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NATO STANDARD
APP-28
TACTICAL PLANNING
FOR LAND FORCES
Edition B, Version 1

MARCH 2024

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED PROCEDURAL PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

06 March 2024

1. The enclosed Allied Procedural Publication APP-28, Edition B, Version 1,

TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES, which has been approved by the nations
in the Military Committee Land Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The
agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2631.

2. APP-28, Edition B, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes APP-28,

Edition A, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure
for the destruction of documents.

3. This NATO standardization document is issued by NATO. In case of

reproduction, NATO is to be acknowledged. NATO does not charge any fee for its
standardization documents at any stage, which are not intended to be sold. They can
be retrieved from the NATO Standardization Document Database
((https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dimitrios ~ULAKIS
Lieutenant General, GRC (A)
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

DEU DEU disagrees with the statements in Chapter 2 which describe
combat power as the result of a (undefined) combination of fighting
power and combat effectiveness. In accordance with AJP 3.2 Para
2.11 and DEU doctrine, combat power constitutes the physical
component of fighting power which, in accordance with APP-28
figure 2-6 results in combat effectiveness, when set in relation to a
given mission / task. Consequently, DEU considers combat power
(as the physical component of fighting power) to encompass visible,
quantitatively measurable values, whereas the disputed statements
in APP-28 Chapter 2 suggest qualitative, qualifying aspects as well.
A confusion between combat power and combat effectiveness must
be prevented. The logical architecture and interdependencies of
established constructs such as combat power, fighting power,
combat effectiveness etc. must remain intact in order to minimize /
avoid misinterpretations.
LTU For LTU Land Forces STEP 2 (Mission analysis) division into sub-
steps 2a (Order analysis) and 2b (Evaluation of factors) is optional,
as well as usage of Order Analysis Briefing. Generally this is one
step which ends with Mission Analysis Briefing and Warning Order
issue.
NLD Para 3.2.2.1 states that commanders determine the form of COA
analysis to be used in their planning guidance. The RNLA leaves
the decision on the form to be used up to the commander and staff,
subject to their roles and responsibilities and the staff planning
timeline.

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

Revision of Allied Procedural Publication

APP-28 TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES, Edition B, version 1

Based on the MCLSB approved revision task for APP-28 (January 2020), this
publication has been reviewed in order to align with the main land operations
publications (AJP-3.2 and subordinate 3.2.x series), while avoiding duplications. In
particular, the new version:

 Harmonizes with AJP-3.2 and subordinate publications;

 Includes the joint functions;

 Removes redundant material;

 Harmonized references with current NATO publications, ensuring that

referenced documents all have NATO status rather than national doctrine
relations;

 Adapted and included practical lessons learned from implementation of APP-28

at national levels and NATO tactical formations during exercises;

 Updates risk management as a continual process throughout planning and

operations;

 Ensures inclusion, referencing other doctrine, of formal processes (such as

IPOE) that are inherent to the tactical planning level;

 Removes overly prescriptive language in favor of fundamental doctrinal

principles;

 Removes redundant or confusing annexes that duplicated material from other

doctrine or which reflected a specific nation’s preferred approach (e.g. ‘Factors’);

 Updates and renames annex demonstrating linkage between NATO operational

and tactical planning processes;

 Adds an annex on war gaming;

 Adds annexes for optional formats, templates, and tools that may be used in the
planning process;

 Updates terms and definitions to reflect latest status of NATOTerm and ongoing
terminology changes.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
No.

CHAPTER 1—OVERVIEW OF TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES

1.1 Mission Command and the Operations Process............................................... 1-1

1.1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.2 Mission Command ........................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.3 The Operations Process .................................................................................. 1-1
1.1.4 The Manoeuvrist Approach .............................................................................. 1-2
1.1.5 The Joint Functions .......................................................................................... 1-3
1.1.6 Risk and Risk Management ............................................................................. 1-3
1.2 Planning, Plans, and Orders ............................................................................ 1-3
1.2.1 Planning ........................................................................................................... 1-3
1.2.2 Plans and Orders ............................................................................................. 1-5
1.2.3 Mission-Type Orders ........................................................................................ 1-6
1.3 Tactical Planning and Process Overview ......................................................... 1-7
1.3.1 General ............................................................................................................ 1-7
1.3.2 Tactical Planning for Land Forces Overview .................................................... 1-7
1.3.3 Modifying Tactical Planning............................................................................ 1-10
1.3.4 Continous Processes Occurring Throughout the Planning Process................ 1-10

CHAPTER 2—UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION AND MISSION

2.1 Receipt of Mission ............................................................................................ 2-1

2.1.1 General ............................................................................................................ 2-1
2.1.2 Alert the Staff and Other Key Participants ........................................................ 2-2
2.1.3 Prepare for Planning ........................................................................................ 2-2
2.1.4 Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment ......................... 2-2
2.1.5 Update Staff Estimates .................................................................................... 2-3
2.1.6 Estimate Mission Timelines .............................................................................. 2-3
2.1.7 Determine Staff Planning Timelines ................................................................. 2-4
2.1.8 Conduct Receipt of Mission Meeting (optional) ................................................ 2-4
2.1.9 Issue Initial Planning Guidance ........................................................................ 2-4
2.1.10 Formulate and Issue Warning Order ................................................................ 2-5
2.2 Step 2: Mission Analysis .................................................................................. 2-5
2.2.1 General ............................................................................................................ 2-5
2.3 Substep 2a: Orders Analysis ............................................................................ 2-6
2.3.1 General ............................................................................................................ 2-6
2.3.2 Analyse the 1-up Commander’s Order ............................................................. 2-7
2.3.3 Formulate the Commander’s Initial Intent ....................................................... 2-10
2.3.4 Develop a Mission Statement......................................................................... 2-11
2.3.5 Update Commander’s Planning Guidance ..................................................... 2-11
2.3.6 Prepare and Deliver Order Analysis Briefing .................................................. 2-15
2.4 Substep 2b: Evaluation of Factors.................................................................. 2-16
2.4.1 General .......................................................................................................... 2-16
2.4.2 Analyse Specific Parts of the Order and Annexes .......................................... 2-17
2.4.3 Continue Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment ................... 2-17

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2.4.4 Review Troops and Support Available ........................................................... 2-23

2.4.5 Review and Update Mission Timeline and Staff Planning Timeline ................ 2-26
2.4.6 Establish Risk Context and Begin Risk Assessment ...................................... 2-26
2.4.7 Develop Commander’s Critical Information Requirements ............................. 2-27
2.4.8 Develop the Initial Intelligence Collection Plan ............................................... 2-28
2.4.9 Prepare and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing ....................................... 2-28
2.4.10 Update Additional Commander’s Planning Guidance ..................................... 2-29
2.4.11 Develop and Issue a Warning Order .............................................................. 2-29
2.4.12 Conduct Commander’s Initial Back Brief (optional) ........................................ 2-29

CHAPTER 3—DEVELOP AND CONSIDER COURSES OF ACTION

3.1 Step 3: Course of Action Development ............................................................ 3-1

3.1.1 General ............................................................................................................ 3-1
3.1.2 Step 3.1 – Establish Approach ......................................................................... 3-6
3.1.3 Step 3.2 – Prepare ........................................................................................... 3-7
3.1.4 Step 3.3 – Generate Options.......................................................................... 3-10
3.1.5 Step 3.4 – Array Forces ................................................................................. 3-11
3.1.6 Step 3.5 – Refine the Concept ....................................................................... 3-13
3.1.7 Step 3.6 – Develop Task Organisation ........................................................... 3-15
3.1.8 Step 3.7 – Develop COA Statement and Finish Sketch .................................. 3-15
3.1.9 Prepare and Deliver Course of Action Briefing (optional) ............................... 3-17
3.1.10 Select or Modify Courses of Action for Continued Analysis ............................ 3-17
3.2 Step 4: Course of Action Analysis .................................................................. 3-17
3.2.1 General .......................................................................................................... 3-18
3.2.2 Preparation .................................................................................................... 3-19
3.2.3 Execution ....................................................................................................... 3-20
3.2.4 Refine the COA (when applicable) ................................................................. 3-22
3.2.5 Course of Action Analysis Briefing (optional) .................................................. 3-22
3.3 Step 5: Course of Action Comparison ............................................................ 3-22
3.3.1 General .......................................................................................................... 3-22
3.3.2 Conducting COA Advantages and Disadvantages Analysis ........................... 3-23
3.3.3 Compare COAs against the Commander’s Evaluation Criteria ....................... 3-24
3.3.4 Identify the Staff Recommended COA ........................................................... 3-24
3.3.5 Prepare and Conduct a Course of Action Decision Briefing............................ 3-25

CHAPTER 4—COMMUNICATION

4.1 Step 6: Commander’s Decision ........................................................................ 4-1

4.1.1 Select COA ...................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.2 Announce Decision .......................................................................................... 4-2
4.1.3 Update Planning Guidance .............................................................................. 4-3
4.1.4 Conduct Back Brief .......................................................................................... 4-4
4.1.5 Issue Warning Order ........................................................................................ 4-4
4.2 Step 7: Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition ............................... 4-4
4.2.1 General ............................................................................................................ 4-4
4.2.2 Plans and Orders Production and Reconciliation ............................................. 4-5
4.2.3 Approving the Plan and/or Order ...................................................................... 4-6
4.2.4 Transition the Operation Plan or Operation Order from Planning to Current
Operations (when applicable)............................................................................ 4-6
4.2.5 Prepare and Issue the Orders .......................................................................... 4-6

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4.2.6 Prepare and Conduct Confirmation Brief (optional) .......................................... 4-6

4.2.7 Prepare and Conduct Back Brief (optional ....................................................... 4-7
4.2.8 Prepare and Conduct Rehearsals (optional) .................................................... 4-7
4.2.9 Prepare and Issue Fragmentary Orders (if necessary) ..................................... 4-7

CHAPTER 5—PLANNING IN A TIME CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

5.0 General ............................................................................................................ 5-1

5.1 Responsibilities ................................................................................................ 5-1
5.1.1 The Commander’s Responsibility ..................................................................... 5-1
5.1.2 The Staff’s Responsibility ................................................................................. 5-1
5.1.3 Other Fundamental Responsibilities to Facilitate Planning ............................... 5-1
5.2 Time Saving Techniques.................................................................................. 5-1
5.2.1 Time Saving Techniques.................................................................................. 5-1
5.2.2 Limitations on COA Development, Analysis, and/or Comparison ..................... 5-2
5.2.3 Step 3: Develop Simplified COA ...................................................................... 5-2
5.2.4 Step 4: Abbreviated COA Analysis ................................................................... 5-3
5.2.5 Step 5: COA Comparison ................................................................................. 5-4
5.3 Developing New COAs Due to Fundamental Mission Change ......................... 5-4
5.3.1 Step 1: Compare the Current Situation to the Order ......................................... 5-4
5.3.2 Step 2: Determine the Type of Decision Required............................................ 5-6

ANNEX A—Related Allied Publications and Stanags ...................................................... A-1

ANNEX B—Tactical Planning for Land Forces Quick Reference Guide........................... B-1
ANNEX C—Linkages of NATO Operational and Land Tactical Planning Processes
on the component level ................................................................................................... C-1
ANNEX D—War Gaming ................................................................................................. D-1
ANNEX E—Optional Formats.......................................................................................... E-1
ANNEX F—Optional Templates ...................................................................................... F-1
ANNEX G—Optional Tools.............................................................................................. G-1

LEXICON

Section I—Glossary...................................................................................................... Lex-1

Section II—List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................... Lex-4

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
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No.

CHAPTER 1—OVERVIEW OF TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES

Figure 1-1. The operations process........................................................................ 1-2

Figure 1-2. Planning horizons ................................................................................ 1-5
Figure 1-3. Mission statement structure ................................................................. 1-6
Figure 1-4. Tactical planning for land forces overview ............................................ 1-9
Figure 1-5. APP-28 continuous processes map ................................................... 1-10

CHAPTER 2—UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION AND MISSION

Figure 2-1. Step 1–Receipt of the Mission.............................................................. 2-1

Figure 2-2. Step 2a–Orders Analysis ..................................................................... 2-6
Figure 2-3. Example of a commander’s intent at the lower tactical levels ............. 2-11
Figure 2-4. Step 2b–Evaluation of factors ............................................................ 2-16
Figure 2-5. Constructing a modified combined obstacle overlay ........................... 2-22
Figure 2-6. Example of determining combat effectiveness ................................... 2-25

CHAPTER 3—DEVELOP AND CONSIDER COURSES OF ACTION

Figure 3-1. Step 3–Courses of Action Development ............................................... 3-3

Figure 3-2. Steps and stages of COA development ............................................... 3-5
Figure 3-3. Stages of Step 3.1–Establish Approach ............................................... 3-6
Figure 3-4. Stages of Step 3.2–Prepare ................................................................. 3-7
Figure 3-5. Stages of Step 3.3–Generate Options................................................ 3-10
Figure 3-6. Stages of Step 3.4–Array Forces ....................................................... 3-11
Figure 3-7. Stages of Step 3.5–Refine the Concept ............................................. 3-13
Figure 3-8. Stages of Step 3.6–Develop Task Organisation ................................. 3-15
Figure 3-9. Stages of Step 3.7–Develop COA Statement and Finish Sketch ........ 3-15
Figure 3-10. Step 4–COA Analysis......................................................................... 3-18
Figure 3-11. Step 5–COA Comparison ................................................................... 3-23

CHAPTER 4—COMMUNICATION

Figure 4-1. Step 6–Commander’s Decision ............................................................ 4-2

Figure 4-2. Step 7–Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition ................... 4-5

CHAPTER 5—PLANNING IN A TIME CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

Figure 5-1. Example of simplified COA sketches.................................................... 5-3

ANNEX B—TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Figure B-1. Receipt of mission................................................................................ B-1

Figure B-2. Order analysis ...................................................................................... B-2
Figure B-3. Evaluation of factors ............................................................................ B-3

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Figure B-4. Courses of action development ............................................................ B-4

Figure B-5. Course of action analysis ..................................................................... B-5
Figure B-6. Course of action comparison................................................................ B-6
Figure B-7. Commander’s decision......................................................................... B-7
Figure B-8. Orders production, dissemination, and transition.................................. B-8
Figure B-9. APP-28 Continuous processes map..................................................... B-9

ANNEX C—LINKAGES OF NATO OPERATIONAL AND LAND TACTICAL PLANNING

PROCESSES ON THE COMPONENT LEVEL

Figure C-1. Applicable doctrine/directives overview ............................................... C-2

Figure C-2. Planning categories and planning manners overview .......................... C-3
Figure C-3. COPD–APP-28 planning process comparison .................................... C-4

ANNEX D—WAR GAMING

Figure D-1. War gaming ........................................................................................ D-2

Figure D-2. Belt technique ..................................................................................... D-5
Figure D-3. Avenue-in-depth technique ................................................................. D-6
Figure D-4. Box technique ..................................................................................... D-7
Figure D-5. War game worksheet .......................................................................... D-8

ANNEX F—OPTIONAL TEMPLATES

Figure F-1. COA statement template ...................................................................... F-1

Figure F-2. Sync matrix template............................................................................ F-2

ANNEX G—OPTIONAL TOOLS

Figure G-1. Relationship outcome, objectives, effects, actions .............................. G-3

Figure G-2. The full centre of gravity analysis model.............................................. G-7
Figure G-3. Centre of gravity analysis matrix ....................................................... G-10

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LIST OF TABLES
Page
No.

CHAPTER 2—UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION AND MISSION

Table 2-1. Examples of topics for commander’s planning guidance .................... 2-13

CHAPTER 3—DEVELOP AND CONSIDER COURSES OF ACTION

Table 3-1. Criteria for viability testing .................................................................... 3-2

Table 3-2. Historical minimum planning ratios ..................................................... 3-12
Table 3-3. Example decision matrix .................................................................... 3-24

CHAPTER 5—PLANNING IN A TIME CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

Table 5-1. Indicators and variances ...................................................................... 5-5

ANNEX E—OPTIONAL FORMATS

Table E-1. Receipt of mission briefing ................................................................... E-1

Table E-2. Orders analysis briefing ....................................................................... E-2
Table E-3. Mission analysis briefing ...................................................................... E-3
Table E-4. Course of action briefing ...................................................................... E-4
Table E-5. Course of action analysis briefing......................................................... E-5
Table E-6. Course of action decision briefing ........................................................ E-6
Table E-7. Confirmation brief optional format ........................................................ E-6
Table E-8. Back brief optional format .................................................................... E-7

ANNEX G—OPTIONAL TOOLS

Table G-1 Three column model ........................................................................... G-6

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PREFACE
0001. Purpose

Recent exercises and operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) demonstrate
a need to standardise tactical planning for land forces at the component command level and
below in order to improve alliance interoperability and effectiveness. Allied Procedural
Publication (APP)-28, Tactical Planning for Land Forces (TPLF), provides this standardisation.

0002. Scope

a. APP-28 provides a common approach to planning operations at the tactical level. It

describes the tactical planning process - a process used by commanders and staffs to receive
and analyse a mission, develop, analyse, and compare courses of action (COAs), decide on
the optimum course of action, and produce a plan and order for execution.

b. Tactical planning is a cyclic dynamic process which interrelates with other processes
such as IPOE, targeting, risk management, etc. This publication does not expand in depth on
these processes and the relationships with the planning process, as there is specific doctrine
on these processes.1 The exception is risk management, for which there is no tactical doctrine
available. Therefore APP-28 is complemented by the standard related document (SRD)2 APP-
28.1, Risk Management. The SRD discusses the risk management process in full and provides
techniques, examples, formats and templates that may serve to develop standard operating
procedures (SOP) and/or standard operating instructions (SOIs) on risk management.3
Integration of risk management is further facilitated by providing the linkages to risk
management and the SRD in the steps of the TPLF.

c. To effectively employ the processes and procedures in APP-28, readers must be

familiar with the command and control (C2) doctrine found in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-
3.2.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Activities and ATP-3.2.2, Command and Control of Allied Land
Forces. Readers must understand the C2 philosophy of mission command, the concept of the
manoeuvrist approach, the joint functions, and the importance of developing mission-type
orders. They must also understand the dynamic nature of the operations process to include
continuous planning and decision-making throughout an operation. In addition, to effectively
plan tactical operations, readers must fully understand the tactics found in ATP-3.2.1, Conduct
of Land Tactical Operations.

d. In order to understand the interaction of operational and tactical level planning, readers
should be familiar with the operations planning process (OPP) and the fundamentals of
operational planning addressed in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5. The tactical planning for
land forces process is linked to the OPP described in AJP- 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Planning of Operations and the Allied Command Operations’ Comprehensive Operations
Planning Directive (COPD).

—————
1 The IPOE is detailed in AIntP-17, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment. Targeting is described in
ATP-3.9.2, Allied Tactical Doctrine for Land Targeting.
2 A standard related document (SRD) is a NATO standardisation document that facilitates understanding and implementation

of one or more Allied standards.

3 SRD 28.1 is developed at Multinational Corps North East. Every command should tailor the guidance provided in the SRD to

their means an capabilities and record this in SOP/SOI.

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0003. Applicability

Applicability The primary audience for APP-28 is NATO commanders and staffs within
multinational headquarters (HQs) at the corps level and below. Commanders of tactical
formations and units who have a staff use this process to plan tactical operations. For HQs
established under the lead nation concept, commanders have the option, not preferable, to use
their national planning doctrine.

0004. References

APP-28 references several NATO documents in which additional or more complete information
on particular subjects is found. References cited are intended to reflect latest versions of
documents, unless stated otherwise.

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CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF TACTICAL PLANNING

FOR LAND FORCES
1.1 MISSION COMMAND AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

1.1.1 Introduction

1. Tactical planning for land forces integrates the activities of the commander, staff,
subordinate headquarters (HQs), and other partners to understand the situation (to include the
formation’s/unit’s mission) and develop a plan and order to achieve the assigned effects and
objectives to accomplish the mission.

2. The effective conduct of tactical planning for land forces requires an understanding of the
philosophy of mission command, the manoeuvrist approach, and an appreciation of the
relationship of planning with the other activities of the operations process. A summary of these
topics is provided below.

1.1.2 Mission Command

1. NATO’s philosophy for the command and control (C2) of military forces is mission command.
Mission command advocates centralised planning that includes provision of clear guidance and
intent with decentralised execution based on mission-type orders and disciplined initiative; a
style that describes the ‘what,’ without necessarily the ‘how.’ Mission command empowers
leaders at every level by promoting initiative - allowing leaders to take advantage of fleeting
opportunities during battle. To be effective, mission command requires a clear expression of
intent by commanders so that subordinate leaders can act within that intent while still exercising
initiative.

2. Mission command must be practised and well understood, by both leaders and
subordinates, to be effective. Commanders must balance granting subordinate’s freedom of
action with the need to monitor their actions during tactical operations/activities. Mission
command principles should be reflected in all plans.

3. Successful mission command is guided by the following principles (See AJP-3.2, Land
Operations for more details):

a. Responsibility;

b. Unity of outcome;

c. Freedom of action;

d. Trust;

e. Mutual understanding.

1.1.3 The Operations Process

1. Exercising C2 takes place dynamically through the cyclical nature of the four activities of the
operations process (Figure 1-1). Those four activities are planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing. Commanders, supported by their staff, use the operations process to understand,

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visualise, and describe operations; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess
tactical operations. Commanders lead this process.

Figure 1-1. The operations process4

2. The four activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as
circumstances demand. While preparing for or executing one operation, the command plans
(or at least refines plans) for branches and sequels to the current operation or for the next
operation. Preparation is also continuous whenever a command is not executing an operation.
Preparing for a specific operation usually starts with the receipt of a warning order (WNGO),
always overlaps with planning, and (for some subordinate units) continues through execution.
Likewise, assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. Subordinate units
within the same command may be in different stages of the operations process at any given
time (see ATP-3.2.2 for more information on the operations process). Tactical planning is
harmonized with the higher level planning process.

1.1.4 The Manoeuvrist Approach

1. The manoeuvrist approach is the NATO-preferred approach to land operations. The concept
is an indirect approach, which seeks to gain a position of psychological advantage over the
adversary: achieving objectives while avoiding direct confrontation. In this regard, commanders
seek to hit the adversary where they do not expect it or are particularly vulnerable. The effect
of this approach, commanders can impair the capabilities of the adversary with comparatively
little effort. Another element of this indirect action is that it can deprive the adversary of external
support as well as demoralize them.

2. The aim of the manoeuvrist approach is to seize, retain, or regain the initiative and to attack
the adversary’s will and cohesion. Both aims and their respective elements are interrelated. For
more details on the manoeuvrist approach see ATP 3.2.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Operations.

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4 Some Nations call this the “Battle Procedure Model.”

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1.1.5 The Joint Functions

1. The joint functions are a framework of related capabilities and activities that assist
commanders to integrate, synchronise, and direct various activities. By considering these
functions, commanders ensure that they are addressing all necessary considerations for land
operations in their planning and execution.

2. The functions are: C2, intelligence, manoeuvre, fires, information, civil-military cooperation
(CIMIC), sustainment; and force protection. For more details see AJP 3.2 and ATP 3.2.1.

1.1.6 Risk and Risk Management

1. Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.5 Land forces face internal and external factors
and influences which make it uncertain whether, and when, they will be able to achieve their
objectives. The effect of uncertainty is a deviation from the expected. It can be positive,
negative, or both, and can address, create, or result in opportunities and threats.

2. Risk management is defined as coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation’s

actions to balance risk controls with mission benefits.6 The risk management process is an
iterative process applied throughout the operations process, consisting of the steps:
establishing the context, risk assessment (sub-steps: risk identification, risk assessment and
risk evaluation) and risk treatment. The risk management process is detailed in SRD APP-28.1,
Risk Management.

3. Force protection7 deals with threats only, and not every threat it deals with is a risk. A threat
turns into a negative risk only when the consequences impact on the achievement of the
objective(s).

