REGULATORY GUIDE 112

Independence of experts

March 2011

About this guide

This is a guide for any person who commissions, issues or uses an expert
report.

It explains how ASIC interprets the requirement that an expert is independent

of the party that commissions the expert report (commissioning party) and
other interested parties.

Note: An interested party is a person with an interest in the outcome of the transaction
different from the interest of the general body of security holders.
 REGULATORY GUIDE 112: Independence of experts

About ASIC regulatory documents

In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory

documents.
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance.
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law
 describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance.
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a
research project.

Document history
This version was issued on 30 March 2011 and is based on legislation and
regulations as at 30 March 2011. The reference to the relief instrument in
RG 112.37 was updated in August 2015 because this instrument was
reviewed as part of the sunsetting of legislative instruments under the
Legislative Instruments Act 2003.

Previous versions:
 Superseded Regulatory Guide 112, issued 30 October 2007

Disclaimer
This guide does not constitute legal advice. We encourage you to seek your
own professional advice to find out how the Corporations Act and other
applicable laws apply to you, as it is your responsibility to determine your
obligations.

Examples in this guide are purely for illustration; they are not exhaustive and
are not intended to impose or imply particular rules or requirements.

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Contents
A Overview .................................................................................................4
Reports covered by this guide .................................................................4
Underlying principles ...............................................................................4
B Expert needs to be independent ..........................................................6
Independence ..........................................................................................6
Genuine opinion .......................................................................................7
C Relationship between the expert and the commissioning party ......9
Identifying relationships ...........................................................................9
Declining the engagement .....................................................................10
Disclosing relationships and interests ...................................................11
Other measures .....................................................................................12
Commissioning an expert ......................................................................13
D Expert’s conduct in preparing its report ...........................................14
Interactions with commissioning party ...................................................14
Preparing the report ...............................................................................16
E Use of specialists ................................................................................19
Engagement of specialists .....................................................................19
Review of specialist report .....................................................................20
Use of specialist report ..........................................................................20
Key terms .....................................................................................................22
Related information .....................................................................................23

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A Overview

Key points

This guide gives ASIC’s view on:

• the need for an expert to be independent (see Section B);

• how previous and existing relationships with commissioning and other

interested parties may affect the independence of an expert (see
Section C);

• how an expert should deal with the commissioning party and other
interested parties to maintain its independence (see Section D); and

• when and how an expert should use a specialist when preparing an

expert report (see Section E).

Reports covered by this guide

RG 112.1 This guide focuses on reports prepared for transactions under Chs 2E, 5, 6
and 6A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), whether the
reports are required in the Corporations Act or are commissioned voluntarily.
The principles in this guide may also be relevant to independent expert reports
commissioned for other purposes—for example, specialist reports like
geologist reports or traffic forecast reports (see Section E) for inclusion in Ch
6D disclosure documents and Ch 7 Product Disclosure Statements (PDSs).

RG 112.2 We consider that security holders regard an expert report as being prepared
by an independent expert irrespective of whether the report has been
prepared voluntarily or because it is required under statute.

RG 112.3 This approach is consistent with the obligations on the holder of an

Australian financial services licence (AFS licensee) to manage conflicts of
interest. An AFS licensee’s obligation to manage conflicts of interest applies
to all of its activities as an AFS licensee and, as such, an expert who holds an
AFS licence needs to manage conflicts of interest in respect of all expert
reports it prepares.

RG 112.4 This guide does not apply to independent or investigating accountant reports.

Underlying principles
RG 112.5 An expert report that is biased frustrates rather than assists informed
decision-making. Security holders will assume that an expert report is an
independent opinion and will be misled if the opinion is not.

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RG 112.6 Brooking J described the role of an expert in Phosphate Co-operative v

Shears (No 3) (1988) 14 ACLR 323 (Pivot) at 339 in the following terms:
Those who prepare experts’ reports in company cases carry a heavy moral
responsibility, whatever their legal duties may be. These reports are either
required by the [Corporations Act] or provided by way of analogy with
those requirements. In either case, they are supposed to be for the
protection of individuals who are being invited to enter into some kind of
transaction. Unless high [independence] standards are observed by those
who prepare these reports, there is a danger that systems established for the
protection of the investing public will, in fact, operate to their detriment
through reliance on these reports and on the reputations of those who
furnish them. In lending his name, the expert will often, as in this case, be
lending a name to conjure with … The expert’s integrity and freedom from
baneful influences are essential.

