Dora
Dora
DORA Regulation
Its full name is “Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial
sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014,
(EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011,” and it was published on 14 December 2022.
Since DORA is a regulation, this means that it directly applies to practically any financial
entity in the European Union — in other words, EU Member States do not need to publish
their own regulations on cybersecurity for the financial sector, since financial
organizations must comply directly with DORA.
DORA is important because it introduces the same level of cybersecurity and digital
resilience to all financial entities in all EU countries — this way, cybersecurity and
continuity of banks, insurance companies, and other financial organizations will be the
same across all EU countries.
You can also find the full text here, arranged by chapters and articles, and with the ability
to search by keyword: Full Text of DORA Regulation.
The DORA regulation has 64 articles structured in the following nine chapters:
DORA was published in December 2022, and it applies starting January 17, 2025.
This means that all financial organizations and their IT suppliers must be compliant from
January 2025.
But what is interesting is that smaller financial organizations have to comply with different
parts of DORA compared to other financial entities, and even more interesting is that IT
companies that provide their services to financial organizations need to be compliant as
well.
In its Article 2, DORA specifies that it applies to almost all financial entities in all EU
countries:
• credit institutions
• payment institutions
• account information service providers
• electronic money institutions
• investment firms
• crypto-asset service providers
• central securities depositories
• central counterparties
• trading venues
• trade repositories
• managers of alternative investment funds
• management companies
• data reporting service providers
• insurance and reinsurance undertakings
• insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance
intermediaries
• institutions for occupational retirement provision
• credit rating agencies
• administrators of critical benchmarks
• crowdfunding service providers
• securitisation repositories
However, there are differences between what smaller financial organizations need to
comply with when compared to other financial organizations.
Out of the financial organizations listed above, the following sub-groups have a little bit
easier job of complying with DORA:
These smaller organizations must comply with the “simplified ICT risk management
framework” that is specified in DORA’s Article 16 and in TITLE III of CDR 2024-1774
Technical standards specifying ICT risk management tools, methods, processes, and
policies and the simplified ICT risk management framework. In other words, these smaller
financial entities do not need to comply with the whole Chapter II ICT risk management
like the other financial organizations.
However, smaller financial organizations must comply with other parts of DORA in the
same way as all the other organizations.
IT companies that provide services to financial organizations in the European Union must
comply with requirements specified in Chapter V Managing of ICT third-party risk.
In particular, all IT service providers must be compliant with security standards, and follow
specific contractual obligations; however, if a service provider is designated as critical, then
the requirements are much stricter.
See sections below to find out which IT companies need to comply with DORA, and how.
Please keep in mind these are requirements from the point of view of financial
organizations and their IT suppliers that need to comply with DORA, not from the
viewpoint of competent authorities (i.e., government bodies in charge of enforcing this
regulation).
The requirements for ICT risk management are described in DORA’s Chapter II, and in
CDR 2024/1774 Regulatory technical standards specifying ICT risk management tools,
methods, processes, and policies and the simplified ICT risk management framework;
altogether 54 articles in 42 pages — a lot to take in.
DORA has structured the ICT risk management requirements in the following way:
The ICT risk management requirements specified above would probably be overwhelming
for smaller financial organizations, which is why DORA has specified a “lighter” version of
ICT risk management for such entities.
This simplified ICT risk management framework is specified in DORA’s Article 16 and in
Title III of CDR 2024/1774 Regulatory technical standards specifying ICT risk management
tools, methods, processes, and policies and the simplified ICT risk management
framework.
The simplified framework follows a very similar structure to the “regular” ICT risk
management specified in DORA’s Chapter II, with the main difference being that the
requirements are not as detailed nor as strict.
DORA dedicates the whole of chapter Chapter III to management, classification, and
reporting of incidents and threats. It requires setting up an incident management
process, defines criteria for classifying incidents and threats, and defines how they need to
be reported.
Similar to requirements in NIS 2, financial entities need to submit the following incident
reports to competent authorities: initial notification, intermediate report, and a final report;
further, they need to inform them about significant cyber threats. Financial organizations
also need to inform their clients of any major ICT-related incidents or significant cyber
threats.
In its Chapter IV, DORA requires financial entities to execute a digital operational resilience
testing program that includes “a range of assessments, tests, methodologies, practices
and tools.”
The tests need to be performed at least once a year on all ICT systems supporting critical
or important functions. According to Article 25, those tests could include “vulnerability
assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap
analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source
code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance
testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing.”
Article 26 introduces the concept of Threat-Led Penetration Testing (TLPT) that needs to
be carried out at least once every three years, and provides detailed rules for such testing.
