Strategic Digest

Vol. 7 | No. 01 | 01 January 2025

Evolving Security Situation in West Asia

Territorial Gains of Myanmar's Ethnic Armed Groups and Escalating

Tensions on the Myanmar-Bangladesh Border

U.S. DoD Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the

People's Republic of China (2024)

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STRATEGIC DIGEST VOL 7 | NO. 01 | 01 January 2025

Evolving Security Situation in West Asia

After ousting Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024, the Syrian
Transitional Government (STG) was formed by Syria’s current provisional
governing body. It emerged following leadership changes in which Ahmed al-
Sharaa, who leads Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and serves as Syria’s present leader,
designated Mohammed al-Bashir as head of the caretaker government to succeed
Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali as Prime Minister. This transition occurred in the
aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse and
President Bashar al-Assad’s departure into exile.
In a significant development, Ahmad al-Sharaa
(formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani),
reached an agreement on 24 December 2024 with
former opposition faction chiefs to dissolve all
armed groups and unify them under the defence
ministry, according to the new administration’s
statement. This move aims to bring stability
following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s
regime on 8 December 2024. On 20 December
2024, the United States removed a $10 million
bounty on Al-Sharaa following a high-level US
delegation meeting in Damascus. Iran’s foreign
minister, Abbas Araghchi, remarked on 25
December 2024 that it is too soon to judge Syria’s
future as many developments can affect it. This remark was in response to Syria’s
new foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani’s comment that Iran must respect
the will of the Syrian people and the country’s sovereignty and security.
The recent developments in the Syrian refugee situation show a complex interplay
of return movements, security challenges, and regional policy adjustments across
multiple countries. According to UNHCR monitoring, approximately 58,350
Syrians, with children comprising nearly half of this number, have returned to Syria
from 8 December to 27 December 2024. Though significant security concerns
persist, these returns are primarily concentrated in regions including Ar-Raqqa,
Aleppo, Dar’a, and Homs.
The regional response to this situation has evolved significantly, with neighbouring
countries implementing various measures to manage refugee movements. Türkiye
has announced a structured approach to temporary returns, implementing a
program from January to July 2025 that will allow Syrian refugees to conduct go-
and-see visits while retaining their temporary protection status. Lebanon has
maintained active monitoring through UNHCR’s network of 570 Outreach
Volunteers from the Syrian refugee community, who help address concerns
regarding education, housing, and transportation costs for potential returnees. Such
policies can be viewed as a balanced approach to facilitating refugee movement
while maintaining protection frameworks.
Jordan and Iraq have also adapted their policies to address the evolving situation
in Syria. Jordan has recently updated its border regulations at the Jaber-Nassib
crossing, specifically accommodating Syrian investors and their families, as well

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as Syrians holding Jordanian citizenship. In Iraq, the Peshkhabour border crossing

has seen consistent movement, with approximately 400 people crossing daily,
primarily consisting of Kurdish Syrians engaging in temporary family visits or
permanent returns.
With regards to updates on Israel’s operations, on 19 December 2024, surface-to-
surface missile attacks by Houthis resulted in damage to a multi-storey school
building in Ramat Gan, Israel. The damage is estimated to be around $11 million.
The same day, Israel’s military carried out a series of intense airstrikes as dozens
of IAF aircraft, including jets, refuelers and spy planes, targeted and struck
Hodeidah port (already struck twice earlier) and Sana’a (targeted for the first time).
These strikes aimed to paralyse all three ports and targeted power stations as well
as the Ras Isa oil terminal on the Red Sea. It also needs to be noted that on 26
December 2024, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted intelligence-based strikes
on military targets belonging to the Houthis on the Western coast and inland
Yemen. Targets included military infrastructure in both the Sana’a International
Airport and the Hezyaz and Ras Kanatib power stations. Additionally, Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) struck military infrastructure in the Al-Hudaydah, Salif and
Ras Kanatib ports on the western coast. According to IDF, these military targets
were used by the Houthis to smuggle Iranian weapons into the region and for the
entry of senior Iranian officials and, hence, become an example of the usage of
civilian infrastructure by Houthis for military purposes.
In response, Houthis statement noted that it fired a missile at Israel’s Ben Gurion
airport on 27 December 2024 and also launched drones at Tel Aviv and a ship in
the Arabian Sea. According to IDF, previously, on 25 December 2024, Houthis
launched a UAV into Israeli territory that triggered sirens in southern Israel.

