CrPC CASES

MODULE 2:
Sonu v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 144 DLT 628
Introduction:
The petitioners filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, along
with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), seeking a writ of certiorari to
quash FIR No. 1367/2006 registered at PS Malviya Nagar or alternatively, mandamus for the
transfer of the FIR and consequent investigation to the jurisdiction of Police Station Ragho
Majra Kotwali, District Patiala, Punjab.

Facts:
 The FIR in question was filed under Sections 406/498A at PS Malviya Nagar, Delhi,
despite no offense being committed within the jurisdiction of NCT of Delhi.
 The respondent-wife alleged cruelty at her matrimonial home in Patiala, Punjab,
where the marriage took place and where the alleged offenses occurred.
 The complainant's FIR did not mention any offense occurring in Delhi, and she stated
that she was residing within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar at the time of filing.
 The petitioners argued that the registration of the FIR in Delhi was contrary to the
provisions of Sections 177 and 181(4) of the Cr.P.C., and the FIR should be quashed
or transferred to the state where the offense was committed.

Arguments:
 The FIR alleged offenses committed in Patiala, Punjab, where the marriage took place
and where the matrimonial home was located.
 The FIR did not mention any offense occurring within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya
Nagar, Delhi.
 The law, as laid down by the Supreme Court, mandates that if the investigating officer
concludes that the crime was not committed within their jurisdiction, the FIR should
be transferred to the police station having jurisdiction over the area where the offense
was committed.
 The refusal of Delhi Police to register FIRs in cases where offenses occurred in Delhi,
coupled with the registration of FIRs in Delhi for offenses committed outside its
jurisdiction, raised doubts about the police's motives and practices.

Court's Decision:
 The court cited the Supreme Court's observations in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) and Anr., emphasizing that the investigating officer has statutory
authority to investigate any cognizable offense, regardless of territorial jurisdiction.
  However, after investigation, if it is found that the cause of action did not arise within
their jurisdiction, the investigating officer must forward the case to the appropriate
magistrate.
 In this case, as no offense was committed within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar,
Delhi, the court directed the SHO of PS Malviya Nagar to transfer the FIR to the
concerned Police Station at Patiala, Punjab, where the offense was committed.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the writ petition, directing the transfer of the FIR to the appropriate police
station in Patiala, Punjab. The court emphasized the need for police officers to follow proper
procedures regarding FIR registration and jurisdiction, preventing unnecessary burdens on
the courts and ensuring justice for victims of crimes.

Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728

Introduction:
The appellant-wife filed a petition seeking the quashing of FIR No. 34 of 1993 under
Sections 406 and 498A IPC, registered at Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. The High
Court quashed the FIR on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The appellant appealed
against this decision.

Facts:
 The appellant-wife got married to Rajinder Singh (Respondent no. 2) on December 9,
1990, in Delhi. Subsequently, she alleged torture and dowry demands by her husband
and in-laws and lodged a complaint at PS Kotwali, Patiala, on January 19, 1992.
 On the same day, she also filed a complaint against her husband in the Women Cell,
Delhi, and later lodged FIR No. 34 of 1993 at PS Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, alleging
offenses committed on December 9, 1990, in Patiala.
 The appellant's husband filed a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the Delhi
High Court, seeking the quashing of the FIR, which was initially dismissed.
 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted
the matter for fresh consideration.
 Upon rehearing, the High Court quashed the FIR, citing lack of territorial jurisdiction
for the Delhi Police.

Arguments:
 The appellant argued that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR based on
territorial jurisdiction since the investigating officer has statutory authority under
Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. to investigate any cognizable case.
  It was contended that at the investigation stage, the jurisdiction of the investigating
officer should not be questioned, and if necessary, the case could be forwarded to the
appropriate magistrate after investigation.
 The appellant further argued that Sections 177 and 178 of the Cr.P.C. provide for the
inquiry or trial of offenses committed in multiple local areas, and hence, the
investigating officer had jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
 The legal position was cited, emphasizing that the Court should exercise its power
under Section 482 sparingly and only in rare cases, and the credibility of the
allegations in the FIR should not be
 questioned at this stage.
Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to quash the FIR based on lack
of territorial jurisdiction was illegal and erroneous.
 It was emphasized that the investigating officer has the statutory authority to
investigate any cognizable offense, and the question of territorial jurisdiction should
be addressed after the investigation is completed.
 Sections 177 and 178 of the Cr.P.C. were cited to support the contention that offenses
committed in multiple local areas can be inquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
 The Court reiterated that the power to quash an FIR should be exercised sparingly and
only when there is a gross miscarriage of justice.
 Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the order quashing the FIR was set aside,
directing the Investigation Officer to complete the investigation promptly.

Ratio:
The investigating officer has the statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offense, and
questions of territorial jurisdiction should be addressed after the investigation is completed.
The power to quash an FIR should be exercised sparingly and only when there is a gross
miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order quashing the FIR
and directing the Investigation Officer to complete the investigation promptly. This case
emphasizes the importance of respecting the statutory powers of investigating officers and
exercising judicial discretion cautiously while quashing FIRs.

Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 (11) SCALE 154; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of
Uttar Pradesh, 2013 (13) SCALE 559
RAHUL RANJAN’s PPTs
 Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India and Others WRIT PETITION (CRL.)
NO.68 OF 2016
Introduction:
The petitioner, Youth Bar Association of India, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a mandamus directing the Union of India and the States to
upload every First Information Report (FIR) registered in all police stations within India on
the official police website within 24 hours of registration.

Facts:
 The petitioner sought the uploading of all FIRs on police websites to facilitate access
to information for accused persons and their families, citing the importance of
protecting individual liberty and rights.
 The petitioner relied on judicial pronouncements highlighting the significance of
Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.
 The respondents, representing the Union of India and various states, provided
submissions on the feasibility and challenges of implementing the petitioner's request,
including concerns about the sensitivity of certain cases and logistical issues.

Arguments:
The petitioner argued that access to FIRs is crucial for individuals accused of crimes to
protect their liberty and rights, citing constitutional provisions and judicial precedents
emphasizing the importance of fair and impartial investigation.
The respondents raised concerns about the practicality of uploading FIRs, particularly in
sensitive cases like sexual offenses, insurgency, terrorism, and cases under the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

Court's Decision:
 The Court recognized the importance of an accused's right to access FIRs at an early
stage and ordered that certified copies of FIRs should be provided to accused persons
within 24 hours of application.
 It directed that FIRs should be uploaded on police or state government websites
within 24 hours of registration, except in cases of sensitive nature where the time limit
could be extended up to 72 hours due to connectivity issues or other unavoidable
difficulties.
 The decision not to upload FIRs should be made by officers of a certain rank, and a
grievance redressal mechanism should be established for cases where FIRs are not
uploaded due to sensitivity.
 The Court emphasized that the term "sensitive" is not exhaustive and includes
considerations of privacy and other relevant factors.
  The directives were to be implemented from November 15, 2016, and copies of the
order were to be sent to all Home Secretaries and Director Generals of Police of the
concerned states.

Ratio:
Access to FIRs is crucial for safeguarding the rights and liberties of accused persons, and
timely provision of FIR copies and online uploading of FIRs promote transparency and
fairness in the criminal justice system.

Conclusion:
The writ petition was disposed of with the issuance of directives for the timely provision and
online uploading of FIRs, balancing the need for transparency with considerations of
sensitivity and practicality.

Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar, (1997) 8 SCC 476

“It was submitted that the application under Section 156(3) CrPC could be treated as a
complaint”.

Facts:
 The appellant filed a complaint against the respondents alleging offenses under
Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) before the Chief Magistrate,
Kurukshetra.
 The Chief Magistrate, exercising powers under Section 156(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC), directed the police to register a case and investigate.
 Two cases were subsequently registered, and charge sheets were filed against the
respondents.
 The respondents challenged the proceedings before the Punjab & Haryana High
Court, arguing that the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrates directing registration
of cases were illegal.
 The High Court quashed the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrates, relying on
interpretations of Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

Issue:
Whether a Magistrate's direction to register a case under Section 156(3) of the CrPC is legal
and valid.

Arguments:
  The respondents contended that the Magistrate exceeded their jurisdiction by directing
the police to register cases under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
 The appellant argued that the Magistrate's direction was within the scope of their
authority under Section 156(3) and was necessary for initiating investigations into
cognizable offenses.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was unsustainable.
 The Court clarified that a Magistrate's direction under Section 156(3) of the CrPC to
register a case is lawful and necessary for initiating investigations into cognizable
offenses.
 It emphasized that the police must register a case based on the complaint received
from the Magistrate, treating it as the First Information Report (FIR), and proceed
with the investigation accordingly.
 The Court distinguished previous cases cited by the High Court, stating that they were
not relevant to the interpretation of Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
 The impugned judgment was set aside, and the Magistrates were directed to proceed
with the cases in accordance with the law.

Ratio:
A Magistrate's direction to register a case under Section 156(3) of the CrPC is legal and
necessary for initiating investigations into cognizable offenses.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and
directed the concerned Magistrates to proceed with the cases according to law.

Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 2 SCC 409

Introduction:
This case is a landmark judgement on the powers of magistrate to direct investigation under
Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

Facts:
 Appellant is the father of a Major in the Indian Army named Ravishankar.
 The Major's body was discovered on 23rd August 2003, at Mathura Railway Station.
 The Government Railway Police (GRP) in Mathura investigated and concluded in a
report on 29th August 2003, that the death was either an accident or a suicide.
  The Army officials in Mathura conducted two separate inquiries, both reaching the
same conclusion that the Major had committed suicide.
 The inquires relied on statements from the deceased Major's servant and an
eyewitness.
 However, the appellant, Major Ravishankar's father, claimed that his son was actually
murdered and did not commit suicide.
 He alleges that his son discovered widespread corruption in the Mathura Army unit,
reported it to superiors and to him, and was killed because of it.
 Dissatisfied with the Court of investigation's finding of suicide, the appellant took the
case to the Allahabad High Court through a writ petition, but the court dismissed it.
 The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court through a special leave petition
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and demanded investigation by
special investigating agency.

Issue Involved:
Whether a person can demand that an inquiry be conducted by a special investigating agency
of their choice?

Observations:
 SC gave observations related to First Information Report (FIR) and investigation.
 SC said that if an individual faces difficulty in getting their First Information Report
(FIR) registered at a police station under Section 154 CrPC, they have recourse to
approach the Superintendent of Police through a written application under Section
154(3) CrPC.
 If this does not yield satisfactory results, and the FIR is still not registered or lacks
proper investigation, the aggrieved party can submit an application under Section
156(3) CrPC before the relevant Magistrate.
 The Magistrate, upon receiving such an application, has the authority to order the
registration of the FIR and ensure a thorough investigation.
 The SC emphasized that even if an FIR is registered or under investigation, an
individual dissatisfied with the process can seek redress from the Magistrate under
Section 156(3) CrPC.
 The Magistrate, endowed with broad powers, can oversee the investigation and issue
necessary directives for a proper inquiry.
 Despite the concise wording of Section 156(3), it encompasses extensive powers
vested in the Magistrate to guarantee a meticulous investigation, including the
authority to order FIR registration and direct an appropriate inquiry.
 The SC cautioned against entertaining Section 482 CrPC petitions if the FIR remains
unregistered, advocating for the pursuit of alternative remedies like approaching
police officers or the Magistrate.
 While acknowledging that alternative remedies do not categorically bar writ petitions,
the Court stressed that interference by the HC should be avoided unless necessary.
  Additionally, the SC cautioned against indiscriminate use of its and HCs' powers to
order CBI investigations, reserving such intervention for rare and exceptional cases to
prevent overwhelming the CBI with an unmanageable caseload.

Conclusion:
After emphasizing remedies for FIR and Complaint under CrPC the SC dismissed the appeal
of appellant.

Note:
 Section 154 (1) of CrPC:
Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an
officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction,
and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or
reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may prescribe in this behalf.
A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of
cost, to the informant.

 Section 154 (3) of CrPC:

Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer-in-charge of a police station to
record the information referred to in subsection (1) may send the substance of such
information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if
satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either
investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the
powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station in relation to that offence.

 Section 156(3) of CrPC:

Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above
mentioned.

 Section 36 of CrPC:
According to Section 36 of CrPC, police officers who are superior in rank to other officers in
charge of a police station might exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which
they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officers within the limits of their station.
  Section 482 of CrPC:
Nothing in this Code will be deemed to restriction or have an effect on the inherent powers of
the High Court to make such orders as may be mandatory to give effect to any order beneath
this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.

State of Haryana v Dinesh Kumar, (2008) 2 SCC 409

Introduction:
 This is the case where the Court defined the basic difference between arrest and
custody.
 If the person surrenders himself before the magistrate without being arrested by the
police, then it would not amount to an arrest. If he presents himself before the
magistrate with his lawyer and without being arrested, and applies for bail, and it is
granted by the magistrate, then it would amount to custody.

Facts:
 In this case, there were two appeals before the High Court where the issue is arrest
and custody in relation to criminal proceedings.
 At the time of appointment as Constable Drivers, there were two queries:
1. Have you been arrested?
2. Have you ever been convicted by the Court of any offence?
 At the time of furnishing the information, two candidates had not disclosed whether
they had been arrested or not.
 Upon verification, it was reported that they had not furnished the information
correctly, and as a result, they were not offered any appointment.

Issues Involved:
 Whether the way they had appeared before the Magistrate and had been released
without being taken into formal custody, could amount to arrest for the purpose of the
query?
 Whether the mere taking into the custody of a person by an authority empowered to
arrest would amount to arrest of that person and whether the terms arrest and custody
are synonymous?
Observation:
 The Supreme Court observed the concept of arrest and custody in connection with a
criminal case.
 The Court said arrest and custody both are not defined under Indian Penal Code, 1860
(IPC) or Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), there is only indication about the
arrest under Section 46(1) and (2) of the CrPC.
  The Court observed the essential elements to the arrest that there must be an intent to
arrest under the authority, apprehension or restraint of one’s personal liberty, and the
arrest must be understood by the person arrested.
 The Court further observed with regards to the Custody in the context of section 439
of the CrPC, where the Court said he can be in custody not merely when the police
arrest him or produces him before the Magistrate. He can be stated to be in judicial
custody when he surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.
 The Court further said that unless a person of an offence is in custody, he cannot move
to the Court for bail under Section 439 of CrPC.
 The main essential of the section is that to apply the bail under this section the person
must be in custody and his movements must be restricted before he can move for bail.

Conclusion:
 The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view and stated that the layman cannot
differentiate between arrest and custody.
 The position would be different if bail were not granted to him; hence, the candidates
will be deemed to have been appointed, but they will be entitled to salary from the
date of the judgment.

XYZ v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2022 SC 3957

The State of Maharashtra and anr. ...Respondents

.........

Mr. Ritesh Thobde for the Applicant.

Ms. M.M. Deshmukh, APP for the State.

Mr. Ashish Sawant

Facts:
 The present application was filed under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) by the informant to cancel the bail granted to respondent No. 2 in
Criminal Appeal No. 739 of 2022.
 The FIR was lodged by the present applicant, leading to the registration of CR No.
147 of 2022 with Kandhar Police Station, District Nanded, for offenses under various
sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
 The applicant alleged that respondent No. 2 breached the conditions of bail by
assaulting her, abusing her, and making threats against her.

Issue:
Whether the bail granted to respondent No. 2 should be cancelled based on the alleged breach
of bail conditions.
Arguments:
 The applicant argued that respondent No. 2's actions constituted a breach of the bail
conditions, warranting cancellation of bail.
 The applicant cited non-cognizable complaints filed against respondent No. 2 for
assault and threats as evidence of the breach.
 The applicant contended that respondent No. 2's behavior amounted to tampering with
evidence and posed a threat to the fairness of the trial.
 The applicant relied on legal principles governing the cancellation of bail,
emphasizing the need for "cogent case based on a supervening event" for bail
cancellation.

Court's Decision:
 The Court referred to legal precedents emphasizing the stringent requirements for bail
cancellation, including "cogent and overwhelming circumstances" justifying
cancellation.
 The Court highlighted the need for evidence of interference with the administration of
justice, evasion of justice, or abuse of bail concessions.
 It noted that bail should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner and should only be
considered when supervening circumstances render it no longer conducive to a fair
trial.
 The Court examined the facts presented by the applicant, including the non-
cognizable complaints filed against respondent No. 2.
 It found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support the
contention that respondent No. 2 breached bail conditions.
 The Court observed that the mere filing of non-cognizable complaints and allegations
of threats without substantial evidence did not warrant bail cancellation.
 Additionally, the Court questioned the credibility of the applicant's claims,
particularly regarding the nature of her relationship with respondent No. 2.
 Considering the lack of merit in the application and absence of supervening
circumstances justifying bail cancellation, the Court rejected the application.