DORA specifies very strict rules on how financial entities need to handle their IT providers,
in order to reduce third-party risks. Those rules include adopting a strategy on ICT third-
party risk and a policy on the use of ICT services, regular review of third-party risks, and
preparing an exit strategy (Article 28).
Finally, in its article (Article 30), DORA specifies minimum contractual clauses that need to
be included in agreements with ICT third-party providers.
3.6. Requirements for ICT service providers and their oversight by the
government
ICT third-party providers that provide their services to financial organizations need to
comply with security standards, and with specific contractual requirements. If those
service providers are designated as critical, then there are a lot more requirements they
have to comply with.
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) will appoint a Lead Overseer for each ICT third-
party provider that is classified as critical. According to Article 33, the purpose of the Lead
Lead Overseers have the right of full access to any information from ICT third-party
providers, and they can conduct investigations and issue recommendations, as well as
enforce fines and other penalties.
Although Chapter VI is the shortest chapter in DORA, it might introduce quite big
changes in how threat intelligence is handled.
It specifies the baseline for exchange of cyber threat information and intelligence, and the
role of competent authorities and IT service providers.
According to regulations referenced in Article 46, for the majority of financial entities that
need to be compliant with DORA, EU Member States designate competent authorities
that supervise and enforce financial regulations.
There are a couple of exceptions, where EU authorities directly supervise and enforce
financial regulations:
• For credit institutions classified as significant - the European Central Bank (ECB)
• For securitisation repositories - the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA)
For financial entities, DORA does not specify minimum fines — rather, it gives the freedom
to Member States to define their own fines in their countries. It does, however, specify
other penalties that can be enacted by competent authorities, including giving orders to
stop activities not compliant with DORA, defining any measures to make sure entities are
compliant with DORA, and issuing public notices.
For critical ICT third-party service providers, DORA specifies a fine of up to 1% of their
worldwide annual turnover. Further, the Lead Overseer (the body that supervises critical
service providers) must issue public notice that reveals the name of the service provider
that was fined.
From our experience, the following 18 steps will enable you to comply with DORA
efficiently. Before reading the steps, a couple of important notes:
• The steps below are designed for financial organizations, whereas for IT companies
that need to comply with DORA, see section “Which IT companies need to comply
with DORA, and how?”
• In its Article 16, DORA specifies special rules for smaller financial organizations
called the “simplified ICT risk management framework” — nevertheless, even for
such smaller organizations, the 18 steps listed below are valid, the only difference
being that the requirements might be somewhat less strict. See which financial
entities qualify for simplified risk management in the section “Who must comply
with the DORA regulation?”
First, since your financial entity probably already does comply with many DORA
requirements, it is useful to find out what are you missing.
Once you know your gap, you can decide which of the following steps are applicable to
you.
Even though compliance with DORA is mandatory, you still might have problems with
implementing various aspects of it — this is why it is important to have formal approval
from the top management for the project, together with enough time, people, and
budget to implement it.
This way, you will be able to overcome most of the problems that you will face during the
project.
Since DORA and its related Commission Delegated Regulations are quite complex, you
should train the project team at the very early stage of the project. In the beginning, it
makes sense to start with introductory topics on DORA, and later on focus on specific
DORA requirements.
This way, you will have a knowledgeable team of people that will execute the project in a
much more efficient way.
In its Article 5, DORA is quite specific regarding the responsibilities of the senior
management, and how to set up the governance of ICT risks. This includes setting up
policies, roles, and responsibilities; approving the strategy, audit plans, and budget; setting
up reporting channels, etc.
Such governance is the foundation upon which the ICT risk management is built.
Article 6 specifies what the risk management framework looks like — according to it, you
need to establish appropriate “… strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools
that are necessary to duly and adequately protect all information assets and ICT assets.”
This kind of documented framework will enable you to perform the next steps, starting
with risk assessment and treatment.
In its Article 8, DORA requires financial organizations to “identify, classify and adequately
document all ICT supported business functions, roles and responsibilities, the information
assets and ICT assets supporting those functions, and their roles and dependencies,” and,
on top of this, to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks.
Further, it requires classifying those assets that are considered critical, and identifying if
ICT third-party service providers support any critical or important functions.
These will probably take the longest time to implement, but this is, in fact, the core of
cybersecurity.
Articles 11 and 12 are oriented towards business continuity, and include a top-level ICT
business continuity policy, business impact analysis (BIA), response and recovery plans,
crisis management and communication, and testing, but also backup and restoration.
