CHAPTER 5: THE ZHENG “STATE” ON

TAIWAN
After losing his final Mainland outposts in 1664, Zheng Jing spent the next ten years on Taiwan,
until the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories brought him back again to the Mainland coast. His
decade on the island has received very little attention in previous scholarship, often relegated to a
minor footnote in maritime East Asian history due to the admittedly scant surviving documentation
and the towering personalities of Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong. Yet, the sources we have
available and some newly discovered records reveal that Zheng Jing proved to be a highly capable
leader in his own right who successfully met the challenge of survival on a new frontier and
established the foundations for a new state on Taiwan. He moved away from the previous
legitimacy of a nominal commitment to Ming restoration in favor of a new conception for his
regime. He tried to naturalize Han customs, especially hair and clothing, to a “foreign” and
peripheral island, while relegating physical “China” to abstract historical memory.
Meanwhile, Zheng managed to reconstitute his father’s flourishing trading network despite a
severe Qing economic blockade. By the end of his decade on Taiwan, he had opened up
commercial relations with the English East Indies Company (EIC) and even prepared to invade the
Spanish Philippines, initiating a new round of expansion overseas. Seen in this light, Zheng Jing
had no compelling material motivation to leave the island, nor did he actively prepare for an
invasion of the Mainland, as Chinese-language scholarship tends to argue. Taiwan, then, did not
merely serve as an economic base to prepare for an inevitable future restoration campaign, but the
focus for development and settlement in its own right. In fact, as the next chapter will show, the
Rebellion of the Three Feudatories came as a completely unexpected event, shortly after Zheng
attempted to institutionalize his budding new legitimacy through negotiations with the Qing.

The Character of Zheng Jing’s Rule

After fleeing from his Mainland bases with all but a handful of followers, Zheng Jing, caught
between a Qing blockade of the entire coastline and a harsh, unsettled frontier, first needed to ensure
the physical survival of his organization and refashion the shattered morale of his soldiers. The
20,000 men in his divisions and their commanders constituted about one-fourth of the Han Chinese
population in Taiwan during this period.1 Most of them had joined Chenggong’s invasion force in
1 In a 1668 memorial to the Qing court, Shi Lang claimed that there were already 20,000 to
30,000 Han Chinese in Taiwan while under the Dutch. Zheng Chenggong brought 30,000 soldiers and
their families with him to the island, while, in 1664, Zheng Jing took another 6,000 to 7,000. Those
who died of illness and battle numbered about five or six thousand. Based upon Shi’s figures, John
Robert Shepherd has concluded that the entire population of Taiwan in 1668 lay at a maximum of
1661 and now worked as farmers in military colonies scattered throughout the island. For them, the
inhospitable atmosphere, along with a loss of purpose in their role as fighting men, had triggered
widespread homesickness within their ranks. In a memorial to the Qing court in 1668, Shi Lang
reported that the Zheng forces had become lax and disorderly due to the neglect of their military
training, and could no longer form a credible defense if attacked. 2 Far more seriously, over half of
them did not have wives and families. They might manage to brave the harsh frontier environment,
but, Shi wondered, “who would be willing to remain single their entire lives without thinking once
about their native land?”3 Despite the highly biased source, it reflected a widespread desire on the
part of these soldiers to return to their homes in the Southeast Coast macroregion, their geographical
place of belonging, even at the cost of sacrificing the cultural aspects of their Chineseness.
According to Shi, only treacherous waters around the island and the lack of boats to cross over to
the Mainland prevented defections on a massive scale.3
To stem these ominous trends, Zheng Jing worked throughout 1664 and 1665 to reconstitute the
political and economic apparatus of his father, while adding his own innovations to suit the new
environment of Taiwan. He began with his own bureaucracy, undertaking a major reform of the Six
Offices (Liuguan) of Works, Rites, Punishment, Revenue, Military, and Personnel. Under Zheng
Jing, civil officials came to enjoy a status theoretically equal to their military counterparts, and both
groups had the same right, “as ministers,” to memorialize him with policy suggestions and
concerns.4 As a result, the people who filled these offices played a greater role in decision-making
and implementation than their predecessors. For instance, Ke Ping, head of the Office of
Punishments, and Ye Heng, the Officer of Rites, would represent the organization as major envoys
in negotiations with the Qing.5 Yang Ying, a financial expert who worked for years under Hong Xu

61,000. See Shepherd, 96.

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4 Xia, 44.
5 Xia, 44 and Jiang Risheng, 238.
and Zheng Tai, now assumed the helm of the Revenue Office, succeeding these predecessors from
military backgrounds.6
Zheng Jing’s reforms certainly did not mean the marginalization of his men in arms. In fact, he
entrusted oversight of all affairs, civil and military, to two key subordinates: Chen Yonghua, the
Advisory Staff Officer (ziyi canjun) and Feng Xifan, head of the Imperial Bodyguard (shiwei).8
Both men, along with Hong Xu and a small handful of others, had remained steadfastly loyal to
Zheng despite massive defections to the Qing in the wake of the loss of Xiamen and Jinmen. Jing
lavishly rewarded them for their unyielding stance, giving them top positions and allowing them to
form the core of his advisory body. Evidently, this arrangement continued to bypass the traditional
civilian oversight of government and reinforce the privileged position of Zheng’s family members
and officers at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Still, by giving civilian ministers an increased
role and making the military accountable for them, he had taken a huge step toward the
rationalization of his government. Moreover, despite the military background of his advisors, many
of them, such as Chen Yonghua, never had direct experience in combat, and would exclusively
oversee and coordinate the handling of civil affairs on the island for the rest of their lives. At the
same time, the appointment of Chen, Feng, and others to prominent positions of trust showed that
policies and actions within the organization increasingly depended upon debate and consensus rather
than the personalized and arbitrary decisions of Jing’s father.
In many ways, the bureaucratic reforms undertaken by Zheng Jing, along with his mode of
governance, reflected his personal character and upbringing. Born in 1642 at the Zheng ancestral
village of Shijing, he spent most of his formative years on the main base of Xiamen, a highly
international port and the largest bastion of Ming loyalist resistance outside the Southwest. As such,
he had plenty of opportunities to interact with traders from across the Western Pacific, as well as
people from “all the nations of the 15 kingdoms [provinces] of China,” who spoke various dialects
and maintained different customs.7 From very young, he also displayed a passion for learning and

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handled weapons with great precision and skill. 8 Yet, compared to his cosmopolitan father and
grandfather, who had both spent significant time abroad, Zheng Jing’s horizons were far
narrower in scope. He undoubtedly received a strict Confucian education, while his concurrent
position as eldest son and heir to the family enterprise allowed him to lead a pampered life relatively
sheltered from Chenggong’s otherwise harsh and unrelenting discipline. Jing’s conservative moral
upbringing, combined with an exterior environment conducive to “all the vices” common to a huge
trading emporium like Xiamen, generated severe contradictions and tensions within his personality. 9
During his earlier years, he completely pushed aside the values imparted to him and turned instead
to a life of rebelliousness, indulgence, and excessive debauchery. He and the servants under him
would randomly seize property around Xiamen and terrorize the common people at will. On one
occasion in 1657, they tore into a church during the Festival of the Most Holy Rosary and
confiscated some of the idols, mostly to satisfy Jing’s curiosity. They then apprehended and
detained Father Gregorio López, a Chinese Dominican priest from Manila, and threatened to
execute him.10 Chenggong could do very little about his son’s misbehavior other than ordering him
to stop, and beating, exiling, or decapitating Jing’s responsible servants. Jing also enjoyed, often to
the point of obsession, the finer pleasures of life, including food, drink, and, especially, sex. Caught
in an unhappy arranged marriage with the daughter of the eminent minister Tang Xianyue, he
frequently engaged in flings with singsong boys and took a fancy toward mature women. 11
Chenggong’s decision to have Jing executed for impregnating the wet nurse of his younger son only
represented the final straw, the culmination of years of frustration and helplessness at what he
perceived was the wasted promise of his designated heir.
Yet, this traumatic incident, which nearly cost Jing his head, along with his father’s subsequent
death on Taiwan, appeared to have made a significant impact upon the young man’s later life, and
caused him to mature quickly. As if trying to atone for his past depravity, Jing readily embraced his
previous Confucian education after he succeeded to the head of the organization. He made sure to
strictly observe the precedents set down by Chenggong in every manner and construed everything
he did as the embodiment of the unfinished legacy of his father.
His edicts, poems, and letters referred frequently to his predecessor as “the Former King”
(xianwang) and often capitalized upon Chenggong’s ambiguous and contradictory words and actions
to justify his own goals.12 By prioritizing filial piety, especially in an overall political context in
which allegiance to an effectively nonexistent Ming court had become unpractical and untenable,
Jing could maintain the flexibility to reimagine the future legitimacy of his organization. In this
sense, he differed from Chenggong’s emphasis on loyalty to make amends for his inability to assist
Zheng Zhilong in captivity.
Jing also lacked his father’s strict and impartial discipline, as well as the desire to personally
manage all matters within the organization. Contemporaries knew him as a benevolent and kind

8 Jiang Risheng, 200.

9 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 592.
10 Ibid., 593.
11 Jiang Risheng, 200 and Zheng Yiju, 22.
12 See, for instance, Zheng Jing’s edicts in Yanping er wang yiji, 133-134.
man, humble and respectful toward others, and always willing to consult their advice and welcome
their input.13 In fact, the high level of trust he placed in his key ministers provided him with a
degree of emotional comfort and stability that he otherwise lacked. An analysis of his poems
reveals him to be a highly solitary and isolated individual who did not have many close friends or
soul mates around to share his happiness and frustrations, and the ups and downs of his life. 16 He
could not find satisfaction in his marriage, while his affair with the wet nurse, perhaps the one
person in whom he could confide, and the illegitimate children she bore for him ended in tragedy. 14
Frequently depressed, he regularly threw sumptuous banquets for his advisors and drank heavily to
dull his pain.15 Based upon these observations, some of his contemporaries, notably Shen

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15 Shen Guangwen, 706.
Guangwen, have labeled him a weak-willed individual who easily succumbed to the “obsequious
flattery” of his retinue and indulged in excessive pleasures under the influence of such unscrupulous
men.16 While it is true that he had the tendency to be too trusting and naïve, his increased
dependence upon consultation with advisors and consensus decisions, as we will see, laid the
framework for greater stability and continuity in his rule, which Taiwan greatly needed at the time.
For all their dissimilarities, however, Zheng Jing and his father resembled one another in one
key respect: their bitter hatred of the Manchus. Although Jing was too young to clearly remember
the traumatic events of the Ming-Qing transition and could only vaguely recall the fate of his
grandparents, his Confucian education had, from a very young age, imparted within him the rigid
separation of “Chinese” and “barbarian.” In fact, the key reason why he had his servants seize
Father Gregorio López was because the priest “came in a shaved head conforming to the customs of
the Tartars and…deserved a grand punishment.” 17 Still, due to the differing circumstances, Jing’s
antipathy toward the Manchus took on a less personal, but far more objectified and intensely
virulent, form than Chenggong. In several of his poems, Jing revealed that he and his ministers
often reminisced during banquets over the events surrounding the Ming fall. Of the stories, the
suicide of the Chongzhen Emperor when rebels overran Beijing caused him the greatest pain. The
late ruler’s tragic fate was, in his words, “a most miserable plight, alas, unseen since antiquity!” 18
Jing also lamented the incompetence of the loyalist regimes that had attempted to resist the Manchu
onslaught. For him, if only the ministers serving these courts could have shown enough leadership
and loyalty, the Ming would still keep control over at least the southern half of the country, just like
the Eastern Jin and the Southern Song before it. 19 In fact, the factionalism and treachery of these
very officials led to the “barbarian disaster that has plagued the country in this day.” 20
In referring to the Manchus, Zheng Jing used highly denigrating terms, such as hu or lu,
equivalent to “Tartar” in Western languages, and called the Qing emperor by the title qiu, a mere
tribal chieftain.21 In a footnote to one of his poems, he described, not without a tinge of exoticism,
the fantastic and perverse customs of the Manchu native religion that he had heard from Zhang
Huangyan’s envoy Luo Zimu:
“At the dawn of the New Year, the fake Emperor and Empress would enter a temple to
worship their demon gods. It is located at a place where people could not go, and contains
idols of males and females embracing each other and engaging in intercourse. After they
complete their worship, the two would proceed to the platform naked, and perform in the
manner of caged animals, with man on the left and woman on the right…these are truly the
despicable customs of beasts. Moreover, when the barbarian chieftain dies, his younger
brother violates his sister-in-law in order to perform this ritual in his place, while calling out
aloud the name of the late emperor.”22
16 Ibid.
17 Borao Mateo, vol. 2, 593.
18 “Yanping er wang yiji,” 130.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 131.
22 Ibid.
Such incestuous behavior, according to Zheng Jing, occurred not only as ritual within the walls of
the secretive Manchu shrines, but also as explicit carnal desires in the very palaces once occupied by
the former Ming emperors. Based upon further hearsay, he composed several more poems
describing the loneliness of the Qing empress after the death of her husband, and her wild lust for
his younger brother and their passionate encounters in the inner court.23
The derogatory lyrical portrayals of the Qing rulers reflected a consensus among Zheng Jing
and his elites on Taiwan that the Manchus, despite their lavish patronage of Chinese culture,
remained fundamentally alien. Their strange customs and religion promoted incest and went
completely against the permissible set of Confucian relationships. They were, in Zheng’s opinion,
no different from sensual animals with a wild and untamed nature that could never assimilate into
the Han ethnicity. Instead, the disorderly conduct among members of the Qing ruling class, which
had usurped the “proper” Confucian hierarchy of the Ming, threatened, through its own example, to
corrupt and tear apart the very fabric of Chinese society. Indeed, Zheng spoke of “the foul and rank
odor of sheep flooding the four corners of the earth.” 24 This intense racial hatred, together with his
personal qualities, the consultative nature of his government, and collective exile on an overseas
island, would deeply influence the character of his rule over the course of the decade. However, in
1664, Zheng, still reeling from the loss of his Mainland bases, first needed to overcome the Qing
blockade and achieve self-sufficiency in food and the basic provisions necessary for the survival of
his regime.

Toward Self-Sufficiency
A series of agrarian reforms implemented with the help of Chen Yonghua marked a crucial sign
of this emphasis on the development of Taiwan’s domestic economy. For the next decade, under his
capable oversight, Taiwan managed to largely resolve its dire labor shortage, and secure the basic
supplies and manpower that would form the material foundations of his organization. A
comprehensive revenue system soon went into effect, which continued many Dutch precedents, but
also implemented Chenggong’s original vision and plans for the island before his untimely death.
As in former times, all residents above 15 years of age, both Han Chinese settlers and native tribes,
were required to pay an annual head tax.25 During the 1680s, when Qing accounts gave us a detailed
glimpse into the organization’s finances, Zheng Jing collected a total of 35,668 taels (1.3 tons) per
year, including 19,440 taels from the Chinese and 16,228 taels from the aborigines.
However, the pressing desire to achieve basic subsistence for his soldiers meant that Zheng
Jing had to place his priority on sufficient primary grain production. Acting under the advice of
Chen Yonghua, he divided the arable acreage in Taiwan into three categories, and subjected the
agriculturally oriented Han population to land taxes, just as on the Mainland. Land previously
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Sheng, 92.
opened up and cultivated by Chinese peasants during the Dutch period, known as “official fields
(guantian),” fell under the direct jurisdiction of Zheng Jing and his family. They imposed a heavy
tax (more like a rent) on average of 11.25 shi of rice or its equivalent per jia (932 kg per hectare) per
year.26 This sum typically translated to around one-third of individual crop yields. In exchange,
however, they provided agricultural implements and animals for the tenants and constructed and
maintained dikes for irrigation. At the same time, Zheng and Chen encouraged officials and wealthy
gentry to open up virgin soil and recruit peasants to work on them. Known as “private fields
(sitian),” or “fields of civil and military officials (wenwuguantian),” they charged a much lower
mean rent of 2.3 shi of grain per jia (196 kg per hectare) annually. In this arrangement, however,
individual landlords typically invested in the tools, animals, and irrigation projects, and were
responsible for paying a proportion of the rent as tax to Zheng. They would then split the harvest
with the tenant working the land, making the total payments more variable than the “official fields,”
and possibly higher.30
To alleviate the tax burden on the peasantry, and thereby better feed his 20,000 soldiers, Zheng
Jing expanded upon his father’s policy of settling soldiers into military colonies (yingpan), where
they could open up new land and grow food for their own survival. 27 He essentially disbanded his
army and placed his commanders in charge of supervising the activities of the fields rather than
planning for future campaigns. True to Shi Lang’s observations, most of Zheng’s men would
become little different from the other Han Chinese peasants on Taiwan. At first concentrated on the
Jianan Plain, close to the main population centers, the scope of their settlement eventually stretched
from the southern tip of the island to roughly present-day Xinzhu County in the north. 28 However,
two divisions continued to guard Anping and Chengtian, while garrisons were maintained at
Danshui and Jilong, in the extreme north. 29 Moreover, all his men still had to undergo military
training in the lax farming seasons and bear the obligation of taking up arms in the event of possible
warfare.30 Nevertheless, since no major conflict broke out until 1674, most of the soldiers generally
engaged in production without any interruption. No exact figures survive regarding the rate of

26 Ibid. The jia was the rough equivalent of the Dutch morgen, utilized by Chinese settlers on
the island. Zheng Chenggong kept it unchanged after his occupation for the purpose of collecting
taxes conveniently and quickly rather than adopting and transferring the corresponding Mainland area
measurements. The jia remained in use on Taiwan well into Qing times. 30 Ibid. Zheng Jing rated all
land on Taiwan belonging to himself and his officials according to two classes of fertility: tian and
yuan. Each, in turn, was subdivided into three subcategories of quality and assigned different levels
of rent. See Jiang Yuying, ed., Taiwan fu zhi (Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture), TWWXCK (1959), 145.
The amounts given here represent an average of the six figures for official and private fields.
27 Xia, 36 and Jiang Risheng, 233. Zheng Chenggong had justified this policy by bringing up
historical precedents of troops that had tilled the soil in times of peace and taken up arms during war,
especially in the early Ming. His men, too, would serve as “seventy percent farmers and thirty percent
soldiers.” See his proclamation, made just after the Dutch surrender of the island, in Jiang Risheng,
206-207, quoted in Cao, “Taiwan kenzhi,” 74-75.
28 Yang Ying, 190 and Daghregister van Meij, Back 31.
29 Cao, “Taiwan kenzhi,” 79 and Deng Kongzhao, “Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan,” 78.
30 During this period, they primarily mobilized to defend Taiwan from the Qing and Dutch, or
battle hostile aboriginal tribes. For instance, upon hearing word of Shi Lang’s plans to attack in 1665,
Zheng pulled three-tenths of Hong Xu’s division from the land and sent them to garrison Penghu. See
Jiang Risheng, 234.
taxation from the military colonies.31 However, before his death, Zheng Chenggong had given these
settlements a relief of three years in payment, but “borrowed” upfront three-tenths of their initial
crop yield.32 This proportion would appear to have become the regular tax rate after the grace
period.
By 1684, one year after the Zheng organization surrendered to the Qing, around 9,783 jia
(10,086 hectares) of “official fields” had come under cultivation, yielding 84,920 shi (7,032 tons) of
tax grain. The “private fields,” on the other hand, registered at 20,272 jia (20,901 hectares), with
revenues of 41,403 shi (3,429 tons).33 Their sum alone had reached 30,055 jia (30,987 hectares),
two and a half times greater than the biggest Dutch-era figure of 12,252 morgen (12,632 hectares),
reported in 1660.34 For calculating the total area of the military colonies, we assume that about
three-tenths of the 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan, or 6,000 men, farmed in the military colonies, a rather
conservative estimate. Moreover, as Deng Kongzhao shows, Qing soldiers, during their initial years
on the island, each received an average of 30 mu (2 hectares), or 2.65 jia of land. By multiplying
these two figures, Deng concludes that the total area of the Zheng colonies could not fall under
15,000 jia (15,465 hectares).35 However, since their taxation figures remain unavailable due to lack
of data, they cannot be counted into the overall estimates of agrarian revenues. The Zheng
organization’s earnings from land exclusive of the military colonies, factoring in an additional
11,868 shi (982 tons) from eight aboriginal tribes south of Anping and Chengtian that paid head
taxes in grain rather than silver, equaled 138,192 shi (11,440 tons) of grain per year.36 At a low,
early Qing price of .4286 taels per shi, this sum translates to 59,229 taels (2 tons) of silver.37
If we add to this figure the other levies collected by the Zheng organization, including those on
fishing, storefronts, salt, mills and carts, and import duties; an annual amount of 65,586 taels (2.4
tons), we arrive at estimated total tax earnings of 124,815 taels (4.7 tons). 38 Compared to the overall
amount of 110,403 reals (4.13 tons) generated by the VOC in 1655, the Zheng revenues represented
only a marginal increase despite the tremendous expansion of population and area under
cultivation.39 The key reason lies in the differing priorities each enterprise assigned toward use of
31 The paucity of data probably reflected the intentional lack of motivation to keep precise
records due to their impermanent nature; the soldiers that cultivated them had to abandon them if
remobilized for battle. In many cases, the vast distances involved also made regular oversight difficult.
32 Jiang Risheng, 207.
33 Jiang Yuying, 145 and Shepherd, 99.
34 Jian, 17 and Shepherd, 99.
35 Deng Kongzhao, “Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan,” 77-78. This figure accords
with empirical observations from scholars, who have established with certainty over 40 locations
throughout the island as former sites of the colonies. In addition, countless other modern-day place
names bear the namesakes of Zheng’s military divisions, a testament to the large scale and wide
distribution of the settlements. Some examples include Zuoying, or “Left Encampment,” outside
Kaohsiung; Linfengying, or “Encampment of Lin Feng (a Zheng commander),” outside Tainan; and
“Guoxingpu,” or “Place of Koxinga,” in Taipei County.
36 Shepherd, 102.
37 Ibid., 101.
38 For a precise breakdown of these additional levies, refer to Jiang Yuying, 151-163.
39 Shepherd, 102. Of course, the variable here is the contribution made by taxes from the Zheng
military colonies, which we have no way of calculating until further evidence surfaces. At the same
time, however, the Dutch revenues were also undercounted, since the VOC did not include sugar
within the levies on land, which mostly consisted of a tithe on the rice harvest.
the land. Since the VOC ran its colony as a profit-making venture to maximize its extraction of
natural resources, most of its revenues consisted of levies related to Taiwan’s two key exports: sugar
and deerskin. Starting from 1653, the Dutch had farmed out the right, in public auctions, to collect
both the head taxes on Han Chinese and aborigines in a given area to the highest bidder. The
varying and fluctuating prices for purchase reflected the demand among residents for land to engage
in commercial farming, particularly sugar production, and the supply of deer, respectively. 40 In
1655, 34% of the earnings came from the head tax on Han Chinese, while the aboriginal head tax
contributed another 18%. However, customs duties made up the largest share of the VOC
revenues, at 37%. In sum, 89% of the total earnings derived from sources related to commercial
farming and trade, while primary
production, in the form of rice tithes, made up the remaining 11%.41
On the other hand, land taxes grew to almost half of the revenues of the Zheng organization,
while the other levies became set at fixed quotas rather than allowed to fluctuate according to
market values. This shift reflected efforts spearheaded by Chen Yonghua to promote a diversified
commercial economy that deemphasized the profit-oriented sugar monoculture under Dutch rule.
The presence of so many hungry troops meant that much more attention was paid to basic grains
such as rice and sweet potatoes. Due to the fertility of the land outside of the southwestern
population centers, the newly opened settlements practiced an extensive slash-and-burn agriculture,
with rotation every three years among fields.42 The Zheng organization would dispatch an envoy
between these intervals to different parts of the island to adjust the measurements of the fields and
update the tax rates accordingly.43 Combined with the shortage of labor, irrigation projects remained
rather crude and limited in scale, typically involving the construction of small ponds or ditches that
trapped rainwater.44 This agrarian regime, which encouraged the rapid production of grain and the
meeting of basic subsistence, naturally led to less commercial potential and lower incremental
revenues on land.
Nevertheless, the efforts of Zheng Jing and his advisory body had begun to reap tremendous
dividends by 1666. Taiwan recorded bumper harvests in 1665 and 1672, while the annual crop
yields of other years remained plentiful enough to allow the government to “rest with the people ( yu
min xiuxi).”45 According to Jian Huiying’s calculations, the total annual output of the official and
private fields, roughly representing a gross national product (GNP) of the island, comes out to
1,127,869.3 shi (93,400 tons) of rice, or 406,032.95 taels of silver (15.2 tons). 46 Besides primary
agricultural products, the traditional sectors of the economy based upon sugar and deerskin
registered a modest increase as well. Writing on September 16, 1672, Simon Delboe of the English
East India Company (EIC) factory at Taiwan wrote to headquarters in London that “all they made
now [of sugar] doth not exceede 20,000 pecull a yeare, of skins about 100,000 yearely of all sorts.”
40 Andrade, 8.10, 9.19-20.
41 Shepherd, 101.
42 Ibid., 99-100.
43 Deng Kongzhao, “Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan,” 82.
44 Cao, “Taiwan kenzhi,” 83.
45 Jiang Risheng, 235, 259 and Zheng Yiju, “Zheng Chenggong zhuan,” 24.
46 The methodology and data utilized to arrive at this figure can be found in Jian, 25-26.
He further claimed, regarding cane production, that “there is not the 1/5 part made now as in the
time of the Dutch.” The “King [Zheng Jing] doth not incourage the people as they did” to grow
more sugar due to his focus on maintaining self-sufficiency. 47 However, the amount given in the
English records, equivalent to 2,000,000 catties (1,000 tons) per year, actually exceeded the Dutch-
era height of 1,730,000 catties (865 tons) recorded in 1658. 48 The level of deerskin output, at
100,000 pieces, remained generally unchanged between the two periods. 53 Hence, the Zheng
organization inherited intact the entire Dutch colonial infrastructure.
At the same time, however, the surpluses generated from agricultural production spawned
increasing specialization and diversification of the island’s economy. Jiang Yuying’s Gazetteer of
Taiwan Prefecture, compiled soon after the Qing occupation, counts among Taiwan’s products 30
different types of grain, 40 varieties of vegetables, and twenty kinds of fruits, along with a
bewildering array of seafood.54 Besides inheriting the sugar mills and carts and the deer processing
techniques of the Dutch period, new native industries sprang up across the island, especially on the
more populated Jianan Plain. They included kilns for making roof tiles, blacksmiths to forge the
iron that went primarily into plows and other agricultural tools, shipbuilding, and wine distilleries. 55
Under the direction of Chen Yonghua, techniques for making salt underwent dramatic improvement.
As opposed to the previous method of boiling seawater, which left behind many impurities and gave
the final product a bitter aftertaste, peasants were encouraged to trap the ocean water in mounds near
the coast. After drying in the sunlight, the salt proved finer and whiter, yielding a far more lucrative
product for both marketing and taxation. 56 Construction also became a big industry, as population
increased and demand for housing grew. Moreover, the Zheng organization invested in building
roads and bridges to facilitate the transfer of surplus.57
By the late 1660s, a network of distribution channels of exchange had taken shape and was
gradually tying the island together. Busy thoroughfares crisscrossed the commercial centers of
Chengtian, Anping, and the seats of Tianxing and Wannian Counties, where markets and shops of
different varieties converged to sell a plethora of domestic and foreign goods. Jiang Yuying
estimates that during the late Zheng period, altogether 4,705 storefronts thrived across the island. 58
As Shi Lang observed, right after he had landed to claim Taiwan for the Qing in 1683, “it has no
shortage of all the daily necessities…people live closely together, families are numerous, and the
peasants, artisans, and merchants all follow their pursuits.” 59 Indeed, the population grew
dramatically during this period, as residents of the Fujian coast, destitute and starving due to the
Qing coastal evacuation policy, which had deprived them of basic supplies and their traditional
livelihood on the seas, set sail for the island in large numbers. Despite the great distances and
treacherous waves, over 30,000 people crossed the Taiwan Strait throughout the Zheng era to join
the military or to seek better opportunities in farming and commerce. They were mostly enticed by
the relative peace on the other side, along with favorable policies in general toward immigration that
included a three-year land tax remission.49 A large number of these newcomers settled in the

