TC - 28

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

W.P. No. /2025

Mr. Salim (PETITIONER)
v.
State of Uttam Pradesh (RESPONDENT)

WITH
W.P. No. /2025
Disqualified MLAs (PETITIONER)
v.
Hon’ble Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Uttam Pradesh
(RESPONDENT)

AND
W.P. No. /2025
Mr. Ravi Ansari (PETITIONER)
v.
National Investigating Agency (NIA) (RESPONDENT)

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
PETITIONER TC-28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………..…….……..03

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………..….…….04

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………….….…..06

STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………….….07

STATEMENT OF ISSUES…………………………………………………………………….10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………….…11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………………..13

I. WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED BY THE

STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA, AND
WHETHER SUCH ACTIONS REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE
OF EXECUTIVE POWER? …………………………………………………………...…13
1. INDICA IS A SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST, SECULAR, AND DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC…...………........................................................................................…...13
2. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE……………………………………...….….14
3. ARTICLES 14,19, 21 AND 300A…………………………….……………………...15

II. WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE

CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REPRESENT
ONE’S CONSTITUENCY IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS
WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY?............................ 17
1. RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE CONSTITUENCY……………………...………….17
2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION……………………………………..18

III. WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE SPEAKER AND DEPUTY
SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR REQUIRES REFORM………………………...….19
1. BIAS IN THE CURRENT ELECTION PROCESS OF THE SPEAKER AND

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 1 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
DEPUTY SPEAKER……………………………………………………………...…19
2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-DEFECTION LAW………………………......21
3. PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES……………………………………………..…26
4. STRUCTURAL REFORMS ARE NECESSARY……………………………..…….28

IV. WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT
(UAPA), THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?...........................................................28

1. MISUSE OF UAPA TO SUPPRESS DISSENT……………………………….…...29

2. “VAGUENESS OF DEFINITION” AND ITS APPLICABILITY

3. DENIAL OF BAIL AND PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL DETENTION…………….32

4. IMPACT OF UAPA ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS…………………………….36

PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………….…. 39

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 2 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

AIHC All India High Court Cases

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article

FIR First Information Report

Govt. Government

Hon’ble Honorable

Ltd. Limited

DEL Delhi

Anr. Another

No. Number

Ors. Others

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

SLP Special Leave Petition

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

UOI Union of India

v. Versus

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 3 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

The Constitution of India, 1950.

STATUTES

 UAPA: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, enacted in 1967.

 TADA: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, enacted in 1987.

 UPDA: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

 BNS: Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

TABLE OF CASES

1. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335

2. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910] AC 87, 89 (1910, House
of Lords).
3. Dr. Anand Teltumbde's v. The National Investigating Agency (2022) SCC Online Bom
5174
4. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416
5. Devangana Kalita v. State of NCT of Delhi AIR Online 2021 DEL 837
6. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3
7. Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239,
183 L.Ed. 2d 234, 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012, U.S. Supreme Court)
8. Gonsalves Case (2023)
9. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972, U.S.
Supreme Court)
10. Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) SCC Online SC 92.
11. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) SCR (3) 532
12. Indian Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641
13. Indra Sawhney & Others v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477; 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454
14. Jalaluddin Khan vs. Union of India (2024) SCC Online SC 1945
15. K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754
16. K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 780
17. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651
18. M/s. S.L. Khurana v. State of U.P. (1990) Supp SCC 546
19. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 4 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
20. Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1
21. Municipal Corporation of Ludhiana v. Inderjit Singh (2008) 13 SCC 506
22. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) 8 SCC 1
23. Najeeb v. State of Kerala (2011) 4 KLT 935
24. Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) 7 SCC 547
25. Nihal Singh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 216.
26. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
27. Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 594
28. Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) Supp (2) SCC 641
29. Romila Thapar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 753
30. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) SCR (2) 204
31. Shri Sanjeet Shukla vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others (2014) 2 Bom CR 1
32. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
33. S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra (1964) SC 1680
34. State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2000) 9 SCC 240
35. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428
36. Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) 4 SCC 657
37. Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294
38. Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713
39. Viswanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 6 SCC 190

BOOKS

 Constituent Assembly Debates by Dr. B.R Ambedkar, Draft Constitution, Constitution

Hall, New Delhi (23/05/1949).
 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Volume 2, (Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice S.S. Subramani, Justice B.P. Banerjee, V.R.
Manohar, 8th ed., 2007).
 Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 34, (4th ed., 1997).

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 5 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indus, which reads as follows:

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

2. The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
Part.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 6 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

STATEMENT OF FACTS

CONSTITUTION OF INDICA AND ITS GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Indica is a federal parliamentary democratic republic governed by a Constitution that ensures a

separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. This system is designed
to maintain a balance of authority and safeguard democratic principles. The central government
and state governments share responsibilities, with states enjoying significant autonomy in critical
sectors like education, health, and agriculture. The Constitution of Indica establishes a bicameral
system of parliament, consisting of the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha
(Council of States). The Lok Sabha is composed of members directly elected by the public, while
the Rajya Sabha includes members appointed by state legislatures and nominated by the
President. Each state in Indica operates its government, comprising a legislative assembly and,
in some cases, a legislative council, along with a Chief Minister who heads the executive branch.
These states wield significant authority over crucial sectors like education, health, and
agriculture, as outlined by the Constitution.

SALIM'S CONTROVERSY AND BULLDOZER JUSTICE

Salim, a student in Uttam Pradesh and son of a tenant farmer, participated in protests opposing
the ruling party's policies. During a January 5, 2024 rally, Salim allegedly made inflammatory
remarks, leading to an FIR accusing him of inciting communal enmity. The Uttam Pradesh
government advanced its urban development plans under the UPDA, 1973, but the demolition
practices, termed “bulldozer justice,” became controversial. This involved using bulldozers to
demolish the properties of alleged criminals, often without legal proceedings, raising concerns
about fundamental rights violations. On January 22, 2024, Salim’s ancestral home was
demolished without notice, citing it as an illegal structure. Salim and his family claimed the
demolition was politically motivated and violated principles of natural justice. Salim filed a
petition in the Supreme Court, challenging the demolition as unconstitutional and alleging
discrimination and retaliation for his political stance. The case gained national prominence, with
human rights organizations condemning the government’s actions as suppressing dissent and
abusing power.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 7 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