1.2 PLANNING, PLANS, AND ORDERS

1.2.1 Planning

1. Planning includes the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired
future, and devising effective ways to achieve that future. It includes translating the
commander’s visualisation into a specific course of action (COA) for preparation and execution.
The goal of planning is to synchronise the actions of forces in time, space, and purpose to
achieve objectives. Effective planning incorporates the philosophy of mission command, the
manoeuvrist approach, and the joint functions (see AJP 3.2 and ATP 3.2.1 for more
information).

2. The planning process is triggered by a new mission or by initiative of the commander, or

because a change in the situation calls for action.

—————
5 This term is a new term and definition and has been processed for NATO Agreed status via terminology tracking file 2016-
0321.
6 This term is a new term and definition and has been processed for NATO Agreed status via terminology tracking file 2011-

1602.
7 All measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, and operations to any threat and in

all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force (NATO Term, 2004-06-22).

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3. A fundamental change in the situation may necessitate the commander to deviate from the
mission on the commander’s own initiative. Such a fundamental change has occurred if the
prerequisites that the mission is based on have ceased to exist or the mission is no longer
feasible. If any such change in the situation requires swift action and commanders cannot
obtain or afford to wait for their 1-up8 commander's decision, they will exercise initiative and
depart from their mission (see Chapter 5 for more on rapid planning after a fundamental
change). However, if departing from the mission becomes necessary, friendly action will still
have to be based on the 1-up commander's intent. In any such case, 1-up commanders will
have to be promptly informed accordingly as soon as contact is re-established.

4. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not end with
the production of an operation plan (OPLAN) or the subsequent operation order (OPORD).
Throughout preparation and execution, the OPORD is continuously refined as the situation
changes. Through assessment, subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is
working, what is not working, and how to improve the situation. In case of a fundamental
change, a new plan needs to be developed.

5. Planning can be a detailed, systematic analysis and evaluation of all factors relating to an
operation. It can provide insight into what might occur in order to produce an optimum COA for
mission accomplishment. This type of detailed planning anticipates future conditions and
events. Alternatively, planning may be hasty, considering only critical aspects to reach an
acceptable COA quickly in the face of adversary actions. In this case, the commander and staff
usually respond to existing conditions and quickly devise a plan for immediate or near-future
execution.

6. Effective planning requires a sensitive awareness and judicious use of time. Personnel must
attempt to complete plans as quickly as possible so as to maximize subordinate commanders’
planning time. The staff should use frequent WNGOs to facilitate parallel planning with
subordinates.

—————
8 1-up commander or headquarters refers to a unit’s immediate higher headquarters in the chain of command. A 2-up commander
refers to the headquarters two levels up from the referenced commander.

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7. Effective planning maintains awareness of and utilizes planning horizons. At all levels there
are three planning horizons: short term, mid term and long term (see Figure 1-2). A planning
horizon is a timeframe commanders use to focus their organizations’ planning efforts to shape
future events. Planning horizons are relative to each planning level. For example, at the tactical
level, long-term planning may consist of planning for an end-of-tour end-state representing the
progress made towards the operational objectives. The same timeframe at the strategic level
would fall with the mid- or short-term planning horizon.

Figure 1-2. Planning horizons

1.2.2 Plans and orders

1. A plan/order is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter. The
measure of a good plan/order is not whether execution transpires as foreseen but whether it
facilitates effective action and maximizes opportunities in the face of unforeseen events. Plans
and orders should foster initiative, which is promoted by the application of mission command.

2. Plans and orders vary in the scope, complexity, and length of time they address. Ideally,
commanders and staffs develop an OPLAN9 well in advance of execution. The OPORD10 is the
means by which OPLAN is directed for execution. Usually planning results in a written OPORD
complete with attachments. Sometimes planning produces brief fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
(see ATP-3.2.2 for NATO plans and orders formats).

—————
9 An operation plan (OPLAN) is a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out, simultaneously or in
succession. It is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting
plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An
OPLAN may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order (NATO agreed). The
OPLAN has the same structure and format as the CONOPS but includes more detail and further particulars.
10 An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of coordinating the execution

of an operation (NATO agreed).

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1.2.3 Mission-Type Orders

1. Mission command demands commanders, and their staffs, use mission-type orders. A
mission-type order is an order issued to a subordinate unit that indicates the mission to be
accomplished without specifying how it is to be done (NATO agreed). Mission-type orders
should be formulated using the mission statement structure and the NATO five-paragraph order
format. At all times orders should be as brief and simple as the situation permits (see NATO
standardization agreement (STANAG) 2287, Task Verbs for use in Planning and the
Dissemination of Orders for more information on mission statement structure). Figure 1-3
illustrates mission statement structure. A simple, concise order reduces confusion and saves
time, both of which contribute to mission success.

Figure 1-3. Mission statement structure

2. Properly drafted mission-type orders provide subordinates the maximum freedom of action
in determining how to best accomplish their missions. They still require lateral coordination
between formations/units and vertical coordination within the chain of command.

3. Mission-type orders emphasize the mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations

(CONOPS), task organization, and subordinates’ mission/task, while providing only essential
coordinating instructions (see ATP-112 for further details). The outcome within the
commander’s intent guides subordinates’ initiative. Effective orders limit the number of activities
explicitly assigned to subordinates. They provide just enough detail to coordinate the activities
of the force.

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1.3 TACTICAL PLANNING AND PROCESS OVERVIEW

1.3.1 General

1. Tactical planning for land forces is an iterative approach to planning tactical operations
consisting of seven steps. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially.
However, they may revisit steps in any iterative fashion, as they learn more about the situation
before producing the plan and/or order.

2. Throughout tactical planning, the staff updates the staff estimates and performs intelligence
preparation of the operating environment (IPOE).

3. Tactical planning is a cyclic dynamic process which interrelates with other processes such
as IPOE, targeting, risk management, etc. Tactical planning integrates the eight joint functions
(C2, intelligence, fires, manoeuvre, force protection, information, sustainment, and CIMIC) into
a synchronised plan and order for execution.

4. Tactical planning includes several formal meetings and briefings between the commander
and staff to discuss, assess, and approve or alter planning efforts as they progress. However,
experience has shown that optimal planning results when the commander meets informally at
frequent intervals with the staff. Such informal interactions can improve understanding of the
situation and ensure the staff’s planning efforts adequately reflect the commander’s
visualisation of the operation.

5. Tactical planning drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders
and staffs conduct a time analysis (estimate) early in the planning process. This analysis helps
them determine what actions are required and when to ensure forces are ready and in position
before execution. This may require commanders to direct subordinates to start necessary
movements, conduct task organisation changes, begin surveillance and reconnaissance
operations, and/or execute other preparation activities before the plan is completed. WNGOs
are used for this purpose.

6. Commanders and their staffs often – but not always – exhibit similar general structure and
roles. See ATP 3.2.2. for additional information about roles and responsibilities.

1.3.2 Tactical Planning for Land Forces Overview

1. Tactical planning consists of seven steps, which can be grouped as follows (see Figure 1-4
for a visual representation of the steps of tactical planning):

a. Understanding the Situation and Mission.

(1) Step 1 – Receipt of the Mission.

(2) Step 2 – Mission Analysis.

(a) Step 2a – Order Analysis.

(b) Step 2b – Evaluation of Factors.

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b. Develop and consider COAs.

(1) Step 3 – COA Development.

(2) Step 4 – COA Analysis.

(3) Step 5 – COA Comparison.

c. Communication.

(1) Step 6 – Commander’s Decision.

(2) Step 7 – Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition.

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Figure 1-4. Tactical planning for land forces overview

2. Some steps include briefings to exchange information between commander and staff.
For exchange of information during tactical planning with subunits, WNGOs are included
in some steps. For exchange of information during tactical planning with the 1-up HQs
back-briefs are scheduled.

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1.3.3 Modifying Tactical Planning

Tactical planning can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the situation permits.
Commanders require sufficient planning time and staff support to thoroughly examine two or
more COAs and devise a fully synchronised plan and order. Completing all seven steps of
tactical planning as described in this publication can be both time and staff intensive. This
typically occurs when planning for a new mission. Once an operation is underway a commander
may alter the steps of tactical planning to fit time-constrained circumstances. In time-
constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation, update their visualisation, and direct
the staff to perform only those tactical planning activities that aid their decision-making process.
In time-constrained situations, commanders can rely on the rapid decision-making and
synchronisation process (See chapter 5 and ATP-3.2.2).

1.3.4 Continuous Processes Occurring Throughout the Planning Process

Figure 1-5 provides an overview map of the APP-28 planning process. It highlights the
continuous nature of the planning process, the key products pulled through to orders, and the
key guidance and briefing events of the process.

Figure 1-5. APP-28 continuous processes map

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CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION

AND MISSION
2.1 RECEIPT OF MISSION

2.1.1 General

1. Commanders often prepare for tactical planning upon receipt of a new mission or when the
situation changes. Tactical planning is not developed in isolation but within the context of the
1-up HQs’ plans/orders. Commanders and staffs often begin tactical planning in the absence
of a complete and approved 1-up HQs’ OPORD. In these instances, the headquarters prepares
a new planning effort based on a WNGO. The purpose of step 1 is to start necessary
preparations for planning, inform personnel and units, and to determine what information is
available and what needs to be obtained. Figure 2-1 shows the key inputs, activities, and
outputs of this step.

Figure 2-1. Step 1–Receipt of the Mission

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2. Integration of risk management. In conjunction with step 1 the command begins a risk
management process. The command considers its standard operating procedure/instruction
(SOP/SOI) on risk management in relation to the mission variables. In order to align the risk
management process with the staff planning timeline the risk management team and level of
ambition of the risk management as such may be tailored to the specific organization and
mission.

2.1.2 Alert the Staff and Other Key Participants

As soon as a command receives a new mission (or when the commander directs changes
based on evolving situations), the staff is alerted to the pending planning requirement.
Command standing operating procedures/Instructions (SOPs/SOIs) should identify members
of the staff who participate in planning. Depending on the situation, the HQs also notifies other
military, civilian, and host-nation organizations of pending planning events.

2.1.3 Prepare for Planning

1. Once notified of the new planning requirement, the staff prepares for mission analysis by
gathering the necessary tools. These tools include but are not limited to:

a. Current staff estimates;

b. 1-up HQs’ and other organizations’ intelligence and assessment products;

c. All documents related to the mission and area of responsibility (AOR) including 1-up HQs’
WNGOs, OPLANs and OPORDs, maps and terrain products, and operations graphics;

d. Estimates and products of other military and civilian agencies and organizations;

e. SOP/SOIs from own and 1-up HQs;

f. Appropriate NATO doctrine publications. See Annex A for listings.

2. Staff officers carefully review the reference sections of the 1-up HQs’ OPLANs and OPORDs
(located before paragraph 1 [Situation]) to identify documents related to the upcoming
operation.

2.1.4 Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

Usually, the IPOE process is already underway by this step but there may be rare
circumstances in which it may need to be initiated at this time. IPOE is an elaborate, time-
consuming process during which multiple products and overlays have to be produced.
Therefore, it is essential to provide IPOE products to the commander, the rest of the staff, and
subordinate units not later than the end of Step 2 (Mission Analysis). This enables subordinate
HQs to receive, analyse, and present the products and conclusions of the 1-up HQ earlier in
the process. This shortens the time they need to conduct their area evaluation and actor
evaluation, which considerably shortens the time needed for planning. The description and
evaluation of the OE provides tailored products and conclusions about the terrain (Combined
Obstacle Overlay [COO], Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay [MCOO] etc.) and weather
(weather forecast and matrix). The evaluation of actors in the OE provides tailored information
about organisation, doctrine, and vulnerabilities of adversaries and enemies.

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2.1.5 Update Staff Estimates

1. Effective plans hinge on accurate and current information. Upon receipt of mission, each
section begins to build upon its staff estimates during the first planning. A staff estimate11 is a
continuous assessment of the current situation. The staff estimate is used to determine if the
operation is going according to commander’s intent and planning, and whether adjustments
need to be made. Each staff element maintains a staff estimate, focused on their function. Staff
estimates represent the analysis and expert opinion of each staff element. Staff estimates exist
to assist commanders in the exercise of mission command. It is continuously updated during
the entire operations process. The staff constantly considers the effects of new information and
updates the following:

a. facts;

b. assumptions;

c. adversary,12 terrain and weather, troops and support, time, information environment, and
civil considerations;

d. conclusions and recommendations.

2. Staff estimates always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning,
commanders use these recommendations to select feasible, acceptable, complete, exclusive,
and suitable COAs for further analysis. During preparation and execution, commanders use
recommendations from planning estimates in decision-making.

2.1.6 Estimate Mission Timelines

1. Preliminary timelines are determined at this stage and are derived from the 1-up HQ order.
These estimates are initial planning only and are process specific. Ensure that planners do not
get ahead of actual mission analysis.

2. All timings mentioned in the 1-up HQ order should be listed to determine the time available
and using the 1/3 – 2/313 rule to determine the time of the Issue of Order.

3. Studying the time frame often includes early estimates of the mission’s duration,
environmental conditions under which it will occur (season, day/night duration, moon phases),
critical dates (historical commemorations, religious festivals, etc.), and determining any
possible restraints that these factors may place on operations. The result is an early
assessment of the conditions under which the mission will take place, any limitations that will
impact the accomplishment of the mission, and a timeline of key activities. This preliminary
timeline serves to orient the staff’s efforts along currently known mission benchmarks.

—————
11 Staff estimates are sometimes referred to as ‘running estimates.’
12 Adversary is defined as “an individual, group, or entity whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties
and against which legal coercive political, military, or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted” (NATO agreed).
Enemy – “An individual or group, entity or state actor whose actions are hostile and against which the legal use of armed
force is authorized” (NATO agreed).
13 The 1/3 – 2/3 planning rule. As a rule, commanders utilize one third of the time available to do their own planning and allocate

the remaining two-thirds to their subordinate commanders.

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2.1.7 Determine Staff Planning Timelines

1. During receipt of mission, the commander and staff prepare an initial staff planning timeline
estimating resources available to plan, prepare, and begin execution of an operation. These
estimates are initial planning only, based on the 1-up HQ order, and are process specific.

2. Commanders and staff consider:

a. complexity of the mission;

b. time available to plan, prepare, and execute the mission for both HQs in the planning
process;

c. which outside agencies and organisations to contact and incorporate into the planning
process;

d. The staff’s and the commander’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.

3. Time, more than any other factor, determines the detail to which the commander and staff
can plan. The commander and staff balance the desire for detailed planning against the need
for timely action. The commander issues guidance, by making use of WNGOs, to subordinate
formations/units as early as possible to provide them with the maximum amount of time possible
to conduct their own planning and preparation.

4. Based on the commander’s initial allocation of time, the chief of staff (COS)14 develops a
staff planning timeline that outlines how long the HQs can spend on each step of tactical
planning. The staff planning timeline indicates what and when products are due, who is
responsible for them, and who receives them. It serves as a benchmark for the commander
and staff throughout tactical planning.

2.1.8 Conduct Receipt of Mission Meeting (optional)

In order to highlight information that is already available for tactical planning, the staff may
decide to have a quick meeting15 to summarise what is available and where to find it. The
purpose is to consolidate the information position and create a staff-wide understanding of that
position at the start of planning. The intent is not to present the complete content of all staff
estimates and IPOE products but only the most recent and relevant changes. In this way, the
staff can determine what information is still missing and start to identify information
requirements.

2.1.9 Issue Initial Planning Guidance

Having determined the time available and the scope and scale of the planning effort, the
commander may decide to issue initial guidance, which includes the mission and the 1-up HQs’
objective. These estimates are initial planning only, based on the 1-up HQ order, and are
process specific. Although brief, the initial guidance includes, but is not limited to:

—————
14
Note that COS is used as a generic term throughout the manual to depict an officer chosen to lead the staff; some countries
may use the term executive officer (XO) instead.
15 Alternatively, the (optional) meeting may be conducted as a receipt of mission brief (see Annex E for optional format).

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a. the mission (as given);

b. mission timeline and staff planning timelines;

c. methods to abbreviate the tactical planning, if required;

d. necessary coordination (collaborative and parallel planning) to include exchange of

liaison officers;

e. presence/role of the commander;

f. information requirements and initial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

guidance/tasks;

g. areas to avoid wasting time and effort of the staff;

h. authorized movements and initiation of intelligence collection;

i. additional staff tasks.

2.1.10 Formulate and Issue Warning Order

The last activity in Step 1 (Receipt of Mission) is to issue a WNGO to subordinate and
supporting units. The WNGO follows the format in ATP-3.2.2.2. It should include at a minimum:
upcoming type of mission based on purpose and objective (e.g., offensive, defensive, or
stability), the general location of the operation, the initial timeline, preliminary movements,
intelligence collection and first ISR to be initiated, attachments and detachments, any
movement to be initiated, time and location for issue of the order, and reaction time for
subordinate units.

2.2 STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

2.2.1 General

1. Tactical planning continues with Step 2 (Mission Analysis), which is a logical process for
extracting and deducing from a superior's orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission (NATO
agreed). Commanders (supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent
commanders and by other partners) gather, analyse, and synthesize information to orient
themselves to the current conditions of the operating environment. The purpose of Step 2 is to
understand the situation, the higher up’s intent, and the formation’s/unit’s mission within the
overall operation. The commander develops their own mission statement, which is a clear,
concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. A subordinate commander only
deviates from the given mission in exceptional circumstances (i.e., the situation develops such
that the original mission is no longer valid or feasible). Step 2 is divided into two substeps, 2a:
Orders Analysis and 2b: Evaluation of Factors.

2. Integration of risk management. In conjunction with Step 2 the command establishes the
risk context and initiates risk identification and risk analysis. How this fits exactly in the
command’s conduct of step 2a and 2b depends on the level of the command, who participates
in step 2a, and identified roles & responsibilities for risk management. Establishing the risk
context, risk identification and risk analysis are therefore described in full in step 2b, whereas

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step 2a only describes the minimum requirement on the commander: the identification of risk
and the risk attitude.

2.3 SUBSTEP 2A: ORDERS ANALYSIS

2.3.1 General

Figure 2-2 summarises the inputs, activities, and outputs of Step 2a.

Figure 2-2. Step 2a–Orders Analysis

The purpose of sub-step 2a is to understand the assigned mission. Order analysis helps
commanders (supported by selected staff) identify what the command must accomplish, when
and where the tasks must be performed, and most importantly why (the purpose of the
operation). The staff normally starts sub-step 2b (Evaluation of Factors), in concurrence with
sub-step 2a, to assess the influence of these factors on accomplishment of the mission. At the

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end of sub-step 2a, the commander briefs the information and the conclusions to guide the staff
analysis. Sub-step 2a incorporates the activities listed in Figure 2-2.

2.3.2 Analyse the 1-up Commander’s Order

1. A commander and staff (i.e., S-3 or G-3) thoroughly analyse the 1-up HQs’ plan or order.
First, the commander determines how their formation/unit, by task and purpose, contributes to
the mission; commander’s intent, and CONOPs of the 1-up HQs in relation to own forces, time
and space, information, and risks to the mission.

2. A key aspect of Step 2 (Mission Analysis) is identifying what the command must do to meet
the 1-up commander’s intent. Commanders and staffs should consider the following to help
determine how to accomplish the mission:

a. analyse the 2-up commander’s intent;

b. analyse the 1-up commander’s mission, intent, and concept of the operation:

(1) analyse the command’s role in the overall plan;

(2) analyse the mission of each adjacent command and their relationship to the 1-up
HQs’ plan;

c. analyse the initial products of IPOE and identified relevant actors;

d. area of interest (AOI), including the AOR and area of intelligence responsibility.

3. Determine Specified and Implied Tasks.

a. The commander and (selected) staff analyse the 1-up HQs’ order and the 1-up
commander’s guidance to determine their specified and implied tasks. In the context of an
operation, a task is a clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual
or organisation that must be accomplished, as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. The
“what” of a mission statement is always a task. From the list of specified and implied tasks,
the staff determines essential task(s) for inclusion in the recommended mission statement.

b. A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its 1-up HQs. The specified
task is usually found in paragraph 3 of the 1-up HQs’ plan (or order) and may also be found
in paragraphs 4 and 5. Some specified tasks may be listed in annexes and overlays. They
may also be assigned verbally during collaborative planning sessions or in directives from
the 1-up commander.

c. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission
but is not stated in the 1-up HQs’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis
of the 1-up HQs’ plan (or order), the adversary situation, the terrain, and civil considerations.
Additionally, an analysis of doctrinal requirements for each specified task might reveal
implied tasks.

d. When analysing the 1-up plan (or order) for specified and implied tasks, the staff should
also identify any ‘be-prepared’ or ‘on-order’ type missions. A be-prepared mission is a
mission assigned to a unit and that may be executed depending on the result of its previous
action (NATO agreed). Generally a contingency mission, commanders execute it because

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something planned has or has not been successful. In planning priorities, commanders plan
a be-prepared mission after any on-order mission. An on-order mission is a mission to be
executed at an unspecified time in the future when the order is given (NATO agreed). A unit
with an on-order mission is a committed force.

e. Commanders visualise task execution in a concept sketch; however, they may not know
the exact time or place of execution. This concept sketch lays the foundation for the more
detailed CONOPs completed in Step 3 (Course of Action Development).

4. Determine Essential Tasks:

a. Once the commander and selected staff have identified all specified and implied tasks,
they need to understand each task’s requirements and purpose. The commander and
selected staff then identifies the essential task(s). An essential task is a specified or implied
task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential task(s) are always included
in the unit’s mission statement.

5. Determine Constraints, Restraints, and Caveats:

a. The commander and the staff identify any constraints and restraints (both of which are
types of limitations) that have been imposed on them by the 1-up commander (caveats, rules
of engagement [ROEs, red cards, etc.). A constraint is a limit, restriction, or control on an
action from a 1-up command. A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a 1-
up command that prohibits an action. As such, both restrict a commander’s freedom of
action.

b. Constraints and restraints are found in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes
to the order may also include constraints/restraints. The operation overlay, for example, may
contain a restrictive fire line or a no fire area. Constraints and restraints may also be issued
verbally, in WNGOs, or in policy memoranda.

c. The commander and staff should coordinate with the legal advisor for a legal review of
perceived or obvious constraints, restraints, or limitations in the OPLAN, OPORD, or related
documents.

d. Additionally, in NATO operations, a caveat is any limitation, restriction, or constraint by a

nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or
otherwise available to NATO that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ
these assets fully in line with the approved OPLAN. A caveat may apply inter alia to freedom
of movement within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the approved rules
of engagement (NATO agreed).

6. Identify Facts and Develop Assumptions:

a. Plans and orders are based on facts and assumptions. Commanders and staffs gather
facts and develop assumptions as they build their plan. A fact is a statement of information
thought to be true at the time. Facts concerning the mission, variables, adversary, terrain
and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations serve as
the basis for developing situational understanding for continued planning.

b. An assumption is a (in planning) supposition on the current situation and/or the future
course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the COA (NATO

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agreed). An assumption can be a pre-supposition on the future course of events, either or

both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof which are necessary to enable the
commander in the planning process to complete an estimate of the situation and make a
COA decision. In the absence of facts, the commander and staff consider assumptions from
their 1-up HQs. They then develop their own assumptions necessary for continued planning.

c. Making assumptions requires commanders and staffs to continually attempt to replace

those assumptions with facts. The commander and staff should list and review the key
assumptions on which fundamental judgments rest throughout the tactical planning. Re-
checking assumptions is valuable at any time during the operations process prior to
rendering judgments and making decisions.

