occupations, however, a large pro-
portion of women reported discrimination in respect of remuneration: one in four
employed women in the USA said they earned less than a man who was doing the

13
 V. K. Borooah

same job while just 5% of men said they earned less than a woman doing the same
job (Barroso & Brown, 2021).
Many of these features carry over into India where the IPL is located. In terms
of the overall gender gap, the World Economic Forum (2021, Table 1.1) reported
that India ranked 1­ 40th out of 156 countries—just above Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco,
and Oman. Behind, this overall result there are, however, several puzzling features.
In terms of the sub-indices of gender disparity, India did best in terms of political
empowerment, ranking 51st out of 155 countries ahead, among others, of Australia
and Luxembourg (World Economic Forum, 2021, Table 1.2). In terms of educational
attainment, India ranked 114th out of 156 countries (World Economic Forum, 2021,
Table 1.2). But, in terms of Economic Participation and Opportunity it came in at
a dismal 151st (out of 156 countries) with only Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and
Afghanistan below. It would appear, therefore, that notwithstanding their political
emancipation and their educational attainment, Indian women were not able to break
free of the patriarchal straitjacket which constrained their economic achievement.
Although traditional theories of wage inequality emphasise employer discrimi-
nation in favour of certain groups (Arrow, 1973; Becker, 1993), Mukherjee and
Sarkhel (2021) added a novel twist to this story for India in the context of patriarchy.
They argued that in India women, prioritising family over career, settled for smaller
salaries in less demanding jobs. So, even in the absence of employer discrimina-
tion, a gender wage gap would emerge because women, obeying patriarchal norms,
placed greater emphasis on their role within the household than outside it.
Another paradox of India’s labour market is that even though its GDP increased
by 241% between 2005 and 2019, its female labour force participation rate (LFPR)
declined 34% over the same period (World Bank, 2019). In 2018, women made up
just a fourth of India’s workforce, and 90 percent of those who were working were
in informal employment, such as unpaid or irregular work.7 Economists have put
forward two theories to explain the decline. The first is that India’s boom has created
jobs in segments that are generally not accessible to women, like construction. The
second has to do with culture: unless their choices are dictated by destitute poverty,
Indian families seek the status that comes from keeping women at home.8 Costagl-
iola (2021) has argued that this decline was mainly associated with patriarchal val-
ues that discouraged women from working in the industrial and service sectors.9

7
Laura Sili, How Can India Help Women Stay in the Labour Force, The London School of Economics,
https://​blogs.​lse.​ac.​uk/​covid​19/​2021/​03/​22/​how-​can-​india-​help-​women-​to-​stay-​in-​the-​workf​orce/.
8
For an interaction of both factors see Elaine Barry, “In India, a small band of women risk it all to seek
work”, The New York Times, 30 January 2016. https://​www.​nytim​es.​com/​2016/​01/​31/​world/​asia/​indian-​
women-​labor-​work-​force.​html?​searc​hResu​ltPos​ition=7.
9
As the Economist magazine reported, Chinese women, on average, spent four hours a day on house-
work, compared with about an hour and a half for men while the gap was even wider in India: five hours
for women to half an hour for men. https://​www.​econo​mist.​com/​the-​econo​mist-​expla​ins/​2021/​03/​08/​
how-​much-​is-​doing-​the-​house​hold-​chores-​worth.

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Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

3 The IPL and WPL auctions

The IPL and WPL auctions featured a list of, respectively, male and female players
to be acquired by one of the 10 IPL teams, and one of the five WPL teams, in the
competition. Teams bid for players, using funds from their auction budget, and the
team bidding highest for a particular player wins their services for that edition of the
tournament. The IPL auction list consisted of two types of players: those who had
been released by their team and those who made a fresh registration. The WPL auc-
tion, being the first such auction, comprised only fresh registrations though many of
women registering for the WPL were established players with distinguished records
in franchise and international cricket.
The composition of the teams’ squads was subject to certain restrictions, the most
important of which was that squads could have a maximum of 25 members of which
not more than eight were to be overseas players. The playing XI for the IPL could
not include more than four overseas players and, indeed, not more than four overseas
players per team were allowed to be on the field at any time.10 The playing XI for the
WPL could, however, include five overseas players provided the fifth was from an
Associate country of the International Cricket Council (ICC).
Each player had a base price which was the minimum amount that had to be paid
for their services. In establishing this base price, firstly, players were categorized as
capped or uncapped depending on whether they had represented their country in an

could choose between ₹5 million, ₹4 million, or ₹3 million while uncapped players

international match or not. In setting their base price, capped players in the WPL

in the WPL could choose a base price of either ₹1 million or ₹2 million (where ₹1

base price subject to ceiling of ₹20 million (approx. $250,000). Uncapped players
million = USD$12,800).11 In the IPL, capped players were allowed to set their own

had to choose a base price from a menu of ₹1 million, ₹2 million, or ₹3 million.12

Bidding for every player in whom a team expressed interest started at the base
price and continued through incremental bids until the highest uncontested bid

if ₹10 million (US$120,800) was paid for a player at auction, then that is what they
emerged. The money paid for a player was their salary and was valid for a season:

were paid for that season.13

Tables 1 and 2 list, respectively, the 87 female, and 80 male, players who were
bought, respectively, in the 2023 WPL (February) and the 2022 IPL (December)
auctions, along with information on: (i) whether they were overseas or Indian play-
ers; (ii) the team buying them; (iii) their base price; (iv) their sale price; (v) the

10
This means that with four overseas players playing, a substitute for an injured Indian player cannot be
an overseas player as that would mean five overseas players on the field.
11
Women’s Premier League Auction 2023: All you need to know. https://​www.​thecr​icket​er.​com/​Topics/​
wpl/​women​’s_​premi​er_​league_​aucti​on_​2023_​all_​you_​need_​to_​know.​html
12
https://​front​lines​media.​in/​how-​is-​the-​base-​price-​of-​every-​player-​decid​ed-​for-​every-​years-​ipl-​aucti​on/.

BCCI, from a central pool. Thus, if ₹10 million (US$ 120,800) was paid to an Australian player, Cricket
13
For overseas players, 20% of what the player earned was paid to their home cricket board by the

Australia would receive ₹2 million (US$24,160). Payments were staggered, often following a 15-65-20
formula, so that 15% was paid at the start, 65% during the season, and 20% at the season’s conclusion.