RG 112.7 The Corporations Act indicates the need for an expert to be independent:
(a) an expert must not be associated with certain interested parties, and
must disclose certain interests and relationships, when preparing reports
required by the Corporations Act for:
(i) a takeover bid under Ch 6 (s648A);
(ii) a scheme of arrangement (reg 5.1.01 and Sch 8, cls 8303 and 8306
of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Corporations Regulations));
and
(iii) a compulsory acquisition or buy-out under Ch 6A (s667B); and
(b) as an AFS licensee, an expert needs to establish and maintain systems to
comply with its obligations to manage conflicts of interest.

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B Expert needs to be independent

Key points

An expert should be, and should appear to be, independent: see

RG 112.8–RG 112.15.

An expert should give an opinion that is genuinely its own opinion: see
RG 112.16–RG 112.20.

Independence
RG 112.8 The Corporations Act contains indicators that an expert must be, and must
appear to be, independent in the provisions requiring an expert report for
certain takeover bids, schemes of arrangement, for any compulsory
acquisition and in the AFS licensee conflicts management provisions.

RG 112.9 The need for an expert to be, and to appear to be, independent is also
indicated in case law establishing that the independence of an expert is
critical for the protection of security holders. Mullighan J observed in Duke
Group v Pilmer (1998) 27 ACSR 1 at 268:
It may be seen that a true state of independence on the part of the expert is
crucial to the efficacy of the [takeover] process and for the protection of the
public generally and the company and its members in particular.

RG 112.10 We will consider regulatory action if we have concerns about the

independence of an expert: see Regulatory Guide 111 Content of expert
reports (RG 111) at RG 111.128–RG 111.130.

Note: In addition to the term ‘independence’, language also used by the courts, our
policies and commentators include: ‘impartial judgment’; ‘disinterested’; ‘objective’;
‘unbiased’; ‘genuine expression of opinion’; ‘integrity’ and, negatively: ‘conflict of
interest’; ‘compromised’; ‘collusion’ and ‘acting in a partisan capacity’.

AFS licensee obligations to manage conflicts

RG 112.11 An expert report typically includes a statement of opinion or recommendation

intended to influence investors in making a decision on a financial product:
s766B(1). This means the expert report usually constitutes financial product
advice, triggering the need for an AFS licence: s766A and 911A(1).
Accordingly, in most cases, an expert who prepares an independent expert
report that will be made available to retail investors will hold an AFS licence.

RG 112.12 Under s912A(1)(aa), an AFS licensee must:

have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of
interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities

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undertaken … in the provision of financial services as part of the financial

services business of the licensee or the representative …

RG 112.13 This conflicts management obligation applies irrespective of:

(a) whether the expert states that it is independent of the commissioning party;
(b) any requirement that the expert not be an associate of the commissioning
party or any other interested party to a transaction (e.g. s648A); or
(c) whether the expert report has been prepared to meet a statutory obligation.

RG 112.14 Whether an expert’s conflicts management arrangements (i.e. measures,

processes and procedures) are adequate will depend on the nature, scale and
complexity of the expert’s business and the circumstances of the expert’s
engagement. The expert should document its conflicts management policies
and procedures. The expert should keep records demonstrating how it has
complied with those procedures. General guidance on these obligations is
provided in Regulatory Guide 181 Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest
(RG 181) at RG 181.10–RG 181.11.

RG 112.15 Expert reports are exempt from the licensing regime (reg 7.6.01(u)) when the
advice is an opinion on matters other than financial products (e.g. a geologist
report) and:
(a) it does not include advice on a financial product;
(b) the document includes a statement that the person is not operating under
an AFS licence when giving the advice; and
(c) the expert discloses remuneration, interests and relationships.

Genuine opinion
RG 112.16 The courts have required the opinion of an expert to be genuine and a
product of the expert’s professional judgment. An expert’s opinion that is
tailored to support the views of the commissioning party or any other
interested party is not a genuine opinion. It may also be misleading or
deceptive.

RG 112.17 A court found that a commissioning party’s active role in shaping an expert
report meant that the expert report was not the product of ‘an exercise of
judgment’ by the expert ‘uninfluenced by pressure brought to bear by or on
behalf of [the commissioning party]’ and was not ‘a genuine expression of
opinion … but was the result of an exercise carried out for the purpose of
arriving at a desired result’: Pivot at 340 and 342 per Brooking J.

RG 112.18 An expert is subject to statutory obligations to avoid making misleading or

deceptive statements and engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct.