POLITICAL CRISIS IN UTTAM PRADESH

Uttam Pradesh faced a severe political and social crisis, marked by riots and tensions, primarily
fueled by the "bulldozer justice" campaign led by Chief Minister Rohit Kumar. Accusations of
bias toward the majority of Tribe A worsened the unrest. The state government, led by the
Indican Progressive Party (IPP), held power with support from the Samast Political Party
(SPP). The minority Tribe B felt marginalized by government policies, adding to the instability.
Amid growing dissatisfaction and unrest, the ruling IPP was compelled to prove its majority
through a floor test. Several MLAs from Tribe B constituencies defied the party whip due to
pressure from their constituents, leading to the government's failure to secure the majority.
MLAs who defied the party whip faced disqualification under the Anti-Defection Law (Tenth
Schedule). The Deputy Speaker disqualified them under Article 180(1) in the absence of the
Speaker, sparking controversy over procedural fairness and impartiality. The disqualified
MLAs contested the decision, arguing their actions were driven by constituency pressure
during extraordinary circumstances, not defection. They criticized the hasty disqualification
process and raised concerns about potential bias in the Deputy Speaker's actions. The situation
prompted discussions about the election process for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker,
suggesting the need for impartial mechanisms to prevent bias and ensure procedural fairness.
The disqualified MLAs filed writ petitions challenging their disqualification, claiming it was
influenced by political turmoil rather than law. They emphasized their duty to represent their
constituents during the crisis.

UAPA CONTROVERSY

Riots broke out between supporters of the IPP (Indican Progressive Party) and IJP (Indica Janta
Party) amid accusations of bias toward Tribe A (the majority community) under the "bulldozer
justice" campaign. Tribe B, a minority group, accused the government of systemic
marginalization. In response, the government invoked the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA), labeling some protests as unlawful and several Tribe B leaders as terrorists. Activist
Ravi Ansari from Tribe B was arrested under UAPA, accused of inciting violence and alleged
links to extremist groups. His detention was extended without charges for 180 days. Ansari
denied these allegations, asserting that his actions were political dissent rather than terrorism.
His arrest, along with others, led to heightened protests, with Tribe B leaders and human rights
groups condemning the government’s actions as misuse of UAPA to silence dissent. Ravi
Ansari filed a writ petition challenging his arrest and prolonged detention. He argued that his
constitutional rights under Article 19 (freedom of speech and expression) and due process were
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 8 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
violated. He claimed that the UAPA's vague definitions were being misused. The government
justified Ansari's detention as necessary for national security and public order, emphasizing the
severity of the unrest. The Supreme Court clubbed all pending petitions and framed four key
issues for adjudication, addressing the constitutionality of bulldozer justice, Tenth Schedule
provisions, Speaker/Deputy Speaker election procedures, and UAPA's broad definitions and
detention provisions.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 9 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED BY THE

STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA, AND WHETHER
SUCH ACTIONS REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF
EXECUTIVE POWER?

II. WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION

VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REPRESENT ONE’S
CONSTITUENCY IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS
WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

III. WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE SPEAKER
AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

IV. WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND “TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT (UAPA),
THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT
FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 10 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED BY

THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDICA, AND WHETHER SUCH ACTIONS REPRESENT AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER?

The counsel on behalf of the respondents humbly submits that

1. That the practice of Bulldozer Justice implemented by the State Government of Uttam
Pradesh violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica and such
actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.
2. The arbitrary action of the State Government violates the Fundamental Rights provided in
Article 14,19,21 and Constitutional rights provided under Article 300A of the Constitution,
by depriving the petitioner’s right to life, liberty, and property.
3. The act was unconstitutional and ignored the core democratic values and legal principles of
fairness and equality.

II. WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE

CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REPRESENT
ONE’S CONSTITUENCY IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS
WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

The counsel on behalf of the respondents humbly submits that

1. The Counsel on behalf of the petitioner humbly submits that the disqualification of the
MLAs under 2(b)of the 10th schedule during a political crisis violates the constitutional
right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances.
2. The disqualification was further hasty and lacked procedural fairness, and was done as a
means to punish, rather than to address the instability.
3. The decision to abstain from voting in favor has to be looked at as the implementation of
the constitutional right to represent one’s constituency rather than defection.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 11 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
III. WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE
SPEAKER AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

The counsel on behalf of the respondents humbly submits that

1. The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly is unconstitutional and void. the current procedure of election is biased.
2. Their actions were justified given the extraordinary circumstances of the riots and the
intense pressure from their constituencies. And that their decision to abstain from voting in
favor of the Chief Minister was not an act of defection but rather an exercise of their
fundamental duty to represent the will of their constituents.
3. The disqualification process was both hasty and deficient in procedural fairness. And that
they were not afforded the standard notice period or an opportunity to present their case
before being disqualified, which contravenes the principles of due process

IV. WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND “TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT
(UAPA), THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

The counsel on behalf of the respondents humbly submits that

1. The broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without
formal charges are not consistent with the protection of fundamental rights petitioner
challenges his arrest under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and seeking
bail, and that the charges against him are vague and unfounded,
2. The speech criticizing the government was wrongly construed as promoting terrorism or
unlawful activities. the broad and ambiguous definition of “terrorist activities” under
UAPA had been misused to target political dissent, thereby infringing the constitutional
right to free speech and expression under Article 19.
3. The extension of his detention without formal charges violated his fundamental rights to
liberty and due process
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 12 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

ARGUMENT ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED

BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDICA, AND WHETHER SUCH ACTIONS REPRESENT AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER?

The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner respectfully submits that the practice of Bulldozer
Justice implemented by the State Government of Uttam Pradesh violates fundamental
rights guaranteed under the constitution of Indica and such actions represent an
unconstitutional exercise of executive power.
1. INDICA IS A SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST, SECULAR, AND A DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
Indica is a democratic country with an Independent Judiciary1. The Constitution of
Indica provides for the separation of powers among the Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. The Legislature is the law-making body while the executive implements
the laws and the Judiciary interprets the laws.

Ancient Monarchy kingdoms were run as per the whims and wishes of the monarch.
Where the Monarch would hold the absolute privilege to punish the criminals as per
his desire. Indica being a republic, with an independent Judiciary, has the sole right
to ensure justice by fair trial as per the rights given by the Constitution.

The Government of Uttam Pradesh being a State executive body has acted as a judicial
body, by punishing the petitioner by demolishing his house, without any trial. The
authority to give punishments lies solely with the 3rd organ of the Government. Such
punishments and sentences are pronounced only after the guilt of the accused is
proved, upon completion of a free and fair trial.

In the present case, the executive preferred the ‘Bulldozer Justice’ over the legal trail
to dispose of the matter swiftly. Such impulsive actions are undemocratic and against
the Constitution and legal principles of fair trial.

