A Critique of Transboundary

Natural Resource Management

in Southern Africa

Yemi Katerere, Ryan Hill and Sam Moyo

The IUCN - ROSA Series on Transboundary Natural Resources Management - Paper 1

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
1
Published by: IUCN - The World Conservation Union
(Regional Office for Southern Africa)

IUCN
The World Conservation Union

Citation: Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A Critique of

Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Southern
Africa. Paper no.1, IUCN-ROSA Series on
Transboundary Natural Resource Management.

Author: Yemi Katerere is Regional Director at IUCN-ROSA, Harare.

Ryan Hill is Projects Coordinator at IUCN-ROSA, Harare.
Sam Moyo is Director of the Southern African Research Institute
for Policy Studies, Harare.

Copyright: IUCN - The World Conservation Union

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acknowledgement of the source is made. IUCN would
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No use of thispublication may be made for resale or other

commercial purposes withot the prior written permission of
the IUCN.The views expresed in this publication do not
necessarily reflect those of IUCN or those of the sponsors of
the publication.

2I A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 C o n t e n t s

INTRODUCTION 4

RATIONALE AND DRIVERS FOR TBNRM 5

The Cross-Border Nature of Resources and Ecosystems 5
Economic Growth and Tourism 5
The SADC Treaty and Regional Economic Integration 6
The Tragedy of the Commons 7
Globalization of the Commons 8
Promotion of Peace and Security 9
Opportunities for Redistribution of Land and Resource Benefits 11
Donor Imperatives and the Evolution of CBNRM 11
The Conservation Imperative 11

TBNRM IN THE SADC REGION 12

A Definition of TBNRM 12
Objectives of TBNRM 12
Traditional Management and Sharing of Transboundary Resources 13
Formal TBNRM Initiatives in the Region 13
Transfrontier Conservation Areas 15
Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas 16
Spatial Development Initiatives and Development Corridors 16
Regional Authorities and Protocols 17
International Conventions 17

KEY ISSUES AND CONCERNS 18

The Pace of Implementation 18
The Important Role of the State in TBNRM 19
The Shift from Agriculture to Wildlife and Tourism 19
Poor Community Consultation and Participation 20
Exacerbation of Inter-State Inequities 21
Liberalization, Resource-Raiding and Loss of Local Control over Resources 22
The Global Commons Discourse 23
Privatization and Market Failures 24
Poor Devolution of Rights 25
The Complexity of Multiple Resources 25
TBNRM and Re-distribution of Rights and Benefits 26

THE WAY FORWARD 26

Building State Level Processes and Capacity 27
Slowing the Pace of Implementation 27
Sharing of Information and Expertise 28
Defining Roles for Organisations and Institutions 28
Conclusion 30

REFERENCES 31

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III
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant events in natural resource management in southern
Africa has been the integration of environmentalism into development policy. An
outcome of the rise of environmentalism is the concept of natural resource manage-
ment. The last decade or more has witnessed a growing focus on social and scientific
research and policy-making in natural resources management and the emergence of
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) as a popular movement.
More recently, factors such as globalisation and increasing efforts at achieving re-
gional economic integration have contributed to growing enthusiasm in transboundary
natural resource management (TBNRM) by NGOs, donors and the private sector as an
additional natural resources management movement.

The meteoric rise of transboundary approaches is due to several factors, including

the need to better manage shared resources; the drive for economic growth through
regional integration and development; the need to promote peace and security; and
more external factors such as globalization and the agendas of international donors
and organizations. Numerous TBNRM initiatives have emerged in the region and are
being developed and implemented at a rapid pace. However, there are numerous
concerns arising from these initiatives ranging from community marginalization to
inter-state inequity in the distribution of benefits. There are fears that border com-
munities, already at the margins of social, political and economic opportunities will
become further isolated through TBNRM initiatives. At the same time TBNRM initia-
tives are bringing into focus these otherwise ignored communities. Hence, TBNRM
presents real opportunities and constraints that require a sharp focus.

This paper seeks to analyze TBNRM in a broad sense. The purpose of the paper is
fourfold:

1. To analyze the rationale for TBNRM and the factors which are driving the
emergence of specific initiatives.
2. To analyze and characterize the nature and types of TBNRM in the SADC re-
gion.
3. To highlight some key concerns related to the likely effectiveness and
sustainability of TBNRM initiatives in the region.
4. To suggest a way forward in terms of key needs and the appropriate roles for
organizations and institutions involved in TBNRM initiatives.

The paper is one of three papers commissioned by IUCN (The World Conservation
Union) as part of a scoping study of TBNRM in Southern Africa. The second paper is
a comprehensive review of specific initiatives (Jones and Chonguica 2001) and the
third is a review of the legal and policy framework for TBNRM (Mohamed-Katerere
2001). This paper draws on some of the material from those two reviews, and also
incorporates some findings from a regional workshop held in February 2001 to iden-
tify and discuss key issues related to TBNRM.

4 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

RATIONALE AND DRIVERS FOR TBNRM
There are numerous factors which provide the rationale for TBNRM or are currently
acting as drivers of TBNRM initiatives. They range from basic development needs to
external factors influencing Southern Africa. By describing these factors, this sec-
tion of the paper helps to shed light on the emergence of TBNRM as a major devel-
opment thrust in the region. However, if the potential benefits of this development
are to be realised and achieve the goal of equity, then a critical and independent
analysis of the drivers of TBNRM is necessary.

The Cross-Border Nature of Resources and Ecosystems

The livelihoods of most people in Southern Africa are dependent on the use of
natural resources and the environment. Consequently, effective management of natural
resources is essential for long-term sustainable development in the region. Yet these
resources are under increasing pressure from human population growth, poverty
resulting from inequitable distribution of resources, and macroeconomic changes
associated with globalization. National governments in the region have struggled
with management of natural resources within their borders, but many now have
effective policy and legal frameworks. Commercial poaching of some wildlife species
such as elephant and rhino, for example, has been effectively countered in recent
years. Unfortunately, many resources in the region cannot be managed at state level
alone because they straddle international borders. Major rivers form the boundaries
between several SADC countries, and numerous valuable wildlife populations mi-
grate across borders. Activities in one country often have effects on neighbouring
countries, and in an era of increasing resource depletion and scarcity, the need for
collaboration in management of these resources is growing. Efforts at rhino conser-
vation provide a practical example of the importance of cross-border collaboration.
In some cases rhino range states find themselves in a situation where all their
rhinos have been poached and hence they are totally dependent on neighbouring
countries for breeding animals and expertise.

Economic Growth and Tourism

There is also an economic justification for TBNRM in southern Africa. Natural re-
sources are a significant basis of economic activity in the region. In particular,
tourism based on wildlife and other resources is considered to be an industry with
high growth potential, especially in areas which have marginal value for agriculture.
The World Travel and Tourism Council has forecasted that annual economic growth in
tourism in the SADC region should be 5.9% over the next decade with the appropri-
ate policy framework and implementation, and the World Tourism Organization pre-
dicts a 5.4% average annual increase in the number of tourist arrivals to the region
over the next 20 years (WTTC 1999). In addition to tourism, transboundary initia-
tives such as Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) are expected to boost regional
trade. Different TBNRM initiatives are expected to attract direct foreign investment
as well as cross-border investments. As the tourism sector flourishes and industrial
activities increase, it is assumed that other stakeholders such as local communities
will benefit through employment and trade opportunities.

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The SADC Treaty and Regional Economic Integration
An additional justification for TBNRM is the drive for regional economic integration
that is enshrined in SADC Treaty. In the preamble, the Treaty refers to

“deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and
mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and freer move-
ment of factors of production, goods and services across international boundaries”.

Since its formation in 1980 SADC has experimented with different approaches to
regional integration in order to guide its strategy for regional cooperation, develop-
ment and integration. The SADC Treaty signed in August 1992 states that coping
with complex regional and global changes, facilitating cross border trade, and achiev-
ing economic integration would be more feasible on a regional than national basis.
The Treaty provides the institutional basis for cooperation and integration, and uses
an approach which is based on project or sectoral coordination (Lee, 1999). The
Treaty lists the following seven areas or sectors in which cooperation towards in-
tegration will be pursued:

• Food security, land and agriculture;

• Infrastructure and services;
• Industry, trade, investment and finance;
• Human resources development, science and technology;
• Natural resources and environment;
• Social welfare, information and culture; and
• Politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security

The Treaty further provides for the conclusion of protocols that would define the
nature of and institutional mechanisms for integration and cooperation (SADC, 1992).
One of the objectives of SADC is to “achieve sustainable utilisation of natural re-
sources and effective management of the environment”. This is to be achieved through
popular participation, development of policies aimed at eliminating obstacles to
free movement of people, goods and services, and harmonisation of policies and
plans of member states (SADC, 1992).