7. Identify Risks and Risk Attitude:

a. The commander (supported by selected staff) appreciates the risk to the mission of the
command in the context of the 1-up commander’s order; potential deviations from the 1-up
commander’s order (i.e. the expected) that could affect accomplishing the essential task(s).
Both positive and negative effects, i.e. opportunities and threats, are identified. This will
reveal what that commander wants to be aware of and/or what causes concern. That informs
the development of the CCIR and the risk classification system, and is taken to the order
analysis brief (OAB).

b. Risk attitude is the specified amount and type of risk that the organization may or may
not take, relative to objectives. The commander (supported by selected staff) considers what
risk is unacceptable and what risk is conditionally acceptable. This is captured in a risk
attitude matrix for opportunities and for threats.16 The risk attitude matrix will be the tool to
focus efforts, prioritize which plans shall be worked on17 and when to execute these as risk
treatments. Establishing the risk attitude (matrix) is explained in full in SRD 28.1.

c. The risk attitude matrix can only be produced once the risk classification system is
established, as it depends on the definitions for likelihood and impact. Hence, in step 2a the
commander’s risk attitude may not yet be captured in a matrix. If so, the matrix is established
following step 2b. besides, the risk attitude is usually not revealed in the OAB in order not to
influence the staff conducting step 2b.

8. Establish and/or Verify ‘Go/No Go’ and Abort Criteria

Criteria to stop the upcoming mission before it is even started will be called NO-GO criteria.
GO criteria. GO criteria are used to describe conditions to start an operation or a planned
and/or prepared contingency plan to the upcoming operation. Similarly, abort criteria are
criteria to terminate a mission for any reason other than adversary action. It may occur at
any point after the beginning of the mission and prior to its completion (NATO agreed).

9. Identify Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

Orders analysis identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decision-
making during preparation and execution. During order analysis, the commander identifies
information requirements. Commander and staff determine the need to request clarification
—————
16 Note that the commander’s risk attitude may change with the phase of the operation.
17 These could be functional plans, branch plans, or contingency plans.

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by 1-up command or submit requests for information (RFIs). Some information requirements
are of such importance to the commander that they become a commander’s critical
information requirement (CCIR). Information concerning areas that are either critical to the
success of the mission or represent a critical threat are expressed as CCIR. CCIRs cover all
aspects of the commander’s concern including friendly force information requirements
(FFIRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI),18 and the priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs). For more detail see paragraph 2.6.3.

2.3.3 Formulate Commander’s Initial Intent

1. Based on their understanding of the situation and the mission, commanders develop, and
may issue, their initial commander’s intent.

2. The commander’s intent is the commander’s clear and concise expression of what the force
must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission, in particular
with respect to the adversary and the environment. It is a succinct description of the
commander’s visualization of the entire operation and what the commander wants to
accomplish. The commander will communicate the intent to the staff and subordinate
commands ensuring a common understanding. The commander’s intent must be easy to
remember and clearly understood by the leaders two echelons lower in the chain of command.
The shorter the commander’s intent the better it serves these purposes.

3. While there is no specified format for the commander’s intent, a generally accepted
construct includes the purpose and objective(s).

a. Purpose. The purpose explains how the military actions contribute to achieving 1-up level
objectives and attaining the end state.19 The purpose helps the force pursue the mission
without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned and it enables
exploitation when the execution unfolds more favourably than expected. Thus, if an
unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders understand the purpose of the
forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the 1-up
commander’s intent.

b. Objective(s). In operations, an objective is a clearly defined and attainable goal for a

military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary’s force or
capability, or achieving another desired outcome that is essential to the commander’s plan
and towards which the operation is directed.20 Objective(s) describe what the commander is
(tasked) to achieve regarding military conditions that define mission success. The
commander’s intent describes these conditions – also referred to as the desired outcome –

—————
18 Some nations no longer recognize EEFI as a component of CCIR in their doctrine.
19
The political-strategic statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation to be attained at the end of a
strategic engagement (NATO agreed, 2019-04-11).
20 NATO agreed, 2006-01-06.

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as an integral part of the higher command’s objective(s) and describes how their own
objective(s) contribute to attaining those.

Figure 2-3. Example of a commander’s intent at the lower tactical levels

4. Commanders may visualize their objective(s) in a schematic to promote greater

understanding. This visualization may be broad or detailed depending on the situation. It
reflects crucial elements of the operation.

5. The commander formulates the initial intent in step 2a. The commander may choose to
disseminate the initial intent prior to the completion of step 2b, to guide staff efforts. Following
step 2b, the commander produces and disseminates the intent, beginning the subsequent
development of the courses of action through the commander’s planning guidance.

2.3.4 Develop a Mission Statement

1. Based on the mission and tasks given by the 1-up command and the commander’s initial
intent, the commander develops the mission statement of the own formation/unit. It is a clear,
concise sentence which provides the essential task(s) (what is to be completed) and the
purpose (the reason why) as per mission statement structure. The mission task verb will have
an object of the action specified (e.g. occupy Hill 123). The mission statement may also include
any limitations (i.e. the time by which the mission must be completed or the boundaries within
which it must occur.21 More detail can be found in ATP-112.

2. Once the mission statement is finalized, commanders give guidance for the continuation of
mission analysis. A technique is for the commander to develop a list of questions to focus the
staff in its evaluation of factors.

2.3.5 Update Commander’s Planning Guidance

1. Following the order analysis, the commander updates the initial planning guidance provided
at the end of step 1. At this stage, additional guidance may be provided to convey the essence
of the commander’s visualisation.22

2. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning
guidance by ensuring the staff understands the broad outline of their visualisation while allowing
—————
21
Including these limitations, if necessary, would generate a concise sentence that states who (the unit), what (the task or tasks),
where (location), when (either the critical time or on order), and why (the purpose of the operation).
22 For more information on commander’s visualisation, refer to Annex G.

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the latitude necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a
detailed CONOPS without dictating the specifics of the final plan.

3. The table below (Table 2-1) lists examples of topics that may be included in the
commander’s planning guidance. This list is not intended to meet the needs of all situations nor
be all-inclusive. Providing guidance by joint function is also not the only method a commander
may use. Commanders should tailor planning guidance to meet specific needs based on the
situation and mission rather than address each item. Each item does not always fit neatly into
a particular joint function as it may be shared by more than one. For example, although ROEs
fall under the joint function command and control, ROEs impact on all joint functions.

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Table 2-1. Examples of topics for commander’s planning guidance

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4. Commanders issue the updated planning guidance at the end of step 2A. They continue to
review and update their guidance throughout the planning effort. Usual moments are
following:

a. mission analysis brief (e.g. update of guidance for COA development and/or evaluation);

b. COA development / COA brief (e.g. update of guidance for improvement of COA);

c. COA decision brief / decision (e.g. update of guidance for completion of the plan).

5. Specific guidance for COA development. The order analysis and regular planning
guidance provide a bandwidth for COA that will (and will not) be acceptable to the commander.
By providing such bandwidth, the commander makes best use of the creativity within the staff.
There may, however, be reasons for the commander to be more specific and include COA(s)
in the planning guidance that the commander wants the staff to develop. Out of many possible
reasons, the usual one would be to make best use of the available time (see also Chapter 5).

6. Evaluation criteria. The commander’s visualisation will have revealed possible COA
evaluation criteria. Whether these will be included in the planning guidance at this stage as
initial evaluation criteria is up to the commander. If initial evaluation criteria are provided, they
may be refined at later points in the planning process. Evaluation criteria address factors
affecting mission success. They are ‘standards’ the commander and staff will later use to
measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to others. Evaluation
criteria are determined and prioritized by the commander; they must be clearly defined and
understood by all staff members. Although evaluation criteria depend on the mission, the
following are typically considered (not an all-inclusive list):

a. likelihood of mission success (effective force employment);

b. efficient force employment;

c. achieving a balance between acceptable risk and mission accomplishment;

d. losses to be expected;

e. desired and possible undesired effects, particularly in the information environment;

f. other criteria may include:

(1) the element of surprise;

(2) the availability and/or establishment of reserves;

(3) initiative;

(4) coordination required;

(5) credibility;

(6) impartiality;

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(7) transparency;

(8) freedom of action.

7. The commander’s evaluation criteria serve COA comparison in step 5, whereas the planning
guidance serves to direct COA development and analysis in step 3 and 4. If the commander
provides (initial) evaluation criteria at this stage, as part of the updated planning guidance,
these will implicitly direct COA development and analysis in step 3 and 4 and may willingly, or
unwillingly, limit creativity and staff output. Whether or not to include the evaluation criteria will
therefore depend on the commander’s evaluation of the use of the staff—command-pull or staff-
push. In either case, the commander 1-up should ensure the planning guidance is explicit rather
than implicit.

2.3.6 Prepare and Deliver the Order Analysis Briefing

The outcome of the order analysis provides focus to step 2b, performed by the staff. In order
to create a shared understanding and common effort, the outcome of the analysis and planning
guidance is delivered to the staff upon completion by means of the Orders Analysis Brief. See
Annex E for the optional format.

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2.4 SUBSTEP 2B: EVALUATION OF FACTORS

Figure 2-4 summarises the inputs, activities, and outputs of step 2b.

Figure 2-4. Substep 2b:Evaluation of factors

2.4.1 General

In substep 2b, the staff analyses the situation in relation to the formation’s/unit’s mission. As
noted previously, the staff normally conducts this substep concurrently – as a parallel effort –
with substep 2a, which is performed by the commander and selected staff. It includes the
following activities:

a. analyse specific parts of the orders and annexes;

b. continue IPOE;

c. review troops and support available;

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d. information environment;

e. review and update Mission Timeline and Staff Planning Timeline;

f. establish risk context and begin risk assessment;

g. develop CCIRs;

h. develop the initial intelligence collection plan (ICP);

i. update additional commander’s planning guidance (CPG);

j. develop and issue a WNGO;

k. conduct a commander’s initial back brief.

2.4.2 Analyse Specific Parts of the Order and Annexes

The staff or a dedicated plans group, such dependant on the level of the command, performs
and order analysis similar to the commander in step 2a. Within that, the staff conducts an order
analysis for each of the specific fields of expertise on the main text and assigned annexes of
the 1-up order. This enables the staff to complete the results of the order analysis with The
Orders Analysis briefing provided by the commander is augmented with additional information
found in the annexes regarding:

a. specified, implied, and essential task(s);

b. constraints and restraints;

c. facts and assumptions;

d. ‘Go/No-go’ and ‘abort criteria’ for the operation;

e. risks and critical points;

f. CCIRs.

2.4.3 Continue Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

1. IPOE is the systematic process of analysing the adversary, terrain, weather and civil
considerations in an AOI to determine their (likely) effects on operations. Oftentimes, IPOE has
already started by (or even before) Step 1 (Receipt of Mission). However, sometimes IPOE
begins in earnest during mission analysis and continues through the production of the
operations order. IPOE identifies critical gaps in the commander’s knowledge of the operating
environment. Its products enable the commander to assess facts about he environment and
make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces may interact.23

—————
23 AIntP-17, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment, includes a detailed discussion of IPOE. The G-2/S-2
may modify the IPOE as required when planning operations at the tactical level.

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2. Part of IPOE could be determining adversary centres of gravity (COGs). A COG is the
primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action, or will to fight.
At the tactical level, it is normally a physical strength. It is the entity representing the primary
physical strength an actor depends on to carry out its (assumed) intent and achieve its
(assumed) objectives.24 Commanders and their staff analyse the COG using the concepts of
critical capabilities and critical requirements to end up at the critical vulnerabilities. From there,
conclusions can be drawn that support COA development, risk management, and further
planning efforts. For more detail and an example COG analysis tool, see Annex G.

3. The intelligence staff use IPOE to complete the intelligence estimate and develop detailed
adversary course of action (ACOA) models that are used by the commander and staff to
develop friendly COAs. In this regard, the commander and staff analyse these ACOAs,
compare them, and use them to develop friendly COAs. Other essential IPOE products include,
but are not limited to, the COO, the modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO), a list of
PIRs, a list of high-value targets, civil considerations, unrefined event overlays, and if possible,
an initial collection plan. Based on the continued IPOE, the risk classification system is updated
as well.

4. The operating environment is a composite of three entwined sub-environments:

a. the human environment is the entirety of audiences, actors, adversaries, and enemies
with their beliefs, values, interests, and aims, and it encompasses all forms of interaction
between them;

b. the physical environment is the sub-surface, surface, airspace, and space areas where
all physical activities take place, and where actors, adversaries, and enemies live, including
all physical objects and infrastructure that support them;

c. the information environment is all forms of storage and transmission of analogue and
digital data and information. It includes information security, and all supporting
communication and information systems and processes.

5. Civil Considerations:

a. General: In analysing civil considerations, one should consider:

(1) the situation, behaviour, and attitude of the population;

(2) the type, size, and condition of critical infrastructure, including sensitive areas;

(3) the situation, capabilities, and level of cooperation of civilian organisations;25

(4) other factors in the civil environment that may affect the conduct of friendly operations
(such as upcoming elections or religious/national holidays).

b. The situation, behavior, and attitude of the population should be analysed in terms of their
implications for the conduct of friendly operations and vice versa. The following factors, in
—————
24
AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations.
25 These include international organisations (IOs), governmental organisations (GOs), and nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs).

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particular, should be assessed (if required in consideration of the relevant factors of the
ASCOPE26/PMESII27 models):28

(1) general living conditions (supply with drinking water, staple foods, electric power,
housing and accommodation, hygiene and health care);

(2) the humanitarian situation (e.g. internally displaced persons, refugees, and
evacuees);

(3) the political and legal context/public affairs (for example, political parties, panels,
political leaders and their influence, degree of functioning government and administrative
bodies, the attitudes of individuals and groups towards the armed forces of the troop-
contributing nations);

(4) cultural parameters (for example, ethnic, religious, cultural, and historical
particularities). Depending on the operation, it will be essential to highlight opposing ethnic
group’s areas through a dedicated graphic map layer. It will facilitate a better
understanding on an ethnic group’s interactions and therefore helps to prevent any
situation worsening;

(5) economic circumstances (efficiency of the industry, trade, agriculture, degree of self-
sufficiency, type, and scope of possible host nation support).

(6) civilian mobility areas/corridors. This includes routine movement as well as for
refugees/displaced people/evacuees as these may interfere with tactical mobility
corridors derived from terrain/weather analysis.

c. All factors should be examined in terms of their potential interactions. Conclusions should
be drawn about how to accomplish the mission and how to minimize undesirable effects.

d. Critical infrastructure comprises both installations that may represent a threat to the
population or to the friendly force, and organisations and facilities which are indispensable
to ensure supplies to the population, which are of particular importance for the conduct of
operations, or which represent a source of considerable risk when comprised. Critical
infrastructure (CI) can be dual-used (civilian and military usage). CI may include nuclear
power stations, chemical industry plants, telecommunications and media facilities, logistic
facilities (e.g. storage sites, ports and harbours, cargo transhipment sites), energy supply,

—————
26 Areas, structures, capabilities, organisation, people, events.
27 Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information.
28 See AIntP-17.

The IPOE analysts can use PMESII/ASCOPE for the identification and analysis of friendly, adversary, neutral, or other actors.
Understanding the changing interactions of these actors with each other and how their relationships and interdependencies
change over time helps understand the OE.
Combining PMESII and ASCOPE into a PMESII/ASCOPE matrix helps to get an understanding of the OE centred on human
networks. PMESII provides a strategic perspective on the OE whereas the ASCOPE is focused on the tactical perspective.
The relevance of PMESII factors and characteristics will depend upon the specific situation associated with each operation.
Some of the characteristics that may be considered significant during a sustained humanitarian relief operation may receive
far less emphasis during combat operations against a single conventional adversary. Therefore, a tailored approach is
imperative for the analyst. The methodology allows for adaptation to the specific operation and situation within the OE.

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water procurement and food production facilities, civilian administrative agencies and
prisons/prisoner camps.

e. Sensitive areas, such as religious and cultural sites are of great importance for the
population. Actions by friendly forces or other actors in these areas generally generate great
emotional repercussions t hat may occasionally appear irrational and whose consequences
are often difficult to foresee. This should be taken into account when planning and
conducting operations. These areas often need protecting by friendly forces, which ties down
troops and assets.

f. The capabilities and intentions of international, governmental, and non-governmental

organizations should be assessed. Opportunities for rendering mutual support should be
identified against the background of the mission. Additionally, the security situation of these
organisations should be analysed along with any restrictions.

g. The capabilities and intents of other governmental departments should be included in the
estimate in order to facilitate a holistic approach.

h. Host nation support can often be vital for operational success; however, sometimes it can
be detrimental. Before accepting support from the host nation, one should consider if it would
have undesirable effects on the population (such as rampant corruption or involvement in
black market activities).

i. Virtually all civil considerations impact and are impacted by the information environment,
as noted in paragraph 2.5.3.4d.

6. Terrain and Weather:

a. This part of the process evaluates both the terrain (including manmade features such as
infrastructure) and environmental conditions such as weather and illumination. The results
of this analysis aid in friendly and adversary COA development. One of the products of this
process is the MCOO. Terrain and weather impact information environment operations as
well, such as maintaining line of sight for radio communication, or weather/solar interference
with the electromagnetic spectrum. The detailed factors below should also account for
impacts to the information environment.

b. Identification and description of terrain and weather conditions: The analysis of terrain
should not be confined to the unit’s own AOR, rather it should include relevant terrain within
the AOI as adversary activities are not confined to friendly boundaries or coordination lines.
In identifying and describing terrain features, the staff should consider:

(1) cross-country mobility;

(2) transportation systems, including road and bridge information;

(3) vegetation type and distribution;

(4) surface drainage and configuration;

(5) soil composition;

(6) ground water;

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(7) obstacles;

(8) slope/elevation;

(9) meteorological and oceanographic conditions such as wind, temperature, humidity,

illumination, and precipitation.

c. Analysing terrain and weather impacts on operations: After identifying and describing the
terrain and weather, the staff must analyse their probable effects on the operation. The
following factors should be considered during this analysis:

(1) Observation and fields of fire. Observation refers to the ability to see (or be seen by)
the adversary either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. A “field of fire”
refers to the area that a weapon or group of weapons may effectively cover with fire from
a given position. Areas that offer good observation and fields of fire generally favour
defensive COAs. Factors that hinder observation and fields of fire include: the height and
density of vegetation and buildings; relief features such as hills and defiles; obstructions
to specific lines of sight (LOSs); target acquisition and sensor capabilities; and visibility,
precipitation, and cloud cover.

(2) Concealment and cover. Concealment refers to protection from observation or

surveillance and can be provided by features such as woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall
grass, and cultivated vegetation. Cover refers to protection from direct and indirect fire.
Cover can be provided by ditches, caves, tunnels, riverbanks, swales in the ground, shell
craters, buildings, walls, and embankments.

(3) Obstacles. Obstacles can be existing or reinforcing. Existing obstacles can be natural,
manmade, or a combination of both. These can include buildings, steep slopes, rivers,
lakes, forests, swamps, jungles, and cities. Reinforcing obstacles can be tactical or
protective. Tactical obstacles (e.g. minefields, trenches, and military wire, etc) are
obstructions emplaced by military forces and designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn,
or block the movement of an opposing force, and to cause the opposing force to commit
additional personnel, time, and equipment resources. The same means can be employed
to protect defensive positions.

(4) Key terrain. Key terrain is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords
a marked advantage to either force. Therefore, it is often selected as a decisive point and
a tactical-level or operational-level objective. (Notice: the evaluation of key terrain
becomes vital ground and resulting objectives for own and/or adversary forces is task of
G-2 and G-3).

(5) Mobility corridors. Mobility corridors are areas relatively free of obstacles where a
force can capitalize on the principles of mass and speed, but is canalized due to restrictive
terrain along both flanks.

(6) Avenues of approach. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an attacking

force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. The identification
of avenues of approach is an important consideration because all COAs that involve
maneouvre depend upon available avenues of approach.

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d. Visual Aids. The result of this analysis is the production of graphics that enable a
visualisation of the terrain and weather effects in the area of operations. There are two types
of overlays that can be used:

(1) Combined obstacle overlay. To visualize the terrain aspects, separate obstacle
overlays can be combined to form a single product known as a combined obstacle
overlay. The combined obstacle overlay can then be used as a baseline to depict areas
where mobility can be categorized as either unrestricted, restricted, or severely restricted.

(2) Modified combined obstacle overlay. In addition to the restricted and severely
restricted areas depicted on a combined obstacle overlay, avenues of approach and
mobility corridors can be added resulting in a modified combined obstacle overlay as
illustrated in Figure 2-5. This graphic appreciation consists of a series of terrain features,
effects, and obstacles that are integrated into a single display providing a comprehensive
visualisation of the OE.

Figure 2-5. Constructing a modified combined obstacle overlay

A final assessment addresses the suitability of the terrain for the mission and the conclusions
to be drawn for operations planning.

7. Information Environment:

a. The situation in the information environment includes analysing and assessing the
following aspects

(1) propaganda activities and indirect effects of actions by adversaries/other actors (e.g.
media coverage, fomenting distrust and fear);

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(2) socially relevant opinion leaders (including attitudes, behaviour, needs and
capabilities, spheres of influence, information strategies, self-image and third-party
perception, and information activities and dependencies).

(3) the defining features of the media landscape (including the role and self-perception
of national, regional, and local media; credibility, funding, ownership, dependencies,
relevance, and influence by national media);

(4) access to information and (traditionally) preferred sources of information;

(5) flow of information, opinion, and decision-making processes; this includes associated
C2 systems (technical and social systems).

(6) degree of freedom of opinion;

(7) facts and topics of general or regional interest as well as subjects to be avoided;

(8) other parameters and their effects on information and communication systems and
processes (e.g. language, level of education, popular beliefs, and mobility).

b. The information environment should be assessed in terms of its influence on

adversaries/other actors, the civilian population and friendly forces. Interdependencies
between these groups in the information environment should also be identified. Additionally,
specific cultural particularities need to be taken into account as well as limits and risks of
friendly information activities.

c. The review of the information environment should identify how information activities—by
friendly, adversary, or neutral groups—may affect friendly COAs.

2.4.4 Review Troops and Support Available

1. The staff examines attachments and detachments, command and support relationships, and
the status (current capabilities and limitations) of all units. This analysis also includes
capabilities of civilian and military organisations (joint, special operations, and multinational)
that operate within the formation’s/unit’s AOR. Determining comparative strengths and
weaknesses subsequently serves to identify opportunities for synergy and potential
dependencies during execution of the mission.

2. The review of friendly forces is designed to determine the availability and capability of troops
and support available for mission accomplishment with a view to developing friendly courses
of action. To this end, the fighting power of friendly forces and support available and their
suitability to carry out their mission are ascertained, which determines their combat
effectiveness.29

—————
29
Combat effectiveness: The ability of a unit or formation, or equipment to perform assigned missions or functions. Note: This
should take into account leadership, personnel strength, the state of repair of equipment, logistics, training and morale and
may be expressed as a level or percentage (NATO agreed).

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3. The purpose of this analysis is threefold:

a. to establish the combat power the command can generate (by establishing fighting power
and the combat effectiveness of the troops and support available);

b. to establish own strengths to exploit;

c. to establish own vulnerabilities to protect.

4. The concept of fighting power describes the ability to use, or threaten to use, force to achieve
a desired outcome and is dependent on the three interrelated components:

a. Physical component. The physical component consists of the correct mix of manpower,
equipment, training, sustainability, and readiness. It is very much a quantitative, measurable
component.

b. Moral component. The moral component is about getting people and their commands to
operate and sustain the will to operate in the way they have been ordered to. It comprises
the force’s morale, resolve, leadership, and ethical conduct, along with the unique culture of
that force.

c. Conceptual component. The conceptual component is the force’s knowledge,

understanding, and application of doctrine; and its continuous learning and adaptation. It
includes understanding of the situation and the operating environment. For a multinational
force, this component will also include interoperability.

None of the components can claim precedence and each mutually supports and informs the
other. Training is the essential system by which the three components of fighting power are
prepared.

5. The physical component can more easily be measured quantitatively, whereas the moral
and conceptual components tend to more subjective, qualitative assessment. Assessment of
fighting power across all three components includes collective performance. Collective
performance is characterized by the high levels of cohesion, confidence, and proficiency
achieved by headquarters and units that have trained or operated together. Collective
performance is optimized when it integrates partners and contractors within the force and is
exercised through training. (For more details see AJP-3.2.)