13
 V. K. Borooah

Table 1  Reserve and sale prices of players bought in the Women’s Premier League 2023 auction (all
prices in millions of Indian Rupees: 10 million Indian rupees = US$120,800)
Player Status Buyer Base Price Sale Price Markup Country

S Mandhana Domestic RCB 5 34 6.8 IND

A Gardner Overseas GG 5 32 6.4 AUS
N Sciver Overseas MI 5 32 6.4 ENG
D Sharma Domestic UPW 5 26 5.2 IND
J Rodrigues Domestic DC 5 22 4.4 IND
S Verma Domestic DC 5 20 4 IND
B Mooney Overseas GG 4 20 5 AUS
R Ghosh Domestic RCB 5 19 3.8 IND
P Vastrakar Domestic MI 5 19 3.8 IND
S Ecclestone Overseas UPW 5 18 3.6 ENG
H Kaur Domestic MI 5 18 3.6 IND
E Perry Overseas RCB 5 17 3.4 AUS
M Kapp Overseas DC 4 15 3.8 SA
R Singh Domestic RCB 5 15 3 IND
Y Bhatia Domestic MI 4 15 3.8 IND
D Vaidya Domestic UPW 4 14 3.5 IND
T McGrath Overseas UPW 4 14 3.5 AUS
M Lanning Overseas DC 5 11 2.2 AUS
S Ismail Overseas UPW 4 10 2.5 SA
A Kerr Overseas MI 4 10 2.5 NZ
S Rana Domestic GG 5 7 1.5 IND
G Harris Overseas UPW 3 7 2.5 AUS
G Wareham Overseas GG 3 7 2.5 AUS
A Capsey Overseas DC 3 7 2.5 ENG
A Sutherland Overseas GG 3 7 2.3 AUS
A Healy Overseas UPW 5 7 1.4 AUS
D Dottin Overseas GG 5 6 1.2 WI
S Dunkley Overseas GG 3 6 2 ENG
S Pandey Domestic DC 4 6 1.5 IND
S Verma Domestic GG 3 6 2 IND
A Sarvani Domestic UPW 3 6 1.8 IND
J Jonassen Overseas DC 5 5 1 AUS
T Kanwar Domestic GG 1 5 5 IND
A Kaur Domestic MI 3 5 1.7 IND
S Devine Overseas RCB 5 5 1 NZ
L Harris Overseas DC 1 4 4.5 AUS
H Deol Domestic GG 4 4 1 IND
H Knight Overseas RCB 4 4 1 ENG
H Matthews Overseas MI 4 4 1 WI
M Schutt Overseas RCB 4 4 1 AUS
R Gayakwad Domestic UPW 4 4 1 IND

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Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Table 1  (continued)
Player Status Buyer Base Price Sale Price Markup Country

R Yadav Domestic DC 4 4 1 IND

S Sehrawat Domestic UPW 1 4 4 IND
K Ahuja Domestic RCB 1 3 3.5 IND
A Kumari Domestic GG 1 3 3.5 IND
E Burns Overseas RCB 3 3 1 AUS
M Patel Domestic GG 3 3 1 IND
D Hemalatha Domestic GG 3 3 1 IND
S Deepti Domestic DC 3 3 1
D v Niekerk Overseas RCB 3 3 1 SA
K Navgire Domestic UPW 3 3 1 IND
A Reddy Domestic DC 3 3 1 IND
H Graham Overseas MI 3 3 1 AUS
T Bhatia Domestic DC 3 3 1 IND
C Tryon Overseas MI 3 3 1 SA
P Yadav Domestic DC 3 3 1 IND
S Meghana Domestic GG 3 3 1 IND
I Wong Overseas MI 3 3 1 ENG
L Bell Overseas UPW 3 3 1 ENG
P Bose Domestic RCB 3 3 1 IND
M Joshi Domestic GG 3 3 1 IND
K Zanzad Domestic RCB 1 2 2.5 IND
T Sadhu Domestic DC 1 2 2.5 IND
J Akhter Domestic DC 2 2 1 IND
P Bala Domestic MI 2 2 1 IND
I Roy Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
A Mondal Domestic DC 1 1 1 IND
S Shaikh Domestic UPW 1 1 1 IND
MD Shabnam Domestic GG 1 1 1 IND
H Gala Domestic GG 1 1 1 IND
T Norris Overseas DC 1 1 1 USA
D Gujjar Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND
S Patil Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
S Pawar Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
S Yashasri Domestic UPW 1 1 1 IND
H Kazi Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND
P Sisodia Domestic GG 1 1 1 IND
S Yadav Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND
N Bisht Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND
L Yadav Domestic UPW 1 1 1 IND
A Shobaba Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
D Kasat Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
J Kalita Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND

13
 V. K. Borooah

Table 1  (continued)
Player Status Buyer Base Price Sale Price Markup Country

S Ishaque Domestic MI 1 1 1 IND

P Khemnar Domestic RCB 1 1 1 IND
P Chopra Domestic UPW 1 1 1 IND
M Mani Domestic DC 1 1 IND

Source: https://​www.​espnc​ricin​fo.​com/​story/​2023-​wpl-​aucti​on-​list-​of-​sold-​and-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13586​95
DC Delhi Capitals; GG Gujarat Giants; MI Mumbai Indians; RCB Royal Challengers Bangalore; UPZ
UP Warriors

mark-up of sale over base price; (vi) their country. All subsequent calculations
reported in this paper were derived, using appropriate techniques, from these data.
The sources for the data in Tables 1 and 2 are from the ESPN Cricinfo website avail-
able, respectively, at: https://​www.​espnc​ricin​fo.​com/​story/​2023-​wpl-​aucti​on-​list-​of-​
sold-​and-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13586​95 and https://​www.​espnc​ricin​fo.​com/​story/​2023-​ipl-​
aucti​on-​list-​of-​sold-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13502​72.
Table 1 shows that of the 87 players who were bought in the WPL 2023 auction,
57 were domestic, and 30 were overseas, players. Of the overseas players, 14 were
from Australia, seven were from England, two were from New Zealand, four were
from South Africa, two were from the West Indies, and one (Tara Norris) was from
the USA which was an Associate country of the ICC.
Table 2 shows that of the 80 players who were bought in the IPL 2023 auction,
51 were domestic, and 29 were overseas, players. Of the overseas players, four were
from Australia, two were from Bangladesh, eight were from England, two were from
New Zealand, five were from South Africa, five were from the West Indies, one was
from Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan and Ireland contributed a player each.14

the Indian batter Smriti Mandhana, who fetched ₹34 million (approximately
Table 1 shows that the most expensive player in the WPL 2023 auction was

price of ₹5 million (approximately US$61,000). Table 2 shows that the most expen-
US$415,000) from Royal Challengers Bangalore, with a 6.8 mark-up over her base

fetched ₹185 million (approximately US$2.25 million) with a 9.25 mark-up over
sive player in the IPL 2023 auction was the English all-rounder Sam Curran, who

his base price of ₹20 million (approximately US$240,000). So, the highest paid IPL
player earned five times as much as his female counterpart in the WPL.
This should be tempered by the fact that each IPL team played more matches
than their WPL equivalent. Under IPL 2023, the 10 competing (men’s) teams were
divided randomly into two groups of five teams each, A and. For the group matches,
each team plays 14 games: playing the other four teams in their group twice (home
and away); four teams in the other group once; and the remaining team in the other
group twice. So, each of the 10 teams in IPL 2023 played 14 league matches with

14
In addition to the players bought at the WPL and IPL auctions, several players who had put them-
selves up for auction remained unsold at both auctions.