These measures are a bit more abstract than the cybersecurity measures from the
previous step, but are nevertheless equally important, especially when a financial
organization needs to deal with larger incidents.
DORA recognizes that managing supply chain risk is of greatest importance, because it
introduces a government oversight of critical IT service providers, although financial
organizations are not directly impacted by such oversight.
Articles 5, 13, and 16 require financial organizations to set up regular training and
awareness for all employees, including the senior management. Articles 13 and 30 go a
step further, and require financial entities to “include ICT third-party service providers in
their relevant training schemes.”
This step is pretty obvious — with all these complex rules and requirements, it would be
hard to expect that people would follow them without being trained and aware.
Despite all the (preventive) cybersecurity measures, it will be impossible to avoid every
incident — this is why the response to them needs to be effective, and all interested
parties need to be informed.
The whole Chapter IV is dedicated to digital operational resilience testing and requires
“the execution of appropriate tests, such as vulnerability assessments and scans, open
source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews,
questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible,
scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing, end-to-end testing and
penetration testing,” “for the purpose of assessing preparedness for handling ICT-related
incidents, of identifying weaknesses, deficiencies and gaps in digital operational resilience,
and of promptly implementing corrective measures.” This also includes the “Threat-Led
Penetration Testing.”
This kind of testing is crucial in order to find out what the real situation is. The internal
audit explained in step #16 has a similar purpose, but is done in a different way.
This way, the management can react quickly and appropriately to any trend or risk.
Articles 5 and 6 require financial entities to perform regular internal audits by auditors that
have enough independence, and “sufficient knowledge, skills and expertise in ICT risk.”
Such audits are crucial to find out what the reality is in a company, because very often
policies and procedures define one thing, but in reality employees might be doing
something very different.
Article 5 specifies several review activities that need to be performed regularly by the
senior management — these include reviewing the business continuity policy, response
and recovery plans, policy for the use of third-party ICT services, various reports, internal
audits, digital resilience budget, etc.
Such reviews are crucial, because this is how the senior management is informed about
key risks and activities related to cybersecurity and resilience.
Follow-up actions and corrective measures are mentioned in different contexts in DORA
— e.g., Article 6 requires a follow-up process after an internal audit, Article 17 requires a
follow-up after incidents, Article 24 requires corrective measures after digital operational
resilience testing, while Article 30 requires corrective actions to be included in the
contracts with IT suppliers.
All of these are crucial for ICT risk management to be continually improved and,
consequently, digital operational resilience to be raised to a better level.
The table below maps each relevant requirement from DORA with documents that are
the best suited to cover those requirements.
* “Smaller” financial organizations are the following entities (these are the ones that must
go for the simplified ICT risk management framework according to DORA Article 16):
** “Microenterprises” are those financial entities that employ fewer than 10 persons and
have an annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total that does not exceed 2 million
euros.
DORA Article
5(2)(c) Information Security
Establish appropriate governance
CDR All except smaller Policy + all documents
arrangements
2024/1774 listed in this column
Title II
DORA Article
Approve, oversee and periodically 5(2)(e)
ICT Business Continuity
review the implementation of ICT CDR All except smaller
Policy
business continuity policy 2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
5(2)(f)
Approve and periodically review ICT
CDR All except smaller Internal Audit Program
internal audit plan
2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
5(2)(g)
Allocate and periodically review the Digital Operational
CDR All except smaller
appropriate budget Resilience Strategy
2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
Approve and periodically review policy
5(2)(h)
on arrangements regarding the use of
CDR All except smaller Supplier Security Policy
ICT services provided by ICT third-
2024/1774
party service providers
Title II
DORA Article
Minimise the impact of ICT risk by
6(3) Information Security
deploying appropriate strategies,
CDR All except smaller Policy + all documents
policies, procedures, ICT protocols and
2024/1774 listed in this column
tools
Title II
DORA Article
Assign the responsibility for managing 6(4) All except smaller
Information Security
and overseeing ICT risk to a control CDR and
Policy
function 2024/1774 microenterprises
Title II
DORA Article
Ensure appropriate segregation and
6(4)
independence of ICT risk Information Security
CDR All except smaller
management functions, control Policy
2024/1774
functions, and internal audit functions
Title II
DORA Article
6(5)
The ICT risk management framework Information Security
CDR All except smaller