6. Fighting power is related to combat effectiveness, as illustrated in Figure 2-6. It is usually

assessed along the following criteria:

a. availability in terms of space and time;30

b. the ability to bring effects to bear on certain adversaries/other actors or target groups;

—————
30 It is often useful to show these in a schematic diagram or on a map.

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c. other factors that may impact the effectiveness of friendly troops (e.g. terrain, weather,
electromagnetic spectrum, constraints and restraints, morale and resolve, and conceptual
approaches31).

7. Based on an assessment of all relevant factors, combat effectiveness can be rated as either
high, medium, or low. Adding up the combat effectiveness of all troops and support available
determines the combat power the command can generate. Combat power is the total means
of force that a military unit and/or formation can apply at a given time.

Figure 2-6. Example of determining combat effectiveness

8. Integration of all joint functions in the next step (COA Development) should optimize combat
effectiveness and relative combat power. With a view to this step, planners determine the

—————
31 The impact of conceptual approaches relates to an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the unit’s (doctrinal) modus
operandi, the use of echelon forces and reserves etc. that affect that actual/maximum force that can be applied at a given time.

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capability of troops and support available to contribute both individually and collectively to the
essential, specified, and implied tasks. This will reveal:

a. strengths that offer potential for exploitation, leading to actions that may form the core of
a COA and/or conditions that may need to be established to perform such actions;

b. weaknesses and shortfalls that need to be mitigated, leading to actions that may be
required to protect critical vulnerabilities.

The staff may conduct a COG analysis of their command to identify strengths and critical
vulnerabilities.32

9. Whereas strengths to exploit are kept on hold for COA development, mitigation measures
to reduce weaknesses and shortfalls are initiated as early as possible. The staff considers how
the command can increase combat effectiveness and initiates remedial action. Requirements
for external support and coordination are identified and, depending on their nature and
availability, the 1-up headquarter may be requested to allocate additional resources. The
commander is informed about any remaining shortfalls, usually in the mission analysis brief. As
long as the outcome of the requests by the command (either by staff or commander) are
uncertain, the weaknesses and shortfalls remain and are taken to COA development. The ICBB
may serve, amongst others, to reduce that uncertainty.

2.4.5 Review and Update Mission Timeline and Staff Planning Timeline

By analysing all available information, a dedicated mission timeline is created. In order to

understand critical timings and identify windows of opportunity for exploitation, the following
steps should be taken:

a. compare the timeline to the adversary’s assumed timeline and anticipate how the
conditions will unfold;

b. include and update the relevant planned actions of 1-up and neighboring formations/units
in the mission timeline;

c. refine the initial plan for the use of time and staff planning timeline.

2.4.6 Establish Risk Context and Begin Risk Assessment

1. Establishing the risk context.33 Based on the outcome of the IPOE the following questions
can be answered:

- What should the commander be aware of?

- What should the commander be concerned of?

By putting these answers in the context of the IPOE domains (addressing both internal and
external issues) and the different types of risk a comprehensive understanding of which areas

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32 COG analysis may be optional depending on time and personnel available.
33 Further details to be found in SRD 28.1, chapter 3.

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poses a risk to mission is accomplished. The outcome is an initial risk classification system
(RCS). The RCS also supports drafting CCIRs.

2. Definitions for impact and likelihood levels are developed. 34 Based on these definitions the
commander determines the risk attitude for both risks with positive and negative outcomes
(opportunities and threats).

3. Risk Identification.35 The command considers risk to the mission of the command in the
context of the 1-up commander’s order. Risks are identified primarily based on the risk
classification system, COG analysis and for example strength, weakness, opportunity, and
threat analysis. To identify risk the question to be asked is: what influences the achievement of
the objective(s)?

4. As risks (both opportunities and threats) are identified, risk ownership is recommended. For
some risks ownership will be retained at the commander’s level (level 1 risks) and other risks
may be mandated (level 2)—for instance to the chief of staff or chief of current operations.

5. Risk Analysis.36 As risks are identified a cross functional risk analysis is conducted. To
analyse risk the questions to be asked are:

- What entities are the sources of the risk?

- Which incidents or events may cause the risk to materialize?

- What may reasonably happen if the risk materializes (consequences)?

6. To maintain momentum in planning, risk evaluation is conducted in step 3 (and refined

during step 4) because the own COAs will affect risk as well as the likelihood and impact of
identified risks.

2.4.7 Develop Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

1. During mission analysis, gaps in information required for further planning and decision-
making will be identified by the staff as information requirements. Some information
requirements are of such importance that the staff nominates them to the command to become
CCIRs.

2. A CCIR is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical in

facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process. Information that
is either critical to the success of the mission or represents a critical threat to it are expressed
as CCIRs. CCIRs cover all aspects of the commander’s concern including PIR, FFIR, and EEFI.

3. Priority Intelligence Requirements. A PIR is an intelligence requirement which a

commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision-making
(AAP-39). PIRs are derived from CCIRs. Their identification and drafting initiates and drives the
intelligence process (see AJP-2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and
Security and AJP-2.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures for more information).
—————
34
Note that defining relevant impact definitions may not be achievable until during step 3 (COA Development).
35 Further details to be found in SRD 28.1, chapter 4.
36 Further details to be found in SRD 28.1, chapter 5.

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PIRs are normally formulated by the intelligence staff in close cooperation with the commander.
PIRs should be limited in number and provide comprehensive and coherent groupings of key
issues. They may be enduring or limited to a particular phase or situation. They should be
written in such a way as to support a decision the commander must make. By formulating a
collection strategy (an overarching concept for intelligence and information gather) the
intelligence staff can both determine how PIRs are most effectively satisfied using all possible
sources and assets available and how intelligence gaps may be addressed. The G-2 manages
PIR for the commander.

4. Friendly Forces Information Requirement. An FFIR is information the commander and

staff need about the forces available to them to develop plans and make informed decisions.
FFIRs provide understanding of the status and capabilities of own and supporting troops. The
G-3 manages FFIRs for the commander.

5. Essential Elements of Friendly Information.37 The staff also identifies and nominates
EEFI. An EEFI is information that needs to be protected rather than collected. EEFIs identify
friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success. EEFIs
include things likely to be sought by the adversary about friendly intentions, capabilities, and
activities, so that they can obtain answers critical to their operational success. Depending on
theorganization, the G-3 or the protection officer will manage EEFIs for the commander.

2.4.8 Develop the Initial Intelligence Collection Plan

The initial ICP is crucial to information and intelligence collection efforts.38 The ICP details
collection priorities and resources to be tasked and as such sets in motion reconnaissance,
surveillance, and intelligence operations. It may be issued as part of a WNGO, FRAGO, or an
OPORD. As more information becomes available it is incorporated into a complete ICP to the
OPORD.

2.4.9 Prepare and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing

1. The mission analysis briefing summarises the results of the order analysis and the
evaluation of factors. It helps the commander understand, visualize, and describe the operation.
To that end, all staff inputs are merged in the preparation phase in order to identify command
level information, conclusions, and recommendations.

2. As part of the mission analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other partners discuss
the various constraints and restraints, facts and assumptions, risks, and critical points
pertaining to the situation. Staff officers present a summary of their staff estimates for their
specific functional areas and how their findings impact, or are impacted, by other functional
areas. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on the
situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing.

3. As of the mission analysis brief the staff should inform the commander/COS on the status
for RFIs to the HQ. As not all RFIs are CCIRs, they are still key for pursuing the planning

—————
37
FFIR and EEFI are not the responsibility of the intelligence staffs. Some nations do not recognize EEFI as a component of
CCIR (see AJP-2).
38 AJP-2 and AJP-2.1 contain additional information on intelligence collection, planning requirements, and assessing collection.

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process with regards to facts/assumptions and might require the commander’s involvement at
some stage. See Annex E for the mission analysis briefing format.

2.4.10 Update Additional Commander’s Planning Guidance

1. At this stage, commanders may refine their initial planning guidance, with additional
elements derived from the evaluation of factors. At this point, the planning guidance provides
focus and direction to the staff for subsequent steps of tactical planning for land forces, to begin
with Step 3 (COA Development).

2. The commander’s guidance is complemented by the commander’s narrative in which the

commander states how the force will express itself in the battle space, in communication and
engagement. Intent and narrative differ in that intent is internal, while narrative is the public
stance. In particular, EEFI and the intent and guidance with regards to deception will create a
difference between the two. The intent and narrative translate into guidance on the presence,
posture, and profile of the force, actors to engage, and the line(s) to take. This drives the
planning of all activities to ensure that there will be no distinction between what is said and what
is done, to the extent possible.

2.4.11 Develop and Issue a Warning Order

Immediately after a commander issues the mission statement, initial intent, and planning
guidance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting formations/units a WNGO. Depending on
the situation, the WNGO may contain:

a. the approved mission statement;

b. the initial commander’s intent;

c. own attachments and detachments of subordinate units, as directed by 1-up.

d. the AOR (sketch, overlay, or some other description—Also, this is not the AOR for
subordinate units, only for the unit producing the WNGO).

e. IPOE planning products and overlays;

f. CCIRs;

g. initial ICP;

h. movements/actions to initiate;

i. updated mission timeline.

2.4.12 Conduct Commander’s Initial Back-Brief (optional)

Understanding the situation, Steps 1 and 2, concludes with the lower commander (subordinate)
providing an initial (i.e. partial) back brief to the 1-up commander to ensure they have a shared

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understanding of both the mission and intent.39 During this back brief the lower commander
may, as required:

a. request/justify any request for additional resources;

b. propose control measure amendments;

c. request ROE implementation or delegation;

d. seek clarification and express any major concerns (i.e. risks and critical points).

—————
39
As per ATP 3.2.2, a back brief “is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to
accomplish their mission.” At this stage, the “how” (i.e. the CONOPs) has not been developed yet. This will instead be the
core of the (complete) back-brief, at the end of Step 6.

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CHAPTER 3 DEVELOP AND CONSIDER COURSES

OF ACTION
3.1 STEP 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

3.1.1 General

1. During COA development, planners use the mission statement, initial commander’s intent,
planning guidance, the assessed (initial) ACOAs and other conclusions from step 2 to generate
options for the commander for further analysis and comparison. The purpose of the COA
development step is to develop at least two options (the how) to accomplish the mission. All
tentative COAs should enable effective mission accomplishment in accordance with the
commander’s intent and the commander’s planning guidance. A COA is a broad potential
solution to an identified problem and should have enough detail to compare to possible ACOAs.
Planners need to be aware during COA development that the ACOAs can be refined to reflect
adversary reactions to planned activities of own troops. This should initiate a dynamic and
collaborative effort between the intelligence staff (i.e. G-2) and the planners (i.e. the G-3/5 and
G-5) to refine the COAs during their development (Step 3) and analysis (Step 4). Figure 3-1
shows the key inputs, activities, and outputs of this step.

2. As a prerequisite for COA development, the intelligence staff has to develop at least the
initial most likely (ML) and most dangerous (MD) ACOA during mission analysis, including
recommendations on both ACOAs. They provide the ML COA and all recommendations on
both ACOAs to the planners (G-3/G-5 shops) before starting the development of the friendly
COA. This is the precondition for step 3.2 of the COA development.

3. Based on the commander’s guidance the staff generates options, developing valid COA(s)
to synchronise joint functions and meet the commander’s guidance. Validation of COAs is the
outcome of the test for viability: feasible, acceptable, complete, exclusive, and suitable
(FACES). Throughout the process of COA development, viability is continuously evaluated to
ensure validity. Continuous validation for viability also avoids wasting valuable time on a
deficient COA. A method to apply the criteria in the viability validation is to ask the questions
contained in Table 3-1.

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Table 3-1. Criteria for viability testing

4. A good COA usually focuses on the most likely (ML) ACOA as main effort and also observes
all other feasible ACOAs' conclusions (e.g. most dangerous [MD] ACOA) as additional specified
and implied tasks without losing the focus on the ML ACOA. The commander, COS, or planning
lead can direct the number and types of COAs to develop. If time is constrained, the
commander's guidance may limit the number of COAs, or even direct the development of a
specific COA. Additionally, the commander provides evaluation criteria for COA comparison.
Finally, the commander provides any further guidance on COA development. In an
unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs. For the remainder
of the description of this step, assume the commander asked for the development of multiple
COAs.

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Figure 3-1. Step 3–Course of Action Development

5. While COAs begin as concepts, by the end of COA development, the COA starts to develop
details necessary for subsequent action by subordinates. A good COA positions the force for
the future mission and provides flexibility in meeting unanticipated events during execution. It
also provides subordinates maximum latitude for initiative and exploiting opportunities.

6. Results should be recorded, for example, using a COA Development sheet, Sync-Matrix,
the Decision Support Overlay (DSO) and, if necessary and useful, the Decision Support
Overlay Matrix (DSOM).

7. In developing COAs, the staff determines the doctrinal requirements for each proposed
operation/activity, including the doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example: (1) a
deliberate water crossing requires an in-place force, a bridgehead force, and an breakout force;
or (2) conducting stability activities requires the ability to provide a level of civil security, civil
control, and retain essential services; or (3) a defensive operation requires a covering force,
defending forces, a counterattack element (strike element) and a reserve. In addition, the staff
considers the potential capabilities of attachments, other organisations, and agencies outside
military channels.

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8. The remainder of this section offers a description of the steps and stages to develop COAs.
See Figure 3-2 for a summary of these steps and stages.

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Steps of Stages of COA development

COA
development
Step 3.1
Create COA Choose a
Establish
development COA
approach
team(s) development
method
Step 3.2
Begin sketch Add Add Add Add Create a Assess Evaluate
Prepare
conclusion higher adversary current pool of relative risk and
W&T (graphic) COA friendly friendly combat add to
analysis control situation forces power graphic
Apply planning guidance & validate for viability

measures
Step 3.3
Determine Determine Integrate Integrate Determine Determine
Generate
focus options to related sustainment sequencing essential
options
accomplish specified battlespace
essential and management
task(s) implied
tasks
Step 3.4
Allocate Work Refine Refine risk
Array forces
combat backwards (graphic) evaluation
power to the and assign control and identify
essential forces to measures controls
task(s) other efforts
Step 3.5
Determine Refine Identify
Refine concept
additional (graphic) potential
tasks for control decision
each joint measures points
function
Step 3.6
Develop Add final
Develop task
task (graphic)
organization
organisation control
measures
Step 3.7
Develop Finish COA
Develop COA
COA sketch
statement and
statement
sketch
Step 3.8
(optional)
Prepare and
conduct COA
brief
Step 3.9
Select and/or
modify COA for
continued
analysis

Figure 3-2. Steps and stages of COA development

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9. Integration of risk management. In conjunction with step 3 the command evaluates risk. An
initial evaluation is provided at the end of step 3.2 (Prepare) to inform the generation of options.
A refinement takes place at the end of step 3.4 (Array of Forces) when the backbone of each
COA has been developed, because the evaluation of both opportunities and threats is usually
different for each COA. This evaluation moves seamlessly into risk treatment and informs step
3.5 (Refinement of the Concept).

3.1.2 Step 3.1 – Establish Approach

COA development starts with preparation. Figure 3-3 shows stages for step 3.1.

1. The staff will generate options based on the commander’s guidance. A good COA usually
focuses on the ML ACOA as the main effort and also observes all other feasible ACOAs’
conclusions (e.g. MD ACOA) as additional specified and implied tasks without losing the focus
on the ML ACOA. If time allows, planners should aim to develop several possible COAs. The
commander’s guidance may limit options based on the time available.

Step 3.1 Stages of Step 3.1: Establish Approach

Establish Create COA Choose a
approach development COA
team(s) development
method

Figure 3-3. Stages of Step 3.1 – Establish Approach

2. Create COA development team(s). When developing more than one COA, the staff has two
organisational options:

a. With the first option, the staff forms separate teams and each team works on a different
COA. Multiple COAs are produced more quickly with this option. The disadvantage is that
each COA team has various levels of expertise and experience and members of each COA
team are unaware of what the other teams are doing. Lower tactical levels may not have the
staff available for this option.

b. Alternatively, the entire staff can work together on each COA. With this option, subject
matter experts (SMEs) and staff that are aware of every COA are available to develop the
COAs.

3. Choose a COA development method. Many methods can be used to develop COAs. One
example is brainstorming, which is the free suggestion of ideas for possible solutions, with few
initial limits on creativity. It requires time, imagination, and creativity but produces the widest
range of choices. The staff must remain unbiased and open minded when developing proposed
solutions. Additionally, COAS should be a logical product of the preceding steps of the TPLF
and take into account all of the conclusions and findings.

4. At this stage the staff should consider the utility of doctrinal frameworks to visualise and
develop coherent COAs. Generally applicable frameworks are the geographic framework
(deep, close, and rear operations), the functional framework (find, fix, strike and exploit) and

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the land operations framework (decisive, shaping and sustaining actions).40 For specific
circumstances there may be different frameworks available, such as Clear – Hold - Build for
counter-insurgency tactics41 and GOTEAM42 for security force assistance.

5. Frameworks are a tool, not a purpose. They support the commander and staff but there is
no obligation to use them. Also, other frameworks may be used or developed if the commonly
used frameworks are not suitable or supportive in a given situation. In the latter case it is
paramount to ensure that all staff and subordinate commands understand the framework being
used.

3.1.3 Step 3.2 – Prepare

1. In order to generate COAs, information and conclusions from the previous steps have to be
visualised in a sketch. Figure 3-4 captures the essential steps for this sub-step. A sketch may
be on any medium, and what it portrays is more important than its form. The sketch can be on
a white board, Digital Command Support System, PowerPoint slide, overlay on a map, chalk
on the side of a vehicle, or any combination.

2. When using digital command support systems, overlays from earlier steps (such as IPOE)
can be imported easily and further overlays made in the COA development process are
automatically in scale and ready for distribution. When not using a digital map, the sketch
should show enough physical terrain to show the reader where activity is taking place. Consider
including a rough scale so the reader can make time and distance inferences from the sketch.
Use caution if the background is a map, because the sketch can look cluttered quickly. Ensure
terrain identifying features such as non-fordable rivers, valleys, natural choke points, restricted
terrain, major roads, urban centres, or bridges are highlighted.

Step 3.2 Stages of Step 3.2: Prepare

Prepare Begin Add Add Add Add Create a Assess Evaluat
sketch conclusion higher adversary current pool of relative e risk
W&T (graphic) COA friendly friendly combat and add
analysis control situation forces power to
measures graphic

Figure 3-4. States of Step 3.2 – Prepare

3. Begin Sketch. With a format chosen, staffs first determine what area the COA sketch is to
cover (for example, AOR or AOI). This decision determines the boundaries of the sketch. A
method for determining how much terrain to cover with the sketch is to define where action is
taking place. Include actions outside the AOR that affect the COA in the sketch. Some outside
actions will not be identified until after beginning; therefore, make a best guess. At a minimum,
include unit/formation boundaries. APP-06, NATO Joint Military Symbology (STANAG 2019)

Technique. If a map (digital or paper) is too cluttered use the MCOO from IPOE. It shows
less detail than a map but has the right scale to produce other overlays during COA
development.
—————
40
ATP-3.2.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Operations.
41 ATP-3.4.4.1, Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Tactics.
42 Generate, organise, train, enable, advise, and mentore. AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA).

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Ed D V1, October 2017, provides task organisation graphics (both friendly and adversary) for
use in sketches.

4. Add conclusions from terrain and weather analysis. Include the conclusions of the IPOE
which are visualised on the MCOO overlay.

5. Add higher (graphic) control measures. This includes, but is not limited to, phase lines,
objectives, support areas, the fire support coordination line, and the coordinated fire line.

Technique. If possible, add key graphics of adjacent units as this will likely show how
your unit’s operation relates to other units’ operations and where deconfliction may be
required.

6. Add adversary COA. The next stage is adding to the sketch the ACOA being planned
against and the conclusions for own forces assessed by G-2/S-2 for this ACOA. Depicting
specific equipment or capabilities—such as HQs, radars or air defence artillery (ADA), which
often are high-value targets—might be required. If the threat is moving, the sketch should
indicate the direction of travel. Include any known or suspected obstacles and any neutral
organisation or populations that could influence planning. The crucial conclusions of feasible
other ACOAs (e.g. MD ACOA) must not be forgotten. As these present risk, they are added
once the risk has been evaluated.

7. Add current friendly situation. The next stage in developing the COA sketch is to visualise
the current friendly situation. This aids the commander and staff in understanding the starting
point for the operation and shows the challenges the unit faces in accomplishing the mission.

8. Create a pool of friendly forces. The purpose is to create a comprehensive overview of

all available capabilities in order to enable the allocation of troops and support available to the
tasks. The capabilities are listed by size, not by their identity (e.g. infantry battalion rather than
17 Infantry Battalion). Planners create the overview using the results of step 2. The overview
lists capabilities 2 levels down in order to ensure the missions 1 level down will be properly
resourced later on. Planners may also want to include key equipment at appropriate echelon in
the pool. For example, reconnaissance and ADA systems or bridging assets. Capabilities of
friendly civilian and military organisations that operate within the formation’s/unit’s AOR would
be listed separately as they cannot be tasked, yet may be of relevance for COA development.
Once created, the overview allows planners to see exactly how much combat power can be
generated. Besides, it helps planners to use all available capabilities.

Technique. When placing forces in the availability pool, one method is to use an icon that
has to be physically moved, such as on adhesive note paper. This technique is preferable to
drawing icons in the pool, erasing them, and then placing them on a sketch. The first array
of forces is never the final array, and corrections will need to be made on the sketch. Using
an icon prevents erasing on the sketch multiple times. Once the array of forces is set, a
planner can neatly transfer the final set to the sketch. Showing forces as an icon also ensures
all units are used, and none are forgotten, because accidental erasure, or forgetting to add a
unit to a sketch, can otherwise easily occur.

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9. Assess relative combat power. The purpose of this stage is to gain insight into:

a. the types of operations possible from both friendly and adversary perspective;
b. how and where the adversary may be vulnerable;
c. how and where friendly forces may be vulnerable.

10. Fundamental to the assessment is the integration of factors evaluated in the previous step.
By combining and integrating these factors, comparative strengths and weaknesses are
identified. These will serve as a reference for the development of options in the next stages, in
particular with regards to suitability and feasibility. The focus at this stage is on capabilities in
order to identify suitable options for force employment (Ways to the End of mission
accomplishment), as is the purpose of step 3.3.

11. Adversary combat power is generated within the adversary COA, which reflects the
estimate of adversary intent and conceptual component of fighting power. The moral
component impacts on persistence and endurance. The actual force that is applied will largely
be generated from the physical component. All these elements are examined and compared
with own intent and capabilities to assess relative combat power.

12. Often this results in an estimate of force ratios and characteristics two levels down, with a
focus on combat and combat support elements. Planners then estimate friendly strengths
against adversary weaknesses, and vice versa. From these comparisons, they may deduce
particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need protection. Planners
will benefit from computer assisted modeling and simulation when available. Comparing force
ratios mathematically, however, has its limits as it fails to consider more subjective estimates
such as levels of training and unit morale. Therefore, sound judgement is needed to draw
proper conclusions.

13. The identification of critical vulnerabilities may be facilitated by the optional COG analysis
in step 2. The adversary COAs locates the results of the analysis, both critical capabilities and
vulnerabilities, in time and space and generates of options for further planning and targeting.

14. The assessment of relative combat power continues and deepens throughout COA
development and analysis in order to allocate troops to tasks and (potentially) identify additional
resources needed to execute the mission.

15. Evaluate risk and add to graphic. The purpose of risk evaluation is to identify which risks
need what treatment and the priority for treatment implementation. A deeper understanding of
the risks allows for the identification of triggers and indicators that will be used later to monitor
if the risk increases or decreases, as well as an understanding of the speed at which the risk
may materialise. This can be used to develop a risk monitoring plan to be used during
execution. The deeper understanding of risk the in general and triggers and indicators in
particular supports a refinement of commander’s critical information requirements.