Through the submission of national projects for funding, it was felt that all member
states would benefit from regional development cooperation even though their econo-
mies were at different stages of development. Regional cooperation in the SADC
context is aimed at overcoming underdevelopment in the spheres of production and
infrastructure. Further, such a strategy was intended to be incremental and generate
regional identity. This was also seen as a way of not impinging on the sovereignty of
member states since national development efforts take priority over regional coop-
eration.

However, the cooperation model has been criticised because cooperation can be
broad and hence not suited to resolving key, yet complex policy issues. For shared
natural resources such as water, the SADC functional integration model displays
weak linkages between national policies and plans and regional integration efforts.
The project-based approach is not designed to respond to potential resource-based
conflicts arising from differences in national and regional sectoral policies and plans

6 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 (SADC, 1992) and also a growing competition for natural resources. Recognising
these weaknesses, SADC resolved to formulate and adopt effectively coordinated
sectoral plans and policies and to develop a regional capacity in policy analysis and
planning. These weaknesses are still evident and continue to be a constraint to
effective regional cooperation. Weaknesses in the functional integration model are
exposed by the fact that a project focus has overshadowed the necessity to devise
non-military mechanisms for conflict resolution (Moyo and Tevera, 2000). This is a
major weakness especially for a shared resource like water with potential for conflict
arising from competing demands for a finite resource.

The Tragedy of the Commons

There is strong rationale for the need for formal management of transboundary re-
sources, based on the theory of common property and the so-called “tragedy of the
commons.” The theory was proposed by Hardin (1968) and holds that resources
such as rivers, oceans, and grazing lands that are not privately owned or controlled
are susceptible to overexploitation because individual resource users gain the full
benefits of using the resource but only bear a portion of the costs of overuse.
Individual users acting rationally will continue to use the resource even if the col-
lective rate of resource use is unsustainable. In reality, the theory does not reflect
the complexity of human use of the environment, and overuse of the commons may
or may not occur in particular circumstances depending on numerous social and
other factors (Goldman 1998). Still, there is no doubt that common property re-
sources have in many cases been overexploited as human populations have grown
and technology has improved our ability to harvest or otherwise use resources.

As with resources in Communal Areas, natural resources which are shared across
international borders can also be characterized as commons because users cannot
control use or impacts caused by actors on the opposite side of a border. As pressure
on natural resources increases in the region due to human population growth, pov-
erty, and other factors, there is growing concern about the sustainability of
transboundary resource use. Many resources are shared across international borders
in the region. For example, virtually every country in the SADC region, with the
exception of the two island states, shares a major river basin with at least one other
country. The Zambezi River Basin alone spans eight countries in the region (Chenje
2000). Resources such as drinking water and fish are therefore held in common
among nations. Other resources such as wildlife populations are also shared across
borders because of migratory behaviour and other characteristics. Even resources
that are stationary such as forests must often be regarded as transboundary if they
have traditionally been accessed by cross-border communities.

Unfortunately, overcoming the tragedy of the commons through management is a

daunting task for several reasons. First, while national governments generally have
the authority and power to regulate resource use within their borders, they do not
have authority or power to regulate resource use across borders. Thus transboundary
resource management requires cooperation among governments, which is voluntary
and not mandatory. In the case of the Zambezi River Basin, the Zambezi River Au-
thority (ZRA) was established between Zimbabwe and Zambia to manage the Kariba
dam and to develop other dams along the river where it flows between the two
countries. The activities of ZRA do not include other countries such as Mozambique

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 which would surely be impacted by upstream developments (Chenje 2000). Second,
actual or perceived inequities in resource use between nations can be difficult to
overcome and can inhibit cooperation (Ingram et al. 1994). Third, scientific uncer-
tainties about the status of and trends in resource abundance hinder decision-mak-
ing and therefore often contribute to overexploitation. For example, a common cause
of the collapse of fish populations historically has been optimism about the size and
productivity of populations (Hilborn and Walters 1992). Often data regarding
transboundary resources are incomplete and uncertain. Fourth, uncertainties also
complicate attempts at international cooperation over environmental issues be-
cause nations are unsure about and disagree over the consequences of agreements
for themselves and other nations (Helm 1998). Fifth, international law for manage-
ment of transboundary resources is poorly developed (Hamner and Wolf 1997). In
Southern Africa it is believed that weak policy and legal frameworks are largely
responsible for poor historical management of shared resources (Mbizvo 2000).

Globalization of the Commons

As part of modernity and the emerging new environmentalism, there is a growing

global commons movement whose perspective is that the world is becoming small
and interconnected in a manner that requires global responses to what they term
the global commons (Goldman 1998). The advocates of global commons argue that
local environmental problems have global impacts and consequently are considered
transboundary in nature. The response to such transboundary problems, according to
their logic, requires global science to understand, and global institutions and ex-
perts to manage them. In response, there is a growing culture of responsibility to an
external constituency such as international conventions, donors and academic peers.
Increasingly, academics and policy makers are striving to direct supranational deci-
sion-making on the global commons hoping to discover the perfect commons model.

The global commoners argue that continued dependence on natural resources will
result in over-exploitation and pollution. They argue that there is already uncon-
trolled deforestation, reduced habitats for wildlife, threatened biodiversity, increas-
ing pollution of the air and water and climate change due to greenhouse gas emis-
sions that require global action. This type of thinking has major implications for
southern Africa where at least two thirds of the region’s population resides in the
communal lands. The global commoners further argue that a global commons insti-
tution can regulate access to global resources in such a manner as to reduce or
minimise conflicts amongst nations or other interest groups; promote equity; and
support efforts at sustainable resource use (Goldman 1998). The growing culture of
responsibility to the global commons agenda is a key driver in the development of
TBNRM projects in the region, as evidenced by the leading role played by interna-
tional and northern institutions and organizations.

The risk of not questioning the global commons model is that TBNRM initiatives fail
to respond to regional realities and nuances.

8 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 Promotion of Peace and Security

A further justification for transboundary initiatives is peace and security. TBNRM

could provide a non-military model for addressing conflicts and promoting stability
in the region. While some of the factors contributing to human insecurity in the
region are natural disasters such as cyclones, floods and drought, many are human
induced such as pollution and natural resource degradation. Inter-state conflicts
and competition over control of and access to natural resources such as water that
are central to national and regional economic development are likely to escalate as
the region’s population increases. The situation is complicated by a history of civil
war and destabilisation that has displaced many families within their countries and
at times forced many others into refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Involun-
tary migrations across the region’s borders result in human and environment insecu-
rity due to degradation of the environment and conflicts with host communities.

While the region has finally emerged from a protracted period of liberation-inspired
armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, mili-
tary conflicts have not entirely disappeared. The region has been experiencing vio-
lent and often protracted post independence military conflicts. Angola remains mired
in a senseless and bloody civil war since the Portuguese granted that country inde-
pendence in 1975. Namibia has seen the Angolan civil war spill over its borders
following its official backing of Angola’s ruling party, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Prior to this, Namibia was itself threatened by civil war
in August 1999 when a separatist group attacked the town of Katima Mulilo in the
Caprivi Strip demanding cessation.

One of SADC’s newest members, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experi-
enced little peace since the overthrow of Mobutu in May 1998. One year after acced-
ing to power, Kabila’s rule was challenged by a loose alliance of several rebel groups.
Backed by Uganda and Rwanda these groups have been fighting Mr. Kabila’s govern-
ment that is backed by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At the centre of the conflict
are claims by Kabila that the invasion by Rwanda and Uganda was motivated by their
ambition to control the DRC’s natural resources (Democracy Factfile, 1999). With the
recent assassination of Kabila, it is unclear how the situation in the DRC will change.

In September 1999 a combined force of South African and Botswana forces entered
Lesotho to prevent the overthrow of the sitting government. This followed an at-
tempt by mutinous soldiers to overthrow the government that was accused of elec-
tion irregularities. The battle between the rebels of the Lesotho army and the com-
bined SADC forces met with resistance resulting in the destruction of the capital,
Maseru (Democracy Factfile, 2000).