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Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Table 2  Reserve and sale prices of players bought in the Indian Premier League 2023 auction (all prices
in millions of Indian rupees: 10 million Indian rupees = US$120,800)
Player Status Buyer Base Price Sale Price Markup Country

S Curran Overseas KP 20 185 9.3 ENG

C Green Overseas MI 20 175 8.8 AUS
B Stokes Overseas CSK 20 162 8.1 ENG
N Pooran Overseas LSG 20 160 8 WI
H Brook Overseas SRH 15 132 8.8 ENG
M Agarwal Domestic SRH 10 82 8.3 IND
S Mavi Domestic GT 4 60 15 IND
J Holder Overseas RR 20 57 2.9 WI
M Kumar Domestic DC 2 55 27.5 IND
H Klaasen Overseas SRH 10 52 5.3 SA
R Rossouw Overseas DC 20 46 2.3 SA
J Little Overseas GT 5 44 8.8 IRL
W Jacks Overseas RCB 15 32 2.1 ENG
V Sharma Domestic SRH 2 26 13 IND
M Pandey Domestic DC 10 24 2.4 IND
P Salt Overseas DC 20 20 1 ENG
K Williamson Overseas GT 20 20 1 NZ
A Rashid Overseas SRH 20 20 1 ENG
R Topley Overseas RCB 7 19 2.5 ENG
M Dagar Domestic SRH 2 18 9 IND
S Al Hasan Overseas KKR 15 15 1 BND
J Richardson Overseas MI 15 15 1 AUS
A Zampa Overseas RR 15 15 1 AUS
KS Bharat Domestic GL 2 12 6 IND
J Root Overseas RR 10 10 1 ENG
A Hosein Overseas SRH 10 10 1 WI
K Jamieson Overseas CSK 10 10 1 NZ
D Wiese Overseas KKR 2 10 5 SA
N Jagadeesan Domestic KKR 2 9 4.5 IND
D Sams Overseas LSG 7 7 1 AUS
R Kumar Domestic RCB 2 7 3.5 IND
V Arora Domestic KKR 2 6 3 IND
A Singh Domestic RCB 2 6 3 IND
N Sindhu Domestic CSK 2 6 3 IND
N ul-Haq Overseas LSG 5 5 1 AFG
M Singh Domestic KKR 5 5 1 IND
D Ferreira Overseas RR 2 5 2.5 SA
J Unadkat Domestic LSG 5 5 1 IND
I Sharma Domestic DC 5 5 1 IND
A Rahane Domestic CSK 5 5 1 IND
S Raza Overseas KP 5 5 1 ZIM
M Sharma Domestic GT 5 5 1 IND
M Markanda Domestic SRH 5 5 1 IND
R Shepherd Overseas LSG 5 5 1 WI

13
 V. K. Borooah

Table 2  (continued)
Player Status Buyer Base Price Sale Price Markup Country

P Chawla Domestic MI 5 5 1 IND

A Mishra Domestic LSG 5 5 1 IND
O Smith Overseas GT 5 5 1 WI
L Das Overseas KKR 5 5 1 BND
Y Thakur Domestic LSG 2 4 2.3 IND
H Bhatia Domestic KP 2 4 2 IND
KM Asif Domestic RR 3 3 1 IND
U Yadav Domestic SRH 2 2 1.3 IND
Y Singh Domestic LSG 2 2 1 IND
A Basith Domestic RR 2 2 1 IND
K Khejroliya Domestic KKR 2 2 1 IND
A Singh Domestic SRH 2 2 1 IND
A Vasisht Domestic RR 2 2 1 IND
S Yadav Domestic RCB 2 2 1 IND
V Kaverappa Domestic KP 2 2 1 IND
S Sharma Domestic KKR 2 2 1 IND
Shivam Singh Domestic KP 2 2 1 IND
M Rathee Domestic KP 2 2 1 IND
A Mandal Domestic CSK 2 2 1 IND
P Mankad Domestic LSG 2 2 1 IND
Sw Singh Domestic LSG 2 2 1 IND
S Mulani Domestic MI 2 2 1 IND
S Vyas Domestic SRH 2 2 1 IND
R Goyal Domestic MI 2 2 1 IND
Sanvir Singh Domestic SRH 2 2 1 IND
K Rathore Domestic RR 2 2 1 IND
H Sharma Domestic RCB 2 2 1 IND
D Jansen Overseas MI 2 2 1 SA
M Ashwin Domestic RR 2 2 1 IND
U Patel Domestic GT 2 2 1 IND
V Vinod Domestic MI 2 2 1 IND
S Rasheed Domestic CSK 2 2 1 IND
M Bhandage Domestic RCB 2 2 1 IND
N Wadhera Domestic MI 2 2 1 IND
NK Reddy Domestic SRH 2 2 1 IND
B Varma Domestic CSK 2 2 1 IND

Source: https://​www.​espnc​ricin​fo.​com/​story/​2023-​ipl-​aucti​on-​list-​of-​sold-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13502​72
CSK Chennai Super Kings; DC Delhi Capitals; GG Gujarat Giants; KKR Kolkata Knight Riders; KP
Kings Punjab; LSG Lucknow Super Giants; MI Mumbai Indians; RCB Royal Challengers Bangalore; RR
Rajasthan Royals; SRH Sunrisers Hyderabad

the top four teams advancing to the playoffs: qualifier, eliminator, semi-final, and
final. By contrast, each of the five WPL teams played every other team twice. So,

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

each of the five teams in IPL 2023 played eight league matches with the top three
teams advancing to the playoffs: eliminator, semi-final, and final.