1
Art. 50, the Constitution of India.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 13 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

The main aim of the democratic republic nation is to ensure separation of powers, but
the demolition of properties as a way of punishment is taking the matter into one’s
hands, which is not the duty of the executive. Public officials cannot take the law into
their own hands. The decision of being guilty or not is to be taken by the judiciary
and not the executive itself. Deciding the guilt without a trial and punishing for the
same is unconstitutional.

2. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The Principle of Audi Alteram Partem is the most essential principle to ensure justice.
According to this maxim, No man shall be condemned unheard or Let the other party
be heard before pronouncing the sentence. The evidence of happening or non-
happening of a fact is to be collected uniformly from both the accused and the other
party in a trial. Upon such collection, the judgment is pronounced. In the present case,
no trial was conducted to prove the guilt of the petitioner nor was anything proved
before the court of law regarding the illegality of the construction of the house.

In the case of Municipal Corporation of Ludhiana v Inderjith Singh 20082 The

Supreme Court held that no authority can directly proceed with demolitions even of
illegal constructions without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to the
occupant.

The maxim of Nemo Judex in Casua Sua reads that no one should be a judge in his
case. In the present case, the government of Uttam Pradesh has personal conflicts with
the petitioner due to his speech against the party in power. The demolition was thus
carried out as a means of punishment, where the punishing personnel is the acting
judge of the issue, with personal gain and loss involved.

The Demolition was not just carried out by unlawful means but intended to suppress
the petitioner's voice by curbing his freedom and to teach him a lesson. Also, The
Bulldozer Justice act of the respondent against the petitioner has violated the
principles of natural justice as mentioned earlier.

2
Municipal Corporation of Ludhiana v Inderjith Singh (2008) 13 SCC 506.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 14 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
The Judicial System follows the principle of presumption of innocence until proven
guilty, Demolition of houses based on alleged criminal charges and illegal
construction violates this principle as no trial was conducted to prove the guilt.

3. ARTICLES 14,19, 21 AND 300A

Article 143 of the Constitution ensures equality and Justice. It ensures all are equal
before the law and it prevents arbitrariness in the state’s action; thereby ensuring
fairness and equality of treatment.

The Doctrine of Arbitrariness ensures that state actions are fair and justifies adhere to
the principles of equality and justice. In the present case, the State Government acted
arbitrarily by unlawfully demolishing the petitioner’s house without issuing any
notice or justification.

In the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)4 The Supreme Court held
that Article 145 not only protects from discrimination but also against arbitrary State
action. In the present case, the demolition was a clear display of arbitrary state action.

In the case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978)6 The Supreme Court held
that the executive procedures must be fair, just, and reasonable. In the present case,
the respondents failed to proceed fairly and reasonably and applied unconstitutional
measures.

In the Case of Air India v Nargesh Meerza (1981)7 The Supreme Court held that
termination of employee duty to pregnancy was arbitrary and unfair. Similarly in the
present case demolishing the petitioner’s house without serving a notice is arbitrary.

Article 19(1)(e)8 provides individuals freedom to reside and settle in any part of the
territory of Indica, This fundamental right is curbed by the demolition. The
Fundamental Rights provided under Article 219 includes the right to life and personal

3
Art. 14, the Constitution of India.
4
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3.
5
Supra 3.
6
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
7
Air India v Nargesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 355.
8
Art. 19(1)(e), the Constitution of India.
9
Art. 21, the Constitution of India.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 15 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
liberty. Supreme Court emphasized that Right to Life not only includes mere
existence but living with peace and dignity within a good environment.

The hasty Bulldozer Demolition is a violation of the Right to shelter which has been
guaranteed under Article 2110. In the case of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal
Corporation 198511 The Supreme Court held that eviction without notice violates the
right to livelihood under Article 2112 of the Constitution.

As per Article 300A13, no person shall be deprived of their property without the
authority of law. This right of the petitioner is violated, On 6th November 2024, The
Supreme Court Bench gave judgment on the Bulldozer justice, It held that “Justice
through Bulldozers is unknown to any civilized system of jurisprudence.” It also
emphasized that “Bulldozer Justice is simply unacceptable under the rule of law”.
Supreme Court also noted that if “bulldozer justice is recognized, Article 300A would
be reduced to the dead letter”14.

Justice BR Gavai and KV Vishwanathan of the division bench on 13th November

202415 addressing the various petitions on bulldozer justice, held that state
government cannot determine the guilt or innocence of an accused, and the
responsibility vests with the judiciary. Supreme Court also condemned such
approaches and held that they violated Articles 1416, 2117, and 300A18 of the
Constitution. It also issued guidelines to issue 15 days prior notice and to ensure
proper allocation of residents in case of demolition. However, the Uttam Pradesh
government failed to follow any of such guidelines of issuing notice and ensuring
reallocation.

10
Ibid.
11
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
12
Supra 9, at 15
13
Art. 300A, the Constitution of India
14
15
Writ petition no. 295 of 2022
16
Supra 3, at 15.
17
Supra 9, at 15
18
Supra 13
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 16 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
II. WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE
CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
REPRESENT ONE’S CONSTITUENCY IN EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST AND POLITICAL
INSTABILITY?

The Counsel on behalf of the petitioner respectfully submits that the Counsel on behalf of
the petitioner humbly submits that the disqualification of the MLAs under 2(b) of the 10th
schedule during a political crisis violates the constitutional right to represent one’s
constituency in extraordinary circumstances.

1. RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE CONSTITUENCY

The democratic framework of the nation is essentially built to facilitate and address
the voice of the people. The leaders of state and national house people or lower house,
are elected by their people to represent their voices and resolve their concerns.

Surely leaders have an absolute obligation towards their party and its proposals. But at
the same time, it has a much deeper obligation towards its people of the constituency
who brought them up in the first place.

In the case of Union of India v Association for democratic reforms 200219 The
Supreme Court while deciding regarding the transparency of voters and elected
leaders, also held the importance of the ability of elected representatives to act freely.

In the case of S.R. Bommai v Union of India 199420The Supreme Court while
deciding that democracy and federalism are part of the basic structure of the
constitution also held that legislative actions must not undermine these core principles.
Being obligated to follow the party rules in unfavorable conditions over the
constituency underscores the democratic process and the freedom to act in their
constituency's interest.

The Anti Defection Law stated in Para 2(b) of the 10th Schedule of the constitution
curbs this freedom of the elected leaders to favor their constituencies, over their party

19
Union of India v Association for democratic reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294
20
S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 17 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
which undermines the democratic principle of choice.