shall be documented and reviewed Policy
2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
The ICT risk management framework 6(6) All except smaller Information Security
shall be subject to internal audit by CDR and Policy + Internal Audit
auditors on a regular basis 2024/1774 microenterprises Procedure
Title II
DORA Article
Internal auditors shall possess
6(6) All except smaller
sufficient knowledge, skills and Internal Audit
CDR and
expertise in ICT risk, as well as Procedure
2024/1774 microenterprises
appropriate independence
Title II
DORA Article
Establish a formal follow-up process,
6(7) Internal Audit
including rules for the timely
CDR All except smaller Procedure + Procedure
verification and remediation of critical
2024/1774 for Corrective Actions
ICT audit findings
Title II
DORA Article
Risk Management
Review on a regular basis, and at least 8(2)
Methodology + Risk
yearly, the risk scenarios impacting CDR All except smaller
Assessment Table / Risk
them. 2024/1774
Register
Title II
DORA Article
Continuously monitor and control the 9(1)
Logging and
security and functioning of ICT CDR All except smaller
Monitoring Procedure
systems and tools 2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
Have appropriate and comprehensive 9(4)(f) Vulnerability and Patch
documented policies for patches and CDR All except smaller Management
updates 2024/1774 Procedure
Title II
DORA Article
11(2)(d)
Estimate preliminary impacts, Business Continuity
CDR All except smaller
damages and losses Plan
2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
Regularly review ICT business 11(6)
ICT Business Continuity
continuity policy and ICT response and CDR All except smaller
Policy
recovery plans 2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
Report to the competent authorities
11(10) All except smaller
an estimation of aggregated annual Incident Handling
CDR and
costs and losses caused by major ICT- Policy
2024/1774 microenterprises
related incidents
Title II
DORA Article
Develop and document backup
12(1)
policies and procedures, and Backup Policy + Backup
CDR All except smaller
restoration and recovery procedures Restoration Procedure
2024/1774
and methods
Title II
DORA Article
Testing of the backup procedures and
12(2)
restoration and recovery procedures Backup Restoration
CDR All except smaller
and methods must be undertaken Procedure
2024/1774
periodically
Title II
DORA Article
Maintain redundant ICT capacities
12(4)
equipped with resources, capabilities Digital Operational
CDR All except smaller
and functions that are adequate to Resilience Strategy
2024/1774
ensure business needs
Title II
DORA Article
When recovering from an ICT-related
12(7)
incident, perform necessary checks, Incident Handling
CDR All except smaller
including any multiple checks and Policy
2024/1774
reconciliations
Title II
DORA Article
Implement communication policies 14(2)
Crisis Management
for internal staff and for external CDR All except smaller
Plan
stakeholders 2024/1774
Title II
DORA Article
16(1)(b)
Continuously monitor the security and Logging and
CDR Only smaller
functioning of all ICT systems Monitoring Procedure
2024/1774
Title III
DORA Article
Minimise the impact of ICT risk
16(1)(c) All documents specified
through the use of sound, resilient and
CDR Only smaller for smaller financial
updated ICT systems, protocols and
2024/1774 organizations
tools
Title III
DORA Article
16(1)(e)
Identify key dependencies on ICT
CDR Only smaller Supplier Security Policy
third-party service providers
2024/1774
Title III
Business Continuity
Ensure the continuity of critical or Plan + Disruptive
DORA Article
important functions, through business Incident Response
16(1)(f)
continuity plans and response and Plan + Activity Recovery
CDR Only smaller
recovery measures, which include, at Plan for (activity
2024/1774
least, back-up and restoration name) + ICT Disaster
Title III
measures Recovery Plan + Backup
Restoration Procedure
DORA Article
Test, on a regular basis, the plans and 16(1)(g)
Exercising and Testing
measures, as well as the effectiveness CDR Only smaller
Plan
of the controls implemented 2024/1774
Title III
DORA Article
Classify ICT-related incidents and 18(1) Incident Handling
All
determine their impact CDR Policy
2024/1772
I’m aware that the list above is very extensive; however, DORA did not mention some
documents that are quite common when managing cybersecurity:
In effect, such IT companies must comply with certain elements of DORA — the text
below explains which IT companies fall under the scope of DORA, and what exactly is
required of them.
Therefore, all IT and telecom companies that provide their services to financial entities on
an ongoing basis (with the exception of analogue telephone services) must be compliant
with DORA.
All ICT third-party service providers that provide services for financial organizations must
comply with the following:
Compliance with security standards. According to Article 28, financial organizations can
use services only from companies complying with appropriate information security
standards — even through DORA does not say which standards, this will probably go in
the direction of ISO 27001 and the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme.
According to Article 31, a critical ICT third-party service provider is designated as such
according to the following criteria:
They decide who is critical based on the criteria listed above, and based on a document
that describes these criteria in more detail: CDR 2024/1502 - The criteria for the
designation of ICT third-party service providers as critical for financial entities.
