China’s Rise and Changing Order in East Asia

David Arase
Editor

CHAPTER 7

US-China Rivalry and South Korea's

Strategy

Chaesung Chun

INTRODUCTION

The summit meeting between President Obama and President Xi in June

2013 was highlighted by an interesting vision of a "new ty pe of great
power relationship." The two presidents jointly expressed their hopes that
their two countries could cooperate and find mutual interests in major
issues, diminishing strategic distrust that can produce great power rivalry.
The core interests of the two great powers were said to be compatible,
making peaceful codevelopment possible.
East Asian countries that would suffer from the rivalry between these
two great powers in almost every issue area welcomed this hopeful devel­
opment. Yet, the future of the US-China relationship still remains uncer­
tain. In particular, sovereignty and territorial integrity questions in East
Asia are among the most critical issues that do not permit any compro­
mise, and this may lead to unhappy encounters between these two powers.
The USA, which is not directly involved in any territorial dispute, is con-

C. Chun ([8J)
Department of International Relations, Seoul National University,
Seoul, South Korea
Asian Security Initiative, East Asian Institute, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s) 2016 125

D. Arase (ed.), China's Rise and Changing Order in East Asia,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-352-00023-8_7
126 C. CHUN

stantly under threat of getting entrapped in its allies' territorial disputes.

Disputed maritime territories between China and US allies in both the
South China Sea and the East China Sea undermines the US desire for a
"new ty pe" of relationship with China as well as renewed, strengthened
relationships with its allies.
This chapter analyzes the evolution of the US-China relationship and
the prospect for continued cooperation. Also it examines the nature of
Northeast Asian international relations and the implications ofthe chang­
ing US-China relationship for Northeast Asian countries. Also, it addresses
the question of South Korean foreign policy strategy, which is a middle
power seeking to lessen the strategic distrust between great powers.

EVOLUTION OF THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

TOWARD POWER SHIFT

East Asians have many fundamental problems inherited from the past. Due
to an as yet incomplete transition to modernity there are problems ofter­
ritorial disputes, historical education, and memory politics. Controversial
sovereignty disputes can only be solved by completing the nation- and
state-building process with mutual respect for sovereignty norms. In terms
of the modern balance ofpower logic, the most significant security chal­
lenge is the US-China rivalry, and the most important consequence of
the rise of China and changing US-China relations is uncertainty. The
relationship between the two giants ranges from naked competition to
multilevel cooperation. Possible flashpoints such as the Korean penin­
sula, the Taiwan Straits, maritime disputes in the South China and East
China seas, and other territorial problems concern all East Asian coun­
tries. For example, regarding the South China Sea, Secretary Kerry in the
US-China Strategic and Economic dialogue in June 2015, emphasized
that "the United States interest is in peaceful resolution ofdisputes in the
South China Sea. It's not about whether or not we take sides; it should
be about reducing tensions in that region. And we mentioned that we've
been particularly concerned about reclamation and possible militarization,
and focused on the need for more diplomacy and not coercion. We'd like
China to focus on more diplomacy between itselfand the other claimants."
We know that the economic growth and the subsequent expansion of
Chinese power in politico-military and sociocultural areas will continue,
and that the balance ofpower between theUSA, still the powerful global
leader, and China will change over time.
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 127