Ratio:
Bail should not be cancelled unless there are cogent and overwhelming circumstances
justifying such action, including interference with the administration of justice, evasion of
justice, or abuse of bail concessions. Mere allegations without substantial evidence are
insufficient to warrant bail cancellation.

Conclusion:
The Court rejected the application for bail cancellation, finding that the applicant failed to
provide sufficient evidence of a breach of bail conditions by respondent No. 2. The Court
emphasized the need for supervening circumstances justifying bail cancellation and cautioned
against mechanical decisions in such matters.

Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639

Facts:
 The complainants filed complaints against the accused alleging forgery and cheating
under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) related to the creation of
Agreements for Sale using blank stamp papers obtained from the complainants.
 The II Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Bangalore directed the police to
register FIRs based on the complaints filed by the complainants.
 The accused approached the High Court contending that the Magistrate passed the
order under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in a
mechanical manner. However, the High Court dismissed their petitions.
 The accused argued that the complaints were purely civil in nature and filed with the
intention to harass them.

Issue:
Whether the Magistrate can entertain an application under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC
without an affidavit, and whether the continuation of criminal proceedings is an abuse of
process of law.

Arguments:
 The accused contended that the Magistrate should have applied his mind before
passing an order under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC.
 It was argued that without an affidavit, the Magistrate could not have entertained the
application under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC.
 The accused claimed that the complaints were filed with an ulterior motive to harass
them, especially since civil suits on the same transactions were already pending.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court referred to the judgment in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, which held that applications under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC must be
supported by an affidavit from the complainant.
 The Court emphasized the need for the Magistrate to verify the truth and the veracity
of the allegations before entertaining such applications.
 It noted that applications under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC are often filed routinely
without taking any responsibility, leading to harassment.
 The Court observed that the complainants did not submit affidavits, and the
Magistrate failed to consider this legal requirement.
  Considering the absence of affidavits and the ulterior motive alleged by the accused,
the Court concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an
abuse of process of law.
 Therefore, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused.

Ratio:
Applications under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC must be supported by an affidavit from the
complainant to deter false allegations and ensure accountability. Failure to submit an affidavit
can lead to the dismissal of the application, and the continuation of criminal proceedings
without proper verification may constitute an abuse of process of law.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused, noting the absence
of affidavits and the potential abuse of legal process by the complainants. The decision
underscores the importance of adherence to procedural requirements and the need to prevent
misuse of legal mechanisms for harassment purposes.

MODULE 3:
State of Orissa v. Sharat Chandra Sahu, (1996) 6 SCC 435
Facts:
 Respondent No. 1, the husband of respondent No. 2, was accused of contracting a
second marriage, which the respondent No. 2 alleged to be an offence under Section
494 IPC (Indian Penal Code). Additionally, she accused him of demanding money
from her, constituting harassment under Section 498A IPC.
 The complaint was made in writing to the Women's Commission, which forwarded it
to the police station. A case (G.R. Case No. 418 of 1993) was registered against
respondent No. 1, and charges were framed under Sections 498A and 494 IPC by the
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Anandpur.
 Respondent No. 1 filed a petition (Criminal Misc. Case No. 1169/94) under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in the Orissa High Court, seeking to
quash the proceedings and charges against him.
 The High Court partly allowed the petition, quashing the charge under Section 494
IPC but maintaining the charge under Section 498A IPC. The State of Orissa
challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the High Court was correct in quashing the charge under Section 494 IPC and
whether the Magistrate had the authority to take cognizance of the offence.
Arguments:
 The State of Orissa argued that the High Court's decision to quash the charge under
Section 494 IPC was erroneous and based on ignorance of relevant statutory
provisions.
 It was contended that under Section 198(1) of the CrPC, the court could take
cognizance of offences under Chapter XX of the IPC only upon a complaint made by
the aggrieved person.
 The State emphasized that the police were entitled to take cognizance of the offence
under Section 498A IPC, irrespective of who filed the first information.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment, quashing the charge under
Section 494 IPC, was wholly erroneous and based on a misunderstanding of the law.
 It emphasized that under Section 198(1) of the CrPC, the court could take cognizance
of offences against marriage only upon a complaint made by the aggrieved person or
specified relatives.
 The Court clarified that the police could investigate both cognizable and non-
cognizable offences arising from the same facts, as per Section 155(4) of the CrPC.
 Referring to the precedent in Preveen Chandra Mody v. State of M.P., the Court
affirmed that police could investigate non-cognizable offences while investigating
cognizable ones arising from the same facts.
 Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the charge under Section 494 IPC was
set aside, and the Magistrate was directed to proceed with the case expeditiously.

Ratio:
 The court can take cognizance of offences against marriage under Section 198(1) of
the CrPC only upon a complaint made by the aggrieved person or specified relatives.
 Police can investigate both cognizable and non-cognizable offences arising from the
same facts as per Section 155(4) of the CrPC.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision to quash the
charge under Section 494 IPC. The Magistrate was directed to proceed with the case
expeditiously, emphasizing the need for adherence to statutory provisions and proper
investigation of offences.

Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 2 SCC 409

“Already done in previous module”.
 Jakia Nasim Ahesan v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 12 SCC 302
Facts:
 The appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
Special Criminal Application No. 421 of 2007.
 The appellant, a victim of the events in Gujarat between February and May 2002,
sought direction from the Director General of Police, Gujarat, to register her private
complaint as a First Information Report (FIR) and conduct an independent
investigation.
 The appellant's husband, a former Member of Parliament, was killed in the Gulberg
Society incident on 28th February 2002. An FIR was registered related to the incident,
but the appellant sought further investigation into the involvement of certain
responsible persons in power.
 The police declined to take cognizance of her complaint, leading the appellant to file a
writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed.
 The Supreme Court appointed an Amicus Curiae and directed the Special
Investigation Team (SIT) to look into the appellant's complaint.
 After further investigation, the SIT recommended further investigation under Section
173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against certain police officials and a
minister in the state cabinet.
 The Amicus Curiae submitted a final report, after which the Court considered the
future course of action.

Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court should continue to monitor the case or allow the trial court to
proceed with the matter after the submission of the final report by the SIT.

Arguments:
 The appellant sought direction for an independent investigation into her complaint
against certain responsible persons.
 The SIT recommended further investigation against certain police officials and a
minister.
 The Amicus Curiae submitted a final report, and the question arose whether the
Supreme Court should continue to monitor the case.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court held that once the investigation was completed by the SIT, the
final report should be forwarded to the trial court for further proceedings.
 The Court emphasized that its role was to ensure proper investigation by the SIT and
that the merits of the accusations would be determined during the trial.
  The Court directed the Chairman, SIT, to forward the final report to the court
empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged.
 If the SIT opined in its report that there was insufficient evidence against any person
named in the complaint, the court should issue notice to the complainant and provide
her with relevant documents.
 The Court concluded that it was not necessary to continue monitoring the case further
and disposed of the appeal accordingly.

Ratio:
 Once the investigation is completed, the final report should be forwarded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
 The Supreme Court's role is to ensure proper investigation, and the merits of the
accusations will be determined during the trial.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that its monitoring of the case should come to an end, and the
final report should be forwarded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court
appreciated the assistance of the Amicus Curiae and directed the State of Gujarat to reimburse
the expenses incurred by him.

Joginder Kumar v. State of UP (1994) 4 SCC 260.

Facts:
 The petitioner, Joginder Kumar, a young advocate, was called by the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, for inquiries in a case.
 On January 7, 1994, Joginder Kumar appeared with his brothers before the Senior
Superintendent of Police and was detained.
 Concerned for Joginder Kumar's safety, his brother sent a telegram to the Chief
Minister, fearing his brother's implication in a criminal case or a fake encounter.
 Joginder Kumar was found to be detained illegally by the SHO of Mussoorie Police
Station.
 Despite inquiries, Joginder Kumar's whereabouts were undisclosed, and he was not
produced before the Magistrate.
 The Senior Superintendent of Police stated that Joginder Kumar was released and
cooperated with the police voluntarily.
 The court ordered an inquiry into the detention of Joginder Kumar and directed the
District Judge, Ghaziabad, to submit a report within four weeks.
 The court emphasized the importance of balancing human rights with crime
prevention.

Main Issue:
Whether the arrest and detention of Joginder Kumar were lawful, whether his fundamental
rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution were violated, and how to strike a
balance between individual rights and crime prevention.

Arguments:
 The petitioner argued against arbitrary arrests and emphasized the need for
justification beyond mere allegations.
 The petitioner invoked Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution, protecting the right
to life and personal liberty.
 The court considered the recommendations of the National Police Commission and
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, emphasizing fairness, openness, and
workability in police powers.

Court's Decision:
 The court ordered an inquiry into Joginder Kumar's detention and emphasized the
importance of balancing individual rights with crime prevention.
 Guidelines were issued to protect arrested persons' rights, including the right to
inform a friend or relative of the arrest.
 These rights were deemed inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and
must be enforced strictly.

Ratio:
Arrests must be justified beyond mere allegations, and individual rights must be balanced
with societal interests in crime prevention.
Guidelines were issued to protect the rights of arrested persons, reflecting the constitutional
guarantee of personal liberty.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Joginder Kumar, ordering an inquiry into his detention
and issuing guidelines to protect the rights of arrested persons. The court emphasized the
importance of balancing individual rights with crime prevention and ensuring fairness,
openness, and workability in police powers.

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) I SCC 416.

Facts:
 DK Basu served as the Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services in West Bengal, a
non-political organisation. He wrote a letter to the Supreme Court of India, bringing
to its attention news reports about deaths in police custody and lockups. In the letter,
 he highlighted that such cases of custodial violence often went unpunished, despite
efforts made to address the issue.
 He urged the court to investigate this matter and provide compensation to the families
of the victims. He requested that the letter be treated as a Writ Petition under the
category of “Public Interest Litigation.” Recognising the importance of the issues
raised in the letter, the court treated it as a formal petition and the defendants were
notified.

Issues Raised:
 Is there an increase in cases of custodial deaths and violence?
 Is there a need for guidelines governing the arrest and custody of detainees?
 Should police officers be held responsible for custodial deaths and violence?
 Does custodial death and violence constitute a violation of Article 21 of the detainees’
rights?

Arguments from the Petitioner:

 The petitioner argued in DK Basu vs State of West Bengal that the physical and
mental suffering experienced by detainees within police stations or confinement
facilities should be prevented. Whether it involves physical assault or rape in police
custody, the trauma endured extends beyond what the law currently addresses.
 The petitioner further contended in DK Basu case that, as a civilised nation,
significant steps should be taken to eliminate such practices.

Arguments from the Respondent:

 Counsel representing different states and Dr. A.M. Singhvi asserted in DK Basu v
State of West Bengal that everything was already well-established within their
respective states. They presented their beliefs and provided valuable assistance to the
court in examining various aspects of the issue.
 They also made suggestions for the court to establish guidelines aimed at reducing, if
not preventing, custodial violence and providing support to the relatives of those who
die in custody due to torture.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court, in DK Basu vs State of West Bengal referring to the case of Neelabati
Bahera v. State of Orissa (AIR 1993 SC 1960), reiterated that prisoners and detainees should
not be deprived of their Fundamental Rights under Article 21. Only legally permissible
restrictions can be imposed on the enjoyment of their Fundamental Rights.

DK Basu Guidelines:
In light of this, the Apex Court laid down the following guidelines for the arrest and detention
of individuals:
1. Police officers involved in the arrest and interrogation of an arrestee must wear clear,
visible identification and name tags with their designations. Details of all police
personnel handling the interrogation must be recorded in a register.
2. The police officer affecting the arrest must prepare a memo of arrest at the time of
arrest. It should be witnessed by at least one person who may be a family member or a
respected individual from the area where the arrest occurs. The memo should also be
countersigned by the arrested person and include the time and date of the arrest.
3. Any person arrested and held in custody has the right to have a friend, relative, or
someone is known to them informed about their arrest and detention as soon as
possible unless the witness to the arrest is such a friend or relative.
4. The police must notify the time, place of arrest and place of custody of the arrestee to
the next of kin if they live outside the district or town. This notification should be
made through the Legal Aid Organisation in the district and the concerned area’s
police station within 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
5. The person arrested must be informed of their right to have someone informed of their
arrest or detention as soon as they are taken into custody.
6. An entry regarding the arrest must be made in the case diary at the place of detention.
This entry should also include the name of the person informed about the arrest (next
of kin) and the names and details of the police officials responsible for the arrestee.
7. The arrestee, upon request, should be examined at the time of arrest and any visible
injuries on their body, major or minor, should be documented. Both the arrestee and
the police officer should sign an “Inspection Memo,” and a copy should be provided
to the arrestee.
8. The arrestee should undergo a medical examination by a qualified doctor every 48
hours during their custody. These doctors should be on a panel of approved doctors
appointed by the Director of Health Services in the respective State or Union
Territory. Such a panel should be prepared for all Tehsils and Districts.
9. Copies of all documents, including the memo of arrest, should be sent to the
Magistrate for their records.
10. The arrestee may be allowed to meet with their attorney during the interrogation,
although not necessarily throughout the entire process.
11. Police control rooms should be established at all district and state headquarters. The
officer in charge of the arrest must communicate information about the arrest and the
place of custody of the arrestee to the control room within 12 hours of effecting the
arrest. This information should be displayed on a visible notice board at the control
room.

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273

Introduction:
 This is the landmark case where the Supreme Court provided directions to Police to
use their power enshrined under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC).
  In this case, the SC adjudged upon the powers of the Police officers to arrest any
person without a warrant against a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC).
 The case addresses the misuse of this provision, which pertains to cruelty against a
married woman by her husband or his relatives

Facts:
 In this case the marriage between appellant (husband) and the respondent (wife)
marriage was solemnized on 1st July 2007.
 The respondent (wife) alleged that her in-laws demanded the dowry from her, and the
appellant (husband) also supported his parents.
 The respondent was driven out of the matrimonial home due to non- fulfillment of the
dowry demand.
 The appellant denied all the allegations and filed an application for anticipatory bail
which was rejected by the Session Judge and thereafter by the Patna High Court.
 The petitioner was arrested under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act).
 Then the Petitioner had moved to the SC by way of a Special Leave Petition for
anticipatory bail.

Issues Involved:
 Whether the police officer can arrest on a mere allegation commission of non-
bailable, and cognizable offence made against a person?
 Whether there are any remedies available to the person if section 498A of IPC
misused by a woman for her own advantage?
 Whether the decision of the High Court to deny the anticipatory bail was correct?

Observation:
 SC discussed the misuse of section 498A of the IPC where the person is arrested by
the Police on a mere allegation without any decent proof.
 As far as the first issue is concerned the Court observed that, no arrest can be made in
routine manner and the Police Officer would not arrest any person without reasonable
satisfaction after some investigation.
 The Court further overturned the rejection of anticipatory bail by the HC and provided
the bail to the appellant.
 The SC provided some mandatory directions for Police to be followed before
arresting a person to avoid unnecessary arrest of accused.

Directions Given by SC:

 o All the State Governments to instruct its Police officers not to automatically arrest
when a case under section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves
about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from
Section 41, Cr.PC.
o All Police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses
under section 41(1)(b)(ii).
o The Police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and
materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused
before the Magistrate for further detention.
o The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report
furnished by the Police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention.
o The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two
weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which
may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be
recorded in writing.
o Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr. PC be served on the accused
within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by
the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing.
o Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the Police
officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be
punished for contempt of Court to be instituted before High Court having territorial
jurisdiction.
o Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial
Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High
Court.

Conclusion:
 This judgment is cited down in several other landmark judgments in India as has had
a significant impact on the way utilization of Section 41 of CrPC.
 Through this verdict the SC sought to strike a balance between protecting the rights of
women facing genuine harassment and preventing the misuse of the provision.
 The judgment has resulted in reduced instances of automatic arrests and has
emphasized the need for a proper investigation before arresting the accused.