Territorial Gains of Myanmar's Ethnic Armed Groups and Escalating

Tensions on the Myanmar-Bangladesh Border
The Bangladesh-Myanmar border has become a
focal point of geopolitical and humanitarian
tensions due to escalating conflicts in Myanmar’s
Rakhine State. In December 2024, the Arakan
Army (AA) achieved a significant milestone by
asserting control over strategic locations, including
the town of Maungdaw. This development has
underscored the strategic importance of
Maungdaw, which serves as a vital hub for cross-
border trade and migration. The AA’s
consolidation of power in northern Rakhine State
marks a significant shift in the region’s dynamics
and has further complicated relations between
Myanmar and Bangladesh. Reports of
confrontations between the Arakan Army and Bangladeshi forces along the border
have emerged, though claims of territorial intrusion into Bangladesh have been
dismissed. The AA’s control remains confined to areas within Myanmar's Rakhine

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State, emphasizing the strategic and contentious nature of the border. This situation
has compounded security and humanitarian challenges for Bangladesh, which is
already grappling with the Rohingya refugee crisis.
The spillover effects of the conflict, including stray bullets, mortar shelling, and
violence, have disrupted life in southeastern Bangladesh, particularly in regions
like Cox’s Bazar and St. Martin’s Island. Transport across the Naf River has been
suspended, further heightening insecurity. Additionally, incidents such as the
unauthorized entry of Myanmar Border Guard Police into Bangladeshi territory in
early 2024 reflect the increasing volatility along the 271-kilometer shared border.
As the Arakan Army continues to consolidate its dominance, the implications for
regional stability and humanitarian efforts remain severe, necessitating urgent
international attention.
Bangladesh has adopted a cautious approach to these border tensions, aiming to
avoid direct confrontation with Myanmar. Diplomatically, Dhaka has focused on
expressing protests and engaging regionally, including its participation in a recent
meeting in Bangkok with six countries. During the meeting, Bangladeshi officials
underscored the challenges arising from the loss of control over its border by
Myanmar’s central government, with non-state actors like the Arakan Army
playing a growing role in the region. Dhaka has also emphasized the need for
Myanmar’s government to address its internal conflicts and restore stability, as
ongoing border instability threatens to escalate into a broader regional issue.
However, the increasing influence of the Arakan Army complicates Bangladesh’s
position. While Dhaka has refrained from formal talks with the AA, reports suggest
that informal channels are being explored to address immediate security concerns.
This approach, though, is fraught with complexities as Bangladesh must balance
its commitment to sovereignty with the need to secure its borders in the face of
rising instability.
Beyond security concerns, the continued influx of Rohingya refugees has placed
immense strain on the country’s resources, infrastructure, and public services,
particularly in southeastern Bangladesh. Bangladesh is currently hosting over 1.2
million Rohingya refugees, most of whom fled Myanmar during the 2017 military
crackdown. Despite Dhaka’s official stance against allowing further refugees, the
deteriorating situation in Myanmar has forced approximately 60,000 Rohingya to
cross into Bangladesh over the past two months. The Rohingya crisis remains a
pressing concern for Bangladesh, as the ongoing conflict in Myanmar has derailed
efforts to repatriate those already in Bangladesh.
In the meantime, the Arakan Army's control of critical land and maritime trade
routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border has created a situation that poses a
significant challenge to regional food supply chains. Myanmar has historically
been a key supplier of rice to Bangladesh, but the group’s control over strategic
areas, including the port of Mongdo and associated customs operations, has
substantially reduced rice shipments to Bangladesh. As a result, Bangladesh is now
facing an intensifying food shortage. Given that rice is a staple in the country and
constitutes a major portion of its food imports, the nation is particularly vulnerable
to such supply chain disruptions. In response to the escalating crisis, Bangladesh
has sought alternative solutions, including an urgent appeal to India for an

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additional 50,000 tons of rice. This development highlights the severity of the
situation and underscores the pressing need for coordinated regional efforts to
address the growing concerns over food security.
The crisis in Myanmar, driven by the military junta and ongoing conflict, poses
significant challenges for the region, particularly for Bangladesh. Doubts over
Myanmar's ability to stabilize its borders compound the issue, leaving Bangladesh
to manage sovereignty, security, and the Rohingya crisis. Immediate priorities
include border security, preventing further refugee inflows, and addressing cross-
border violations. However, a long-term resolution in Myanmar is essential. As the
crisis deepens, Bangladesh must balance diplomacy, defence, and humanitarian
efforts to safeguard its interests and navigate the fallout from Myanmar's civil war.