47 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 153.

48 Yao Keisuke, “Two Rivals on an Island of Sugar: The Sugar Trade of the VOC and Overseas Chinese in Formosa in the
49 Shepherd, 96; Jian, 15; Shen Yun, 53; and Ura, 117.
military colonies, as greater harvests above the need to maintain self-sufficiency prompted many
commanders and soldiers to lease out their land.50

Certainly, for most people living on Taiwan during this period, life remained tough and the tax
burdens onerous, forcing some people to sell “even their daughters to pay.” 51 For the typical tenant
household, assuming a family of six with both husband and wife engaged in farming and after
taking out the various rents and taxes imposed upon them, it would earn about 30 shi, translating to
2.684 taels (100.5 g) per person per year. 52 This figure remained relatively unchanged from the
Dutch period, when an average Chinese laborer made just fewer than 3 reals (112.3 g) annually.
Although most peasants lived on the edge, this income, while meager, still implied that they could
generate sufficient surpluses to cover costs, and provided them with a much better standard of living
than in resource-deficient Fujian. Indeed, one contemporary observed, not without reason, that
Taiwan, a place where “people once feared to go, has now become a land of happiness ( letu).”53
With the successful implementation of agrarian policies and rise of a modest but expanding
domestic market, the Zheng organization mostly resolved its perennial shortages of food and basic
supplies, a feat never before accomplished on the Mainland.

A New “China” Abroad

Besides providing economic and material relief, Zheng Jing proceeded to forge a new
legitimacy that would appeal to the Han ethnic pride and homesickness of his subjects. At the same
time, he would inherit and move further along his father’s policies of deemphasizing Ming
restoration and firmly committing their future to this island overseas. However, Zheng initially had
to undertake this task in such a way as to not upset the sensitivities of his commanders and elites,
who clamored for a hasty return to the Mainland. He thus left several key outward forms of Ming
legitimacy unchanged throughout his rule. He steadfastly refused to alter the Yongli reign name,
and continued to use it in all of his correspondences. 54 He accorded the deceased emperor with great
respect and honor, and treated him as if he still lived. For instance, on the Lunar New Year of
Yongli 19 (February 15, 1665), Zheng and his civil and military officials, all adorned in court garb,
paid homage to the ruler and congratulated him before his empty throne. 55 Of course, these gestures
may also have served as calculated and preemptive maneuvers to prevent any of the imperial princes
from laying claim to the throne and challenging Zheng’s political power. He could acquire much-
needed space and time to undertake further reforms that, while not entirely doing away with the
Ming legacy, effectively marginalized it and promoted the creation of new and distinct narratives.

50 Deng, Zheng Cheggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan, 83.

51 Hsu Wen-hsiung, “From Aboriginal Island to Chinese Frontier,” in China’s Island Frontier, ed. Ronald Knapp (Honolulu, HI:
University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 23-24.
52 For the exact method and data utilized in calculating personal income, see Jian, 26-27.
53 Ruan, 44.
54 Xia, 31.
55 Jiang Risheng, 233.
 A generational shift in elite opinion greatly aided the creation of a new discourse of legitimacy.
Many of the gentry and high-ranking civil and military officials who had originally come to Taiwan
with the Zhengs had either died or become old. 56 The new group of men at the core of Zheng Jing’s
decision-making circle primarily consisted of the descendants of the ones they replaced. Feng Xifan
was the son of the deceased Feng Chengshi, Officer of Works, while Hong Xu’s son, Hong Lei, also
became a close advisor who served in different positions of the Six Offices. 57 Unlike their
predecessors, these men lacked independent moral authority, and owed their high positions almost
solely to their fathers’ loyalty to the organization and, of course, Zheng Jing. With their advice, he
set out to create new symbols and myths, while undoing or toning down old ones.
The first major shift in direction was symbolic and seemingly harmless, involving a mere
question of names. In 1664, soon after he and his soldiers fled back to Taiwan, Zheng changed the
official title of the island from Dongdu to Dongning, or “Eastern Pacification.” 58 The move was a
subtle statement of the goals he intended to achieve for his organization. Dongdu, coined by his
father, implied a new seat of Ming government, of making Taiwan “China,” but still hinted at future
efforts at restoration of the Mainland. Dongning imparted the additional feeling of settled
permanency, of creating a new “China” outside of a corrupted, “barbarianized” one, and involving a
long-term commitment to Taiwan, rather than as the focal point of a broader movement. Moreover,
the change signaled a desire to end hostilities with the Qing and arrive at some kind of political
settlement. In another significant move, Zheng Jing elevated Tianxing and Wannian Counties to the
status of sub-prefectures (zhou).59 Their upgraded profile directly translated into a higher status for
the entire island, making it the focus of administrative and economic policies. Indeed, to better
manage Taiwan’s burgeoning commercial activity, he concurrently extended his control beyond the
sub-prefectural level, establishing four wards (fang) in the urban areas and 24 districts (li) to oversee
the Han Chinese peasantry. He also set up two Pacification Divisions (Anfu si): the Northern and
Southern Routes (Nanbei lu) to handle aboriginal affairs within the interior, and a branch that
administered the Penghu Islands.60
The implementation of sweeping agrarian reforms under Chen Yonghua resulted, in part, as we
have seen, from dire economic circumstances. Yet, the measures also aimed at a full-scale
sinicization of the foreign landscape of Taiwan, transforming it from an inhospitable frontier of
“wild” aboriginal tribes and exotic miasmas into a “civilized” atmosphere of cultivated farms and
peasant households. To this effect, he advised commoners to replace their grass huts, typically
found even in the busy urban areas of Chengtian and Anping, with permanent houses made of wood
and baked tiles.61 He ordered numerous temples and shrines built in every major population center
to worship Buddha and the various local deities of Fujianese culture. 62 In 1665 and 1666, Chen

56 Gao, 212-213.
57 Hong Lei became the Officer of Punishments soon after Xu’s death. Xia, 38.
58 Xia, 36 and Yang Ying, 189.
59 Gao, 3-4.
60 Ibid., 4.
61 Jiang Risheng, 235 and Yang Ying, 186.
62 For a list of these places of worship, including names and their exact
location, refer to Jiang Yuying, 119-125. 74 Chen Yonghua headed the Imperial
established an Imperial Academy and Confucian Shrine in Chengtian, and founded schools
throughout the sub-prefectures. He also transplanted the system of regular civil service
examinations from the Mainland to acquire talent for managing Taiwan’s affairs. 74 In a further
attempt to promote the transformation of the island into a bastion of
“civilization,” Zheng Jing dispatched teachers to the various aboriginal tribes to instruct them in
advanced and intensive farming methods, and provide them with tools and animals. 75 Of course, as
a necessary corollary, he did not hesitate to severely punish the indigenous population should they
refuse to accept the blessings of “civilization.” During the decade on Taiwan, several major
rebellions flared up, especially in the remote northern and central parts of the island, chiefly due to
the incursion of Han Chinese settlers on their land and way of life. 63 The reaction to these acts of
defiance was often brutal. In one campaign, Liu Guoxuan, stationed in present-day Zhanghua
County, nearly obliterated the local Shalu tribe for its defiance, leaving only six people alive out of
an original population of several hundred.64 These twin aspects of culturalism, both benevolent and
ruthless, represented, ironically, a microcosm of what the Qing practiced toward the Zhengs
themselves.
Whether violent or not, the internal sinicization effort, besides fundamentally changing the
landscape of Taiwan, marked a definitive shift away from Ming restoration, a process already begun
under Chenggong. As shown above, Jing kept the nominal imperial throne at Chengtian empty,
refusing to allow anyone to succeed the late Yongli pretender despite the presence on Taiwan of
many qualified descendants from the Ming imperial house. Ironically, these princes, who once
directly epitomized the defense of Han ethnic characteristics from “barbarian” desecration, were
now the main group to fall victim to his attempt to divorce geographic and cultural “Chineseness.”
As potential rallying points for restorationist sentiments, the ideas they represented appeared
incompatible with his new political orientation. Zheng Jing reversed his father’s deep reverence and
respect for Zhu Shugui, the most prominent of the descendants on Taiwan and likeliest candidate for
succession to the throne, cutting off all financial assistance to him and ending Chenggong’s practice
of providing for his meals. The prince was soon reduced to a status no different from a commoner,
although, to support his basic needs, he was given a plot of land in the suburbs of present-day
Tainan, which Jing also taxed heavily.65 If even Zhu Shugui could hardly receive the proper
treatment befitting his royal status, the other Ming descendants did not fare much better.
Meanwhile, Zheng kept a close eye on the central and local elites who had accompanied him to
the island, and tried to ensure that they did not voice opinions contrary to his new policies. Shen
Guangwen, a close friend of Zhu Shugui, learned the hard way after he wrote a poem satirizing
Zheng’s dependence upon his advisors, the shift in the organization’s direction, and the “disbanding

Academy, with Ye Heng as his assistant. See Jiang Risheng, 235-236. 75 Jiang
Risheng, 236 and Xia, 36.
63 Jiang Renjie, 127.
64 Huang Shujing, 128. Jiang Renjie gives 1670 as the year of the offensive, although no
mention of this date can be found in the original source.
65 This account can be found in Gao’s Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture under “Biography of the Ming Prince of Ningjing,” written
by Chen Yuantu, a former confidant of Zhu Shugui, shortly after the prince’s suicide in 1683. See Gao, 255.
of troops” into the military colonies. 66 Fearing possible recriminations, Shen disguised himself as a
monk and fled into the mountains of Baccloan, where he lived for years in exile among the local
aborigines. Other prominent literati, who experienced similar disillusionment with what they
viewed as Zheng Jing’s cowardice and weak character, withdrew voluntarily from society to lead
secluded lives. Li Maochun, his former tutor, concluded that he “was not leadership material,” and,
along with Wang Zhongxiao, “refused to serve the false Zhengs.” 67 They chose the path of
eremitism to “signify a form of passive resistance” not only toward foreign domination over
“China,” as Frederic Wakeman points out, but also toward an organization that could no longer
represent their core values.68 These men felt hurt and betrayed by Zheng’s inability and
unwillingness to launch another campaign against the Qing, even as he waged vicious internal
power struggles to get rid of potential rivals and expand his own interests. As one of Shen’s
numerous poems written in exile lamented, “I often looked toward the West [to the Mainland] for
good news, but I had to flee north because of my fear of alienation from the group.” 69
Despite tremendous opposition from civil elites and his homesick soldiers, Zheng Jing managed
to push through his policies unfazed with the unwavering support of his advisory body, spearheaded
by Chen Yonghua. Chen adapted a phrase from the Chunqiu to justify the shift in ideological
direction. According to him, “after ten years of letting the multitudes grow, and ten years of
educating and nourishing them…in thirty years, [Taiwan] can truly compete for first and second
with the Central Plain.”70 Even Wang Zhongxiao grudgingly came to recognize this advancement of
“civilization” on the island. In an inscription dedicated in 1665, a year before his death, to the
newly built Shrine to the Supreme Heaven (Shangdi miao), he wrote:

“Once the Imperial Surname [Zheng Chenggong] governed this land, the Chinese people came one
after another. In Anping of Dongning, I only see and hear Chinese. The people here are people of
the Middle Kingdom, and the soil is the soil of the Middle Kingdom.71

For Chen and Wang, the years of efforts spent at “naturalizing” Taiwan had successfully
transformed it from a wild “foreign” frontier into a new “China” abroad, able to outcompete and
outshine the old. Nevertheless, the former legitimacy of Ming restoration, which had once so
successfully melded the organization together through shared defense of ethnic identity, love of
native place, and dynastic loyalty, remained a powerful inspiration for many and always lay not far

66 Huang Shujing, 75-76. Shen often wrote and exchanged poems with Zhu Shugui. For examples, see “Shen Guangwen,” in
Quan Tai shi (Complete Collection of Taiwanese Poems), ed. Shi Yilin et al., vol. 1 (Tainan: Guojia Taiwan wenxue guan, 2004),
62.
67 Jiang Yuying, 216, 219.
68 Wakeman, vol. 1, 644-645, 674.
69 欲聆佳信頻西望，卻訝離群又北飛. See “Shen Guangwen,” 64.
70 十年生長、十年教養…三十年真可與中原相甲乙. See Jiang Risheng, 236 and Gao, 3.
71 賜姓撫茲土, 華人遂接踵而來, 安平東寧, 所見所聞, 無非華者, 人為中國之人, 土則為中國之土. See Wang
Zhongxiao, Wang Zhongxiao gong ji (Collection of the Gentleman Wang Zhongxiao) (Nanjing, Jiangsu: Jiangsu guji chubanshe,
2000), 82.
beneath the surface. Zheng Jing needed time for his separation of physical and cultural “China” to
sink in, as well as a means to institutionalize it by means of a more stable political arrangement.

Overseas Trade Reconstituted

As he tried to rebuild the shattered ideological infrastructure of his organization, Zheng Jing

concurrently turned his attention toward reconstituting his family’s foreign trading network, which
had been severely interrupted due to the bitter succession struggle and the Qing economic blockade.
With the assistance of Hong Xu, a seasoned veteran of the sea lanes and one of the last surviving
senior authorities from Chenggong’s days, Jing began to refashion his commercial fleet, whose
junks had already started to rot as they sat idly in the ports. In 1665, he transferred some of his
military colonies to areas deep within the mountainous interior to access its rich forests of camphor
wood, while Hong dispatched his own commercial vessels to ports across the Western Pacific to
acquire other shipbuilding materials.72 Meanwhile, Zheng asserted full control over Taiwan’s
overseas trade, establishing the Monopoly Firm (Gonghang), whose activities, as before, came
under the direct supervision of the Revenue Office, now headed by Yang Ying. The firm essentially
consolidated the functions of both the Mountain and Oceanic Five Firms of his father’s day. 73 His
agents, known in English sources as the “King’s merchants,” bought and sold on his account, and
enjoyed a monopsony over the procurement of local products, while serving as the sole supplier of
exports for other traders on Taiwan. 74 In this manner, Zheng Jing was able to take a huge cut of the
business for himself, certainly greater than the proportion during Chenggong’s time.
As before, private merchants and his commanders, through their agents, could also participate
in the trade, but the former needed to first purchase a license to go abroad. Instead of a flat levy in
previous times, the tax now varied in increments based upon the carrying capacity of a ship’s
wooden beam, which could measure its overall size with a greater degree of preciseness and
accuracy. The Zheng organization would charge one qian one fen (5.5 g) per dan of cargo for this
beam license (liangtou pai).75 In exchange for the payment, private merchants enjoyed the armed
protection of its naval escorts on the high seas. For instance, Yang Yandi, commander of a division
of 70 junks and 3,000 troops, patrolled the seas around Guangdong, Tonkin, Quinam, and Cambodia
to prevent piracy and privateering, especially from the Dutch, who, embittered at the loss of Taiwan,
specifically targeted Zheng shipping as a means of venting their anger. 76 In a report to Amsterdam
on April 22, 1662, Governor-General Maetsuyker emphasized forcefully that “regardless of whether
the Japanese decline or approve, we have decided to attack and subdue all of Koxinga’s junks

72 Jiang Risheng, 237.

73 Zheng Ruiming, 77.
74 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 63-64.
75 Xia, 44 and Nie Dening, 335-336.
76 Hayashi Shunsai, 366-367 and Zheng Ruiming, 80.
sailing in those waters.”77 Those Chinese vessels that did not pay for the license fees would thus
have to face VOC intimidation alone. Moreover, the Zheng ships, too, made prizes out of any
“jonckes they meete with which have not the King’s pass.” 78 When a vessel of Kea Nabby, a
leading merchant of Bantam, blew off course in a storm and landed in Zheng-held territory, “they
plundered her and…tooke from them in money & goods betweene 4 & 5000” reals (149.7 to 187.1
kg).79
After initial forays into the market in 1664, the commercial activities of Zheng Jing and other
merchants based on the island began to pick up in earnest during the following year. In 1670, there
were over 200 official and affiliated long-distance trading junks in Taiwan. 80 We actually have a
detailed depiction of one of these vessels, although of a slightly later period: the Dongbenniao
belonging to Liu Guoxuan, which fell into Qing hands upon its return to Xiamen in 1684, one year
after the Zheng surrender. This ship, considered typical for junks under Zheng Jing and his
commanders, was constructed in Taiwan and measured just below eight zhang (26.7 m) in length
and two zhang (6.7 m) in width, and had a depth of around two zhang. It had a total of 25
compartments for living space and storage of cargo, and carried a crew of 83 men. 81
The journey these vessels took almost exclusively followed the Mainland China/Taiwan-Japan-
Southeast Asia-Mainland China/Taiwan triangle. For instance, the Dongbenniao set out for
Nagasaki on Kangxi 22.Intercalary 6/1 (July 24, 1683), arriving at port on Intercalary 6/23. After
staying until 12/25, it then headed for Siam, where it docked on Kangxi 23.2/22. It left port again
on 6/1, returning to Xiamen on 7/15 (August 25, 1684). 82 Because of dependence upon the
prevailing winds and currents during a given season, it took a junk about one year to complete a
roundtrip journey, with significant layover time in the different ports of East and Southeast Asia.