Paramvir Singh Saini vs. Baljit Singh and Ors. (02.12.2020 - SC):
MANU/SC/0908/2020
Facts of the Case:
The case revolves around the issue of custodial violence and the protection of human rights,
particularly concerning the installation of CCTV cameras in police stations and offices of
investigative agencies. The Supreme Court addressed the compliance of its earlier directives
regarding the installation of CCTV cameras in police stations and the use of audio-visual
recording under Section 161(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The petitioner
sought to examine the status of compliance with these directives and the establishment of
oversight committees.

Main Issue:
The main issue in this case was the enforcement of the Supreme Court's directives regarding
the installation of CCTV cameras and oversight committees in police stations and
investigative agencies to curb custodial violence and protect human rights.

Important Arguments:
 The petitioner argued for the strict enforcement of the Supreme Court's directives to
ensure the protection of the rights of accused individuals and undertrial prisoners.
 The respondents provided compliance affidavits, but the reports lacked essential
information regarding the installation of CCTV cameras and the constitution of
oversight committees.
 The Court emphasized the importance of CCTV cameras in preventing custodial
violence and ensuring accountability in law enforcement agencies.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court, comprising a 3-judge division bench, unanimously held that the
installation of CCTV cameras in police stations and offices of investigative agencies is
mandatory to prevent custodial violence and protect human rights. The Court issued detailed
guidelines for the installation, maintenance, and monitoring of CCTV cameras, as well as the
establishment of oversight committees at state and district levels.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Installation of CCTV cameras in police stations and investigative agencies is
mandatory to prevent custodial violence and protect human rights.
 State and district-level oversight committees must be established to monitor the
functioning of CCTV cameras and address grievances.
 Compliance with the Supreme Court's directives is essential for ensuring
accountability and transparency in law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion:
The judgment in Paramvir Singh Saini vs. Baljit Singh & Others is a significant step towards
protecting the rights of individuals in police custody and preventing custodial violence. By
mandating the installation of CCTV cameras and the establishment of oversight committees,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of accountability and transparency in law
enforcement agencies. This decision sets an important precedent for safeguarding human
rights and ensuring justice for all individuals, especially those vulnerable to abuse in
custodial settings.

The Supreme Court also issued orders for the institution of 'Oversight Committees' at the
state level, namely, State Level Oversight Committee ("SLOC") and district level, namely,
District Level Oversight Committee ("DLOC") to expedite the ongoing installation and
maintenance of CCTV cameras in police stations across all States and UTs.

The SLOC must consist of:

 The Secretary/Additional Secretary, Home Department
 Secretary/Additional Secretary, Finance Department;
 The Director General/Inspector General of Police; and
 The Chairperson/member of the State Women's Commission.

Duties of SLOC include:

 Directions passed by the Hon'ble SC are carried out;
 Purchase, distribution, and installation of CCTVs and their equipment;
 Obtaining the budgetary allocation for the same;
 Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and their equipment;
 Carrying out inspections and addressing the grievances received from the DLOC; and
 To call for monthly reports from the DLOC and immediately address any concerns
like faulty equipment.

The DLOC must consist of:

 The Divisional Commissioner/ Commissioner of Divisions/ Regional Commissioner/
Revenue
 Commissioner Division of the District (by whatever name called);
 The District Magistrate of the District;
 A Superintendent of Police of that District; and
 A mayor of a municipality within the district/ a Head of the Zilla Panchayat in rural
areas.

Duties of DLOC include:

 Supervision, maintenance, and upkeep of CCTVs and their equipment;
 Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and their equipment;
 To interact with the Station House Officer ("SHO") as to the functioning and
maintenance of CCTVs and their equipment;
  To send monthly reports to the SLOC about the functioning of CCTVs and allied
equipment and
 To review footage stored from CCTVs in the various Police Stations to check for any
human rights violations that may have occurred but are not reported.

M. Ravindran vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence

(26.10.2020 - SC): MANU/SC/0788/2020
Facts of the Case:
The appellant was arrested and remanded in custody for alleged offences under the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. He applied for bail under Section 167(2) of
the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) before the Special Court in Chennai, citing incomplete
investigation and non-filing of case papers. During the bail hearing, the respondent filed an
additional complaint against the appellant, seeking the rejection of the bail application.
Despite this, the bail was granted by the Court of Appeals. The respondent then appealed to
the Supreme Court, challenging the bail order.

Main Issue:
The main issue in this case was whether the appellant's indefeasible right to bail under
Section 167(2) of the CrPC gets extinguished by the subsequent filing of an additional
complaint by the investigating agency.

Important Arguments:
 The appellant argued that his right to bail under Section 167(2) should not be
invalidated by the filing of an additional complaint after he had exercised his right to
seek bail.
 The respondent contended that the subsequent filing of a complaint should nullify the
appellant's right to bail, as it indicates ongoing investigation and the possibility of
further charges.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the appellant's right to bail under Section 167(2) remains valid
even after the subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the investigating agency. The
Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 167(2) is to ensure prompt completion of
investigation and prevent unnecessary detention. It ruled that the appellant's bail application,
filed before the additional complaint, should be upheld, and the bail order granted by the
Court of Appeals was valid.

Ratio Decidendi:
  The right to bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC remains valid even after the
subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the investigating agency.
 The purpose of Section 167(2) is to prevent unnecessary detention and ensure prompt
completion of investigation.
 Filing additional complaints solely to avoid granting bail is against the principles of
justice and fairness.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's right to bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC
and ruled that the subsequent filing of an additional complaint should not invalidate this right.
It emphasized the importance of ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process and
preventing abuse of power by investigating agencies. The Court's decision clarified the legal
framework surrounding bail applications and reinforced the principles of accountability and
transparency in law enforcement.

Gautam Navlakha v NIA, 2021 SC

Facts of the Case:
Gautam Navlakha, a journalist, and activist, was arrested in connection with the Elgar
Parishad – Bhima Koregaon violence case. This violence erupted during an event
commemorating the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Bhima Koregaon between Dalits and
Marathas. Navlakha's name was added to the FIR about eight months after the event, alleging
his involvement in plotting the violence and having links with Maoists. He was placed under
house arrest, police custody, and judicial custody for over 90 days cumulatively. Navlakha
sought default bail under Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, arguing that his
period of house arrest should be counted towards the 90-day custody requirement.

Main Issue:
The main issue was whether Navlakha's period of house arrest could be considered as
"custody" for the purpose of eligibility for default bail under Section 167 of the CrPC.

Important Arguments:
 Navlakha argued that his house arrest constituted custody as he was under the control
of the authorities and the investigation against him continued during this period.
 The NIA contended that house arrest does not qualify as custody under Section 167,
as the purpose of custody is to enable police interrogation, which was not the case
during house arrest.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court held that Navlakha's period of house arrest could not be considered as
"custody" for the purpose of eligibility for default bail under Section 167 of the CrPC. The
Court emphasized that the order of house arrest was issued by the Delhi High Court, not by a
Magistrate as required under Section 167(2) of CrPC. Therefore, the standards applicable to
Magistrates ordering detention were not followed, and the house arrest did not fall within the
ambit of Section 167.

Ratio Decidendi:
 House arrest ordered by a High Court, not a Magistrate under Section 167, does not
constitute "custody" for the purpose of eligibility for default bail.
 The purpose of custody under Section 167 is to enable police interrogation, which was
not fully applicable during house arrest.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's decision denied Gautam Navlakha's claim for default bail, ruling that
his period of house arrest could not be counted towards the 90-day custody requirement under
Section 167 of the CrPC. This decision clarified the legal interpretation of custody and bail
provisions in cases involving house arrest and set a precedent for future similar cases.

MODULE 4:
State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 622
Headnote:
The respondent, a former Captain of the Indian Army and an employee of a French company
in India, was prosecuted for conspiracy and under sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act
for passing official secrets to a foreign agency. His bail application was initially rejected by
the Sessions judge, but the High Court granted him bail, considering the possibility that his
case might fall under the bailable section 5 rather than the non-bailable section 3. On appeal
by the State, the Supreme Court held that the High Court should have considered the bail
application on the assumption that the offence fell under section 3 and proceeded to evaluate
various factors relevant to bail in non-bailable offences.

Facts of the Case:

Jagjit Singh, along with two others, was charged with conspiracy and under sections 3 and 5
of the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing official secrets to a foreign agency. Singh, a
former Captain in the Indian Army, was working for a French company in India at the time of
his arrest in December 1960. He applied for bail, which was rejected by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Delhi. Singh then approached the High Court under section 498 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for bail.
Main Issue:
The main issue was whether the High Court correctly granted bail to the respondent without
considering whether the offence was bailable or non-bailable under sections 3 and 5 of the
Official Secrets Act.

Important Arguments:
 The respondent argued that his case might fall under the bailable section 5 of the Act,
and therefore, he should be granted bail.
 The State contended that the High Court erred in granting bail without considering the
seriousness of the offence and other relevant factors associated with non-bailable
offences.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error by not considering whether
the offence under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act was bailable or non-bailable. Even if
the High Court was hesitant to determine the applicability of sections 3 or 5 at that stage, it
should have proceeded to evaluate the bail application assuming the offence was non-bailable
under section 3. The Court emphasized that various factors, such as the nature of the offence,
character of evidence, likelihood of absconding, tampering with witnesses, and public
interest, should have been considered before granting bail in a non-bailable offence. As the
offence under section 3 was serious and prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, the
High Court's decision to grant bail was erroneous.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Courts must determine whether an offence is bailable or non-bailable before
considering a bail application.
 Whenever an application for bail is made to a court, the first question that it has to
decide is whether the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted is bailable or
otherwise. If the offence is bailable, bail will be granted under Section 436 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure without more ado; but if the offence is not bailable,
further considerations will arise and the court will decide the question of grant of bail
in the light of those further considerations.
 Bail should be granted in non-bailable offences only after considering various factors,
including the nature and seriousness of the offence, the likelihood of the accused
absconding, tampering with witnesses, and public interest.
 Among other considerations, which a court has to take into account in deciding
whether bail should be granted in a non-bailable offence, is the nature of the offence;
and if the offence is of a kind in which bail should not be granted considering its
seriousness, the court should refuse bail even though it has very wide powers under
Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order granting bail to
the respondent. The Court emphasized that bail should not be granted in serious non-bailable
offences without considering the relevant factors. The Sessions Judge was directed to ensure
that the trial of the respondent commenced within two months from the date of the order.

Moti Ram v. State of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47

Introduction:
 This case deals with the issue of granting bail by the Magistrate under the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) with or without sureties.
 It was noted in this case that the rights of the accused cannot be nullified by fixing a
high amount of surety.

Facts:
 The Magistrate ordered the appellant to be released on bail subject to the satisfaction
of the Magistrate.
 The Magistrate ordered the surety bond of Rs 10000/- to be produced, but the
petitioner could not procure the huge sum by himself.
 The Magistrate made an order refusing to accept suretyship from the petitioner’s
brother.
 The reason recorder for refusing the suretyship from the brother of petitioner was that
his assets were in another district.
 The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court to modify the order and release him on
furnishing the bond of Rs 2000/- or on executing a personal bond or passing any other
order or direction.

Issues Involved:
 Whether the High Court or the Subordinate Courts have powers to enlarge a person on
his own bond without sureties?
 Whether there are any criteria to quantify the amount of bail while releasing any
person on surety?
 Is it within the power of the court to reject a surety because he or his estate is situated
in a different District or State?

Observations:
 The Court observed that “Social Justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and
the little man in peril of losing his liberty is the consumer of social justice”.
  The SC noted that the grant of bail will lose its purpose if the Court is powerless to
dispense bail with surety.
 The Court observed that the basic purpose of bail is to ensure that an accused person
undergoes trial if he is out on bail.
 The Court further said that “The discrimination arises even if the amount of the bail
fixed by the Magistrate is not high, for a large majority of those who are brought
before the Courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would find it difficult to
furnish bail even in a small amount”.
 Bail covers release on one's bond with or without sureties, to foster social justice,
individual freedom and indigent's rights justify.
 The Court said that Section 436 of CrPC speaks of bail, but the proviso makes a
contradiction between bail and own bond without sureties, and this creates ambiguity.
 The Bail covers both release on one’s own bond with or without sureties.
 Also, when sureties should be demanded and what sum should be insisted on are
dependent on several other factors.

Conclusion:
 The Court held that monetary bail is not an indispensable element of the Criminal
procedure.
 The Court said the Magistrate should not consider the points if the person belongs to
the south and committed some offence in north and had no money for sureties or he
may not know any one there then it's impossible to furnish the sureties.
 The Court ordered the Magistrate to release the petitioner on his own bond in a sum of
Rs 1000/-.

Notes:
 Section 436, CrPC, 1973 - In what cases bail to be taken —
(1) When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or
detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought
before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage
of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail:
Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, and shall, if such person is
indigent and is unable to furnish surety, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge
him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.
Explanation. —Where a person is unable to give bail within a week of the date of his arrest, it
shall be a sufficient ground for the officer or the Court to presume that he is an indigent
person for the purposes of this proviso:

Provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sub-
section (3) of section 116 or section 446A.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person has failed to
comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the
Court may refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he
appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any such refusal shall be without
prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the
penalty thereof under section 446.

Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118

Introduction:
 This case deals with the exercise of judicial discretion while granting bail under
Section 437 and Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
 The facts and circumstances of the cases illustrate the factors and conditions under
which bail may be granted to an accused.

Facts:
 In this case the appellants were suspended police officer who were accused of the
offence of murdering a notorious dacoit.
 The Magistrate declined to release them on bail then they approached session judge
under Section 439 of CrPC and secured released on bail.
 The Delhi High Court cancelled the bail granted by the Session Court during appeal
against which a Special Leave Petition (SLP) appeal was filed before Supreme Court.

Issues Involved:
 Whether it is possible to define exact factors which should be considered by the
Courts while granting or rejecting the bail?
 Whether there is an overriding consideration in granting bail?

Observations:
 The Court observed that the Section 437(1) of CrPC is only concerned with the Court
of Magistrate and there is no provision under Section 437(1), when the accused is for
the first time produced after initial arrest before the Court of Session or before HC.
 If the accused with the allegation against him of the offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, then the Court of Magistrate has no other option except
rejection of the bail.
 Under Section 439(1) it confers the special powers to the HC or Session Court in
respect of bail.
 The common point in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) are the nature and
gravity of the circumstances in which the offences are committed; the position and
status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses.
  The Session Court and the HC may be approached by the accused after refusal of bail
by the Magistrate under Section 437.
 There are two paramount considerations to be looked into while granting bail:
 Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; and
 Tampering with prosecution evidence related to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a
court of Justice.
 The Court said as far as the bail of the offence punishable with death or life
imprisonment is concerned, it is necessary for the Court to consider whether the
evidence discloses a prima facie case to warrant his detention in jail besides the other
relevant factors.

Conclusion:
The Court finally held that the Session Court was wrong while granting bail to the accused
and unable to appreciate the evidence, hence appeals dismissed.

Notes:
 CrPC, Sec. 437
 CrPC, Sec. 439

Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012)1 SCC 40

INTRODUCTION:
This case is related to Section 437 and 439 of CrPC, and the principle that It is not in the
interest of justice that the accused should be in jail for an indefinite period during trial.

FACTS:
 The Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi had rejected Bail Applications filed by the
appellants. They moved to High Court of Delhi under Section 439 CrPC, but HC also
refused to grant bail to the accused-appellants in this case. Hence, they moved to
Supreme Court.
 The appellants were facing trials in respect of offences under Sections 420-B, 468,
471 and 109 IPC and others. (cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property,
forgery for the purpose of cheating using as genuine a forged document)
 Both the courts refused the bail on two grounds:
1. The primary offence alleged against the accused persons is very serious
involving deep rooted planning in which huge financial loss is caused to the
State Exchequer
2. The secondary ground is that the possibility of the accused persons tempering
with the witness
ISSUE:
Were the appellants entitled to be granted bail in the case? Held: Yes on the principle that : It
was not in the interest of justice that the accused should be in jail for an indefinite period
during trial.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURT:

Sec. 437(1) & 439(1)
 Sec. 439(1) CrPC confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in
respect of bail.
 There is no ban imposed under Sec. 439(1) against granting of bail by HC or the
Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life while same band has been given in sec. 437(1).
 The considerations/factors in granting bail which are common both in the case of
Section 437(1) and sec 439, CrPC are:
1. The nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed
2. The position and status of the accused
3. The likelihood of the accused:
 Of fleeing from justice
 Of repeating the offence
 Of jeopardizing his own life being faced with grim prospect of possible
convicton in the case
 Of tampering with witness
4. The history of the case as well as of its investigation

In answer to ISSUE:
 The court observed that there were 17 accused persons. Statements of witnesses runs
to several hundred pages and the documents on which reliance was placed by the
prosecution, was voluminous. The trial could have taken considerable time and it
looked to the court that the appellants who were in jail would then have to remain in
jail longer than the period of detention, had they been convicted.
 It was not in the interest of justice that the accused should be in jail for an indefinite
period.
 The court observed that even if the offence alleged against the appellants is a serious
one in terms of huge loss to the State Exchequer.
 But that should not deter the court from releasing the appellants on bail when there is
no serious contention of the respondents that the accused if released on bail, would
interfere with the trial or temper with the evidence.