U.S. DoD Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China (2024)
The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gradually expanding its operational reach
beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges,
including a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden,” the Pentagon reported in its
latest assessment of Beijing’s military power in its
2024 annual report to Congress on China’s military
developments.
The report highlights significant transformations in
China's military capabilities and strategic goals,
particularly as part of its national strategy to achieve
the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by
2049. It outlines the modernization of the PLA, its
growing global presence, and the implications for
U.S. security and global stability while addressing
challenges faced by Chairman Xi Jinping and his
party.
The report highlights China's ambition to create a
revised international order that reflects its governance model and national interests.
Key initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global
Development Initiative (GDI), aim to reshape global norms in Beijing's favour.
Increasing tensions with the U.S., particularly regarding alliances like AUKUS and
the Quad, influence China's strategic approach. Beijing seeks to reduce U.S.
influence while fostering partnerships in the Global South, using coercive
diplomacy, economic incentives, and military manoeuvres to assert its interests,
especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
The PLA has undergone significant modernization to support China’s goal of
fielding a “world-class military” by 2049. This transformation spans all domains
of warfare—land, sea, air, nuclear, space, and cyberspace. The PLA Navy (PLAN),
with the largest naval fleet by number, continues to expand its ability to project
power beyond the First Island Chain, while the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) rapidly
modernizes its fleet, enhancing China’s integrated air defence and strategic
deterrence capabilities.

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The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is central to China’s nuclear strategy, developing
intercontinental ballistic missiles and diversifying its nuclear arsenal. These
advancements aim to strengthen China’s ability to deter third-party intervention in
regional conflicts and enhance its global strike capabilities. The PLA also invests
heavily in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum
computing, and hypersonic weapons, to maintain a technological edge.
Despite these advancements, the PLA faces challenges, including deficiencies in long-
range logistics, urban warfare readiness, and commander proficiency. Nonetheless,
structural reforms and an emphasis on joint operations demonstrate the PLA’s
commitment to addressing these gaps and achieving a fully modernized force.
China’s global ambitions are increasingly evident in the PLA’s growing overseas
presence. The establishment of foreign military bases, such as the one in Djibouti,
and regular naval deployments in strategic regions highlight its intent to project
power and protect its interests abroad. This expansion aligns with Beijing’s broader
strategic objectives, including safeguarding its investments under the BRI and
ensuring the security of its global supply chains.
Regionally, China’s activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea
exemplify its coercive tactics. In 2023, the PLA intensified military exercises near
Taiwan, increased incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ),
and challenged the norms of freedom of navigation in contested waters. Such actions
reflect Beijing’s broader strategy to assert its sovereignty claims and undermine U.S.
influence in the region.
In Taiwan, the PRC’s use of diplomatic, economic, and military pressure remains a
focal point of its strategy. The report highlights Beijing’s efforts to prepare for
potential military operations to achieve reunification while eroding Taiwan’s
resilience through psychological and economic tactics. Similarly, in the South China
Sea, China’s reliance on the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia
underscores its use of grey-zone operations to assert territorial claims and counter
rival claimants.
The PLA’s progress is not without setbacks. Corruption investigations in 2023 led
to the removal of several senior officials, including those involved in critical
weapons development programs. These disruptions have hindered some
modernization efforts but reflect ongoing attempts by Xi Jinping’s leadership to
consolidate political control over the military. Furthermore, the report notes
persistent inefficiencies in PLA command structures and limited combat experience
among its forces.
The document details key highlights of Chinese military build-up along with
ongoing challenges that Chairman Xi Jinping and his party army are addressing with
determination, and context to interpret what it all means. The report emphasises that
endemic corruption and lingering personnel and organizational weaknesses must be
weighed against the Chinese Communist Party’s unrivalled ability to marshal
resources and its ongoing production and deployment of advanced military systems
on an unmatched industrial scale. The report calls for sustained vigilance and robust
U.S. engagement to address the challenges posed by China’s growing military
capabilities and assertive policies.