What we don't know, however, is whether there will be a change of

leadership status between the USA and China; what the final result of
China's rise will be; whether there will be a violent clash between the two
titans; or whether there will be a new common ground for cooperation
not just between the two powers, but also for regional and global multi­
lateral cooperation.
Reasons for a high level of uncertainty come from several factors: at the
individual level, the USA and China both have unique characteristics. The
former is an exceptionally powerful, liberal hegemon, while the latter has
vast natural and human resources that defy historical comparative analysis.
At the structural level, this case of power transition occurs against the
background of unprecedented factors such as the rise of soft and institu­
tional power, a post-Westphalian transformation of international politics
and globalization.
Among other things, uncertainty about the future gives rise to two
interesting phenomena: too many theories about the future, which I will
call over-theorizing; and growing conservatism in both powers in the
sense that, they want to prepare for the worst-case scenario. If we com­
bine these two, we see the advent of conservative over-theorizing. There
are different versions of over-theorized pessimism about the future of rela­
tions between the USA and China. Because the analysis of facts is indeter­
minate, a stronger need to raise the level of security and prepare for the
worst complicates the relations between the two.
From a South Korean perspective, the challenge is not only to prevent a
final clash between the two great powers, but also to muddle through the
long process of finding mutual strategic cooperation. Situated at the front
lines between the two, South Korea will suffer not only from an all-out,
final confrontation, but also from small, procedural disagreements caused
by strategic mistrust as recently witnessed in the case of theater high alti­
tude anti-ballistic missile defense (THAAD). More problematic for South
Korea is its inability to influence the trajectory of the US-China relations
to a great degree. This dilemma may be common to many relatively weak
countries neighboring China.
The US-China relationship can be divided into several phases after
the beginning of the twenty-first century. Before the economic crisis in
2008, China was somehow absorbed in its own national strategy of rapid
and full-scale economic development and the construction of a favorable
international environment. Increasing Chinese ambitions after the 2008
economic crisis drove China to take a more assertive stance at regional and
128 C. CHUN

global levels. For example, China put forward the RMB as an alternative
key currency to solve problems in the US dollar-based global monetary
system; criticized the deficiencies of the current global climate change
regime; and began to assert its geostrategic interests against its neighbors.
This created growing strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing,
which ultimately led to the next phase that focused on alleviating mutual
mistrust and a competitive mindset. The USA, frustrated by China's
unwillingness to take on global and regional responsibilities as a great
power, asked it to assume a proper role in major issues. Chinese assertive­
ness also caused a higher level of concern in neighboring countries, lead­
ing to China's rhetoric of"peaceful rise" (Johnston 2013; Swaine 2010).
China also has been trying to advance and realize its regional vision
regarding Asia under various concepts. Recently at the 2015 annual Boao
Forum for Asia, President Xi Jinping proposed the idea ofan Asian "com­
munity of common destiny," which relies on a plan to be "formulated
regarding connectivity building in East Asia and Asia at large to advance
full integration in infrastructure, policies, institutions, and personnel flow."
It hopes to "increase maritime connectivity, speed up institution building
for marine cooperation in Asia, and step up cooperation in marine econ­
omy, environmental protection, disaster management and fishery."
To realize this idea, China proposed a regional architectural concept,
the so-called Belt and Road initiative, which has begun to take form in the
case of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and other infra­
structure connectivity projects. China has announced that more than 60
countries located along the routes and international organizations have
shown interest in taking part in the development of the Belt and Road
initiative.
The US-China relationship has changed as each side advanced a foreign
strategy ofits own: the American rebalancing strategy and China's strategy
of "peaceful development." There appears to be three core components
of the US rebalancing strategy. The first is the US policy toward China.
In international politics, when the power gap between a dominant and
challenger state becomes narrower, the dominant power will generally
not wait until the rising power reaches power parity. According to power
transition theory, when a dissatisfied rising power reaches a ±20 percent
power differential with the established power, there will be a hegemonic
war. In this regard, a hegemon will tend to act first (Chan 2008). After
a confusing episode with G-2 rhetoric, the Obama administration seems
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 129

to have decided to be more definitive in building relations with China.