LAW:
  The court observed that “in bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from
earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person
at his trial by reasonable amount of bail.”
 The court retraced the law from Babba v. State of Maharashtra 2005, that when there
is a delay in the trial, bail should be granted to the accused.

HELD:
The court while observing the fact that investigating agency had already completed the
investigation and the charge sheet was already filed before the Special Judge, CBI, and
ordered to release the appellants on bail to the satisfaction of the Special Judge, CBI, New
Delhi on the conditions given the court in the judgement.

Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565

Facts of the Case:
 Mr. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, a former Minister of Irrigation and Power in the
Government of Punjab, along with other individuals, faced serious allegations of
corruption and misuse of power.
 They applied for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.) in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana after apprehending
arrest.
 The High Court dismissed their application, but the Supreme Court allowed it on
special leave to appeal.

Relevant Laws:
 Sections 437 and 438 of the Cr.P.C. deal with the grant of bail for non-bailable
offences and anticipatory bail, respectively.
 The aim of these provisions was clarified in the case of Ashok Kumar v. State of
Rajasthan.
 Section 438 provides for the procedure of granting anticipatory bail and its conditions.

Arguments:
 Appellants:
1. Contended that their high positions and social status made them unlikely to
abscond or evade trial.
2. Argued that the discretion of granting anticipatory bail should not be limited
by the circumstances outlined by the High Court's Full Bench.
3. Asserted that denial of bail violated the Right to life and personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution.
 High Court's Full Bench:
 1. Emphasized the exceptional nature of the power to grant anticipatory bail and
advocated for its restricted use.
2. Stated that anticipatory bail cannot be granted for offences not yet committed
or accusations not yet made.
3. Highlighted specific limitations and conditions for granting anticipatory bail,
especially in cases of grave economic offences involving corruption.

Judgement:
 The Supreme Court held that the discretion of granting anticipatory bail must be
exercised objectively, with provisions for correction by higher courts if needed.
 Provided guidelines for the exercise of discretionary power, emphasizing reasonable
apprehension of arrest, limitations on bail for severe offences, and imposition of
conditions for efficient investigation.
 Interim bail orders can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor but must be
mandatorily issued afterward.
 Filing of FIR is not a prerequisite for anticipatory bail under Section 438.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Discretionary power for anticipatory bail should be exercised judiciously, considering
individual circumstances and ensuring a balance between personal liberty and
investigative powers.
 Reasonable apprehension of arrest is a prerequisite for anticipatory bail, which cannot
be denied arbitrarily.
 Imposition of conditions and limitations may be necessary for efficient investigation
and to prevent misuse of bail provisions.

Conclusion:
 The decision of the Constitutional Bench upheld the importance of discretion in
granting anticipatory bail while providing guidelines to prevent its misuse.
 Emphasized the need for a balance between personal liberty and investigative powers,
ensuring fairness and justice in the criminal justice system.
 Anticipatory bail serves as a safeguard for individual liberty but is not a shield against
accusations or crimes.

State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411

Facts:
 The respondent, Amitabh Bachchan, along with co-accused Vidya Charan Shukla,
faced charges in connection with the destruction of the film "Kissa Kursi Ka", which
portrayed political events involving Bachchan and his mother, Indira Gandhi.
  The film faced censorship issues, and when a court directed its screening, Bachchan
and Shukla allegedly conspired to destroy it.
 Evidence suggested that film spools were destroyed at the premises of Maruti
Limited, where Bachchan was the Managing Director.
 Witnesses, including employees and security officers of Maruti Limited, provided
statements regarding the destruction of the film and attempts to tamper with evidence.

Main Issue:
The main issue revolved around the cancellation of Amitabh Bachchan's bail, as the
prosecution alleged he was tampering with witnesses and interfering with the judicial
process.

Important Arguments:
 The prosecution argued that Bachchan, charged with serious offenses, should not have
been granted bail initially, especially considering the subsequent escalation of
charges.
 They presented evidence of Bachchan's attempts to tamper with witnesses, including
complaints filed by witnesses themselves.
 The defense contended that the prosecution was politically motivated and that the
charges were exaggerated.
 They objected to the consideration of new evidence not presented before the High
Court.
 The defense argued that witnesses turning hostile did not necessarily indicate
tampering by Bachchan and should not lead to bail cancellation.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court upheld the prosecution's appeal to cancel Bachchan's bail, citing
evidence of attempted witness tampering.
 They emphasized that cancellation of bail requires a preponderance of evidence, not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
 The Court found sufficient evidence, including complaints from witnesses, to
conclude that Bachchan had abused his liberty.
 The cancellation of bail was limited to one month, after which Bachchan could seek
fresh bail.

Ratio:
 The power to cancel bail should be exercised cautiously but can be justified if there is
a preponderance of evidence indicating interference with the judicial process.
 Witnesses turning hostile may suggest tampering, but additional evidence is needed to
establish the accused's involvement.
  The cancellation of bail should balance the interests of justice with considerations of
fairness and mercy.

Conclusion:
 The appeal was allowed partly, and Amitabh Bachchan's bail was canceled for one
month, after which he could seek fresh bail.
 The Court's decision underscored the need for caution in bail cancellations and
emphasized the importance of balancing justice with mercy.

P. Chidambaram vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

SCC article (IMP.)
Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of R Banumathi, AS Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ has
granted bail to former Finance Minister and senior Congress leader P Chidambaram in
connection with the INX Media case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Chidambaram is currently in the custody of Enforcement Directorate (ED) till October 24 in
the INX Media money laundering case. Chidambaram, who is currently in judicial custody in
Tihar jail, had filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the apex court days after the High
Court dismissed his bail plea contending that he might influence the witnesses in the case.
When the Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted before the Court that “flight risk” of
economic offenders should be looked at as a national phenomenon and be dealt with in that
manner merely because certain other offenders have flown out of the country, the Court said
that the same cannot, be put in a straight-jacket formula so as to deny bail to the one who is
before the Court, due to the conduct of other offenders, if the person under consideration is
otherwise entitled to bail on the merits of his own case. Hence, such consideration including
as to “flight risk” is to be made on individual basis being uninfluenced by the unconnected
cases, more so, when the personal liberty is involved.
The Court noticed that Chidambaram was neither a “flight risk” nor there was possibility of
his abscondence and said that Chidambaram
“being the Member of Parliament and a Senior Member of the Bar has strong
roots in society and his passport having been surrendered and “look out notice”
issued against him, there is no likelihood of his fleeing away from the country or
his abscondence from the trial.”
On the allegation of possibility of influencing the witnesses, the Court noticed,
“Till the date, there has been no allegation regarding influencing of any witness
by the appellant or his men directly or indirectly. In the number of remand
applications, there was no whisper that any material witness has been
approached not to disclose information about the appellant and his son. It
appears that only at the time of opposing the bail and in the counter affidavit
filed by the CBI before the High Court, the averments were made.”
The Court observed that CBI has no direct evidence against Chidambaram regarding the
allegation of appellant directly or indirectly influencing the witnesses. It further noticed that
the conclusion of the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court “…that it cannot be ruled out
that the petitioner will not influence the witnesses directly or indirectly……” is not
substantiated by any materials and is only a generalised apprehension and appears to be
speculative. It, hence, held,
“Mere averments that the appellant approached the witnesses and the assertion
that the appellant would further pressurize the witnesses, without any material
basis cannot be the reason to deny regular bail to the appellant; more so, when
the appellant has been in custody for nearly two months, co-operated with the
investigating agency and the charge sheet is also filed.”
Setting aside the Delhi High Court judgment, the Court, hence, directed that Chidambaram be
released on bail if not required in another case subject to the condition of his executing bail
bonds for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with two sureties of like sum to the satisfaction of the
Special CBI Judge. The Court further directed,
“The passport if already not deposited, shall be deposited with the Special Court
and Chidambaram shall not leave the country without leave of the Special Court
and subject to the order that may be passed by the Special Judge from time to
time. He shall make himself available for interrogation as and when required.”

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.
ABSTRACT:
Sushila Aggarwal v. NCT of Delhi is a landmark judgement of the Supreme Court as it made
crystal clear that there is no provision of time restriction in the applicability of an anticipatory
bail, granted under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), 1973. In other
words, it implies that no time limit could be fixed while granting anticipatory bail and that the
protection under section 438 can continue till the end of the trial.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the light of the conflicting views of the different Benches of varying strength regarding the
scope of Section 438 of the CrPC, which provides for grant of anticipatory bail and its
limitations, a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court. The question that
was put forth before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition was heard by a
constitutional bench headed by Justice Kurian Joseph as it noted contradictory views in
earlier judgments as to whether an anticipatory bail should be for a limited period of time or
not.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT:

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decided a reference made in Sushila Aggarwal &
Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. , where two questions had been posed for consideration:
(1) Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 Cr.P.C. should be
limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial Court
and seek regular bail?
(2) Whether the life of anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the
accused is summoned by the court?

RATIO OF THE COURT:

 As regard to the first issue, the court held that the protection granted under section
438 cannot be limited to a fixed period of time and should be in favour of the accused
without any restrictions on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with
Section 438 (2) should be imposed. At the same time, it was also recognised that it is
always open to the court to impose conditions owing to circumstances which are
peculiar in nature. However, it must be noted that the need to impose restrictive
conditions would have to be judged on a case-to-case basis, depending upon the
materials produced by the state or the investigating agency.
 The court while answering the second issue held that the life or duration of
anticipatory bail order does not normally end at the time and stage when the accused
is summoned by the court, or when the charges are framed, but can continue till the
end of the trial. It further added that if there are any special or peculiar features
necessitating the Court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open to do so.
 Thus, it is clear from above that there is nothing in section 438 Cr.P.C that indicates
the grant of anticipatory bail should be time-bound. Further, it is discretionary power
of the Court to decide on a case-to-case basis and impose a time limit while granting
pre-arrest Bail.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

 On 29th January, 2020, the five judge bench of the Supreme Court in the Sushila
Aggarwal and others Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another unanimously held that
anticipatory bail should not be time bound and can be granted to an accused till the
conclusion of the trial.
 The court finally settled the controversy by concluding that there is no limitation on
the life of the anticipatory bail as long as the court does not put the same down while
granting the said anticipatory bail. The court has to look at it from the facts of case to
case, should have reasons to believe that there is an apprehension of an arrest of the
concerned person and put the conditions, it deems fit to be applied to, while granting
the said anticipatory bail.
 There is no such limitation on the anticipatory bail as per the statute but the same
entirely lies on the discretion of the court. If the court issuing the order of the
anticipatory bail has any reason to believe the inclusion of such conditions is
necessary, it may put them in while granting the said order of anticipatory bail. Thus,
 this means that any limitations or conditions which are not specifically mentioned in
the statute are completely at the broad discretion of the court issuing the said order.
 The court laid down following points that has to be kept in mind by the courts while
dealing with applications under section 438 of the Cr.P.C.:-
a. When a person complains of apprehension of arrest and approaches for order,
the application should be based on concrete facts such as relating to the
offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends arrest, as well as his
side of the story, and not vague or general allegations, relatable to one or other
specific offence.
b. Application for anticipatory bail could be filed by a person before the FIR
(First Information Report) as soon as the facts make clear there is a substantial
reason for the arrest.
c. Depending on the seriousness of the threat of arrest, the Court should issue
notice to the Public Prosecutor and obtain facts, even while granting limited
interim anticipatory bail.
d. The Court held that nothing in Section 438 of Cr.P.C. compels or obliges the
Court to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time or upon filing of
FIR or recording of statement of witness. The Court while granting
anticipatory bail, should examine the seriousness and gravity of the offence
(like nature of the crime, material placed on records, etc.) to impose any
condition on the petitioner, if necessary.
e. Anticipatory bail can be continued after filing of charge sheet till the end of
the trial.
f. An order granting anticipatory bail cannot operate in respect of a future
incident that involves commission of an offence and thus, should not be
'blanket' order.
g. The anticipatory bail does not in any manner restrict or limit the rights or
duties of police or investigating agencies. It also laid down that it is open for
the police or investigating agency under Section 439(2) to move to the court to
arrest the accused in certain cases
h. The correctness of an anticipatory bail order is open to be considered by an
appellate or superior court on the request of the investigating agency or the
state and the order may be set aside on the ground of non-consideration of
material facts and crucial circumstances, doing so does not amount to
cancellation of the order but is rather equivalent to setting it aside. The
Supreme Court rightly held that section 438 cannot be time bound and thus,
gave rest to a long-standing question on the time period of an order granting
anticipatory bail.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:

Thus, having discussed about the several judicial pronouncements of the apex court, it can be
rightly said that there is no such hard and fast rule in the grant of anticipatory bail. In reality,
the discretion is of the court which is adjudicating the anticipatory bail application. The court,
while granting anticipatory bail, should follow the fundamental cannon of criminal
jurisprudence that every individual is presumed to be innocent till he or she is found guilty.
The main purpose for incorporating Section 438 in Cr.P.C. was that the liberty of an
individual should not be unnecessarily jeopardised. Right to life and personal liberty are one
of the important fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and therefore, no person
should be confined or detained in any manner unless he has been held guilty.
Anticipatory bail is one of the foremost hotly debated subjects within the Indian criminal
justice system. While, on one hand, it is said to be the custodian of the basic right of life and
liberty of an individual, it is also seen as a burden in some way to waste judicial time. In a
country that already battles with extreme pendency of cases, the cases are increasing at a
higher rate as some influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the
purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail. This
increases the court’s burden making the justice delivery system slow and passive.

Mehboob Dawood Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra

Facts:
 On 11th October 2002, a complaint was lodged by Sunil Nyaneshwar Yadav regarding
a communal riot in Solapur.
 During the incident, a group removed the idol of Shakti, leading to a scuffle where
Chanderkant Arjun was stabbed.
 The appellant was accused of instigating the mob and being responsible for riots in
Solapur.
 The appellant was granted bail earlier due to the sole allegation of instigation.
 The State filed an application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging suppression of facts and subsequent threats to
witnesses by the appellant.
 A police affidavit stated that the appellant threatened the complainant in the court
premises during trial.

Main Issue:
Whether the bail granted earlier should be cancelled due to the alleged threats made by the
appellant to witnesses, despite being on trial for instigation and involvement in a communal
riot.

Important Arguments:
For the State:
 The trust reposed in the appellant by granting bail was betrayed when he threatened
witnesses, thus interfering with the course of justice.
 The threat to witnesses creates a likelihood of tampering with evidence, warranting
cancellation of bail.
 A case was registered based on the threats made by the appellant, supporting the
State's contention.
For the Appellant:
 The cancellation of bail application should have been heard by the judge who granted
bail initially, maintaining judicial consistency.
 Mere allegations of threats without proper enquiry should not suffice for cancellation
of bail, as it could lead to routine misuse.
 The absence of any reference to the threat in trial records doesn't disprove its
occurrence.

Court's Decision:
 The Court emphasized the distinction between granting bail and cancelling it, noting
that cancellation is warranted when the accused interferes with justice.
 The Court upheld the cancellation of bail, citing the seriousness of threats to witnesses
and potential tampering with evidence.
 The absence of explicit trial record regarding threats didn't nullify the affidavit's
contentions.
 It dismissed the appeal, urging expeditious trial completion and leaving the door open
for future bail applications.

Ratio:
 Grounds for cancellation of bail include interference with the course of justice,
witness tampering, or similar activities hindering investigation or trial.
 Judicial consistency in handling bail matters is desirable, but deviations are
permissible when grounds for cancellation differ from those considered during bail
grant.