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Note: See, for example, s412(8), 670A(1)(h), 1041E, 1041F and 1041H and s12DA of
the Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (ASIC Act).

RG 112.19 An expert has been found to have engaged in misleading or deceptive

conduct when the expert did not hold the opinions expressed in the expert
report: MGICA v Kenny & Good (1996) 140 ALR 313 at 356–357 (a case
involving a property valuation).

RG 112.20 Similarly in Reiffel v ACN 075 839 226 (2003) 45 ACSR 67 at 92–93, the
court held that the expert report was misleading and deceptive in
circumstances when ‘there was no reasonable basis for the [expert’s]
statement in the report’ and the expert ‘did not hold the opinion it
expressed’. The court held that the expert should have disclosed that it
disagreed with the methodology used by a promoter in its forecasts and
disclosed the methodology that the expert in fact used.

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C Relationship between the expert and the

commissioning party
Key points

An expert should identify relationships and interests that may affect, or may
be perceived to affect, the expert’s ability to prepare an independent report:
see RG 112.21–RG 112.24.
The expert should then consider whether, on the basis of that relationship
or interest:
• it should decline the engagement (see RG 112.25–RG 112.27); or
• the relationship or interest can be adequately dealt with by way of
disclosure in the expert report (see RG 112.28–RG 112.37).
The expert may also need to take other actions to manage a conflict of
interest: see RG 112.38.
Before engaging an expert, a commissioning party should be satisfied that
the expert is independent and has sufficient expertise and resources to
provide a thorough report: see RG 112.39–RG 112.41.

Note: A reference to expert in this guide is to the person or entity that issues the report. In
most cases, this will be a corporate entity holding an AFS licence, even though a senior
director or employee may sign the report in the name of the corporate entity and be
principally responsible for preparing the report.

Identifying relationships
RG 112.21 Previous and existing relationships may threaten, or appear to threaten, the
independence of an expert. The objectivity of an expert may also be
compromised, or called into question, if the expert has an interest in the
outcome of the transaction that is the subject of its report.

RG 112.22 The closer the relationship between the expert and a commissioning party or
any other interested party, the greater the onus on the expert to demonstrate
the absence of bias.

RG 112.23 In identifying relationships and interests that may affect, or may be perceived to
affect, the expert’s ability to prepare an independent report, the expert should
not only identify relationships with, and interests of, the expert but also of:
(a) the expert’s associates;
(b) those directors and senior employees who are principally responsible
for preparing and issuing the expert report; and
(c) the spouse, children and associates of the directors and senior employees
who are principally responsible for preparing and issuing the expert report.

RG 112.24 The need to undertake this identification process also arises from the
obligation to manage conflicts of interest if the expert is an AFS licensee.

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Declining the engagement

RG 112.25 An expert should seriously consider declining an engagement when:
(a) a person to be involved in preparing the expert report is an officer of the
commissioning party or an interested party;
(b) the expert, a director or a senior employee who is involved in preparing
the expert report has a substantial interest in or is a substantial creditor
of the commissioning party or has other material financial interests in
the relevant transaction;
(c) the expert has participated in strategic planning work for the
commissioning party as a lawyer, financial consultant, tax adviser or
accountant, whether in connection with the relevant transaction or
generally (e.g. advising on possible takeovers or takeover defences); or
(d) the expert has acted as a lawyer, financial consultant, tax adviser or
accountant to the commissioning party (other than providing
professional services strictly for compliance purposes rather than
strategic or operational decisions or planning).

RG 112.26 The Corporations Act specifically states that an expert must decline an
engagement for the preparation of an expert report in each of the following
circumstances:
(a) when the report is to be cited or included in a target statement if the
expert is an ‘associate’ (as defined in s12) of the bidder or the target and
the bidder has 30% or more of the voting power in the target entity or
there are common directors of the target and the bidder (s640 and
648A(2));
(b) when the report is to be cited or included in a bidder’s statement if the
expert is an ‘associate’ (as defined in s12) of the bidder or the target and
the consideration for a pre-bid stake acquired in a target was unquoted
securities (s636(1)(h)(iii), 636(2) and 648A(2));
(c) when the report is to be cited or included in the explanatory statement
for a scheme of arrangement if the expert is an ‘associate’ (as defined in
s12) of the parties to the scheme if the other party to a reconstruction in
a scheme of arrangement has at least 30% of the voting shares of the
scheme company or there are common directors (reg 5.1.01(b) and
Sch 8, cls 8303 and 8306 of the Corporations Regulations); and
(d) if the expert is an ‘associate’ (as defined in s12) of the person issuing a
compulsory acquisition or buy-out notice (s663B, 664C, 665B and
667B).