Borrowing from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's remarks at the US
Institute of Peace in March 2012, the USA wants to challenge the histori­
cal trend of hegemonic clashes by proving that an established power and a
rising power can coexist. "New relations among great powers" is emerg­
ing as a new term, but there are requirements. China should respect the
already established rules of the game. As the global order has been main­
tained, thanks to the US hegemonic role in providing global and regional
public goods, China cannot be a leader without respecting these rules and
burden-sharing commitments as a responsible power. Soft power require­
ments are frequently indicated, implying that a great power can acquire
the status of hegemon only by proving itself as a value and norm leader
in the areas of human rights, free trade, and democracy. The game now is
not just about military power or economic influence, but also about the
rules of the game, transforming it into a sort of meta-game, resulting in
an ambiguous period ofhedging. In this respect, the USA has changed the
rules of the relationship.
Second are the economic benefits. Since 2000, Asia has become the
USA's largest source of imports and its second-largest export market
after the North America region. As the world's most populous area and
fastest growing economic zone, Asia is expected to become even more
vital for the US economy in the future. This why the Obama adminis­
tration is pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which aims to
make Asian nations central to its National Export Initiative (Manyin
et al. 2012). The economic importance of East Asia becomes very clear
when looking at the trends over the last decade. With Asia as the second­
largest region in regional shares of global merchandise trade in 2010,
Asia's shares of US merchandise trade rose from 22.0 percent in 2000 to
23.5 percent in 2010 for exports, and 28.9 percent in 2000 to 32.2 per­
cent in 2010 for imports, making Asia the second-largest trading region
following North America in exports. As the structural engagement as
well as the volume of the US economic relationship with Asia increases,
there is growing expectation that it will be harder for the USA to leave
again. This also means that there will be more roles for the USA to take
on in the future.
Third is the security architecture. It is evident that one focus of the US
rebalancing strategy lies in its China policy of how to counter Beijing's
area denial and anti-access strategy. The basic motivation, however, seems
130 C. CHUN

not to reside in containing China, but in building a more effective security

architecture where the USA can manage a peaceful power transition. The
USA has repeatedly announced that its bilateral alliances are the key to
its security architecture with the renewed roles of mini-, and multilateral
institutions. Developing multifaceted and multilayered dispute settlement
mechanisms is crucial in preventing conflicts from escalating into major
military clashes. So far the USA has maintained the so-called hub-and­
spoke security architecture in the region, which seems insufficient under
a transforming security environment. The hub-and-spoke model of the
past is slowly giving way to a more complex network among the differ­
ent US alliance partners in East Asia. Other elements will be necessary,
such as inter-spoke cooperation or cooperation among US allies and mul­
tihub networks. These "linchpins" allow for important US allies to take on
major regional roles with a renewed awareness of collective identity and
common values.
However, China revolves around the concept of"core interests" when­
ever the strategy of development is concerned. It was from 2003 that
Beijing officials started to make declarations about core interests, greatly
influenced by a situation in which Taiwan steadily moved toward de jure
independence. It is well known that in his closing remarks at the July
2009 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, then Chinese State
Councilor Dai Bingguo listed and ranked China's core interests. He
stated: "For China, our concern is we must uphold our basic systems, our
national security; and secondly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity;
and thirdly, sustained economic and social development." A 2011 White
Paper entitled "China's Peaceful Development" reiterates these principles
ofState Councilor Dai's list and the 2011 White Paper represents the most
authoritative articulations of the general principles comprising China's set
of core interests.
However, confusion arises from the fact that the meaning of "core
interest" is constantly changing. In addition to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjang
were included as components of core interests. Then tensions involving
China's maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea
affected the definition of the concept. Chinese officials reportedly told
US officials that the South China Sea was one of China's core interests in
2010. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also stated that State
Councilor Dai told her that the South China Sea was a core interest dur­
ing the 2010 Strategic and Economic Dialogue. So far Chinese officials
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 131

neither publicly confirmed nor denied that Beijing had raised the South
China Sea to core interest status.
Interestingly enough, the same thing happened with the Senkaku
Islands in 2013. Japanese media claimed that the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officially elevated the Senk:aku Islands to a "core interest"
in an the daily press conference. All this means that China defines core
interest based on the diplomatic context to act accordingly and uses con­
ceptual ambiguity very strategically (Campbell et al. 2013).

NEW TYPE OF GREAT POWERS' RELATIONSHIP?