On top of the requirements specified above, DORA requires critical ICT service providers to
comply with a lot more:
Oversight by government bodies. Article 31 specifies that critical service providers are
subject to oversight activities by a Lead Overseer, which is appointed by European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs).
According to Article 33, the purpose of the Lead Overseer is to continually assess whether
such an IT provider has in place “comprehensive, sound and effective rules, procedures,
mechanisms and arrangements to manage the ICT risk which it may pose to financial
entities.”
Paying for the supervision. Article 43 specifies that the supervision comes with a cost,
and that the Lead Overseer calculates this cost every year. According to CDR 2024/1505
The amount of the oversight fees to be charged by the Lead Overseer to critical ICT third-
party service providers and the way in which those fees are to be paid, the minimum
annual fee is 50,000 euros.
Supervision access. According to Article 39, the IT service provider needs to allow the
Lead Overseer to “enter in, and conduct all necessary onsite inspections on, any business
premises, land or property of the ICT third-party service providers, such as head offices,
operation centres, secondary premises, as well as to conduct off-site inspections.”
Supervision elements. According to Article 33, the Lead Overseer must check the
following:
Documentation and evidence. According to Article 37, the Lead Overseer may require
the following documentation and evidence: “all relevant business or operational
documents, contracts, policies, documentation, ICT security audit reports, ICT-related
Additional contractual obligations. Article 30 specifies that financial entities must sign
agreements with specific clauses for critical service providers, including:
• precise quantitative and qualitative performance targets within the agreed service
levels
• notice periods and reporting obligations
• implementing and testing business contingency plans
• have in place ICT security measures, tools, and policies that provide an appropriate
level of security for the provision of services by the financial entity
• participate and fully cooperate in the threat-led penetration testing of a financial
entity
• unrestricted rights of access, inspection, and audit by the financial entity
• obligation to fully cooperate during the onsite inspections and audits
• continuing to provide the ICT services during a period of cancellation of the
agreement
• allowing the financial entity to migrate to another ICT third-party service provider
Treatment of non-EU suppliers. Article 31 says that if the critical service provider is based
in a non-EU country, then it must establish a subsidiary within the EU.
Article 36 specifies that the Lead Overseer may exercise the powers “on any premises
located in a third-country which is owned, or used in any way, for the purposes of
providing services to Union financial entities, by a critical ICT third-party service provider.”
Fines and penalties. In its Article 35, DORA is quite specific on fines that critical ICT third-
party service providers need to pay if they are not compliant: This is up to 1% of their
worldwide annual turnover, and the amount of the fine depends on the number of days
that the service provider was not compliant. Further, the Lead Overseer must issue a
public notice that reveals the name of the service provider that was fined.
Article 42 specifies perhaps the worst penalty — a competent authority can require a
financial organization that is a client of an IT service provider that is not compliant with
DORA to stop using their services.
See also: ISO 27001 Implementation Guide: Checklist of Steps, Timing, and Costs Involved.
The text below specifies what those DORA requirements are, and suggests how to
organize effective training and awareness according to this EU regulation.
To start, what exactly does DORA require? There are several articles in DORA that
prescribe training and awareness for financial organizations:
As mentioned earlier, DORA specifies that ICT suppliers of financial organizations also
need to go for training and awareness — basically, this training needs to be arranged by
the financial organization:
• Article 13(6) says that “where appropriate, financial entities shall also include ICT
third-party service providers in their relevant training schemes in accordance with
Article 30(2), point (i).”
• Article 30(2) point (i) goes a step further and says that “the contractual
arrangements on the use of ICT services shall include at least the following
elements: … the conditions for the participation of ICT third-party service providers
in the financial entities’ ICT security awareness programmes and digital operational
resilience training in accordance with Article 13(6).”
• Article 19 (b), in “CDR 2024-1774 Technical standards specifying ICT risk
management tools, methods, processes, and policies and the simplified ICT risk
management framework” similarly to the requirement listed for financial
organizations, requires the whole staff of ICT third-party service providers to be
informed about security documentation, reporting channels for anomalous
behavior, and returning all the assets upon termination of employment.
When defining topics for training and awareness, the best approach is to go through each
DORA article and determine which of them need to be covered with training or
awareness.
However, since different DORA requirements are relevant to different employees, the best
approach is to group employees and define which articles, i.e., topics, are the best suited
for them.
In the table below, you can see how to map DORA requirements (and requirements of
some Commission Delegated Regulations) to particular target groups.