₹13.2 and ₹4.25 million implying that, on a per-match basis, the highest paid IPL
Thus, the amounts Curran and Mandhana were paid per match were, respectively,

earnings spectrum, the lowest paid IPL player earned ₹2 million which was twice as
player earned three times more than his WPL equivalent. At the other end of the

much as the ₹1 million paid to his WPL equivalent. On a per-match basis, however,
the lowest paid WPL player received ₹125,000 (that is, ₹1 million for eight matches)
compared to the ₹143,000 (that is, ₹2 million for 14 matches) received by the lowest
paid IPL player. Thus, in terms of payment per match, the lowest paid WPL players
were only slightly worse (₹18,000) than their IPL equivalents. More generally, if
the total amount paid for a female player was more than 57% (8/14) of that paid to a
male player then, on a per-match basis, the female player would be better-off.

at least ₹60 million to be better off than the three highest paid female players—Man-
So, on a payment per match basis, a male player would need to be paid a total of

dhana, Gardner, and Scriver who earned, respectively, ₹34, ₹32, and ₹32 million.
There were seven such men —Curran, Green, Stokes, Pooran, Brooks, Agarwal, and

paid a total of more than ₹1.75 million to be better off than the lowest paid female
Mavi. Similarly, at the bottom of the payment scale, a male player would need to be

players who were paid ₹1 million at auction. Of the 80 men sold at the IPL auction
in December 2022, not a single player failed to meet this threshold of ₹1.75 million
and of the 87 women sold at the WPL auction in March 2023, 22 were paid ₹1 mil-
lion at auction. So, all the auctioned men (80/80) were paid more on a per-match
basis than 25% of the auctioned women (22/87).
It is important to note that this situation does not arise with either the Australian
BBL and WBBL tournament or with the English Hundred competition. There the
“double-header” system, under which there are two matches per day—a women’s
game in the afternoon and a men’s game in the evening or vice-versa—both women
and men play the same number of matches. Under IPL/WPL rules, women com-
mand lower prices than men at auction, but they are also required to play fewer—
eight against 14—matches.

4 Measuring inequality in base and sale prices

The average sale price of overseas players in the WPL, at ₹9.1 million (US$110,000),
was 62.5% higher that of the average sale price of ₹5.6 million (US$67,650) for

price—₹3.7 million (US$44,700) compared to the ₹2.4 million (US$29,000) of

Indian players. However, since overseas players had, on average, a higher base

Indian players—the average mark-ups of overseas and Indian players were nearly the
same: 2.5 (overseas) versus 2.3 (Indian). Thirty-six of the 57 Indian players and 12
of the 30 overseas players up for the WPL auction—respectively, 63% and 40% of

In contrast, the average sale price of overseas players in the IPL, at ₹43.1 mil-
their cohorts—failed to improve on their base price.

lion (US$520,660), was 5.25 times higher that of the average sale price of ₹8.2
million (US$99,060) for Indian players. However, since overseas players had, on

13
 V. K. Borooah

Gini×100
80
71.91
70
63.26 61.56
57.96
60 53.76
50
42.38
40

30

20

10

0
All Players Domesc Players Overseas Players

WPL IPL

Fig. 1  Gini coefficients for the sale price in WPL and IPL auctions Source: Own calculations from data
in Tables 1 and 2

average, a higher base price, ₹3.7 million (US$44,700) compared to the ₹2.4 million
(US$29,000) of Indian players, the average mark-ups of overseas and Indian players
were nearly the same: 2.5 (overseas) versus 2.3 (Indian).

received, respectively, totals of ₹242 million and ₹1,120 million which were, respec-
The ten players commanding the highest prices in the WPL and IPL auctions

tively, 40.8% and 67.1% of the total amounts of ₹593 million (WPL) and ₹1,670
(IPL) million spent at the auctions. So, prima facie, the sale prices for the play-

between 77 players in the WPL and ₹550 million between 80 players in the IPL)
ers embodied a great deal of inequality with relatively small sums (₹351 million

distributed between players who were not in the top ten earners.
The Gini coefficients for the sale price outcomes of the WPL and IPL auctions,
associated with various groups, are shown in Fig. 1.15 Considering women and men
in their entirety, the sale price Gini was considerably lower for women (53.76: 87
women) than it was for men (71.91: 80 men). In considering specific categories, the
Gini values for the WPL were considerably higher for domestic (57.96: 57 women),
than for overseas (42.38: 30 women), players. On the other hand, the Gini values for
the IPL were almost identical for domestic (63.26: 51 men) and overseas (61.56: 29
men), players.
Notes for Figure 1:
The Gini coefficient is computed as follows. If N is the number of persons, wi is
the (sale or base) price of person i and w is the mean price, computed over the N
persons, the Gini coefficient is defined as:

15
Note the calculated Gini values are × 100.

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Gini×100
60

50 47.8

40
33.88
31.18
29.4
30
24.45

20 15.54

10

0
All Players Domesc Players Overseas Players

WPL IPL

Fig. 2  Gini coefficients for the base price in WPL and IPL auctions Source: Own Calculations from data
in Tables 1 and 2 using the ineqdeco command in Stata 15.0

N N
1 ∑∑
G= |w − wj | (1)
2N 2 w i=1 j=1 i

In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference
in prices between pairs of respondents, divided by the average price ( w).16 Conse-
quently, a Gini value of say, G*, implies that the average difference in price between
two players chosen at random would be (2 × ­G*) × w.
Figure 2 shows that inequality in the pre-auction base prices was much lower than
in the post-auction sale prices. Considering women and men in their entirety, the
base price Gini was considerably lower for women (29.4: 87 women) than it was
for men (47.8: 80 men). In considering specific categories, the Gini values for base
prices in the WPL were considerably higher for domestic (33.88: 57 women), than
for overseas (15.54: 30 women), players. On the other hand, the Gini values for the
IPL were lower for domestic (24.45: 51 men) than for overseas (31.18: 29 men),
players. These results point to two aspects of the 2023 WPL and IPL auctions.
First, in setting their base prices, women were much more modest than men. The

of ₹5 million which was only five times more than the base prices of the lowest
three highest paid women—Mandhana, Gardner, and Scriver—all had base prices

paid women. By contrast, the four highest paid men—Curran, Green, Stokes, and

16
One can also, from the Gini coefficient compute a measure of welfare (W) due to Sen (1976). The idea
behind this measure, represented by W = w(1 − G), is that welfare rises with increases in the average
wage,w , but falls as inequality in the distribution of wages rises. There is thus a trade-off between the
welfare-enhancing property of the average wage and the welfare-diminishing property of inequality in
the wage distribution and it is this trade-off that Sen’s (1976) welfare measure seeks to capture.