The summit meeting between President Obama and President Hu in
January 2011 started a new phase with a more realistic awareness that
the two countries need mutual cooperation for their own interests. China
accepted America as an Asia-Pacific nation, with a quid pro quo to respect
Chinese core interests from the American side.
Most interesting was the phrase that President Xi Jinping used to define
the US-China relationship during his term of presidency. President Xi
first proposed the phrase of "new type of great powers relationship" in
February 2012 when he visited the USA. What he meant at that time
was: (1) "steadily increase mutual understanding and strategic trust," (2)
"respect each other's core interests and major concerns," (3) "work hard
to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation," and (4) "steadily enhance
coordination and cooperation in international affairs and on global issues."
Continuing this move, at the seventh round of the US-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) June 22-24, 2015, in Washington,
DC, The USA and China highlighted the progress in US-China relations
in recent years, and decided to enhance practical cooperation and con­
structively manage differences, in order to promote the building of a new
model of relations between China and the USA, in accordance with the
consensus reached by the two heads of state.
It is still uncertain what President Xi and Beijing wanted to achieve
with this term. However, it is certain that this concept is closely associated
with President Xi's effort to create a favorable environment for expand­
ing China's economic and strategic interests. Also, this concept reflects
President Xi's intention to advance his own style of leadership, with the
political goal to draw more popular support commensurate with higher
international status.
132 C. CHUN

After the official launch of the "new type" concept, many different
Chinese officials frame it with some flexibility. The common elements can
be summarized as below:

• Develop deeper, more frequent, and more resilient channels of com­

munication to improve the two countries' abilities to manage crises
if and when they arise.
• Pressure the USA to respect China's "core interests," defined by
Beijing as upholding China's political system and national security,
Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and economic and
social development.
• Promote an image of China as a constructive actor seeking common
solutions to regional and global issues.
• Demonstrate that China is proactive in building a peaceful and coop­
erative relationship with the USA and does not have the intent or
ability to challenge the U.S. militarily.
• Pressure the USA to cease military reconnaissance and survey oper­
ations in China's claimed exclusive economic zone,* reduce arms
sales to Taiwan, and relax restrictions on bilateral military coop­
eration, particularly those imposed in the 2000 National Defense
Authorization Act (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission 2013).

The US response to President Xi's proposal has been moderately positive.

Officials during President Obama's first term expressed their hope that China
and the USA can avoid hegemonic rivalry and even general war caused by
the dynamics of shifting power. According to Jeffrey Bader's memoir, foreign
policy key advisors for President Obama tried to reverse the trend of under­
estimating the importance of East Asia. They were aware of the previous
Bush administration's error of too much emphasis on counterterrorism and
national security (Bader 2012).
With determination to sustain a stable and economically open regional
order and respect for human rights, Washington welcomed President Xi's
"new type" of relationship. This culminated during the informal sum­
mit meeting between President Obama and President Xi. President Xi
announced:

"And at present, the China-U.S. relationship has reached a new historical

starting point. Our two countries have vast convergence of shared interests,
from promoting our respective economic growth at home to ensuring the
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 133

stability of the global economy; from addressing international and regional

hotspot issues to dealing with all kinds of global challenges. On all these
issues, our two countries need to increase exchanges and cooperation. Both
sides should proceed from the fundamental interests of our peoples and
bear in mind human development and progress. We need to think creatively
and act energetically so that working together we can build a new model of
major country relationship" (White House 2013a).
President Obama responded: "Inevitably, there are areas of tension
between our two countries, but what I've learned over the last four years
is both the Chinese people and the American people want a strong, coop­
erative relationship, and that I think there's a strong recognition on the
part of both President Xi and myself that it is very much in our interest to
work together to meet the global challenges that we face. And I'm very
much looking forward to this being a strong foundation for the kind of
new model of cooperation that we can establish for years to come" (White
House 2013a). After the summit, American national security advisor Tom
Donilon recalled the two presidents' "aspiration of charting a new course
here for our relationship into a reality, and to build out what President Xi
and President Obama call the new model of relations between great pow­
ers" (White House 20136 ).

If we focus on the cooperative side of the US-China relationship, it

is undeniably true that it provides other Asian countries with wide win­
dows of opportunity to pursue their national interests without worrying
about the clash of the titans. However, this is not the whole picture of
the US-China relationship. With the two great powers rebalancing from
2011, both countries adopt hedging strategies: Washington maintains
amicable relations with China while strengthening its traditional and new
military alliance relationships to check China's military buildup; Beijing
also pursues a cooperative relationship with the USA while rapidly per­
forming military modernization, which will slowly lead to new strategic
relations with other Asian countries. If the new pattern of great power
relationship implies that both powers increase strategic checking and
balancing the other, other countries may suffer the consequences. For
example, Japan, expecting higher levels of conflict with China, decided
to balance against China more by reinterpreting its constitution to allow
the Japanese self defence force (SDF) to expand its roles. When two great
powers rebalance and hedge, there may be less room for other powers
to hedge because they are pressed by the great powers to assume specific
roles (Goh 2006, 2007, 2011).
134 C. CHUN