The Nagasaki Route

A total of 111 ships traveled the well-established route to Japan between 1663 and 1673, or an
average of around 10.1 per annum, with the figures maintaining a general upward momentum
despite moderate fluctuations. From a low of two to three ships in 1662 and 1663, soon after the
disastrous internecine conflicts and Qing blockade had devastated the family enterprise, the numbers
climbed to eight in 1665. It then reached a high of 20 in 1671, before falling precipitously to just
one in 1673 due to the mass mobilization of soldiers in preparation for the Rebellion of the Three
Feudatories, which would break out a year later on the Mainland against Qing rule. 83 These
estimates err on the low side, as they only counted the number of vessels belonging directly to
Zheng Jing, and further did not take into account the annual average of 14.2 junks sailing to Japan
77 Cheng, 558.
78 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 69.
79 Ibid., 65.
80 Ibid.
81 Zheng shi shiliao sanbian, 217-218.
82 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 216-217.
83 Zheng Ruiming, 72.
from Southeast Asia.84 For instance, in 1670, 18 junks, 11 of them under Zheng, went to Nagasaki
from Taiwan, while a total of 36 made the return trip. This figure only represented over half of the
63 vessels on average per year during Chenggong’s day, but they nevertheless outnumbered the six
Dutch ships visiting the port in the same year.85
We can get a rare glimpse into the types and quantities of goods exported to Japan during this
period through Korean records of a junk operated by one of Jing’s official merchants that had blown
off course during a storm and ran aground on Jeju Island in 1667. Among the cargo of Lin Yinguan
and his 94 other shipwrecked crew members, Korean authorities counted a total of 7,203 skins from
several different varieties of deer.86 The export of this item, which Zheng Jing completely
monopolized, amounted to some 200,000 to 300,000 skins per year, with bucks valued at 20 reals in
Taiwan, while does could be purchased at 16 reals (748.6 g), each per 100 skins. 87 In Japan, it could
fetch anywhere from 60 (2.25 kg) to 70 reals (2.62 kg), yielding a mean rate of return of 306%. 101
Assuming the higher Taiwan purchasing price and the lower sale price at Nagasaki, we can safely
estimate that Lin Yinguan could have realized a profit of at least 2881.2 reals (108 kg) from his
supply of deerskins alone. Taken on a grander scale, and based upon the overall annual export of
200,000 skins, Zheng Jing could earn a total of 80,000 reals (3 tons) of silver. The other items from
Taiwan that Lin Yinguan brought along included 114 catties (57 kg) of ramie cloth, leather items,
iron implements, and parasols. Interestingly enough, the junk also carried large quantities of
arquebuses, knives, gunpowder, and even two large cannons, allowing it to defend itself against
possible predation on the high seas.88
Surprisingly, however, Lin’s shipwrecked vessel does not appear to have carried on board any
sugar, Taiwan’s other lucrative export item. However, we can be certain that the cargoes of other
ships belonging to Zheng and his official merchants contained plenty of it. English observers
pointed out in 1670 that Taiwan could churn out some 20,000 piculs (1,000 tons) of sugar for export
per year.89 Although Zheng seized the lion’s share of this trade, private merchants could also
participate in a certain proportion of the business. Liu Guoxuan’s Dongbenniao, for instance,
carried 2,050 dan (102.5 tons) of refined white sugar and 150 dan (7.5 tons) of rock candy in 1684.90
White sugar normally can be purchased on the island at three reals (112.3 g) per picul and sold at
eight reals (299 g) at Nagasaki, a 167% rate of return. If processed into rock candy, the revenue

84 Jian, 44.
85 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 65 and Yamawaki, 114.
86 Seong, 277_004b.
87
Chang
Hsiu-
jung et
al., 65.
101
Ibid.,
65, 69.
88 Seong, 277_004b-277_006c.
89 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 153.
90 Zheng shi shiliao sanbian, 218.
obtained from its sale would normally rise to 12 reals (449 g). 91 Taken altogether, Taiwan could
earn 100,000 reals (3.74 tons) annually, making sugar its most profitable export. Therefore, the
resources of the island alone already greatly boosted the Zheng organization’s earnings, adding an
average of 180,000 reals (6.73 tons) to its coffers. In contrast, the available data we have of mean
Dutch-period earnings from trade throughout its rule, primarily dependent upon the twin exports of
sugar and deerskin, amounted to 299,125 guldens, or 104,956 reals (3.9 tons).92
Among the cargo of Lin Yinguan’s shipwrecked vessel, the Korean authorities also discovered
467 bolts of raw Chinese silk and several items of silk cloth, along with limited amounts of
porcelain and lacquerware.93 So, how did these prized Mainland luxury goods wound up in the
Zheng vessel during a time of severe economic blockade launched by the Qing to specifically
counter the organization’s activities? After all, as part of the coastal evacuation policy, the Qing
authorities had “built walls and established boundary markers” all along the Chinese coast,
especially in the southeast, and “garrisoned forces to guard them. Those who dare to cross the
boundary will die.”94 Likewise, the English acknowledged the tremendous difficulty of accessing
the Chinese coast, where “there is noe carrying in or bringing out goods. There is a wall allso all
along the sea coast & every 5 howers’ journey distant a castle for keepeing the coast of China.” 95
They, too, noted that “if any person is found without the wall ‘tis death.”96
At the same time, however, coastal removal brought about severe destitution, homelessness, and
starvation among the local population, which had depended upon the ocean for their very sustenance
in this already resource-deficient macroregion. Because of the draconian measures, many residents
assembled together in large bands, and either fled deep into the mountains to become robbers, or
settled on the deserted islands outside the boundaries. In this liminal no-man’s-land, safely out of
the reach of the Qing patrols, which lacked sufficient naval power to dislodge them, they preyed
upon villages and towns in the interior and otherwise maintained their former way of life. Lawless
elements at the time tended to congregate in eastern Guangdong, just south of the Fujian border. A
laxer enforcement of the coastal evacuation policy there due to the Portuguese presence in Macao,
and the lack of coordination between the naval commands of the two provinces within this
ambiguous jurisdiction facilitated their rapid proliferation.97
Zheng Jing took advantage of this chaotic situation to form alliances with one of the key rebel
leaders, a pirate named Qiu Hui (d. 1683), during the early 1660s. Based on the island of Dahao, in
present-day Shantou, this young and ferocious warrior, nicknamed “Stinky Red Meat (Chou
hongrou),” operated a squadron of boats manned mostly by tanka fishermen. They launched
frequent raids on the various towns of Chaozhou Prefecture. 98 Besides providing Taiwan with silk,
91 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 65, 69.
92 Andrade, Appendix C, 2.
93 Seong, 277_004b.
94 Ruan, 39.
95 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 67.
96 Ibid., 64.
97 For a fascinating series of memorials, imperial edicts, and eyewitness testimonies that speak of piracy on the high seas and
illicit collusion with Taiwan, see Zheng shi shiliao sanbian, 62-63; 66-73; and 74-87.
98 Jiang Risheng, 238-239 and Zheng shi shiliao xubian, 1211-1212.
porcelain, and other Mainland products, Qiu actively engaged in the trafficking of humans. 99 Young
girls became especially precious commodities fetching premium prices, as over half of the soldiers
who came with Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing to the island were single men with no wives or
families.100 The increased presence of women through these admittedly perverse means would
alleviate the severe gender imbalance and give this rough frontier a more settled feel, thereby
elevating troop morale and maintaining their long-term commitment toward Taiwan. Nevertheless,
young adult males continued to occupy a substantial portion of immigration during this period. 101
Even though Qing soldiers proved unable to effectively dislodge Qiu Hui and his men, the sole
reliance upon plunder to obtain Mainland products and labor only provided rather haphazard results,
and contributed to steep prices in Taiwan. 102 To ensure a more stable supply, Zheng needed to
institutionalize the smuggling by having his own agents infiltrate into the interior to purchase goods
and acquire information, while controlling ports on the coast where they could be shipped out in a
safe and orderly manner. By 1666, he had already established a foothold at Putuoshan, on the
Zhoushan Islands off Zhejiang, where “the King hath lately putt some people…& from thence hath
a trade with the Governor of Lamking.”117 Jing, then, sent some of his official merchants from the
Monopoly Firm to covertly enter and live in Qing territory, fulfilling a role similar to the Mountain
Five Firms of Chenggong’s day. These agents would purchase silk, porcelain, and other proto-
industrial manufactures of the highly developed Jiangnan region from the nearby commercial
centers of Hangzhou and Suzhou. In addition to espionage activities, they apparently entered into a
covert deal with a high-ranking Qing authority, possibly the governor or governor-general of
Jiangnan, to buy directly from merchants trading under his account. With the secret connivance of a
well-placed individual within the Qing hierarchy, the Zheng organization could enjoy official
protection for its business in the region, and acquire a high level of stability and reliability on the
supply side.
However, Zheng Jing needed a bigger port of transit located closer and more directly accessible
to Taiwan, and with better natural harbors and facilities to accommodate a larger number of junks.
It should also be easily defensible from potential harassment from outlaw groups and Qing soldiers
when the ships docked to load and unload goods, their most vulnerable moment. The islands of
Xiamen and Jinmen, his former twin bases, became the natural choice for Zheng to establish a main
foothold that would coordinate all of his organization’s activities along the Mainland coast. Until
1668, the presence of Shi Lang’s Fujian Naval Command at Haicheng, located directly south across
a narrow stretch of sea, made any covert smuggling operation a highly difficult task. During that
year, however, to facilitate a negotiated settlement with Zheng Jing, the Qing court dismantled and
burned the entire naval fleet, and ordered Shi to Beijing. 103 Even after the talks failed, the new
99 Jiang Risheng, 238-239.
100 Ibid., 257-258.
101 Ura, 117. Shepherd estimates that under Dutch rule, “at least two-thirds of the immigrants
had been adult males.” While the Zheng figures remain unknown, the influx of women during that
period must have decreased this majority. See Shepherd, 97.
102 Jiang Risheng, 238 and Zheng
shi shiliao xubian, 1211-1212. 117 Chang
Hsiu-jung et al., 65.
103 Jiang Risheng 242-246 and Shi, 4-5.
Kangxi Emperor, faced with the far greater challenge of domestic consolidation, had grown “weary
of war” and “promised not to punish” Zheng anymore. 104 Until the Rebellion of the Three
Feudatories broke out, then, the two sides “were mutually at peace.” 105 The sudden disappearance of
the Qing navy, along with a partial relaxation of the removal policy, opened up a new power vacuum
on the coast that allowed the chaotic lawlessness of the Guangdong border to spread into southern
Fujian.
Zheng Jing moved quickly to establish control over the region by coopting the largest and most
organized rebel group in the area: the bandits of the Southern Taiwu Mountains, close to Haicheng.
He transformed them into a regular division of the Zheng military apparatus under the command of
their leader, Jiang Sheng (d. 1683). With the assistance of Qiu Hui, who had also formally joined
the organization not too long ago, Jiang seized control of Xiamen and Jinmen from another band of
pirates in 1669. He then constructed straw huts as makeshift markets and applied the strict laws of
Taiwan on the islands, enforcing contracts at market prices, and prohibiting robbery and murder. 106
From a strategic standpoint, Zheng’s control of these and other key ports allowed the fleets of his
semi-autonomous allies to form an outer defensive ring along a vast arc extending from Ningbo,
Zhejiang to Chaozhou in eastern Guangdong. Besides guarding the approach to Taiwan, the
perimeter gave his organization a stranglehold over most of China’s access to the sea, helping to
enforce his monopoly over virtually its entire foreign trade.
With a stable infrastructure for trade established, Jiang proceeded to form cordial relations with
the Qing border garrison commanders, primarily through the payment of handsome bribes. As a
result, while they adhered to all the outward forms of enforcing the prohibition, including frequent
and careful patrols of the coastal no-man’s-land, they tacitly allowed smuggling under their very
noses. The official Zheng merchants would infiltrate the boundary walls at night, carrying only
Japanese silver or gold coins (koban) with them to purchase Mainland goods and pay off any greedy
guards.122 When “discovered,” as was usually the case, they would “run” from the pursuing
soldiers, actually dispatched by the commander to escort and guide them into the interior. 107 After
the smugglers had obtained their products and returned to the coast, they simply needed to bribe the
border guards on the spot before leaving their jurisdiction. In the words of an English observer, “’tis
much less trouble to bring goods out than carry in.” 108 Still, Zheng’s agents could sell any non-
104 Zheng Yiju, 26.
105 Xia, 37.
106 Jiang
Risheng, 239 and
Zheng Yiju, 26. 122
Chang Hsiu-jung et
al., 64.
107 Jiang Risheng, 257.
10
8C
hang
Hsiu-
jung et
al., 64.
125
Yu,
Chinese wares they had carried along directly at Xiamen and the other ports due to the sizable
presence of Mainland-based merchants. Eager to find lucrative outlets for their own products, they,
too, paid their way through the boundaries and flocked to do business. 125 Meanwhile, on the other
side of the strait, the English observed that “dayly the China junkes brings in great quantities” of
silk, porcelain, and other prized luxuries. 109 Indeed, this system of institutionalized illicit trade with
the Mainland had greatly leveled their purchasing price in Taiwan.110
In addition to the sugar and deerskin, junks bound for Japan, like Lin Yinguan’s vessel, now had
plentiful supplies of Chinese products among their cargoes. The item in greatest demand, as in
Chenggong’s day, remained raw silk, which could be bought in Taiwan at 255 reals (9.54 kg) per
picul and sold at Nagasaki for 600 reals (22.46 kg) per picul, yielding a return of 135%. This rate,
however, was significantly lower than the 200% realized during the 1650s due to the higher risk, and
therefore cost, involved in transporting the product to Taiwan. Moreover, it encountered fierce
competition from Bengali silk, which the VOC could market at a comparable, if not greater yield, as
high as 192% in 1671.111 Data regarding the quantities of Chinese silk exported to Japan during the
decade of 1663 to 1673 remains rather spotty and incomplete, with precise figures available only for
the years of 1663, 1664, 1665, and 1671. However, they reveal a rather large fluctuation in the
volume, ranging from a low end of around 50,000 jin (25 tons) in 1663 and 1671 to highs of 119,208
jin (59.6 tons) in 1664 and 163,042 jin (81.6 tons) in 1665.112 On average, the amount of silk shipped
from Taiwan to Nagasaki amounted to 94,966 jin (47 tons). We do not have comparably precise
figures for the VOC, although we know that the Company exported a total of 1,516,600 catties (758
tons) from Bengal and Tonkin between 1655 and 1668, yielding a mean of 116,661 catties (58.3 tons)
per year.113 On the whole, then, the Zheng organization managed to ship slightly fewer quantities of
the luxury to Nagasaki during this period than the Dutch.
While the Zheng organization handled a smaller volume of the silk trade and realized a
lower rate of return, the absolute profits nevertheless exceeded that of the VOC due to the greater
overall value of the Chinese variety. We know that the purchase price for Bengali silk was 2.38
guldens per pound, which translates to about 2.62 guldens per catty. 114 Now, assuming a 192% rate
of return, we arrive at a profit per unit of 5.03 guldens per catty. We further apply this figure,
derived only for Bengali silk, to the average annual quantity of all Dutch shipments to Nagasaki of
116,661 catties, obtaining total mean earnings of 586,804 guldens, or 205,896 taels (7.7 tons) of
silver. The Zheng organization, on the other hand, had a profit per unit of 345 reals per picul.
48.
109 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 64.
110 Jiang Risheng, 239.
111 Zhang Bincun, “Shiqi shiji mo Helan Dongyindu gongsi wei shenme bu zai pai chuan dao Zhongguo lai?” (“Why Would the
Dutch East India Company No Longer Dispatch Ships to China at the End of the Seventeenth Century?”), in Zhongguo haiyang
fazhanshi lunwen ji (Essays in Chinese Maritime History), ed. Liu Xufeng, vol. 8 (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and
Social Studies, Academia Sinica, 2005), 181.
112 Jian, 54.
113 Of this figure, 1,232,400 catties (616.2 tons) came from Bengal, while Tonkinese silk made
up 284,200 catties (142.1 tons). I have decided to exclude the 82,800 catties (41.4 tons) of Chinese
silk, since it had virtually disappeared from the Dutch inventories by the 1660s. See Nara, 173 and
Zhang Bincun, 180-182.
114 Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China,” Modern Asian Studies 30.1 (1996): 68.
Multiplied by the average volume of 94,966 jin, converted to 949.66 dan, we obtain a total of
327,633 reals (12.3 tons). Even in 1663, its worst year, the Zheng organization still realized
earnings of 178,553 reals (6.6 tons) from a shipment of 47,614 jin, comparing quite favorably to the
mean Dutch figures.115
For most of the 1660s, the vessels of Zheng Jing and his affiliated merchants exchanged the
contraband silk and other products, including Taiwanese sugar and deerskin, primarily for Japanese
kan at Nagasaki. According to von Glahn’s figures, their exports of silver from 1663 to 1668
amounted to a total of 45,315 kan (4,540,000 taels, 169.9 tons), or an average of 7,552 kan (756,600
taels, 28.32 tons) per annum.116 However, the bullion shipments suddenly fell to lows of 296 kan
(29,660 taels, 1.11 tons) in 1669 and 395 kan (39,570 taels, 1.48 tons) for the following year. Then,
they recorded a modest rebound to 950 kan (95,180 taels, 3.56 tons) in 1671, before making a
spectacular leap to 8,964 kan (898,100 taels, 33.6 tons) in 1672 back to the figures of the previous
decade. What could explain this tremendous three-year gap in bullion exports? As it turned out, the
continuous outflow of silver for over a century had begun to deplete the Japanese mines,
contributing to growing scarcity of the metal and calls for further official containment of overseas
trade. In 1668, after a major fire in Edo led to rapid inflation of prices for building materials and
basic necessities, the bakufu launched a comprehensive program of sumptuary regulations that
included a prohibition on the export of silver. 117 Instead, from 1664, it actively encouraged the
export of gold by lifting a ban it had enacted in 1641. 118 Chinese merchants primarily acquired the
metal in the form of coins, or koban, for those three years.
However, due to the tremendous demand for silver from the Mainland market, gold fetched a
low price in Taiwan, valued at five and a half to six reals per koban, as opposed to 10 reals on the
Coromandel Coast of India.119 The prohibition, then, put the Zheng traders at a sudden comparative
disadvantage in the commerce with Nagasaki. In 1670, for instance, the VOC exported 77,333 gold
coins valued at around 1,569,790 guldens, equivalent to 550,803 taels (20.62 tons) of silver, making
the ratio of the two metals 1:7 if we continue to assume the official exchange rate of one tael to 57
stuivers.120 Under these circumstances, the Dutch could simply ship the gold to Coromandel, under
their sphere of influence, and sell at 770,330 taels (28.83 tons), obtaining an arbitrage profit of
219,527 taels (8.2 tons). On the contrary, the 36 Chinese junks at Nagasaki that year exported
152,304 koban, equal to 1,066,128 taels (39 tons) of silver. 121 However, once at Taiwan, their gold

115 Jian, 54.

116 Von Glahn, 227-228.
117 Totman, 143-144.
118 Von Glahn, 228.
119 Von Glahn, 74, 153 and Yamawaki, 115.
120 Yamawaki, 111, 114 and Blussé, 70-71.
12
1
Hayashi
Akira,
vol. 4,
327. 139
Von
would depreciate to a ratio of 1:5.5 or 1:6, which, taking the lower figure, would amount to 837,672
taels (31.3 tons), a loss of 228,456 taels (8 tons).
Because of the lack of demand for gold in Taiwan and Mainland China, Zheng merchants
continued to press for payment in silver, and even threatened to turn away from Nagasaki
altogether.139 Since fewer ships would mean decreased quantities of highly coveted Chinese silk,
prices at the port would rise even higher from the inability of supply to meet demand, resulting in
further depletion of bullion. In a sign of just how much economic clout the Zheng organization had
on the trade with Japan, the bakufu finally relented and decided to lift the ban in 1671, although the
prohibition remained in effect on the Dutch. In fact, Edo could never completely stem the outflow
of silver, as demonstrated in 1669 and 1670 by continued, albeit drastically curtailed, exports of
bullion, which the Chinese vessels must have transported covertly out of the country. 122 Besides the
brief shift in precious metals, the Zheng organization’s other purchases remained essentially
unchanged from the previous decade, consisting of imports of knives, armor, and copper. The latter
remained the most important item after silver, for forging weapons and casting into Yongli-era coins
for small daily transactions in Taiwan. 123 In 1670, Chinese junks carried 732,470 catties (366 tons)
of copper.142 Given that it could be bought at 16 reals (224.6 g) per picul in Taiwan that year, we use
this rate to arrive at a total import value of 117,195 reals (4.38 tons).124
Now, based upon the total silver shipments from 1663 to 1668 and 1672, and adding to these
the gold obtained in 1671 at a conversion rate of 1:5.5, we arrive at the Zheng organization’s annual
mean value of trade with Nagasaki. 125 If we assume that silver or its gold equivalent constituted
80% of total revenues, as in Chenggong’s day, then we obtain 1,009,107 taels (37.8 tons). 126
Alternatively, we could individually multiply the Japan sale prices of Zheng’s most crucial exports
of raw silk, sugar, and deerskin; valued respectively at 600 reals per picul, eight reals per picul, and
60 reals per 100 skins; by the quantities shipped there annually. 127 After obtaining their average, we
add it to the 1670 value from copper to arrive at an overall estimate of revenue amounting to
966,911 reals (36.2 tons) of silver. The discrepancy between the two revenue figures could readily
be explained by other, miscellaneous goods that the Chinese vessels brought out of Nagasaki. The
VOC, on the other hand, acquired 622,365 taels’ (23.3 tons) worth of silver and gold coins on
average from 1663 to 1668, and 1670. 128 Besides these two metals, copper made up the bulk of
exports from Nagasaki, amounting to 2,263,100 catties (84.7 tons) in 1670. 148 According to Leonard
Blussé, the mean copper shipment equaled around 400,000 guldens, or 140,351 taels (5.25 tons).

Glahn,
228.
122 Ibid.
123 Jiang Risheng, 237. On Taiwan, 1,000 copper pieces equaled 2 taels (74.86 g) of
silver. See Liu Xianting, 8. 142 Yamawaki, 114.
124 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 74.
125 Our calculations leave out 1670, since the amount of gold exports for that year awaits further investigation.
126 That is, the average of the sum of the figures from 1663 to 1668 and from 1671 to 1672, 807,286 taels, divided by .8.
127 Chang Hsiu-jung et al, 64.
128 The Dutch exported on average 4,735 kan (474,400 taels, 17.8 tons) of silver from
1663 to 1667, along with 77,333 gold coins (770,330 taels, 28.83 tons) in 1670. See Von Glahn,
227 and Yamawaki, 114. 148 Yamawaki, 114. 149 Blussé, 70.
Hence, we derive an average VOC revenue of 762,716 taels (28.6 tons), which accords well with
Blussé’s range of 1.5 to 2.5 million guldens (526,315 taels, 19.7 tons to 877,193 taels, 32.8 tons) per
year.149
For the period from 1663 to 1673, we can obtain fairly accurate estimates of the Zheng
organization’s profitability for the Mainland China/Taiwan-Japan leg of its network and evaluate its
performance with comparable Dutch figures. Based upon the per unit prices given by the English,
the average earnings from raw silk, deerskin, and sugar, its three main-ticket export items, could be
added to arrive at 507,633 taels (19 tons). Of that amount, raw silk shipments made up 65%, while
the other two came in at 20% and 15%, respectively. Now, assuming that these exports combined
constituted 90% of the entire shipment, we estimate a total profit of 564,037 taels (21.1 tons).
An alternative calculation involves taking a weighted average of the yields of raw silk (135%),
sugar (167%), and deerskin (306%) based upon their contribution to earnings. The result is then
further weighted to reflect its 90% contribution to the cargo, assuming that the rest of the goods had
zero profits. The rate of return on the entire annual shipment of Chinese junks to Nagasaki comes
out to 150%. With revenues of 1,009,107 taels, we calculate a sum of 605,464 taels (22 tons). The
Zheng organization could thus earn anywhere from 564,037 to 605,464 taels per year in the trade
with Nagasaki. For the VOC, Blussé estimates that the highest revenues it could realize amounted
to 2.5 million guldens (877,193 taels), while its profit margins averaged 100% for the 1650s, and
gradually dropped to 50% by 1670.129 Assuming the larger rate of return, we calculate earnings of
1,250,000 guldens (438,596 taels, 16.5 tons) per year. Despite relatively lower revenues and profits
compared to the days of Chenggong, Zheng Jing maintained the family’s superiority over the Dutch
at Nagasaki, capturing, at the very least, half of the Japanese market in terms of both revenue and
income.