13
 V. K. Borooah

Pooran—had base prices of ₹20 million which was 10 times more than the base
prices of the lowest paid men and four times more than the base prices of the high-

players claimed the highest IPL base price of ₹20 million in contrast to seven Indian
est paid women. Overall, in terms of base prices, 21 Indian players and 21 overseas

players and four overseas players claiming the highest WPL base price of ₹5 million.
This finding is consistent with broader research finding that women consistently
rated their performance lower than men—men were far more at ease with self-pro-
motion than women. Exley and Kessler (2021) ran a series of experiments involving
over 4000 experiments and found that women subjectively described their ability
and potential to potential employers less favourably than equally performing men.
These results could also be replicated for middle and high school children.
This raises the question of how to mitigate the consequences of the gender gap in
self-promotion. Given the potential difficulty of altering men and women’s self-eval-
uation when such perceptions are deeply ingrained, another approach may require
“changing the system” rather than “changing the women.” This involves changing
the behaviour of institutions. As the previous paragraphs made clear, the financial

such that the ceiling is set lower for women than for men (for example, ₹5 million
ceiling for base prices floor for the IPL and WPL auctions are set administratively

for women versus ₹20 million for men).

In this context, Apicella et al. (2017) using experimental methods, based on data
from Amazon’s “Mechanical Turk”, showed that while women were less willing,
than equally able men, to compete against other people, there was no gender differ-
ence in the willingness to compete against one’s own, previous score. For those wor-
ried about competition being diluted through the presence of women in the labour
force, these results provide an alternative route to fostering competition. This is
through restructuring institutions such that competitive pressure involving compari-
sons with oneself is enhanced and comparisons against others is downplayed.
The second aspect is that overseas players in the WPL were more likely to be
capped players (since a team could only have four overseas players in the playing XI,
with a fifth overseas player being permitted in the WPL if she was from an Associate
nation) and hence their base prices were bunched at, or near the top, of the ceiling.17
The domestic players, on the other hand were a mixture of star players and players
who were pedestrian and this was reflected in a greater spread in base prices. In the
IPL, however, the capped Indian players had been retained by their franchises and

domestic players. The base prices of the former group ranged from ₹20 million to ₹5
the new entrants consisted of capped and uncapped overseas players and uncapped

million while those of the latter group were in the ₹5–₹2 million range.

4.1 From base to sale prices

The results reported above are the consequence of two effects operating simultane-
ously. The first is a mean-enhancing effect whereby pre-auction average base prices

17
In the 2023 WPL this was Tara Norris from the USA.

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

rose from ₹2.9 million ($35,000) for the WPL and ₹6.1 million ($73,690) for the
IPL to the post-auction average sale prices of ₹6.8 million ($82,150) for the WPL
and ₹20.9 million ($252,480) for the IPL. The second was an inequality-increasing
effect whereby, in the movement from reserve prices to sale prices, the distribution
of rewards became more unequal.
If there had been no change in inequality between the base price and sale price
distributions in the WPL (that is, the Gini value of 0.294 remained unchanged), the

chosen at random would have been 2 × 0.294 × ₹6.8 million = ₹4 million ($48,320).
average difference in sale price between two players, bought in the WPL auction,

This difference, computed based on inequality in the distribution of sale and base
prices being the same, represents the mean-enhancing effect.
However, because inequality associated with the distribution of base prices was
higher than that for sale prices, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.294 for WPL base
prices to 0.538 for WPL sale prices. So, with G = 0.538, the average difference in

2 × 0.538 × ₹6.8 million = ₹7.3 million ($88,200). So, of the total difference of ₹7.3
sale price between two auctioned WPL players, chosen at random, would have been

random, ₹4 million ($48,320), or 55% was due to the mean-enhancing effect and the
million ($88,200) in the sale prices of two auctioned players at the WPL, chosen at

remaining 45% was due to the inequality-increasing effect.

Similarly, with G = 0.719 for inequality in sale prices in the IPL, the average dif-

have been 2 × 0.719 × ₹20.9 million = ₹30 million ($362,400). However, if inequality
ference in sale price between two auctioned IPL players, chosen at random, would

had remained unchanged between base and sale prices, so that G = 0.478, the aver-

would have been 2 × 0.478 × ₹20.9 million = ₹20 million ($241,600). So, of the total
age difference in sale price between two auctioned IPL players, chosen at random,

difference of ₹30 million ($362,400) in the sale prices of two auctioned players at
the WPL, chosen at random, ₹20 million ($241,600), or 67% was due to the mean-
enhancing effect and the remaining 33% was due to the inequality-increasing effect.

5 The decomposition of inequality

The Gini coefficient measures inequality, it does not explain it. In addition to meas-
uring inequality, one might also like to know what ‘explains’ the observed level of
inequality between players. Is it due to the fact that players are segmented into mutu-
ally exclusive groups: male/female or domestic/overseas players? In that case one
might expect that some of the observed inequality in (sale or base) prices can be
explained by differences between groups because players from some groups have, on
average, a lower price compared to those from other groups. But not all inequality
can be explained by differences between groups; some of the overall inequality will
be due to the fact that there is inequality within groups meaning that not all players
within a particular group will have the same price.
Whenever, and however, one subdivides persons into mutually exclusive groups
there are two sources of inequality: between-group and within-group. The method
of inequality decomposition separates (or decomposes) overall inequality into its
constituent parts: between-group and within-group. When the decomposition is

13
 V. K. Borooah

additive, overall inequality can be written as the sum of within group and between
group inequality:
I = A + B
⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟
overall ineqality within group inequality between group inequality

When inequality is additively decomposed then one can say that the basis on
which the persons were subdivided (say, overseas/domestic players) contributed
[(B/I) × 100]% to overall inequality, the remaining inequality, [(A/I) × 100]%, being
due to inequality within the groups. So, inequality decomposition provides a way
of analysing the extent to which inter-player inequality in prices is ‘explained’ by
a constellation of factors. For example, it allows one to answer how much of the
observed inequality in sale prices can be accounted for by differences—either singly
or collectively—in gender and by whether one is a domestic or overseas player.
If, indeed, inequality can be “additively decomposed”, then, as Cowell and Jen-
kins (1995) have shown, the proportionate contribution of the between-group com-
ponent (B) to overall inequality is the income inequality literature’s analogue of the
R2 statistic used in regression analysis: the size of this contribution is a measure of
the amount of inequality that can be “explained” by the factor (or factors) used to
subdivide the sample.
In examining inequality decomposition, the first division of the sample was by
gender. In order words, inequality in the vector of prices associated with the 167
players in the WPL (87 players) and IPL (80 players) auctions was explained in
terms of a within-WPL/IPL component and a between-WPL/IPL component. The
second division was by status—domestic or overseas—and the third division was by
both gender and status.
Table 3 shows the contributions that each of these factors made to overall ine-
quality in sale and base prices. The contributions of between group inequality to
overall inequality in sale and base prices were, respectively, 15.8% and 19.4% when
the division of the players was by gender. When the division of the players was by
status, the between group contributions to overall inequality in sale and base prices
were, respectively, 22.4% and 39.3%. Lastly, when the division of the players was by
gender and status, the between group contributions to overall inequality in sale and
base prices were, respectively, 33.9% and 55.5%. So, again using the language of
Cowell and Jenkins (1995), 34% of overall inequality in sale prices between the 167
players sold at the WPL and IPL auctions of 20,222/23 could be “explained” by a
collective of two factors: gender, and status. Similarly, gender and status collectively
explained nearly 56% of overall inequality in base prices between the 167 players
sold at the WPL and IPL auctions of 2022/23.
Notes for Table 3:
To decompose inequality additively, inequality must be measured in a very spe-
cific way. Only inequality indices belonging to the family of Generalised Entropy
Indices are additively decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980). These indices are defined
by a parameter θ and, when θ = 0, the weights are the population shares of the dif-
ferent groups (that is, 𝜆j = Nj ∕N ); since the weights sum to unity, the within-group