A potentially volatile and acute conflict is that between Mozambique and its up-
stream neighbours on the Zambezi River. Mozambique is unique in the sense that at
least 50 percent of its land is drained by 8 international shared rivers and 54 percent
of all its surface water resources comes through its borders with neighbouring coun-
tries. In addition, the Zambezi river alone contributes almost 50 percent of the
surface water resources of the country. Increased upstream activities such as the
proposed dams between Zambia and Zimbabwe will decrease the river’s flow causing
severe environmental degradation and salinisation of water supplies. This can result
in a wave of environmental refugees as has been experienced on the Ganges be-
tween India and Bangladesh (Wolf and Hammer, 2000).
T BNRM Pa pe r 1
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 In war-torn societies, the conflict potential may be exacerbated as a result of large-
scale population displacement, refugee accumulations and movements, demobilisa-
tion and reintegration of large numbers of ex-combatants. In general, community-
level institutions can become destabilised while institutions of government get chal-
lenged. There may also be large numbers of landmines laid by the previously warring
factions, which prevent access to cropland, fresh water and other resources by the
rural poor and compromise livelihoods. Recent floods in Mozambique may have re-
sulted in the relocation of landmines into new areas creating new forms of instabil-
ity.

While the region is connected in many ways ranging from shared cultures and tradi-
tions to infrastructure (roads, rail and electricity grids), trade and shared resources,
many SADC countries are now openly competing for shared natural resources. At
least 15 of SADC’s major river systems are shared by two or more riparian states.
These rivers define the international boundaries of most of these countries adding
yet another potential point of conflict since it is sometimes difficult to define the
precise location of international boundaries located along river systems. Examples
of such boundary disputes include the Sedudu/Kasikili island between Botswana and
Namibia which was found to legally belong to Botswana by the International Court
of Justice in December 1999. Hangula (1993) reports other border disputes in the
Caprivi between Namibia and Botswana. Similarly, South Africa and Namibia agreed
to re-locate their international boundary along the lower Orange river to the deepest
channel of the river (Ashton, 2000). These boundary disputes highlight the regional
nature of southern Africa’s water resources and the need for TBNRM approaches such
as basin-wide agreements and joint management at the basin level.

These realities are a worrying development for natural resources management. The
region is clearly highly militarised due to its past history of armed struggles, and
armed conflicts point to a growing tendency towards the use of military force rather
than conflict management mechanisms to resolve political and resource-based con-
flicts. According to Moyo and Tevera (2000) a militarised approach to conflict reso-
lution is to be expected since the region has a legacy of promoting regional integra-
tion and cooperation in the social and economic sectors rather than in the conflict
resolution sphere. For a region whose national and regional economies are highly
dependent on natural resources, the implications of a culture of military resolution
of conflicts in the region are not encouraging. There has to be a new regional
paradigm and strategy that promotes non-military regional solutions to natural re-
sources management, particularly water. Such an approach must of necessity facili-
tate improving the livelihoods of the people through broadening of benefits (Moyo
and Tevera, 2000). Transboundary natural resource management is an option with
potential to broaden the benefits from natural resources management and facilitate
a culture of non-military approaches to natural-resource-based conflicts.

10 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 Opportunities for Redistribution of Land and Resource Benefits

TBNRM also offers a potential opportunity for resolving some of the inequity in the
distribution of land, resources, and associated benefits. The history of land in most
southern African countries is one of expropriation from local people during the
colonial period. The land resources continue to be inequitably distributed and domi-
nated by a few land owners with a growing tendency towards privatisation (Moyo
and Tevera, 2000). Colonial settlers in many countries forced indigenous people into
marginal and often crowded Communal Areas. In Zimbabwe, for example, 49% of the
land was contained in Communal Areas as of independence in 1980 (Vudzijena 1998).
The Communal Areas are generally located on lands of poor rainfall and productivity,
yet they are expected to support a disproportionately large human population. It is
no surprise that resources have been overexploited and degraded in many Communal
Areas due to competition and ineffective management. Resource depletion has led
to increased human insecurity in many countries and in many cases to resource-
based conflicts (Moyo and Tevera 2000). In turn, those conflicts have prevented
governments from regulating resource use and have therefore exacerbated resource
degradation (Katerere and Hill 2000). Broadening the benefits to the people from
the region’s rich natural resources is unlikely to happen without addressing the
skewed nature of land ownership. For many, TBNRM initiatives represent an opportu-
nity to address this issue of distribution of land, resources, and associated benefits.

In many countries in southern Africa, TBNRM is being promoted under the banner of
the “African Dream” that assumes that expanding areas under tourism will deliver
broad benefits to the region’s poor people. The success of this model further as-
sumes that development will be private sector driven. Such an approach is closely
dependent on the prior allocation of resource rights, an arrangement that many
people are increasingly objecting to.

Donor Imperatives and the Evolution of CBNRM

International donors have generously supported natural resource management ini-

tiatives over the past 15 years, largely in the form of Community-Based Natural
Resource Management (CBNRM). Recently, many donors have focused more effort on
natural resource management at the larger transborder scale in response to per-
ceived needs and opportunities in the region. Many donors and others see TBNRM as
an opportunity to apply lessons learned in CBNRM at a larger scale. The donor im-
perative must be complemented by legitimacy. If there is no legitimacy, then we end
up with “choiceless” partnerships and failed but expensive experiments.

The Conservation Imperative

Another driver of TBNRM is conservation, based on the belief that large protected
areas such as some transfrontier parks are essential for biodiversity conservation
and can pay for themselves through non-consumptive utilisation. Hence, the larger
the conservation area, the more biodiversity that can be conserved and the more
tourists that can be accommodated at any one time. The conservation drive is based
partly on the concept of ecosystem management. Ecosystem management seeks to
manage natural resources at the ecosystem level (Pirot, Meynell and Elder 2000),
and recognizes that an area of ecosystem might overlap with administrative,

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
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 political and international boundaries. By creating mega-parks such as the Gaza-
Kruger-Gonarezhou, it is hoped that a single management plan and approach can be
adopted in order to minimise competing management objectives and administrative
arrangements.

There is a long tradition in southern Africa of promoting conservation through pro-

tected areas. The conservation sector through wildlife departments has provided the
foundation for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiatives
giving rise to initiatives such as the Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, Administrative Management Design
for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) in Zambia and conservancies in Namibia and
Zimbabwe.

TBNRM IN THE SADC REGION

This section defines TBNRM and its objectives in the SADC context, and analyzes the
major types of TBNRM that are occurring in the region.

A Definition of TBNRM

Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) attempts to address the chal-

lenge of managing resources that are shared across international borders. TBNRM is
a broad concept, and has been defined as:

“Any process of cooperation across boundaries that facilitates or improves the man-
agement of natural resources (to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned).”
(from Griffin et al. 1999).

While this definition is useful and broad, there is a need to further distinguish
among different types of initiatives based on different proponents, goals, types of
land use and other factors. As well, it must be noted that TBNRM includes not only
specific initiatives but also traditional or informal resource sharing arrangements at
community-level as well as multi-lateral agreements and authorities. Finally, it is
acknowledged that boundaries are not just international borders but can include any
boundaries within states. However, the international aspect of TBNRM has been the
focus of work to date, and we believe that international borders deserve that focus
in Southern Africa and this paper.

Objectives of TBNRM

Resource management in border areas deserves special attention because borders

are areas where inequities surface and conflicts erupt (Ingram et al 1994). Water
resources in particular are potential sources of conflict as they are increasingly
scarce, are viewed as an important component of national security (Appelgren and
Klohn 1997), and are shared extensively among SADC countries. In response to the
problem of resource management in border areas, arrangements and initiatives fo-
cused on Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) have emerged with
the following objectives:

12 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 1. To improve conservation of shared resources that are being depleted or de
graded at unsustainable rates.
2. To ensure that communities and other stakeholders benefit from sustainable
use of resources (in particular, to counter inequitable resource distribution
associated with land and resource appropriation by local elite and foreign
investors).
3. To optimize regional distribution of benefits from resource use.

Of course, the specific proponents of TBNRM initiatives may also have their own
particular objectives, but these are the overall objectives of these initiatives taken
collectively.