2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. This
includes the right to assent and dissent to a matter as per own personal freedom under
this article. By conditioning the elected leaders to favor only their party undermining
their constituencies in extraordinary scenarios and removing them for failure in such
support is a violation of 19(1)(a). As the choice, opinion, and belief of the leaders are
curbed it is ensured that such actions are negatively rewarded by way of removal of
the leaders under 10th schedule Para 2(b).

In the case of Indian Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 198521 The
Supreme Court held that Article 19(1)(a) not only includes the freedom to represent
one’s own views but also the views of others. By favoring the constituency the
petitioners were raising the voice of their people and not allowing them to do, so by
removal is a violation of this right.

In the case of Ramesh Thappar v State of Madras 195022 The Supreme emphasized
that Article 19(1)(a) ensures the right to express opinions, including those on matters
of governance and public welfare, thus safeguarding the ability of representatives to
voice the will of their voters. With the voters dissenting with the most controversial
decisions of the ruling party, their representative leaders had no choice but to vote
against the party. This was done in accordance with the right given under 19(1)(a).

It is also pertinent to mention here that the application of the 10th schedule para 2(b)
was done more to punish the leaders rather than, following the constitutional system.
Such use of constitutional powers to punish and to teach a lesson is arbitrary and
displays more of an autocratic display of power under the disguise of democratic lines.

21
Indian Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1SCC 641
22
Ramesh Thappar v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 18 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
III. WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE SPEAKER AND DEPUTY
SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR REQUIRES REFORM.

The petitioner submits that the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly is unconstitutional and void.

1. BIAS IN THE CURRENT ELECTION PROCESS OF THE SPEAKER AND

DEPUTY SPEAKER
The Speaker and the Deputy Speaker represent the most constitutional positions that
require total neutrality for the prestige of the Legislature. However, the election
procedure gives the majority party a right to capture those positions and makes them
partisan political weapons. The election process enables the ruling party to dominate
the positions of Speaker and Deputy Speaker, compromising their neutrality and
independence.

The petitioners humbly submit that the present election process does not ensure such
impartiality and, therefore, requires structural reforms to restore trust in the legislative
process. The election process should be free from political bias. If the speaker and
Deputy Speaker are from the ruling party, it may compromise their ability to act
impartially, affecting the integrity of legislative proceedings.

The proper functioning of these procedures lies at the heart of democracy, as it is in

the legislative houses that our elected representatives debate and make laws. If the
ruling party continues to misuse the speaker’s post to escape accountability and
facilitate defections, it could spell a troubling future for our constitutional democracy.

In this case, the Deputy Speaker, elected through a process skewed in favor of the
ruling Indican Progressive Party, disqualified 40 MLAs without adhering to principles
of natural justice. This bias not only violated the petitioners' fundamental rights but
also undermined the integrity of democratic processes. The Speaker and Deputy
Speaker represent the entire Assembly, not just the ruling party, and must act
impartially. Given the current political landscape, where tensions between Tribe A and
Tribe B are escalating, the perception of bias in the election of the Deputy Speaker
could lead to further alienation of minority voices. If the Deputy Speaker is seen as
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 19 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
favoring the ruling party, it could result in the marginalization of dissenting opinions,
particularly from Tribe B, which has already expressed grievances against the
government. This could further destabilize the political environment in Uttam Pradesh.

The counsel submits that the current procedure, which allows for the election of the
Speaker and Deputy Speaker from within the party ranks, compromises impartiality.
This is particularly relevant when the Deputy Speaker, belonging to Tribe A,
disqualified dissenting MLAs from Tribe B, raising bias concerns.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975)23, the Supreme Court highlighted the
necessity of impartiality in legislative proceedings, asserting that any bias could
undermine the democratic process and the rights of minority groups. The Court
emphasized that impartiality is essential to maintain the integrity of legislative and
electoral processes. Any form of bias—whether by elected representatives, public
officials, or constitutional authorities—undermines public trust in democracy. The
Court highlighted that bias in governance or legislative procedures disproportionately
affects minority groups, who rely on impartiality to ensure equal representation and
protection of their rights.

Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994)24: Highlighted the Speaker’s role as a neutral
authority in anti-defection matters. The Speaker’s role under the Tenth Schedule is not
merely administrative but judicial.

The Speaker must maintain the highest standards of neutrality to ensure that the
disqualification process upholds the integrity of the legislative assembly. Any failure
to act impartially undermines the purpose of the Anti-Defection Law, which is to
prevent political instability caused by defections.

In K. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala (2005)25, the Supreme Court emphasized the

need for impartiality in legislative proceedings, stating that the Speaker must act
without bias to maintain the integrity of the legislative process.

23
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 248
24
Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) Supp (2) SCC 641
25
K. Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala (2005) 1 SCC 754
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 20 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
In the UK, the office of the Speaker ensures their impartiality and neutrality. These
have developed over time with support from both the ruling and opposition parties. the
Speaker is elected, they are typically re-elected regardless of the party in power. The
Speaker stands for re-election as "the Speaker," and does not involve himself in active
campaigning on political issues.

Major political parties have rarely opposed the speaker on their re-election and this
continuity has only been disrupted once in the 19th century. Even apart from these two
conventions, upon election, the Speaker of the House resigns from their political party
and distances themselves from former party colleagues, avoiding associations with any
particular group or interest within the House. They also do not frequent the Commons
dining rooms or bars. Former Speakers also do not return to active party politics. Even
when they are appointed to the House of Lords, they sit as Cross-Benchers. To address
these issues, India must evolve conventions similar to those in the UK to promote the
speaker’s impartiality.

Rule 5 of the Tenth Schedule exempts the Speaker from disqualification for defection
when they resign from their party due to their election as a speaker. Moreover, the
speaker only votes in the house in case of a tie.

The Deputy Speaker, elected in an election that seemed to be dominated by the ruling
Indican Progressive Party (IPP), was biased when it disqualified 40 MLAs who
disobeyed the party whip. The Deputy Speaker’s affiliation with the ruling party
influenced the disqualification decision, compromising the independence required
under the Tenth Schedule

2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-DEFECTION LAW

The anti-defection law punishes individual Members of Parliament or Legislative

Assemblies (MPs)/MLAs for leaving one party for another. With the enactment of the
Anti-defection law, the MP or MLA has to follow the party’s direction blindly and has
no freedom to vote in their judgment. Due to the Anti-Defection law, the chain of
accountability has been broken by making legislators accountable primarily to the
political party.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 21 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
The Anti-Defection Law has created a democracy of parties and numbers in India
rather than a democracy of debate and discussion. In this way, it does not differentiate
between dissent and defection and weakens Parliamentary deliberations on any law.