The Southeast Asian Route and the Rise of

Manila
In the meantime, commercial relations with Southeast Asia continued to flourish. For 1665
alone, Zheng Jing dispatched 20 trading vessels to the region, ten of which went to Siam. 130
Although we lack more precise records regarding the number of junks from Taiwan in another year
between 1663 and 1673, Zheng Ruiming’s data shows that a total of 156 ships arrived at Nagasaki
from different parts of Southeast Asia over this period, an annual average of 14.2. Due to the Zheng
organization’s continued domination of the sea lanes, most of them inevitably came under its control
or sphere of influence.131 Ships of Southeast Asian origin would often sail directly to Nagasaki and
exchange their cargo before heading to Taiwan and the Mainland coast and back. Alternatively, they
could travel to the island and then move onward to Japan, in which case they become counted with
129 Blussé, 69-70.
130 Viraphol, 45.
131 Zheng Ruiming, 95-96.
other Taiwanese junks. On the flip side of the coin, vessels from Taiwan, as well as a limited
number from the Mainland, would sail directly to Southeast Asia and then to Nagasaki and back, or
to Japan and then southward. The integrated nature of intra-Asian trade meant that one can hardly
discern the true place of origin of Chinese junks. Nevertheless, the available data reveals the
centrality of Taiwan in this commercial network, as well as the importance of Southeast Asia to
Zheng Jing’s business.
Zheng continued to carry on a lively trade with almost all major ports in the region, including
its traditionally close partners of Tonkin, Quinam, Cambodia, Siam, and Pattani. 132 The most
important of these various states was, as before, Siam, on account of its abundant natural resources
and the desire of King Narai and his ruling class for Chinese products. The cargo of Liu Guoxuan’s
Dongbenniao, which had sailed from there back to Xiamen in 1684, contained 120,000 jin (60 tons)
of sapanwood, several hundred jin of elephant ivory tusks, and 50 jin (25 kg) of ettusais (doukou),
all of which served as essential ingredients for Chinese herbal medicine. Moreover, Qing authorities
found 1,300 jin (650 kg) of pepper, along with different varieties of swallow’s nests for elite luxury
consumption in Taiwan and the Mainland. Dongbenniao’s imports of 20,480 jin (10.24 tons) of lead
and 40,000 jin (20 tons) of tin demonstrate Siam’s importance as a supplier of gunpowder
ingredients.133 Other vessels also procured bulk items, such as wood for shipbuilding and, in
particular, rice, which it produced in abundance. 134 On a political level, Zheng Jing enjoyed very
close relations with King Narai. After the collapse of his organization in 1683, the ruler voluntarily
granted asylum to Zheng’s former commanders and soldiers, and encouraged them to settle down
permanently, noting that “this country and Dongning enjoy a deep mutual friendship.”135
Unlike the days of Chenggong, the organization came to develop far more extensive
commercial ties with the Spanish in their colony of the Philippines. According to the English
records, “the King hath 5 or 6 jouncks that goe yearely for Manilha in January and retorne in Aprill
or May.”136 VOC accounts similarly note that for 1665, a total of twelve Chinese vessels arrived
there from across East and Southeast Asia, almost all of them affiliated with Zheng Jing. As Father
Riccio recounted to the Dutch, the Zheng merchants all “do big business at Manila.” They typically
brought along with them large quantities of “raw silk and silk fabric (rouwe zijde en stoffen), wheat
(tarwe), and iron (iser) and animal products (diergelijke waare).”137 In fact, “there was such a great
abundance” of wheat at Manila that “it sold at 2.5 pesos [93.6 g, equivalent to real and tael] per
picul.” The Zheng organization managed to acquire this surprisingly plentiful supply from a place
known as “Santon,” which most likely referred to Shandong Province in northern China, a top

132 Ibid.
133 Zheng shi shiliao sanbian, 218.
134 Viraphol, 43-44.
135 Hayashi Shunsai, 398.
136 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 151.
137 Bo
rao Mateo et
al., vol. 2,
639. 159 Ibid.,
641.
producer.159 The export of a bulk item like wheat from a region located so far away from Zheng’s
main bases depended upon a relatively predictable and secure environment, and implies some
manner of collusion with local Qing authorities. It also demonstrates the extent of his reach over the
Mainland coastline and penetration into the interior of enemy territory.
Wheat and iron made up a significant part of the cargo of junks going to Manila, but silk
products from the Mainland, valued at 380 Spanish reals (14.2 kg) per picul on the local market,
remained the most prized item. 138 The Spanish would pay for all of these goods with silver brought
by the galleons from Acapulco each year, and load them onto the same vessels for reexport back to
the New World. As an example of the scale of this trade, a ship from Mexico carried around two
million reals (75 tons) to Manila in 1665. 161 Although we lack more specific data on revenues and
profitability, the Philippines probably constituted the most important market for Zheng Jing outside
of Japan. More importantly, the Spanish colony also appeared to occupy a growing share of his
overseas commerce, as the Tokugawa bakufu gradually tightened the outflow of bullion and placed
additional restrictions and regulations on foreign merchants at Nagasaki.139
To figure out the annual revenues and profits realized from the Southeast Asian leg, we continue
to assume that junks plying the route could realize revenues of 80,000 to 100,000 taels, and earn
40,000 to 50,000 taels per ship. 140 Although we lack precise records regarding the average number
of vessels sailing to ports in the region from Taiwan every year, we can use as a proxy the
corresponding figures for ships of Southeast Asian origin arriving at Nagasaki. Due to the
integrated nature of the intra-Asian trade, they would most likely include Taiwan as one of their
main destinations. Given an average of 14.2 junks per year, the rough annual value of the Southeast
1
38

I
b
i
d
.

I
b
i
d
.

139 Besides encouraging the export of gold and copper, Edo replaced the system of competitive bidding for overseas goods, in
place since 1648, with a managed market in which merchants collaborated to set wholesale prices. This measure appeared to
“have reduced the total value of imports by squeezing foreign traders,” particularly the Dutch, which, unlike the Chinese, were
forbidden from taking silver out of the country. See Totman, 144.
140 These assumptions remain relevant since they represent the profit per ship realized during the mid-1670s. For a detailed
description of my methodology in calculating the total figures of the Southeast Asian trade, see Chapter 3.
Asian trade comes out anywhere from 1,136,000 taels (42.5 tons) to 1,420,000 taels (53.1 tons) of
silver, yielding a profit of 568,000 taels (21.2 tons) to 710,000 taels (26.5 tons).

Diplomatic Relations with the European

Powers
Not surprisingly, the decade from 1663 to 1673 also saw a dramatic decrease in the number of
Zheng-affiliated junks sailing to Batavia and the other ports under VOC control or influence. After
the bitter loss of Taiwan, Dutch vessels prowled the Straits of Malacca with orders to specifically
identify such ships and seize them by force, and, if they encountered any resistance, liquidate the
entire crew.141 As another part of their effort to exact revenge, the company attacked smuggling
outposts along the Mainland coast run mostly by illicit networks with close ties to Zheng Jing. In
1665, for instance, it launched a raid upon Putuoshan, a holy Buddhist pilgrimage site, killing
monks and seizing hostages, and carrying off massive quantities of ancient religious statues and
relics from a temple.142 A year earlier, the Dutch had occupied Jilong, on the northern tip of Taiwan,
in the hopes of reconstituting a formerly important leg of its East Asian trade centered upon Fort
Zeelandia, and thereby more effectively competing with the Zheng organization in the south. 143
However, the outpost failed to realize its potential, primarily because of the VOC’s inability to open
up regular commercial ties with China despite repeated efforts at negotiations with the Qing Fujian
authorities and attempts to establish a trading post at Fuzhou. In the fall of 1668, the company
finally decided to abandon Jilong, demolishing its defensive structures and evacuating its employees
to Batavia.144
Although the Dutch posed a threat to Zheng Jing’s operations farther south, their brief
reappearance on Taiwan also presented an opportunity for commercial gain. As Chinese soldiers
and settlers expanded northward to the area around the nearby port of Danshui, their vessels would
secretly sail into Jilong and supply it with deerskin, gold, and other products from the hinterland. 145
In early 1666, Zheng Jing even tried to mend fences with his former enemies and reopen official
commercial relations. In February, he dispatched an envoy with a letter to Jilong promising to free
all remaining Dutch prisoners on Taiwan taken by his father during the invasion, and offering them
the islet of Beixianwei (Baxemboy) in the Lu’ermen Channel, close to Anping, as a trading factory.
In exchange, all company vessels had to turn over their “arms, gunpowder, lead, and rudder” for
safekeeping with a designated official during their stay, “following the laws of Japan.” Zheng

141 Zheng Ruiming, 76.

142 Wills, Peppers, 122 and Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 65.
143 Zheng Ruiming, 91.
144 For a detailed narrative of the VOC’s persistent attempts to open up regular trade with the Qing from 1664 to 1669, including
the intricacies of its ties with the feudatory and high-ranking officials of Fujian and an audience in Beijing with the Kangxi
Emperor, refer to Wills, Peppers, 105-144. A careful study of the Dutch factory in Jilong can be found in Wills, “Dutch
Reoccupation,” 273-290.
145 Zheng Ruiming, 91 and Wills, “Dutch Reoccupation,” 281.
further requested that the Dutch refrain, in the future, from “attacking or harassing the King’s junks
sent to engage in trade on the seas, as heretofore Your Honor has witnessed, but let them pass freely
on their course to the east, west, north, or south.” 146 The representative for the VOC, Constantin
Nobel, rejected the proposal, as he had no authority from Batavia to engage in negotiations with the
Zheng organization, and simply found the terms unacceptable. He also flatly refused to consider a
modified offer of establishing a Chinese trading post near the Dutch settlement. 147
Nobel’s negative reaction notwithstanding, Zheng Jing appeared to have adopted a surprisingly
unusual degree of leniency and flexibility toward a former rival. In fact, this gesture formed part of
his larger open-door policy during this period that welcomed all merchants from abroad to come to
Taiwan and do business there. Besides dispatching junks overseas, then, Zheng “sent abroad letters
to invite people to trade in his country, promiseing they shall have friendly reception.” 171 Among
those who enthusiastically responded, and left the most extensive records of their experience, was
the English East India Company, based out of Bantam in the Indonesian archipelago. On June 23,
1670, a commercial delegation headed by Ellis Crispe and consisting of the ships Bantam and
Pearle, landed at Anping to the great welcome of Zheng Jing and his officials, who entertained him
and his crew “upon the King’s cost neere a weeke most plentifully.” 148 The two sides then signed a
formal commercial treaty, the very first documented between a Chinese and Western political entity,
granting the English use of the former Dutch town hall of Tayouan as their trading factory. In
exchange, the EIC would pay an annual rent of 500 reals (18.7 kg) of silver, and provide two
gunners “for the King’s service,” as well as a skilled smith to produce weapons. The Zheng
authorities would confiscate the arms and powder of each entering ship until departure, just like the
terms they had offered the Dutch, and levy a customs duty of three percent after sales on all
imports.149
By forging an alliance with Zheng Jing, the EIC hoped to obtain from him the coveted Chinese
and Japanese products that would allow it to effectively compete with the VOC for supremacy in the
intra-Asian trade and exports to the European market. A letter from company headquarters in
London to Henry Dacres, head of the Council at Bantam, made this point clear when it spoke
glowingly of “our trading with Tywan” that “it may be in effect as if we did trade to China, Japan &
the Manilhaes.”150 However, the actual results of the commercial relationship fell far short of these
grand expectations. A total of nine ships visited Taiwan between 1670 and 1672, or an average of
three per year. The English would bring guns and gunpowder; lead; Southeast Asian products, such
as pepper; and European woolens.151 Yet, other than the sale of firearms, most of their goods lacked

146 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 649.

147 Wills,
“Dutch
Reoccupation,” 283-
284. 171 Chang Hsiu-
jung et al., 73-74.
148 Ibid., 62.
149 Ibid., 56-58.
150 Ibid., 191.
151 Zheng Ruiming, 88-89.
sufficient demand on the Taiwan market. For one, Zheng Jing either monopolized or dominated the
most profitable sectors of the economy, including the exports of deerskin and sugar, and the supply
of Mainland silk.152 Moreover, his own junks could procure pepper and other goods from Southeast
Asia at much better rates, while the overall need for woolens remained predictably low in
semitropical Taiwan.153
The English found themselves dealing almost exclusively with Zheng’s official merchants, who
offered for their wares “no more then [sic] they were worth at Bantam.”154 On the other hand, they
could only purchase the limited quantities of Mainland and Taiwanese goods remaining after Zheng
Jing had taken his share, and at high prices. The Qing coastal evacuation policy meant that no
foreigners could travel to the Chinese coast, making direct access to the sources of production
impossible. Even with sufficient cargos of silk, deerskin, and sugar, the EIC still could not readily
sell them to Japan, the biggest consumer market for these items, on account of its strict maritime
restriction policy. The English failed in their admittedly ambitious attempt to become the leading
intermediaries of the Asian trade, but they nevertheless continued to do business with the Zheng
organization until its fall in 1683. Although we do not have overall revenue and profitability figures
for their operations, they apparently managed to stay on due to their decent performance in several
niche markets. Besides the import of armaments into Taiwan, the EIC could rely upon the arbitrage
realized through the reexport of Japanese copper and gold to India, where they were in great demand
for casting coinage and as components of household utensils. In fact, the koban brought by the
Zheng ships from Nagasaki during the bakufu’s brief ban on silver shipments could fetch a 40% rate
of return at Mumbai.155
The other European power that maintained formal commercial relations with Taiwan during this
period was Spain, via its colony of the Philippines. In Yongli 20.8 (September 1666), Governor
Diego Salcedo (r. 1662-1668) dispatched a Catholic priest to Taiwan, where he had a personal
audience with Zheng Jing.156 The ruler bequeathed upon him Chinese gowns and robes, and ordered
the Division of Honored Guests (Binke si), the unit under the Rites Office in charge of foreign
affairs, to fete him lavishly for the purpose of “cherishing men from afar (rou yuanren).”157
Although only Jiang Risheng’s comprehensive but at times fanciful account speaks of this visit in
detail, the Spanish accounts likewise allude to “the peace [Zheng] had with Manila” (“los paces que
tenían con Manila”).158 The English, also present in Taiwan at the time, noted that “peace is now
concluded betweene the Castillians & them, freedome of trade permitted.” 159

152 Ibid., 83.

153 Ibid., 85.
154 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 64.
155 Yamawaki, 115.
156 The priest had actually come to reestablish ties with the Zheng organization, which had
remained cut off since 1662. That year, shortly before his death, Zheng Chenggong had written a letter
to Saucedo’s predecessor, Sabiniano Manrique de Lara (r. 1653-1662), threatening to invade the
Philippines unless it agreed to pay tribute. The Spanish responded in panic, massacring the Chinese
civilians of Manila and sending many others away by ship. See Wills, Peppers, 27 and Carioti, 49-50.
157 Jiang Risheng, 237.
158 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 656.
159 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 171.
 As conditions for the opening of commerce, if we trust Jiang’s narrative, Zheng Jing required
the Spanish to present a regular tribute of shipbuilding materials and refrain from harassing the
vessels that sailed to Manila. 160 We do not have sufficient information to determine whether the
Spanish agreed to these specific terms, but they seemed quite willing to go out of their way to
appease him. Indeed, Zheng Jing had threatened in his audience with the priest to “immediately
dispatch his soldiers to punish” the Philippines should they fail to comply. 161 In a letter to Mariana
(r. 1665-1675), the Queen Regent of Austria, Governor Manuel de León (r. 1669-1677) warned that
“these provinces [the Philippines] are in no state to be complaining to the neighboring kings, with
the ease with which they move to any altercation.” 162 As late as 1673, he wrote of sending an envoy
to Zheng “who might admonish and persuade him to continue the peace,” one method possibly
involving the presentation of tribute.187 Several Dominican and Capuchin priests also resided long-
term at Taiwan to pass along messages between Zheng Jing and Manila. In addition, they
apparently tried to gain access to the Mainland market, report abnormal activities, and covertly
engage in proselytizing among the local populace.163
The implied lack of mutual trust between the organization and the Spanish, as seen through
their interactions, would increasingly strain their relationship despite booming commercial ties.
Zheng Jing remained highly suspicious of the Catholic priests and their religion, and, during their
stay, kept them under tight surveillance, at times equivalent to house arrest. Already before the 1666
audience with the first envoy, Chen Yonghua had warned his ruler “never to allow them to establish
churches, since they always use the arts of deception to plot and occupy other countries.” 164
Similarly, according to Arcadio del Rosario, one of four Dominican friars dispatched to Taiwan in
1673, Zheng sent a message to them informing them that “he did not want his vassals to become
Christians, and even if the fathers came to visit him, he would not see them.” 165
On their part, the Spanish authorities remained highly suspicious of the Zheng family’s designs
on the Philippines, especially in the wake of the threats to invade the islands, which often led to
great unease and even panic in Manila. Like the Dutch, they also expressed deep alarm with the
now all-too-familiar pattern of gradual but steady encroachment of their sovereignty from within.
Between 1670 and 1671, the “Master of Camp and Governor-General of the States and Armed
Forces of Isla Hermosa and first cousin of the King,” probably referring to Chen Yonghua, who was
the chief-of-staff and whose daughter was married to Zheng’s son, sent a letter to Governor de
León.166 He demanded that two local Chinese prisoners incarcerated for committing “nefarious

160 Jiang Risheng, 237.

161 Ibid.
162 Bo
rao Mateo et
al., vol. 2,
654. 187 Ibid.,
659.
163 See, for instance, Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 655-657, 660.
164 Jiang Risheng, 237.
165 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 656.
166 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 654 and Ruan, 59.
sins” and awaiting execution—among them one Lousu, whom he claimed as his mandarin—be
released immediately and extradited to Taiwan for “the King to punish them.” 167 A petition for their
freedom from prominent leaders of the Chinese quarter, or Parián, accompanied the letter,
undoubtedly a sign of Zheng’s pervasive influence.
When de León eventually complied with the request, Queen-Regent Mariana expressed shock
and horror at the decision. She stressed in her letter that “you cannot and should not” send these
prisoners to him, as their “crime being so grave and averse to our sacred Religion…they were so
justly condemned by the Courts.”193 She correctly believed that Zheng’s actions essentially treated
the Chinese residents of the Philippines as his own subjects and grossly interfered with Spanish
legal procedures. However, the Spanish officials in the colony could do very little except tolerate
the extraterritorial interference and continue their policy of appeasement. Their well-armed but tiny
garrison stood no match for the tens of thousands of soldiers Taiwan could muster in the event of
armed conflict.168 In fact, by 1670, Zheng Jing and his officials were already seriously considering
an invasion of the Philippines, and appeared, for all purposes, to be repeating the precedent set out
by Chenggong toward the Dutch, until the outbreak of Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in 1674
put an end to their preparations.

Maritime Horizons
On the whole, the stability provided by Zheng Jing during the decade of 1663 to 1673 on
Taiwan allowed Chinese traders to sail abroad relatively unhindered, while his open attitude toward
all countries, in turn, drew many foreign merchants to the island. After making their rounds through
Japan and Southeast Asia, junks belonging to him and his affiliated merchants would bring back
spices, luxuries, and bulk goods to service the Mainland and Taiwanese consumer markets. As
before, silver, copper, gold, and other precious metals would either go into government warehouses
to accumulate interest or serve as the working capital for fresh journeys abroad. On the other hand,
commercial missions would often come from Siam and Annam to “present tribute” and do business,
together with the aforementioned English and Spanish. 195 By 1674, Taiwan had recovered its
strategic role as a regional entrepôt, and even expanded its functions from the Dutch period. It
became a clearinghouse where goods from all over East and Southeast Asia, including the much-
coveted but ever-elusive China market, could be concentrated and then reexported to their respective
destinations.

167 Borao
Mateo et al., vol.
2, 654-655. 193
Ibid., 655.
168 In 1662, Zheng Chenggong had mobilized some 15,000 troops in preparation for
an imminent attack on Manila after Governor de Lara refused to comply with his demand for
tribute. See Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 151 and Carioti, 49-51. 195 Xia, 46 and Shao, 152. 196
Yamawaki, 114.
 We can obtain a rough estimate of the average annual value of goods exchanged through this
interconnected network of trade, along with the profitability of Zheng Jing and his official
merchants. By taking the lower end of the range of revenues for the Southeast Asian (1,136,000
taels) and the Japan routes (996,911 taels), we find the trading value of the Zheng organization for
the decade of 1663 to 1673 to be around 2,132,911 taels (79.8 tons) per year. Similarly, the sum of
the corresponding profits for both (568,000 and 564,037 taels) translates to 1,132,037 taels (42
tons). Since about half of the 36 junks that sailed to Nagasaki belonged directly to Zheng Jing, we
infer that he dominated at least 50% of the commercial revenues and earnings, although, as
anecdotal evidence reveals, he probably took a much larger slice of the pie. 196 At a very minimum,
then, his own profit amounted to 566,019 taels (22 tons) per year, while his subordinates and private
merchants pocketed at most the remaining half. The average annual earnings realized by the
organization represented a moderate decline of around 230,000 taels, as compared to the 1,365,000
taels during the previous period from 1650 to 1662.
It would appear that the Qing economic blockade, combined with the Tokugawa bakufu’s
increasing restrictions on bullion exports, worked together to depress the scale of the highly
lucrative China-Japan trade. However, the organization’s overall results for the decade from 1663 to
1673 still outmatched the average seventeenth-century VOC trading balance of 1,049,507 guldens
(368,248 taels), about one-third of the Zheng profits and 65% of Jing’s direct earnings. Moreover,
these rough measures of the Zheng network’s performance exclude the rapidly growing commercial
ties with Manila, and the income realized from duties and sale of goods to the English and other
mercantile groups based in Taiwan. An interesting question worth exploring further, then, is
whether the organization actually declined in scale under Zheng Jing, or rather, it was transitioning
away from Japan toward more lucrative markets for Mainland and Taiwanese products, especially
the Philippines, which could pay for them with bountiful American silver.
Even if we assume a moderate contraction had taken place, most of the profits could be retained
in Taiwan due to dramatic decreases on the cost side, especially in relation to the 1650s. Unlike his
father, Zheng Jing no longer faced the threat of imminent extinction at the hands of Qing forces
constantly attacking a set of precarious and shifting ports along a small strip of the southeastern
Mainland coast. Separated by the natural barrier of the Taiwan Strait, he did not need to maintain
massive armies or field them in bloody and expensive campaigns against one of the fiercest and
most formidable war machines in Inner Asia. Moreover, as will be seen, the Kangxi Emperor
drastically scaled back the draconian removal policy and essentially tolerated his existence after
1666.169 By that year, Taiwan had itself become a tremendous asset to the organization through its
bountiful agricultural surpluses and natural resources. Instead of relying upon plunder and forced
contributions, as during the days of Chenggong, Jing’s soldiers could now grow food for their own
survival. The Zheng organization’s ability to maintain high levels of profit, combined with lower
costs of defense, allowed for greater investment in Taiwan’s domestic infrastructure, and
increasingly rationalized bureaucratic institutions. From a purely material standpoint, then, Zheng

169 Xia 37; Jiang Risheng, 246; and Zheng Yiju, 26.
simply had no pressing motivation to return to the Mainland, nor, judging from his words and deeds
during his decade on Taiwan, did he expect, much less actively prepare for, such an eventuality.