Traditional Management and Sharing of Transboundary Resources

Traditionally, people in the region survived, depending on their exact location, on a

combination of agriculture and harvesting of forest resources. Communities located
near the borders constructed by colonial governments traditionally used resources
in surrounding areas that in many situations are now separated by international
boundaries. Even within countries, many communities traditionally used areas which
have since been designated as parks or are otherwise officially not accessible. In
any case, it is important for resource management initiatives in border areas to
recognize when and how communities use resources across borders, and if appropri-
ate to promote this resource use. Yet, these traditional forms of natural resource
management are under threat from trends toward formalised models of TBNRM driven
by the state, NGOs and donors. There are legitimate reasons for promoting these
organic forms of TBNRM that have withstood the test of time. Initiatives that ex-
clude communities from accessing resources that they traditionally use are likely to
fail to gain community support. These models need to be understood and perhaps
improved and not replaced by the more charismatic and well-resourced current ini-
tiatives.

Formal TBNRM Initiatives in the Region

Access to, and demand for resources, has increased as a result of human population
growth, economic liberalization and infrastructure development. Prior to these de-
velopments, formal sharing arrangements were generally not as necessary (due to
relative resource abundance) or as enforceable (due to poor ability to access and
regulate rural behaviour) as they are now. Currently, as a result of numerous factors
discussed earlier, there are several identifiable types of formal TBNRM initiatives in
the region that aim to improve management of transboundary natural resources.
These initiatives can be grouped into broad categories comprising (1) transfrontier
conservation areas (TFCAs); (2) spatial development initiatives (SDIs); (3)
transboundary natural resource management areas (TBNRMAs), (4) Regional Authori-
ties and Protocols, and (5) International Conventions and Agreements (see table 1).
Jones and Chonguica (2001) and Mohamed-Katerere (2001) provide detailed de-
scriptions of these types of initiatives. However, it is useful here to understand the
differences among the various types of initiatives in terms of the resource(s) they
target and the institutions and organizations that are typically involved. As with
any typology, the categories are imperfect and there are initiatives in southern
Africa which are not easily identified with one category; still, it is useful at a
general level to understand the differences among initiatives (Table 1).

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 Table 1. Formal Types of TBNRM Initiatives in the SADC Region
(adapted from Jones and Chonguica 2001)

Type of Initiative Proponents Dominant Objective Dominant Land Beneficiaries

Use Types

Transfrontier -international - long-term - protected areas, -protected areas

Conservation Area organizations, conservation game reserves, interests, some
(TFCA)- wildlife of wildlife hunting spin-offs to
departments, concessions- communities
donors, national
governments

Transboundary Natural -communities, -community - based -variable, often -local

Resource Management NGOs, donors NRM across community lands government
Area government international boundary and local
communities

Spatial Development Initiatives -South Africa -Stimulate -focus is on all -private

(SDI) including Development government, private development in areas resources that sector with
Corridors sector, Earlier with under-utilised support investment potential
concept of corridor economic potential oppotunities trickle down
driven by frontline through anchor including tourism effects to
states e.g Zimbabwe projects. mining and communities
and Mozambique -Achieve regional agriculture.
economic integration
and cross-border
investments

Regional Authority or Protocol -bi-lateral -establish basis for -can be variable -national
governments or cooperation in but include water, governments
multi-lateral management of power generation, with trickle
through SADC specific resources such wildlife, tourism, down effects
as water and wildlife and trade.

International Convention or -SADC and -establish basis for -wildlife, trade in -national
Agreement international cooperation in endangered governments
communities management of species, water, with trickle
resources and the toxic waste, down effects
environment biodiversity
internationally

It is also interesting to look at the number of each type of initiative underway in

each country of the region. South Africa is clearly either leading or is involved in the
majority of the spatially explicit initiatives (i.e., TFCAs, TBNRMAs, and SDIs)
(Table 2).

14 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 Table 2. Number of Each Type of Initiative With Which Each Country is Involved
(adapted from Jones and Chonguica 2001)

Country TFCA TBNRMA SDI/DC

Angola 0 2 1
Botswana 0 4 2
Lesotho 1 0 0
Malawi 1 2 0
Mozambique 3 3 5
Namibia 2 4 3
South Africa 6 2 6
Swaziland 1 0 2
Tanzania 0 1 0
Zambia 0 3 1
Zimbabwe 2 3 3

Transfrontier Conservation Areas

Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), also known as Transborder Conservation

Areas (TBCAs) are based on linking one or more protected areas in neighbouring
countries (Fall 1999; Griffin et al. 1999; Westing 1998; Duda and Roche 1997), but
often involve other lands to some extent. These initiatives have focused predomi-
nantly on large mammal populations that require large contiguous areas of habitat.
The private sector has been very actively involved in TFCAs in an effort to generate
revenue through tourism.

Kock and Nyoni (1994) identify several principles that guide the implementation of
the TFCA process. First, agreeing to participate in a transfrontier conservation area
does not lead to loss or dilution of national sovereignty. Second, each country is not
required to pursue a particular model of conservation in its park. The TFCA model
provides for the integration of local communities and could theoretically allow re-
lated communities in neighbouring countries previously separated by the park and
international boundaries to re-establish links. In practice, however, TFCAs have been
pushed forward at a rapid pace without much time for consultation with communi-
ties and other stakeholders. While there has been little implementation yet, indi-
vidual countries have signed agreements committing themselves to TFCAs with very
little understanding of the consequences.

It is worth noting that within countries in the region, private landowners have in
some cases pooled their lands to form nature conservancies which offer tourism
opportunities. The Save Conservancy and others in Zimbabwe are examples. In the
context of regional integration, we can expect that such initiatives could occur in
future on a larger scale in border areas as private individuals and groups appropriate
land and explore economic opportunities. Unfortunately, it is only Namibia that has
legislation and administrative guidelines specifically developed to facilitate the es-
tablishment and management of conservancies. The provisions allow the establish-
ment of conservancies on privately owned and communally held land. In Zimbabwe,
conservancies have been confined to private commercial farming land whose owners

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
15
 have agreed to manage their individual land as a single and integrated unit. Such an
arrangement effectively means that wildlife on private farm land is under the agri-
cultural administrative domain. Since communities do not own the land on which
they live, the animals belong to the state.

Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas

Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas (TBNRMAs) can include virtually

any spatial area straddling a border in which there is management of transboundary
resources. Thus those initiatives that cannot be categorized more specifically as
TFCAs or other initiatives fall in this category. One example is the ZIMOZA initiative
which is underway at the intersection of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia (the
acronym denotes the three countries). This initiative is driven by communities and
the state, and does not involve any protected areas. Rather, the initiative is aimed
at improving sharing, exchange, and management of resources and tradable goods
among communities in the area. Another TBNRMA in its inception phase is the “Four
Corners” TBNRMA defined by the area bordered by Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. This initiative has not been community and state-driven so far, hence
there are unresolved concerns about its legitimacy.

Spatial Development Initiatives and Development Corridors

Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) are created to stimulate local economic de-
velopment through key anchor projects such as harbours, toll roads, mining and
industries with a potential to attract other investments and create opportunities for
secondary and tertiary industries that were previously not possible. Spatial Develop-
ment Initiatives (SDIs) focus on developing areas that are believed to have under-
utilized economic potential, to curtail the problem of economic imbalances within a
country and also between countries as part of the drive for regional economic inte-
gration. Development Corridors are specific SDIs that focus on promoting develop-
ment along lines of existing transport and communications infrastructure that link
countries.

SDIs are a legitimate intervention to achieve regional economic integration and to

attract cross-border investment. Features of SDIs include the concentration of pri-
vate investment in selected geographic areas, export orientated growth and employ-
ment creation. In southern Africa, the most vigorous push for SDIs has been by
South Africa. This was part of its strategy to realign resources and create markets
and jobs in the post apartheid era as articulated in the Reconstruction and Develop-
ment Programme (RDP) of 1994 and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(GEAR) Policy Framework (Tevera and Chimhowu 2000).

The success of SDIs has been mixed. Beira corridor which was one of the earlier
initiatives between Zimbabwe and Mozambique was planned mainly as a transport
route designed to reduce dependence on South Africa and provide alternative and
shorter access to the sea for Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Tevera and Chimhowu
2000). It would appear that prior to the resurgence of SDIs driven mainly by South
Africa, they were designed principally as transport corridors with no linkage to re-
gional economic development. South Africa’s leadership in SDIs is based on her
economic, technological and military superiority. This means that the SDIs attract-

16 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 ing the greatest attention are those that involve South Africa. The notable regional
SDIs are the Maputo, Lubombo, Lobito, Okavango-Upper Zambezi and Walvis Bay.