Recently there have been questions about the sustainability of rebal­

ancing strategy because the Obama administration in its second term is
re-rebalancing its strategy to address the turmoil in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe (as in Crimea). The original rebalancing created the fol­
lowing issues: American retrenchment led to new security problems in
non-Asian regions; reduced American commitment in non-Asian regions
caused doubt among American allies there; American commitment to the
new type of relationship with China caused US allies in Asia to doubt US
alliance commitment, expressed by Japan after China's declaration of an
Air Defense Zone in the East China Sea; American entrapment should the
USA permit its allies too much maneuvering room; subsequent disagree­
ment among American allies with regard to new roles and cooperation
with other US allies; and Chinese skepticism about American intentions
when Washington strengthens its ties with its allies.
To solve such problems, the USA reassures its alliance partners by
providing certain security commitments such as inclusion of the Senkaku
Islands within the parameters of the American security treaty with Japan
and Washington's agreement to Seoul's request to further postpone the
transfer of operational control (OpCon) of ROK troops. Also, the USA
tries hard to harmonize relations among alliance partners, as shown by its
mediating role between South Korea and Japan. It is true that the USA
works hard to operationalize the new type of great power relationship with
China. However, because China interprets US reassurance of its allies as a
strategy to proactively encircle China, it is to be yet to be seen whether the
new type of major power relation will really take root in future.

FUTURE OF US-CHINA RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Future of the US-China Relationship

How American rebalancing strategy and China's "peaceful development"
will evolve together remains to be seen. If the future bilateral relation­
ship is hegemonic rivalry, all-out competition may not be inevitable. If
a predictable and stable pattern of both competition and cooperation is
established, we will see an oscillation between good and bad relations.
Also important is how different issue areas will produce their specific logic
of cooperation and competition. Under the American rebalancing strategy
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 135

and Chinese development strategy, a strong consensus seems to take hold

at least in economic areas. However, economic interdependence can coex­
ist with the logic of military competition and mutual balancing. This will
be most evident in maritime territorial issues. Although neither side wants
outright confrontation over territorial issues, worsening relations between
China and American allies will reinforce military buildups (Table 7.1 ).
Direct maritime confrontation between the USA and China lies in the
question of exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In 2012, China's People's
liberation army (PLA) Navy for the first time conducted maritime intel­
ligence collection operations in the US territory of Guam and the state
of Hawaii. The US Department of Defense announced that the Chinese
navy had not provided any prior notification, which contradicted China's
own insistence that foreign militaries must provide notification and receive
approval prior to operating in China's claimed EEZ. China and the USA
share the common view that the coastal state has the right to explore,
exploit, conserve, and manage natural resources within its EEZ. However,
China claims the right to regulate foreign military activity in its EEZ,
whether it is exercises, military surveys, reconnaissance, or other military
operations. However, the USA, in accordance with the majority view,
adheres to the opinion that coastal states share those rights. This is espe­
cially serious in the case of South China Sea.
This difference in interpretation regarding maritime rights and the free­
dom to navigate may lead to bilateral tensions, aggravating other related
territorial and military issues. Furthermore, the PLA Navy seems to plan
distant water naval operational capabilities to expand its economic and

Table 7.1 US-China relationship in different power games

Engagement/ Cooperation
Hegemonic competition Great power Rivalry
b/w great powers

us To preserve hegemonic To preserve vital To engage on important

power interests interests
To deter the rise of To strengthen its To develop the framework
China position for competition for cooperation
China To challenge US-led To compete in major To rise under the US-led
governance framework issues and have framework
To fight and win o core superiority To build its own
interests architecture for further
development
136 C. CHUN