Conclusion:
The Bombay High Court upheld the cancellation of bail granted earlier to the appellant,
considering the serious nature of the alleged threats to witnesses. The Court underscored the
importance of expeditious trial completion and left room for future bail applications to be
dealt with in accordance with the law.

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Facts:
 Arnab Goswami, editor-in-chief of Republic TV and managing director of ARG
Outlier Media Asianet News Pvt. Ltd., was arrested on 4th November 2020 under an
FIR registered on 5th May 2018.
 The FIR was filed by Akshyata Anvay Naik, spouse of deceased Anvay Naik, alleging
non-payment of dues for an interior design project, leading to the suicide of Anvay
Naik and his mother.
  ARG Outlier Media Pvt. Ltd. addressed a closure letter to the informant stating the
payment of dues by April 2020, but the case was reopened after a broadcast on
Republic TV.
 Arnab Goswami's bail application was denied by the High Court of Bombay, leading
to an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Main Issue:
Whether Arnab Goswami should be granted interim bail considering the allegations against
him and the denial of bail by the High Court.

Important Arguments:
For Arnab Goswami:
 The arrest was allegedly rooted in malice due to his criticism of the Maharashtra
government and police, indicating targeted harassment.
 The allegations in the FIR do not establish the offence of abetment under Section 306
of the IPC, and even if accepted, no case of abetment is made out.
 The judgment in Habib Jeelani was wrongly interpreted, and there was no reasonable
basis for Arnab Goswami's detention.
 In the interest of preserving personal liberty, bail should be granted as the default rule
is 'bail, not jail.
For the State of Maharashtra:
 The High Court refrained from expressing a prima facie view on mala fides, giving
the State an opportunity to file its counter.
 Instigation to commit suicide can be inferred from circumstances, and the court has no
obligation to form a firm view but only a tentative opinion while considering
quashing proceedings.
 A hierarchy of courts exists for bail applications under Section 439 CrPC, and
bypassing it to grant bail to Arnab Goswami is unwarranted.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The Supreme Court held that human liberty is a precious constitutional value, subject
to regulation by validly enacted legislation, and recognized the inherent power of
High Courts under Section 482 of CrPC to make orders necessary to give effect to its
provisions.
 The court emphasized the duty of High Courts to function as protectors of liberty and
ensure that the law does not become a tool for targeted harassment.

Judgment:
  The Supreme Court ordered the release of Arnab Goswami on bail, stating that the
writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution and it is the duty of High
Courts to protect liberty.
 The Court highlighted concerns about the misuse of State power and the large number
of pending bail applications across India.

Conclusion:
The judgment reaffirms the importance of personal liberty and the role of courts in
safeguarding it. It addresses concerns of targeted harassment and emphasizes the duty of
courts to ensure the fair application of law. The case highlights the need for a balance
between law enforcement and individual rights in a democratic society.

UOI v KA Najeeb, 2021 SC

Facts:
 The appellant, charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
("UAPA"), was allegedly promoting the Khalistani terror movement.
 The appellant had been in jail for over 5 years and only 19 out of 106 witnesses had
been examined.
 The appellant's trial was already underway, with 22 witnesses, including protected
witnesses, examined.
 The appellant's involvement in facilitating terrorist activities and exchanging large
sums of money was alleged.
 The investigation was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in 2020
due to the severity of the charges.
 Charges were framed in 2021 based on allegations of illegal funding from "Sikhs for
Justice" to further separatist ideology and preparatory acts.

Main Issue:
Whether the appellant should be granted bail despite the delay in trial and his alleged
involvement in terrorist activities.

Important Arguments:
For the Appellant:
 Citing Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, the appellant argued that the right to speedy
trial is a fundamental right and a ground for bail in UAPA cases.
 The appellant's trial had been delayed, and his name was missing from relevant
documentation, indicating lack of evidence against him.
 The appellant's involvement in terrorist activities was not conclusively proven, and he
had not received any funds or incriminating evidence was found on his phone.
For the State:
 Section 43 D(5) of UAPA provides for sufficient material to prove the appellant's
incriminating role.
 The appellant's disclosure statement implicated him in facilitating terrorist activities
and procuring weapons.
 The charges relate to a terrorist gang, not an individual, operating at the behest of a
proscribed terrorist organization.

Ratio Decidendi:
 Mere delay in trial is not a ground for bail in grave offences under UAPA.
 The appellant's alleged complicity in terrorist activities, supported by evidence,
outweighs the delay in trial.

Judgment:
 The Supreme Court denied bail to the appellant, citing prima facie evidence of his
involvement in terrorist activities and the seriousness of the charges against him.
 The Court distinguished the case from K.A. Najeeb, emphasizing the appellant's
ongoing trial and the nature of the charges.
 The Court highlighted the possibility of key witnesses being influenced if the
appellant was released on bail, supporting the denial of bail.

Conclusion:
The judgment underscores the importance of national security and the severity of charges
under UAPA. It prioritizes public safety over individual liberty in cases involving terrorism.
The decision reaffirms the stringent criteria for granting bail in grave offences, particularly
those related to terrorism.

Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh LL 2021 SC 391

Facts:
 The appellant, along with 83 other private persons, was implicated in a First
Information Report (FIR) registered seven years ago.
 The appellant claims to be a supplier of stone, for which royalty was paid in advance
to the holders, and denies involvement in the tendering process.
 The appellant had joined the investigation voluntarily before approaching the Court,
and a chargesheet was ready to be filed against him.
 Despite cooperation with the investigation, an arrest memo was issued against the
appellant, prompting the appellant to seek anticipatory bail.
Main Issue:
 The main issue before the court was whether the anticipatory bail application of the
appellant should have been allowed, considering that a chargesheet was ready to be
filed against him.

Important Arguments:
 The respondent argued that according to Section 170 of the Cr.P.C., the trial court
could not take the chargesheet on record unless the accused was taken into custody.
 The appellant relied on judicial precedents, including a Delhi High Court decision,
which interpreted Section 170 as not mandating the arrest of the accused before filing
the chargesheet.
 The appellant contended that personal liberty is a fundamental aspect of the
constitutional mandate, and arrest should only be made when absolutely necessary,
such as in cases of custodial investigation or heinous crimes.
Court's Decision:
The Court, after considering the arguments presented, set aside the impugned order and
allowed the appeal. The Court held that the requirement for the accused to be taken into
custody before filing the chargesheet was misplaced and contrary to the intent of Section 170
of the Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that if the Investigating Officer had no reason to believe
that the accused would abscond or disobey summons, there was no compulsion to arrest the
accused. The Court noted that personal liberty should be safeguarded, and routine arrests
could cause harm to an individual's reputation and self-esteem.

Ratio:
The Court's decision establishes that the requirement for the accused to be taken into custody
before filing the chargesheet, as interpreted under Section 170 of the Cr.P.C., is not
mandatory. The Court emphasized the importance of personal liberty and reasoned that arrest
should only be made when absolutely necessary, considering factors such as the nature of the
crime and the cooperation of the accused with the investigation.

Conclusion:
The Court's decision grants relief to the appellant by allowing the appeal and setting aside the
impugned order. It clarifies the interpretation of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C., highlighting that
arrest should not be made a pre-requisite for filing the chargesheet unless absolutely
necessary. The decision underscores the importance of protecting personal liberty and
avoiding routine arrests, particularly when the accused has cooperated with the investigation.

Satender Kumar Antil vs Central Bureau Of Investigation 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577
https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/editorial/satender-kumar-antil-case#:~:text=In%20case
%20of%20Satender%20Kumar,of%20undertrial%20and%20granting%20bail.

MODULE 5:

Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. UOI (2005) 8 SCC 202

Facts:
 This writ petition is an offshoot of WP(C) No.150/1997, which pertained to alleged
irregularities and illegalities committed by respondent No.3 (Ms. Neera Yadav), who
was respondent No.7 in the earlier writ petition.
 The main grievance in the present petition relates to the appointment of Ms. Neera
Yadav as Chief Secretary of the State of Uttar Pradesh (Respondent No.2).
 Ms. Neera Yadav had previously served as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) from 10.1.1994 to
8.11.1995.
 Allegations of corruption were made against Ms. Neera Yadav, leading to
investigations by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and a Commission of
Inquiry under a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court.
 Despite the ongoing investigations and pending criminal cases, Ms. Neera Yadav was
appointed as Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh on 30.4.2005, which the petitioner
challenged in the present writ petition.

Main Issue:
The main issue before the court was whether the appointment of Ms. Neera Yadav as Chief
Secretary of Uttar Pradesh was proper, considering the allegations of corruption against her
and the ongoing investigations.

Important Arguments:
 The petitioner argued that Ms. Neera Yadav's appointment violated norms fixed by the
Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training, and raised concerns
about her tainted reputation and doubtful integrity.
 The respondents argued that until a person is found guilty, they should be presumed
innocent, and questioned the maintainability of the writ petition.
 The petitioner contended that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
did not apply to the facts of the case, as acts of corruption are not protected by that
provision.

Court's Decision:
The Court directed the Allahabad High Court to ensure the prompt disposal of Criminal
Revision No. 2284 of 2004 within three months. Regarding the appointment of Ms. Neera
Yadav as Chief Secretary, the Court held that it was improper, considering the ongoing
investigations and the importance of transparency in government actions. The Court ordered
the State Government to transfer Ms. Neera Yadav to some other post within seven days.

Ratio:
The Court emphasized the importance of transparency in government actions, especially
regarding appointments to sensitive posts. It held that until a person is found guilty, they
should be presumed innocent, but in this case, the appointment of Ms. Neera Yadav as Chief
Secretary raised concerns about the perception of justice being done.

Conclusion:
The Court's decision to direct the transfer of Ms. Neera Yadav from the post of Chief
Secretary highlighted the importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in
government actions. It underscored the need for transparency and caution in appointments to
sensitive positions, especially in cases where allegations of corruption are pending
investigation.

Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab and Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 1

Introduction:
The case involves Prakash Singh Badal, former Chief Minister of Punjab, and his son
Shukhbir Singh Badal, who were charged under corruption offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioners challenged the notifications issued by the State of
Punjab, which extended the jurisdiction of the Vigilance Bureau and appointed special judges
for trials under the Act.

Facts:
 Prakash Singh Badal served as the Chief Minister of Punjab and was the leader of the
opposition in the Legislative Assembly.
 His son, Shukhbir Singh Badal, was a secretary of Shriromani Akali Dal and a
member of Lok Sabha.
 Amarinder Singh, the present Chief Minister of Punjab, was once a member of the
Shriromani Akali Dal but later joined the Congress.
 In 2001, Amarinder Singh wrote a letter to Prakash Singh Badal regarding the
exchange of properties.
 In 2002, Amarinder Singh allegedly started a defamatory campaign against Prakash
Singh Badal and his son.
  In June 2003, a complaint was filed against Prakash Singh Badal and his son under
various sections of the IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 The State of Punjab issued notifications extending the jurisdiction of the Vigilance
Bureau and appointing special judges for trials under the Act.
 Prakash Singh Badal and his son challenged these notifications, alleging invalidity
and malice.

Main Issues:
 Validity of the notifications issued by the State of Punjab extending the jurisdiction of
the Vigilance Bureau and appointing special judges.
 Requirement of sanction for prosecuting public servants under the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
 Allegations of malice and political vendetta in the filing of charges against the
petitioners.

Arguments:
 Petitioners argued that the notifications were invalid as they were issued without
consultation with the High Court, contrary to constitutional provisions.
 They also contended that only the central government, not the state, had the power to
issue such notifications.
 Petitioners claimed that the prosecution failed to obtain sanction before filing charges
against them, as required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
 They further alleged that the prosecution was politically motivated and filed with
malicious intent.
 Respondents argued that the notifications were valid and issued with consultation
with the High Court.
 They asserted that sanction was not required as the petitioners had ceased to be public
servants by the time charges were filed.
 Respondents denied any malice or political vendetta in the prosecution.

Court's Decision:
 The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the
notifications were valid and issued with consultation.
 The High Court also ruled that no sanction was required as the petitioners had ceased
to be public servants when charges were filed.
 The Supreme Court upheld the decision, stating that immunity under Section 6 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act does not apply if the accused ceased to be a public
servant when charges were filed.
 The Court rejected claims of malice, stating that they were not substantiated.

Ratio:
  Public servants facing prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act do not
require sanction if they cease to be public servants when charges are filed.
 Immunity under Section 6 of the Act does not apply if the accused is no longer a
public servant at the time charges are filed.
 Allegations of malice require substantiation and cannot be accepted without evidence.

Conclusion:
The case of Parkash Singh Badal and anr v. State of Punjab and Ors highlights the importance
of sanctions for prosecuting public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It
clarifies that immunity under the Act does not extend to individuals who are no longer public
servants at the time charges are filed. Additionally, the case emphasizes the need for evidence
to substantiate claims of malice or political vendetta in prosecutions against public servants.

Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2011)9 SCC 272 114

Facts:
 Mohan Singh, the appellant, appealed against the judgment of the High Court
upholding his conviction by the Sessions Court for criminal conspiracy for murder
and extortion.
 The case stemmed from events where the appellant demanded money from the
informant, Vikas Kumar Jha, and his family, threatening dire consequences if the
demand was not met.
 Subsequently, Vikas Kumar Jha's elder brother, Anil Kumar Jha, and their father,
Sureshwar Jha, were attacked, resulting in Anil's death.

Main Issue:
The main issue revolved around the appellant's conviction under Section 120B of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC) for criminal conspiracy, and the sufficiency of evidence, particularly
regarding voice identification and conspiracy.

Important Arguments:
 The appellant argued that he couldn't be convicted under Section 120B and sentenced
to life imprisonment due to the charges framed against him.
 He contended that his involvement was based solely on the identification of his voice
by the informant, which was unreliable.

Court's Decision:
 The Court examined the charges framed against the appellant and concluded that they
sufficiently notified him of the accusation.
  It cited Section 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and other relevant
provisions, emphasizing that the charge must give clear notice of the nature of the
accusation.
 The Court rejected the appellant's argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence,
noting that identification by voice can be admissible, especially when the witness is
intimately acquainted with the accused.
 It referred to previous cases such as Kirpal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
upheld the admissibility of voice identification in this case.
 The Court also found substantial evidence supporting the conspiracy charge,
including call records linking the appellant and his co-conspirator.
 It cited various precedents to underscore that circumstantial evidence can establish
conspiracy, and lack of direct evidence does not undermine its validity.

Ratio:
The case reaffirmed the principles regarding framing of charges, admissibility of voice
identification, and establishment of conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.

Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 120B of the
IPC for life imprisonment. The Court upheld the lower courts' decisions based on the
sufficiency of evidence and adherence to procedural requirements.

Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of Rajasthan, (2012)9 SCALE 542

Facts:
 An FIR was filed by the prosecutrix alleging rape against the appellant on March 22,
1997.
 The prosecutrix stated that she was raped by the appellant on March 10, 1997, and
was subsequently confined in the appellant's house without food or water until she
managed to escape.
 The prosecutrix, after lodging the FIR, appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Sirohi, on April 9, 1997, requesting her statement to be recorded under Section 164 of
the Cr.P.C.
 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi, directed the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, to
record the prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
 The prosecutrix's statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, on
April 10, 1997, wherein she retracted her allegations against the appellant.
 The Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, relying on the prosecutrix's statement under
Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., refused to take cognizance of the offences under Sections
376 and 342 of the IPC against the appellant.
 The order of refusal to take cognizance was challenged by the prosecution, and the
revisional court and the High Court upheld the challenge.
Main Issue:
Whether the Magistrate was justified in refusing to take cognizance of the offences based on
the prosecutrix's retracted statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Important Arguments:
Appellant's Counsel:
 Argued that the Magistrate rightly refused to take cognizance based on the
prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
 Contended that the statement was voluntary and truthful, and therefore, the
Magistrate's decision was correct.
State's Counsel:
 Opposed the appeal, arguing that the Magistrate erred in relying solely on the
prosecutrix's retracted statement.
 Stated that the prosecutrix's statement was recorded hastily and without proper
identification, thus rendering it unreliable.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court considered the validity of the Magistrate's decision to refuse
cognizance based on the prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
 The Court cited previous judgments emphasizing the importance of the prosecutrix
being produced before the Magistrate by the police for recording a statement under
Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
 It was observed that the Magistrate's reliance on the retracted statement without
proper identification and in haste was erroneous.
 The Court noted that the Magistrate's jurisdiction was limited to determining whether
the facts alleged made out an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, and
he was bound to commit the case to the Sessions Court if so.
 The Court also highlighted that the Magistrate's consideration of defence evidence at
the stage of refusal to take cognizance was impermissible.
 The Court held that the Magistrate's order refusing cognizance was without
jurisdiction and therefore null and void.