It undermines the representative and parliamentary democracy by restricting the

legislators’ freedom of speech and expression and making them accountable to their
party leaders rather than the people who elected them.

One of the most criticized aspects of the anti-defection legislation is that it infringes
on the right of the member of the legislature to make a choice that is contrary to the
party’s stance in furtherance of the interests of the electorate which they represent. By
punishing defectors and subjecting them to disqualification on the basis that they have
voted in contradiction to the party without prior ratification and permission from the
party, the anti-defection law infringes on the concept of intra-party democracy.

Democracy is an ever-pervading concept and there is no particular stipulation or code

which states that within a party there is no right to dissent and that all the party
members are under an obligation to act according to the party’s directions.

There have been instances since independence, wherein a member of one party has
acted beyond the party’s opinions, which is the basic feature of dissent in a democracy.
However, on the other hand, the anti-defection scheme as provided for in the Tenth
Schedule, by making it mandatory to receive the party’s permission before voting
against or abstaining, is a clear contravention of the concept of intra-party democracy.

It has been alleged that by using the threat of disqualification, the top leadership of a
political party can coerce the dissenting members of the party into not going against
the directions of the party’s leadership, and if they do so, they would be subject to
disqualification. This makes it mandatory for a member to vote in line with his/her
party, despite knowing that the party stands in contrast to the rights and interests of the
electorate that the member represents. This indirectly hampers the spirit of
representative democracy. Every political representative represents his/her electorate
and the first responsibility is to cater to their interests and not that of the political party
to which he/she belongs.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 22 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
The anti-defection law aims to maintain a stable government by ensuring that the
legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also limits a legislator from voting
according to his conscience, judgment, and electorate’s interests. This kind of situation
hinders the oversight functions of the legislature over the government, by making sure
that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not based
on what their constituents would like them to vote for.

Political parties issue directions to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of
the nature of the issue. Anti-defection does not provide sufficient incentive for an MP
or MLA to examine an issue in-depth and ponder over it to participate in the
debate. The Law breaks the link between the elected legislator and his elector.

The Tenth Schedule inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, by the Union
legislature is patently arbitrary. it is violative of the fundamental principles of
parliamentary democracy, is in contrast to the basic principles envisaged by the Indian
Constitution, and hence is to be struck down. The Tenth Schedule fundamentally
undermines the basic democratic principles of freedom of speech and expression, the
right to dissent, and freedom of conscience, which lie at the very core of a healthy,
functioning democracy.

A disease needs a remedy, but when the remedy is more than what the disease requires,
it in itself becomes a new disease. Switching to another party is a problem, but the
remedies prescribed for the same in the Tenth Schedule are more of an issue than the
problem itself.

Deciding to change their party’s allegiance is based on a representative’s conscience.

A person must not be punished for acting as per his conscience. defection with evil
and nefarious motives must be looked into, and action should be taken to curb such
practices for a healthy democracy.

However, it must be ensured that the action or remedy does not hinder the elected
member’s right to freedom of speech and expression and that the right to dissent, which
are the cardinal principles of Indian democracy, is not violated. In the impugned case,
the Central Government, by enacting the Tenth Schedule, has provided for a
mechanism that is so strict and arbitrary that it not only attacks defection as a
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 23 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
phenomenon but also curbs the basic right to freedom of conscience and choice of an
elected Member of Parliament and of the State Legislatures. Hence, the scheme of the
Tenth Schedule supersedes the requirement that the problem of defection demands and
can become a disease in itself.

Relying on Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants vs. Osborne (1910)26, Tenth

Schedule) that stands in contrast to an elected member’s right to speech and
expression, freedom of choice, and conscience is opposed to public policy. It was
stated that the most important obligation that an elected representative has towards his
people in a parliamentary democracy is to vindicate their rights and interests and the
promises that the representative made to them while being elected. If the opinion of
the parliamentary or regional (state) party to which he or she belongs differs from the
elected member’s opinion and the elected member thinks that it would be in the interest
of his ideals and the rights and interests of the people for whom he stands to change
his political party due to a non-alignment of views, there is nothing that should stop
him or her from doing so.

This choice is implied by the constitutional scheme of the Indian Constitution and has
the sanction of law. To take it away without any valid ground is patently arbitrary and
unconstitutional on the face of it. The elected representatives are chosen by a free
electorate. This electorate may choose one candidate for one election and another
candidate for another.

Going by the freedom that the Indian parliamentary democracy stands for, it was
contended that if things are looked at from the other perspective, the elected
representative is also free to act as he deems fit, taking into account his obligation to
his or her electorate and changing his political association or party.
It was further submitted that Article 105(2) of the Indian Constitution, which provides
rights and immunities to an elected Member of Parliament, is absolute and barred from
being scrutinized or curbed by any legislation. The absolute exemption provided by
Article 105(2) to the Union legislators by judicial decisions is superior to the freedom
of speech and expression envisaged under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and
hence the legislature or the Union Government has no right to interfere with the same

26
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910] AC 87, 89 (1910, House of Lords).

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 24 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
and make any alterations, implying that the impugned defection law is unconstitutional
on the face of it.

The distinction between the terms “defection” and “split” as provided under the Tenth
Schedule is so thin and ambiguous that it is very hard to ascertain what the statute
intends to confer or say. Such an ambiguous provision defeats the purpose for which
the legislation was introduced and, in a broader sense, is a strict defiance of the
principles of rationale and logic that the rule of law stands for.

If floor crossing, switching of parties, or political allegiance by an elected member is

wrong and evil in the eyes of the law, then going by the law, the defection of 1/3rd of
the members of a party to another party is no less evil and should be subjected to
criticism in a similar manner.

However, the anti-defection legislation and scheme envisaged by the Tenth Schedule
provided that the former evil is harmful to the parliamentary democracy, but when a
collective preparation is carried out, which is what happens in the latter case, it has the
sanction of law and is not subject to criticism.

While referring to the democratic structure of the Indian polity, the minority judgment
thought that free and fair elections form the basic structure. In a parliamentary
democracy like that of India, the State Assemblies and the Parliament, are elected by
the people of the country and every member is elected by his/her electorate. Hence,
he/she is under an obligation to cater to their rights and interests.

Several times, their rights and interests may not resonate with the stance of the party
to which the member belongs. In such a situation, the member is under a democratic
obligation to vote or abstain from voting for vindicating the interests of his/her
electorate, and hence deviating from the stance of the political party to which he/she
is affiliated. This is quite basic in a democracy and is a feature of dissent and the right
to choice, as envisaged in the essence of the Indian Constitution.