16. At this stage, the risks identified and analysed in step 2 are evaluated to inform the
generation of options. The focus is on deepening an understanding of triggers and indicators,
the speed at which a risk may materialise, and a general assessment of likelihood and impact
on own operations. The general assessment will be turned into a specific assessment for each
COA in step 3.5 (Refine concept) as likelihood and impact will be different for each COA.

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17. Conclusions are added to the sketch. The ACOA that has been chosen as the one being
planned against represents expected adversary behaviour. Consequently, the other feasible
ACOAs (e.g. the most dangerous ACOA) represent a deviation from the expected that may
result in a risk (opportunity or threat). The risk that these other feasible ACOAs may represent
is evaluated and added to the sketch.

3.1.4 Step 3.3 – Generate Options

1. The purpose of step 3.3 is to generate suitable and feasible options to accomplish the
mission in accordance with the commander’s (initial) intent and planning guidance, as shown
in Figure 3-5. Simply processing the evaluation of factors and planning guidance methodically
is likely to lead to predictable COAs, as adversaries and other actors will (to a certain degree)
be familiar with NATO’s approach to operations (the conceptual component). Therefore,
generating options should build on originality, creativity, and imagination, and aim to develop
unpredictable, yet suitable and feasible COAs.

2. In terms of ends, ways, means, step 3.3 develops ways, leading to tasks, to the end of
mission accomplishment. Although this builds on an understanding of the combat power the
command can generate in time and space, it does not yet consider the employment of means,
subordinate and supporting forces, in detail. This is done in step 3.4.

Step 3.3 Stages of Step 3.3: Generate Options

Generate Determine Determine Integrate Integrate Determine Determine
options focus options to related sustainmen sequencing essential
accomplish specified t battlespace
essential and implied managemen
task(s) tasks t

Figure 3-5. Stages of Step 3.3 – Generate Options

3. Determine focus. Focus is used to concentrate planning efforts when generating options.
A single focus may be used to concentrate on the essentials. An example could be a focus on
the adversary or on terrain. Focus may also be determined for each COA in order to develop
different COAs to achieve the objective. For instance, COAs are built around different strengths,
or one COA is to build on an indirect approach, the other on a direct confrontation or physical
action. Focus may be provided by the commanders (initial) intent and planning guidance. If not
specifically provided, it may be derived from essential task(s), COG analysis (if used), and the
comparison of relative fighting power. If not provided, it may also be left open in order not to
limit suitable force employment options in advance.

4. Determine options to accomplish the essential task(s). To develop suitable and feasible
ways to accomplish the mission, the staff focuses initially on ways to accomplish the essential
task(s). Planners are encouraged to use doctrinal support and, for instance, explore the various
offensive forms of manoeuvre or methods of defence, as applicable. Doctrinal inspiration is
complemented by imagination and creativity to enhance unpredictability, as outlined in the
introduction. Depending on the generated number of options and the number of COA to be
developed, the ones considered most suitable are selected. These are refined into tasks and
capability requirements43 that will serve, amongst others, the array of forces in step 3.4. The
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43 For instance heavy-medium-light forces, (counter) mobility support, psychological operations, CIMIC.

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refinement is done by working backwards from purpose and objective(s) through intended
effects to create (as applicable) actions and tasks. The tasks are plotted on a COA sketch.

5. Integrate related specified and implied tasks. With COA to accomplish the essential
task(s) identified, planners now determine other tasks. On the one hand these fall out of step
2, on the other hand they fall out of the COA. Per COA, ways are identified to create or maintain
favourable conditions, including deception efforts, and opportunities for exploitation. The use
of a (doctrinal) framework, though not mandatory, will be helpful at this stage. Like before, all
actions are translated into tasks and capability requirements and plotted on the COA sketch. In
the process, a general order of task performance in time will automatically emerge. However,
detailed sequencing follows after sustainment options have been integrated as well.

6. Integrate sustainment. Sustainment enables the command to operate and delivers

freedom of action. Using the tasks identified so far, the staff can determine the required actions
to sustain the mission and translate these into tasks in time and space.

7. Determine sequencing. The staff integrates and sequences all identified tasks to ensure
overall coherence, beginning with accomplishment of the essential task(s) and potential
opportunities for subsequent exploitation. Next, planning backwards, the staff prioritizes and
synchronises the remaining tasks to ensure conditions will be set to accomplish the essential
task(s). Sequencing all the tasks may lead to phasing. A product of sequencing is a refined
mission timeline per COA, which may be used to develop a synchronisation matrix (per COA).

8. Determine essential battlespace management.44 Now that tasks have been ordered in
time and space, the staff determines what control measures need to be implemented. Only
essential control measures should be applied because the primary function of battlespace
management is to maximize freedom of action, while maintaining awareness that the COA
requires further development and refinment. Note that battlespace management exceeds
physical force employment on the ground or in the air. It may also relate to presence, profile,
and posture and roles and responsibilities for communication and engagement. Once
determined, the essential control measures are added to the COA sketch.

3.1.5 Step 3.4 – Array45 Forces

1. The next step is to array friendly forces to the identified tasks in the previous stage, generate
options. Figure 3-6 shows stages for Step 3.4, array forces.

Step 3.4 Stages of Step 3.4: Array Forces

Array forces Allocate Work Refine Refine risk
combat backwards (graphic) evaluation
power to and assign control and
the forces to measure identify
essential other efforts s controls
task(s)

Figure 3-6. Stages of Step 3.4 – Array Forces

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44
The purpose of battlespace management is to maximise freedom of action, minimise constraints for all battlespace users, and
manage and reduce the risk of friendly fire.
45 Array is defined as an ordered arrangement of troops (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011).

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3. Allocate combat power to the essential task(s). Considering the nature of the essential
task(s), the capabilities in the pool of forces and staff planning data, the staff takes the most
appropriate forces out of the pool and places them on the sketch near the task and the
adversary forces they will engage.

Table 3-2. Historical minimum planning ratios46 47

Friendly Mission Position Friendly : Adversary

Delay 1:6
Defend Prepared or fortified 1:3
Defend Hasty 1:2.5
Attack Prepared or fortified 3:1
Attack Hasty 2.5:1
Counterattack Flank 1:1

4. Work backwards and assign forces to other efforts. Once the forces required to
accomplish the essential task(s) are assigned, the staff performs the same process with the
other specified and implied tasks and sustainment, in order of priority. The staff uses forces
available in the pool to allocate combat power to the reserve. Once complete, planners can use
excess forces in the pool to improve the combat ratios of the essential, specified, and implied
tasks, as well as the reserves.

5. Refine (graphic) control measures. After making necessary adjustments, the staff refines
the graphic control measures and the synch-matrix.

6. Refine risk evaluation and identify controls. With the forces arrayed, the backbone of the
COA is developed and risks may now be assessed in terms of their likelihood and impact in the
context of each COA (and each phase), and can be plotted into the risk attitude matrix. The
final part of this evaluation is the identification of measures to control the risks (in short: controls)
towards the most favourable outcome. Some controls will be aimed at preventing/enhancing
the risk (minor adjustments to the plan), some will be aimed at directing the force to adjust e.g
command and control relation, or fire support coordination measures (medium adjustments to
the plan) and some will be branch plans or sequels (major adjustments to the plan). Others will
allow detection if the risk occurs and how it may impact the mission. These may later be
reflected in the need for reports and returns from subordinate units.

7. Risk Treatment. Most risk treatment will be implemented via risk controls during execution
of the mission, because an acceptable COA cannot contain unacceptable risk. Therefore,
negative risks (i.e. threats) that are plotted in the red zone must be treated in the plan for the
COA to become acceptable. In this case, risk controls are selected and applied in the COA until

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46 Based on recent NATO operations in urban environments, planning ratios for urban environments should be 3–5 times the
amounts listed in table (see ATP-3.2.1.2, Land Operations in Urban Environments).
47 For COIN operations a force planning ratio should be 20 counter-insurgents per 1000 habitants. This includes indigenous

security forces.

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it is assessed that the risk is acceptable according to the commander’s risk attitude. The applied
controls inform the refinement of the concept for each joint function in the next step.

8. Likewise, risk controls that translate into “on order” and “be prepared to” orders may be
added to the COA already at this point to remain proactive and ready to execute these at short
notice during execution.

9. The remainder of the risk treatment controls will become part of the risk monitoring plan.
These are not implemented before needed during execution.

3.1.6 Step 3.5 – Refine the Concept

1. As part of refining the concept, all joint functions should be considered in order to ensure
the unity of action required to achieve mission success. After that, (graphic) control measures
are refined and potential decision points are identified. Figure 3-7 shows stages for Step 3.5.

Step 3.5 Stages of Step 3.5: Refine Concept

Refine Determine Refine Identify
concept additional (graphic) potential
tasks for control decision
each joint measures points
function

Figure 3-7. Stages of Step 3.5 – Refine the Concept

2. Manoeuvre. When developing a COA, the joint function manoeuvre is typically the dominant
aspect of the COA as it places effectors in a position of advantage. Therefore, refinement of
the joint function manoeuvre usually drives the refinement of the other joint functions.

3. Fires. Add engagement areas from the COA sketch to the DSO and depict other target
areas of interest (TAIs). Determine the joint fire support effects needed for the support of the
manoeuvre. When the TAI is out of reach of combat elements, synchronise the TAI with
intelligence assets to find the targeted (element of the) adversary. Additionally, this
synchronisationprovides battle damage assessment (BDA) after engagement. Deconflict
intelligence tasks with joint fire support tasks by applying manoeuvre and / or joint fire support
control measures. Also deconflict joint fire support, intelligence actions (drones), and the use
of airspace through application of airspace control measures on a separate overlay.

4. Information. Determine which role the command has in the information tasks of the 1-up
command. Conveying messages towards audiences in order to influence their understanding
and behaviour can be part of the COA concept. Tasks to subordinate units can be assigned
accordingly.

5. CIMIC. When applicable, commanders and their staff should stay in contact or liaise with
local authorities and non-governmental organisations. This can be deconflicted in a CIMIC
contact matrix. CIMIC tasks to subunits can be assigned accordingly.

6. Intelligence. Add the initial decision support overlay as an overlay to the COA sketch. The
collection requirement and collection task list (CRL/CTL) has to be updated by the intelligence
staff in order to run the joint ISR process. Synchronise the intelligence tasks with manoeuvre

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tasks. Add eventual manoeuvre control measures resulting from this synchronisation to the
COA sketch.

7. Force protection. Most of the time, protection measures are depicted in the coordinating
instructions of the OPORD of the 1-up command. Many diverse capabilities reside in the force
protection joint function, and planners may need to create separate overlays or follow specific
procedures. Most common protection-related capabilities include, but are not limited to, the
following:

a. Air Defence: Determine Air Defence (AD) effects for assigned AD units and plan the
locations for the AD assets.

b. Barrier control plan: Determine military engineering effects needed to promote and
safeguard freedom of movement and those that restrict the adversary’s freedom of
movement. Draw these on a separate overlay.

c. Other protection related capabilities (e.g. counter improvised explosive device, counter
unmanned aircraft system, CBRN, electronic warfare protection, cyber defence, counter
intelligence, engineer activities on survivability, some of the provost marshal activities, etc.)
may be integrated at this stage in the refinement of the concept.

8. Sustainment. Using the concept as developed so far, the staff can refine the required
actions to sustain the mission and translate these into tasks in time and space.

9. Command and control. Many land tactical operations and tactical tasks require the
commander and staff to follow the manoeuvre elements of their unit and deploy elements of
their HQ for C2 with subordinate commands. These planned liaison and HQ locations should
be added to the COA sketch.

10. Refine (graphic) control measures. After making necessary adjustments, the staff
refines the graphic control measures and the synchronisation matrix. All joint functions have
their own control measures. To avoid cluttering the COA sketch, the focus is typically on the
joint function manoeuvre. The staff can draw control measures of other joint functions on a
separate overlay, which later become the corresponding annexes and / or appendices of the
operations order.

11. Identify potential decision points (DPs). After refining the COA, the staff identifies
potential decision points during the execution of the plan and capture those on a DSO and
DSOM.

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3.1.7 Step 3.6 – Develop Task Organisation

1. In this step the HQs will be assigned and final control measures added. Figure 3-8 shows
the stages for step 3.6.48

Step 3.6 Stages of Step 3.6: Develop task organization

Develop task Develop Add final
organization task (graphic)
organisatio control
n measures

Figure 3-8. Stages of Step 3.6 – Develop Task Organisation

2. Develop task organisation. After refining the COA concept, planners develop the task
organisation by assigning HQs to previously identified groupings of forces.49 Considering the
organic organisation of the assigned headquarters, planners identify the required attachments
and detachments, as well as C2 and support relations. These are identified per phase. Specific
attention is paid to transitional stages such as a passage of line or a river crossing.

Generally, headquarters are assigned. A headquarters controls two to five subordinate units
for combat operations. If needed, planners can create a specific task force and develop options
(for the commander to approve) for command and control of the task force. Planners should
ensure all available headquarters are accounted for in this stage.

3. Add final graphic control measures. Add final graphic control measures (usually sub-unit
boundaries) once HQs are assigned. Planners should ensure all doctrinally required graphic
control measures are on the sketch as a final check.

3.1.8 Step 3.7 – Develop COA Statement and Finish Sketch

1. The staff prepares a COA statement for each COA and prepares the sketches for
presentation. Figure 3-9 shows the stages for step 3.7.

Step 3.7 Stages of Step 3.7: Develop COA statement and sketch
Develop Develop Finish COA
COA COA sketch
statement statement
and sketch

Figure 3-9. Stages of Step 3.7 – Develop COA Statement and Finish Sketch

2. Develop COA Statement. At the end of COA development the COA must be developed to
such an extent that the staff can move on to analysis and refinement. The purpose of
developing the COA statement and sketch is to summarise all relevant aspects of the COA in
order to create a comprehensive baseplate and common understanding for deeper analysis in
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48 In some NATO countries, assigning headquarters is a commander’s prerogative and is part of step 6 (Commander’s Decision).
49 In some NATO countries, assigning headquarters is a commander’s prerogative and is part of step 6 (Commander’s Decision).

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the next step. It may also serve as a check on whether all relevant aspects have been covered.
Minimum requirements for the relevant aspects for the sketch are in paragraph 3.1.7.4.

3. The full COA statement (including sketch) therefore serves the next step. It is up to
commander and staff how to substantiate this. The essence is to capture and distribute all
relevant aspects, so the staff can move on to the analysis. At higher tactical levels, such as
corps, the following elements are typically included. Lower tactical levels often exclude certain
elements. Commands may choose the most appropriate inclusions dependent on mission and
resourcing.

a. mission;

b. limitations (constraints, restraints, caveats);

c. assumptions;

d. deception;

e. intent;

f. narrative (including themes and messages);

g. concept of operations:

(1) general outline (integration of maneouvre, fires, information, and CIMIC);

(2) sequencing and phasing;

(3) scheme of manoeuvre;

(4) per phase, the tasks for subordinate commands and reserve, information and CIMIC,
main effort.

h. task organisation;

i. sustainment;

j. C2;

k. opportunities;

l. threats;

m. information requirements.

4. Finish COA sketch. A finalized COA sketch includes the task organization (TASKORG) of
subunit forces and an updated operational timeline (or sync matrix), including control measures,
such as:

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a. boundary control measures. For example:

(1) the unit and subordinate unit boundaries;

(2) main effort and position of the reserves.

b. manoeuvre control measures. For example:

(1) the line of departure and phase lines with estimated time references;

(2) ground axis of advance, when applicable;

(3) assembly areas, battle positions, engagement areas and objectives.

c. mission task symbols to visualise the tasks of the subunits;

d. C2 measure symbols, such as:

(1) location of command posts;

(2) critical communications nodes.

e. (When necessary to visualise the COA):

(1) obstacle control measures;

(2) fire support and air support coordination measures;

(3) DSO/DOS/M.

f. known and suspected adversary locations.

3.1.9 Prepare and Deliver Course of Action Briefing (optional)

1. The (optional) course of action briefing (COAB) informs the commander and the staff
primarily on the results of the COA statement, sketch and evaluation criteria development. It
provides a common understanding and serves as an azimuth check as a basis for the remaining
steps of the planning process.

2. Relevant SMEs provide a summary of their findings in their respective functional areas
including potential interdependencies with other functional areas.

3. The briefing results in confirmatory or additional guidance for the planning activities including
an updated work plan.

4. As the commander may decide not to attend the meeting, that direction and guidance will
typically be provided by COS or G-5. See Annex E for an optional format for the COAB.

3.1.10 Select or Modify Courses of Action for Continued Analysis

1. In case no COAB is conducted, or the commander (or someone designated on their behalf)
did not attend the COAB, the commander (or designate) is informed about the COAs and

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selects or modifies those COAs the staff is to continue analysing. Consequently, the planning
guidance is revised to facilitate COA improvements.

2. If all COAs are rejected, the staff must begin anew. If one or more of the COAs are accepted,
the staff begins COA analysis. The commander (or designate) may also create a new COA by
incorporating elements of one or more COA developed by the staff.

3.2 STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

3.2.1 General

1. The purpose of COA analysis is to improve the developed COAs, enabling commanders
and staffs to identify difficulties, coordination issues, or probable consequences of planned
actions for each COA being considered. It helps them think through the tentative plan. COA
analysis may require commanders and staffs to revise parts of a COA as discrepancies arise.
COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA, it also uncovers potential execution
problems, decisions, and contingencies. In addition, COA analysis influences how commanders
and staffs understand a problem and may require the planning process to restart. Figure 3-10
shows the key inputs, activities, and outputs for COA analysis.

Figure 3-10. Step 4–COA Analysis

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2. COA analysis allows the staff to further synchronise the eight50 joint functions for each COA.
It also helps the commander and staff to:

a. determine how to apply combat power in a manoeuvrist approach against the adversary
while protecting the friendly forces and minimising collateral damage;

b. further refine the COA(s);

c. anticipate events;

d. refine conditions and resources required for success;

e. refine when and where to apply force capabilities;

f. identify coordination needed to produce synchronised results;

g. determine the flexibility of the COA(s).

3. Integration of risk management. Step 4 (COA Analysis) serves to further refine the
controls for each COA (including final recommendations for risk ownership), the decision points
and CCIR, as well as to finalize the risk monitoring plan. Finally, at the end of step 4 it will be
clear how many resources each COA requires to manage the risks, allowing planners to
compare in step 5 COA comparison.

3.2.2 Preparation

1. Select analysis technique. COAs can be analysed in several ways. Each form has its
advantages and disadvantages. Variations of these forms are possible, as are combinations.
Making staff participation as extensive as possible best achieves integration. Commanders
determine the form to be used in their planning guidance. Forms of COA analysis include:

a. mentally, whether by the commander personally or one of the staff officers;

b. “thinking out loud” with others in which the commander may take part;

c. through a formal procedure (such as war gaming - explained more below and in Annex
C);

d. using computer simulations;

e. a combat power/combat effectiveness comparison (for more details, see Chapter 5).

2. Select the adversary COA for comparison. The purpose of friendly and adversary COA
comparison is to set each friendly COA against selected adversary COA in order to determine
which friendly COA will be most successful. As a time saving technique, one can compare each
friendly COA with the adversary most likely COA and develop contingency plans against the
most dangerous COA. The comparison is organised into successive phases or stages, at each
phase or stage taking into account the positive or negative effects of the comparison of the
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50 C2, intelligence, manoeuvre, fires, information, CIMIC, sustainment, and force protection. See also paragraph 1.1.5. For more
details see AJP-3.2 and ATP-3.2.1.

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previous phase or stage (losses, delays, attrition, discontinuities, etc.), and identifying possible
adjustments to a friendly COA (task organisation and synchronisation). It will be more effective
if delivered with visual aids; maps, reproductions of the battlefields (models or sandboxes,
diagrams, or use of COA simulation system.

3. Further preparations include:

a. objective of the analysis;

b. number of COAs (of those developed) to analyse;

c. period, event, phase, critical events, and decision points to analyse;

d. select the analysis method (e.g. belt, box, or avenue in depth; see Annex D);

e. type of visual representation (i.e. PowerPoint, sand box);

f. select and prepare method to record and display results;

g. participants, roles, and responsibilities;

h. list and position all relevant friendly and adversary forces;

i. List COA specific assumptions and CCIRs.

3.2.3 Execution

1. Conduct COA analysis. As described above, there are many ways to perform COA
analysis. Some methods require more time and staff than others (such as war gaming). The
fastest methods involve the commander or designated staff officer performing their own
individual analysis (mental) or through the commander and staff using a process typically
termed “thinking out loud,” or informally talking through the analysis. Additionally, comparisons
of combat power or combat effectiveness can be used for quick analysis.

2. When time is available, war gaming is a more formal technique for COA analysis. The
process has rules and steps that attempt to visualise the flow of the operation. The simplest
form of war gaming is the manual method, often using a table-top approach with blow-ups of
matrixes and templates. The most sophisticated form of war gaming is computer-aided
modelling and simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed
COA is typically war gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly
and adversary forces interaction. It is often helpful to start with who (friendly forces, adversary,
other actors including civilians) owns the initiative in the given event. This basic war gaming
method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) is applicable to offensive,
defensive, and stability operations (see Annex C for a detailed description of the war gaming
process).

3. Regardless of the method chosen, during COA analysis the commander and staff identify:

a. assessed viability of each joint function to support the developed COA;

b. key or decisive terrain and determine how to use it;

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c. refined tasks to be assigned to subordinates;

d. locations of named areas of interest (NAIs), TAIs, DPs and intelligence requirements
needed to support them;

e. potential times or locations for committing the reserve;

f. critical events;

g. requirements for support;

h. risks and risk treatment;

i. potential media reaction to the operation;

j. potential impact on civil security, civil control, and essential services in the AOR;

k. strengths and weaknesses of each COA;

4. Subsequently, they would refine and determine:

a. targeting efforts, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff targets and establishing

attack guidance;

b. DPs;

c. the intelligence collection plan;

d. efforts to create deception and surprise;

e. timings for the concentration of forces, starting an attack or counterattack, etc;

f. the estimated duration of each phase or critical event, and the entire operation;

g. the estimate of enemy forces defeated in each critical event and overall;

h. task organisation (attachments/detachments, C2, and support relations) per phase.

5. Summarise recording and assess results. COA analysis often results in refined COAs, a
refined synchronisation matrix, and decision support templates and matrices for each COA. A
synchronisation matrix can be used to record the results of a COA analysis technique.51 Another
option is to use a capture/record technique as done during wargaming (see Annex C figure
C.5). It depicts how friendly forces for a particular COA are synchronised in time, space, and
purpose in relation to an adversary COA (or other events in stability or defence support of civil
authorities operations). The decision support template and matrix portray key decisions and
potential actions that are likely to arise during the execution of each COA.

—————
51
When time is available, the synchronisation matrix may be prepared in advance, before COA analysis (i.e. at the end of Step
3, at stage 3.7.3) and refined during analysis by directly recording results on it. This results in more thorough analysis and
synchronisation of the COAs.

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3.2.4 Refine the COA (when applicable)

During the COA analysis the staff will develop a more detailed knowledge of the COA due to
the cycles of interaction between own forces and the adversary. New facts and assumptions,
new commander’s decision points and coordination issues and other changes to the COA will
be identified. These news issues and changes will have to be incorporated in the products of
the COA.

3.2.5 Course of Action Analysis Briefing (optional)

The staff may brief the commander on the results of COA analysis prior to COA comparison.
During the briefing, the commander approves any recommended changes to the COAs or
requests one or more COA be refined before they are compared. The commander may also
provide additional guidance for COA comparison.