13
 Table 3  The contribution of between group inequality to overall inequality Source: Own calculations from data in Tables 1 and 2 using the ineqdeco command in Stata
15.0
Sale price Base price
Division of Sample by → Gender Domestic/Overseas Gender and domestic/ Gender Domestic/Overseas Gender and
overseas domestic/over-
seas
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Between group 0.1510 0.2137 0.3237 0.0702 0.1421 0.2009

Within group 0.8029 0.7402 0.6302 0.2918 0.2199 0.1611
Total inequality 0.9539 0.9539 0.9539 0.3620 0.3620 0.3620
Between group as percentage of 15.8 22.4 33.9 19.4 39.3 55.5
total inequality

13
 V. K. Borooah

contribution A above is a weighted average of the inequality levels within the

groups. When θ = 0, the inequality index takes the form:
(N )
∑
I(𝐰;N) = log(wi ∕w) ∕N (2)
i=1
∑N
where: w = i=1 wi ∕N is the mean price over the entire sample. The inequality
index defined in Eq. (2) is known as the Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic Deviation
(MLD) and, because of its attractive features in terms of the interpretation of the
weights, it was the one used in this paper to decompose sale/base price inequality. In
Table 3, inequality is measured by the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) Index,
as shown in Eq. (2).
This paper has referred to, and discussed disparities in remuneration between men
and women in the labour market which extends to the labour market in cricket. Con-
sequently, nearly 16% of inequality in sale prices between players put up for auction
in the 2023 IPL and WPL auctions was due to inequality between male domestic and
female players. Overlaying this, however, was the finding that 22% of inequality in
sale prices between players put up for auction in the 2023 IPL and WPL auctions
was due to inequality between domestic and overseas players.
An explanation for the overseas-domestic player disparity might be that fran-
chises are likely to be more selective in buying overseas, compared to domestic,
players since there are only four places available in the playing XI for overseas play-
ers compared to seven for domestic players. The market for “good” players—encom-
passing all cricketing countries other than India—is also larger for overseas players
than for domestic countries. Overseas players were more likely to be bought in the
expectation that they could change the outcome of a match in their team’s favour
rather than acquired because they had “promise/potential”.18

6 Inequality and welfare

In a seminal paper, Atkinson (1970) established a link between inequality and wel-
fare arguing that, unless one had zero aversion to inequality, welfare would fall as
inequality increased. This idea of an inverse relation between welfare and inequal-
ity—with the strength of the relationship dependent on the policy maker’s distaste
for inequality—has found several applications most notably in human develop-
ment. Anand and Sen (1997 argued that a country’s achievement with respect to a

18
Results from the 2023 WPL bear out this hypothesis. Four of the five best batting performances in
the 2023 WPL were by overseas players: New Zealand’s Sophie Devine’s 72 for Bangalore against Guja-
rat; Australia’s Alyssa Healy’s 96 for UP against Bangalore; Australia’s Grace Harris’ 72 for UP against
Gujarat; and Australia’s Meg Lanning’s 72 for Delhi against Bangalore. Similarly, four of the five best
bowling performances in the 2023 WPL were also by overseas players: South Africa’ Marizanne Kapp’s
4 wickets for 15 runs (4/15) for Delhi against Gujarat; the USA’s Tara Norris’ 5/29 for Delhi against Ban-
galore; Australia’s Kimberley Garth’s 5/36 for Gujarat against UP; and England’s Sophie Ecclestone’s
4/13 for UP against Bangalore.

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

particular outcome should not be judged exclusively by its mean level of achieve-
ment (for example, by the average literacy rate for a country) but rather by the mean
level adjusted to take account of inter-group differences in achievements. Following
from this, they proposed a method, based on Atkinson’s (1970) seminal work, for
making such adjustments and they termed the resulting indicators equity sensitive
indicators. They further suggested that assessments of country achievements should
be based on such equity sensitive indicators rather than, as was often the case, upon
its mean level of achievement.
These ideas resonate in player auctions to the Indian Premier League (IPL). Each
player who offers himself at these auctions arrives with a “base price” which, in
effect is their reservation price—they will not accept employment for a lower price.
A player sets their base price based on a subjective assessment of worth which in,
turn, could be predicated on their on-field achievements which are in the public
domain.19 However, during the auction, players who are bought receive a mark-up
on their base price (with, of course a mark-up of 1 implying that they are offered
no more than their base price). Given a prior inequality in base prices (which, argu-
ably, are due to inter-player differences in innate ability), a further layer of inequality
between players in terms of the mark-ups they obtain attenuates inequality in the
final amounts paid to players. This section defines the concept of an equally dis-
tributed equivalent (EDE) mark-up—the mark-up which, if received by all players,
would yield the same level of welfare as the existing vector of unequal mark-ups.
This markup is derived as part of Fig. 3, below.

6.1 A diagrammatic representation

Figure 3 portrays a world of two players: player R and player S who are required
to ‘share’ a given overall mark-up, λ, in terms of their individual mark-ups, λR and
λS. The horizontal axis of Fig. 1 measures λR and the vertical axis measures λS. The
two player mark-ups are related to the aggregate mark-up by the ‘sharing’ equation:
𝜆 = bR 𝜆R + bS 𝜆S and this is represented in Fig. 3 by the ‘sharing possibility line’,
MN. The point X, on MN, lies on the 4­ 50-line passing through the origin and, so, X
is the point at which 𝜆R = 𝜆S . The auction system may be viewed as a mapping from
the parameters of the system (λ, bR, and bS) to a point on MN which establishes λR
and λS. Different auction outcomes will locate at different points of MN. Those that

19
There is of course the possibility that private information might also enter the base price equation. For
example, it might be "known" that certain players were a positive (or negative) influence in the dress-
ing room. Nor can the role of sentiment be ruled out. Prior to the formation of the IPL, international
cricket was largely based on inter-country competition. Although the IPL sought to form teams of mixed
nationalities one cannot rule out bias in setting base prices: a nationalistic bias in favour of Indian play-
ers or, conversely, an excessive awe of foreign heroes. However, given that cricket is a game replete with
publicly available statistical information about all international (and national) players, it is reasonable to
believe that in essence—the above caveats notwithstanding—base prices follow the semi-strong version
of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970): the base prices of players reflect all the publicly avail-
able information about them and that these prices would change in subsequent IPL rounds in response to
newly available public information.