security purposes. China is building additional aircraft carriers after its first
one was launched recently, and this implies further modernization and
long-distance projection of Chinese military power.
It is uncertain that the "new type of great power relationship" between
the USA and China will alleviate military competition in the future. So
far, despite agreement that the two countries need to respect mutual core
interests, find common ground for cooperation, and establish the basis
for a more integrated economy, strategic uncertainty accelerates a con­
tinuing military buildup and military preparedness in case of maritime
confrontation.
Over time, China will be able both to increase its anti-access advantage
where it currently exists and to expand it into the Pacific, to Northeast
Asia, and eventually to Southeast Asia. In addition, Chinese cyber and
antisatellite capabilities may in time be able to disrupt US C4ISR capa­
bilities and thus impair US direct defense. In sum, forward-operating US
forces could become more vulnerable, an outcome that represents the top
priority of China's military investments and deployments (Dobbins 2012).
American rebalancing strategy does not mean weakening military pre­
paredness in Asia. Washington endorses the continued deployment of 11
aircraft carriers, reversing a plan to reduce it to 10. Also it supports contin­
ued production, with only a temporary slowdown, of attack submarines as
well as development of a new cruise missile that can be deployed in fairly
large numbers on submarines. In addition, it calls for continued produc­
tion of a broad range of naval ship types, including relatively "high-end"
Aegis radar-equipped destroyers and, though in somewhat reduced num­
bers, of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a relatively small, maneuverable
vessel for a variety of lower-end missions. Lastly, it includes plans to sus­
tain the projected total number of amphibious ships for the Marine Corps
at 33 ships. Some have called for a larger number of ships-the Marine
Corps, for instance, has wanted 38 ships-but 33 has long been, and will
now remain, the actual program (Manyin et al. 2012).

Diverse Interpretations
How the situation will evolve from now on partly depends on how people
in both countries think about the future relationship. There are pessi­
mists and optimists. In the USA, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer
assume that US-China relations will be defined by typical great power rela­
tions. Given the theoretical hypothesis that great powers pursue maximum
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 137

security by maximizing national power, the narrowing power gap between

the USA and China is destined to bring about fierce security competi­
tion probably after 20 or 30 years. In this line of thinking, an important
assumption is that the rise of China will continue regardless of what other
countries do because national power is the combination of population
and wealth. China, with a population of four times as much as that of the
USA and a fast growing economy, will translate these into military might,
and will never fail to challenge international politics dominated by the
USA. As security competition is in the nature of great powers due to the
logical imperative of anarchy, the USA will have no choice but to meet the
challenge by China, which leads to hegemonic rivalry (Mearsheimer 2001;
Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005).
These predictions based on past cases of hegemonic rivalry are enlight­
ening. A repetition of the past, however, is doubtful for the following
reasons. First, there is no reason to think that China will be strong enough
to challenge American hegemony, and just to assume this will cast a long,
pessimistic shadow of the future over current policy making. Assuming
a very powerful, expansive, and intransigent China may help to prepare
for the worst scenario, but the discourse itself determines the thinking
of policy makers. There are many ways to project China's future national
power using many indicators, such as the growth of the GDP. However,
it is also true that continued growth of China will bring about many pain­
ful problems like having to deal with inequality, demands for democracy,
unemployment, and corruption, and so on. China will wisely control these
situations and feel the need for a stable external environment and favor­
able relations with strong powers such as the USA. Given the possibility
that China will grow into the status of regional hegemon, not a global
one, to expect China to become a global rival will effectively narrow the
policy options not just for the USA, but also for the countries around
China. To avoid the undesirable self-fulfilling prophecy of offensive real­
ism, a more process-oriented approach is necessary.
Second, the rise of China is a phenomenon that may continue, but the
future shape of China is quite uncertain. Now China is characterized by
market socialism directed by one-party authoritarianism. China will be
able to continue its economic development by maintaining its involve­
ment in the framework of liberal international political economy mainly
manufactured by the USA. It is certain that China actually transformed
itself in many major economic areas such as finance and trade in accor­
dance with international standards, not to speak of many groups in civil
138 C. CHUN