While many SDI initiatives claim benefits will accrue to local communities, the
national elites and private business tend to be the ones that accrue benefits through
increasing concentration of land ownership (Moyo and Tevera 2000). SDIs do not
focus on particular resources but rather on all resources that support opportunities
for investment including tourism. Where private capital is dominant the participa-
tion of locals is generally not provided for. In the case of the Maputo Corridor, Tevera
and Chimhowu (2000) report that the SDI performed badly in terms of accruals to
the poor. Other questions that arise concern the extent to which the state should
withdraw from SDIs in favour of private capital. The short term interests of private
capital may fail to address the longer-term considerations of employment and in-
volvement of previously marginalised groups.

SDIs can have major social and environmental impacts that need to be considered.
For instance, successful SDIs can act as labour magnates resulting in mass migra-
tions by people seeking employment. Unless proactive steps are taken to cater for
such eventualities, there could be major health risks and social conflicts. Besides
the potential for increasing opportunities for investment, SDI initiatives can have
major impacts on local communities that are at times not considered. Transport
corridors can expose local communities to both positive and negative consequences.
For instance transport corridors can provide access to markets, new technology, and
social services. At the same time roads can also have negative impacts on local
communities in the form of increased incidents of HIV infection.

The SDI model that has been driven by South Africa could be seen as another form
of South African domination over its neighbours in terms of the provision of raw
materials to South Africa and in some cases a clear strategy of locating polluting
industries outside South Africa’s borders. This raises the sensitive issue of inter-
state equity.

Regional Authorities and Protocols

Various regional and subregional authorities, protocols, and other agreements have
been made that commit nations to cooperate on management of transboundary
resources. Management bodies such as the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) involve
two or more countries and transfer decision-making power from nations to sub-
regional bodies (see Milich and Varady 1998; Mumme 1993 for general discussion of
transboundary resource authorities). In the case of the ZRA, upstream actions can
have major transboundary impacts on downstream Mozambique. As well, several
SADC protocols have been signed which establish a basis for cooperation in the
management of specific resources such as water and wildlife (see Mohamed-Katerere
2001 for details). In general, these protocols commit countries at a general level but
do not include specific recommendations that are binding.

International Conventions

International conventions and treaties exist which bind nations in SADC and else-
where, to particular commitments aimed at conserving specific resources (see Boadu

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
17
 1998 UNCE 1994 for discussion). For example, the Convention for International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES) controls opportunities for trade in animal products
among nations and therefore limits opportunities for wildlife use by communities.

KEY ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Transfrontier arrangements are seen by many as exciting experiments for building on
the past experience of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in
the region, enhancing biodiversity conservation, and creating economic opportuni-
ties for private investors and communities. It is claimed that these TBNRM initia-
tives are capable of improving the quality of lives of rural people. While experimen-
tation is important in order to refine our thinking in this new and exciting field of
TBNRM, it is important that we analyze these new initiatives and mold them so that
they deliver on their promises. Here we raise a number of concerns that have emerged
from our experience and the experience of others with TBNRM, as well as the earlier
experiences of CBNRM.

The Pace of Implementation

The urgency surrounding the creation of transfrontier conservation areas raises seri-
ous questions about the justifiability of the approach, the appropriateness of the
model, the pace of implementation and the overall implications for regional eco-
nomic integration and local communities. The region lacks experience in managing
mega conservation areas and yet in 2000 alone two agreements were signed creat-
ing the Kgalagadi (Botswana and South Africa) and Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou (GKG)
(Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe) transfrontier parks. The GKG is expected
to cover an estimated area of 100 000 km2 and is likely to involve the removal of
local communities to make it a reality. Despite real community interests in Mozam-
bique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, there is no evidence that local communities have
been consulted and are aware of the short and long-term implications. Without the
benefit of past lessons and experience there are several other TFCA initiatives that
have been identified and await formal agreements. These include the Limpopo/
Shashe TFCA (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe), Richtersveld/Ai-Ais TFCA (Na-
mibia and South Africa), Maloti/Drakensberg TFCA (Lesotho and South Africa) (all
three promoted and supported by the Peace Parks Foundation, a South African-
based not for profit organisation) and the Chimanimani TFCA (Mozambique and
Zimbabwe). These initiatives show clearly that South Africa through the Peace Parks
Foundation and some key donors are driving TFCAs in the region.

The main concern regarding the current approach by NGOs, the private sector and
donors, to fast track TBNRM, is the ill-defined framework and context. In the past
these types of initiatives have yielded lopsided benefits although claiming to be
flexible, strengthening human rights of local communities, and enhancing their con-
trol over local resources. If the time is taken to legitimately frame and construct
these initiatives, TBNRM can expand opportunities for improving national and cross-
border natural resource management and widen the benefits from natural resources
and even contribute to the expansion of the resource base.

18 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 The Important Role of the State in TBNRM

In contrast to past experiences in CBNRM, the role of the state in TBNRM is much
more important since cross border resource management impinges on issues of sov-
ereignty and national security. For instance, many of the parks proposed as transfrontier
conservation areas are also sites of national security management in the form of
maintenance of boundaries and curtailing insurgency and poaching. Under CBNRM
the role of the state has been challenged, and at times reduced to that of “facilitator”,
guarantor and enforcer of rights. TBNRM, on the other hand, will challenge the
power and nature of the nation state. This raises the question of the extent to which
SADC member states are willing to cede some power or autonomy to SADC or other
supra-national structures.

Further, cross-border cooperation, investment and trade are creating new patterns
of resource ownership that are placing new and additional demands on national
institutions in terms of administration and policy analysis that go beyond project
implementation. The supporting and technical capacities that these emerging re-
source arrangements demand are regional and global and require matching skills in
terms of enabling policies and negotiations. From our experience with particular
initiatives, some national governments in the region are struggling to cope with
this new burden. There is therefore a threat to the success of TBNRM initiatives in
the form of unequal implementation of liberalization policies and the failure of
governments to cushion the most vulnerable groups against the impacts of liberali-
sation. The key to ensuring sustainable and equitable use of transboundary resources
and other commons is management that is based on equitable and enforceable rules
and incentives agreed to by all resource users (WCED 1987). Clearly the burden on
the state in TBNRM and regional development generally is significant.

The Shift from Agriculture to Wildlife and Tourism

Many TBNRM initiatives, similar to past CBNRM initiatives, are focused on trying to
convert the rural areas into tourism destinations. The approach is generally to try
and generate income primarily from wildlife and not from livestock and crop produc-
tion systems. The argument by economists that wildlife-based tourism is more vi-
able and profitable than other land-use systems has effectively led to a decline in
the investment in research, extension and technology development for rural-based
agricultural production systems. It is hoped that under such a scenario, rural com-
munities could behave “rationally”, reconvert much agricultural land to wildlife habi-
tat, and use the economic benefits from ecotourism and big game hunting to buy
food and other products. While it is true that many areas which are the focus of
CBNRM and TBNRM initiatives are poor agricultural lands, there is still a push to
switch from agriculture to wildlife in many cases. This rationale led to the creation
of CBNRM initiatives such as Communal Areas Management Programme for Indig-
enous Resources (Campfire) and similar approaches in neighbouring countries.

There are several problems with this model of CBNRM and TBRNM. First, there are
social disruptions and displacement of people. In the case of Zimbabwe, the estab-
lishment of Campfire areas required partitioning of land for wildlife and agriculture.
This led to the evictions of people from their established homes, fields and grazing
areas to make way for wild animals. In Mozambique, communities residing in Coutada

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
19
 16, a hunting area that borders Kruger National Park in South Africa, face possible
eviction if the proposal by the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA to fence Coutada 16 as
an extension of Kruger National Park goes ahead. The communities residing in this
area had embarked on CBNRM activities with government support which will likely
be abandoned. The coordinator of the GKG TFCA is quoted as saying “the status of
Coutada 16 will be changed from a hunting concession to a protected area, prefer-
ably a national park” (Mail and Guardian, May 4-10, 2001, page 14). People will be
moved to make way for the relocation of 1,000 elephants. As with many other cases
of displacement, the communities currently residing in Coutada 16 will get little or
no compensation and face zero prospects of benefiting from the expansion of pro-
tected areas.

Second, the growth of wildlife ranches has created an additional complication with
livestock production particularly for beef export markets. To gain access to interna-
tional beef markets, livestock producers have to meet international trade standards.
This entails strict controls on movement of livestock between foot and mouth free
zones and wildlife zones where buffalo are carriers of the disease. Fences are erected
to maintain disease free areas and prevent the movement of livestock and fresh
meat from foot and mouth zones. This arrangement effectively means that livestock
producers located in game areas cannot “export” beef as they are located in foot and
mouth designated areas. This arrangement essentially limits the size of the internal
markets for such local livestock producers. In these situations fences are used as a
means to guarantee access to foreign markets without due regard of the broader
impacts on the economy. Responding to external markets further undermines the
wider social and economic objectives such as poverty eradication.