13
 V. K. Borooah

Fig. 3  The distribution-sensitive mark-up

locate closer to the point X (for example, B) will be more egalitarian than those (like
A) which locate further away.
Superimposed upon the sharing possibility line are the welfare indifference
curves. The curves WW and W′ W′ represent indifference curves associated with the
welfare function of Eq. (4), the higher curve (WW) representing a higher level of
utility than the lower curve (W′ W′). From Eq. (4), the slope of the indifference
𝜕W ∕ 𝜕𝜆
curves is: 𝜕W∕ 𝜕𝜆 S = b S 𝛼S and welfare is maximised when the slope of the indiffer-
b 𝛼
R R R
ence curve is equal to the slope of MN, that is, when: b S 𝛼S = ⇒ 𝛼s = 𝛼R and since
b 𝛼 bS
R R bR
the welfare function is concave, so that marginal utilities αR and αS diminish with
increases in, respectively, λR and λS this implies 𝜆R = 𝜆S . Consequently, X is the
point at which the indifference curve, WW, is tangential to the sharing possibility
line, MN.
The auction system, however, delivers an outcome at point A at which player
R receives a large mark-up (𝜆R = OF ) and player S a smaller mark-up (𝜆S = AF ).
The outcome at point A is welfare equivalent to that at point C at which both
players receive the same mark-up (𝜆R = 𝜆S = CD ). The degree of inequality in the
system is given by 1 − CD∕ XY .
Point A can be given a welfare interpretation by noting that it lies at the point
of tangency between the indifference curve W′ W′ and the sharing possibility line
PQ. Both PQ and MN embody the same overall mark-up, λ, but while MN uses
actual base price shares, bR and bS (𝜆 = bR 𝜆R + bS 𝜆S ), the line PQ uses imputed
base price shares, b�R and b�S (𝜆=b�R 𝜆R +b�S 𝜆S ). Comparing the slopes of MN and
b′S
PQ, ⇒ bS > b′S and bR < b′R . In other words, any auction outcome on the
bS
bR
> b′R
line MN, other than X, represented by a point such as A, may be viewed as

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Fig. 4  Curvature of the indifference curves and the value of ε

maximising welfare but in the context of a synthetic sharing possibility line, such
as PQ, which uses imputed base price shares ( b′R and b′S ) as weights.
The curvature of the indifference curves is determined by the value of an ine-
quality parameter, ε. The larger the value of ε, the greater the aversion to ine-
quality and the more ‘bow-shaped’ will be the indifference curve; conversely, the
smaller the value of ε, the flatter will be the indifference curve and, at the extreme
when ε = 0, so that there is no aversion to inequality, it will be a straight line. This
is illustrated in Fig. 4 in which WW and W′W′ represent, respectively, indifference
curves associated with a low and high value of ε. Both curves pass through the
point A on the share-possibility line MN but CD, the EDE associated with WW
(low ε), is greater than C′D′, the EDE associated with W′W′ (high ε).
Notes to Figs. 3 and 4:
Suppose there are N players (indexed, i = 1…N) such that Bi and Fi are, respec-
tively the base and final prices of player i. The total amounts /spent and demanded
∑ ∑
are, respectively, F = Ni=1 Fi and B = Ni=1 Bi Define 𝜆i = Fi Bi ≥ 1 as the mark-
up of the final price paid for player i over the base price demanded (i = 1…N). If
𝜆i = 1 the amount paid for player i is the same as his base price whereas if 𝜆i > 1
the amount paid for player i exceeds his base price. The overall mark-up is then:
N
F ∑N Fi Bi ∑
𝜆= = = 𝜆i bi (3)
B i=1 B B
i i=1

where: bi = Bi ∕B is player i’s base price as a proportion of total base price.

that player i obtains from a mark-up of 𝜆i per ₹ over his base price. Since his base
If every player has the same concave utility function U(.), then U(𝜆i ) is the utility

price is Bi, a mark-up of 𝜆i per ₹ yields player i a total utility of Bi × U(𝜆i ). Define
‘social welfare—hereafter, simply ‘welfare’ – as the sum of the (total) utilities of all
the players and denote it by W:

13
 V. K. Borooah

Table 4  The equally distributed equivalent mark-up: 2023 WPL and 2022 IPL auctions
ε=0 ε = 0.5 ε=1 ε=2

WPL

₹592 ₹540 ₹487 ₹414

Equally distributed equivalent mark-up (EDE mark-up) 2.36 2.15 1.94 1.65
Amount spent under mark-up (₹ million)
IPL

₹1670 ₹1257 ₹1002 ₹781

Equally distributed equivalent mark-up (EDE mark-up) 3.4 2.56 2.04 1.59
Amount spent under mark-up (₹ million)

Source: Own calculations from data in Tables 1 and 2 using the ineqdeco command in Stata 15.0

N
∑
W= Bi × U(𝜆i ) (4)
i=1

7 Empirical results

The average mark-up computed across all the 87 players sold at the 2023 WPL auc-
tion was 2.36 while the average mark-up computed across all the 80 players sold at
the 2022 IPL auction was 3.4. Table 4 shows that the EDE mark-ups that were wel-
fare equivalent to the observed WPL average mark-up of 2.36, for different values
of ε, the inequality aversion parameter, were: 2.15 (ε = 0.5); 1.94 (ε = 1.0); and 1.65
(ε = 1.0). Similarly, Table 4 also shows that the EDE mark-ups that were welfare
equivalent to the observed IPL average mark-up of 3.4, for different values of ε, the
inequality aversion parameter, were: 2.56 (ε = 0.5); 2.04 (ε = 1.0); and 1.59. (ε = 1.0).

ture on the WPL auction of ₹540 million (₹251 × 2.15), or $6.5 million, would yield
Under mild inequality aversion (ε = 0.5), this would mean that the total expendi-

the same amount of welfare as the actual amount spent, ₹592 million ($7.2 million),
representing a saving of ₹52 million ($628,000). For the IPL, the implication is that,

₹1,257 million (₹491 × 2.56), or $15.2 million, would yield the same amount of wel-
under mild inequality aversion (ε = 0.5), total expenditure on the WPL auction of

fare as the actual amount spent, ₹1,670 million ($20.2 million), representing a sav-
ing of ₹413 million ($5 million). The EDE mark-up falls with increasing inequality
aversion.