Hence, the Tenth Schedule, by making it mandatory to take the permission of the party
to which one belongs, before voting contrary to the party’s stance, impedes the basic
structure and crucial democratic right of dissent and is unconstitutional.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 25 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

Coming to the independent adjudicatory authority plea by the petitioners, the minority
opinion concurred with that of the petitioners. It was held that the speaker cannot be
the final arbiter, as far as the disqualification proceedings of the members of the
legislature are concerned. It has been prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule,
that the speaker has the final authority to decide on the disqualification of a member
of the legislative assembly or the Parliament in case of defection, but the same is prima
facie unconstitutional. To substantiate this, the Court’s reasoning was based on the
petitioner’s concern that a speaker is generally elected based on which party or alliance
has the majority seats in a House. This implies that when the speaker is elected, he or
she is generally someone who represents the voice of the majority party or alliance.
Nevertheless, the post of the speaker holds a sacred position in a democratic polity,
but to assume that he/she would be impartial at all times is practically impossible
because of his/her affiliation to a political party or alliance. Hence, the speaker cannot
be considered an independent adjudicatory authority, and making him the final
authority to decide disqualification is patently arbitrary. Therefore, paragraph 2 of the
Tenth Schedule contradicts the scheme of the Indian Constitution.

3. PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
The council on behalf of petitioners submits that the disqualification orders were
issued without providing a fair hearing, which is a fundamental principle of natural
justice.

In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)27, where the Supreme Court
emphasized that the right to a fair hearing is an essential component of the right to life
and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioners assert that the
Speaker's failure to allow them to present their case constitutes a breach of this
principle.

While acknowledging the importance of natural justice, the petitioners argue for a
flexible application of these principles based on the specific circumstances of their
case.

27
Supra 6, at 15.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 26 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
In the case of M/s. S. L. Khurana v. State of U.P. (1990)28, where the Supreme Court
recognized that the principles of natural justice should be adapted to the context of
each case. The petitioners maintain that the Speaker's actions did not meet the required
standards of fairness providing outside support to a political party does not equate to
joining that party, thus arguing against the application of defection laws.

In the case of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)29 the Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between defection and mere support. The petitioners argue that their actions
should be viewed in light of this distinction, asserting that they did not formally join
the Indian National Congress.

The petitioners claim they were denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
which they argue undermines the legitimacy of the disqualification orders. State of
Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2000), where the Supreme Court held that the right to cross-
examine is a vital aspect of a fair trial. The petitioners argue that without this right, the
proceedings were fundamentally flawed. The speaker acted with mala fides,
suggesting that political motives influenced the disqualification.

S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra (1964)30, where the Supreme Court held that
actions taken with mala fides are liable to be struck down. The petitioners argue that
the Speaker's alleged communication with them regarding abstention from voting
indicates improper conduct. The petitioners assert that they are entitled to protections
under paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, claiming that splits occurred in their
respective parties.

Viswanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996)31, where the Supreme Court recognized
the concept of splits within political parties. The petitioners argue that as lone
members, they should not be disqualified under the defection law.

Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016)32 Emphasized the importance of impartiality

and procedural safeguards in disqualification decisions. The SC held that a speaker

28
M/s. S. L. Khurana v. State of U.P. (1990) Supp SCC 546.
29
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651.
30
S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra (1964) SC 1680.
31
Viswanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 6 SCC 190.
32
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) 8 SCC 1.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 27 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
will be disabled from deciding disqualification petitions under the anti-defection law
(10th schedule of the constitution) if a notice for their removal is pending. this
judgment stopped a Speaker facing removal notice from deciding disqualification
pleas against members of legislatures under the anti-defection law.

Also, in 2023, the Supreme Court in Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor
of Maharashtra Case, 202333, directed the Maharashtra Assembly Speaker, to set a
timeline for deciding pleas for the disqualification of MLAs.

4. STRUCTURAL REFORMS ARE NECESSARY

The Speaker is not just a presiding officer, they wields significant power in shaping
the functioning of the House and influencing the balance between the ruling party and
the opposition, especially in the case of a coalition government. The Speaker's
decisions and actions can have far-reaching consequences for the functioning and
stability of the government.

The election process should be reformed to ensure neutrality and independence in

legislative leadership positions 178 and 180: Allow for improvements to strengthen
fairness and impartiality in these roles.

Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014)34: Highlighted the need for structural
safeguards to uphold the independence of constitutional offices.

IV. WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND “TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT
(UAPA), THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

The counsel on behalf of the petitioner respectfully submits that the broad definition of
“unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges
are not consistent with the protection of fundamental rights

33
Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra Case, (2023) 4 SCC 657.
34
Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 28 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28

1. MISUSE OF UAPA TO SUPPRESS DISSENT

The cornerstone of any democracy is the ability of its citizens to voice dissent and
criticize the government without fear of retribution. However, the misuse of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) represents a dangerous departure from
this principle.

The petitioner, a vocal activist from Tribe B, exercised his constitutional right under
Article 19(1)(a) by speaking against the government’s alleged discriminatory
practices. Instead of engaging in dialogue, the state has labeled his speech as an
"unlawful activity," weaponizing UAPA to silence dissent.

This misuse is not an isolated event but part of a broader pattern where minority voices
and activists critical of the government are arbitrarily branded as threats to national
security. Such actions not only violate Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution but
also erode the democratic fabric of our nation.

The second Chief Justice of India, M Patanjali Sastri has observed, “Freedom of
Speech lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations, for without free political
discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the process
of Government, is possible.” This is important because democracy works well only if
the people have the right to express their opinions about the government and criticize
it if needed.

The petitioner belongs to Tribe B, a minority community accusing the ruling

government of systemic bias. Labeling activists and dissenters as terrorists
disproportionately affect these communities, exacerbating existing inequalities. This
selective enforcement violates Article 14 (equality before the law) The government
must protect and uplift marginalized minority communities, ensuring their rights and
dignity.

In the case Indra Sawhney & Others v. Union of India (1992)35: The Supreme Court
held that the reservation of 27% of central government jobs for Other Backward

35
Indra Sawhney & Others v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477; 1992 SUPP 2 SCR 454.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 29 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
Classes (OBCs) recognized caste as a valid indicator of social and educational
backwardness. The Supreme Court introduced the concept of the "creamy layer,"
excluding the more advanced members of OBCs from reservations to ensure benefits
reach the truly disadvantaged. The Court also stipulated that reservations should not
exceed 50% to balance affirmative action and meritocracy.