3.3 STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

3.3.1 General

1. As all COA are screened, all COA are viable. The purpose of the COA comparison is to
establish a prioritisation and a recommendation for a decision by the commander. To be able
to articulate to the commander why one COA is preferred over the other(s), COAs are
compared in different contexts (for examples of potential evaluation criteria, please see
paragraph 2.4.5):

a. by comparing their inherent advantages and disadvantages;

b. by comparing them against the commander’s COA evaluation criteria;

c. by comparing their performance/risks against adversarial COAs.

Figure 3-11 shows the key inputs, activities, and outputs of step 5.

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Figure 3-11. Step 5 – COA Comparison

2. The aim is to compare friendly COAs against each other in an objective manner. Evaluating
and comparing COAs by clearly defined criteria is most likely to serve that aim. Nevertheless,
it should not be reduced to a mere mathematical equation. COA comparison remains a human
endeavor and therefore inherently subjective to a certain extent.

3. At the beginning of step 5, the commander may issue revised planning guidance, if required,
for COA comparison. The revised guidance should focus on observations and refinements that
have developed through the process.

4. Integration of risk management. During COA comparison, the current risks for each COA
are compared as well as the resources required to treat the risks. Conclusions and
recommendations--including final recommendations for risk ownership—are presented to the
commander during the COA decision brief at the end of step 5.

3.3.2 Conduct COA Advantages and Disadvantages Analysis

1. The staff consolidates the advantages and disadvantages during COA analysis. Staff
functions present their findings for each COA and may identify a preferred COA. Out of the

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advantages and disadvantages presented for all COAs, the staff determines the key
advantages and disadvantages as criteria for comparison. The staff also add weight to the
selected criteria.

2. The staff compares the COAs using whatever method the commander prefers. A common
technique is the decision matrix. This may be applied using numerical rating (example not
provided), rank ordering or +/-.

Table 3-3. Example decision matrix

3. In table 3-3, instead of assigning a value, a plus/minus ranking is used to signify the COA is
either favourable or unfavourable. Plusses and minuses are added for each COA, with a plus
neutralizing a minus for an overall score. A “+/-“ is effectively neutral.

4. Other techniques include, but are not limited to, a table with a narrative or a one-word
descriptor for each COA. In the latter case, the criteria are rated as HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW. The
rating may also be represented by using a colour code. In fact, any method will do as long as
the rules are clear to the entire staff.

3.3.3 Compare COAs against the Commander’s COA Evaluation Criteria

1. The commander’s evaluation criteria, if provided, will have guided the development of
COAs. Therefore, all COAs should meet these criteria. However, COAs will differ as to how
well they satisfy them. Therefore, the staff executes a comparison of the COAs against the
commander’s evaluation criteria. Techniques for the comparison are similar to the ones
described in the previous paragraph.

2. In case the commander has given mere words as evaluation criteria, for instance speed or
surprise, this may leave room for interpretation. In that case the staff should define its
interpretation of the criteria before assessing each COA.

3.3.4 Identify the Staff Recommended COA

After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies the COA to recommend to the
commander. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the COS decides which COA to recommend
and informs the staff on the rationale for that recommendation.

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3.3.5 Prepare and Conduct a Course of Action Decision Briefing

1. After identifying their preferred COA the staff delivers a decision briefing to the commander.
The briefing must balance detail against relevance and time available, with a focus on the
decision to be taken by the commander. See Annex D, Appendix 2, for an optional format.

2. As applicable, the COS highlights any changes made to the COAs during COA analysis. In
case the COS had to decide on the recommendation, the COS summarises the main areas of
concern and the reasons for disagreement in the staff and concludes with the rationale for the
recommendation. A member of the staff will be assigned to capture any guidance, direction, or
decision provided during the conduct of the briefing.

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CHAPTER 4 COMMUNICATION
4.1 STEP 6: COMMANDER’S DECISION

The purpose of this step is to decide on a COA that will form the basis of the OPLAN/OPORD.
After the COA decision briefing, the commander selects a COA, announces the decision,
updates the planning guidance and conducts a backbrief with the 1-up commander. The staff
issue a warning order to communicate the essentials of the decision. Note that the commander
may choose to take a preliminary decision first and conduct the back brief before making the
decision final.

4.1.1 Select COA

1. The commander may:

a. accept a COA in full;

b. accept a COA with modifications;

c. merge two or more COAs;

d. order the investigation/development of a new COA.

Figure 4-1 shows the key inputs, activities, and outputs of Step 6.

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Figure 4-1. Step 6–Commander’s Decision

4.1.2 Announce Decision

In the announcement of the decision the commander should provide the rationale for the
decision, including an expression of risk attitude (optional, via the risk attitude matrix52) and the
assumptions and CCIRs that still exist. Additionally, the commander should, as a minimum,
articulate approval or changes to:

a. mission;

b. commander’s intent;

c. task organization;

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52 Further details found in SRD 28.1, chapter 3.

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d. concept of the operations:

 scheme of manoeuvre;

 main effort;

 concept of joint fires;

 military engineering concept;

 themes and messages (information concept);

 CIMIC concept.

e. tasks to subordinate combat element;

f. tasks to subordinate combat support elements;

g. tasks to the reserve;

h. Coordinating Instructions:

 critical timings;

 CCIR collection priorities;

 protection measures;

 constraints and restraints.

i. concept of sustainment;

j. concept of C2;

k. risk after treatment (named ‘current risk level’).

4.1.3 Update Planning Guidance

After announcing the decision, the commander updates the planning guidance. The guidance
includes a refined commander’s intent (as applicable) and direction on the selected COA to be
refined, as well as guidance on the development of the WNGO, the OPLAN/OPORD and, as
applicable, follow-on planning (contingencies or sequels). The guidance includes new CCIRs
(if necessary) to support execution. Priorities and guidelines for the joint functions, including
priorities and guidelines for resources preserving freedom of action and ensuring continuous
sustainment should be included. The commander also addresses risk treatment. It should also
include guidance on the issue of orders and rehearsals. Finally, it should address priority issues
requiring intelligence collection, liaison, coordination (including coordination required with
relevant national and international actors), reconnaissance and/or surveillance in the AOR.

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4.1.4 Conduct Back Brief

If there is time, or as ordered by the 1-up commander, the commander back briefs the decision
to the 1-up commander. The back brief includes a discussion of any risks in the plan that might
significantly influence accomplishing the 1-up commander’s mission. Whenever possible, a
commander should communicate with adjacent and subordinate commanders to discuss
acceptable risks prior to the back brief.

4.1.5 Issue Warning Order

Based on the commander’s decision and final planning guidance, the staff issues a WNGO to
subordinate headquarters. This WNGO provides the information subordinate formations/units
need to refine their analysis. It should contain the same elements as the commander’s decision
listed in paragraph 4.1.2., including any refinements and directions as per the commander’s
planning guidance. As such, it confirms guidance issued in person or by other means and
expands on details not covered by the commander personally. For more detail on the WNGO
see ATP-3.2.2.2.

4.2 STEP 7: ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION

4.2.1 General

1. The purpose of Step 7 is to produce the OPLAN/OPORD, transition the OPLAN/OPORD

from planning to current operations (when applicable), issue the order, and ensure
subordinates’ understanding of the upcoming operation. Major activities during this step
include:

a. plans and orders production and reconciliation;

b. approving the plan or order;

c. transition the OPLAN or OPORD from planning to current operations (when applicable);

d. prepare and issue orders;

e. prepare and conduct confirmation brief (optional);

f. prepare and conduct rehearsals (optional);

g. prepare and issue FRAGOs (if necessary).

2. The staff prepares plans and orders by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise
CONOPs with the required supporting information. The selected COA sketch becomes the
basis for the operation overlay. The staff writes the OPORD in accordance with the NATO
OPORD format located in ATP-3.2.2.2.

3. The CONOPS brings together the planning output from the outset of the process to this
point. It is the concise and formal expression of the commander’s intent for the conduct of the
operation, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces.

4. The OPLAN has the same structure and format as the CONOPS but includes more detail
and further particulars.

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Figure 4-2 shows the key inputs, activities, and outputs of Step 7.

Figure 4-2. Step 7–Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition

4.2.2 Plans and Orders Production and Reconciliation

1. The purpose of this activity is to produce a coherent CONOPS and an OPLAN/OPORD. The
CONOPS forms the core and fundament of the OPLAN. It clearly and concisely expresses what
the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Key
elements are the commander’s intent, the main effort, and the actual concept which describes
how the actions of the command and supporting organisations will be integrated, synchronised,
and phased to accomplish the mission, including the main effort and potential sequels and
contingencies. It provides the basis for the assignment of missions to subordinate and
supporting commands as well as priorities for each functional area and the risk management
in the OPLAN and the OPORD.

2. The CONOPS is integrated into the OPLAN/OPORD (the OPLAN has the same structure
and format as an OPORD). The OPLAN/OPORD brings together the planning output from the
outset of the process to this point. The selected (and refined, as applicable) COA sketch

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becomes the basis for the operation overlay. The staff writes the OPLAN/OPORD in
accordance with the NATO OPORD format located in ATP-3.2.2.2.

3. Plans and orders reconciliation occurs internally as the staff conducts a detailed review of
the entire plan and order. This reconciliation ensures:

a. plans and orders meet the 1-up and 2-up commander’s intent;

b. plans and orders achieve unity of effort;

c. all attachments are complete and in agreement.

4. The commander's intent, mission, and CCIRs are compliant with the concept of operations
and the different schemes of support (e.g. scheme of fires, scheme of sustainment).

5. Integration of risk management. As a part of the transition in step 7, risk manager(s) and
risk monitors are provided with the final version of the risk monitoring plan. Triggers, indicators,
and DPs for risks retained at the commander’s level may also be reflected in CCIR and decision
support tools and systems.

4.2.3 Approving the Plan and/or Order

Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them,
unless they have delegated that authority. Commanders normally do not sign attachments but
they should review them before signing the plan and/or order.

4.2.4 Transition the Operation Plan or Operation Order from Planning to Current
Operations (when applicable)

Step 7 is where the transition between planning and current operations occurs; the primary aim
is to ensure members of the operations cell fully understand the plan as they will be responsible
for managing its execution. Their responsibility includes answering requests for information
concerning the order and maintaining the order through FRAGOs. The handover should also
include the transfer of management of FFIRs, CCIRs, and DPs. Once the current operations
cell has assumed responsibility, the plans cell is able to focus more of its efforts on sequel,
branches and other planning requirements as directed by the commander.

4.2.5 Prepare and Issue the Orders

Orders should be sent electronically to subordinate, adjacent, and 1-up commanders so they
can read them prior to the verbal orders being issued by the commander. Subordinates
immediately acknowledge receipt to the 1-up HQs. Normally, the 1-up commander and staff
verbally brief the orders to subordinate commanders in person.

4.2.6 Prepare and Conduct Confirmation Brief (optional)

The commander may receive confirmation briefings from subordinate commanders, sometimes
immediately after issuing the order. Confirmation briefings can be conducted collaboratively
with several commanders at the same time or individually. These briefings are best conducted
in person.

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4.2.7 Prepare and Conduct Back-Briefs (optional)

In the order, the commander may arrange times to receive back briefs from their subordinate
commanders. However, back briefs are often performed throughout the planning process and
allows the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. It also
allows the commander to clarify their intent early in the subordinate commander’s planning
process. It allows the 1-up commander to:

a. identify problems in own CONOPS;

b. identify problems in a subordinate commander’s concept;

c. learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission.

4.2.8 Prepare and Conduct Rehearsals (optional)

Rehearsing key actions of the plan allows participants to become familiar with the operation or
activity and to ensure the force understands their role and the timing associated with the
operation. As time permits, commanders conduct combined arms rehearsals and support
rehearsals to ensure subordinates are prepared and if any changes to plan need to occur (see
ATP-3.2.2, Annex F for a detailed description of these rehearsals).

4.2.9 Prepare and Issue Fragmentary Orders (if necessary)

1. Normally, needed changes to the plan identified from back briefs and rehearsals will be
issued as verbal orders. However, time permitting, the staff may prepare and issue FRAGOs
to confirm and codify these decisions.

2. When subordinate commanders have compiled an order, a copy of that order is issued to
the 1-up HQ. The staff of the 1-up HQ will synchronise these subordinate orders and compile
a composition overlay (of all the subordinate commands) a unit joint fires plan and a unit
obstacle plan to facilitate the execution of the order. These will be issued as a FRAGO to
subordinate, peer, and 1-up HQs.

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CHAPTER 5 PLANNING IN A TIME CONSTRAINED

ENVIRONMENT
5.0 General

1. An effective staff and planning process greatly facilitates the commander’s ability to quickly
develop flexible, sound, integrated, and synchronized plans. However, even the most effective
staff and planning process cannot produce plans anticipating every possible scenario. If a staff
is to effectively respond to or take advantage of such events it must be capable of rapidly
planning for a solution to the problem.

2. Planning in a time-constrained environment demands a staff competent at producing plans

and using an abbreviated (hasty) planning process. However, for a staff to be successful in its
application of an abbreviated planning process it must first have a thorough understanding of
tactical planning and be adept in its application. While a process is provided in this chapter, the
term “rapid” is more important than “process”—meaning the commander and staff must use
their judgement in deciding where to assume risk and what portions of planning to skip or
abbreviate.

5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1.1 The Commander’s Responsibility

Time is a non-renewable—and often the most critical—resource. When there is insufficient time
to perform all of the steps in tactical planning it is the commander who dictates how the staff is
to abbreviate the process by providing them with the staff planning guidance. Because changes
in staff planning guidance cost time (as the staff is forced to adjust to the new guidance),
effective commanders avoid doing so unless the situation demands it.

5.1.2 The Staff’s Responsibility

Staff members must keep their respective staff estimates as current as possible. Doing so
enables them to quickly provide accurate, up-to-date assessments and move directly into
abbreviated tactical planning whenever the situation demands. The importance of keeping staff
estimates current increases as the amount of time available decreases. Under time-constrained
conditions, commanders and staffs become more reliant on staff estimates and existing
planning products.

5.1.3 Other Fundamental Responsibilities to Facilitate Planning

1. Create and employ sound SOPs and SOIs.

2. Timely and relevant individual and collective staff training (at all levels within a command).

5.2 TIME SAVING TECHNIQUES

5.2.1 Time Saving Techniques

There are numerous techniques and tools enabling commanders and staffs to speed up
planning efforts. Some of these techniques are:

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a. Commanders increase their involvement in tactical planning (command pull, as opposed

to staff push; the more the commander is involved, the less time is spent briefing the
commander on planning progress. (ATP-3.2.2).

b. The commander reduces the staff's work. For instance by limiting the number of COAs
to be developed to only two or even one, by directing which COA(s) to develop or the depth
in COA development (for example: focus on manoeuvre & fires initially), by directing detailed
analysis and plan development for the initial phase(s) only (leaving detailed planning for
subsequent phase(s) for later), etc.

c. Increase collaborative planning efforts and use of liaison officers.

d. Choose an efficient technique for COA analysis.

e. Limit analysis in COA comparison.

5.2.2 Limitations on COA Development, Analysis, and/or Comparison

Planning in a time-constrained environment usually occurs after a command has entered the
area of operation and begun operations. The rapid development of COAs focuses on the critical
friction points and the identification of the common elements present in each COA. As outlined
above, commanders can significantly speed up the process of COA development, analysis,
and comparison Below, an abbreviated planning sequence is described that focuses on Steps
3, 4, and 5.

5.2.3 Step 3: Develop Simplified COAs

1. COAs must be a logical product of the preceding analysis and decisions. The simplified
COAs should concisely describe the mission statement, the commander’s intent, and a basic
concept of operation (statement + sketch). Possible templates are covered in Annex F; Staffs
can choose the most appropriate planning factors from that template for use in a time-
constrained environment.

2. Developed COAs should be depicted in a simplified sketch focusing on the essentials (see
Figure 5-1). Available forces should only be represented if they are vital for the commander’s
understanding of the developed COA.

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Figure 5-1. Example of simplified COA sketches

5.2.4 Step 4: Abbreviated COA Analysis

1. Once COA development is complete, the staff should proceed to an abbreviated COA
analysis. As a time-saving technique, it may be optional to compare each friendly COA with
only the adversary most likely COA.

a. Performing an assessment of relative combat power could significantly shorten COA

analysis. In doing this, the assessment could be subdivided into:

(1) overall combat power comparison;

(2) local combat power comparison;

(3) local comparison of combat effectiveness.

b. Depending on time available and the type of operation, the overall comparison can be
omitted (this is less important in stability operations). The primary focus of COA analysis
should be the local comparison of combat power and effectiveness.

c. In the comparison of combat power, the process will show the force ratio at each location
where friendly forces affect the adversary. As discussed earlier, a higher number of forces
does not imply superiority nor does a lower number imply inferiority. Judgement is required
in this type of quantitative analysis.

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d. In the comparison of combat effectiveness, the combat effectiveness of friendly forces

is matched against that of adversary forces/other actors.

It is expedient to conduct such a comparison for each distinct COA, proceeding with the
assessment and evaluation either by terrain sections or force groupings. It is imperative to
evaluate units individually and the force in its entirety to ascertain if they will be able to
accomplish their mission with superior, balanced, or inferior combat effectiveness. Before
coming to a conclusion, the following questions need to be taken into account:

(1) How can disadvantages in combat effectiveness be compensated?

(2) How can advantages be maximised?

2. After the combat power/combat effectiveness comparison weigh only the friendly COAs that
are most likely to succeed up against each other in Step 5, COA comparison.

5.2.5 Step 5: COA Comparison

Compare the remaining COAs along with assessing each COA's advantages and
disadvantages. Commanders identify and provide their comparison criteria and the staff may
supplement with additional criteria, if warranted. When the pros and cons of the remaining
COAs are assessed, the most important advantage and disadvantage of each COA must be
emphasized. The number of advantages and disadvantages is not a decisive factor when
considering a COA. The recommendation from the staff on the best COA must be chosen in
relation to the tactical situation and the commander’s initial guidance. Sometimes a single
advantage can be crucial.

5.3 DEVELOPING NEW COAS DUE TO FUNDAMENTAL MISSION CHANGE

Several instigating events may trigger time-constrained planning. One of those is a fundamental
change in situation, time-constrained planning is necessary to develop a new COA. (see
paragraph 1.2.1.2). Below are necessary steps for developing a new COA in response to
fundamentally changed conditions. After these steps, planning reverts to the other time-
constrained steps previously detailed in this chapter.

5.3.1 Step 1: Compare the Current Situation to the Order

Ideally, commanders and their staff identify likely variances during initial planning, including
options that will be present, and actions that will be available when each variance occurs. Then,
during execution, commanders and staff monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions.
If identified, they then ask if these changes affect the overall conduct of operations or their part
in them and if the changes are significant. Finally, they identify if the changed conditions
represent variances from the order—especially all types of risks. The staff uses their ongoing
staff estimate to look for indicators of variances (examples listed in Table 5-1 below) that affect
their respective joint function. Additionally, the staff should be alert for answers to CCIRs that
support the anticipated decisions.

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Table 5-1. Indicators and variances

Indicators and variances that may require a rapid decision-making

Types
process
 Answer to a commander’s critical information requirement
 Identification of an information requirement
 Change in mission
General

 Change in organisation of unit

 Change in leadership of unit
 Signing or implementation of peace treaty or other key political arrangement
 Change in capabilities of subordinate unit
 Change in role of host nation military force
 Climate changes or natural disasters operation

 Impending changes in key military leadership

and control
Command

 Interference with freedom of the press or news media

 Receipt of a fragmentary order or warning order from higher headquarters
 Effective threat information efforts on civilians
 Loss of civilian communications nodes
 Loss of contact with a command post or commander
 Jamming or interference

 Success or failure in breaching or gap crossing operations

 Capture of significant numbers of enemy prisoners of war, enemy command posts, supply
points, or artillery units
Manoeuvre

 Establishment of roadblocks along major traffic routes

 Unexplained displacement of neighbourhoods within a given area of operations
 Success or failure of a subordinate unit task
 Modification of an airspace coordination measure
 Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to affect friendly operations
 Damages to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility
 Loss of one or more critical transportation systems

 Receipt of an air tasking order

 Battle damage assessment results
 Unplanned repositioning of firing units
 Identification of high payoff targets
Fires

 Identification of an information requirement

 Execution of planned fires
 Modification of a fire support coordination measure
 Effective enemy counter fire
 Negative effects of fires on civilians

 Identification of enemy main effort

 Identification of enemy reserves or counterattack
 Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation

Intelligence

Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for intelligence operations

 Identification of an information requirement
 Insertion of manned surveillance teams
 Disruption of primary and secondary education system
 Unexplained disappearance of key members of intelligence community
 Enemy electromagnetic attack use
 Indicators of illicit economic activity
 Identification of threats from within the population
 Identification of high value targets

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 Unmanned aircraft system launch

 Answer to a priority intelligence requirement
 Enemy rotary wing or unmanned aircraft system use

 Significant loss of capability in any class of supply

 Identification of significant incidences of disease and non-battle injury casualties
 Mass casualties
Sustainment

 Receipt of significant resupply

 Disruption of one or more essential civil services (such as water or electricity)
 Contact on a supply route
 Answer to a friendly force information requirement
 Mass detainees
 Degradations to essential civilian infrastructure by threat actions
 Civilian mass casualty event beyond capability of host nation resources
 Disruption of key logistics lines of communication
 Changes in availability of host nation support

 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear report, or other indicators of enemy chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear use
Force protection

 Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive devise use

 Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against civilians or friendly forces
 Increased criminal activity in a given area of operations
 Increase in organised protests or riots
 Identification of threats to communications or computer systems
 Reports of enemy targeting critical host nation infrastructure
 Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities
 Escalation of force incidents
 Loss of border security

5.3.2 Step 2: Determine the Type of the Decision Required

1. When a variance is identified, the commander directs action while the leaders of the staff
sections compare the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment
accomplishes the following:

a. describes the variance;

b. determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat and examines the
potential for either;

c. determines if a decision is needed by identifying if the variance:

(1) indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with
fewer resources;

(2) directly threatens the decisive action’s success;

(3) threatens the shaping action such that the variance may threaten the decisive action
directly or in the near future;

(4) can be addressed within the commander’s intent (and if so, determine what execution
decision is needed);

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(5) requires changing the CONOPs substantially (and if so, determine what adjustment
decision or new approach best suits the circumstances).

2. For minor variances, the lead staff elements work to determine whether changes to control
measures are needed. They determine how those changes affect their area of expertise. They
direct changes within their authority and notify the COS

3. Commanders intervene directly in cases that affect the overall direction of the unit/formation.
They describe the situation, direct their subordinates to provide any additional information they
need, and order either implementation of planned responses or development of an order to
redirect the forc

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ANNEX A RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS

AND STANAGS
General

NATO nations have concluded a wide range of agreements on various matters and more are
under negotiation. A selection of the more prominent publications is listed in AJP-3-2, Allied
Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Annex 3A.

It is noted that NATO STANAGs are not normally circulated directly to users, unlike allied
publications (APs). Their contents are included in national and command instructions (for
example, training pamphlets and SOPs).

Policy Documents

MC 0362/1; NATO Rules of Engagement.

Operational Doctrine

AJP-01; Allied Joint Doctrine (STANAG 2437).

AJP-02; Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, and Security Doctrine
(STANAG 2190).

AJP-2.1; Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures (STANAG 2191).

AJP-03; Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (STANAG 2490).

AJP-3.2; Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (STANAG 2288).

AJP-3.4.4; Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) (STANAG 2611).

AJP-3.9; Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (STANAG 2524).

AJP-3.19; Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (STANAG 2509).

AJP-3.14; Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection (STANAG 2528

Tactical Doctrine

ATP-3.2.1; Conduct of Land Tactical Operations (STANAG 2605).

ATP-3.2.1.1.; Conduct of Land Tactical Activities.

ATP-3.2.1.2; Conduct of Land Tactical Activities in Urban Environments.

ATP-3.2.2; Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (STANAG 2199).

ATP-3.9.2; Land Targeting (STANAG 2285).

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AAP-39, NATO Handbook of Land Operations Terminology (STANAG 2248).

Other

APP-6; NATO Joint Military Symbology (STANAG 2019).