DORA
implementation
✓ ✓
steps (all relevant
DORA articles)
Which IT providers
need to comply with ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
DORA?
Relationship
between ISO 27001,
✓ ✓
ISO 22301, and
DORA
Governance
responsibilities for
✓ ✓ ✓
senior management
(Article 5)
Key elements of an
ICT risk
management
✓ ✓ ✓
framework (Article 6;
CDR 2024/1774
Articles 2 and 3)
Follow-up and
corrective actions
(Article 6 paragraph
7; Article 13 ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 3 and 5;
Article 17 paragraph
2)
Encryption and
cryptography
(Article 7; CDR ✓ ✓ ✓
2024/1774 Articles 6
and 7)
Identifying ICT-
supported business
functions, roles and
responsibilities, and ✓ ✓ ✓
assets (Article 8;
CDR 2024/1774
Articles 4 and 5)
Policies and
procedures for ICT
operations security
✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
2; CDR 2024/1774
Article 8)
Capacity and
performance
management
✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
2; CDR 2024/1774
Article 9)
Logging
procedures,
protocols, and tools
✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
2; CDR 2024/1774
Article 12)
Physical and
environmental
security (Article 9 ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 2; CDR
2024/1774 Article 18)
Organizing human
resources security
✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
2)
Human resources
policy (Article 9
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 2; CDR
2024/1774 Article 19)
Handling risks
arising from data
management ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
3 point d)
Developing a top-
level information
security policy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 9 paragraph
4 point a)
Establishing
network and
infrastructure
management
✓ ✓ ✓
structure (Article 9
paragraph 4 point b;
CDR 2024/1774
Article 13)
Identity
management and
strong
authentication
✓ ✓ ✓
mechanisms (Article
9 paragraph 4 point
d; CDR 2024/1774
Article 20)
ICT project
management (CDR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2024/1774 Article 15)
Vulnerability, patch
management, and
updates (Article 9
✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 4 point f;
CDR 2024/1774
Article 10)
ICT systems
acquisition,
development, and ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
maintenance (CDR
2024/1774 Article 16)
Mechanisms to
promptly detect
anomalous activities ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 10; CDR
2024/1774 Article 23)
Implementing an
ICT business
continuity policy
(Article 11
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraphs 1, 2, and
4; Article 9
paragraph 2; CDR
2024/1774 Article 24)
Implementing ICT
response and
recovery plans
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 11 paragraph
3; CDR 2024/1774
Article 26)
Business impact
analysis, RTO, and
RPO (Article 11 ✓ ✓
paragraph 5; Article
12 paragraph 6)
Testing business
continuity and
recovery plans
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 11 paragraph
6; CDR 2024/1774
Article 25)
Emergency
communications
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 11 paragraph
7; Article 14)
Managing backup
and restoration
(Article 12 ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
and 7)
Secondary
processing site
✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 12
paragraphs 4 and 5)
Threat intelligence
(Article 13 paragraph ✓ ✓ ✓
1)
Post-incident
reviews (Article 13 ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 2)
Organizing security
training and
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
awareness (Article 13
paragraph 6)
Monitoring
technological
developments ✓ ✓
(Article 13 paragraph
7)
Main elements of
the simplified ICT
risk management
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
framework (Article
16; CDR 2024/1774
Title III)
Classification of ICT
incidents and
threats (Article 18; ✓ ✓ ✓
CDR 2024/1772
Articles 1 to 10)
Reporting of major
incidents and cyber ✓ ✓
threats (Article 19)
Main elements of
digital operational
✓ ✓ ✓
resilience testing
(Article 24)
Resilience testing of
ICT tools and ✓ ✓ ✓
systems (Article 25)
Key elements of
Threat-Led
Penetration Testing ✓ ✓ ✓
- TLPT (Articles 26
and 27)
Main elements of
management of ICT
third-party risk
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(Article 28; CDR
2024/1773 Articles 1
to 4)
Monitoring,
inspection, and
audit of the ICT
third-party service
provider (Article 28 ✓ ✓ ✓
paragraph 6; Article
30 paragraph 3
points a and e; CDR
2024/1773 Article 9)
Clauses to be
included in
contracts with ICT
✓ ✓ ✓
service providers
(Article 30; CDR
2024/1773 Article 8)
When it comes to awareness, DORA’s articles 5, 13, 16, and 30 require ICT security
awareness programs for all employees — not only for financial entities, but also for ICT
service providers.