Third, the switch from agriculture to tourism as a source of livelihood makes commu-
nities vulnerable to shifts in the tourism industry which are outside of their control.
When tourism revenues decline due to political unrest (e.g., the current situation in
Zimbabwe) or to changes in the preferences of tourists, communities could easily be
faced with food security problems because of lack of revenue. It is appropriate to
question whether it is smart from a human security perspective for communities to
rely on a source of livelihood that is largely outside of their control.

Poor Community Consultation and Participation

Many of the transboundary initiatives make references to involvement of local com-

munities. The nature of this “community involvement” needs to be clearly articu-
lated since such involvement could be limited to the extent to which local commu-
nities act as a labour pool to make protected areas and private property more pro-
ductive. It is now evident that CBNRM needs to be capable of addressing local
values, needs and interests; failure to do so undermines the potential of such initia-
tives. In order for communities to participate in TBNRM initiatives, the benefits of
such initiatives must outweigh the costs from the community perspective.

One danger with the current movement to formalise TBNRM is that efforts of local
communities currently engaged in organic forms of community-based natural re-
sources management that offer opportunities to cooperate with other cross-border
communities could be severely constrained. Firstly, formalisation of cross border
arrangements will result in greater state control and regulation. Another problem

20 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 relates to the unequal power relations between the potential parties interested in
formalising TBNRM. The state and private sector have greater lobbying capacity and
power to influence the direction of policy. Intermediary organisations such as NGOs
can represent the interests of communities provided they do not allow their internal
agendas to undermine their ability to play a credible role as mediator. Third, the
poor harmonisation of policies and legislation between neighbouring countries of-
ten results in conflicts between users of resources such as fish where two countries
establish different quotas and fishing seasons.

There are models of community involvement in the region from which we can learn.
The Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe, for example, has been experimenting with
co-management of forests in Gokwe South District. In this case the state forest
authority sought to mobilise protected forest area neighbours to co-operate in the
management of the forest in exchange for economic benefits from the forest. The
failure by the Forestry Commission to demonstrate the benefits of co-management
in the form of local development, is cited as the main reason communities did not
support state conservation initiatives (Mamimine 2000). Namibia has gone a step
further than Zimbabwe by introducing a Conservancy programme that seeks to em-
power communities and not local government authorities to define the basis for the
conservancy. Despite the move towards greater community participation, the state
retains a degree of control since it is the state that approves the nominated commit-
tees and registers the conservancies and ultimately has authority to disband them.

Exacerbation of Inter-State Inequities

The problem of distribution of and access to natural resources as well as access to

finance, technology and skills is not limited to intra-state inequities. At the regional
level inter-state inequities arise from differing resource endowments and the domi-
nance of larger and economically powerful states like South Africa and to a lesser
extent Zimbabwe. These differences tend to fuel economic resentment among the
states in the region and conflicting claims over natural resources. In some instances
the inter-state inequities have fuelled xenophobic reactions towards citizens of poorer
neighbours who try to seek better opportunities across their borders. The implemen-
tation of TBNRM initiatives could easily be undermined by the fact that South Africa
and some donors have emerged as the key proponents of TFCAs. The aggressive and
dominant role being played by South Africa in TFCAs is threatening the economically
poor countries that hitherto have been reactive to the agenda being set by South
Africa and some donors.

This raises the concern that the justification for TBNRM is located external to the
region and is being driven by expanding international trade, particularly interests in
tourism. Such an approach would suit South Africa, which is highly geared to cap-
ture a larger share of visitors to the region given its superior infrastructure, technol-
ogy, and airline industry. However, the type or success of cross border cooperation
and economic integration is very much dependent on real power relations between
the collaborating countries. In some instances, economically powerful countries
such as South Africa are seen to be gaining control over key natural resources in
neighbouring countries (Moyo and Tevera 2000). For instance Mohamed-Katerere
(2001) refers to perceived inadequacies in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP) agreement between South Africa and Lesotho. The agreement does not take

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
21
 into account future water demands in Lesotho which is exporting itself into scarcity.
The formula for compensation to displaced people for loss of homes and agricultural
production has proved grossly inadequate and promised jobs have not materialised.
Although Lesotho would like the agreement to be renegotiated, she lacks both the
political and economic influence to coerce South Africa to the negotiating table.

Liberalization, Resource-Raiding and Loss of Local Control over Re-

sources

Cross-border investments in tourism, mining, transport corridors, and agriculture

have become an attractive window for foreign investors. This trend is seen as even-
tually increasing the foreign control of land and resources in the region with limited
local benefits. Private investors have been characterized as “natural resource raid-
ers”, who take advantage of the under-valuation of natural resources to exploit
indigenous timber and wildlife (Mudenda 2000). Some countries in the region (e.g.,
Zambia, Mozambique) give rights over resources to global investors. Indeed there is
a growing regional trend towards the privatisation of control over natural resources,
often by transnational companies. This process undermines local actors’ ability to
utilise natural resources in a manner that is sustainable and facilitates accrual of
economic benefit to them. It may also be an important factor in generating conflict
that is yet to be analysed and understood.

To facilitate investment, many private sector interventions are disguised as “part-

nerships” with communities. Many of these agreements are inappropriately labeled
“joint ventures” and “partnerships” when in reality they are nothing more than
lease agreements to gain access to valuable natural resources. Similarly, communi-
ties deprived of essential social infrastructure due to dysfunctional and corrupt gov-
ernments, become desperate and enter into less than perfect “partnership” arrange-
ments with the private sector in order to generate some revenue. Hence many part-
nership arrangements that are hailed as success stories are actually not what the
communities want, but more of a private sector agenda. Under these circumstances,
many resource raiders have little long-term commitment in the country (Mudenda
2000). The resource-raiding phenomena can be attributed in part to inappropriate
national government policies that are designed to promote direct external invest-
ment. Some business interests vociferously defend the maintenance of the commu-
nal land systems in the region, so that they can expand access beyond protected
areas and private property into the communal areas. The proliferation of different
forms of agreements between communities and the private sector is evidence of this
trend.

Furthermore, in line with the conventional paradigm of natural resource manage-

ment, approaches suggested to counter overexploitation include utilitarian meas-
ures such as centralized control and privatization of land and resources (Goldman
1998). Centralized control has been popular for decades, but in recent years has
given way to privatization under the umbrella of globalization. TBNRM initiatives
have elements of both centralization and privatization. While in theory such ap-
proaches can control overexploitation, there are many drawbacks. Both centralized
control and privatization generally fail to manage resources to the benefit of local
people. Centralized authorities have historically marginalized people and channeled
the benefits of resource use back to the state and the elite. Similarly, private land-

22 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 owners generally keep benefits for themselves or shareholders with little meaningful
distribution to local communities. In the context of globalization and market liber-
alization, local resources are increasingly controlled not by local users but by non-
local users or actors (Goldman 1998). Even resources which have always been re-
garded as commons, such as water, are now being treated as commodities which can
be owned and traded (GWP-TAC 2000). This thinking presents major problems for a
region such as southern Africa where resource inequities are structural and institu-
tionalised. Market mechanisms cannot be used to resolve gross inequities and glar-
ing disparities in wealth between the rich and poor sectors of the population. There
is a need to improve rural livelihoods by increasing access to land and resources.
Addressing past inequities requires bold political decisions and cannot be left to
market mechanisms to resolve.

The Global Commons Discourse

Globalisation is not just about the speed and freedom with which capital, goods and
services, and information can circulate. It has resulted in the massive importation of
ideologies regarding for instance the management of the commons and the role of
external experts in this process. According to Goldman (1998), the global commons
movement does not view communal land in southern Africa as an isolated land-use
category. Its degradation is seen as threatening all life on the planet. Hence, the air,
atmosphere, the ozone shield and land are all considered part of the global com-
mons. Land is considered a global resource since it supports terrestrial biomass that
is harvested with impacts on the earth’s atmosphere. The global commons move-
ment holds that global problems require global solutions and therefore justify the
involvement of global experts and the global agenda.

