Frege’s “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” – A Logical Exploration

Gottlob Frege, one of the founding figures of modern logic and philosophy of language, made
seminal contributions that continue to shape contemporary thought. One of his most important
works is “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” published in Mind, Volume 259, between pages 289 and
311. In this work, Frege presents a detailed analysis of the concept of thought and examines how it
relates to logic, meaning, and truth. His approach reveals deep insights into the nature of
philosophical inquiry, the structure of language, and the way in which humans come to understand
and communicate about the world.

Frege’s philosophical journey can be understood as one that transitions from an emphasis on formal
logic to the exploration of the cognitive and linguistic elements that underpin human reasoning. In
"The Thought," Frege embarks on an investigation into the mental and objective dimensions of
thoughts, linking these to his previous work in logic and semantics. This essay aims to delve deeply
into the core themes of Frege’s article, highlighting his exploration of thoughts as entities, their
relationship to sentences and meaning, and their connection to the truth-conditions of statements.

1. The Concept of "The Thought"

In this essay, Frege introduces the notion of the thought (or Gedanke in German), which he
distinguishes from other elements involved in meaning such as senses (Sinn) and referents
(Bedeutung). A thought is not simply a subjective mental image or a vague sense of something but is
instead a proposition, an objective content that can be shared and communicated. According to
Frege, a thought has its own independent existence, and the same thought can be grasped by
different minds, thus allowing for the possibility of objective communication and understanding.

A thought is inherently a representational element in the mind and is tied to the idea of truth.
Frege’s key argument is that thoughts are propositions that can be true or false, which distinguishes
them from mere mental images or perceptions. Unlike a mental image, which is subjective and
private, a thought is an objective entity. It can be expressed through language, but its existence does
not depend on any particular linguistic expression. Frege’s distinction between sense and thought is
crucial here; whereas the sense of an expression refers to the mode of presentation of an object, a
thought refers to the content that can be expressed by a sentence.

2. The Relationship Between Thoughts and Sentences

Frege’s exploration of thoughts cannot be divorced from his understanding of the relationship
between sentences and the meaning of those sentences. According to Frege, a sentence expresses a
thought, and it is through the sentence that the thought is made accessible to others. However, the
relationship between a sentence and a thought is not one of simple equivalence. A sentence can
express a thought, but different sentences may express the same thought. This distinction is critical
to Frege's work because it allows him to tackle the problem of how different linguistic expressions
can convey the same objective content.

Frege’s theory of reference or Bedeutung comes into play here. According to Frege, the meaning of a
sentence involves two components: the sense (Sinn) and the reference (Bedeutung). The sense is the
mode of presentation of the content, whereas the reference is the actual entity or concept to which
the sentence refers. In this way, Frege argues, sentences are vehicles for thoughts, and the thought
contained in a sentence is not reducible to the sentence itself. The thought is a more fundamental
entity, and different sentences can express the same thought.

For example, the sentences “The morning star is Venus” and “The evening star is Venus” are
different in their sense (mode of presentation), but they refer to the same object (Venus). In this
way, Frege highlights the complexity of linguistic meaning, emphasizing that the meaning of a
sentence extends beyond its superficial structure to the thought it conveys.

3. The Objectivity of Thought

Frege’s central concern in “The Thought” is to establish that thoughts are objective entities that are
independent of individual minds. In doing so, he engages in a profound exploration of the nature of
objectivity in thought and knowledge. A key element of Frege's analysis is his rejection of the idea
that meaning is solely subjective or bound to individual mental experiences.

Frege argues that thoughts exist independently of any particular individual or mind. This is a direct
challenge to idealist or subjectivist theories of meaning that emphasize the centrality of individual
perception or mental states. Thoughts, according to Frege, are not merely private experiences but
are objective and can be shared by different individuals. This objectivity is what allows for the
communication of thoughts through language and logic. Thus, when two people make a statement,
they are not merely expressing private mental states, but they are referring to an objective content
(the thought) that can be evaluated for truth or falsehood.

4. Truth and Thought

Frege’s notion of truth is tightly connected to his understanding of thought. In his logical framework,
a thought is a proposition that can be either true or false. This is a crucial insight, as it allows Frege
to tie the concept of thought to the broader logical structure of truth conditions. A thought can be
evaluated against the world, and its truth value is determined by its correspondence with the facts
of the world.

For Frege, truth is a central feature of a thought. The ability to distinguish between true and false
thoughts is essential to reasoning and understanding. This emphasis on truth is what grounds Frege’s
logicism—the idea that mathematics can be reduced to logic—and the broader significance of his
work in the philosophy of language and logic. By establishing that thoughts are objective and have
truth values, Frege makes possible a rigorous logical framework for understanding meaning and
reference.

5. Thoughts and Cognitive Acts

While Frege emphasizes the objectivity of thoughts, he also acknowledges their relationship to
cognitive acts. The act of grasping or entertaining a thought is a mental activity that occurs in the
mind of an individual. However, the thought itself is not reducible to the act of thinking it. Frege’s
distinction between the subjective act of thinking and the objective content of the thought is critical
in understanding his conception of mental life. The thought exists as an objective entity independent
of the mind, but it can be grasped by the mind. This distinction between act and content plays a
significant role in Frege's philosophy, as it allows him to maintain the objectivity of thought while
also accounting for the subjective experience of thinking.

6. The Implications for Logic and Meaning

Frege’s investigation into the nature of thought has profound implications for logic and the
philosophy of meaning. First, by grounding thoughts in the logical structure of truth, Frege provides
a foundation for formal logic and the analysis of meaning. Thoughts, as objective contents that can
be true or false, can be analyzed in terms of their logical structure, allowing for the development of a
formal system for reasoning about meaning.

Second, Frege's insights into the relationship between sense, reference, and thought illuminate the
complexity of meaning. The distinction between sense and reference allows for a nuanced
understanding of how language conveys meaning. A single thought can be expressed in different
ways, and different linguistic forms can refer to the same content. This insight not only deepens our
understanding of meaning but also provides the basis for more sophisticated analyses of reference
and meaning in both natural language and formal logic.

7. Conclusion

In “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” Frege presents a powerful and detailed analysis of the concept
of thought. Through his exploration of thoughts as objective entities, their relationship to sentences,
and their connection to truth, Frege offers a rigorous framework for understanding meaning,
reference, and logic. His work highlights the complexity of linguistic and cognitive processes and
provides the foundation for much of modern philosophy of language and logic. The distinction
between sense, reference, and thought allows for a deeper understanding of how language works
and how meaning is communicated, and it continues to shape contemporary debates in philosophy,
linguistics, and cognitive science.

Frege’s insights into thought, truth, and meaning not only make significant contributions to logic but
also provide a bridge between formal logical systems and the practical use of language. His work
continues to inspire new generations of thinkers in the fields of philosophy, logic, and linguistics, and
his concepts remain central to discussions on how language, thought, and reality are interconnected.