In the case of Kailas & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 36 the Supreme Court
highlighted the historical injustices faced by Scheduled Tribes (STs), emphasizing the
state's duty to provide special protections and assistance to uplift these communities.
The Court noted that formal equality alone is insufficient and that affirmative action
is necessary to address the deep-rooted disadvantages suffered by these groups.

In the case of Shri. Sanjeet Shukla vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others
(2014)37 The Bombay High Court reiterated the importance of affirmative action for
marginalized communities, referencing the Supreme Court's observations in the
Kailas case. The Court underscored the need for special provisions to undo historical
injustices inflicted upon disadvantaged and marginalized communities, particularly
Scheduled Tribes.

Arresting the petitioner under UAPA for criticizing the government demonstrates the
misuse of state power to silence opposition rather than addressing actual threats to
national security. Romila Thapar v. Union of India (2018)38.

In the case of S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989)39, the Supreme Court stated
that free speech is essential for a democratic society and that any attempt to suppress
dissent must be viewed skeptically.

The selective enforcement of UAPA, particularly against Tribe B activists, suggests

political and ethnic discrimination. UAPA has been misused to target certain
communities, violating the equality clause under Article 14.

36
Kailas & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 793.
37
Shri. Sanjeet Shukla vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others (2014) 2 Bom CR 1.
38
Romila Thapar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 753.
39
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) SCR (2) 204.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 30 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
In the case of D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997)40 – The Supreme Court
emphasized that detentions should not be used to suppress political dissent or targeted
groups.

2. "VAGUENESS OF DEFINITION " AND ITS APPLICABILITY

The constitutionality of the vague and overly broad provisions under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Sections 2(o) and 15 of the Act define “unlawful
activity” and “terrorist act” in terms so expansive that they encompass legitimate
activities, including peaceful protests and political criticism.

The petitioner, an activist who exercised his right to free speech, has been labeled a
terrorist under these provisions. His speech, critical of government policies, was a
rightful act of dissent in a democracy, not an unlawful or terrorist activity. However,
the vagueness and overbreadth of these definitions allowed the state to misuse its
powers and criminalize its expression.

We humbly submit that such provisions violate Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the
Constitution. They not only stifle dissent but also undermine the foundational
democratic principle that citizens have the right to question and criticize their
government.

The Supreme Court has dealt with such laws/rules firmly and declared most of them
unconstitutional. The Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015)41 (Writ Petition
Criminal No. 167 of 2012) comes in very handy as a case in point. As it empowers us
with logic and or information to evaluate such laws against the metric "vagueness". In
this case, the petitioner challenged the validity of article 66A (of the amended IT Act
of 2000) on various factors, "vagueness" being one such factor the penal law is void
for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness.
Ordinary people should be able to understand what conduct is prohibited and what is
permitted. Also, those who administer the law must know what offense has been
committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take
place.

40
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416.
41
The Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 31 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
Grayned v. City of Rockford 33 L.Ed. 2d42. The court held that Vague laws offend
several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them Third, Uncertain meaning
inevitably leads citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were marked.

In Federal Communication Commission v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S Ct.

230743, it was held that a fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws that
regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or
required regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove an
incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.

The definition arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately invades the right of free
speech and upsets the balance between such right and the reasonable restriction that
may be imposed on such right. K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1971)44 In this case the
Supreme Court held that vague laws violate the principle of reasonableness under
Article 19(2).

The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that laws criminalizing speech
must be precise and narrowly tailored to prevent misuse. The Johannesburg Principles
on Freedom of Expression advocate for restrictions on free speech only when
necessary and proportionate.

3. DENIAL OF BAIL AND PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

The petitioner has been a victim of excessive state power under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act. Section 43D (5) denies bail based on mere prima facie
evidence, reversing the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, Section 43D (2)

42
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972, U.S. Supreme Court).
43
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 183 L.Ed. 2d 234, 132 S.Ct.
2307 (2012, U.S. Supreme Court).
44
K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1971) 2 SCC 780.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 32 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
permits detention for up to 180 days without filing charges, violating procedural
fairness and fundamental rights.

These provisions disproportionately affect the liberty of individuals, as seen in this

case, where the petitioner has been detained for six months without substantial
evidence. Such stringent provisions undermine Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution,
guaranteeing the right to life, liberty, and protection against arbitrary detention.

Delhi High Court granted bail to student activists, it emphasized that the prosecution
must present specific factual allegations rather than relying on broad speculations and
inferences.in Anand Teltumbde's Case45- the Bombay High Court insisted on the
prosecution demonstrating a nexus between the accused and the offense.

In the case of Union of India vs KA Najeeb, 202146- It allowed bail considering the
significant period of incarceration undergone by the accused. The decision
acknowledged that bail under UAPA is an exception but should be balanced with the
right to a speedy trial.

Gonsalves case, 2023- It differed from Watali's judgment and said that the courts
must do a surface analysis of the evidence and its worth before granting bail.

Gurwinder Singh case47- It relied on the Watali ruling entirely without considering
the Gonsalves ruling. the court emphasized that even if the public prosecutor has been
heard, the court is required to evaluate whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accusations are true based on an initial examination of the case diary or the
police report.

In the case of Jalaluddin Khan vs Union of India 48 the court held that bail is the rule
Jail is an Exception. The Court pointed out that the Special Court under UAPA and
Patna High Court did not consider the material in the charge sheet objectively.
“Perhaps the focus was more on the activities of PFI, and therefore, the appellant’s
case could not be properly appreciated.” Reiterating that “Bail is the rule and jail is

45
Dr. Anand Teltumbde’s v. The National Investigating Agency (2022) SCC Online Bom 5174.
46
Union of India vs KA Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713.
47
Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) SCC Online SC 92.
48
Jalaluddin Khan vs Union of India (2024) SCC Online SC 1945.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 33 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
an exception” is a settled law, the Court stated that this rule holds good even in cases
such as the instant matter where there are stringent conditions for the grant of bail in
the relevant statutes; the only modification being that the bail can be granted if the
conditions in the statute are satisfied. “The rule also means that once a case is made
out for the grant of bail, the Court cannot decline to grant bail. If the Courts start
denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the rights guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution.”

The principle of presumption of innocence states that a person is considered

innocent until proven guilty. This means that the burden of proof is on the prosecution
to prove the defendant's guilt. The presumption of innocence is a legal right of the
accused in a criminal trial. It is also an international human right as stated in Article
11 of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The presumption of
innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. It is a basic
requirement of a fair trial. The prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution cannot prove the charges, the defendant is
acquitted. The defendant is not required to prove their innocence. The presumption of
innocence is a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence. Denying bail based on prima
facie evidence undermines this principle.