RG 112.27 An expert’s AFS licensee obligations to manage conflicts of interest may

oblige an expert to decline engagements in some circumstances. Licensee
experts may be offered an engagement in which relationships and interests
pose such a serious risk of conflict of interest that the threat to the expert’s

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independence cannot be adequately managed through disclosure or internal

controls. The only way an expert can adequately manage these threats is to
avoid them and the expert’s conflicts management policies and procedures
should give specific guidance on circumstances when it should decline
engagements: see RG 181.42–RG 181.43 and RG 181.60.

Disclosing relationships and interests

Requirement

RG 112.28 As security holders rely on an expert report, they should be clearly informed
about any relationships or interests (including financial or other interests)
that could reasonably be regarded as relevant to the independence of the
expert. This requirement arises from the Corporations Act and case law: see
ANZ Nominees v Wormald (1988) 13 ACLR 698 at 707.

RG 112.29 Disclosure of relationships or interests is required under the Corporations

Act for an expert report when the report is required to be included in:
(a) a target statement, when the bidder has 30% or more of the voting
power in the target entity or there are common directors of the target
and the bidder (s648A(3));
(b) a bidder’s statement, when the consideration for a pre-bid stake
acquired in a target is unquoted securities (s648A(3)); and
(c) a compulsory acquisition or buy-out notice (s667B(2)).

RG 112.30 Similarly, as an AFS licensee, an expert needs to make appropriate

disclosure of conflicts of interest to commissioning parties and to those
relying on the report as part of the conflicts management obligation: see
RG 181.49–RG 181.63.

Content of disclosure

RG 112.31 An expert should prominently disclose in the report:

(a) the business or professional relationships with a commissioning party or
any other interested party;
(b) any financial or other interest that could reasonably be regarded as
capable of affecting the expert’s ability to give an unbiased opinion on
the matter being reported on; and
(c) any fee or benefit (whether direct or indirect) to be received in
connection with the report (s648A(3) and 667B(2)).

RG 112.32 If an expert has, within the previous two years, valued assets representing
more than a de minimus (i.e. trivial) proportion by value of the assets that it

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has been engaged to value for the commissioning party, this should also be
prominently disclosed in the report.

Note: Disclosure is also required by RG 112.31 if the expert was previously engaged to
value the relevant assets by the commissioning party or any other interested party.

RG 112.33 These disclosures should be made in all expert reports irrespective of

whether the report is required to be prepared by the Corporations Act or is
voluntarily commissioned and supplied to security holders.

RG 112.34 These disclosures should relate to relationships or interests existing at the

time of preparation of the report or existing in the previous two years. This
two-year period is a minimum period for disclosure and earlier relationships
might be so significant that they warrant disclosure as well.
Note: In Duke Group v Pilmer, Mullighan J referred to this benchmark with approval
(at 268).

RG 112.35 Disclosures should be timely, prominent, specific and meaningful. An expert

should not use ‘boilerplate’ disclosures (e.g. that the expert has been paid ‘a
normal professional rate’). An actual amount should be shown for fees paid
to an expert for the report.

RG 112.36 When an expert report is cited or included in a bidder’s statement in which

any securities in the bidder (or a person who controls the bidder) are offered
as consideration under the bid, these disclosures must also meet the specific
disclosure obligations that apply to prospectuses under s711(2)–(4),
including:
(a) any interests that the expert has in the bidder; and
(b) any fees or benefits given or agreed for the expert’s services (s636(1)(g)).

RG 112.37 As an expert report will usually constitute financial services advice, an

expert will need to give retail investors a Financial Services Guide (FSG).
We have given relief to allow an expert to include a FSG as a separate and
clearly identifiable part of an expert report: see ASIC Corporations
(Financial Services Guides) Instrument 2015/541. In view of this relief, we
consider that an expert should include all of its disclosure of interests and
benefits, whether flowing from the FSG requirements, conflicts
management, s648A or case law, in the FSG rather than duplicating that
disclosure in another part of the expert report.

Other measures
RG 112.38 In addition to disclosing any conflict of interest, an expert will need to
consider whether other measures to properly manage the conflict of interest
are appropriate (e.g. implementing information barriers): see RG 181.35–
RG 181.37.