APP-11; NATO Message Catalogue.

AAP-15; NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications 2020.

AIntP-17; Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE).

Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD).

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ANNEX B TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES

QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Figure B-1. Receipt of mission

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Figure B-2. Order analysis

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Figure B-3. Evaluation of factors

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Figure B-4. Course of action development

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Figure B-5. Course of action analysis

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Figure B-6. Course of action comparison

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Figure B-7. Commander’s decision

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Figure B-8. Orders production, dissemination, and transition

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Figure B-9. APP-28 Continues processes map

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ANNEX C LINKAGES OF NATO OPERATIONAL AND LAND

TACTICAL PLANNING PROCESSES ON THE COMPONENT
LEVEL
C.1 Introduction

C.1.1 A component command (CC) is defined as: In the NATO military command structure
(NCS) a third-level command organisation with specific air, maritime or land capabilities that is
responsible for operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the
NATO commander.53 A land component command (LCC) bridges operational level OPLAN
planning for campaigns and major operations into land tactical OPORD to coordinate battles,
engagements and activities. The LCC synchronizes land-based tactical effects across an
assigned area of operations and coordinates these effects with other CCs and the joint task
force (JTF).

C.1.2 While AJP-5 (A) is the keystone Allied joint doctrine for NATO doctrine for the planning
of operations, APP-28 provides a common approach to planning operations at the land tactical
level. It describes the tactical planning process - a process used by commanders and staffs to
receive and analyse a mission, to develop, analyse, and compare courses of action, decide on
the optimum COA, and produce a plan and orders for execution. The primary audience for APP-
28 is NATO commanders and staffs within multinational HQs at the LCC level and below. The
planning process outlined in APP-28 does not describe the detailed collaboration of the
component level with the operational level and other CC.

C.1.3 The Allied Command Operations COPD is the cornerstone document for planning staff
within the NATO military command structure and the NATO force structure. It describes the
operations planning process (OPP) from the military strategic level to the operational level and
the interaction of both with the higher tactical level commanders. It addresses all aspects of an
OPLAN, provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning, as well as identifying the
factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. It also contains the
standard structure and content of OPLANs. As such, it can be a reference for planning at
tactical levels, especially for HQs operating at the high end of the tactical level. 54 As stated, the
COPD focusses on the military strategic and operational level and the interaction with the
component command. COPD does not describe the planning activities on the component level.

C.1.4 This annex highlights some of the additional considerations that need to be taken into
account in case a land tactical echelon is employed as a LCC. It indicates some of the
necessary contributions from the tactical level to inform the NATO Crisis Response Planning
Process (NCRPP). The COPD is the document that implements the NCRPP on the operational
level. The primary focus of this annex is the interaction during Phase 3 ‘Component Estimate’
and Phase 4 ‘Component Plan Development’. Phase 5 ‘Execution’ and Phase 6 ‘Transition’ are
outside the scope of APP-28 and not considered. Figure C-1 illustrates the differences as well
as the overlap between operational and tactical planning.

—————
53 NATO agreed.
54 AJP-5.

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Figure C-1. Applicable doctrine/directives overview

C.2 Overview

C.2.1 AJP-5 identifies two main operations planning categories; advance planning and crisis
response planning. Advance planning is conducted to deal with potential threats to the
Alliance when identified and before they occur.55 Advance planning is used to develop plans
for a broad range of activities based on requirements identified by the North Atlantic Council.
Crisis response planning addresses emerging and unexpected crises and is based on
circumstances that exist at the time planning is conducted.

C.2.2 Operations planning can be conducted in a sequential, parallel, or collaborative

manner, as shown in figure C-2. These methods are applied by all levels of command.

C.2.2.1 Sequential planning process operations planning is conducted by the higher-level

commander and staff; this is followed by planning at the subordinate HQs. This method is best
suited for advanced planning but can be used for crisis response planning, if time allows.

C.2.2.2 Parallel planning, in which the commanders at various levels of command56 initiate the
operations planning process staggered by a brief time-lapse and conduct their planning efforts

—————
55
Graduated response plans.
56 COPD describes this process for overall 4 levels of command: North Atlantic Council/MC, SHAPE, operational, and
component.

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concurrently. Parallel planning is ideally suited for crisis response operations with limited time
to plan due to an imminent threat.

C.2.2.3 Collaborative planning is a very dynamic process that requires disciplined information
management. This method implies the interaction between two or more command echelons
involved in the operations planning process. It allows subordinate commanders to provide the
superior commander with their assessment and advice.

Collaborative planning may be more appropriate for meeting contingency situations, which can
occur during the conduct of an operation, requiring an urgent plan revision.

Figure C-2. Planning categories and planning manners overview

C.2.3 COPD addresses crisis response planning only and utilizes a parallel planning manner.
APP-28 outlines a more sequential planning approach with the higher level of command
concentrating on the actual level of command while COPD describes a comprehensive process
covering four different tiers of command. Phase 3 (Operational Estimate) in the COPD57 applies
very similar planning principles as outlined in APP-28. The tactical planning process is generally
fit for purpose to be used on the land component level but may require likely modifications
pending on requirements of the COPD. Nevertheless, the output(s) that need(s) to be
developed during Steps 2 to 6 differs slightly. The developed product must help to validate
requirements and the operational design of the operational level during their sub-phase 3b
(COA Development) and sub-phase 4a (CONOPS Development).

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57 COPD V 3.0, chapter 4.

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C.2.4 APP-28 starts the planning process with Step 1 (Receipt of Mission). This will equal the
issuing of the operational planning guidance at the end of sub-phase 3a (Mission Analysis) on
the operational level and will formerly start phase 3 (Components Estimate) on the CC-level
according to COPD. Planning activities during Phase 1 (Initial Situational Awareness of
Potential / Actual Crisis) and Phase 2 (Component Appreciation of the Strategic Environment)
need to be developed by HQ certified as LCC and outlined in their SOPs58 in accordance with
their structure and manning. HQ allied land command may cover Phase 1 and Phase 2
supporting one or more JTF in the role as land domain advisor before handing over to a LCC
certified corps HQ to execute Phase 3 to 6 for a designated AOR inside a joint operations area
(JOA). This hand over/ take over might even take place at the end of Phase 4 (Component
Plan Development) and a designated corps HQ will become the LCC with the issuing of the
activation order at the beginning of Phase 5 (Execution).59 This is a common procedure, if a
crisis response planning effort is based on an advance plan.

Figure C-3. COPD – APP 28 planning process comparison

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58 AAP-39 Ed. B, ver. 1, NATO Handbook of Land Operations Terminology.
59 This is only possible when Phase I of the OPLAN is fully executable and does not need refinement.

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C.3 Potential additional domain input to inform OPP

C.3.1 Force / capability and C2 requirements. The mission analysis needs to identify critical
tactical capability requirements and forces. This will help the operational level to validate their
draft Combined Joint Statement of Requirements.

C.3.2 C2 Requirements:

a. JOA/ AOR.The JOA and AOR designated by supreme Allied commander Europe /
operational level commander are analysed. Conclusions from this analysis will help the land
operations planning group to determine tactical requirements, such as final destination, lines
of communication, assembly areas, battle positions, force and logistic requirements, etc. It
will also assist the joint operations planning group to determine if the provisional JOA and
AOR as proposed in the operational planning directive meets the COM’s needs.

b. C2 Functions and Locations. The next step is to appreciate what actions will be
accomplished, where and by what kind of forces. This should include evaluating how C2
could be configured and phased if the LCC will deploy utilising different HQ configurations.

c. Liaison and Coordination. The location of other NATO or non-NATO military HQs,
international and governmental authorities in the area may require a permanent high level
C2 presence which will influence C2 requirements.

d. Span of Control/ Command Authority. Following military principles, the COM will want
to balance the advantages and disadvantages between a relatively flat organisation and a
multilevel hierarchy. In the land domain, this will be influenced by geography and the
assumed enemy COA.

C.3.3 Critical Tactical Requirements:

a. Information, Knowledge, and Intelligence. The mission analysis will highlight gaps in
information, knowledge, and intelligence, including that which is critical for subsequent
command decisions. CCIRs are provided to the operational level, other CC, subordinate and
supporting commands. CCIRs cover all aspects of the COM’s concern including FFIRs,
EEFIs, and the PIRs.

b. Critical Support and Resource. These must capture the military capabilities (abilities -
across all warfighting functions), sustainment, enabling and operational support
requirements required to accomplish the mission; the estimated NATO resource implications
associated with delivering these requirements must be reflected in the request to the
operational level.

c. Preconditions for Success. The land operations planning group must identify any
essential conditions that are beyond the influence of the HQ that must be established by the
operational level or SHAPE to allow tactical success. These may include legal agreements,
host nation support and regulation with regards to transfer of command authority over
National Home Defence Forces in the AOR as well as battle space management authorities.

d. ROEs. The land operations planning group need to analyse the provisional ROEs
provided in the operational planning guidance and/or the operational planning directive
against the components provisional mission and should highlight any potential mismatch

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with so far identified requirements for use of force / actions. The detailed development of
ROE requirements will continue during COA development and comparison.

e. Crisis Response Measures. The mission analysis will highlight tactical requirements
that may call for the implementation of critical response measures by the supreme Allied
commander Europe and nations to ensure that necessary preparations are being made and
that capabilities will be ready and available.

f. Interaction with other relevant military actors. The joint operations planning group
needs to consider with which military actors there is a need to interact for the reasons noted
below. These forces include. national home defence forces not assigned to NATO, or NATO-
member forces not assigned to NATO in the AOR.

(1) military actions in support of non-military activity;

(2) mutual support;

(3) de-confliction of critical activities.

C.3.4 Operational/Tactical Design. An operational/tactical design is an expression of the

commander’s vision for the transformation of an overall unacceptable condition into a series of
acceptable conditions. This is done by the establishing decisive conditions along lines of
operation leading to the achievement of objectives in support of the higher level objectives and
NATO end state.

C.3.4.1 A land tactical design on the component level is not always a necessity. However, the
more complex an operation is the greater is the need for a land tactical design nested with the
operational design. During planning, the tactical design helps sequencing the operation,
identifying DPs60 and supports the estimate of force/capability requirements linking tasks to
tactical effects or decisive conditions. This allows the creation of troops to task list and enables
force/capability estimation. Furthermore, it provides a common basis for the development of
COA and missions to subordinate units. During execution it allows the assessment of progress
and refinement of plans to deal with foreseen (branch plan and sequels) and unforeseen
events. If the provisional mission does not require a land tactical design, it has to be ensured
that the development of DC, operational effects and actions on the operational level is informed
by the LCC during their planning process to allow the operational level effective tasking.

—————
60 In case a land tactical design is developed by the land operations planning group, DP must be linked to decision support
matrix.

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ANNEX D WAR GAMING

D.1 General

War gaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempts to visualise the flow of
a battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; adversary
assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the AOR. It relies heavily on a doctrinal
foundation, tactical judgment, and experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of
the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and
counteraction. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with tactical possibilities
otherwise difficult to achieve. With new technologies available, this process can be shortened
using combat force ratios derived from extensive data banks and software to do analysis of
COAs. However, the commander or COS must determine how much time to commit to the war-
gaming process.

D.2 Process Overview

1. War gaming is one method of conducting COA analysis. It identifies which COA best
accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future operations. (See Figure D-
1.) It helps the commander and staff to—

a. Determine how to maximise combat power against the adversary while protecting the
friendly forces and minimising collateral damage;

b. Have as near an identical a visualisation of the battle as possible;

c. Anticipate events during the operation or activity;

d. Determine conditions and resources required for success;

e. Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities;

f. Focus IPOE on desired outcome, decisive points, and adversary strengths, weaknesses,
and COG;

g. Identify coordination requirements to produce synchronized results;

h. Determine the most flexible COA.

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Figure D-1. War gaming

2. During the war game, the staff plays out one or more COAs to determine the strengths and
weaknesses of each one. War gaming supports the commander and staff (and subordinate
commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) to identify unforeseen
events, tasks, requirements, or problems. As a result the commander may task the staff to
improve or to develop a new COA.

D.3 The General Rules of War Gaming

Staff conducting war games need to:

a. Remain objective. Staff do not allow personality or their sense of “what the commander
wants” to influence them. They must avoid defending a COA just because they personally
developed it.

b. Accurately record strengths and weaknesses of each COA as they become evident.

c. Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the COA. If a COA fails any
of these tests during the war game, they must reject it.

d. Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions.

Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This must wait until Step 5 (COA
Comparison).

D.4 War Gaming Responsibilities

1. The commander is essential to a successful war game. They normally do not participate
directly because their presence might unduly influence the staff to generate results in the
direction it perceives the commander desires rather than analyse objectively. However,
commanders may also participate in it, especially if time is critical. As part of their planning

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guidance, commanders decide which friendly or adversary COAs they want the war game to
analyse. During the war game or at the war game briefing, the leader of the wargame (COS)
decides how to solve problems arising from the game, where DPs are, and which contingencies
to plan. By doing so, commanders check their intent and get an overview of the operation.

2. The COS is responsible for coordinating actions of the staff during the war game. The COS
is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the staff stays on a timeline and
accomplishes the goals of the war gaming session. In a time-constrained environment, they
ensure that, at a minimum, the essential task(s) is war gamed.

3. The G-1 or S-1 analyses COAs to determine how combat service support provides
personnel support during operations.

4. The G-2 or S-2 role-plays the adversary commander. They develop critical adversary
decision points in relation to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions,
and projects adversary losses. Besides playing the adversary commander, the G-2 or S-2
assigns the role of friendly G-2 or S-2 to another member of the staff section if section strength
allows. They ensure that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each adversary COA.
For the friendly force, the G-2 or S-2—

a. Identifies information requirements and refines the DSO to include named areas of
interest that support decision points and refines the DSOM with corresponding decision
points, target areas of interest, and high-payoff targets.

b. Refines situation templates.

c. Participates in the targeting meetings and determines high pay-off targets based on
IPOE.

5. The leader of the wargame (COS) normally selects the techniques and methods that the
staff will use for war gaming. The G-3 or S-3 staff must ensure that the war game of the COA
covers every operational aspect of the mission, records each event’s threats and opportunities,
and annotates the rationale.

6. The G-4 or S-4 analyses each COA to assess its sustainment feasibility. They determine
critical requirements for each sustainment function by analysing each COA to identify potential
problems and deficiencies. In addition, the G-4 or S-4 ensures that available movement times
and assets will support the COA.

7. The G-6 or S-6 analyses each COA to assess its command and control feasibility. They
determine critical requirements, constrains, and restrains by analysing each COA to identify
potential problems and deficiencies.

8. The G-9 or S-9 analyses each COA for effectively integrating the civil considerations of the
mission and operational variables. They also focus on host nation support, local populations
and actors, and the care of displaced civilians. Their analysis of each COA considers the impact
of operations on public order and safety, potential for disaster relief requirements, non-
combatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and protection of culturally significant
sites. If the unit does not have an assigned G-9 or S-9, the unit assigns these responsibilities
to a staff member.

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9. Other staff officers, such as legal officers and chaplains, help the coordinating staff by
analysing the COAs in their own areas of expertise.

D.5 War Gaming Steps

The staff follows nine steps during the war gaming preparation process.

1. Gather the tools. The tools required include, but are not limited to—

a. current coordinating staff estimates;

b. event template;

c. recording method.

d. complete COAs, to include manoeuvre, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security

graphics;

e. means to post adversary and friendly unit symbols;

f. map of the AOR (either paper or digital);

g. updated staff estimates and common operational picture.

2. List all friendly forces. The commander and staff consider all units that can be committed
to the operation or activity, paying special attention to support relationships and constraints.
The friendly force list remains constant for all COAs the staff analyses.

3. List assumptions. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued
validity and necessity.

4. List known critical events and decision points. Critical events are those that directly
influence mission accomplishment. The list of critical events includes major events from the
unit’s current position to the accomplishment of the mission. Decision points are events or
locations in the AOR where tactical decisions are required during mission execution. Decision
points do not dictate what the decision is, only that one must be made, and when and where it
should be made, to have the maximum impact on friendly or adversary COAs. When time is
short, the staff must reduce the list to only essential critical events and decision points.

5. Determine evaluation criteria. Evaluation criteria are those factors the staff uses to
measure the relative effectiveness of one COA relative to other COAs following the war game.
Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission. Evaluation criteria may include anything the
commander desires. The criteria should look not only at what will create success, but also at
what will cause failure. They are updated as the operation progresses.

6. Select the war game technique. There are three recommended techniques: the belt, the
avenue-in-depth, and the box.

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a. Belt Technique. The belt technique divides the AOR into belts (areas) running the width
of the AOR. The shape of the belt is based on mission and operational variables analysis.
The belt technique is most effective when terrain is divided into well-defined cross-
compartments; during phased operations (such as river crossings, air assaults, or airborne
operations) or when the adversary is deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons. (See
Figure D-2.)

Figure D-2. Belt technique

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b. Avenue-in-Depth Technique. The avenue-in-depth technique focuses on one avenue
of approach at a time, beginning with the decisive operation. This technique is good for
offensive COAs or in the defence when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support. (See
Figure D-3).

Figure D-3. Avenue-in-depth technique

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c. Box Technique. The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an
engagement area, a river-crossing site, or a landing zone. It is most useful when time is
constrained, as in a hasty attack, and is particularly useful when conducting operations in a
non-contiguous AOR. When using this technique, the staff isolates the area and focuses on
critical events in it. (See Figure D-4).

Figure D-4. Box technique

7. Select a method to record and display results. Two methods are often used to portray
the action: the synchronization matrix and the sketch note. In both methods, staff members
record any remarks regarding the strengths and weaknesses they discover. The amount of
detail depends on the time available. Details and methods of recording and displaying war
game results are best addressed in unit SOPs and SOIs.

a. The synchronization matrix method allows the staff to synchronize the COA across time
and space in relation to the adversary COA.

b. The sketch note method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or tasks and
purposes. These notes reference specific locations on the map or relate to general
considerations covering broad areas. They assign the event a number and a title and use
the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence as shown in Figure D-5.

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(1) tasks and assets (allocated forces);

(2) expected adversary / friendly actions and reactions and assets;

(3) friendly / adversary counteractions and assets;

(4) total assets needed for the task;

(5) estimated time to accomplish the task;

(6) decision points when the commander must decide to execute the task;

(7) CCIRs;

(8) control measures execution.

Figure D-5. War game work sheet

8. War game the battle and assess the results. During the war game, the commander and
staff try to foresee the dynamics of a battle’s action, reaction, and counteraction. Actions are
those events initiated by the side with the initiative (normally the force on the offensive).
Reactions are the other side’s actions in response. Counteractions are the first side’s
responses to reactions. The war game can result in the following tasks for the commander and
staff:

a. refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches61 and sequels62 that
become on-order or be-prepared missions;

—————
61 A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of
movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruption caused by enemy
actions and reactions. See ATP-3.2.2 for more information.
62 Sequel is the subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current

major operation or phase. With computers now performing some activities, commanders and staffs can shift their time and

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b. refining location and timing of decision points;

c. refining the adversary event template and matrix;

d. refining task organisation;

e. refining tasks the unit must retain and tasks to be assigned to subordinate commanders;

f. refining the allocation of joint functions assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish

their missions;

g. refining decision points;

h. refining a synchronization matrix;

i. refining DSO and DSOM;

j. refining information activity objectives and tasks;

k. refining estimates of the duration of each critical event as well as of the entire operation;

l. projecting the percentage of total adversary forces defeated in each critical event, and
overall. Identifying likely times and areas for adversary use of weapons of mass destruction
and friendly CBRN defence requirements;

m. refining the location and commitment of the reserve;

n. refining the most dangerous adversary COA;

o. refining the location of the commander, unit command posts, and computer information
systems nodes;

p. refining additional critical events;

q. refining additional requirements for joint functions support;

r. refining requirements for deception and surprise;

s. refining C2 requirements, to include control measures and updated operational graphics;

t. refining CCIRs and information requirements—to include the last time information is of
value - and incorporating them into the reconnaissance and surveillance plan;

u. refining the intelligence collection and dissemination plan and the resulting
reconnaissance and surveillance plan and graphics;

v. refining information activities objectives and tasks;

—————

mental energy from lower order thinking skills to higher order thinking skills of transforming information into knowledge
and understanding. See ATP-3.2.2 for more information.

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w. refining fire support, engineer, air defence, information, and combat service support
plans and graphics;

x. refining or confirming the locations of decisive points, named areas of interest, target
areas of interest, and information requirements needed to support the decision points;

y. refining the timing of force concentration and initiation of the attack or counterattack;

z. refining movement times and tables for critical assets, to include computer information
systems nodes;

aa. identifying, analysing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the COA;

bb. refining the targeting process, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff targets
and determining attack guidance;

cc. refining risk monitoring plan as well as risk controls;

9. War Game Briefing (optional). Time permitting, a war game briefing is conducted to ensure
the staff comprehends fully the results of the war game. This briefing is not given to the
commander, but it is the staff’s means to review the war games to ensure that the decision
briefing to the commander covers all relevant points. It is normally given to the COS or the
deputy or assistant commander and may include selected subordinate staff in a collaborative
environment.

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ANNEX E OPTIONAL FORMATS

Briefing Formats

The following optional formats provide examples of the briefs that occur at various points in the
planning process.

Receipt of Mission Briefing

The receipt of mission briefing may consist of the most recent and relevant changes on the
following topics as illustrated in Table E-1.

Table E-1. Receipt of mission briefing

STEP 1: RECEIPT OF MISSION BRIEFING (OPTIONAL)

COM TO STAFF PLUS COM AND STAFF INTERNALLY
PURPOSE: TO HIGHLIGHT INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR STAFF TO
PLAN
Subject Who
1 Running estimates/ staff estimates COS/G-5/SME

2 Superior headquarters’ commander’s intent (2-up)

Higher headquarters’ commander’s mission, intent,

3
and concept of operation (1-up)
4 Formation’s/unit’s role in the overall plan
COM/COS
Missions of adjacent formation/unit and their relation-
5
ship to the higher headquarters’ plan
6 Area of operations
7 Situation own forces (including logistics)
8 Mission timelines
Initial results of IPOE (evaluation of the environment)
9 G-2
and identified relevant actors.
10 Planning timelines COS
11 Commander’s guidance COM
12 Staff direction and workplan COS

Orders Analysis Briefing

The orders analysis briefing should consist of the content outlined in Table E-2.

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Table E-2. Orders analysis briefing

STEP 2A: ORDER ANALYSIS BRIEFING

COMMANDER TO STAFF
PURPOSE: TO CREATE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE
UPCOMING MISSION
Subject Who
1 Running estimates/ staff estimates COS/G-5/specialist
2 Superior headquarters’ commander’s intent (2-up)
Higher headquarters’ commander’s mission, intent,
3
and concept of operation (1-up)
4 Formation’s/unit’s role in the overall plan
Missions of adjacent formation/unit and their relation-
5
ship to the higher headquarters’ plan
6 Area of operations
7 Specified and implied tasks
8 Essential tasks
9 Constraints and restraints (including logistics)
COM/COS
10 Facts and assumptions
11 Mission timeline/planning timeline
12 Risk (opportunities and threats)
13 Go, no-go and abort criteria for the operation
14 Evaluation criteria
15 Initial CCIRs
16 Mission statement
17 (initial) Commander’s intent
18 Additional commander’s guidance

Mission Analysis Briefing

The mission analysis briefing may consist of the content outlined in Table E-3 (not in any
particular order).