There is a general paralysis of national and regional development agendas in re-

sponse to this notion of the global commons. As the transboundary movement in
southern Africa gains momentum we need to ask whether globalization justifies
unfettered access to regional resources, markets, politics and knowledge by north-
ern researchers and international capital? The fragmentation of ideology and con-
cepts with respect to management of natural resources has undermined our ability
to understand the nature of the natural resources crisis and the way forward. This
fragmentation is apparent in the manner we shape our projects or responses. How-
ever, allowing a northern agenda to drive natural resource management in the region
could lead to resource overexploitation and marginalisation of local actors for the
many reasons discussed in this paper. For this reason decisions regarding the man-
agement of land, terrestrial, aquatic and marine resources cannot be surrendered to
global experts and institutions. It is important that the region articulate its own
vision for resource management that is informed by the reality on the ground and
not responsive to common property theory developed elsewhere and perhaps not
sensitive to local-level nuances.

There do appear to be many parallels between the global commons agenda and the
theory of TBNRM. As Fakir (2000) notes, TBNRM may be described as “regional com-
mons” rather than a global commons. The “regional commons” include rivers, marine
resources, forests and wildlife that were once freely accessible prior to the creation
of international borders. The creation of international boundaries by colonial powers
not only divided Africa, its resources and communities that once moved freely, but

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
23
 more significantly, changed the nature of the relationship that communities had
between them and with their natural resources giving rise to new forms of conflict.
In the same manner that the global commoners argue for international institutions
and experts to manage global commons, the region has created its own multi-lateral
arrangements under SADC that include regional protocols on Shared Watercourses,
Wildlife Management, Tourism, and Forestry (under discussion). This has lead to
some criticisms that the TBNRM movement is nothing more than an extension of the
global commons agenda. In addition, should the “regional commons” approach suc-
ceed in facilitating a regional development approach that minimises damage to a
fragile ecosystem by diversifying resource use and promoting high product develop-
ment, then the region can expect fewer environmentally-induced disasters that ex-
acerbate human suffering. However, for “regional commons” in the form of TBNRM
to work, they should respond to regional needs and not global discourse, be led by
regional experts and not global commoners and be governed by regional institu-
tional arrangements. Such an approach will mark a critical point of departure with
the global commons agenda.

Furthejrmore, fundamental differences between the global commons discourse and

the TBNRM concept are found in the motivational factors. Transboundary coopera-
tion is intended to promote economic development in the region rather than trying
to find a solution to the world’s emission problems (emissions that originate mostly
in the north). Still, the question remains the extent to which the “regional com-
mons” agenda is independent of the global commons agenda and whether it is
responsive to regional realities and needs. It is feasible that the creation of mega
transfrontier parks is part of the global commons agenda to prevent degradation by
local commoners of the land-based natural resources that would threaten to imperil
all forms of life on earth. Already, many of the regional responses to conservation
and the environment are driven by international conventions supported by the new
institutions created to administer and finance them. It is not enough simply to try
to understand how these global and regional trends operate since this can only
result in a reactive response and prolong our accountability to an external constitu-
ency. We need to evolve new and alternative concepts that challenge conventional
wisdom on TBNRM.

Privatization and Market Failures

In addition to the problems above related to liberalization, there are specific prob-
lems related to privatization of land, resources and institutions which accompany
some transboundary initiatives. Progress towards regional economic integration and
liberalization increases the need for management of shared natural resources. First,
since the market generally fails to account for environmental externalities of re-
source development, and also fails to account for equity concerns, resource develop-
ment by market mechanisms requires political interventions. Second, privatization
can change land and resource use patterns so that traditional management mecha-
nisms can easily become obsolete. Third, with privatization comes competition, so
there is increased likelihood of resource use in some areas being affected by re-
source use in other areas. For example, downstream water users can be adversely
affected by high rates of water consumption or pollution upstream – such effects are
not accounted for by the free market and require management intervention. This
phenomenon is especially true for Southern Africa where economic growth is largely
resource-based.

24 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 Clearly, privatization associated with TBNRM, if appropriate at all, must be accom-
panied by measures that ensure that resources are managed sustainably and equita-
bly. In the case of transboundary resources, the same in-state market failures that
have clearly failed to redress environmental and equity concerns will occur. Private
sector-driven development has been criticised for increasing flows of money rather
than contributing to improved rural development. This is precisely the failure of
CBNRM that cites private sector “ choiceless partnerships” with communities as a
measure of success.

Poor Devolution of Rights

One key failure of CBNRM which persists in the case of TBNRM has been poor transfer
of rights over land, resource and decision-making powers to local actors (Katerere
2000). Shackleton and Campbell (2000) found that in most countries in the region,
NGOs and donors have been instrumental in driving the CBNRM agenda towards
greater local control over natural resources. Despite these efforts, transfer of rights
to local actors in most countries has been partial and mainly designed to diffuse
conflicts between the state and rural communities. The main reason for this appears
to be a legacy of manipulating and dis-empowering local institutions by successive
governments. Further, a lack of commitment by the state to release power to local
actors, despite numerous policies advocating devolution has fuelled a trend towards
centralisation.

Under such conditions can the communities expect that TBNRM will go beyond the
unfulfilled promises of CBNRM? On the contrary, it seems feasible that the minimum
gains made under CBNRM with respect to decentralisation and participation can be
lost under the TBNRM experimentation given the greater role of the state. For exam-
ple, the approach to TFCAs is not dissimilar to colonial models of creating protected
areas. Local people are moved out of the protected areas and wildlife fences erected.
While fences might be necessary to minimise human-animal conflicts and to control
the spread of diseases across boundaries, the social and economic implications of
fencing need to be assessed. Fences as boundaries between communities and pro-
tected areas should not alienate communities from the resources but rather define
the relationship between the community and the resources.

Given that past failures in CBNRM have been linked to the non-participatory and
centralised methods of planning, decentralisation and empowerment are now con-
sidered key to any new natural resource management projects and initiatives. These
are precisely the same issues that TBNRM will have to resolve if it is to succeed in
fulfilling its objectives.

The Complexity of Multiple Resources

A key concern with TBNRM is the complexity of managing multiple resources. CBNRM
and many TBNRM initiatives have focused on single resources, particularly wildlife.
However, many recent TBNRM initiatives are aimed at management of multiple re-
sources. In general, TBNRM initiatives that target a single resource, such as a par-
ticular wildlife population, are much simpler to implement than initiatives that
target complex, multi-faceted resources such as biodiversity, watersheds or tracts of
land. Even initiatives targeting a single watercourse such as a stream are complex

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
25
 because of the myriad of uses of water, the importance of water quality as well as
quantity, and the timing of access for upstream versus downstream users. Further-
more, dealing with multiple resources may exceed the authority or capacity of rel-
evant agencies and organizations. Legal frameworks quickly become complex for
multiple resources as well. In spite of these complexities, it is often necessary to
consider multiple resources since targeting a single resource may oversimplify hu-
man-environment relations.

TBNRM and Re-distribution of Rights and Benefits

The are legitimate concerns that some forms of TBNRM such as transfrontier parks
and SDIs simply reinforce the inherited colonial models of land-use planning and
prior allocation of land rights. When many of these initiatives are being planned,
decisions are made around issues such as animal corridors and re-classification of
current uses without adequate consultation with those likely to be affected. Little
attention is being paid to potential impacts of TBNRM on the poor, such as forced
removals and social dislocation. Rather than reinforce the colonial legacy of land
alienation and inequitable distribution of resources, people are demanding that
TBNRM initiatives become a vehicle for re-distribution of rights. Unless this happens
then the current huge income disparities between the rich and the poor can only
increase, as will conflicts. TBNRM is currently viewed as being supply driven and
consequently not able to address the imbalance of power between the local actors
on the one hand and the state and private investors on the other. As long as the
powerful and influential dominate the TBNRM process then the very legitimacy of
TBNRM initiatives is likely to be contested in the medium and long-term. The big
question is whether the regional governments actually see TBNRM as an opportunity
to begin to tackle re-distribution of rights and benefits including in many contested
protected areas.

THE WAY FORWARD

This paper highlights the emerging challenges in the design and implementation of
TBNRM initiatives. Unless we pay attention to some basic principles we are likely to
experience similar disillusionment with TBNRM that Murphree (2000) aptly describes
for CBNRM. TBNRM should avoid forcing people into “choiceless” partnerships and
imposing itself as the way forward for conservation and as a solution to poverty and
economic development in the region. Further, TBNRM should not be seen as an
alternative model or answer to protected area challenges. TBNRM must have legiti-
macy with a clear methodology that creates space for broader involvement of key
stakeholders, particularly local communities, and must offer a real opportunity to
re-distribute property rights and tangible benefits. While trying to take advantage
of the opportunities presented by TBNRM, we have to be careful that we do not
inadvertently marginalise communities in pursuit of the mega-scale of TBNRM. The
real danger posed by the TBNRM approach is to further isolate the poor by pooling
common transboundary resources while de-facto privatising associated benefits. The
absence of a system of community rights and the non-acknowledgement of histori-
cal rights further undermines community interests and rights.