In the case of Noor Aga Khan vs State of Punjab (2005)49, it was held by the apex
court that though not explicitly mentioned in the constitution presumption of
innocence is nevertheless a potent background to the constitution of justice in
preserving confidence in enduring integrity and security of the legal system.

Right to Life and Liberty: The denial of bail infringes the petitioner’s right to liberty,
a core element of Article 21. Prolonged incarceration without a fair trial undermines
this right. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979)50 the court recognized that
speedy trials and reasonable bail conditions are integral to Article 21.

International Standards: Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR): States that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

49
Noor Aga Khan vs State of Punjab (2005) 5 SCC 437.
50
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) SCR (3) 532.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 34 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
Section 43D (5) curtails judicial discretion, forcing courts to deny bail even when
evidence is insufficient or fabricated. This leads to arbitrary detentions and
undermines judicial independence.

Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides certain safeguards regarding arrests and
detentions. It aims to protect the rights and liberties of individuals who are arrested or
detained by the authorities.

Right, to be Presented before Magistrate Article 22 guarantees that an arrested person

must be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest. This
provision aims to prevent unlawful and prolonged detention without proper judicial
oversight.

Right to Consult a Legal Practitioner Article 22 grants the right to an arrested person
to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. This right helps
ensure that individuals have proper legal representation during the process of arrest
and detention.

Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb51 The Supreme Court ruled that Section 43-D (5) of
the UAPA does not necessarily prevent constitutional courts from granting bail
because the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial has been violated. The Court
observed that the strict provisions of this section will become less stringent when there
is no possibility of the trial being completed within a reasonable time and the accused
has already spent a significant portion of the prescribed sentence in prison.

Devangana Kalita v. State52 In this case, the Delhi High Court granted bail to three
activists who were accused of being involved in the 2020 Delhi riots under UAPA.
The court held that the state failed to produce any material to show that the accused
had any links with any banned organization or that they advocated violence or
secessionism. The court also observed that dissent and disagreement are essential
ingredients of a robust democracy and that the right to protest is a fundamental right.

51
Supra 46, at 33.
52
Devangana Kalita v. State of NCT Delhi AIR Online 2021 DEL 837.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 35 of 39
 PETITIONER TC-28
Nihal Singh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra53 In this case, the Bombay High Court
granted bail to a lawyer who was arrested under UAPA for his alleged Maoist links.
The court noted that the prosecution had not filed a charge sheet within the stipulated
time of 90 days and that there was no prima facie evidence to show that the accused
was involved in any unlawful activity or conspiracy.

Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) 54 The case dealt with the
constitutionality of Section 22 of the UAPA, which allowed the government to declare
an area as a disturbed area and empower security forces with special powers. The
Supreme Court held that the provision was not unconstitutional per se but emphasized
the need for strict compliance with guidelines to prevent abuse of power.

Najeeb v. State of Kerala (2011)55: This case concerned the legality of Section 43A
of the UAPA, which allows confessions made to police officers to be used as evidence
in court. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 43A was not unconstitutional, but it
stressed the importance of ensuring that such confessions were made freely and
without coercion.

4. IMPACT OF UAPA ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 (UAPA) allows police to arrest
people without a warrant. Section 43 A&B of the UAPA gives police the power to
search, seize, and arrest. Section 43D of the UAPA Act allows the police to keep
someone in police custody for 30 days and to keep someone in court detention for 180
days without a charge sheet.

Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to be informed of the
grounds of arrest. If Section 43B involves preventive detention, the accused person
should be informed of the reasons for their detention promptly.

Right to Speedy Trial (Article 21): Prolonged preventive detention without formal
charges can impede an individual’s right to a speedy trial. Right against Self-
Incrimination (Article 20(3)): Provisions related to obtaining evidence or confessions

53
Nihal Singh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 216.
54
Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) 7 SCC 547.
55
Najeeb v. State of Kerala (2011) 4 KLT 935.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 36 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
must adhere to the right against self-incrimination is guaranteed in the article

Section 43D of the UAPA act allows the police to keep someone in police custody for
30 days and to keep someone in court detention for 180 days without a charge sheet.
This provision can be criticized for violating the Right to Speedy Trial (Article 21)
and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Authorities have been under criticism for abusing the UAPA to target activists,
dissenters, and human rights defenders. Opponents claim that the act has been applied
to suppress free expression and put an end to any kind of nonviolent demonstrations.

Section 35 of the UAPA gives the central government the power to declare individuals
as terrorists without following proper procedures or due process. This has been
criticized because it could violate the right to personal liberty (Article 21), the right
to reputation, and the right to a fair trial (Article 21).

The UAPA defines “unlawful activities” very broadly, including many actions that
could be seen as a threat to the country. This broad definition could be used to violate
the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a) of the
Indian Constitution).

The UAPA also allows the government to ban organizations involved in unlawful
activities, but this process is not transparent and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
This could violate the right to form associations or unions without interference from
the state (Article 19(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution).

The UAPA defines terrorism very broadly, including acts that may not be a serious
threat to national security. This broad definition could lead to people being treated
differently under the law (violating Article 14 of the Constitution) and could also lead
to people being imprisoned without good reason (violating Article 21 of the
Constitution).

Overall, the UAPA has been criticized for violating many fundamental rights
enshrined in the Indian Constitution, including the right to equality before the law, the
right to life and personal liberty, the right to freedom of speech and expression, and
UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 37 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28
the right to form associations.

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 38 of 39
PETITIONER TC-28

PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the legal precedents and principles cited; and in light of the provisions
of the Constitution applied and arguments advanced; it is most humbly pleaded before the
Hon’ble Court that this Court adjudges and declares that:

 The "bulldozer justice" is unconstitutional under Articles 21 and 300A, instruct Uttam
Pradesh to stop demolitions without due process, and compensate the affected
petitioners.

 Declare the disqualification of MLAs under the Anti-Defection Law procedurally

invalid, restore their status, and suggest guidelines for disqualification proceedings free
from bias and arbitrariness.

 Declare the election procedure for Speaker and Deputy Speaker unconstitutional due to
bias, and recommend structural reforms to make the roles impartial.

 Declare Sections 2(o), 15, 43D (2), and 43D (5) of the UAPA unconstitutional because
they violate Articles 14, 19, 21, and 22. Quash the judgment and release Ravi Ansari.
Establish safeguards against the misuse of the UAPA.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of justice,
fairness, equity, and good conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

UU-LCD-NMCC-2025 Page 39 of 39