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Table E-3. Mission analysis briefing

STEP 2B: MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING

STAFF TO COMMANDER
PURPOSE: TO INFORM THE COMMANDER OF THE STAFF’S RESULTS OF
THE ORDER ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF FACTORS
Subject Who
1 Superior headquarters’ commander’s intent (2-up)
Higher headquarters’ commander’s mission, intent,
2
and concept of operation (1-up)
3 Mission statement
4 (initial) Commander’s intent
5 Specified, implied and essential tasks
6 Facts and assumptions
7 Constraints and restraints (including logistics)
Risk (context and analysis identified opportunities and COS/G-5
8
threats)
9 Go, no-go and abort criteria for the operation
10 CCIRs
11 Updated operational timelines
12 Updated staff planning timeline
Troops and support (including forces available and
13 capability shortfalls and (friendly) CoG, as well as
logistics)
14 Evaluation criteria
Initial intelligence collection plan (ICP) and/or initial
15
ISR approach
16 Adversary/enemy CoGs
17 Adversary/enemy COAs G-2
18 Terrain analysis products, overlays and conclusions
19 Weather forecast, matrix and conclusions
20 Civil environment considerations
CMI/G9
21 Information environment considerations
22 Commander’s guidance COM
23 Work plan staff COS

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Course of Action Briefing (optional)

Table E-4. Course of action briefing

STEP 3: COA BRIEFING (OPTIONAL)

STAFF TO COMMANDER
PURPOSE: TO INFORM THE COMMANDER OF THE DEVELOPED
COAS
Subject Who
An updated IPOE with the focus on the most likely
1
and most dangerous adversary/enemy COAs
As many threat COAs as necessary or as specified by G-2
2 the commander (at minimum the most likely and most
dangerous threat COA)
Superior commander’s (2-up) intent and
3
higher commander’s (1-up) mission and intent
4 Approved mission statement
COS/G5
COA statements and sketches including updated
5
synchronization matrices
6 Refined COA evaluation criteria
7 Commander’s guidance COM
8 Work plan staff COS

The COA briefing may include:

a. any changes to the IPOE with focus on the most likely and most dangerous adversary
COAs, including conclusions for own COA development ;

b. COA statements and sketches, including updated synch matrices.

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Course of Action Analysis Brief

Table E-5. Course of action analysis briefing

STEP 4: COA ANALYSIS BRIEFING (OPTIONAL)

STAFF TO COMMANDER
PURPOSE: TO INFORM THE COMMANDER OF COA ANALYSIS
RESULTS
Subject Who
1 Updated IPOE G2
Superior commander’s (2-up) intent and
2
higher commander’s (1-up) mission and intent
3 Own intent and mission statement
(war game) Technique used
Friendly and adversary/enemy COAs that were
analysed/war gamed
- Assumptions used
- Critical events COS/G5
- Possible enemy actions and reactions
4
- Possible impact on civilians
- Possible media impacts
- Modifications to the COAs
- Strength and weaknesses
- Risks (opportunities and threats)
Result of the analysis/war game
Commander’s guidance
- Approval of modifications to COAs
5 COM
- Refinement of COAs
- COA comparison
6 Work plan staff COS

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Course of Action Decision Brief

Table E-6. Course of action decision briefing

STEP 5: COA DECISION BRIEFING

STAFF TO COMMANDER
PURPOSE: TO RECOMMEND THE COMMANDER THE STAFF’S
PREFERRED COA
Subject Who
1 Updated IPOE G2
Superior commander’s (2-up) intent
2
higher commander’s (1-up) mission and intent
3 Own intent
The COAs considered
- Assumptions used
- A summary of the war game for each COA,
COS/G5
including critical events, modifications to any
4
COA and war game results
- Advantages and disadvantages (including
risks) of each COA
- Evaluation criteria results
5 The (staff) recommended COA
6 Commander’s final planning guidance COM
7 Work plan staff COS

Confirmation Brief (optional)

The confirmation brief may consist of the content outlined in Table E-7.

Table E-7. Confirmation brief optional format

Item Action By Time

Main focus (intent and mission statement) of 1-up commander Commander
My role and effect to accomplish in the 1-up commander’s plan Commander
My coordination requirements: With whom and about what Commander
Other questions for 1-up commander Commander

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Back Brief (optional)

Table E-8. Back brief optional format

Item Action By Time

My role/task in the 1-up commander’s plan Commander
Intended objective(s)/effects to achieve Commander
Implied tasks in time and space requiring execution Commander
Identified constraints/restraints and their effect on mission Commander
Conditions to be provided by the higher level(s) and (additional) Commander
requirements
(Additional) information requirements Commander
Identified risks (opportunities and threats) Commander
Identified critical points in the 1-up commander’s plan related to Commander
my mission
My coordination requirements: With whom and about what Commander
Questions Commander

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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ANNEX F OPTIONAL TEMPLATES

COA Statement Template

Figure F-1. COA statement template

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Example of a Sync Matrix Template

Figure F-2. Sync matrix template

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ANNEX G OPTIONAL TOOLS

Several analysis support techniques exist. The selections presented in this Appendix
are intended for use, if desired, by staff components.

Commander’s Visualisation Tool

1. The purpose of this tool is to provide a cognitive path to integrate the outcomes of the order
analysis up to, and in support of, the development of the (initial) intent, mission statement and
planning guidance.

2. Commander’s visualisation. A commander, and staff, who are able to visualise the
battlespace, identify the key activities to be undertaken, and the frictions and risks to be
overcome will generally produce better plans. A clear picture should be developed so that
appropriate planning guidance can be provided for COA development. Visualisation requires
experience and practice. The commander’s visualisation is a methodology, complementary to
mission analysis, which provides a synopsis of the situation, the commander’s initial impression
of the task(s), a description of how they fit into the plan and what is important to them. It is used
to consolidate the commander’s thoughts and express them concisely to the staff, and as a
reference point for the remainder of the planning process.

Visualise the Battlespace

1. The targeted and deliberate use of combat power is one of the most important skills of a
military commander. Decisive is the ability to create the right effects at the right time in the
operating environment within existing and imposed parameters (including orders or mandate,
responsibilities, constraint and restraints). Conceptually, the combination of the operating
environment and the parameters define the commander’s battlespace.63 For the mission at
hand, identifying the battlespace builds on an understanding of the context and the order
analysis.

2. Understanding the context. Understanding is the ability to know why something has
happened/is happening (insight), and to identify and anticipate what may happen (foresight).
Understanding starts with the analysis of the operating environment, after which the
commander and their staff determine the role of the military in support of attaining the end state
and achieving higher-level objectives. Without understanding the conflict and its context, the
operating environment, the audiences and threats, own capabilities and the capabilities of other
actors, the use of combat power will not be effective and efficient.

3. Orders analysis serves to extract specified and implied do’s and don’ts, narrowing the
battlespace from the full range of means, capabilities and the imaginary to requirements,
freedoms and limits in time and space. Note that limits are also imposed by the risk attitude of
the commander.

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63 The battlespace is the part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted (NATO
agreed).

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Identify Key Activities

1. This is a creative process, not a purely mechanistic one. Although it builds on vertical
integration and working backwards from outcomes through objectives and effects to actions as
a method, application of the method requires creativity and originality. Doctrine supports the
process.

2. Vertical integration. Using the outcomes of the order analysis, during vertical integration64
a force’s role in the operation is identified and subsequently analysed from the intent of the
commander 2-up and the CONOPS of the commander 1-up. This seeks to allow the
commander to understand their commander’s desired outcome, objectives and main effort, the
context in which they will be operating and the nature of the problem to be solved. The ‘intent’
of other key joint, interagency, multinational, and public actors should also be analysed.

3. Outcome, objectives, effects, actions (OOEAs). An understanding of the relationship

between outcome, objective(s) and what needs to be accomplished in terms of effects and
actions is crucial to successful planning. It not only helps a commander to understand the 1-up
commander’s CONOPS, but also aids the analysis of specified and implied tasks. When
considering OOEA, it is essential to understand that actions might not necessarily result in
desired effects and that the necessary simplicity and flexibility must therefore be built into plans.
In addition, while establishing cause and effect can sometimes be difficult, especially with
regard to human behaviour, it is critical to effective assessment. Appropriate measures of
effectiveness and measures of performance must therefore be established during planning.
The ‘layered’ relationship between outcomes – objectives – effects – actions, with definitions,
is depicted in Figure G.1. The OOEAs interrelationship expressed succinctly is actions create
effects; effects achieve objectives, and objectives attain the desired outcome.

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64 Vertical integration: commanders’ nesting their plans in the context and intent of superiors, at least two levels up and ensuring
that their own direction is resourced two levels down.

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Figure G-1. Relationship outcome, objectives, effects, actions65

4. Depending on the context, the use of desired outcome and effects may not apply to every
tactical planning. For instance, in a time-constrained environment a command may choose to
turn immediately to objectives and what needs to be accomplished in terms of actions. Certain
tactical levels may also merely consider objective – action relationships. The higher tactical
levels however, in particular those that conduct deep, close and rear operations, should
consider the joint, interagency, multinational, and public operating environment,66 effects
dimensions,67 and operational domains.68 These tactical levels therefore must synchronize and
deconflict all activity within this context. To which tactical levels this applies depends on the
operational context and national perspectives

5. Creativity and originality. Simply processing the results of vertical integration methodically
into OOEA is likely to lead to a predictable intent and plan, as adversaries and other actors will
(to a certain degree) be familiar with NATO’s approach to operations (the conceptual
component). Therefore, it is essential to use imagination, creativity and originality.

—————
65 Note that actions describe a task in terms of WHAT needs to be accomplished, not HOW it is to be done.
66 For ease of understanding, the operating environment may be broken down into discrete environments that describe the
surroundings of activity from a specific perspective. Examples include: information, urban, political, human (AJP-01).
67 Effect dimensions is a targeting framework for understanding the purpose, consequences, and measurements of military

activities in the operating environment. It provides a clearer view on OOEA relationships. The three effects dimensions are:
cognitive, physical, and virtual (AJP-01).
68 Operational domains are defined as discrete spheres of capabilities and activities that are applied in the battlespace.

Operational does not reflect the operational level of operations, it reflects operations and activity within the battlespace. The
five operational domains are: maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace. They are complemented by the electromagnetic and
acoustic spectra. Although these spectra could be viewed as discrete spheres of capability or activity, they do not constitute
an operational domain (AJP-01).

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Part of the creative process is to consider deception as a tool to create favourable conditions
and windows of opportunity.69 Deception must have a clearly defined aim, specifying the
desired behaviour of an adversary, which must support the overall concept. Deception may
cause friction and risk(s) that require treatment, as it is likely to affect friendly, supportive and
neutral actors as well. The commander’s conclusions with regards to deception inform the
narrative, that will complement the (initial) intent, and the commander’s planning guidance.

Doctrinal support. Doctrine supports the commander and staff throughout the planning
process. During mission analysis, primary support is provided by the overarching doctrinal
approaches and principles that apply across all operations themes, the continuum of
competition and levels of operations.

6. The behaviour-centric approach serves to determine the conditions that would mark the
outcome, identify the stakeholders and (the required changes in) their behaviour to attain the
outcome. The manoeuvrist approach supports the identification of (military) objectives in the
mission analysis. The effect centric approach subsequently helps to identify effects to create in
order to achieve the objectives. The multi-domain approach and a comprehensive approach
aid in identifying parallel and collaborative military and civil actions in time and space that would
create desired effects.

7. The principles of military operations provide enduring considerations for the conduct of
operations at all levels. Understanding and applying these principles, which have proven
successful in past conflicts, enables a coherent approach to ‘the problem’ at hand.

8. Doctrinal frameworks may be used substantiate, order, and sequence objective(s), effects,
and actions into a coherent concept. The joint functions70 in the land environment ensure
military (and nonmilitary) activity is harmonized in time and geographically71 to find, fix, and
strike a target audience and exploit opportunity in the physical, virtual and cognitive
dimension.72 These activities are either decisive, shaping or sustaining73 for changing the
behaviour of a target audience.

Identify Frictions and Risk

Identifying potential for friction and risk(s) is part of the creative process. A final examination
may be conducted before the commander consolidates their thoughts. However, with risk
attitude already identified at an earlier stage, potential friction and risk(s) in the concept should
be manageable. Risk management is expanded in SRD 28.1

—————
69 Deception is deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the
commander’s objectives. AJP-3.10.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception.
70 The joint functions in the land environment support the identification of appropriate military and nonmilitary activities that

would create the desired effects, achieve the objective(s) and the intended behaviour (ATP-3.2.1).
71 The geographical framework supports the arrangement of resources, C2, architecture and activities in time and space in the

operating environment. It distinguishes in deep, close, and rear (ATP-3.2.1).

72 The functional framework supports the arrangement of activities to create the desired effects by synchronising and integrating

the core functions find, fix, strike, and exploit (ATP-3.2.1).

73 The land operations framework describes how the effects to be created by actions achieve the desired objectives through their

purpose, being decisive, shaping or sustaining (ATP-3.2.1).

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Consolidation

1. The commander’s thoughts are consolidated in the (initial) intent, the mission statement and
planning guidance. The (initial) intent is often associated by a schematic or sketch and
complemented by the commander's narrative. In the narrative the commander states how the
force will express the intent in the battlespace, in communication and engagement. This drives
the planning of tactical activity to ensure that there will be no 'say-do' gap. Hence, both intent
and narrative serve to develop the planning guidance.

2. The commander’s thoughts are consolidated in the (initial) intent, the mission statement and
planning guidance. The (initial) intent is often associated by a schematic or sketch and
complemented by the commander's narrative. In the narrative the commander states how the
force will express the intent in the battlespace, in communication and engagement.74 This drives
the planning of tactical activity to ensure that there will be no 'say-do' gap. Hence, both intent
and narrative serve to develop the planning guidance.

Three Column Model Tool

One means of planning analysis is through the application of the three-column model
(see Table G.1). In this model, the first column captures all the factors, assumptions
and any related questions are generated by the commander and staff during their
analysis of the problem. The second column captures the deductions resulting in
answering the related questions from column one. The third column summarises the
conclusions from the deductions captured in column two. These conclusions can take
various forms. For example: a series of RFIs; a set of requests for clarification to the
2-up commander; tasks to be assigned to units; commander’s guidance (including
constraints and restraints); etc.

—————
74 The intent is internal affairs and (partly) secret, the narrative is the public stance.

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Table G-1. Three column model

Centre of Gravity Analysis Tool75

1. Centre of Gravity Analysis Model. The purpose of this tool is to provide a cognitive path
to the identification of critical strengths and, in particular, critical vulnerabilities. This is
fundamental to the application of the manoeuvrist approach, which aims to attack the
adversary’s critical vulnerabilities as well as to build our partners’ strengths and reduce and
protect own weaknesses and vulnerabilities.76

2. A COG is the primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action,
or will to fight. At the tactical level, it is normally a physical strength. It is the entity representing
the primary physical strength an actor depends on to carry out its (assumed) intent and achieve
its (assumed) objectives.77 Commanders and their staff analyse the COG using the concepts
of critical capabilities and critical requirements to end up at the critical vulnerabilities. From

—————
75 Steven D. Kornatz, “The Primacy of COG in Planning–Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Forces Quarterly, ed. 82 (2016): 91–
91
76 AJP-3.2.
77 AJP-5.

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there, conclusions can be drawn that support COA development, risk management and further
planning efforts.

3. The COG analysis model consists of two main parts: the COG identification & validation and
the analysis. The full model contains the following elements:

a. critical strengths (CS);

b. critical weaknesses (CW);

c. COG;

d. critical capabilities (CC);

e. critical requirements (CR);

f. critical vulnerabilities.

Figure G-2. The full centre of gravity analysis model

4. The elements are depicted in a logical sequence that provides order and focus to the
findings in the IPOE and the review of troops and support available. How to use it is up to
commander and staff. It is not mandatory to follow the order as depicted 78 or to use and/or
populate all fields as it is a cognitive process that commander and staff can also perform
mentally or verbally. Essential, however, is to start from the objective and to end with
conclusions on how to exploit respectively protect the COG critical vulnerabilities as tangible
input for further planning.

COG identification and validation

1. The COG is identified and validated by considering the actors’ (assumed) objective(s) (i.e.
ends), intent (i.e. ways) and capabilities (means). The capabilities are examined and analysed
to identify the entity that will provide the primary source of power to achieve the objective within
the intent. They may be considered by joint function initially but should end up at an entity,

—————
78 Some planners may prefer to first identify the critical capabilities the actor requires to achieve the objective(s) and then
identify the primary entity that possesses most of those critical capabilities to establish the COG.

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whether a singular unit or a specific grouping in the actors’ (assumed) COA.79 In operations
other than warfighting it may not be a military style unit or grouping, hence the use of the term
entity.

2. As the COG is related to the actors’ (assumed) objective(s) and intent it may be different
when an alternate COA is chosen. It may also change when the actor enters a distinct new
phase. Therefore as a minimum the most likely and most dangerous COAs need to be
examined.

3. The determination of the critical strengths and weaknesses of (sub)units or groupings

serves effective COG identification. The strengths and weaknesses are the capacities or
abilities of an entity. It will narrow down the list of potential COGs and it will allow for more
focused analysis and clarity in COA development. To nominate a COG candidate it must
possess the required critical strengths. The identification of critical weaknesses may support
the determination of the critical vulnerabilities later in the methodology and/or provide options
to engage the COG’s critical vulnerabilities at a later stage of planning.

4. Candidate COGs are examined by asking the following questions. For the actual COG the
answer to all questions must be ‘yes’:

a. Is the COG candidate the primary entity to achieve the objectives?

If it is an important or even essential entity, but not the primary entity, then it is a critical
requirement for the actual COG.

If it is not an entity but rather an important condition that must be present to achieve the
objectives, then it is likewise a critical requirement for the real COG.

b. Does the COG candidate possess the most critical capabilities required to achieve the
objectives?

If some critical capabilities are missing, then support from the entities possessing them
becomes a requirement for the COG.

c. If the COG candidate is defeated, does this defeat the COA?

If not, the candidate is not the COG for this COA.

COG analysis

1. Once the COG is established it is analysed. The COG analysis matrix provides a commonly
used, logical sequence to analyse an actor’s COG; yet other methods may be used. The
subsequent explanation follows that order. A figure of the matrix is provided at the end of the
explanation (Figure G-3).

2. Critical capabilities provide the COG its actual strength. The key question for the
identification of critical capabilities is: “Does this enable the COG to accomplish the objective?”
For example, if an artillery group is identified as the COG, its critical capabilities could be its

—————
79 In operations other than warfighting it may not be a military style unit or grouping, hence the use of the term entity.

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range and accuracy, its ability to deliver within minutes of detection of a target and its ability to
fire day and night.

3. Critical requirements are the resources that are essential for the critical capability to deliver
and to accomplish the objective. In the example of the artillery group being the COG, critical
requirements would be sensors, communications, fire control systems and ammunition.
Besides systems, it could also be conditions, such as the ability to move or cross an obstacle
in order to stay in range; or the gunners being willing and able to continue duty.

4. Critical vulnerabilities are derived from the critical requirements. The vulnerabilities are
the elements that, when targeted effectively, will have an indirect yet high impact on ability of
the COG to achieve the objective (through its critical requirements). This is the grand idea of
the manoeuvrist approach. In the example it would be capacities for target acquisition, the
electromagnetic spectrum and cyberdomain and capacities for resupply. In terms of
conditions it could be a mobility corridor or bridge; or the morale or crewrest of the gunners.

5. The entire tool serves to draw conclusions on how to effectively exploit respectively protect
the COG critical vulnerabilities as tangible input for COA development. The example could lead
to conclusions with regards to high pay off targets and active force employment to deny or
disrupt target acquisition, the employment of electromagnetic warfare or tactical cyber to deny
or disrupt communications, targets (critical points) on deployment routes for the guns and/or
resupply, and information activities or harassing (counter-)fires to disrupt the gunners morale
and physical rest. Besides input for planning, the COG analysis will also provide valuable input
for risk identification and treatment.

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Figure G-3. Centre of gravity analysis matrix

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LEXICON
SECTION I—GLOSSARY

This lexicon contains terms and abbreviations relevant to APP-28 and is not meant to be
exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15, NATO
Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications.

abort. To terminate a mission for any reason other than adversary action. It may occur at any
point after the beginning of the mission and prior to its completion.
(NATO agreed)

adversary. A party whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and
against which the legal use of armed force may be envisaged.
(NATO agreed)

area of interest. For a given level of command, the area of concern to a commander relative
to the objectives of current or planned operations, and which includes the commander’s
areas of influence, operations or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.
See ATP 3.2.1 for more details. (NATO agreed)

area of responsibility. For a given level of command, an area assigned to a commander to

plan and conduct operations. See ATP 3.2.1 for more details.
(NATO agreed)

area of intelligence responsibility. The area for which a commander has the responsibility
to provide intelligence with the means available.
(NATO agreed).

assumption. In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future
course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action.
(NATO agreed)

be-prepared mission. A mission assigned to a unit and that may be executed depending on
the result of its previous action.
(NATO agreed)

caveats. In NATO operations, any limitation, restriction or constraint by a nation on its military
forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to
NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in
line with the approved operation plan.
(NATO agreed)

centre of gravity. The primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of
action and/or will to fight.
(NATO agreed)

combat effectiveness. The ability of a unit or formation, or equipment to perform assigned

missions or functions.
(NATO agreed)

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combat power. The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military
unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.
(NATO agreed)

command and control. The authority, responsibilities, and activities of military commanders
in the direction and coordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders related
to the execution of operations.
(ATP-3.2.2 – not NATO agreed)

commander’s critical information requirement. Information requirement identified by the

commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-
making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.
(AAP-39)

commander’s intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions
the force must meet to succeed with respect to the adversary, terrain, and to the desired end
state.
(ATP-3.2.2 – not NATO agreed)

constraints. A requirement placed on a commander that dictates action. (COPD – not NATO
agreed); a restriction placed on the command by a higher command which dictates an action
or inaction.
(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

deduction. The implications, issues or considerations derived from the fact(s) with strategic
significance.
(COPD – not NATO agreed)

essential task. A specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission.
(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

factor. A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic
implication.
(COPD – not Nato agreed)

fighting power. The ability to use, or threaten to use, force to achieve a desired outcome and
is dependent on three interrelated components: moral, conceptual, and physical.
(NATO agreed)

implied task. A task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is
not stated in the higher headquarters’ order.
(This is a new term and definition will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

mission statement. A clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be performed and the
purpose of the mission.
(NATO agreed)

mission analysis. A logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s orders the
tasks necessary to fulfil a mission.
(AAP-39)

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mission-type order. An order issued to a subordinate unit that indicates the mission to be
accomplished without specifying how it is to be done.
(NATO agreed)

on-order mission. A mission to be executed at an unspecified time in the future when the
order is given.
(NATO agreed)

planning guidance. An intellectual peg in the sand that is valid at the time of deduction. PG
must be reviewed (and amended as required) throughout the planning process (later
deductions may alter past deductions).
(not NATO agreed)

restraint. A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits action. (COPD – not NATO
agreed); a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an
action.
(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

risk. The effect of uncertainty on objectives.

(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

specified task. A task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters.

(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO agreed status.)

war game. A simulation of a military operation, by whatever means, using specific rules, data,
methods and procedures.
(NATO agreed)

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SECTION II—LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP allied administrative publication

ACOA adversary course of action

ADA air defence artillery

AJP allied joint publication

AOI area of interest

AOR area of responsibility

APP allied procedural publication

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organisations, people, and events

ATP allied tactical publication

C2 command and control

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CIMIC civil-military cooperation

COA course of action

COG centre of gravity

CONOPS concept of operations

COO combined obstacle overlay

COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

COS chief of staff

CRL/CTL Collection Requirement and Collection Task List

EEFI essential elements of friendly information

FFIR friendly forces information requirement

FACES feasible, acceptable, complete, exclusive, and suitable

FRAGO fragmentary order

HQ headquarters

ICP intelligence collection plan

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IPOE intelligence preparation of the operating environment

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JOA joint operations area

MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay

MD most dangerous

ML most likely

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OPP operations planning process

OOEA outcome, objective, effects, and actions

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

RFI request for information

ROE rule of engagement

SRD standard related document

SME subject matter expert

SOI standard operating instruction

SOP standing operating procedures

STANAG NATO standardisation agreement

WNGO warning order

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