8 Conclusions

This paper began by observing that gender inequality in the remuneration of

sportspersons is consistent with a general inequality of earnings between men and
women. Arguably, some sports, like tennis, have gone some way towards estab-
lishing parity by paying equal prize money to men and women in Grand Slam

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

tournaments while other sports, like golf, have remained impervious to gender
disparities.
Equal prize money for men and women does not, however, work well in reduc-
ing gender disparities in sports earnings when sportsmen and women, rather than
being individual contractors as in tennis and golf, are, as in cricket, employees
of the cricket boards and/or the franchises to which they are affiliated. In such a
situation, with the bulk of earnings emanating from salaries, men and women are
dependent on the pay scales set by their employers. Employers in cricket do not
make any pretence of striving for gender equality when setting pay scales; even
in a tournament like the Hundred which, more than most tournaments, aspires to
be gender-sensitive, the ECB has seen fit to pay the highest paid woman player
substantially less than the lowest paid man.
An alternative to administratively determined pay scales in cricket might be
to let the market determine salaries, through an auction of players. This is the
practice adopted by the WPL and IPL. As this paper has argued, under a market-

of December 2022—the English all-rounder Sam Curran who fetched ₹185 mil-
based system of price determination, the highest paid player in the IPL auction

lion (approximately US$2.25 million)—was paid five times more than the highest

hana who fetched ₹34 million (approximately US$415,000). By contrast, in the

paid player in the WPL auction of March 2023—the Indian batter Smriti Mand-

Hundred tournament of 2020, the ECB pay scales paid male players a maximum
of £100,000, which was 6.7 times more than the maximum of £15,000 paid to
female players, for the five-week period that they were part of their Hundred
squads and during which they played the same number of matches.
However, as this paper argued, since WPL players were required to play fewer
matches than their IPL counterparts—eight against 14—there was less gender
inequality when prices were presented on a per-match basis. The paper argued
that while gender explained about 16% the observed inequality in sale prices
between the 167 players (87 women and 80 men) in the WPL and IPL auctions of
2022/2023, it was the players’ domestic/overseas status which provided the larger
(22%) explanation. When combined, gender and status explained over one-third
of observed inequality in inter-player sale prices.
The paper also offered an insight into the welfare implications of inequality in
sale prices. Players enter the auctions with base prices which reflect their self-
worth in terms of ability. Given a prior inequality in base prices (which, arguably,
are based on an own-assessment of a player’s ability in terms of past achieve-
ments), a further layer of inequality between players is added in terms of inequal-
ity in the mark-ups they obtain. This attenuates inequality in the final amounts
paid to players. Using Atkinson’s (1970) framework, the paper argued that total
expenditure on the two auctions could be reduced, without a loss of welfare, by
giving the same markup on base prices to all the players.
The WPL and IPL auctions are conducted as ‘English Auctions’: as the auction-
eer raises the price of the item being sold, bidders drop out until only one bidder
remains who then gets the item at the price he/she bid. The assumption underlying
the auctions is that each bidder (the team) has an intrinsic value—perhaps based on
the judgement of its in-house ‘experts’—for the item being auctioned (the player)

13
 V. K. Borooah

and will bid for that item up to, but not exceeding, this value. The bidder’s strategy
of bidding up to, but not beyond, his/her evaluation of the item’s value is a dominant
strategy in the sense that this is the bidder’s optimal bid, regardless of rivals’ bids.
In this scenario, one of the ways that a winner’s curse can arise is when the win-
ner discovers, after the event, that the value of the item was less than the value they
imputed to it at the auction. (Thaler, 1988). The obverse of the winner’s curse is the
winner’s bonus which occurs when the ex-post value of the asset exceeds that which
the buyer imputed to it at the time of purchase. Two players who epitomised these

Hayley Matthews. The former, bought for ₹34 million (US$415,000) scored only
two extremes at the conclusion of the March 2023 WPL were Smriti Mandhana and

149 runs over the eight matches she played and, at nearly ₹230,000 ($2,800) per run,

the other hand, Hayley Matthews, bought for just ₹4 million by Mumbai Indians,
surely represented a “winner’s curse for her team, Royal Challengers Bangalore. On

(US$48,300) played 10 matches (the eight round-robin matches, the eliminator and
the final), scoring 271 runs and taking 16 wickets, unarguably delivered a “winner’s
bonus” for her team.
Sekhri (2016), in his comprehensive book on the Indian Premier League, has
argued that “if there is one aspect of the IPL that requires immediate change it is the
auction system”. Several features of the IPL’s system of determining the composi-
tion of the franchises’ teams are unsatisfactory. One feature is that the importance
of the auction varies by franchise. Teams with deep pockets place little reliance on
the auction since, year after year, they retain their core players by paying them high
wages. They can do so because the salaries paid to retained players can be supple-
mented by providing other sources of income (such as acting as “Brand Ambassa-
dor”). Consequently, depending upon their resources, team stability varies across
the franchises. In advance of the December 2023 IPL auction, for example, Kol-
kata Knight Riders, Mumbai Indians, and Sunrisers Hyderabad made big changes
to their squads by releasing, respectively, 16, 13, and 10 players. At the other end of
the scale, Royal Challengers Bangalore and Gujarat Titans released respectively, just
five and six players each.
The second feature is that of “irrational exuberance”. In models that stress
rational behaviour and market efficiency, agents are assumed to make unbiased pre-
dictions about the future and markets are assumed to aggregate individual expecta-
tions into unbiased predictions of fundamental value. However, research in this area
suggests that over-confidence, engendered by “irrational exuberance”, actual behav-
iour in the bidding process can deviate substantially from that suggested by such
models. As Massey and Thaler (2010) found for the National Football League, sale
prices were characterised by over-valuations in the upper level of the draft picks,
with corresponding under-valuation of lower ranking draft picks. This is also a fault
of the WPL and IPL auctions in which an excess of investor confidence leads to a
gross underestimation of some players with a parallel overestimation of others.
Author contributions Not applicable.

Funding No funding received.

13
Gender and remuneration in professional franchise cricket:…

Data availability Data used are publicly available from the following websites: https://​www.​espnc​ricin​
fo.​com/​story/​2023-​ipl-​aucti​on-​list-​of-​sold-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13502​72, https://​www.​espnc​ricin​fo.​com/​story/​
2023-​wpl-​aucti​on-​list-​of-​sold-​unsold-​playe​rs-​13586​95.

Declarations
Conflict of interest Not applicable.

Ethical approval and consent to participate. Not applicable.

Consent for publication Not applicable.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permis-
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licenses/by/4.0/.

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