The future of TBNRM will undoubtedly be influenced by successes in regional eco-

nomic integration, trade, population dynamics and their influence on production

26 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 and consumption trends, inequities and attendant poverty, and the political com-
mitment by regional governments to find common but lasting and durable solutions
to the region’s common heritage. SADC member states need to be able to articulate
regional versus national and identify or allocate accountability. These are important
issues especially with regard to how benefits are generated and distributed.

Based on the issues raised in this paper, and incorporating suggestions from a
broad-based workshop on TBNRM held in February 2001, we have a number of rec-
ommendations regarding the way forward for TBNRM in Southern Africa.

Building State Level Processes and Capacity

The success of transboundary initiatives will depend largely on the capacity of na-
tional governments to facilitate national level dialogues, provide meaningful and
informed inputs into the design of initiatives, and negotiate with other countries.
There have been concerns that unequal partnerships will undermine the success of
transboundary initiatives. On the other hand, Tevera and Chimhowu (2000) argue
based on regional integration experiences in Africa that the dominant country acts
as the growth catalyst enabling the weaker partners to benefit from the spillover
effects. However, unless the dominance of one partner is applied positively it could
undermine the spirit of the partnership. In addition, if there is no perception of
equitable distribution of the benefits, the initiatives might suffer from lack of po-
litical support. Closely linked to leadership and benefits sharing in TBNRM initia-
tives is the issue of accountability between collaborating states and also between
the state and local communities.

Ultimately, transboundary initiatives are creating new and additional demands on

administration of natural resources; policy development and harmonization; consul-
tation processes; and on-the-ground implementation that is not confined to the
national level. This means in part that the region needs to develop a new cadre of
expertise capable of operating in a complex and multi-layered policy environment.
At the same time, the role of the state should not be based on centralization that
excludes local communities, nor should the state be seen to withdraw in the interest
of the private sector.

Slowing the Pace of Implementation

There are numerous reasons for slowing the pace of signing and implementing
transboundary agreements. They include the need to:

• Consult and ensure broad participation in policy and specific initiatives within
and between countries.
• Incorporate lessons from past experience into the design and planning of new
TBNRM initiatives.
• Build capacity among interested parties so that the skills of potential part
ners though variable do not skew power relations and ultimately the outcome
of any agreement.
• Collect and analyze baseline information and to share that information with
all stakeholders.

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
27
 Documenting Lessons from CBNRM

Over the past few years many Community-Based Natural Resource Management
(CBNRM) initiatives have been implemented which attempt to facilitate the sustain-
able use of local resources by communities (Steiner and Rihoy 1995; Mickels-Kokwe
2000; Hughes 2000). CBNRM policies are still evolving in many countries in southern
Africa. Experience in Zimbabwe and Namibia offers examples of where considerable
progress has been made but also illustrates some difficulties that must be overcome
if CBNRM is to become a meaningful option for both communities and the environ-
ment. Although these initiatives do not necessarily focus on transboundary resources,
many of them include transboundary resources depending on the location of com-
munities. The experiences of CBNRM are the basis for the enthusiasm in TBNRM
although no empirical evidence is available to support the transferability of CBNRM
to TBNRM. Given the wide range of CBNRM initiatives in the region, there are lessons
that can be learned such as the importance of:

1. Devolving rights and powers to the local level, most importantly tenure or
redistribution of rights and benefits.
2. Gaining legitimacy so that partnerships are mutually beneficial and not domi
nated by the powerful and elite.
3. Consulting and evolving a management system that is inclusive.
4. Demonstrating community benefits in order to ensure community participa
tion and support.

Sharing of Information and Expertise

In addition to lessons from CBNRM, there is a wealth of experience arising from

TBNRM initiatives in the region. It will be important to ensure that lessons are
documented and disseminated so that actors involved in different initiatives and
different types of initiatives can learn and improve on past failures. As well, as
expertise develops in TBNRM, various initiatives must be aware of the nature of that
expertise so that it can be engaged appropriately. Regional networks, dialogues,
and/or fora will be essential mechanisms for sharing of information and expertise.

Defining Roles for Organisations and Institutions

TBNRM initiatives have involved various organizations and institutions such as state
governments, regional or sub-regional bodies such as SADC or the Zambezi River
Authority, civil society (e.g., non-government organizations, academics), communi-
ties, and the private sector. In order for TBNRM initiatives to succeed, these groups
must not only collaborate but also fulfil the roles to which they are best suited. Each
situation demands a careful analysis of the objectives and type of the particular
transboundary initiative. Of importance is the nature of power relations between the
various interested stakeholders and in particular the power relations between these
interested parties. The nature and quality of skills required to develop and manage
transboundary resources must also be understood.

28 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

 Perhaps more than any other player, the state governments must play a key role in
facilitating the effective management of transboundary resources. Control over re-
sources resides mainly at the national level, so it is imperative that neighbouring
country governments cooperate to ensure that resources are shared and appropri-
ately managed. SADC must play a leadership role in facilitating the cooperation of
national governments, and in ensuring that regional economic integration is accom-
panied by more integrated management of natural resources. This integration is
occurring in the form of SADC protocols, under which signatory nations pledge to
cooperate.

Non-government organizations and other representatives of civil society must en-

sure that the states and SADC implement policies and agreements that truly improve
management of resources to the benefit of the people. Many democracies in the
region remain weak, and so NGOs have a particularly important responsibility in
supporting them to implement successful TBNRM programmes. They must also en-
sure that the private sector and others do not take advantage of communities where
resource development experience is limited. Extra effort is needed to involve other-
wise marginalised border communities in the implementation of TBNRM initiatives
to ensure that natural resources will be managed to their long-term benefit.

Cooperation among various groups is essential. The state ultimately has control over
resources and resource use, and it is therefore the state’s responsibility to involve
communities and other groups. At the same time, however, communities must en-
gage the state in an effort to acquire more responsibility in the management of local
resources, and to cooperate with the state on particular issues. Involving communi-
ties in TBNRM is proving more difficult to implement than simply acknowledging
that it needs to be done. The reason for this is that communities are the least
understood actors in transboundary initiatives. Ultimately, communities cannot control
other communities and cannot regulate resource use outside of the community (e.g.,
upstream), and therefore they must work closely with state institutions and SADC.
The important issue is that the notion of TBNRM should be holistic to avoid the view
that natural resources on their own could significantly improve the livelihoods of
the region’s people. Natural resources management has to be complemented through
improved agricultural production and wage labour, as envisioned for example under
SDI initiatives.

The private sector has also emerged as a key player in the different types of TBNRM
initiatives. In the case of SDIs in particular the state needs to re-examine the extent
to which private capital can be left to determine the nature of development in the
corridors. The private sector often has short-term objectives and is not necessarily
committed to community involvement and equity considerations between countries.
Since the private sector is ultimately responsible financially to shareholders and not
to communities, it is important for the state and other groups to ensure that ben-
efits are distributed fairly and to ensure that private sector resource development is
sustainable. As economies in southern Africa liberalize, there is potential for market
failures such as monopolies in the energy sector and environmental externalities
such as pollution, which could exacerbate inequities and environmental problems.
The private sector’s role in TBNRM must be directed to ensure that it contributes to
the objectives of equitable and sustainable use of resources.

T BNRM Pa pe r 1
29
 Conclusion

In southern Africa TBNRM is a reality. The challenge is not to frustrate the progress
to date but rather to ensure that its design is right. There remain numerous but
pertinent issues that need addressing. These include amongst other issues, incon-
sistencies in law and policy, conflicts between community and private interests,
unresolved imperatives of land reform, confusion around the organisational roles
and responsibilities of the state, local versus international NGOs, donors, and the
power imbalances amongst key actors. It is clear that in the context of resource
development and integration in Southern Africa, effective approaches to manage-
ment of transboundary resources are needed. It is hoped that this paper, along with
the two additional papers that describe in detail the current state of TBNRM in the
region, will provide a basis for development of a regional TBNRM networking pro-
gramme that will allow stakeholders to learn from past experience and develop
improved TBNRM initiatives in future.

30 A Critique of Transboundary Natural Resources Management

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