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Commissioning an expert
RG 112.39 In commissioning an expert, a commissioning party should consider whether
the expert is independent and whether the expert has sufficient expertise and
resources to give a thorough opinion on the proposed transaction. The
quality of an expert report may be affected if this is not the case. If an expert
considers that it is not independent or does not have sufficient expertise or
resources to give a thorough opinion, it should decline the engagement.

RG 112.40 In selecting an appropriate expert, we consider that relevant factors are likely
to include:
(a) whether the expert has adequate resources (which may include access to
appropriate third party specialists) to perform the necessary work;
(b) the qualifications of the expert and whether the expert has the requisite
level of technical expertise (including whether the expert meets the
requirements of any relevant industry codes);
(c) the experience of the expert. For example, a commissioning party may
ask what comparable transactions the expert has given an opinion on
and whether that experience is relevant to the current transaction;
(d) whether the expert can meet the timeframe required for the report to be
produced; and
(e) whether there are any independence issues.

RG 112.41 While a commissioning party should satisfy itself that an expert is

competent, it should ensure that any pre-engagement discussions do not
compromise the expert’s independence. For example, these discussions
should not deal with how the expert proposes to evaluate the transaction or
the merits of the transaction: see RG 112.46–RG 112.48.

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D Expert’s conduct in preparing its report

Key points

An expert should:
• obtain written terms of engagement from the commissioning party
before commencing work;
• take care to avoid any communication with the commissioning party or
any other interested party that may undermine, or appear to undermine,
independence; and
• consent to the use or incorporation of its report.

Commissioning parties should be careful not to release the conclusions of

an expert report in advance of the final report.

Interactions with commissioning party

Terms of engagement

RG 112.42 Before commencing work, an expert should obtain written terms of

engagement from the commissioning party that:
(a) set out the scope and purpose of the report;
(b) set out the facts of the proposal and relevant data;
(c) recognise the expert’s right to refuse to give an opinion or report at all if it is
not given the information and explanations it requires to prepare the report;
(d) give the expert the same access to the commissioning party’s records as
the auditor of the commissioning party; and
(e) set out the fee.

Approval of appointment
RG 112.43 It is possible that some directors of a commissioning party may have a
conflict of interest in the proposed transaction, such as cross-directorships
held in the target and the bidder. In these circumstances, the expert and
commissioning party should ensure that the directors without a conflict
select and engage the expert.

RG 112.44 The commissioning party should ensure that the method by which an expert
is appointed, and the scope of its engagement, is consistent with the concepts
of independence and perceived independence of the expert. For example, it
may be appropriate to have a non-executive director oversee the appointment
process if management is likely to be perceived to have a strong interest in
the outcome of the expert report.

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Expert’s fee

RG 112.45 We will consider that an expert is not independent if the amount it is to receive
for the expert report depends in any way on the outcome of the transaction to
which the report relates. This is consistent with the requirement that a person
who provides financial services must not hold itself out as ‘independent’,
‘impartial’ or ‘unbiased’ if it is paid success fees or has a conflict of interest
arising from a relationship with an issuer of financial products that might
reasonably be expected to influence the report: s923A.

Manner of communication

RG 112.46 Ensuring security holders receive an objective expression of opinion in an

expert report involves more than identifying and dealing with previous or
existing relationships or interests. An expert’s objectivity, or the appearance
of objectivity, may be undermined by the interactions between the expert
and the commissioning and other interested parties.

RG 112.47 We are likely to view the following interactions as indicators of a lack of

independence:
(a) the commissioning party having rejected another expert after the expert
disclosed its likely approach to evaluating the proposal;
(b) an expert attending discussions on the development of the transaction,
the merits of the transaction or on strategies to be adopted by the
commissioning party;
(c) an expert taking instructions from, or holding discussions with, a
commissioning party, its advisers or any interested party on the choice of
methodologies for the report or evaluation of the transaction (including the
underlying assumptions or reasoning), although the expert may interrogate
those parties for the purpose of the expert’s own analysis;
(d) an expert accepting from a commissioning party, its advisers or any
interested party their analysis of the transaction, although the expert may
interrogate those parties for the purpose of the expert’s own analysis;
(e) the expert discussing preliminary views or findings with the
commissioning party or any other interested party;
(f) the expert entering into a success fee arrangement with the
commissioning party or any other interested party;
(g) the expert discussing future business relationships with the
commissioning party or any other interested party before finalising the
report. This includes refraining from cross-selling other services of the
expert; and
(h) the expert changing its opinion at the suggestion of the commissioning
party or any other interested party without adequate explanation: see
RG 112.56–RG 112.57.