CHAPTER 6: A QUESTION OF HAIRDOS AND

FASHION
Having restructured the economic foundations of his “state” on Taiwan, Zheng Jing now needed
to institutionalize his turn away from the Mainland and Ming restoration in the form of an
alternative political model for his organization. From 1667 to 1669, he entered into negotiations
with the Qing court, agreeing to recognize its legitimacy and even suzerainty in exchange for some
form of autonomy. I argue that, in this period, both sides proposed and seriously considered
different political settlements, and were willing to give generous concessions to institutionalize their
relationship. The Qing wanted to make Zheng Jing an inner vassal, initially ordering him to leave
Taiwan in exchange for land and titles on the southeastern coast, but later allowed him to keep the
island as a hereditary fiefdom. However, as a subject directly under imperial rule, he had to
conform to Qing institutions and shave his hair to show his loyalty and submission. Zheng, on the
other hand, wished to follow the example of Korea, first proposing an alliance of equal states, before
modifying his stance toward a hierarchical tributary relationship.
However, the talks ultimately broke down chiefly due to the issue of hairstyle and fashion. This
seemingly innocuous dispute encapsulated an explosive divide over “Chineseness,” as defined by
the Qing, the Zheng regime, and Taiwan, which both sides agreed lay outside the cultural and
geographic boundaries of “China.” The Qing viewed Zheng Jing and his men as untransformed
internal rebels, who had to show their loyalty to the new dynasty by wearing Manchu-style clothing
and shaving their heads. For Zheng, however, the preservation of their
Han Chinese long hair and topknots and flowing robes amounted to a last-ditch defense of
“civilization” from “barbarians.” His exile on a “foreign” island meant that such ethnic and cultural
symbols, bolstered by Confucian morality, became even more critical to the legitimacy of his
organization.
Although inconclusive, the negotiations ushered in an unprecedented period of peace, with both
the Qing and Zheng Jing tacitly renouncing the use of force against one another. Zheng would
utilize this window of opportunity to turn entirely toward the maritime trading lanes and away from
the Mainland. From 1670 to 1674, he and his men planned an invasion of the Philippines, not only
to expand his territory, but, more importantly, to clarify and articulate his rule on Taiwan, a process
already started during the failed talks. Besides converting his massive economic influence into
actual political domination, he would reimagine and reevaluate his father’s invasion of Taiwan to
fashion a new legitimacy, transforming his struggle against the Manchus into a defense of all
overseas Chinese against foreign “barbarians.” For the first time in the organization’s existence,
continental forms of discourse had the potential to merge with its maritime orientation and provide
symbolic value for its trading activities and overseas expansion. However, the outbreak of the
Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Qing would bring out the latent sentiments for
restoration even among Zheng’s closest advisors, and engineer a dramatic reorientation of his
priorities back toward the Mainland.

The Path toward Negotiations

We have seen in the previous chapter how Zheng Jing’s attempt to forge a new “China” abroad
became projected outward in the search for suitable political models away from the Ming. These
efforts coincided with the Qing’s desire to abandon its previous belligerence toward the organization
and seek a peaceful settlement. By 1665, Qing officials had concluded that, despite his defeat,
Zheng still represented a credible source of resistance that has not yet been eliminated. 170 Many
feared that his organization would continue to harass the southeastern coastline, and worried that his
active collusion with maritime bandits and pirates, local officials, and foreign powers would pose an
ominous threat to dynastic rule and stability in the long-term.
Yet, even if no such disturbance occurred, the Zheng regime, through its very existence, directly
challenged the ideological foundations of the Qing polity. As Shi Lang wrote in a memorial to the
court, “How can the mighty Celestial Empire, to which myriad kingdoms have submitted, tolerate
the daily spread of this remnant of ashes [the Zhengs]?” 171 Likewise, Jiang Risheng wrote in the
preface to his work that the Qing “responded to Heaven’s will…and inherited the empire. The
myriad foreign kingdoms all submitted. Only the Zhengs on Taiwan…harassed our frontiers,
causing the court countless sums of cash…and frequently creating worries in the south…” 172 By

170 Chen Kongli, “Kangxi 22 nian,” 96.

171 Shi, 1.
1
72

J
i
a
n
g

R
i
s
h
e
n
g
,

3
.
refusing to accept Manchu rule, Zheng Jing acted in a manner even more “barbaric” than foreign
rulers, who at least wished to partake of “Chinese” culture as redefined by its new patrons. At the
same time, he and his followers mostly came from Fujian and Guangdong, areas considered integral
to “China,” subscribed to the same customs and Confucian value system, thereby presenting a
credible alternative that needed to be neutralized in some manner. After all, how could a dynasty
completely convince its subjects of its legitimacy when a group of their own countrymen adamantly
rejected its civilizing mission?
Qing officials in 1665 also held a broad consensus that the current measures against this threat
to legitimacy had not proven effective. While the coastal removal policy made a sustained hostile
presence in the maritime region untenable, the Zheng organization did not collapse on its own, as
was expected, but, as we have seen, acquired new life on Taiwan. More sobering for the Qing was
the staggering cost of the evacuation, both in terms of human lives and lost tax revenues for the
state. In a memorial to the court, Li Zhifang (1642-1698), Circuit Censor for Hubei and Hunan,
complained that the income from fishing and salt mines, two lucrative coastal industries, had totaled
“tens of millions of [taels]. Products from the soil are again many times the amount.” 4 His
sentiments were echoed in another memorial by Guangdong Governor Wang Lairen (d. 1666),
which argued for at least a partial restoration of access to the coastal zone. 173 Hence, the Qing faced
tremendous pressure to end its disastrous policy, which not only had little effect against Zheng, but
also abandoned thousands of kilometers of coastline considered an integral part of “China.” As Shi
Lang forcefully emphasized in his memorial, “emperors from ancient times have ruled by defending
every inch of land that has been acquired. How can territory already obtained be cut off and
abandoned?”174 Li Zhifang concurred, pointing out that “since ancient times, the purpose of
supporting an army was originally to protect our territory.” 175 Li went on to ridicule the policy,
stating that he had

I
b
i
d
.
,

2
0
3
.

173 Ibid., 247-250.

174 Shi, 5.
175 Jiang Risheng, 202. Contrast this attitude to the willingness of the Qing to give Taiwan to the Dutch. For the court, a VOC-
held island would pose far less of an ideological threat than a Zheng-held one. The other side of the deal also appears
noteworthy; the Qing wanted Dutch help to dislodge Zheng Jing from Xiamen and Jinmen, islands considered an integral part of
“China.” Wong Young-tsu, 151.
“never heard of abandoning our territory to repel the bandits.”176
The key area where Qing elite opinion diverged lay in the specific actions necessary to
neutralize this threat. Shi Lang, along with Huang Wu, Zhou Quanbin, Zheng Mingjun, and other
prominent defectors from the Zheng camp, formed the core of a regional war faction. These men
called for a forceful response to root out the remaining challenge to Qing universal authority. Their
enthusiastic fervor not only reflected a desire for personal vengeance against the Zhengs, but also to
convince their new masters that they somehow remained relevant to the preservation of order along
the coast. By emphasizing the seriousness and pressing nature of the threat, they would have
continued reason to keep command over their soldiers and stay close to their families in Fujian. In
long and detailed memorials to the court, Shi carefully outlined plans for a naval attack on Taiwan,
and provided extensive information about its troop numbers and conditions. He concluded that the
Zheng soldiers were stretched thinly across the island and lacked military training. They stood no
chance against the newly constituted Fujian navy, furnished with new ships built from yards along
the southeastern coast, a sizable number of them once in Zheng hands, and consisting mostly of men
who had defected from the rival camp and had extensive knowledge of ocean currents. 177 If the
court did not seize this opportunity, Shi warned, Zheng Jing would recover his power and “unite
with foreign lands” to become an endless source of worry in the long-term.178
The imperial court and Fujianese officials, flushed with success at the victory in Xiamen and
Jinmen, initially adopted the suggestions of Shi and the war party, arranging for a Dutch fleet to
assist in a naval invasion of Taiwan.179 In return for the VOC’s efforts in helping to drive the Zhengs
out of Xiamen and Jinmen, the Qing had promised to restore the island to the company. However,
on December 24, 1664, shortly after the joint fleet had set out, the entire Qing squadron of 300
vessels under the command of Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin suddenly turned back to shore. Perhaps
the two men did not wish to share credit with the Dutch for any victory over the Zheng organization,
or they may have wanted to hold onto their power for several more months. 180 Whatever their
motives, a second expedition under their exclusive control set sail on Kangxi 4.4/15 (May 29,
1665), only to encounter a ferocious storm that seriously damaged their ships and forced them to
return and undertake repairs.181
The abortive campaigns hardened objections toward the war party from other central and
provincial officials, including Wang Lairen. In his opinion, large concentrations of troops in the
southeastern coast already proved an expensive proposition, especially in a macroregion with a

176 Jiang Risheng, 202.

177 Shi., 6.
178 Ibid., 5.
179 Wong Young-tsu, 150-152.
180 Wills, Peppers, 99. Wills convincingly contradicts Deng Kongzhao’s claim that the
expeditions to Taiwan under Shi and Zhou “all represented the individual actions of the Qing army. No
Dutch squadrons participated.” In fact, the evidence points to Dutch fleets joining in at least the first of
the failed invasions. Refer to Deng Kongzhao, “Shilun Qing-He lianhe jingong Zheng shi 试论清荷联合进攻
郑氏” (“A Hypothesis on the Qing-Dutch United Attack on the Zhengs”), in Qing dai Taiwan shi yanjiu,
ed. Chen Zaizheng et al., 224.
181 Peng, 71 and Jiang Risheng, 234-235.
highly limited agricultural base to support their needs. 182 This problem became further compounded
by the economically disastrous coastal removal policy, which severely devastated the livelihood of
local commoners. As his memorial stated, “in my over two years as governor, I have never once
heard of the sea bandits attacking and plundering. What I have heard are still those removed coastal
residents gathering together in the interior and becoming bandits.” At the same time, a more
conservative atmosphere pervaded the court under the Oboi regency, which viewed Han Chinese
subjects with suspicion. In such a political climate, Shi Lang and his faction, nearly all of whom
had relatives or other connections in Zheng Jing’s organization, could never earn its full trust. 183 In
its eyes, nothing could prevent them from defecting again if another naval campaign ran into
difficulties or homesickness overtook them.
However, these factors only partially explain why the Qing ultimately chose the path of
negotiations. The decision of the court should be seen more as a lack of motivation, and not just
ability, to seek a military solution. After all, the Manchus had demonstrated a remarkable
adaptability to a wide variety of adverse circumstances and terrain, even mastering warfare in the
rivers and jungles of the south and southwest to overpower Ming loyalist bastions. 16 Yet, just as
with the Ming before it and many of the Zheng followers, the prevailing Qing opinion saw Taiwan
as psychologically distant and physically outside the traditional boundaries of China, as seen
through the narratives of early elite travelers to the island. The court only paid attention to Taiwan
because Zheng Jing and his organization remained a significant political enemy. Although they
lived in a “barbaric” land among “barbaric” tribes, and even acted in a “barbaric” manner, they
nevertheless appeared too “Chinese,” and, in doing so, walked a fine line between transformation
through Qing culturalism and a threat to that same legitimacy. On the other hand, the perceived
“foreignness” of Taiwan, along with a shift in the priorities of Zheng Jing away from warfare and
toward long-term development of the island, decreased the attractiveness of a risky and costly
military operation across the sea.
For Zheng Jing, the talks served as a welcome opportunity to forge a new legitimacy
independent of the need to reassert control over any part of the Mainland, divorcing “China” from
its geographic setting. In the short-term, he also wanted to persuade the Qing to reverse its coastal
removal policy and institutionalize his covert trading relations with the southeastern Chinese coast,
the source of most of the lucrative export products needed to restart his devastated maritime trading
empire.184 Moreover, through negotiations, Zheng could achieve the tactical purpose of
marginalizing Shi Lang and the war party, and prevent the Qing and Dutch from forming another
alliance against Taiwan. By 1667, this menace had already subsided due to Shi’s abortive
campaigns, and arguments between the two potential invaders over timing and logistics, which
“spared their common enemy.”185 In Yongli 20.12 (January 1667), Zheng ordered Xue Jinsi,
garrison commander of the strategic Penghu Islands, the frontline of Taiwan’s defense, to withdraw,
182 Jiang Risheng, 249.
183 Needless to say, the Zheng relatives would always come under suspicion for sympathizing
with Zheng Jing. Moreover, Shi Lang’s own eldest son remained within the organization. See
Peng, 90. 16 Struve, Southern Ming, 118-119.
184 Jiang Risheng, 238-239.
185 Wong Young-tsu, 152.
and disbanded him and his men to a military colony after their return. 186 Zheng hoped to
demonstrate that “we resolve to stay here and have no intentions toward the West [Mainland],” and
create a favorable climate for negotiations to start. 187 Such signals contradict the claim of scholars
like Zhuang Jinde, who believe that the initiative of the talks all came from an evil, manipulative
Qing court.188 After all, the Qing overcame the agitations of the war party and swung toward
negotiations partly because the Zheng regime also signaled its willingness by dramatically toning
down its belligerence.

Round One: Envoys

It was within this overall political climate that on Kangxi 5.11/4 (November 29, 1666), Kong
Yuanzhang, Jingkou Garrison Commander at Zhenjiang, in Jiangnan, secretly memorialized the
imperial court, confidently stating his expectation of “results that can be obtained” if he persuaded
Zheng Jing to submit.189 An edict promptly dispatched him to Fujian under the new title of Fujian
Summoning and Soothing Garrison Commander (Fujian zhaofu zongbing). He was authorized to
oversee negotiations with the Zheng organization in consultation with the regional feudatory, Geng
Jimao, and Governor-General Zu Zepu. 23 Kong’s background and sketchy past made him highly
useful for undertaking this kind of activity. After the Ming fall, he had mingled within the circles of
loyalist literati, dressed as a monk, and enjoyed close relationships with Zhejiang elites, particularly
Wei Geng and Qian Zuanzeng.190 Through participation in the underground activities of these men,
passing along strategic messages and coordinating activities among different Ming loyalist
organizations across the country, he came into close contact with the maritime resistance of Zhang
Huangyan and Zheng Chenggong. He came to know many people within these movements on an
intimate basis, including Hong Xu and Weng Tianyou, now Jing’s top officials. 191 Although no
conclusive evidence can yet support this claim, the scholar He Lingxiu has suggested convincingly
that Kong may even have taken part in Zheng’s failed invasion of Nanjing in 1659, organized with
the help of Wei Geng and his associates.192

186 Jiang Risheng, 239.

187 Ibid., 238.
188 Zhuang Jinde, “Zheng-Qing heyi shimo,” 1-2.
189 Jiang Risheng, 239 and Wu Fei, “Kong Yuanzhang guanyu shoufu Taiwan de zouben”
(“The Memorial of Kong Yuanzhang Regarding the Recovery of Taiwan”), Lishi dang’an
(Historical Archives) 3 (1983): 134. 23 Wu Fei, 134 and Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71.
190 Kong traced his ancestry to central China’s Henan Province, but was born and grew up in
Jiangyin, Jiangnan. He came from a poor family, and served as the servant boy of a local elite family
before moving to Huzhou, in Zhejiang. During the turmoil of the later years of the Ming, he earned his
reputation as a military man, and, in 1638, became the garrison commander of Jingkou, the same
position he would later assume under the Qing. From early on, he had demonstrated an ability to form
connections with people in high places to speak on behalf of him, including the prominent Qian
Qianyi. For a brief but highly fascinating biography of Kong Yuanzhang, refer to He, 294-302.
191 Wu Fei, 134 and He, 296.
192 He, 296.
 Apparently, Kong Yuanzhang’s greed and ambition for an important post with stable revenue,
which this gentry-led movement failed to satisfy, brought him into conflict with the other elites and
marginalized him from the group. 193 The breaking point came in 1662, when he was discovered and
sternly rebuked for forging a letter in Wei’s name to solicit and embezzle silver. 194 Incensed and
hungry for revenge, Kong went to Wenzhou, in coastal southern Zhejiang, which still lay under
Zheng Chenggong’s influence at the time. There, he compiled a list containing the names of officers
and soldiers stationed in the area to use as “evidence” that he held a high-ranking office with
responsibility over many men, and thus obtain more favorable terms of surrender from the Qing. He
then turned himself in at Zhenjiang, claiming to be a Zheng garrison commander, and proceeded to
expose Wei Geng’s entire network, an act that led to a mass roundup and the execution of Wei, Qian,
and others in 1662. As a result of the massive betrayal, Kong obtained his coveted job position at
Jingkou, where he was placed in charge of further sabotaging local Ming loyalist movements.
Although he now had a means of living, he soon found himself with very little to do as the decade
progressed and the situation in China gradually stabilized. 195 Since the center of conflict had already
shifted to Taiwan, Kong sought another opportunity for fame by trying to obtain Zheng Jing’s
submission.
The court, dominated by conservative Manchu nobles, viewed Kong Yuanzhang with a great
degree of suspicion, and, in part due to his shady reputation, had purposely marginalized him
with the post at Jingkou, which provided no soldiers, no fortresses, nothing at all tangible. 196
The Qing nevertheless recognized his value to a potential settlement of the Taiwan problem,
given his intimate knowledge of conditions within the Zheng regime and close ties to its former
and current key figures. Hence, the court authorized Kong to undertake this task, but, aware of
his past opportunism, also made sure he was closely supervised from the very beginning. His
new garrison command post at the port of Haicheng, headquarters of the Fujian naval fleet, put
him under Admiral Shi Lang of the war party, allowing for a built-in mutual check on each
other’s activities.197
Once he arrived, Kong sent out a report to Beijing on Kangxi 6.5/16 (July 6, 1667), forwarded
by the provincial authorities and approved by the court, that laid out his strategy for obtaining Zheng
Jing’s submission.198 Besides “summoning and soothing (zhaofu)” him through the talks, offering
him ranks and territory in exchange for his surrender, Kong wanted to concurrently entice Hong,
Weng, and other key leaders in the organization with attractive rewards. He hoped that these
193 Indeed, this grouping of elites functioned in a highly loose manner, tied together only by enthusiasm, friendship, and shared
political ideals. In terms of organization, it could not even compare to the factions of the late Ming or popular millenarian cults,
which at least had leaders, a hierarchical structure, and a system of rewards and punishments. This underground network of
gentry, then, became highly susceptible to infiltration from opportunists like Kong Yuanzhang. See Ibid., 294.
194 Throughout their cooperation, Kong kept on asking for silver from Wei. Wei initially granted
him whatever he wanted, but soon realized his true intentions and broke off the relationship. However,
Kong did not stop there. Besides the forgery incident, another trigger for his defection was his attempt
to blackmail Wei, who, out of anger, slapped him in the face. See Ibid., 297.
195 Ibid., 297-298. During his tenure, with the little he had to do, he nevertheless managed to further gain infamy by
imprisoning, killing, and exiling hundreds of suspected Ming loyalists in the Jiangnan area.
196 Ibid., 298.
197 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71-73.
198 Although the contents of his report remain unknown, fragments of it can be found within the response of the Qing court.
advisors and subordinates would provide additional pressure on their leader to accept his terms, or
capture and hand Zheng over to the Qing.199 This method, Kong believed, would save the court far
more money than a highly risky naval campaign, which
Shi Lang had tried without success.200
Kong also wasted no time reestablishing contact with his old connections along the coast. On
Kangxi 6.5/16 (July 6, 1667), he dispatched Summoning and Soothing Circuit Official Liu Ergong
and Subprefect Ma Xing as envoys to Taiwan to feel out Zheng’s attitude. Nothing else is known of
these enigmatic figures, not even the exact nature of their positions, other than the fact that both Liu
and Ma lived near the Kaiyuan Temple in Quanzhou. 201 Their official ranks may have been no more
than empty titles added onto their names to increase their prestige as envoys. Kong entrusted them
with a letter from himself and a man named Dong Ban she, brother of Zheng Chenggong’s wife,
Madame Dong, and maternal uncle of Zheng Jing. 202 Kong, then, appeared to have made effective
use of his contacts in the Fujian maritime region, opening to the Qing a valuable web of informal
relationships it could tap in its attempt to win over Taiwan’s submission.

Round One: Terms, Counter-terms, and Their

Significance
Both letters from Kong and Dong entreated Zheng Jing to surrender for the sake of the
coastal residents, whose suffering and impoverishment they blamed on his continued stubbornness
and refusal to accept the Qing civilizing influence. If he agreed to submit, the imperial court
promised to bestow upon him the title of “King of Fujian (Bamin wang),” and grant him control
over all of the evacuated southeastern coastal islands. 203 The court planned to treat Zheng Jing as
one of its feudatories to help it assert control and preempt potential rebels in a politically
troublesome frontier, in addition to Wu Sangui in the southwest, Geng Jimao in Fujian, and Shang
Kexi in Guangdong. In exchange for the reward of land and autonomous rights in local
administration, Zheng, as an internal vassal (neifan) and direct imperial subject, could not stay on a
foreign island, but should signal his acceptance of the new dynasty by shaving his head and
abandoning Taiwan.204

199 Wu Fei, 134.

200 In Kong’s words, “even if the entire [Qing] navy goes to subdue [the Zheng regime], it is still
easy for these defiant remnants to escape within the vast ocean, and cause the court to waste unlimited
sums of cash.” See Ibid.
201 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71-73.
202 The term she refers to “sir” or “mister” in Minnanese, and is added to the end of a person’s name. Documents of this period
often referred to Zheng Jing as Jin she before the death of his father. See, for instance, Yu, 10.
203 The conditions for Zheng Jing could be discerned from his reply to the letters of Kong Yuanzhang and Dong Ban she. See
Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 70.
204 Fairbank, “Preliminary Framework,” 7.
 Zheng flatly rejected the offers in two separate replies addressed to Dong and Kong, each dated
Yongli 21.6/23 (August 12, 1667). After the personal inquiries to his uncle, he complained that
“Commander Kong’s letter contains nothing substantial, and what Liu Ergong and Ma Xing have
said all amount to empty talk.”205 Since the time of the “late king [Chenggong] to your nephew,” he
wrote, “the Qing negotiators kept insisting, but in the past, during the height of our time on all the
islands [of the Chinese coast], we still refused to shave our heads.” 206 Filial piety dictated that
Zheng could not agree to what his father, during his own negotiations with the Manchus, had
refused to do even within his territories considered integral to “China,” not to mention now a
“foreign” land. Indeed, “we only ever fought over these two words [shaving hair].”207
Moreover, Jing told the Qing negotiators that he could not abandon Taiwan for the sake of land
and ranks on the Mainland. According to his letter to Dong Ban she:

“Today, I have opened up another universe (lingpi qiankun) at Dongning, outside of the domain
(bantu zhi wai). Its area is thousands of li, and its grain can last decades. The barbarians from
the four directions submit, myriad products circulate, and the living masses gather and receive
education. These are enough to be strong on its own (ziqiang). What do I have to desire from a
feudatory title? What have I to envy about the Central Land (Zhongtu)?”208

Similarly, he announced to Kong his creation of an entirely new kingdom abroad:

“Today, Dongning is far away overseas, and does not form part of the domain (fei shu bantu
zhi zhong). It neighbors Japan to the east and Luzon to the south. Numerous people congregate
here and products circulate. The honors of a king are those which I already have myself, and
the foundations of ten thousand generations have been established to the point it cannot be
transplanted. You, sir, have already witnessed this. What have I to envy of ranks, to desire of
land, and to shave my head on account of these?”209

He already ruled over an island that had nothing to do with “China,” and the Qing simply could not
give him a satisfying incentive to leave, especially if it meant cutting his hair.
Zheng Jing tried to convince Kong that he had withdrawn to Taiwan to steer clear of the
Mainland coast and leave it in Qing hands. Since Dongning could satisfy the needs of him and his
men, he had no intention to return to scramble for territory:

“During the battle for Siming [Xiamen] some time ago, I withdrew [to Taiwan] because of grain
shortages, not because of military miscalculation. Still, wherever the wind points, as south as
Hainan Island and as north as Liaodong [the entire length of the Chinese coast], where can I not

205 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 69.