Since DORA did not specify what the content of such awareness programs should be,
below you will find a list of suggested topics that could be suitable for a company-wide
cybersecurity awareness program:
Essentially, you have three potential options for delivering training to a group of people:
Pros:
Cons:
Pros:
Cons:
3) Pre-recorded online training delivered via learning management system (LMS). This
approach is different from the first two options — here, all the videos are pre-recorded and
Pros
Cons
Regular vs. one-time training. If the training happens only once, then instructor-led
classroom training or instructor-led online training is something that can be organized, as
opposed to training that needs to be delivered regularly (e.g., monthly, quarterly,
annually). For such regular training, pre-recorded online training via LMS is a more
appropriate solution.
Required engagement. If the training covers some very in-depth topics that require high
engagement with the instructor, then instructor-led classroom training or instructor-led
online training is probably a better solution. If the training covers some more general
topics that do not require high engagement, then pre-recorded online training via LMS
will be a more practical solution.
Number of attendees. If the training involves a smaller group of people, then instructor-
led classroom training or instructor-led online training will be manageable. If the training
involves a larger number of people, then pre-recorded online training via LMS will be
easier.
Time zones. If all attendees are in the same time zone, then instructor-led classroom
training or instructor-led online training will be feasible; however, if the attendees are
scattered across different time zones, pre-recorded online training via LMS is a more viable
solution.
Ultimately, you might end up with a mix of the approaches described above — for
selected employees that require one-time training with in-depth knowledge, you might
go with instructor-led training, whereas for regular training that has to be delivered to a
larger number of employees and that does not go into too much depth, pre-recorded
online training via LMS will probably do a good job.
Unlike NIS 2, DORA does not specify minimum fines for financial entities — rather, it gives
the freedom to Member States to define their own fines in their countries.
However, DORA does specify other penalties for financial entities that can be enacted by
competent authorities:
• Ordering a financial entity to stop activities that are not compliant with DORA.
• Defining any measure (including fines) to make sure financial entities are
compliant with DORA.
• Issuing public notices that can reveal the names of non-complying financial
entities, as well as persons in charge.
DORA is quite specific on fines that critical ICT third-party service providers need to pay if
they are not compliant: This is up to 1% of their worldwide annual turnover, and the
amount of the fine depends on the number of days that the service provider was not
compliant.
The Lead Overseer (the body that supervises critical service providers) must issue public
notice that reveals the name of the service provider that was fined. The competent
authority can require a financial organization that is a client of a non-compliant service
provider to stop using their services.
DORA does not bring any novelties when it comes to enforcement — in its Article 46 it
refers to existing regulations that specify which competent authorities are in charge of
supervising particular types of financial organizations.
According to regulations referenced in Article 46, for the majority of financial entities that
need to be compliant with DORA, EU Member States designate competent authorities
that supervise and enforce financial regulations.
There are a couple of exceptions, where EU authorities directly supervise and enforce
financial regulations:
• For credit institutions classified as significant - the European Central Bank (ECB)
• For securitisation repositories - the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA)
The European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA), and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) have
several tasks according to DORA, including defining guidelines and regulatory technical
standards (which will be published as Commission Delegated Regulations), defining
which ICT third-party service providers are critical, appointing Lead Overseers for critical
service providers, etc.
DORA does not mention cybersecurity standards like ISO 27001 (nor any other standard
from the ISO27k series), or business continuity standards like ISO 22301.
However, when reading DORA’s Chapter II ICT risk management and CDR 2024-1774
Technical standards specifying ICT risk management tools, methods, processes, and
policies and the simplified ICT risk management framework, it becomes obvious that
many concepts were taken from ISO 27001, ISO 27002, ISO 27005, and ISO 22301.
Therefore, financial entities will find it useful to use those standards to comply with
DORA’s risk management requirements.
For IT suppliers, DORA Article 28 specifies that “Financial entities may only enter into
contractual arrangements with ICT third-party service providers that comply with
appropriate information security standards.” Since ISO 27001 is the most popular
information security standard worldwide, the certification against this standard will most
probably become even more popular.
The full title of NIS 2 is “Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of
cybersecurity across the Union.”
Although NIS 2 and DORA were both published on the same day (December 27, 2022),
there are big differences between them:
DORA NIS 2
Effective
January 17, 2025 October 18, 2024
from
NIS 2 lists “banking” and “financial market infrastructures” as sectors that need to be
compliant with NIS 2 — however, according to NIS 2 Article 4, DORA and other sector-
specific regulations have priority over NIS 2.
In effect, any financial entities that are in the scope of DORA do not need to comply with
NIS 2.
The full title of the EU GDPR is “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data (General Data Protection Regulation).”