society. As China's rise is inevitably an 'engaged rise' under unipolarity

at least up to now, there are structural imperatives for continuation of
this basic pattern. If engagement with China and Chinese input into the
US-led international system are mutually reinforcing, it is not certain, as
Mearsheimer thinks, that a clash is inevitable. There will be more mecha­
nisms to deal with conflicts in specific areas to avoid direct escalation into
strategic antagonism. More small conflicts accompanying China's rise may
help to prevent a final devastating clash from happening.
Pessimism in China is best represented by realists like Yan Xuetong. He
argues that bilateral relations between the USA and China have experi­
enced a long period of fluctuations due to conflicts and disagreements of
interests. Even in the post-Cold War era, this fact will not easily change.
Having wrongheaded wishful thinking for genuine friendship, Yan argues,
will prevent the realistic management of the relationship. Based on this so­
called theory of superficial friendship he concludes as follows: First, being
psychologically prepared for the other side's unfavorable or unfriendly
decisions would lessen the danger of an escalating conflict. Second, a
better the mutual deterrence strategy would generate more preventative
security cooperation between them. Third, their relations would become
more stable by reducing unrealistic expectations of support by the other
side. Fourth, they could improve their relations at a steadier rate by apply­
ing different principles according to specific aspects of their relations (Yan
2010a, b).
In both countries, optimism also remains effective with liberal inter­
national relations discourses believing in the power of economic interde­
pendence, international institutions, and democratic peace. Some liberals
believe that bilateral economic relations create mutual interests in good
relations between states. The greater the volume of trade and investment
between two countries, the more the groups on both sides will have a
strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace (Karabell 2009;
Chan 2011). In addition to their faith in economic interdependence an
instrument of peace, liberal optimists place great expectations in the role
of international institutions of various kinds. These can help to improve
communication between states, reducing uncertainty about intentions
and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible, binding
commitments to one another. By so doing, they can help to ease or
counteract some of the pernicious effects of international anarchy, pav­
ing the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust than would other­
wise be attainable.
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 139

Democratic peace theorists also suggest expectations both for political

development in China, and subsequent better relations with the USA. The
process of political reform in China is being driven largely by economic
development, which, in turn, is being accelerated by China's increasing
openness to trade.

SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY

South Korea, as a relatively weak state in the region, has limited options
in the matter of great power competition. South Korea should have the
following in mind.
First, hasty and rash pessimism due to over-theorizing will have far more
disastrous effect upon weak stakeholders like South Korea that are situated
at the interface of the relationship. The specifics of power transition and,
more importantly, changes in the nature of international politics give more
room for South Korea to maneuver. It will try to assuage strategic mistrust
between the USA and China by giving more ideas and knowledge for
issue-specific dispute settlement mechanisms, fostering institutionalization
of cooperation, and assuming roles as conveners or facilitators of coopera­
tion. Also, to situate South Korea as a global middle power that is able to
import global norms into regional problem solving with the help of other
regional middle powers (ASEAN, Australia, Taiwan, and arguably Japan)
is helpful. There are issue areas that both the USA and China can rela­
tively easily accommodate such as human security or emerging issues such
as environmental degradation, cyber security, and nuclear security. South
Korea hosted the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 and suggested the
formation of a regional nuclear security regime. Both the USA and China
also work for this kind of regime in the bilateral Strategic and Economic
Dialogue, which may be combined with South Korean efforts.
Second, South Korea needs to promote East Asian systemic flexibility.
As uneven development of national power in international politics is inevi­
table, the critical issue is whether there is systemic flexibility and adaptabil­
ity to adjust to new distributions of power. Enhancing systemic flexibility
means: (1) to prevent war among great powers or military clashes for
regional hegemony; (2) to peacefully manage difficult regional affairs that
affect great power rivalry; ( 3) to establish universal, international norms in
spite of a power shift; (4) to enhance the role of middle powers in lessen­
ing strategic distrust between great powers, especially between the USA
and China.
140 C.CHUN