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RG 112.48 We expect that an expert who is an AFS licensee will include in its internal
policies and procedures guidelines to address:
(a) communications and interactions with the commissioning party and any
other interested party during the commissioning of the expert and the
preparation of the report;
(b) remuneration arrangements; and
(c) supervision of the preparation of the report.

Preparing the report

Access to information
RG 112.49 The expert, not the commissioning party, should determine what information
will be required for the report. The commissioning party should give the
expert all the information it is aware of about the subject of the expert report,
in sufficient detail to enable the expert to determine its relevance.

RG 112.50 If the expert is not given access to the records it requires, or is given an
unduly short time to complete the report (relative to any applicable statutory
time constraints), it should consider refusing to prepare a report at all. An
expert should not prepare an unsatisfactory report and attempt to deal with
deficiencies in the report by disclaiming responsibility.

Communication

RG 112.51 An expert and its commissioning party may communicate and meet with
each other during the preparation of the expert report for the expert to:
(a) discuss the progress of the report;
(b) gain access to information;
(c) ascertain matters of fact or to correct factual errors (Re Matine (1998)
28 ACSR 268 at 288); and
(d) interrogate the commissioning party or another interested party for the
purposes of its own analysis.

RG 112.52 To help maintain independence and negate any inference of bias, we

consider that an expert should direct and lead all meetings and discussions
with the commissioning party, its advisers and any other interested party.
The expert should keep appropriate file notes of discussions and retain
copies of documents worked on in discussions with the commissioning
party, its advisers and any other interested party.

RG 112.53 Brooking J in Pivot at 339 summarised this issue in the following terms:
The guiding principle must be that care should be taken to avoid any
communication which may undermine, or appear to undermine, the
independence of the expert.

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Drafts of reports

RG 112.54 An expert may give draft copies of parts of its report to a commissioning
party or its advisers for factual checking before delivery of a full draft copy
of the report. These early drafts should not contain the expert’s analysis of
the transaction, the merits of a transaction or the methodologies employed:
Pivot at 339.

RG 112.55 The expert should only provide a full draft copy of the report to the
commissioning party for factual checking when the expert is reasonably
assured that the conclusions in the report are unlikely to change.

RG 112.56 If a commissioning party or an adviser disagrees with the expert’s analysis in

a draft of the expert report, the report should only be altered if the expert is
persuaded that all or part of the expert’s assessment is based on an error of
fact. We would expect an expert, in this situation, to independently reassess
the whole or relevant part of the report based on its view of the revised facts.

RG 112.57 After a full draft copy of an expert report has been provided to a
commissioning party or its advisers, any alteration of the report made at the
suggestion of the commissioning party or its advisers that affects an expert’s
analysis of the transaction or the expert’s conclusions should be clearly and
prominently disclosed in the report. This disclosure should include an
explanation of the changes, the reasons why the expert considered the
changes appropriate and the significance of the changes to the expert’s
opinion.

RG 112.58 Minor factual corrections made at the suggestion of the commissioning party
or its advisers that are immaterial to an expert’s analysis, conclusions or
opinion need not be disclosed in the report.

Use and distribution

RG 112.59 If a party commissions two or more reports, a copy of each report should be
sent to security holders. This should be done regardless of whether more
than one report is prepared by the same expert or by different experts: Pivot
at 339. It should also be done regardless of whether the commissioning party
is obliged to do so under s648A(1).

RG 112.60 An expert should deliver its final, signed report to the commissioning party
even if the commissioning party requests otherwise (unless the transaction is
discontinued or varied substantially).

RG 112.61 The directors of a commissioning party should not adopt or recommend that
security holders accept the findings of an expert report without critically
analysing the report. The directors should satisfy themselves that the
information relied on in the report is accurate and that the report has not omitted
material information known to the directors but not given to the expert.

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Release of conclusions of expert reports

RG 112.62 An expert report needs to contain sufficient information to assist security
holders to make a decision, including providing details of the methodologies
and material assumptions on which the report is based, together with any
qualifications: see RG 111.64–RG 111.79. The directors of a commissioning
party need to ensure that an expert report is not used or referred to in a way
that may be misleading or deceptive.