206 Ibid., 71.
207 Ibid., 70.
208 Ibid., 69.
209 Ibid., 70.
 open up land? Where can I not congregate my troops? The reason why I decided to isolate
myself on the ocean and establish the Kingdom of Dongning was because I felt truly grieved at
the separation of young men and women, and the daily escalation of warfare…yet, your dynasty
still has not investigated this in-depth, and enforced with great strictness the evacuation of the
coast. As a result, the myriad surnames are homeless and wandering, and four provinces have
been laid to waste. To just sit and give up the rents and taxes of several thousand li and spend
annually on the provisions of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, alas, is this not your dynasty’s
strategic miscalculation?”210

Although he still possessed the capability to fight anywhere along the coast, Zheng Jing voluntarily
chose to leave the Mainland because of his great pain at the tremendous suffering brought to
innocent commoners by years of warfare. As he emphasized, “I only want to construct for your
dynasty a method for prolonged peace, to plot for the sake of the lives of the myriad people.” 211 Yet,
he lamented, the Qing failed to recognize his sincere interest in pursuing peaceful coexistence, and
continued to treat him as an enemy to be forced into surrender. Therefore, responsibility for the
current suffering and destitution of coastal residents lay not with his refusal to submit, but rather
with its deep mistrust of his intentions, as manifested in its brutal removal of the coast, a policy that
only harmed the court in terms of lost revenues and skyrocketing expenditures.
Zheng then laid out his own conditions for achieving mutual peace. His only requests, he
told his uncle, were for the Qing “to treat me according to the rituals of a foreign country (yi waiguo
zhi li jiandai), and for the two sides to initiate trade and friendly interaction (hushi tonghao).”212 He
proposed to Kong that “representatives from each country could establish friendly relations based
upon mutual trade. Both your side and ours would have no [missing character], and the tempests
would not roar.”213 These measures would encourage “coastal farmers and fishermen to return to
their original activities,” and benefit the Qing government with “millions in tax revenues.” 214 They
would also legalize, or make semi-legal, the organization’s rampant smuggling operations along the
southeastern coast, and provide an additional avenue of official trade.
Zheng Jing’s negotiating position contained two components, one for the Qing side and the
second for domestic consumption, each closely connected to the other in dynamic interaction. As
shown, his attempt to forge a new ideological foundation for his regime propelled his willingness to
engage in talks. The negotiating table, in turn, became an arena where his quest for legitimacy
could be further refined and articulated internally. Other than the Yongli reign title, itself frozen in
time, Zheng did not make any mention of the Ming or restoration in his letters. Moreover, in
referring to Taiwan’s geographic position, he avoided Qing tributaries, such as Liuqiu or Vietnam,
but rather Japan and Luzon, important trading partners of the Chinese maritime region with no
political ties to the Mainland. Even his tone and use of words, while polite, seemed far from

210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid., 69.
213 Ibid., 70.
214 Ibid.
submissive. By boasting of “barbarians” submitting to him from the four corners of the earth, he
tried to prove that, like the Qing, he possessed the moral character to bring “civilization” to non-Han
peoples. His terms and actions apparently aimed at achieving equal status with the Qing, such as in
a friendly trading alliance somewhat akin to the first Manchu settlement with Korea. 215 Besides
legitimate access to the lucrative China market, he could keep existing institutions on Taiwan
completely intact within this model, placating potential internal opposition from Ming princes and
their elite supporters. Meanwhile, he could consider several different political options, which might
include a kingdom with titles and ranks still from a fictive Ming court, or a new empire in its own
right.
At the same time, Zheng placed strong emphasis on Confucian morality in his correspondence
with the Qing. He demanded to keep the Ming hair and dress for himself and his subjects,
ostensibly because his father had proposed the same conditions, but also because of a more deeply
held desire to preserve in full the body handed down by one’s parents. Not only did he care for his
own people, but it was also due to his pain at the misery of coastal Chinese residents that prompted
him to withdraw from his Mainland bases. On the other hand, he pointed to the Qing’s brutal
removal of its subjects, their suffering, and its violation of filial piety as examples of the inhumanity
of Manchu rulers, who competed on these same Confucian values, and seize from them the moral
high ground. In this manner, Zheng Jing could shift
“Chineseness” from physical settings to more abstract qualities, allowing for an exclusivist Han
identity without having to engage in a suicidal venture to expel the invaders in the name of
restoration.
After receiving the letters from Zheng, Kong Yuanzhang begged the Qing court to allow him to
travel to Taiwan in person, and “permit me to persuade him to submit and listen to reason.” 216 The
regents granted his request, and further agreed to raise his daily stipend from four qian, eight fen to
six qian in silver. However, they remained highly suspicious of him and the other defectors in the
Fujian maritime zone. They prohibited Ma Xing and Liu Ergong from ever being dispatched again,
and turned down Kong’s appeal for Huang Yi of the Tongan garrison, a nephew of Huang Wu and a
potentially valuable negotiator, to join him in the talks. 217 They also kept a close watch over Kong’s
activities, dispatching the Manchu nobleman Narsai to Haicheng before the scheduled departure to
personally verify Kong’s cargo and accompanying personnel. The nativist regents resorted to such
measures out of fear that he and other defectors might use such an opportunity to engage in illicit
commerce with Zheng in violation of the maritime prohibitions, or even active political collusion
against the Qing.218 Besides weathering official suspicion, Kong had to deal with obstacles from

215 Ibid.
216 Ibid., 71.
217 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71 and Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 86.
218 An imperial edict to Kong read, “The Fujian Navy has a responsibility for carrying out
duties in the region. The vessels plying the domestic routes, if unchecked, might find an excuse to
engage in trade.” See Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 71. However, this decision appeared to be
aimed more at the Zheng defectors themselves, who could conduct smuggling activities with
greater ease due to their possession of capital and familiarity with their rivals. 53 Kangxi tongyi
Taiwan dang’an, 72.
Mother Nature. A man named Dong Shen, who had originally planned to join him on the mission,
unexpectedly passed away during this period due to illness. Judging from his surname, he was most
likely a maternal relative of Zheng Jing, probably none other than Dong Ban she himself. 53 Huge
winds and tempests in the sea further postponed the start of the journey.
Finally, on Kangxi 6.8/26, eighteen days after the originally scheduled departure date, the skies
had cleared enough for Kong to leave. A naval squadron under Ke Cai carried out a final check of
his ships before “escorting” him out to the open sea. 219 According to Kong’s recollection after his
return, his fleet ran into strong, adverse winds and turbulent waves throughout the journey, greatly
delaying his arrival on the island.220 However, once on Taiwan, Zheng Jing feted him lavishly with
banquets and treated him as a guest of honor for over a month. 56 Otherwise, besides increasing
goodwill, the two sides made little substantive progress during his stay. The Qing side merely
enhanced and repackaged its old offers. It promised to end the maritime ban and give Zheng the
right to oversee all trade along the coast, but continued to insist upon his status as an internal vassal,
who must first shave his head and leave the overseas island to join other Qing officials and subjects
on the Mainland.221 As an added condition, he even had to send one of his sons to Beijing as a
hostage to ensure his sincerity and trustworthiness. 222 For his part, Zheng Jing repeated his demands
to preserve his hair and clothing, and stay on his island. He emphasized to Kong:

“Taiwan is far away overseas, and not the domain of the Middle Kingdom (fei Zhongguo
bantu). When the former King was alive, we only disagreed on the two words ‘shaving hair.’ If
you can use the example of Korea, then I can [accept it].”223

Since Taiwan was a foreign land like Korea, Zheng implied, it should deserve treatment different
from China, including its ruler, political institutions, and cultural practices.
The talks sunk into deadlock, as both sides refused to give further ground. Zheng finally told
Kong explicitly to stop wasting his time: “The strategy of negotiations cannot drag out indefinitely.
The will of the former King cannot be violated!” 224 He then ordered Kong’s captain, Lin Gongxun,
to ferry him back to the Mainland. However, in a sign that Zheng left the door open for future talks,
he sent along several cargoes of local Taiwanese products, including sandalwood, dalbergia wood,
deer meat, and salted fish to accompany the mission, apparently an attempted tribute payment to the
emperor.225 His gesture hinted at his willingness to give up the initial vision of equality for
219 Ibid., 71-72.
220 The distance from Xiamen to Penghu was seven geng, and the Penghu to Anping leg was
five geng. See Huang Shujing, 15-16. Assuming good weather and favorable winds, Kong would have
arrived, at the fastest, in Penghu after a day and on the main island by the end of the next. 56 Jiang
Risheng, 239.
221 Xia, 37.
222 Ibid.
223 Jiang Risheng, 239.
224 Xia, 37.
225 According to the tally of Zheng’s tribute items made by Manchu officials on Kangxi
6.10/27 (December 11, 1667), after Kong’s return to Haicheng, the cargo consisted of 21 dan, 40 jin
(1.07 tons) of sandalwood, 400 jin (200 kg) of dalbergia, 200 jin (100 kg) of deer tendons, 2,610 jin
(1,305 kg) of deer breasts, and 1,150 jin (575 kg) of salted fish. In addition, Zheng handed out a total
Dongning and become a subordinate outer vassal state (waifan). In this framework, he could have
complete domestic autonomy, and only recognize the Qing emperor as overlord. 62 As a result of this
round of talks, he now seemed to tilt toward a mode of interaction with the Qing along the model of
Korea after the second Manchu invasion of 1636.

Round One: Failure and Aftermath

Kong Yuanzhang set out for sea on Kangxi 6.10/7 (November 22, 1667), and arrived back at
Haicheng eighteen days later, after another windy and turbulent journey. The inconclusive nature of
this round of talks was due primarily to the Qing side’s inability to offer sufficiently powerful
incentives for Zheng Jing to concede. On the one hand, the Qing navy proved incapable of
launching an assault on Taiwan. Despite lacking the ability to coerce, the Qing laid out terms for
peace that would essentially force him to give up the natural security of Taiwan and place his fate
completely into its hands. As he aptly put it, “What have I to envy of ranks, to desire of land, and to
shave my head on account of these?” 226 Although it is not clear whether Kong spoke with any of
Zheng’s top officials, they evidently did not betray their ruler or force him to surrender, but stuck
behind him to negotiate as one body.227
The stinginess of the Qing offer resulted, in part, from the regents’ deep mistrust of Zheng’s
intentions. As R. Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz correctly point out, these rulers of a massive
continental empire, who prioritized social stability and keeping taxes and defense outlays low, saw
the organization as a dangerous concentration of Chinese overseas engaged in rebellion and illegal
armed trade.228 To prevent a protracted and costly campaign, it wanted to entice Zheng back within
its boundaries, where it could keep him and his activities under close watch. In return for his
submission, however, the court would not hesitate to grant him favorable concessions, including the
right to serve as “exclusive link between the huge Chinese market and overseas luxury goods,” even
though it did not have any interest in licensing armed monopolies. 229 At times, then, an empire’s
of 360 taels (13.5 kg) of silver to Kong’s entire crew. See Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 75. 62
Fairbank, “Preliminary Framework,” 7.
226 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 70.
227 Before Kong set out for Taiwan, he tried to secure the surrender of Li Feng, an ally of Zheng Jing based on the islands off of
Zhejiang. “If the fake garrison commander Li Feng and others take their troops and ships, and
come to submit,” he claimed, “then we can seriously destroy one of Zheng’s arms in the southeast.
Taiwan would naturally become isolated, and then we can gradually plan.” See Kangxi tongyi Taiwan
dang’an, 73. The outcome of this mission remains unknown, but, either way, it was unlikely to have
had much impact on the survival of the Zheng organization. Kong likely exaggerated the role of Li,
who was nothing more than one of the many coastal rebels engaged in illicit trade with Taiwan,
peripheral to Zheng and his core followers.
228 R. Bin Wing, 148-149.
2
29

P
o
m
e
need to achieve internal stability did not necessarily mean that it had to view maritime-based
organizations as a zero-sum game. Yet, this same suspicion and fear also severely restricted its
flexibility and limited the scope of its negotiation options. Not only did they suspect the intentions
of the organization, but they also exhibited paranoia against their own personnel in Fujian, many of
them defectors from the Zheng camp. This attitude exacerbated tensions on the ground between the
war and negotiating parties, which they had forcibly grouped together in the first place as a mutual
check. In sum, it resulted in the Qing side’s inability to coordinate a unified response to Zheng’s
demands other than repeating the same basic terms, with little room for meaningful concessions.
In the end, the peace process spelled disaster for collaborators in both parties. After Kong’s
return, an imperial edict ordered all officials in Fujian to secretly memorialize the court with their
suggestions on the next step to take toward Zheng Jing. Shi Lang was among the first to come out
and dismiss the talks as a fruitless endeavor. He complained to the court that even after “our envoys
went there two times,” Zheng still did not dispatch any officials to accompany them back for further
consultations. Based upon the information provided by Kong’s ship captain Lin Gongxun, whom he
had sent to spy on the mission, Shi felt convinced that Zheng “does not necessarily have any true
intention to return and submit.” 67 Instead, the admiral asked for another chance to lead a naval
expedition. This time, he would first capture Penghu, and, from there, try again to conduct
negotiations with Zheng Jing, but from a position of military strength. If he refused to accept the
terms, Shi would then eliminate him by attacking and occupying the main island. 230 The proposal
r
a
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z
,

2
0
3
.

S
h
i
,

1
.

230 Ibid., 3. In Shi’s words, “Zheng Jing…only depends upon the forbidden vast ocean. If you
specifically dispatch one envoy to summon and soothe, then the decision-making power lies only in
the one person of Zheng Jing. However, if we use our grand army to press against the frontier, then
the opportunity to leave [Taiwan] or stay is with the bandit masses. How can Zheng Jing make this
decision by himself?” Given his image of Taiwan as a place where the Zheng soldiers lacked spouses
and missed home, Shi was confident that they would flock over to the Qing if he took military action.
See Ibid., 6. The methods used by the war and peace parties, then, both contained the elements of
official negotiations and surrender, as well as the use of defections to put additional pressure upon the
essentially implied that Kong had achieved nothing during his mission to Taiwan, dealing a heavy
blow to his efforts to obtain recognition through these negotiations, upon which he had staked his
entire reputation.
Partly due to this report, the Qing court suspended the talks and recalled Kong to Beijing to
await his next assignment.231 Obviously unhappy, he turned around and accused Shi of collusion
with Taiwan. Kong revealed in a memorial that, during his stay on Taiwan, Zheng Jing had told him
about the secret contacts the organization maintained with Shi, and even showed Kong the letters
exchanged between the two men. 232 These allegations touched off a chain reaction. Soon, several
subordinates of Zhou Quanbin came out and accused him of faking his surrender in
1664 simply to retake Haicheng for Zheng at the soonest convenient opportunity. 233 In Kangxi
7.1/10 (February 21, 1668), the Qing regents ordered both Shi and Zhou to Beijing for “an imperial
audience,” which, in reality, meant giving them honorable but worthless titles in the central
bureaucracy.234 Huang Wu, too, fell under suspicion, and his nephew, Huang Yi, was reduced to the
status of a commoner.235 The court then disbanded the entire naval establishment in Fujian,
reconverting a small number of defected Zheng troops into land forces, while dispatching the rest,
along with their families, deep into the interior provinces to open up military colonies. 236 Most of
the Qing ships were grounded in Haicheng harbor and eventually burned. Kong Yuanzhang, the
chief instigator of this entire chain of events, met with a similarly tragic fate. Soon after the failure
of the talks, he was exiled to the frontier outpost of Ningguta, in Manchuria, where he lived until his
death around 1690.237

Round Two: Motivations and Preparations

Besides suspicion of its collaborators, the Qing court undertook these drastic actions as a sign of
goodwill toward the Zheng organization. With these potentially unstable elements out of the way,
they could not hijack future conciliatory gestures through rash military maneuvers or illicit
smuggling and political collusion. In early 1669, even as the purge of personnel progressed, the
court dispatched officials to Fujian and Guangdong to survey the coastline. A few months later, in
Kangxi 8.2 (March 1669), an imperial edict called for a limited extension of the maritime
enemy. As in previous and future interactions with the organization, however, the first group wanted a
strong show of force and success in battle to bring about submission, while the second desired to
achieve it peacefully, while complementing its actions with “summoning and soothing” officers and
soldiers from the opposing camp.
231 Jiang Risheng, 242.
232 Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 86.
233 Zheng shi shiliao sanbian, 121. The accusers claimed that before Zhou’s surrender, he and Zheng Jing had sworn by the
sword to seal the pact. They purportedly promised each other that “if the two sides had a contrary heart, then may we die under
ten thousand swords.”
234 Jiang Risheng 242-246 and Shi, 4-5.
235 Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 86.
236 Jiang Risheng, 246; Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 86-87. These defectors were mostly sent to the provinces of Shanxi,
Shaanxi, Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei.
237 He, 298.
boundaries, allowing residents to return to the evacuated areas for farming and fishing in the harbors
and bays.238 This friendlier attitude continued despite a major palace coup in Beijing on 5/16 (June
14), when the fifteen-year-old Emperor Shengzu ousted Oboi and his allies, and assumed personal
control over the empire.239 The new ruler had to spend the rest of the year ridding the government of
officials with close ties to the former regents, and dealing with massive flooding from the Yellow
River, which had breached its dikes for two years in a row. 240 In contrast, Zheng Jing’s exile on an
overseas island represented a much less pressing issue that did not immediately threaten the stability
of the empire, especially after his assurances that he had no intention to harass the Mainland
coastline again.
In 1669, the emperor restarted the negotiations, dispatching Mingju, Secretary of the Board of
Punishments, and Cai Yurong, Assistant Secretary of the Board of War, to Fujian. They arrived at
the port of Quanzhou in Kangxi 8.6 (July 1669), and met with Geng Jimao and Zu Zepu for
consultation.241 The four of them agreed to send Xinghua Prefect Mu Tianyan and Assistant
Commander Ji Quan as envoys to Taiwan. Unlike the defectors before them, these imperial officials
were some of Shengzu’s most trusted allies. Mingju, a Manchu bannerman of the Yehe clan,
enjoyed close relations with Suoetu, the emperor’s imperial bodyguard, who had helped mastermind
the ousting of the Oboi faction.242 It was through Mingju’s enthusiastic patronage that Cai, a Han
bannerman from Liaodong, rose to his present position. The assistant secretary, in turn, knew Zu
Zepu on a personal basis, having once served under his father, Zu
Dashou, a former Ming commander who had surrendered to the Manchus in 1641
with his men and entire family. 243 Mu, a northerner from Shaanxi in the service of Geng and Zu,
represented a new generation of bureaucrats, who had acquired his jinshi degree during the Shunzhi
period, and thus owed his entire career to the new dynasty. 244 Through this personal chain of ties
from top to bottom, Shengzu could obtain timely and accurate information on the progress of the
talks.
Mu and Ji arrived at Penghu on 6/12 (July 9), where a Zheng fleet escorted them to Taiwan a
few weeks later. For the upcoming talks, Zheng Jing chose two of his own trusted officials. Officer
of Punishments Ke Ping was the son of Ke Chenshu, a highly esteemed general under

238 Jiang Risheng, 251; Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 86-87.
239 For more details on this political struggle, refer to Zhang Kaiyuan et al., vol. 1, 615-617.
240 Zhang Kaiyuan et al., vol. 1, 617-624, 608-609, 622-623. The flooding caused tremendous loss of lives and property, and
severely threatened the Grand Canal, the key artery for the shipment of imperial grain from prosperous Jiangnan to Beijing.
241 Jiang Risheng, 251; Peng, 72; and Xia, 22.
242 See Mingju’s biography in Zhao Erxun et al., eds., Qing shigao (A Draft Qing History), vol. 33 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1998), 9992-9994. For more on Suoetu’s role in the overthrow of Oboi, refer to Zhang Kaiyuan et al., vol. 1, 616-617.
243 For Cai Yurong’s biography, see Zhao et al., vol. 32, 9787-9791. For a detailed account of Zu Dashou’s surrender to the
Manchus, see Wakeman, vol. 1, 180-194 and 221-224. A biography of the entire Zu family can be found in Zhao et al., vol. 31,
9419-9429. Both Cai and Zu should have been familiar with Geng Jimao, another bannerman from Liaodong.
244 Jiang Risheng, 251.
Chenggong, while Ye Heng headed the Rites Office and served in the Imperial Academy under Chen
Yonghua.245 The two men put the Qing envoys in an official residence until they arranged a date for
a personal audience with Jing.246

Round Two: An Issue of Hair and Tribute

During their wait, the envoys apparently insinuated in their conversations with Ke and Ye that
the Kangxi Emperor would permit Zheng Jing to rule Taiwan in perpetuity as a subordinate
vassal.247 Zheng heard the rumors, since he noted, in a caption to one of his poems, the coming of
“an envoy from the Manchu tribal chieftain with a saying of ‘not setting foot on shore and not
changing clothes.’”248 Wanting to find out more about the attractive terms, he initiated a series of
audiences with Mu Tianyan and Ji Quan, attended by all his civil and military officials, starting on
Kangxi 8.7/7 (August 3, 1669). During these sessions, Mu forwarded to him the letters from
Mingju and other officials, along with an imperial command that laid out the detailed conditions of
submission. Sensing trickery, Jing refused to receive the edict, as that would
mean automatic approval of Shengzu’s terms based upon mere hearsay.249
In order to understand what the Qing really offered, he opened Mingju’s letter:

“I have once heard that to soothe the people is called benevolence, and to know the times is
called wisdom. From antiquity, great men have understood that the Mandate of Heaven has a
place of belonging, and believe in the fruitlessness of hurting the people. They do not doubt
their decision to entrust their bodies to the Celestial Dynasty. Fortune would fill the black-haired
multitudes, and overflow to their descendants. The names [of these great men] would go down
honorably in history. For you, sir, to understand the times and changes is a simple matter
compared to the earlier sages, being a great man of this generation. Yet, your name has no
contact with the imperial domain, and your ranks and titles do not emanate from the Celestial
Dynasty. Instead, you float and submerge overseas. If this was conversed about for a time, does
it not cause deep regret among those with understanding? Now, fortunately, the Son of Heaven
has felt pain one day, and grieved at the unrecovered injuries of the coastal residents. Among
them are those who have left their villages and wells, who have fled and wandered to islands in
245 Xia, 44; Jiang Risheng, 238; and Deng, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng Taiwan, 49.
246 Jiang Risheng, 251-252.
247 According to Jiang Risheng, Mu allegedly hinted to Ke, “The landscape of Taiwan already
does not show a large contrast with the interior [China], and His Excellency has had a heart for some
time to submit.” Ke enthusiastically replied, “If it can truly be as what you, old master, have said, then
the myriad surnames have great fortune!” See Jiang Risheng, 251-252. It is impossible to verify
whether or not these conversations actually took place, or their exact wording. Nevertheless, the
general terms and conditions put forth by the Qing and Zheng Jing accords well with the other sources
of the period, including imperial edicts and memorials.
248 “Yanping er wang yiji,” 129.
249 Jiang Risheng, 252. For more on the implications of receiving an imperial command during
the course of Zheng Chenggong’s negotiations with the Qing, see Wu Zhenglong, Zheng Chenggong
yu Qing zhengfu jian de tanpan, 69-70.
 the sea, some as recently as over ten years ago, and others as distant as over twenty years ago.
Many have suffered, and it is uncertain whether they are living or dead. Since these people all
live in this world, which of them do not possess the desire to return home gloriously? …