Third, the development of a new equation for South Korea-US-China

triangular relationship will be a crucial task. The most formidable chal­
lenge is how to maintain strategic relations both with the USA and China,
while contributing to the smooth management of power shift. One thing
that South Koreans have been doing is to smartly transform the ROK-US
alliance. Alliance in the twenty-first century is not just a military partner­
ship against predetermined adversaries. New roles include dealing with
uncertain security threats and human security problems based on universal
values and norms. The concept of strategic alliance in the twenty-first cen­
tury between South Korea and the USA, then, contains common values,
trust, and norms as crucial elements for future alliance. When common
norms provide the basis of alliance, its regional and global role will gain
support not just from both partners but from other countries, including
China.
Values and norms such as nonproliferation, durable peace, modernizing
failed states, and solving human security problems can be most promi­
nent examples, because South Korean civil society can easily draw on past
experiences in dealing with North Korea and Northeast Asian security
problems. When universal values utilizing these specific experiences are
realized in an alliance, new roles for the alliance will not cause unnecessary
misunderstandings.
South Korea's strategic cooperation with China is also indispensable in
many areas not only in bilateral issues, but also in North Korean issues,
regional ones, and global issues. China, now as the number one trad­
ing partner of South Korea, most significant player in solving the North
Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean peninsula, and a country
that shares many traditional and modern values with South Korea, shares
strategic interests with South Korea. Also, because neither South Korea
nor China desire conflict in the region, and they agree to transform the
regional order into one that is more peaceful, mature, and responsive to
regional members, there are many issue areas for cooperation. To have
balanced and mutually beneficial relations with China in the Northeast
Asian regional context will be crucial to South Korean national interests.
South Korea's interests toward China include a need to further eco­
nomic cooperation and find favorable ways for settling economic disagree­
ments. Other aims include: to develop and share more understanding
about each other in the form of cultural exchanges and human exchanges
at various levels; to facilitate political cooperation by developing multi­
level exchanges of officials and diverse conferences for strategic dialogues;
 US-CHINA RIVALRY AND SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY 141

to find a better way to reconcile nationalism with common values such

as economic development and prosperity, regional cooperation, democ­
racy, new postmodern civilization, human rights, and peace in order to
solve critical problems; to establish multilateral Northeast Asian coopera­
tion mechanisms and enhance openness and transparency to solve critical
issues such as environmental problems, refugees, and nuclear prolifera­
tion; and to cooperate in global arenas in areas such as climate change,
energy security, environmental protection, poverty, contagious diseases,
and other global issues.
Fourth, South Korea needs to make full use of global changes that
empower nonstate actors such as civil society and global institutions,
and to localize global norms and civil networks for East Asian multilevel
cooperation. With denser networking among multilayered actors in the
USA and China, and also among other East Asian countries, there will
be more stakeholders in Sino-American relations. Also, close connections
among institutional settings and norms between global and regional lev­
els will have the effect of interlocking East Asian architecture with global
governance. For example, when South Koreans deal with North Korean
problems, it is not just seen in the context of East Asian power relations,
but also from the global normative framework of nonproliferation or nor­
malizing outlaw states, which all great powers cannot but observe. South
Korea has succeeded in persuading China not to recognize Kim Jong Un's
Byungjin Strategic line, which rejects North Korean denuclearization, by
referencing the global nonproliferation regime. In this way, there is more
leeway to guide the purely power-oriented process of power transition
into a more norm-based one that engages a lot more actors and levels.
Fifth, South Korea needs to develop issue-specific strategies. What is
interesting in US-China relations is that there are different logics working
in different issue areas. Competitiveness is much higher in security and
military issues, moderate in economic issues, and far less in sociocultural
issues. To securitize less competitive economic and sociocultural issues
from the geostrategic perspective is very hasty and risky.
By cultivating the possibility of cooperation in different fields, we can
contain negative spillover and even de-securitize major issues. South
Korean President Park Geun Hye has suggested a regional plan, the
Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). South Korea
emphasizes functional, nonpolitical cooperation in the areas of nuclear
security, environmental degradation and other emerging areas such as
cyber security. It is noteworthy that seemingly nonpolitical issues such as
142 C.CHUN

freedom of navigation, maritime resource development, and cyber security

are actually anchored in political interests.
Sixth, South Korea can develop its grand strategic concept of "mid­
dle power diplomacy," in the relationship between the USA and China.
Building a complex cooperative network to transcend the balance of
power mechanism in East Asia with the help of other middle powers fac­
ing similar dilemmas is a regional middle power initiative. For this South
Korea needs to establish cohesive domestic, social support for this para­
digm and situate South Korea as a global middle power that contributes
to the development of global governance.

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