RG 112.63 If a commissioning party releases the conclusions of an expert report in advance

of the final report, this is likely to be misleading or deceptive, particularly if the
final report contains any ‘surprises’ for a person who has only read the
conclusions. Releasing conclusions without providing relevant supporting
information may cause confusion or uncertainty since security holders and the
market will not be able to determine whether those conclusions are reasonable.
Note: In Re Origin Energy Limited 02 [2008] ATP 23, the Takeovers Panel considered
that it was potentially misleading to quote the conclusions of a technical expert’s report
in a target’s statement without giving shareholders a copy of the report or the
underlying assumptions and qualifications.

RG 112.64 Consequently, a commissioning party that releases the conclusions of an

expert report in advance of the final report risks regulatory action for
contravention of the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions or other
regulatory action. For example, if a report is provided in relation to a bid, the
commissioning party risks an application by us, or another party, to the
Takeovers Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances.

RG 112.65 There may be limited situations in which a commissioning party’s continuous

disclosure obligations will require disclosure of the conclusions of an expert
report in advance of the final report (e.g. if confidentiality has been lost before the
final report is ready for release to the market). Commissioning parties and experts
should put in place processes that minimise the risk that preliminary disclosure
will be required before the report has been finalised. If preliminary disclosure is
required, commissioning parties should ensure that this is done in a way that is not
misleading or confusing (e.g. by highlighting the limitations of the preliminary
disclosure and providing all available material information about the report).

Consent of expert
RG 112.66 An expert report may only be incorporated or referred to in a bidder’s statement
or target statement if the expert has consented to the use of the report in the
form and context in which it appears: s636(3) and 638(5). Before consenting,
the expert should consider whether the report has been accurately reproduced
and used for the purpose for which it was commissioned. The expert should also
consider the appropriateness, or otherwise, of express or implied representations
about its report, the conclusions or recommendations: see Regulatory Guide 55
Prospectus and PDS: Consent to quote (RG 55), which also applies to the
consent obligations in s636(3) and 638(5).

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E Use of specialists
Key points

If an expert does not have the necessary specialist expertise on a matter

that must be determined for the purposes of the report, it should retain an
appropriate specialist for that matter who is independent of the
commissioning party: see RG 112.67–RG 112.70.

The specialist should report to the expert rather than the commissioning
party: see RG 112.71–RG 112.72.

The expert should ensure that the specialist has consented to the use of its
report: see RG 112.73–RG 112.77.

Engagement of specialists
RG 112.67 It is the expert’s responsibility to:
(a) determine that a specialist’s assistance is required on a matter that must
be determined for the purposes of the report;
(b) select the specialist and ensure that the specialist is competent in the
field;
(c) negotiate the scope and purpose of the specialist’s work and ensure that
this is clearly documented in an agreement (though the agreement may
be with the commissioning party or the expert); and
(d) be satisfied that the specialist is independent of, and is perceived to be
independent of, the commissioning party and any other interested party.

RG 112.68 We consider best practice would be for the expert to pay the specialist its
fees and recover those fees from the commissioning party.

RG 112.69 We would expect a specialist report to be specifically commissioned and

prepared for the transaction the subject of the expert report. We would also
expect the expert to make it clear to the specialist that the report is being
commissioned for inclusion in the expert report. If the specialist report is not
prepared specifically for the current transaction, this should be clearly explained
to security holders. The Takeovers Panel in Re Great Mines Limited [2004]
ATP 01 expressed the disclosure requirement in the following terms (at [56]):
Wherever a report is re-used in this way, however, shareholders should be
advised of the purpose for which the report was prepared. It would be
inappropriate to re-use a report in this way to satisfy a requirement for an
independent experts report and in general, it would be misleading to
describe a report re-used in this way as independent.

RG 112.70 While these comments were made in the context of an independent expert
report, we consider they are equally applicable to the use of a specialist report.

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Review of specialist report

RG 112.71 The expert should:
(a) critically review the specialist report, particularly to consider whether
the specialist has used assumptions and methodologies which appear to
be reasonable and has drawn on source data which appears to be
appropriate in the circumstances;
(b) have reasonable grounds for believing the specialist report is not false
or misleading;
(c) ensure the specialist signs its report and consents to its use in the form
and context in which it will be published; and
(d) ensure that the specialist report is used in a way that will not be
misleading or deceptive.

RG 112.72 A specialist report commissioned by the expert should be dated close enough
to the date of the expert report to ensure that assumptions applied have not
been overtaken by time or events.