“Let us not talk about the utmost pain of the Son of Heaven, to whom we should all look up and
not fear, but as for your homeland, the children and white-haired elders of Fujian, they are
mostly your fellow people. How could you bear to cause their mutual separation for a long
time? Our country treats people with sincerity and trust; its virtuous intentions are all
trustworthy, and those from near and far all come here. By these, it achieves the glory of
unification (yitong) without peer in antiquity! Even the most remote and isolated lands still do
not fear to come to court with important translators. You, sir, are prominent among humans, yet
you, on the other hand, put yourself outside of the imperial benevolence. How does this harm
the court? However, we just feel regret on your behalf! You should truly turn around and
return, and let the remote corners of the ocean become a land of joy, and the wandering masses
go back to their hometowns. If you, sir, can return to the Central Plain from overseas, will it not
be a tremendously happy matter for thousands of ages, an opportunity that cannot be achieved
again? Our Emperor has tried all he can to show you his sincerity, and he has provided an
imperial edict. After reading it, you should look up to the most benevolent and loving heart of
the Son of Heaven…”250

As Mingju’s letter shows, despite the sweet talk of Mu and Ji, he essentially repeated Kong
Yuanzhang’s basic stance: accept Qing ranks, quit Taiwan, and return to Fujian. This time, however,
Mingju turned Zheng Jing’s Confucian morality on its head to launch a subtle counterattack against
him. Since the Manchus, he insisted, already possessed the Mandate of Heaven due to superior
moral values, any decision to submit represented an understanding of the times, and, therefore, an
ethical course of action. Instead, Zheng Jing’s continued disobedience to this inevitable trend would
only bring endless suffering to the coastal residents and tear their families apart, a claim that
conveniently excused the Qing for its own brutal evacuation policy. Mingju further exploited the
homesickness within Zheng’s ranks, reminding him of his soldiers’ desire to return and reunite with
their loved ones and fellow villagers. The secretary implored him to trust in the emperor’s sincerity,
while subtly threatening that if he did not, the troops on Taiwan, moved by the benevolence of the
Qing court, would do so for him.
Predictably, Zheng flatly rejected this offer. Unable to modify the conditions on their own, Mu
and Ji could do nothing but ceaselessly, and fruitlessly, persuade him to reconsider. The two sides
even came to the point of trading insults, with Zheng insinuating that he could still fight if
necessary, while the Qing envoys threatened that “we do not lack battleships or soldiers” if he
continued to refuse their demands.251 After two weeks of stalemate, they finally requested him to
dispatch Ke and Ye to Quanzhou to meet their superiors, who would have greater latitude in

250 Jiang Risheng, 252-253.

251 Ibid., 253.
determining his requests. Zheng agreed, and sent his envoys, accompanied by Mu and Ji, to the
Fujian coast by junk via Penghu. The arrival of Ke and Ye at Quanzhou brings us back to the scene
at the beginning of this study, when crowds of curious commoners flocked to gawk at the Ming-
style hair and dress of the visitors. The stark contrast in fashion laid bare the tremendous underlying
gulf between the Zheng organization and the Qing in terms of their institutions and worldview.
These fundamental differences led to further troubles for the two envoys before their scheduled
meeting with the Qing central officials.
Ke and Ye had carried with them a letter from Zheng Jing to Mingju that laid out his own
conditions for the submission of the organization:

“I have heard that the form of a unicorn or phoenix cannot be surrounded by fences or cages.
The view of heroes cannot be muddled by activities of persuasion. Yet, as the ruler of mortals,
one should have the entire universe in mind, and let even the insects and birds share in his
bounty. If there are common men and women who could not live securely, a gentleman would
feel shame. Ever since the shifting of the boundary, people have been separated and wander
around hopelessly in five provinces, and ten thousand li have been laid to waste! Therefore, I
did not fear to withdraw afar and establish a kingdom at Dongning. Probably, that would allow
for us to rest our soldiers and pacify our masses, and coexist without incident. Yet, your
dynasty has still not forgotten its sentiments, to the point of letting the coastal residents wander
around homeless. My heart truly regrets that!

“You, sir, have received orders to come from far away, and desire to create fortune for the
people, to allow those exiled to return to their work, to establish security in the maritime region,
and to be virtuous and compassionate. There had also been word spread about ‘not setting foot
on shore and not shaving hair’ and others. It was somewhat moving. Yet, I realized that I had
never understood [your terms] in detail, so I had no choice but to instruct that the [imperial]
command be welcomed. Matters must be set in advance before I could regret them, and words
must be set in advance before I can step over them. A true man trusts with his heart, expresses
utmost sincerity, and does things matter-of-factly. Why should he alter what he has already
said? … I respectfully uphold the precedents of my forefathers to protect their great
foundation. I must not abandon their work in order to covet the profits of a moment. I only feel
pity in my chest for the suffering of the mortals. If your dynasty truly cherishes the people in its
mind, it is not hard for me to put down my heart and submit, to follow the ritual of ‘serving the
great (K. sadae / C. shida).’ After we establish friendship, I will necessarily withdraw my
patrols and sentries. As the coastal areas are all under your control, [peace] is not that which I
provide. If I have missed something, then you, sir, please instruct me. I humbly await your
reply.”252

252 Jiang Risheng, 253-254 and Zheng Yiju, 26. Some very minor differences, particularly usage of characters, exist between the
two texts. This passage has been translated from Jiang Risheng’s work.
 Similar to the first round of talks, Zheng Jing attempted to seize the moral high ground by
highlighting his concern for the coastal residents, his sincerity for peaceful coexistence, and his filial
piety, as opposed to the shiftiness and lack of trust on the part of the Qing. This time, however, he
had taken further steps in re-envisioning his polity and its relationship to “China.” He now
explicitly floated the idea of an unequal tributary model, with Taiwan as an outer vassal in a
universe centered upon the Qing state. He wanted his kingdom to “follow the example of Korea,
not shaving the hair and becoming your ministers and paying tribute (chengchen nagong).”253
Zheng now explicitly referred to the term “serving the great (sadae),” which the Koreans used to
characterize the Joseon Dynasty’s relationship with the Ming for over 200 years and with the
Manchus after their second invasion in 1636.
For Zheng, the normalization of trade served as an important but subsidiary concern for him to
enter into a tributary relationship, since an institutionalized system of smuggling already yielded
handsome profits for his organization. The more important advantage of the system lay in the
official recognition of his status as King of Dongning, in exchange for his adoption of the Qing
calendar and Shengzu as his suzerain. If Zheng obtained a patent of investiture from an established
empire widely recognized as the new center of the East Asian world, he could secure automatic
legitimacy at a very low risk by tying his destiny to its wellbeing. As one scholar points out, close
tributary relations protected the interests of both ruler and elites in Korea’s Joseon Dynasty, partly
explaining why it lasted over five centuries.254 Like Korea, Zheng could count upon Qing military
assistance in the event of an internal succession crisis or rebellion. 93 Moreover, he could enjoy
exclusive domestic control, including the right to use Ming institutions and the Yongli reign title,
and preserve Han customs free of Qing interference. In this manner, he could calm internal pressure
to expel the “barbarians” from the Central Plain, transforming restoration from a concrete goal into
an abstract ideal, and continue to be “Chinese” by making himself foreign to “China.”
Yet, Zheng did not entirely relinquish the other model of relations between roughly equal
entities. Although he would have to create his own symbols of power from scratch, and assume full
risk of failure, it would give him greater freedom to expand his authority over Taiwan without limit,
perhaps even beyond his current status as king. Moreover, he would not have to accept a
“barbarian” as overlord or express his inferior status through tribute missions. Therefore, despite his
request for investiture, he simultaneously made another bid for equality expressed subtly in the
wording of his reply to Mingju. Before this letter reached the hands of the Qing ministers, however,
Mu Tianyan had spotted his “inappropriate” use of words, and sternly rebuked Zheng’s envoys:

“Inside the letter of His Excellency, there is ‘the form of a unicorn or phoenix cannot be
surrounded by fences or cages.’ Yet, of all living beings between Heaven and Earth, only the
Son of Great Heaven can be said to be ‘unfettered.’ If His Excellency cannot be surrounded by
fences or cages, then this means that Taiwan is still not his sole focus. He also mentioned that
‘the view of heroes cannot be muddled by activities of persuasion (youshui).’ This applies to
253 Jiang Risheng, 253.
254 Chun Hae-jong, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in Fairbank,
ed., The Chinese World Order, 111. 93 Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, 30-31.
 the Warring States period, when Qin and Chu competed for power, not today’s order of great
unity (da yitong).255 The Supreme Emperor specially displayed his grace and dispatched his
high ministers to come with his edict, while I, an imperial official of the third rank, received
orders to travel across the sea. If you view this as persuasion, then it is equivalent to comparing
people who do not belong to the same category. As for ‘after we establish friendship
(tonghao),’ this sentence is even more misguided. When there are two huge countries whose
strength is equivalent, only then could we begin to call it friendship. Friendship would then
result from negotiations. Now, our dynasty commands the respect of the Four Seas and myriad
lands. The various barbarians all come to pay their respects. Taiwan is but a remote corner
overseas. If it wants to resist us on an equal basis, then regardless of wise or foolish, they will
all know who is strong and who is weak. What [Zheng] described in his letter amounts to
nothing more than armies on paper. What benefit is there to reply to it? …”95

Through his meticulous critique of these sentences, Mu was reminding Ke and Ye that Taiwan simply
could not match China in terms of military strength or political clout, nor was it even remotely
qualified to form an alternate tianxia and enthrone a second Son of Heaven. After all, the
“barbarians” everywhere submitted to the Qing, and definitely not to Zheng. His reply, then,
amounted to a spirited defense of the entire Qing-centered Chinese world order.
In the face of this rejection, the Zheng envoys had no choice but to back down and apologize for the
inconsiderate wording.256 However, their attempt to assert equality with the Qing did not end there.
On the scheduled day of the talks, Mu required Ke and Ye to enter through the side gate of the
compound of Mingju and Cai, and sit perpendicular to them, in the manner of prospective vassals
paying homage to the Son of Heaven, whose will these representatives embodied. 257 The Zheng
envoys refused to comply, and instead requested treatment as foreign guests, who could use the
main gate and face them directly across the room. “There are lands large and small,” Ke defended
his stance, “but envoys are of one body.” 98 Due to sharp differences over the preferred ceremony,
the imperial ministers and Zheng envoys refused to meet for the next few days. In the end, Mu
Tianyan managed to break the impasse by relocating the negotiations to the local Confucian shrine.
There, Ke and Ye would still enter through the side doors to greet the imperial envoys. 258 Mingju
and Cai could view this move as an act of subordination toward the emperor, while the Zheng
envoys could claim that they were paying their respects to Confucius, something also acceptable to
the Qing, since both sides espoused him as a great sage and upheld the Confucian value system. 259

255 Qin and Chu were two large states of roughly the same power battling for control over all of
China during the Warring States Period (c. 400-221 BCE). The literal translation is “Qin at dawn and
Chu at dusk (zhao Qin mu Chu).” In making this analogy, the Qing envoy refused to acknowledge
Zheng Jing as an equal partner in negotiations, but, rather, a rebel who needed to submit in some
manner acceptable to both sides, a subtle yet important difference. 95 Jiang Risheng, 254.
256 Ibid.
257 This ritual applied not just to the Zheng envoys, but to all Qing officials, including, on
that day, the Fujian civil and military authorities. The Qing seemed to view Taiwan as a
prospective inner feudatory. See Jiang Risheng, 255. 98Jiang Risheng, 255.
258 Ibid.
259 This interpretation comes from Deng Kongzhao, with which I wholly agree. See Deng, Zheng Chenggong yu Ming-Zheng
Taiwan, 119.
 During this round of talks, Ke and Ye quietly let the issue of equality drop, and settled upon
Zheng’s bottom line of a tributary framework of relations with the Qing:

“The land of Taiwan was opened up by [Jing’s] father, Zheng Chenggong, so he cannot easily
bear to abandon it. Once we submit, Taiwan will belong to the imperial court, and our bodies,
hair, and skin will all be at its disposal. Yet, our submission lies in the sincerity of our hearts,
not in shaving our heads and returning to shore. We are willing to pay tribute along the
precedents of Korea.”260

The Qing officials agreed to reconsider the envoys’ requests, and, after a meeting among
themselves, memorialized the emperor. In Kangxi 8.9 (September 1669), Shengzu allowed Zheng
to remain on Taiwan in perpetuity. His imperial edict read:

“I believe that Zheng Jing had lived for a long time on islands in the sea, and was blocked from
the sound of civilization. Now, because our officials went there to summon and soothe him, he
has actually sent his envoys to accompany them. It is highly praiseworthy that he desires to
submit. If Zheng Jing cherishes and loves Taiwan and cannot bear to abandon it, we can
concede to his desires…We can allow him to live there according to his wishes.261

However, the emperor refused to give the island tributary status along the lines of Korea, meaning
that Zheng Jing must shave his hair and change his clothes:

“Korea has always been a foreign country (waiguo), but Zheng Jing is a man of the Middle
Kingdom (Zhongguo zhi ren).262 Since he will reside on Taiwan, on what basis could we
discern his sincerity in submitting if he does not shave his hair? … If he follows [Qing]
institutions and shaves his hair, I will not hesitate to award him high ranks and honors.”263

Since Shengzu considered Zheng Jing a direct subject of the emperor, he could not adopt the
customs of a foreign country like Korea. As such, he would first have to become an inner feudatory,
and make Taiwan an integral part of “China.”
Mingju, Geng, and Zu ordered Mu and Ji to accompany Ke and Ye back to Taiwan with the
edict, along with their own letters announcing the concessions. 264 They also contained warnings that
260 Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang’an, 85.
261 Ibid.
262 朝鮮系從來所有之外國，鄭經乃中國之人.
263 Jiang Risheng, 256.
264 In an alternative account, the Qing authorities held Ke Ping and Ye Heng hostage in
Quanzhou, and only summoned Mu and Ji to Taiwan to pressure Zheng Jing into shaving his hair.
Highly angered, Zheng abused and imprisoned the envoys, and threatened to launch raids on the Fujian
coast if his representatives were not returned. Only then did Mingju finally agree to send back Ke and
Ye. See Peng, 72. Peng’s story, just like Jiang Risheng’s here, cannot be independently verified.
However, I prefer to utilize the latter, since it appears more consistent with the verbal and written
exchanges between the two parties, and the briefer narratives found in other sources.
such lenient terms would never be offered again, for the Qing, too, had reached its bottom line. As
one letter from Geng Jimao put it, “now you have received the rank of feudatory and are allowed to
stay in Taiwan. This is already the height of luxury!” 265 “If you sit and lose this opportunity,” added
Mingju, “the time will never again return!”266
Indeed, Zheng Jing found the offer highly attractive, and seriously considered shaving his hair
and changing his clothing. He even sought out Zhu Shugui, the most prominent of the Ming
imperial relatives on the island, and hinted to him this intention:

“Your minister, along with his grandfather and father, have, for three generations, received the
munificent grace of this guo [Ming], and is unable to repay it at any chance. How can I decide
by myself? It is only at Your Highness’s command.”267

The prince refused with equal subtlety, and threw the ball back into his court,

“The affairs of the country are all in your hands. If matters succeed, then it is due to your
wisdom. If they do not succeed, then it is my life. I recall the late emperor’s decision to die for
this guo, and want to follow his example.”268

Although Zhu Shugui had been marginalized and enjoyed very little official privilege, he still
commanded great respect, and reflected and influenced a significant segment of elite opinion on
Taiwan. Even if Zheng Jing overcame his own disinclination to shave his hair, he could not afford
to lose his moral high ground, and, along with it, the fragile “glue” of cultural Chineseness that held
his movement together.
In the end, Zheng firmly decided against changing his customs: “If [the Qing] can follow the
example of Korea, then I shall submit. If it wants us to shave our heads, then I will not change them
even to the point of death.”110 In the face of his resolute refusal to alter his hair and dress, Mu
Tianyan and Ji Quan saw little choice but to return to Quanzhou, carrying along his reply letters to
Geng Jimao and Mingju. However, the central and Fujian authorities saw no purpose in continuing
the negotiations, since Zheng’s demands remained unchanged and need not be reported to the
emperor, who already made clear his bottom line. 269 Therefore, at the end of 1669, Mingju and Cai
headed back to Beijing, marking an unsuccessful conclusion to the second round of talks.

265 Jiang Risheng, 256.

266 Ibid.
267 Chen Hong and Chen Bangxian, 87.
268 Ibid. Zhu here appears to refer
to the Chongzhen Emperor. 110 Jiang
Risheng, 256.
269 Jiang Risheng, 256-257 and Zheng Yiju, 26. Zheng claims that Ke Ping and Ye Heng accompanied Mu Tianyan back to
Quanzhou once again, along with Zheng Jing’s reply letters. However, this fact cannot be independently verified.
 Toward a New Legitimacy
In both rounds of negotiations, the two sides sincerely sought out a mutual settlement due to
their inability and unwillingness to continue their protracted conflict. Although it is true that the
Qing court initiated the talks each time, once they began, Zheng Jing’s behavior contradicted the
image attributed to him in traditional scholarship of a passive recipient in no mood to compromise
with the enemy under any circumstance. In fact, he actively utilized the process to drive home a
deal most favorable for his organization, and encouraged it to continue at key moments by
withdrawing his garrisons or sending along tribute gifts. Zheng even considered shaving his head
when Shengzu granted his request to stay on Taiwan. On the Qing side, the court showed greater
flexibility in the second round, with a unified hierarchy of officials answerable directly to the
emperor. The reasons why the talks did not succeed had as much to do with principles as with
whether the benefits received were worth the sacrifices in principles needed to realize them.
The most fundamental point of digression between the Qing and the Zheng organization lay in
hairdos and fashion. For a Manchu-dominated court, altering customs represented a necessary test
of its majority Han Chinese subjects’ loyalty to the dynasty. As the Kangxi Emperor admitted, if
Zheng did not shave his hair, “on what basis could we discern his sincerity in submitting…?” 270 Yet,
Zheng feared that if he accepted these conditions, his fate would become completely subject to the
whims of an untrustworthy regime. Many previous Ming loyalist leaders, including his grandfather
Zhilong, had similarly agreed to surrender and alter their customs, only to encounter tragedy at the
hands of their new masters. Jing made clear his mistrust in his final reply to Geng Jimao:

“None can compare to your dynasty’s tolerance and benevolence? Let me not inquire about
those far away. From what I have recently seen and heard, for example, Fang Guoan and Sun
Kewang, are these not men who showed utmost sincerity to your dynasty? Where are they all
now? The examples of past affairs are sufficient for me to shiver in my heart!” 271
Since Taiwan lay safely outside the Qing military’s reach, however, and since Shengzu had
promised Zheng the autonomy he sought, such suspicions could still be overcome.
A far deeper issue involved differing shades of identity as manifested in the hairstyles and
fashion. Certainly, both sides agreed upon Taiwan’s “foreign” status vis-à-vis the guo, and marginal
position within the tianxia, a point made clear in their exchanges. Mingju and Mu emphasized that
Zheng “lived alone in a remote wilderness,” or “escaped to a remote place.” 114 In his replies to
Kong, Geng, and the central officials, Zheng spoke of the island as “outside of the domain,” or “a
remote corner far away overseas, with nothing at all to do with the domain.” 115 Yet, beneath this
consensus lay a wide gulf between them in defining “Chinese” identity without a physical “China.”
The Qing authorities could care less about Taiwan, a mere “ball of mud overseas,” but they
could not regard Zheng Jing and his regime as equally “foreign.” 116 Unlike the Koreans, he and his
elites came mostly from Fujian and Guangdong, spoke their regional tongues, and practiced the

270 Jiang Risheng, 256-257.

271 Jiang Risheng, 257; Zheng Yiju, 26; and Xia, 31. In the latter two works, this final reply to Geng Jimao actually appears
same customs. The Qing, then, saw them as untransformed internal rebels, so close to its version of
“civilized” values, and yet refusing to take the crucial final step of shaving the hair and changing
fashion. As Geng Jimao implored to Zheng, “you already received titles and call yourself a minister.
How can you have different institutions, and wear different clothes?” 117 If Zheng agreed to alter his
customs, the officials were prepared to offer significant concessions, including opening up trade and
granting him Taiwan as a hereditary fiefdom.
His continued refusal, on the other hand, represented a threat to the legitimacy of the Manchu
ruling class. This challenge became explicitly visible when the residents of Quanzhou flocked to
view the “majestic presence of Han officials” in the scene at the beginning of this study. 118 Their
nostalgic sentiments were actually widely shared among elites and commoners throughout the
empire. When the Korean envoy Hong Myeongha (1607-1667) traveled to Beijing in 1664, he
noted that many Han residents, upon seeing his Ming-style outfit and long hair, would “wear long
sighs on their faces. They acted as if wanting to speak, but did not say anything.” 119 Such
expressions of regret and envy were still potent even 20 years after the Manchus entered the capital.
More than Koreans, the prospect of other “Chinese” refusing to alter their customs could cause
discontent among Qing subjects, who might question why they did not enjoy the same privilege.272

For Zheng Jing, his personal memories of “China” remained powerful, the wounds from its loss
never completely healing. In some of his poems, he would lament the “mountains and rivers of my
homeland,” which “have all changed colors, and the palaces of the old capital turned into ashes.” 273
Elsewhere, he swore to “prepare his weapons daily” as long as “my grand plans [to retake China]
have not been achieved.”274 Zhu Shuangyi points to such stanzas to argue that
Zheng never wavered in his commitment to Ming restoration, and plotted to counterattack the
Mainland throughout his years in Taiwan. 123 However, a closer reading of his poetry, juxtaposed to
his actual policies, reveal them more as emotional outlets for expressing longing, bitterness, and
nostalgia due to the hopelessness of recovery. These militant verses usually depicted a fictional
struggle between Chinese legions and “barbarian” hordes rather than mentioning the Manchus
directly. Moreover, he often expressed resignation to his predicament within the same poems,
referring to the Ming as “a former dynasty from times past” and Beijing as the “old capital
(jiujing).”275 In the last line of one verse, after fantasizing about raising an army of brave warriors to
expel the invaders, he admits, ironically, “I look up to behold the imperial carriage [of his ruler], but
year after year, I still cannot see it.”276

272 Ibid.
273 “Zheng Jing,” in Quan Tai shi, ed. Shi Yilin et al., 130.
274
“Yanping
er wang
yiji,” 129.
123
Zhu
Shuangyi,
69.
275 “Zheng Jing,” 130, 166.
 More frequent in Zheng’s poems are his references to clothing, and its naturalization to Taiwan.
He noted, for instance, that “the imperial spirit is finished in the Central Plain, but gowns and caps
survive overseas.”126 He also spoke of “gowns and caps in the maritime kingdom,” where “various
affairs are managed by separate departments.” 127 He brought up fashion again in a celebration of
Taiwan’s sinicized landscape:
“The Pacified Capital has been established in the east of the great ocean. 277 Thousands of
mountains and hundreds of valleys stretch far across the sky. Fragrant forests twist and turn
toward outside the blue clouds, while water long flows within the green creeks. The people and
houses on both shores welcome the dawn, and fishing boats throughout the river sail with
morning winds. I have once heard that the ancient sages may find it difficult to say, but the
gowns and caps of the Han Country (Hanguo) is the same as all antiquity.”278

Zheng conjures up similar images and themes in another verse:

“The green sea’s waves flow from west to east. The new city’s lucky spirit pervades the realm.
I still entertain strong feelings for my former home, and the old country reappears in my dreams
during the middle of the night … Although the scenery of mountains and rivers here are
different, the pureness of the wind and glory of the moon are the same for tens of thousands of
li.”279