Even though both DORA and the GDPR focus on protection of data, each has a different
angle:
DORA EU GDPR
The focus is on protecting any data Cybersecurity measures apply to personal data
Protection in ICT systems and achieving digital only; there is also a legal aspect of protection of
resilience. personal data.
Effective
January 17, 2025 May 25, 2018
from
9.5. What is the difference between DORA and the Critical Entities
Resilience Directive (CER)
The full title of CER is “Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities.”
Although DORA and CER (as well as NIS 2) were published on the same day (December 27,
2022), they each have a different scope:
DORA CER
Regulation (directly
Directive (companies comply with local
Type applicable to financial
legislation that is published)
institutions)
At the time this white paper was updated (February 2025), the following CDRs were
published:
• CDR 2024/1502 - The criteria for the designation of ICT third-party service providers
as critical for financial entities — related to DORA Article 31
• CDR 2024/1505 - The amount of the oversight fees to be charged by the Lead
Overseer to critical ICT third-party service providers and the way in which those
fees are to be paid — related to DORA Article 43
• CDR 2024/1772 - The criteria for the classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber
threats, setting out materiality thresholds and specifying the details of reports of
major incidents — related to DORA Article 18
• CDR 2024/1773 - Regulatory technical standards specifying the detailed content of
the policy regarding contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services
supporting critical or important functions provided by ICT third-party service
providers — related to DORA Article 28
• CDR 2024/1774 - Regulatory technical standards specifying ICT risk management
tools, methods, processes, and policies and the simplified ICT risk management
framework — related to DORA Article 15 and Article 16
• CIR 2024/2956 – Templates for the register of information for contractual
arrangements — related to DORA Article 28(9)
CDR 2024/1502 - The criteria for the designation of ICT third-party service providers as
critical for financial entities specifies:
See also: Which IT companies need to comply with DORA, and how?
• Lead Overseers must calculate the oversight fees based on their overall cost of
supervision.
• The minimum annual oversight fee is €50,000 per critical ICT third-party service
provider.
• Oversight fees are paid once a year.
CDR 2024/1772 - The criteria for the classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber
threats, setting out materiality thresholds and specifying the details of reports of major
incidents specifies:
• Financial entities need to take into account various aspects of an incident when
deciding if it is a major incident.
• Those aspects include: number of clients affected, number of financial
counterparts affected, amount of transactions affected, reputational impact,
duration and service downtime, geographical spread, data losses, criticality of
services affected, and economic impact.
• Financial entities must classify threats, and decide if threats are significant based
on several criteria.
CDR 2024/1773 - Regulatory technical standards specifying the detailed content of the
policy regarding contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or
important functions provided by ICT third-party service providers specifies:
• When creating the policy for contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services,
financial entities must take into account overall risk profile and complexity, and
include several elements in the policy.
• Elements that must be included in the policy are: governance arrangements, life
cycle for the adoption and use of contractual arrangements, risk assessment, due
diligence, conflicts of interest, contractual clauses, monitoring of the contractual
arrangements, and exit from and termination of the contractual arrangements.
CDR 2024/1774 - Regulatory technical standards specifying ICT risk management tools,
methods, processes, and policies and the simplified ICT risk management framework
specifies:
• A very detailed list of ICT security policies, procedures, protocols, and tools that
financial entities need to establish.
• These must cover several areas, including ICT risk management, ICT asset
management, encryption and cryptography, ICT operations security, network
security, ICT project and change management, physical and environmental
security, human resources policy, identity management, access control, ICT-related
incident detection and response, ICT business continuity management, and report
on the ICT risk management framework review.
• The CDR specifies separate rules for a simplified ICT risk management framework.
CIR 2024/2956 – Templates for the register of information for contractual arrangements
specifies:
Here are some of the CDRs that are in the process of being published:
So, as you can see, DORA in itself is already pretty specific when it comes to cybersecurity
rules, but together with these CDRs it becomes very demanding with regard to how
cybersecurity needs to be implemented.
Sources:
• DORA regulation
• Series of DORA articles on Advisera.com
Author:
Dejan Kosutic
Leading expert on cybersecurity & information security and the author of several books,
articles, webinars, and courses. As a premier expert, Dejan founded Advisera to help small
and medium businesses obtain the resources they need to become compliant with EU
regulations and ISO standards. He believes that making complex frameworks easy to
understand and simple to use creates a competitive advantage for Advisera's clients, and
that AI technology is crucial for achieving this.
As an ISO 27001, NIS 2, and DORA expert, Dejan helps companies find the best path to
compliance by eliminating overhead and adapting the implementation to their size and
industry specifics.
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