Ratio:
 A Magistrate must ensure that a person's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is
recorded only when the person is produced before the Magistrate by the police.
 The Magistrate's jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the facts alleged make
out an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, and he must commit the
case to the Sessions Court if so.
  The Magistrate cannot consider defence evidence at the stage of refusal to take
cognizance.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the orders of the revisional court and the
High Court. It directed the Sessions Court to proceed with the case expeditiously and in
accordance with law. The observations made in the judgment were clarified not to adversely
affect either party, as they were made solely for deciding the present case.

Willie Slaney v.State of MP AIR 1956 SC 116

Facts:
The appellant and his brother were both accused of murder under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The specific charge against the appellant was
murder in prosecution of a common intention. During the trial, evidence indicated that it was
the appellant, not his brother, who had delivered the fatal blow. However, the brother was
acquitted, and the appellant was convicted under Section 302 and sentenced to transportation
for life. The appellant appealed against his conviction, arguing that the omission to frame an
alternative charge under Section 302 simpliciter was illegal and that there was a conflict of
decisions on this matter.

Main Issue:
The main issue revolved around whether the omission to frame an alternative charge under
Section 302 constituted an illegality that invalidated the trial and conviction, and whether
there was a conflict of decisions by the court on this matter.

Important Arguments:
 The appellant argued that the omission to frame an alternative charge under Section
302 was illegal and vitiated the trial.
 The appellant contended that the conviction should be set aside because there was a
conflict of decisions between Nanak Chand v. The State of Punjab and Suraj Pal v.
The State of U.P.
 The prosecution countered that the omission to frame an alternative charge under
Section 302 was a curable irregularity and did not prejudice the appellant's case.
 The prosecution argued that Section 34 of the IPC does not create an offense by itself,
and the conviction for murder under Section 302 was valid as long as the common
intention was proven.

Court's Decision:
The court held unanimously that the omission to frame an alternative charge under Section
302 was not an illegality that vitiated the trial. Instead, it was considered a curable
irregularity as it did not cause any prejudice to the appellant. The court emphasized that the
essential purpose of a charge is to give notice to the accused, and as long as the accused
understands the matter they are charged with, the trial is not invalidated by the mere absence
of a formal charge in writing. Additionally, the court clarified that the conviction fell under
the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, not Section 302, and ordered the alteration of the
conviction accordingly.

Ratio:
The court clarified that while procedural laws like the Code of Criminal Procedure serve the
ends of justice, breaches of certain provisions are considered curable irregularities unless they
result in prejudice to the accused. The absence of a charge does not necessarily invalidate a
trial, and courts must consider whether the accused had a fair trial and understood the
allegations against them.

Conclusion:
In this case, the court ruled that the omission to frame an alternative charge under Section 302
was a curable irregularity that did not prejudice the appellant's case. Therefore, the conviction
was upheld but altered to fall under the relevant section of the IPC. The court emphasized the
importance of focusing on substance rather than technicalities in criminal proceedings to
ensure a fair trial for the accused.

P. Gopalkrishnan vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Facts:
The appellant was one of the accused in a case involving sexual assault under various
sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).
The prosecution relied on a memory card containing video footage of the alleged rape
incident as crucial evidence. The appellant sought direction from the court to provide him
with a cloned copy of the memory card's contents. However, both the trial court and the High
Court denied the appellant's application. The trial court rejected it on grounds of privacy and
dignity of the victim, while the High Court held that the memory card, being a product of the
crime, did not need to be furnished as part of the documentary evidence under Section 207 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Aggrieved by these decisions, the appellant
filed a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.

Main Issues:
 Whether the contents of a memory card/pen drive qualify as a 'document' under the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
  Whether the court can decline the accused's request for a cloned copy of the memory
card's contents based on the victim's right to privacy.

Arguments:
 The appellant argued that providing a cloned copy of the memory card's contents was
essential for a fair trial, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
 The respondent-state and the intervenor (victim) contended that granting access to the
cloned copy might lead to misuse and violate the victim's right to privacy and dignity.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court concluded that the contents of the memory card qualified as a
'document' under the IEA and IPC. Furnishing documents to the accused under
Section 207 of the CrPC was crucial for ensuring a fair trial.
 While acknowledging the importance of the accused's right to a fair trial, the court
also recognized the victim's right to privacy. It adopted a balanced approach by
allowing only an inspection of the memory card's contents and forensic analysis by an
independent laboratory. The court cited precedents and principles of public interest
and primacy to justify its decision.
 The court held that in ordinary circumstances, the accused should be provided with a
cloned copy to present an effective defense. However, in sensitive cases like this,
where privacy concerns are significant, the court may limit access to balance
conflicting rights.

Ratio:
The court emphasized the need to balance the accused's right to a fair trial and the victim's
right to privacy. It recognized that while the right to a fair trial is important, it should not
overshadow the victim's privacy rights. The court's decision highlighted the importance of
adopting a nuanced approach to protect both fundamental rights.

Conclusion:
In this case, the Supreme Court struck a balance between the conflicting rights arising from
Article 21. It allowed the accused limited access to the memory card's contents while
safeguarding the victim's privacy. The court's decision reflected the principles of fairness,
justice, and respect for individual rights in criminal proceedings.

Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Facts:
The appellant, Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla, sought permission from the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay to travel to the US for eight weeks. As a Green Card holder, it was
mandatory for him to return to the US within a stipulated period, failing which the conditions
for revalidation of the Green Card would not be fulfilled. The appellant's request was based
on his travel obligations and family commitments. However, the High Court declined to relax
the conditions imposed for interim bail, citing an FIR registered against the appellant.

Main Issue:
Whether the High Court erred in declining the appellant's request to travel abroad,
considering his fundamental right to travel and the proportionality of bail conditions imposed.

Arguments:
 The appellant argued that the conditions imposed by the High Court were
disproportionate and infringed upon his right to travel abroad, especially considering
his long-term residency in the US and the necessity to fulfill his Green Card
obligations.
 The state contended that allowing the appellant to travel abroad might pose a risk of
him evading prosecution, considering the FIR lodged against him.

Court's Decision:
 The Supreme Court, in a judgment authored by Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y.
Chandrachud and Justice Indira Banerjee, emphasized the need to balance the rights
of the accused with the administration of justice.
 The Court observed that while the discretion to impose bail conditions rests with the
court, such conditions must be proportionate to the purpose of securing the accused's
presence, facilitating investigation, and ensuring a fair trial.
 Citing previous case law, the Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that bail
conditions are not so strict as to make the grant of bail illusory, especially in cases
where the accused's right to travel abroad is at stake.
 Evaluating the appellant's travel history, conduct, and the nature of allegations against
him, the Court held that there was no justification to deny him permission to travel to
the US for eight weeks.
 The Court set aside the High Court's order and permitted the appellant to travel
abroad for the specified period, subject to certain undertakings to ensure his return
and availability for legal proceedings.
 The Court underscored the principle that the protection of legal rights, including the
right to travel, must be upheld, even in cases where the accused is facing criminal
charges.

Ratio:
The judgment highlights the importance of balancing the rights of the accused with the
administration of justice. It emphasizes that bail conditions should not be disproportionately
restrictive and must be tailored to serve the purpose of ensuring the accused's presence,
facilitating investigation, and ensuring a fair trial.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla vs. State of Maharashtra
reaffirms the principle that the protection of legal rights, including the right to travel, is
paramount, even for individuals facing criminal charges. The Court's decision underscores the
need for bail conditions to be proportionate and not unduly burdensome on the accused,
thereby upholding the fundamental principles of justice and fairness in the legal system.
MODULE 6:
Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976)

Introduction:

This case concerns an accused, charged with double murder and convicted under S. 302 of
Indian Penal Code by session Court Ludhiana. The convict was sentenced to death by the
Learned Session Judge of Ludhiana, but due to the absence of his advocate, he wasn’t heard,
and neither did he contented the same at that time and went with the flow. The case was sent
to the High Court for confirmation of the Death Penalty, also the convict challenged the
impugned order of the Learned Session Court of Ludhiana based on violation of S 235 (2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same sentence was confirmed by the High Court and
the present case arose through appeal challenging the order of the high court as well as
session court.

Background of the Case:

The appellant was charged for double murder, one of his mothers and the other of his
stepfather/second husband of his mother. He was tried in the session court of Ludhiana for the
same. After hearing the arguments and concluding the evidence from both the parties, the
learned session judge pronounced the judgment on 26th February 1975. The advocate of the
appellant was absent on the day, so the learned session judge passed the judgment and the
appellant wasn’t allowed to be heard. The same wasn’t contented by any of the parties and
the appellant himself was quiet at that moment and didn’t raise his voice for the same,
believing it to be common ground. The case was referred to the high court for confirmation of
the death penalty. The appellant filed an appeal in the high court as well challenging the order
of the session court on basis of violation of S 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
high court confirmed the death penalty and went with the order passed by the learned session
judge of Ludhiana. The appellant aggrieved from the order moved to the apex court, where
this case arose.

Facts of the Case:

The appellant is charged with double murder under the S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The
appellant was convicted by the Session Court Ludhiana. Death Sentence was Pronounced by
the Learned Session Judge, Ludhiana on 26th February 1975. The advocate for the appellant
was not present on the date, thus the judge didn’t allow the appellant to be heard on common
ground as the appellant didn’t raise contention as well. The high court agreed with the view
of Session Court, Ludhiana as well and confirmed the death sentence. This appeal was filed
in the supreme court in response to the impugned order passed by the high court and session
court on basis of violation of S. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issues Raised:

“Does the non-compliance with the provisions of S. 235(2) of the 1973 Code vitiate the
sentence passed by the Court?”

“Whether non-compliance with S. 235(2) is merely an irregularity which can be cured by S.

465 or it is an illegality which vitiates the sentence.”

Arguments of the Petitioner”:

The appellant wasn’t allowed to be heard under S. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The death penalty was pronounced by the learned sessions judge, Ludhiana without keeping
in consideration the right of the appellant under S. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The high court also erred in the same way as sessions court and confirmed the death penalty.
If the opportunity may have been given, there would have been a possibility, the appellant
may have presented something which might have increased the chances of commutation of
his punishment. The stages prescribed under the code weren’t followed during the trial in the
sessions court, thus the sentence can’t be considered standing.

Arguments by the Respondents:

The learned session judge was not aware of the new stage in the trial provided by S. 235(2).
If the learned judge had been aware of the stage, he would have allowed the appellant to be
heard. The high court was in the same view as that of sessions court and thus confirmed the
sentence passed. The appellant was quiet as well during the pronouncement of the death
sentence. The learned session judge took the common ground of silence from the appellant
and proceeded with the pronouncement of the sentence.

Judgment:

S. 235 (2) was added to the code of criminal procedure to ensure that if a person is sentenced
to death or capital punishment, he has no setback in his heart that if he had the chance to
speak, the punishment might have been reduced. S. 235 (2) describes one of the fundamental
stages of the trial or criminal procedure and its non-compliance will ex-facie vitiate the order.
The appeal was allowed in the supreme court as per both the judges and clarified the limits
and expansions of the S. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter was sent
back to the trial court again and the appellant was given another opportunity to be heard and
make a representation of his own.

Conclusion:

The importance of the trial stages to be followed in a trial was redefined in this case, as the
case was sent back to the trial court allowing the appellant to be heard. The learned judges
proposed to establish training institutes to train new judicial recruits and serving judges as
well with changing trends and laws. The order passed by the learned session judge of
Ludhiana was vitiated and so was that of the high court to ensure the trial stages are
completed thoroughly. The S. 235 (2) has its importance to diminish any sort of resilience in
the heart of any accused of not being heard in case of pronouncement of capital punishment.
 Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra (2012)

Introduction:

Ajay Pandit @ Jagdish Dayabhai Patel was sentenced to death by the Bombay High Court for
double murder in two different events, one for the murder of Nilesh Bhailal Patel and the
other for the murder of Jayashree. The appellant, a dentist who was found guilty and
sentenced to death on the same day for drugging and murdering two people for money while
claiming to be able to assist them, acquired a visa through his contacts at the American
Embassy.

Decision by the Supreme Court of India:

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in the present case of Ajay Pandit v. State of
Maharashtra (2012). The death sentence, however, was overturned, and the case was sent to
the High Court for consideration of the penalty. The Apex Court had viewed that the High
Court had made no serious effort to obtain any information from the accused or the
prosecution on the existence of any factors that would influence the court to avert the death
penalty. The Apex Court had further declared that the death penalty is an exception rather
than a rule and that it should only be used in the “rarest of rare” instances. It stressed the High
Court’s duty and obligation to obtain crucial facts even if the accused has remained
completely mute in such cases.

MODULE 7:

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) (Best Bakery case)

Facts:

On 3rd February 2002, a business called Best Bakery in Vadodara was set ablaze by a
disorderly mob consisting of numerous individuals, resulting in the tragic death of 14 people.
These attacks were purportedly in retaliation for the killing of 56 individuals who had
perished in the Sabarmati Express train fire. Zahira Sheikh, an eyewitness in the case,
changed her testimony, and her mother and brothers withdrew their statements in court.
Zahira claimed to have been on the terrace during the incident and was unable to identify the
perpetrators. Later, she confessed in an interview that she had lied in court about the incident.
Subsequently, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) filed a special leave petition
in the Supreme Court, seeking a retrial outside Gujarat. Zahira asserted that her change in
testimony was due to threats. In response, the SC mandated that the trial be relocated outside
the state of Gujarat to Maharashtra.

Issue Involved:

Whether there is any importance of witnesses in ensuring fair trial?

Observations:

The SC stated that witnesses play a major role in ensuring justice. If a witness is unable to
fulfill this role, the trial becomes corrupted and unfair. The court emphasized the importance
of ensuring a fair trial and mentioned that its powers are complementary to certain legal
sections. The court cannot ignore serious mistakes or negligence by the prosecution.
Regarding a specific legal section, the court explained that it is an exception to the usual rule.
In this case, the Gujarat High Court found the police investigation to be dishonest and faulty.
The court criticized the HC for making conclusions without a solid basis and relying on
speculation.

Conclusion:

After considering the facts and circumstances and the evidence the Supreme Court directed
that the re-trial should be done by a court under the jurisdiction of Bombay HC.

Mohammed Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408

Facts:

 A secret information was received by a police station regarding the alleged supply of
ganja under Barapula Flyover, Ring Road near Gurudwara Bala Sahib.
 A raid was conducted, resulting in the apprehension of four accused persons allegedly
in possession of illegal ganja.
  The appellant, Mohd. Muslim, was arrested based on the disclosure statement of a co-
accused, Nitesh Ekka.
 Charges were laid against the appellant and other co-accused, and the appellant's
request for bail was denied by the district court due to the seriousness of the alleged
offences.

Main Issues:

 How should the court determine the phrase 'not guilty' under Section 37 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 when all the evidence
is not before the Court?
 Can bail be granted to the accused considering the rigid conditions in Section 37 of
the NDPS Act?

Important Arguments:

 Appellant's Argument: The appellant's counsel argued for bail due to prolonged
confinement and slow progress in the trial. It was also noted that other co-accused had
been granted bail.
 Respondent's Argument: The Additional Solicitor General objected to bail, citing
Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The ASG argued that the appellant was involved in the
crime and posed a risk to public safety.

Court's Decision:

 The court reasoned that the phrase 'not guilty' under Section 37 of the NDPS Act must
be interpreted reasonably in light of the general law on bail.
 The court acknowledged that prolonged detention and slow trial progress warranted
consideration for bail, especially when the accused is presumed innocent.
 The court emphasized the importance of balancing individual liberty with the public
interest in preventing drug-related crimes.
 Considering the appellant's lengthy detention and the slow progress of the trial, the
court granted bail to the appellant.
Ratio:

The court emphasized the need to interpret the phrase 'not guilty' in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act reasonably, considering the general law on bail. Prolonged detention and slow trial
progress can be grounds for granting bail, especially when the accused is presumed innocent.