Use of specialist report

RG 112.73 The expert should ensure that the specialist consents to the use of its report in
the form and context in which it will be published. If a specialist does not take
responsibility for, or authorise the use of, its report and the expert considers
that the material the subject of the report needs to be included in the expert
report, the expert must accept entire responsibility for the statements as the
expert’s own and, as such, must have reasonable grounds for believing the
statements not to be misleading or deceptive. This is consistent with our
approach to directors assuming responsibility for statements in a prospectus or
PDS that are not attributed to another person: see RG 55.11–RG 55.12.

RG 112.74 The expert should exercise its judgment to determine whether to include the
specialist report in full or include a concise or short form version or cite or
extract the specialist report.

RG 112.75 We encourage an expert to consider whether it is appropriate to have the

specialist prepare a concise or short form specialist report for inclusion in the
expert report with a longer specialist report available on request free of
charge or accessible online.

RG 112.76 An expert should only quote or cite the specialist’s work in a way that is fair
and representative. Otherwise the expert risks misleading security holders. If
the full specialist report contains any ‘surprises’ for the security holder who
only reads the short form or concise report, this would indicate the short
form specialist report was misleading.

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RG 112.77 In the situation when an expert has obtained more than one specialist report
on the same matter, we consider that security holders will not be given all
material information if the expert merely supplies abridged results of those
reports, and states, without comment or analysis, the result is the sum of the
values given in each of the specialist reports.

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Key terms

Term Meaning in this document

AFS licence An Australian financial services licence under s913B of

the Corporations Act that authorises a person who carries
out a financial services business to provide financial
services
Note: This is a definition contained in s761A of the
Corporations Act.

AFS licensee A person who holds an Australian financial services

licence under s913B of the Corporations Act
Note: This is a definition contained in s761A of the
Corporations Act.

ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission

ASIC Act Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act

2001

Corporations Act Corporations Act 2001, including regulations made for the
purposes of that Act

Corporations Corporations Regulations 2001

Regulations

expert The meaning given to that term in s9 of the Corporations

Act

Financial Services A document that must be given to a retail client in relation

Guide (FSG) to the provision of a financial service in accordance with
Div 2 of Pt 7.7 of the Corporations Act
Note: See s761A for the exact definition.

Product Disclosure A document that must be given to a retail client in relation

Statement (PDS) to the offer or issue of a financial product in accordance
with Div 2 of Pt 7.9 of the Corporations Act
Note: See s761A for the exact definition.

reg 5.1.01 (for A regulation of the Corporations Regulations (in this

example) example numbered 5.1.01)

RG 181 (for example) An ASIC regulatory guide (in this example numbered
181)

s648A (for example) A section of the Corporations Act (in this example,
numbered 648A), unless otherwise specified

Sch 4 (for example) A schedule of the Corporations Act (in this example
numbered 4), unless otherwise specified

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 REGULATORY GUIDE 112: Independence of experts

Related information
Headnotes
experts, expert reports, independence, genuine opinion, relationships or
interests, declining the engagement, disclosing relationships or interests,
conduct of experts, use of specialists

Regulatory guides
RG 55 Disclosure documents and PDS: Consent to quote
RG 111 Content of expert reports
RG 181 Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest

Legislative instruments
ASIC Corporations (Financial Services Guides) Instrument 2015/541

Legislation
Corporations Act, Chs 2E, 6 and 6A, s12, 412(8), 636, 638, 640, 648A,
663B, 664C, 665B, 667B, 670A(1)(h), 711, 766A, 766B(1), 911A(1),
912A(1)(aa), 1041E, 1041F and 1041H, Corporations Regulations, regs
5.1.01 and 7.6.01(u), Sch 8, cls 8303 and 8306
ASIC Act, s12DA

Cases
ANZ Nominees v Wormald (1988) 13 ACLR 698
Re AuIron Energy Limited [2003] ATP 31
Duke Group v Pilmer (1998) 27 ACSR 1
Re Great Mines Limited [2004] ATP 01
Re Matine (1998) 28 ACSR 268
MGICA v Kenny & Good (1996) 140 ALR 313
Re Origin Energy Limited 02 [2008] ATP 23
Phosphate Co-operative Co of Aust Ltd v Shears & Anor (No 3) (1988) 14
ACLR 323
Reiffel v ACN 075 839 226 (2003) 45 ACSR 67

Consultation papers and reports

CP 62 Better experts’ reports
CP 143 Expert reports and independence of experts: Updates to RG 111 and RG 112
REP 234 Response to submissions on CP 143 Expert reports and
independence of experts

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