Zheng Jing’s poems reveal that Taiwan had become the primary focus of his rule, an independent
space where both hair and clothing could flourish safe from Qing mutilation.
Their preservation represented a defense of Han ethnic identity and institutions, of an entire
way of life that was, in turn, bolstered in terms of filial piety and loyalty. Zheng Jing must protect
the body handed down from his forefathers, just as he had to carry on the family business, and
defend and develop Taiwan. Moreover, being the island’s ruler, he had to show benevolence and
compassion for his people, to educate them and bring them prosperity. In this manner, the Zheng
regime was imagining a dynamic new legitimacy built upon a hierarchy of Confucian relationships
and obligations, culminating in loyalty to an ethnicity embodied in hair and clothing. Meanwhile, as
the prospect for restoration became increasingly remote, the memory of the Ming and geographic
“China” in general became decentered, objectified, and historicized. The marginalization of the
Ming princes and their supporters, and policies aimed at sinifying Taiwan, represented the concrete
embodiments of this discourse. Negotiations clarified and facilitated this process, and brought out
two means of institutionalizing this identity: private loyalty to a deceased Ming ruler within a

276 Ibid., 74-1. Besides the ones already cited, see, for
example, Ibid., 100, 110, 122, and 166. 126 “Yanping er wang yiji,”
129. 127 “Zheng Jing,” 130.
277 Literally, “setting the tripods (dingding).”
278 “Zheng Jing,” 127. In the last line, Zheng probably means that the ancient sages may have
never expected an overseas island to become a place of refuge for Han people and their customs.
279 Ibid., 136.
subordinate Qing vassal state or a “new universe outside the boundaries of the domain,” an
independent tianxia abroad.280
The Qing negotiators realized the connection between Confucian morality and Han ethnicity,
and tried to gain Zheng’s submission by “rewiring” these networks of relationships. In his letter
announcing Shengzu’s concessions, Mingju wrote:
“As for becoming a minister and paying tribute, since you already respect the institutions of the
empire, and settled upon the righteousness of ruler and minister, this is just like relations
between father and son. There has never been a father and son with different gowns and caps.
How can there be rulers and ministers with different ceremonial clothes? This matter of
shaving the hair is what you must follow respectfully with a single will, and must not allow for
any worries. Moreover, in staying on Taiwan, now we respectfully received word of the
Emperor’s intention to yield to your filial piety, and treat you according to the ceremonial status
of a king. Why, sir, do you not follow the distinction between ruler and minister? In this one
act, you can fulfill both loyalty and filial piety…”281

The Qing tried to harness Zheng’s desire to inherit his family’s legacy, and extend his filial piety and
loyalty to the Kangxi Emperor, as expressed in the shaving of hair.
Zheng Jing responded to Mingju by bringing up the example of past loyalists who went into
self-imposed exile because they refused to serve a second lord. He referred to Jizi, a legendary sage
and minister of the fallen Shang Dynasty (c. 1756-1050 BCE), who became enfeoffed in Korea by
King Wu of the newly established Western Zhou (c. 1050-771 BCE). 282 He pointed to Bo Yi and
Shu Qi, Shang ministers who hid on a mountain, preferring to eat wild grass and die of starvation
than accept Zhou food.283 He spoke of Tian Heng, “a mere commoner of Qi,” who refused to serve
the Western Han (202 BCE- 8 CE) after the fall of Qin, and supposedly fled with 500 of his
followers to an island off the coast of Shandong, where he proclaimed himself king.284
Zheng compared himself to Zhang Zhongjian, the famed Qiuran, or “Bearded Warrior,” who
“retreated from the Central Land” and seized the Fuyu Kingdom in Manchuria, so the Tang Dynasty
could enter its golden age.285 Like these men before him, Zheng accepted the shift in the Mandate of
Heaven, and went overseas to “be neighbors daily” with “mud dwellings and my soldiers” to avoid
interfering with the inevitable prosperity of the Qing. 137 In this manner, he used loyalty in the
creation of a “founding legend” for Taiwan.

280 Jiang Risheng, 255.

281 Ibid.
282 Ibid., 256. For more on Jizi and his enfeoffment, see Sima Qian, Xinjiaoben Shiji sanjiazhu
(Records of the Grand Historian: New Annotated Edition with Commentaries from Three Schools)
(Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1985), 1609-1611.
283 Jiang Risheng, 256 and Sima, 2121-2129.
284 Jiang Risheng, 257; Zheng Yiju, 23; Xia, 31; and Sima, 2646-2649.
285 Jiang Risheng,
257; Zheng Yiju, 23; Xia,
31. 137 Jiang Risheng, 257;
Zheng Yiju, 23; Xia, 31.
 For Zheng Jing, staying on the island and not changing customs became his regime’s core
identity. While the Qing faced a challenge from his assertion of Han values, the successful
consolidation of its rule, along with his intention to promote peaceful relations, seen in both his
words and actions, put it in the best position to grant his conditions with minimal risk. Yet, even if it
felt genuine concern with its own legitimacy, the court stubbornly clung to the demand for Zheng to
shave his hair without adding sufficiently attractive incentives to overcome his strong disinclination.
On the other hand, the Qing did not possess the coercive power to make him concede. Even though
it held an absolute military advantage over Zheng in terms of size, tax revenues, and manpower, it
lacked the relative ability to match his might on the sea. Instead of mobilizing its superior resources
to build a strong navy, the Qing disbanded its fleets out of suspicion for its collaborators, precisely
the people with expertise on naval matters.
As a result, Zheng Jing did not have to fear any negative consequences even if negotiations
failed. As he told Mingju, “Gowns and caps are what I have myself, and ranks and honors are also
what I possess. How can your words of ‘lavish titles and hereditary status’ move the heart of a
solitary overseas minister?”286 Even if Zheng willingly agreed to sacrifice what he already had, he
would still run into significant opposition from his influential elites, who were equally adamant
about preserving their hair and fashion. The Qing, too, realized that Zheng Jing “relied upon the
danger of the waves and could not be persuaded,” nor did it plan to make any further concessions. 287
The court finally withdrew its envoys and had completely abandoned the idea of an institutionalized
political settlement by the end of 1669.

From Maritime Expansion to Continental

Restoration
From 1670 to 1674, the two sides of the strait generally ignored each other, while enjoying
relative peace and flourishing, though covert, economic ties. 288 Zheng Jing would utilize this
opportunity to finalize his shift away from the Mainland. On the other hand, he involved his
organization within both the commerce and political intrigues of the Western Pacific maritime
world. As we have seen in the previous chapter, he welcomed merchants from around the region to
trade at Taiwan and signed a formal treaty with the EIC in 1670. During that year, he also began to
plan for a massive campaign against the Spanish in the Philippines, swayed by eager proponents
within his advisory bodies. Two of his division commanders, Yan Wangzhong and Yang Xiang,
offered to lead the expedition as a means of “expanding the land (guang difang).”289 By enlarging
its territory, the organization could acquire a broader base for agricultural and natural resource

286 Jiang Risheng, 257; Zheng Yiju, 23; Xia, 31.

287 Jiang Risheng, 257.
288 Xia, 37
289 Jiang Risheng, 259.
exploitation, and convert its already tremendous informal influence within a key trading hub of the
Western Pacific sea lanes into actual political control.
Even more importantly, the policy of expansion signaled a further step along the gradual
maturity of the organization’s ideological foundations, initially conceptualized and refined through
the course of the failed negotiations with the Qing. It combined and put into concrete action the
discourse of abstract Han ethnic identity and the establishment of a new “China” abroad. With
himself and his followers in exile, Zheng Jing no longer had to straddle the awkward divide between
continental and maritime, but could now fully cast his lot with the overseas Chinese population and
concentrate on his role as the protector of their interests. As English records show, the prime
motivation for his planned campaign on Manila arose from his anger at “severall wrongs done to the
Chinamen there.”290 Indeed, the Spanish ruled over their colony with an iron grip, and initiated
several bloody massacres of the Chinese at Manila throughout the seventeenth century, killing up to
tens of thousands in response both to revolts and perceived plots at uprising. 291 By fulfilling the
moral aim of ending Spanish mistreatment, Zheng was rechanneling resistance against the Manchu
“barbarians” on the Mainland into a broader struggle against foreign domination and oppression
overseas. In this sense, he began to reconstruct and reinterpret Chenggong’s previous relations with
the Dutch and invasion of Taiwan not just as a transfer and recentering of the Ming, but also the first
step in the creation of a new maritime empire. Continental discourse now had the potential to merge
with his maritime orientation to bring his organization outside of “China.”
Zheng Jing and his key officials appeared to have been carefully putting their ideas into action
over the next four years, from 1670 until 1674. Most of his purchases of large quantities of firearms
and ammunition from the EIC served to further his “designe to make himselfe master of all those
islands” of the Philippines.292 The Spanish would soon learn that Zheng had “harnessed a grand
armada to come over to these isles.” 293 Deeply anxious, they even sent a ship to the Dutch governor
of Ternate, going as far as to buy powder and ammunition from a bitter enemy to defend the colony
against attack.294 As the English noted, Zheng would have most likely succeeded had he initiated the
campaign, “there being soe many Chynees within & without the citty” of Manila, akin to the
situation in Dutch Taiwan on the eve of Chenggong’s invasion.295
290 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 68.
291 Although the Spanish depended upon the Chinese for the luxuries and essential goods and
services that only they could provide, the colonial authorities remained highly suspicious of their
actions. For instance, the Spanish killed over 20,000 Chinese in 1603 and again in 1632. See Andrade,
“Conclusion,” 7. In late 1662, after the Chinese at Manila rose up in revolt in expectation of Zheng
Chenggong’s imminent invasion of the city, the colonial authorities savagely put down the rebellion
and carried out another systematic massacre. See Carioti, 50-51.
292 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 164.
293 Borao Mateo et al., vol. 2, 658.
294 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 117.
295
Chang
Hsiu-jung
et al., 104.
148
Liu
Fengyun,
153-166.
 However, the outbreak of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Qing on the
Mainland completely changed the geopolitical equation. This internal uprising occurred as a result
of the young Kangxi Emperor’s desire to consolidate his power over the empire. Fearing that his
vassals would pose a fatal long-term threat to the court with their huge, semi-independent power
bases and personal armies, he decided to strip them of their territorial holdings. 148 Accordingly,
when an aging Shang Kexi sought permission to retire in April 1673, Shengzu granted his request.
At the same time, the emperor prohibited his son, Zhixin, from succeeding to the post and, instead,
abolished the Feudatory of Guangdong. In response, the two other satraps sent out feelers to the
court by asking for the same “favor” of retiring. When the Kangxi Emperor actually accepted their
resignation, Wu Sangui refused to comply and rose up in rebellion. In April 1674, Geng Jingzhong,
the son of Geng Jimao, who had died in 1671, joined the insurrection, followed by a disgruntled
Shang Zhixin two years later. 296 The three feudatories, possessing bountiful land and resources,
easily managed to overwhelm government forces and sweep across the southwest, southeast, and
northwest. Qing commanders, one after another, cast their lot with the insurgents and swelled their
ranks. By early 1676, well over half of the empire lay under rebel control.297
In Taiwan, the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories resulted in a radical turnaround in political
discourse. Until late 1673, Zheng Jing simply had no intention of getting involved in Mainland
affairs; “hee will not suffer [his soldiers] to returne to China.” 298 Instead, he continued to eagerly
anticipate the arrival of “an ambassador from the King of China…expected here for a treaty of
peace,” even after negotiations with the Qing court had broken down in 1669. 299 As long as the
Mainland remained securely under Qing control, with no realistic hope of returning, his civil and
military officials supported, at least grudgingly, his plans to invade the Philippines. However, the
contingency of the rebellion reactivated the latent sentiments for restoration among his followers, by
making “China” as concrete geographic entity once again tangible and realistic. Around this time,
Feng Xifan, a crucial member of Zheng Jing’s advisory body, came out in open opposition to further
overseas expansion. Since the Philippines, he argued, already submitted tribute to Taiwan, any
military action would “have no moral basis and lose the hearts of men from afar.” 300 On a more
practical level, it would severely harm the prosperity and stable economic development achieved by
the organization in Taiwan over the past decade. Feng added that even if the campaign proved
successful, Zheng would overextend his forces to occupy a land of very little value in terms of
natural resources.301
The arrival of the envoy Huang Yong, dispatched from Fuzhou by Geng Jingzhong, on
Taiwan in early 1674 further increased the attractiveness and urgency of a Mainland campaign. 302
Geng had sent along a message promising to grant Zheng all the coastal Fujianese prefectures that

296 Ibid., 181-206.

297 Ibid., 206-213.
298 Chang Hsiu-jung et al., 68.
299 Ibid., 64.
300 Jiang Risheng, 259.
301 Ibid.
302 Xia, 39.
Chenggong had once occupied in exchange for the backing of his navy. Geng wanted Jing to
“advance by water,” while he himself “went forward on land. Would these not be sufficient to
pacify Jiangnan and Zhejiang?”303 Pressure and persuasion from both subordinates and the camps of
the feudatories would convince Zheng to cut short his designs on the Philippines and redirect all of
his mobilized fleets and weapons toward the Mainland coast. His own intense hatred for the
Manchus also played a huge role, as evident from his poem, entitled “Singing Joyously upon
Hearing of the Recovery of the West,” which celebrated the outbreak of the rebellion:

“Once I heard the news, all the colors seemed to move. I was filled with happiness but also felt
surprise in my heart. I want to help sweep clean the camps seething with the stink of mutton,
and completely recover Beijing and Nanjing.304 We can reopen again the path of tributary
kingdoms and rebuild the surrendered cities.”158

In April 1674, Zheng Jing left Chen Yonghua in charge of Taiwan’s affairs, and led the bulk of the
organization’s forces to Xiamen and Jinmen, where he formally reestablished his main bases and
proudly proclaimed the calendar year of Yongli 28. 305 Feng Xifan, the same individual who had
adamantly rejected a move on Manila in the name of preserving Taiwan’s peaceful development,
would now spearhead the offensive against the Qing.306
The events on the Mainland had evidently caught Zheng Jing completely unprepared and
necessitated an abrupt turnaround from his previous maritime orientation. In early May, Filipino
Governor de León suddenly received a letter from Zheng assuring him of “friendship, saying that
the movement and restrictions on people and boats that had been undertaken [on Taiwan] would be
against the Tartar with whom he had declared war.” 307 As we have seen, however, Zheng’s original
mobilization of soldiers and ships could have only targeted the Philippines. In fact, he was once
again transforming his discourse to support his complete tilt back toward the Ming restoration
movement. Soon after his arrival at Xiamen, he issued an open proclamation to the entire empire in
which he called for “upholding together the Great Ming civilization and completely recovering the
Han universe.”308 He also restored the great honor and reverence that he had taken away from Zhu
Shugui during the decade on Taiwan, and sent him across the strait to reside on the Mainland. 309 At
the same time, Zheng excused his previous policies by comparing himself to Gou Jian, ruler of the
Warring States kingdom of Yue, who kept a low profile for years as he secretly prepared to take
revenge upon his enemy, the king of Wu.164 This final shift in rhetoric would provide the basis for
Zheng Jing’s later image as an unwavering Ming loyalist who never ceased his preparations to fight

303 Ibid., 40.

304 The “stink of mutton” (xingshan) refers to the foul body odor supposedly emitted
by the meat-eating “barbarians.” 158 “Zheng Jing,” 156.
305 Jiang Risheng, 263 and Xia, 41.
306 Ruan 45-46 and Xia, 40.
307 Borao Mateo, 660.
308 Xia, 39.
309 Shen Binghu, Chonglin yuce (The Jade Volume of
Chonglin), TWWXHK, 1.1 (2004), 192. 164 Kawaguchi, 59.
against the Manchus even while in exile, a narrative conveniently appropriated by nationalist
discourse.

Collapse and Surrender

From 1675 to 1680, Zheng Jing launched a massive offensive on the Mainland that saw his
forces occupying most of Fujian and Guangdong. At first, his reappearance provided a major boost
to his movement, as many of his former soldiers and commanders, who had already surrendered to
the Qing, flocked to join his ranks. 310 Once again, geographic and cultural “Chineseness” became
reconciled through the uneasy union of macroregional interests with
“empire-wide” priorities, and the marginalization of the overseas trading networks. However,
Zheng Jing could not hold onto the territories that he had occupied for long. Although his forces
defeated the Manchus in battle after battle, major tactical errors and miscalculations prevented them
from winning the war.311 Moreover, mistrust soon developed between Zheng and Geng, resulting in
bitter infighting between the two that, in large part, contributed to the latter’s surrender to the
Manchus in 1676 out of desperation and disgust. During this period, Zheng Jing and the Qing
continued to hold talks on an almost annual basis. Ironically, the Qing representatives of this period
appropriated his former negotiating position, allowing him to preserve his hair and granting him
tributary status if he would only leave the Mainland completely. However, the talks failed every
time due to the stubborn refusal of him and his main advisors, particularly Feng Xifan, to abandon
the captured coastal territories.312
Zheng’s return to the Mainland would also tremendously harm the organization in economic
terms, drawing away much-needed manpower from the military colonies of labor-scarce Taiwan to
fight a formidable adversary that commanded the agrarian resources of an entire continent. At the
same time, the island had to become the primary supplier of grain and other basic provisions for the
soldiers on the other side of strait during the rebellion, since the marginal coastal areas they
occupied produced very little.313 As a result, taxes had become increasingly numerous by the early
1680s, and were being levied upon every single item imaginable on Taiwan, even, for instance, on
the number of rooms in houses. Many residents destroyed part of their dwellings to avoid this
onerous burden.314 Zheng’s return to the Mainland coast certainly put him in a better position to
access the lucrative markets in the continental interior, but almost constant warfare with the Qing
frequently disrupted the supply lines, leading to far greater fluctuation and risk. In fact, the
available data hint at a slight decline in the scale of trade from the previous decade. 315 The
310 Xia, 40.
311 Wong Young-tsu, 162.
312 For a detailed summary of these negotiations, a total of five rounds, see Zhuang Jinde, “Zheng-Qing heyi shimo,” 28-34 and
Chen Jiexian, 110-117.
313 Ruan, 47.
314 Xia, 73.
315 Although we lack specific figures, we can get a sense of this decline by taking the mean of
the number of ships sailing to Japan each year. Over the ten-year period from 1674 to 1683, an annual
campaign, then, appeared to be an ill-planned and foolhardy decision to drastically increase his
expenditures while decreasing the certainty of his revenues. The decline of income from trade and
the land, his two main pillars, forced Zheng Jing to revert to plunder and other forms of extralegal
extraction to fund his war effort on the severely resource-deficient Fujian coast. 316
Meanwhile, the Qing gradually turned the tide against the feudatories, forcing Geng Jingzhong
and Shang Zhixin to surrender and pushing Wu Sangui’s forces further into the southwest. Wu died
in 1680 from dysentery, and, a year later, Qing troops entered his headquarters at Kunming, in
Yunnan Province, and captured and executed his son and successor. 317 As the flames of rebellion
were gradually quelled elsewhere, Shengzu could now turn his entire attention toward the
eradication of Zheng Jing. In close coordination with two trusted confidants he had appointed to
Fujian, Governor-General Yao Qisheng (1624-1684) and Governor Wu Xingzuo, he adopted a three-
pronged strategy that would deliver the final death blow to the organization. In 1679, Shengzu
authorized a second evacuation of the coastline, ordering the construction of a huge, continuous wall
from Funing to Zhaoan, or the entire length of the province. 318 The same year, Yao Qisheng
established a “Hall for Reform and Return (Xiulaiguan)” on the outskirts of Zhangzhou that offered
generous ranks and monetary rewards for any Zheng follower who submitted. 319 Already pressed
hard by shortages of food and provisions, Zheng commanders and soldiers defected en masse, at a
rate of several hundred per day. 320 By 1680, a total of fifteen major commanders, 500 officials, and
over 30,000 soldiers had come over to the Qing side.321
Even more importantly, the Kangxi Emperor reestablished the Fujian naval command, and
ordered the construction of fighting vessels and the manufacture of armaments for a fleet to be
equipped and sent into action as soon as possible. After two years of frantic building, the Qing
could finally boast a formidable navy consisting of 240 junks, fifty supporting boats, and over
50,000 men.322 The sailors who manned these vessels would primarily come from the ranks of the
defected Zheng troops. On March 6 of the same year, this naval force, led by Admiral Wan
Zhengse, directly confronted the bulk of the Zheng fleet under the command of Zhu Tiangui at
Haitan Island. When the smoke cleared, Wan had undoubtedly carried the day. Keeping up his
momentum, he succeeded in routing another rival detachment on March 20 in the waters outside
Chongwu.323 With these two dramatic victories, the Zheng resistance quickly collapsed, as Zheng
average of 8.8 junks arrived at Nagasaki from Taiwan and the Mainland coast, compared to 10.1 over
the previous decade. See Zheng Ruiming, 72.
316 For more on the increasingly desperate measures to secure resources and provisions, see Xia, 60; Ruan, 52; and Zheng Yiju,
32.
317 Liu Fengyun, 305-308.
318 Xia, 59.
319 Military commanders turning themselves in would be guaranteed an equivalent rank in the Qing bureaucracy. Moreover, the
Qing offered them and the common rank-and-file gifts of silver along the following pay scale: “3 taels for long hair, 1.5 for half-
long, 0.8 for short.” The length of the hair supposedly marked the years of service under the Zheng organization. See Peng, 89-
90 and Wills, “Contingent Connections,” 195.
320 Peng 90.
321 Zhuang Jinde, “Zheng-Qing heyi shimo,” 32.
322 Chen Zaizheng, Taiwan haijiangshi yanjiu (Historical Research on the Taiwan Maritime Frontier) (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue
chubanshe, 2002), 58-59.
323 Wong Young-tsu, 165.
Jing and his commanders hastily abandoned their remaining Mainland possessions of Haicheng,
Xiamen, and Jinmen, and fled back to Taiwan. Crushed and forlorn, Zheng retired to a mansion on
the outskirts of Chengtian, where he reverted to his earlier debauchery, whiling away his days
intoxicated with wine and women. He would soon die of these excesses in the early winter of
1681.324
Taking advantage of a fierce succession struggle in the wake of Zheng’s death, the Kangxi
Emperor decided to launch an expedition on Taiwan to exterminate the organization once and for
all. In 1681, he recalled Shi Lang from retirement in Beijing and reappointed him to his former post
as head of the Fujian Navy. Two years later, Shi set sail along with a formidable expeditionary force
consisting of 300 ships and 21,000 soldiers.325 On July 9, 1683, they engaged the Zheng navy under
Liu Guoxuan at Penghu, Taiwan’s first line of defense. After a week of intense fighting, the Qing
navy won a decisive victory, nearly obliterating Liu’s 200 junks and 20,000 soldiers. 326 When news
of the fateful battle reached Taiwan, its thirteen-year-old ruler Zheng Keshuang, who had just
succeeded his father Jing, lost the will to fight. Together with Liu, Feng Xifan, and other civil and
military officials, he surrendered unconditionally to the Qing on September 1, 1683. All of his
followers signaled their submission to the new dynasty by returning to the Mainland, shaving their
heads, and adopting its style of dress. Zheng Keshuang and Feng Xifan would live out the
remainder of their lives in Beijing, where they joined the Eight Banners and received honorary titles.
Liu Guoxuan was appointed to the post of Garrison Commander of Tianjin, a position he held until
his death.182 The Zheng resistance, which had lasted for almost 40 years, came to an end. Taiwan

324 Ibid.
325 Ibid., 173.
3
26

C
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e
n
Z
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z
h
e
n
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6.
18

P
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became formally incorporated into the Qing Empire, marking the complete redefinition of
geographic and cultural “Chineseness” according to Manchu ethnic characteristics.