Conclusion:

The court granted bail to the appellant, considering his lengthy detention and the slow
progress of the trial. The decision highlighted the importance of balancing individual liberty
with the public interest in preventing drug-related crimes.

Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1

Introduction:

This case dealt with several aspects of criminal law and constitutional law which also
includes right to get represented by an advocate under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) and Constitution of India, 1950.

Facts:

The only surviving Terrorist for 26/11 (2008) terrorists' attack on Mumbai at targeted places -
Ajmal Kasab was convicted under Sections 302, 120B, 121, and 121A of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (IPC). Initially no lawyer agreed to represent the Ajmal Kasab as his client before the
Court, and Kasab also denied all the services provided by the India and demanded the lawyer
from his Country. Pakistan even did not accept the Kasab as his citizen and Kasab then
accepted a lawyer from India.

Issues Involved:

 Whether Article 22(1) comes into force only on the commencement of the trial as
provided under Section 304, CrPC?
  Whether not providing a lawyer as per the choice of the accused person is violation of
the accused’s fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution?

Observations:

The Supreme Court observed that the right to be defended by a legal practitioner crystallizes
only at the stage of commencement of the trial under Section 304 of CrPC, but it is incorrect
because there are two reasons: First, such a view is based on an unreasonably restricted
construction of the Constitutional and statutory provisions; Second, it overlooks the socio-
economic realities of the country. The Court further emphasized upon the developments of
the legal aid under Article 22, 39A and Section 304 of the CRPC. The Court said that the
right to defend does not arise only at the time of commencement of the trial but also when the
accused is present before the Magistrate as he is remanded from time to time. The Magistrate
is under obligation to inform the accused about his right to free legal aid just before the
accused was produced. The right to access legal aid to consult and to be defended by a legal
practitioner arises when a person arrested in connection with a cognizable offence is first
produced before a Magistrate. The right to free legal services is clearly essential for the
reasonable, fair and just procedure for a person accused. The Court further said it is the
constitutional duty of the Court to provide the lawyer to the accused even if he doesn’t ask
for the lawyer.

Conclusion:

The Court concluded that as the accused refused to accept the lawyers provided by the India
and demand for the Pakistan lawyer, but it was unacceptable because Pakistan did not even
consider him as its citizen. And when he asked for the lawyer, the two lawyers were provided
to him, hence there is no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant under
Constitution of India, 1950. The SC also upheld the decisions of the Trial Court and accused
was hanged to death in complete secrecy on 21st Nov 2012 at 7:30 AM at Yerwada jail in
Pune.

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92

Facts:

In this case, the appellant was engaged in running a coaching centre. He was arrested on
certain allegation and taken to the police custody where he was handcuffed by the police
without any reason. He was tortured during the trial and the treatment of the police in custody
was not reasonable. The dignity and reputation of the accused was harmed because of delay
in trial. He filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution that prosecution
purposefully caused delay in trial.

Issues Involved:

 What is the stage at which power under Section 319 can be exercised?
 Whether the evidence word used under Section 319 of the CrPC could only mean
evidence tested by cross-examination, or it can be exercised on the basis of the
statement made in the examination-in-chief?

Observations:

The Court said that the constitution mandates to provide a protected umbrella under Article
20 and 21 for smooth administrative justice and for efficacious and fair trial. For the
empowerment of the Court to ensure that the administration of the criminal courts works
properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under the CrPC.
The Court further said the Section 319 of the CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex
damantur cum nocens absolvitur (judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this
doctrine can be explained by the enactment under Section 319. When the investigating
agency for any reason doesn’t array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not
powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The Court said the word evidence under
Section 319 of the Crpc must be broadly understood and not literally I.e. as evidence brought
during a trial.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage of
completion of examination-in-chief and the court does not need to wait till the said evidence
is tested on cross-examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered
from the reasons recorded by the court, in respect of complicity of some other person(s), not
facing the trial in the offence.

Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1 (2012) 9 SCC 1

Facts:

 The appellant, a doctor and social activist, was falsely implicated in multiple criminal
cases for assisting weaker sections of society against local coal mafia.
 While in police custody, the appellant was photographed with a placard containing
self-humiliating words, which was circulated publicly and used in revenue
proceedings.
 The High Court found the appellant was harassed and entitled to compensation,
directing the State Government to determine and award compensation.
 Despite the Supreme Court giving the State Government another chance to award
compensation, it denied compensation, claiming the matter was one of defamation
requiring civil action.
 The appellant approached the Hon'ble Court against the High Court's order.

Main Issues:

 Whether compensation could be awarded for custodial humiliation and mental torture
under Article 21 of the Constitution.
 Whether the appellant should be required to initiate a civil action for damages on the
basis of defamation.

Arguments:

 Appellant: Contended that since harassment was proven and police officers found
guilty and punished, compensation should be awarded without resorting to civil
action.
 State: Supported the High Court's order and subsequent denial of compensation,
arguing defamation claims should be pursued in civil court.
  Respondent's Counsel: Asserted that punishment in disciplinary proceedings
precluded compensation claims, which if entertained, should be determined in civil
court based on evidence of defamation.

Court's Decision:

 The Hon'ble Court emphasized the citizen's right to dignity and social reputation
under Article 21 of the Constitution, especially in cases of custodial abuse.
 Referenced the precedent set in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B, which established the right
to live with human dignity and protection from torture and assault by the state or its
functionaries.
 Declared that the right to reputation is a facet of the right to life under Article 21.
 Acknowledged that monetary compensation, in the form of exemplary damages, is a
remedy available in public law for the violation of fundamental rights.
 Noted the appellant's mental torture at the hands of insensitive police officials, which
undermined the essence of life protected by Article 21.
 Criticized the State's rejection of compensation as defamation, and awarded Rs. 5
lakhs as compensation to the appellant.

Conclusion:

 The Hon'ble Court held that compensation for custodial humiliation and torture,
whether physical or mental, impacting rights under Article 21, should be awarded.
 This decision emphasizes the importance of protecting fundamental rights and
ensuring accountability for violations, even in cases of defamation allegations.

Mrs. Neelam Katara v. Union of India, ILR (2003) II Del 377

This is a landmark case dealing with factors related to police protection of witnesses.

Facts:

A person's son was killed at a wedding, prompting them to file a legal petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in the Delhi High Court. The petition aimed to
establish guidelines for witness protection It was based on the idea that witnesses must feel
safe from threats or pressure to tell the truth in court and ensure justice is served. Previous
law commissions had also looked into problems with witnesses turning hostile and had
suggested guidelines. The petitioner wanted guidelines to ensure that justice could be served
quickly and fairly, and to make sure witnesses didn't face uncertainty.

Issues Involved:

Whether the witness protection become an urgent necessity as per the current scenario as the
witness turn hostile and it cause the unnecessary delay?

Observations:

The court delineated several key considerations to be weighed in determining whether a

witness should receive police protection. The competent authority, tasked with this
evaluation, must take into account various factors, including:

 The nature of the risk to the witness's security, particularly originating from the
accused or their affiliates.
 The nature of the ongoing investigation in the case.
 The significance of the witness's testimony in the case and the importance of the
information or evidence they provide or have agreed to provide.
 The financial implications associated with providing police protection to the witness.

In its deliberations, the court referenced the seminal case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
1997, which established a precedent for considering international conventions in the absence
of domestic legislation, provided they do not infringe upon fundamental rights or societal
harmony. In accordance with these principles, the "Witness Protection Guidelines" were
formulated and were to be adhered to until formal legislation was enacted. The court further
outlined the obligations incumbent upon law enforcement agencies:

 When recording a witness's statement under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (CrPC), it is imperative for the investigating officer to apprise the witness
of the Witness Protection Guidelines and inform them of their right to seek assistance
from the competent authority.
  The responsibility for providing protection to the witness rests with the Commissioner
of Police, subject to an order from the competent authority directing police protection.

Conclusion:

The Court directs the State to give due publicity to the guidelines framed. The Court in 2015
sentenced the accused of the death of petitioner’s son in this case.

Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1679

Facts:

 March 5, 2015: FIR was filed against eleven accused for the offences under NDPS
Act, Arms Act and Information Technology Act. The Appellants were not charged in
the charge sheets filed by the Police.
 July 31, 2017: Prosecution filed an application under Section 311 of CrPC for
recalling witness, who named the Appellants as accused.
 Thereafter, the prosecution filed an application under Section 319 of CrPC for
summoning additional five accused including Appellants by placing reliance on
statements of recalled witnesses.
 October 31, 2017: Sessions Court pronounced the judgment, convicting nine accused
in the trial.
 The Appellants filed Criminal Revision Petitions challenging the summoning order of
the Sessions Court which was dismissed by the High Court.
 Aggrieved by the order of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Appellants
approached the Supreme Court through SLPs.
 May 10, 2019: Considering the issues in the case, the two judge bench of the Supreme
Court ordered for the case to be placed before an appropriate larger bench.

Issues:

Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional
accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of
conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?
Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning
additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose
presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main
trial?

What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under
Section 319 CrPC?

Judgment:

Answering the first issue, the Court has held that in the case of conviction, the power under
Section 319 of CrPC is to be invoked and exercised before the pronouncement of the order of
sentence. The summoning order has to precede the conclusion of trial by imposition of
sentence in the case of conviction. In the case of acquittal, the power should be exercised
before the order of acquittal is pronounced. If the order is passed on the same day, it will have
to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and if such summoning order is
passed either after the order of acquittal or imposing sentence in the case of conviction, the
same will not be sustainable.

As far as the second issue is concerned, the Court has held that the trial court has the power to
summon additional accused when the trial is proceeded in respect of the absconding accused
after securing his presence, subject to the evidence recorded in the split up (bifurcated) trial
pointing to the involvement of the accused sought to be summoned. But the evidence
recorded in the main concluded trial cannot be the basis of the summoning order if such
power has not been exercised in the main trial till its conclusion.

Coming to the third issue, the Court has issued the following guidelines for the competent
court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 CrPC:

 If the competent court finds evidence or if application under Section 319 of CrPC is
filed regarding involvement of any other person in committing the offence based on
evidence recorded at any stage in the trial before passing of the order on acquittal or
sentence, it shall pause the trial at that stage.
 The Court shall thereupon first decide the need or otherwise to summon the additional
accused and pass orders thereon.
  If the decision of the court is to exercise the power under Section 319 of CrPC and
summon the accused, such summoning order shall be passed before proceeding
further with the trial in the main case.
 If the summoning order of additional accused is passed, depending on the stage at
which it is passed, the Court shall also apply its mind to the fact as to whether such
summoned accused is to be tried along with the other accused or separately.
 If the decision is for joint trial, the fresh trial shall be commenced only after securing
the presence of the summoned accused.
 If the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried separately, on such order
being made, there will be no impediment for the Court to continue and conclude the
trial against the accused who were being proceeded with.
 If the proceeding paused as in (1) above is in a case where the accused who were tried
are to be acquitted and the decision is that the summoned accused can be tried afresh
separately, there will be no impediment to pass the judgment of acquittal in the main
case.
 If the power is not invoked or exercised in the main trial till its conclusion and if there
is a split-up (bifurcated) case, the power under Section 319 of CrPC can be invoked or
exercised only if there is evidence to that effect, pointing to the involvement of the
additional accused to be summoned in the split up (bifurcated) trial.
 If, after arguments are heard and the case is reserved for judgment the occasion arises
for the Court to invoke and exercise the power under Section 319 of CrPC, the
appropriate course for the court is to set it down for re-hearing.
 On setting it down for re-hearing, the above laid down procedure to decide about
summoning; holding of joint trial or otherwise shall be decided and proceeded with
accordingly.
 Even in such a case, at that stage, if the decision is to summon additional accused and
hold a joint trial the trial shall be conducted afresh and de novo proceedings be held.

MODULE 8:

Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra (03.05.2013 - SC):

MANU/SC/0461/2013

Facts of the Case:

The appellant-accused along with other co-accused was tried and held guilty under S.302/34
IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 2,000/- each. The incident of
sudden fight took place without any premeditation and in that incident; appellant hit the
deceased in the heat of passion without taking any unfair advantage or acting in a cruel or
unusual manner. The High Court, in appeal, confirmed the conviction and sentence of the
appellant-accused and acquitted the co-accused that gave rise to this appeal for consideration
before the Apex Court.

ISSUE: -

 Whether the appellant-accused is liable for lesser offence i.e. culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable u/s. 304 Part I or II of IPC?
 Whether the courts have a duty to consider the question of awarding compensation to
the victim and record reasons while granting or refusing compensation to them?
 Whether compensation u/s. 357 Cr.P.C. should be awarded?

JUDGMENT: -

The apex court noted that the nature of the simple injury inflicted by the accused, the part of
the body on which it was inflicted, the weapon used to inflict the same and the circumstances
in which the injury was inflicted do not suggest that the appellant had the intention to kill the
deceased. Even the weapon used was not lethal. The prosecution not even made any
suggestion about ill will or motive to commit such offence against the deceased. Thus, these
circumstances would, therefore, more appropriately liable to the benefit of Exception 4 of
S.300 and fall under S.304 Part II of the IPC, once more, the team at
http://www.braininjurylawofseattle.com/ won the trial. Looking at the issue to award
compensation to the victim it appears that S.357 Cr.P.C. provides power to award
compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused in
addition to conviction. The power to award compensation is intended to reassure the victim
that has full faith in the criminal justice system. England was perhaps the first to introduce
the idea of payment of compensation by the offender. Later, the United States of America
through the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 authorizes a federal court to award
restitution by means of a convict’s sentence.
Though it is not mandatory for the Court to award restitution in every case but demands that
the court provide its reasons for denying the same. To decide the quantum of money to be
paid in a restitution order, the United States federal law requires that details such as the
financial history of the offender, the monetary loss caused to the victim by the offence, etc.
Thus, thereby looking into the background and development in law for providing
rehabilitation of victims in other countries, the Apex Court convinced to consider
compensation clause in criminal cases unless unwarranted. The language of S.357 Cr.P.C, at
glance, grants discretional power to the court to award or reject the compensation in a
particular case. It is mandatory duty on the court to apply its mind to the question of
compensation to the victim and conduct a certain enquiry to know the capacity of accused to
pay and decide sentence and compensation for the welfare of victim or his/her family. Thus,
undoubtedly, trial court and high court failed to consider S.357 Cr.P.C.

HELD: -

Thus, the Apex Court allowed the appeal to the extent of convicting appellant with rigorous
imprisonment under S.304 Part II of IPC instead of S.302 IPC. Also, it was held that court in
every criminal case will consider the issue of compensation under S.357 IPC and apply its
mind with reasons to award or reject the monetary compensation to the victim.

Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives vs. State of

Karnataka and Ors. (12.10.2018 - SC): MANU/SC/1165/2018

..

Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu, AIR 2022 SC 1918

Facts:

 The case involves an incident where the victims, represented by Jagjeet Singh and
others, were allegedly harmed by the accused, Ashish Mishra @ Monu and another
individual.
  During the adjudication of the bail application of the accused, the victims sought to be
heard in the proceedings to represent their interests and ensure justice.

Main Issue:

The main issue in the case was whether the victims have the right to be heard and participate
in the criminal proceedings, particularly during the bail application of the accused.

Important Arguments:

 The victims argued that they have independent, substantive, and enforceable rights,
separate from those of the state, under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
 They emphasized the importance of their participation in the proceedings to ensure
that their interests are represented and justice is served.
 The victims also highlighted the recognition by the judiciary and the Law
Commission of India of the victim's right to be heard and participate in criminal trials,
including at crucial stages like bail hearings.

Court's Decision:

 The Supreme Court, in line with its previous judgments and recommendations, upheld
the importance of the victim's right to be heard and participate in the criminal
proceedings.
 It emphasized that the victim's rights are independent and substantive, not merely
accessory or auxiliary to those of the state.
 The Court recognized the victim's right to be represented by an advocate of their
choice and to know the status of the investigation.
 It also stressed the need to treat the near and dear ones of the victim, such as
guardians or legal heirs, as victims themselves, ensuring their voices are heard and
their interests are protected.
 Certain orders that were not in accordance with the law were set aside by the Supreme
Court, reinforcing the need to uphold the victim's rights in line with its previous
judgments.
Ratio:

 The victim's right to be heard and participate in criminal proceedings, including bail
hearings, is recognized as independent, substantive, and enforceable.
 The victim should be represented by an advocate of their choice and should have
access to information about the status of the investigation.
 Near and dear ones of the victim should be treated as victims themselves, ensuring
their voices are heard and their interests are protected.

Conclusion:

 The judgment in the case of Jagjeet Singh & Ors. vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr.
reinforces the principles of fairness and justice in the criminal justice system.
 It ensures that the victim's voice is heard and considered in the legal process,
emphasizing the importance of their rights and participation in criminal proceedings.
 The decision underscores the need to uphold the victim's rights in line with previous
judgments and recommendations, promoting transparency and accountability in the
legal system.

P. Dharamaraj v. Shanmugam, AIR 2022 SC 4195

 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 2(wa), 372 - Right of appeal to the victims
- Public, who are recipients of these services, also become victims, though indirectly,
because the consequences of such appointments get reflected sooner or later in the
work performed by the appointees – The appellant in one of these appeals, is a victim,
as he could not get selected on account of the alleged corrupt practices. Therefore, the
contention regarding the locus standi of the appellants is to be rejected.
 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Court has to go slow even while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC or Article 226 of the Constitution in
the matter of quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of a settlement reached
between the parties, when the offences are capable of having an impact not merely on
the complainant and the accused but also on others.
 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Corruption by a public servant is an offence against the State and the society at
 large. The Court cannot deal with cases involving abuse of official position and
adoption of corrupt practices, like suits for specific performance, where the refund of
the money paid may also satisfy the agreement holder.

MODULE 9:

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat,2004 (4) SCC 158

Already done in Module 7.

Mahender Chawla and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (05.12.2018 - SC) :

MANU/SC/1421/2018

Facts:

 The case revolves around a writ petition filed under Article 32, raising concerns about
the efficacy of the Indian criminal justice system, particularly regarding witness
protection.
 Witnesses in a case involving a self-styled godman, Asaram, who faced charges of
multiple rapes, were intimidated and threatened with serious consequences if they
testified against him.
 Up to ten witnesses were attacked, and three were killed. Petitioners, including
Mahendra Chawla, a survivor of an assassination attempt for testifying against
Asaram, and Karamvir Singh, the father of a victim, raised concerns about the lack of
security provided by the Uttar Pradesh police.
 The petitioners also highlighted the survival of journalist Narendra Yadav, who faced
an assassination attempt for writing articles against Asaram.

Main Issue:

The main issue in the case pertained to the protection and security of witnesses during the
trial and other proceedings, especially in cases involving powerful individuals or entities.
Important Arguments:

 Petitioners argued that witness intimidation and attacks violated their fundamental
right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, which includes the right to live in a
society free from crimes and fears.
 They emphasized the need for a comprehensive witness protection regime to ensure
the safety and security of witnesses, particularly in high-profile cases.
 Respondents, including the Union of India, were urged to take immediate steps to
enforce witness protection measures, given the gravity of the situation.

Court's Decision:

 The Supreme Court recognized that the inability to testify in court due to threats or
intimidation amounts to a violation of Article 21.
 Considering the seriousness of witness intimidation and the importance of protecting
witnesses, the Court directed the enforcement of the Witness Protection Scheme,
2018.
 The Court held that the scheme would serve as the "law" under Article 141 and
Article 142 of the Constitution until suitable legislation is enacted on the subject.
 Additionally, the Court directed the establishment of vulnerable witness deposition
complexes in all district courts in India to provide further protection.

Ratio:

 The inability to testify in court due to threats or intimidation violates the fundamental
right to life under Article 21.
 The considerations that influenced the Court to establish a holistic witness protection
regime should be regarded as law until appropriate legislation is enacted.
 It is essential to enforce witness protection measures, including the implementation of
the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, to ensure the safety and security of witnesses.

Conclusion:
  The judgment in Mahendra Chawla v. Union of India underscores the critical
importance of witness protection in ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the
criminal justice system.
 By directing the enforcement of the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, and
establishing vulnerable witness deposition complexes, the Court aims to eliminate
threats, intimidation, and violence against witnesses.
 This decision sets a precedent for safeguarding the rights of witnesses and promoting
transparency and accountability in legal proceedings, especially in cases involving
powerful individuals or entities.

MODULE 10:

KARNA NAHI PENCHO……

MODULE 11:

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 216

Facts:

 Gian Singh was accused of causing hurt under Sections 324 and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC) in 1994.
 During the trial, a compromise was reached between Gian Singh and the injured party,
leading to Gian Singh's release by the trial court.
 The State of Punjab contested this decision and went to the High Court, arguing that
the compromise was against the rules.
 The High Court overturned the trial court's decision and ordered the case to be retried.
 Gian Singh was later found guilty of offenses under Sections 420 and 120B of the
IPC.
 He appealed this decision to the Sessions Judge and simultaneously requested to
compound the case.
 However, his request to compound the case was denied, and he approached the High
Court to quash the First Information Report (FIR) under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (CrPC), citing the settlement with the injured party.
 The High Court rejected his plea, leading to Gian Singh's petition to the Supreme
Court.
Main Issue:

The main issue in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab is whether the court can allow the
compounding of non-compoundable offenses, either directly or indirectly.

Important Arguments:

 Gian Singh argued that since he had reached a settlement with the injured party, the
case should be quashed.
 The State of Punjab contended that serious offenses should not be compromised,
regardless of any settlement between the parties.
 The central question was whether the court's inherent power to quash criminal
proceedings could be exercised in cases involving non-compoundable offenses.

Court's Decision:

 The Supreme Court held that the inherent power of the High Court to quash criminal
proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC is distinct from the power to compound
offenses under Section 320.
 The exercise of this power must be guided by the twin objectives of ensuring justice
and preventing the abuse of court processes.
 While the court acknowledged that compromises between parties can sometimes lead
to fair resolutions, it cautioned against quashing serious offenses, especially those
involving heinous crimes like murder or rape.
 The Court established guidelines for the exercise of this power, emphasizing
considerations such as the predominantly civil nature of the offense, the seriousness
of the offense, and the antecedents and conduct of the accused.
 It also highlighted that offenses under Section 307 of the IPC (attempt to murder)
should be carefully examined for evidence before considering quashing.
 Special statutes and the role of public servants in committing offenses were also
considered in the guidelines.
Ratio:

 The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC can be used to
quash criminal proceedings, but this power should be exercised cautiously,
considering the nature and seriousness of the offense.
 Serious offenses with significant societal impact, such as murder or rape, should not
be quashed even if there is a compromise between the parties.
 The court should consider various factors, including the predominantly civil nature of
the offense, the evidence available, and the conduct of the accused, before deciding
whether to quash criminal proceedings.

Conclusion:

 The judgment in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab clarifies the scope and limitations of
the court's inherent power to quash criminal proceedings.
 While acknowledging the potential benefits of settlements between parties, the Court
emphasizes the importance of upholding justice and preventing abuse of court
processes, particularly in cases involving serious offenses.
 The guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court provide a framework for High Courts
to exercise their inherent powers judiciously, ensuring a balanced approach to the
administration of criminal justice.

State of M.P. v. Deepak, (2014) 10 SCC 285

Facts:

 The respondent and the deceased were employees in the Central Bank. On 9th August
2017, the deceased committed suicide by consuming poison and was shifted to the
District hospital for treatment. On the same day in the presence of Naib Tehsildar of
Neemuch the dying declaration of the victim was recorded, according to which she
alleged that she was molested by Mr Deepak Bhamawat (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent) and was unable to get any job because of him. The deceased died on 10th
August 2017and on 16th August the FIR was registered for the same. After
completion of investigation on 22nd September 2017, a charge sheet was submitted
 before the Special Judge, Neemuch charging under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code
and Section 3(2)(v) and Section 3(2)(v)(a) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
Act. On cognizance of which a criminal revision was filed before the Court
challenging the above order.
 On 31st January 2018, the learned Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
passed the judgment discharging the respondent from charges by setting aside the
order of Special Judge thereafter, an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of India.

Issue:

Whether the High Court under Section 397 read with 401 of Criminal Procedural Code
correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction by discharging the respondent of charges framed
by Special Judge, Neemuch.

Contentions raised:

 On the basis of the charge sheet, the Deputy Advocate General for the state contended
that the respondent by forging the deceased signature had taken a loan that was not
paid and a notice was issued by the Central Bank for the same. During the
investigation, it was discovered that three complaints were filed by the deceased
against the respondent to the Station house officer at P.S. Jeeran on 1st November and
1st December 2016 and another to the Collector of Neemuch on 6th January 2017
alleging that the respondent was harassing her by causing her to terminate her
employment and instigating her landlord to oust her from the house.
 On the other hand, the counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that the
allegations mentioned in the FIR was false and the High Court was justified in
concluding that there was no provocation, inducement, or incitement to fit the
description of ‘abetment’, sustaining a charge under Section 306 of Penal Code.

Observations:

 The Court relying on the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander which dealt with
the revisional power of the Court observed that the rights of the revisional power of
 the Court observed that the rights of revisional jurisdiction are limited and should not
be against any interim or interlocutory order. Further, one should ascertain whether
the documents submitted establishes the offence or not. The Court may only interfere
when basic ingredients of a criminal offense are missing or if the allegations are so
absurd and improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion.
 Further taking in view the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State it was observed that where
the accused by his conducts or acts creates such circumstances that the deceased is left
with no other choice but to take his life by committing suicide then in such case an
‘instigation’ may be inferred.

Judgement:

Taking into view the facts, contentions, and evidence put forth the Court stated that in the
given case there are sufficient materials to uphold the order passed by the Trial Court. The
materials emerged during the course of investigation relating to the complaints filed by the
deceased, the loan fraudulently taken by the respondent by forging the signature of the
deceased, the termination of employment and the eviction of the deceased from the house
instigated by the respondent were evidently ignored by the High Court. Based on these
reasons the Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

Conclusion:

Setting aside the impugned order of the High Court, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal
thereby charging the respondent under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3 (2)(v)
and Section 3 (2)(v)(a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.

MODULE 12:

Shamim Bano vs AsrafKhan, 2014 SC

In the Shamim Bano case, the Supreme Court has combined the interpretations espoused in
Shah Bano and Danial Latifi and correctly held that Shamim Bano is entitled not only to
Mahr, ornaments, and maintenance under Section 3 of the Act but also to maintenance for the
post- Iddat period as the same has not been provided in the order granting mahr. Thus, the
Supreme Court made a commendable effort to bring Muslim women on par with other
communities. Additionally, the Bench sustained her application under Section 125 of the
Code despite the fact that her husband, Ashraf Khan had not consented to the same. The court
realized that if the application under Section 125 were dismissed, Shamim Bano would be
remediless as the Magistrate’s order only ensured Mahr and did not give her any
maintenance. Thus, foreseeing this situation as a travesty of justice, the court reasoned that
Section 125’s parameters should be applied.

Thus, the verdicts like Shamim Bano has improvised on Shah Bano and given legitimacy to
the secular character of Section 125; this secular character has been helpful in protecting
Muslim women from oppression at the hands of Male orthodoxy. However, the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act continues to be an obstruction to these efforts.
Thus, it is necessary to clearly demarcate the extent of this Act by reserving it only for
providing fair and reasonable Mahr and maintenance during the Iddat period. The cases like
these have helped in reducing the monopoly of female discriminatory laws in matters of
Marriage and much more.

For maintenance during the post-Iddat period, the legislature shall assume this duty to give
Muslim women the uncompromising, secular right to file an application under Section 125 of
the Code. Therefore, the legislature must amend the Act to restrict its application only for
obtaining Mahr and to delete Section 5 which makes it mandatory to obtain the husband’s
consent for obtaining maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. Such a result would work
harmoniously as it takes into account religious differences but also gives primary importance
to the welfare of divorced women.

Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re (2012) 5 SCC 1.

Facts:

 The Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the events that unfolded when the
Government imposed Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to
disperse a peaceful crowd of sleeping protesters at Ramlila Maidan.
 The protest, led by Baba Ramdev against government inaction on black money, was
initially granted permission for a Yoga Training Camp from 1st – 20th June 2011.
  Despite this, Ramdev staged a protest at the Ramlila Maidan on 4th June 2011,
attended by over 50,000 people.
 Police forces were deployed at 12:30 am to break up the protest using water cannons,
tear gas, and batons, resulting in injuries and one death.

Main Issue:

Whether the imposition of Section 144 of the CrPC and subsequent actions by the police
violated fundamental rights protected under Article 19 (right to free speech, assembly) and
Article 21 (right to life) of the Indian Constitution.

Arguments:

 The Amicus Curiae argued that the withdrawal of permission and imposition of
Section 144 were politically motivated and aimed at quelling peaceful protests,
leading to excessive use of force by the police.
 The Bharat Swabhiman Trust, representing Baba Ramdev, contended that the protest
was lawful and peaceful, with no intent to disrupt public order.
 The Delhi Police justified their actions based on potential security concerns and
incidents of violence among the protesters.

Court's Decision:

 The Court emphasized the need for immediate preventive steps and material facts to
justify the imposition of Section 144.
 It distinguished between 'law and order' and 'public order', noting that restrictions for
the latter may be more intrusive.
 While acknowledging the validity of imposing Section 144, the Court found the late-
night imposition in this case unreasonable and disproportionate.
 The Court held that orders under Section 144 must be in writing and based on
material facts, and should not encroach upon fundamental rights without just cause.
 It emphasized the importance of providing reasonable notice to the public before
implementing such orders.
  Justice Chauhan, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the right to privacy and the
right to sleep as fundamental rights, both protected under Article 21.
 He condemned the use of force against sleeping individuals as a violation of their
human rights.

Ratio:

 Imposition of Section 144 must be justified by immediate preventive needs and

material facts.
 Orders under Section 144 should not encroach upon fundamental rights without just
cause.
 Right to privacy and right to sleep are fundamental rights protected under Article 21.
 Use of force against sleeping individuals violates human rights and constitutional
freedoms.

Conclusion:

 The Court's decision reaffirms the importance of balancing public order concerns with
the protection of fundamental rights.
 It underscores the need for authorities to exercise their powers judiciously and with
respect for constitutional freedoms.
 The judgment sets a precedent for future cases involving the imposition of Section
144 and the use of force by authorities against peaceful protesters.

Anuradha Bhasin and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (10.01.2020 - SC) :

MANU/SC/0022/2020

Introduction:

The judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, delivered by the Honorable Supreme
Court of India, had a significant impact on Constitutional Law in India. This case addressed
crucial issues related to fundamental rights, particularly concerning freedom of speech and
expression, and the legality of internet shutdowns in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Facts:

 In August 2019, the Civil Secretariat of the Home Department, Government of Jammu
and Kashmir, issued guidelines for tourists to cut short their stay, shut down
educational institutions and offices, and imposed restrictions under Section 144 of the
CrPC.
 Constitutional Order No. 272, issued by the President of India, applied all provisions
of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir, modifying Article 370.
 Restrictions were imposed, including internet shutdowns, and movements of
journalists were restricted, leading to a challenge under Article 19 of the Indian
Constitution.

Main Issues:

 Whether the Government can claim exemption from producing all orders passed
under Section 144 and others under suspension rules.
 Whether imposing restrictions under Section 144 is valid.
 Whether freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom to carry out trade or
occupation over the internet, are fundamental rights.
 Whether the action of the Government to prohibit internet access in the state is valid.

Arguments:

 Petitioner's Argument:
1. Anuradha Bhasin argued that internet shutdowns severely impacted media
operations and trade, violating fundamental rights.
2. Ghulam Nabi Azad contended that restrictions should be targeted, not blanket,
to balance rights and security.
 Respondent's Argument:
1. The Government argued that internet shutdowns were essential for combating
terrorism and maintaining public order.
 2. They asserted that the internet's boundless nature posed security risks,
justifying the shutdown.

Court's Decision:

 Orders for restrictions under Section 144 and internet shutdowns must be published
promptly.
 Section 144 cannot suppress fundamental rights and must only be used to address
emergencies, subject to judicial scrutiny.
 Freedom of speech and expression extends to the internet under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.

Conclusion:

 The judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India clarified that freedom of speech
and expression, and the freedom to conduct trade or occupation over the internet, are
fundamental rights.
 It emphasized that government actions, including internet shutdowns, must be
proportional and subject to judicial review to protect fundamental rights.
 This landmark judgment sets a precedent for future cases involving internet
shutdowns and the protection of fundamental rights in India.