Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

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Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

The rise of military capital in Pakistan: Military neoliberalism,

authoritarianism and urbanization
Ateeb Ahmed
Department of Geography, Environment, and Society, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities), United States

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This article develops the concept of military neoliberalism that allows us to trace the historical development of
Military capital Pakistani military capital with the expansion of market-led reforms and its mode of operation in the urban
Neoliberalism domain. Military neoliberalism signifies the double role of the military; firstly, using authoritarianism, the
Authoritarianism
military has extended neoliberal reforms in collaboration with local and foreign capitalist classes over the de­
Infrastructure
Urbanization
cades. Secondly, the military has expanded its reach and operations in the economy at a large scale, transitioning
Pakistan into a sovereign capitalist power that operates independently from the rest of the state apparatuses and utilizes
its powers for economic, political, and territorial objectives. Such dynamics are leading to new class trans­
formations and producing seismic shifts within the state apparatuses because, along with a revitalized capitalist
class, a class of military capitalists has emerged in different sectors of the economy, most prominently in in­
dustrial production, urban real estate, and infrastructure development. The category of sovereign capitalist
power gestures towards the twin dynamics; firstly, the military can use violence for its strategic political and
economic goals. Secondly, the military can operate above the law for the advantage of military capital. As a
result, the increasing militarization of the economy, and the corporatization of the military, have produced a new
system of socioeconomic and political control that relies upon repeated interventions of the military in politics to
resolve class antagonisms, strengthen the power of local capital, and intensify the reach of global financial capital
in different markets of Pakistan.

1. Introduction Pakistan, Egypt, Myanmar, and Vietnam, have enjoyed unprecedented

economic growth during market reforms. They have also held the reins
The specter of booming military businesses in various countries of of government multiple times by orchestrating coups d’états and
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America has come under continue to abuse political power through extra-legal means under
renewed scrutiny in recent years by political economy scholars. These conditions of parliamentary democracies (Chambers and Waitookiat,
militaries are often considered distinct from Western armies since they 2017; Siddiqa, 2017; Abul-Magd, 2017).
have extended their operations into the civilian sectors of the economy Unlike most states in the Western countries that have disinvested
and play an influential role in politics (Springborg, 2016; Chambers and from manufacturing, finance, and real estate, allowing private capital
Waitookiat, 2017). For example, many militaries are owners and man­ unprecedented leverage in decision-making processes, many states and
agers of agricultural farms, industrial units, commercial airlines, real militaries in the global South function as market participants and market
estate corporations, marriage halls, logistical services, mining opera­ creators, at times taking the mantle of capitalist development away from
tions, power generation units, and banks, and participate in other the capitalist classes. How do we understand this paradox? Are the op­
lucrative profit-making activities. This makes them critical stakeholders erations of military capital evidence of a new military mode of pro­
in the means of production and, as Mani (2011) argues, a faction of the duction? (Chambers and Waitookiat, 2017). Or are we witnessing a new
capitalist class. In some countries, the expansion of market-led reforms articulation of state, military, classes, and capital against the backdrop
combined with the emergence of parliamentary democracy has curtailed of neoliberalism? What role has the military played in the roll-out of
military businesses and the military’s role in politics, such as Argentina neoliberal reforms? How do we explain the substitution of many state
Brazil, and Chile (Karl, 1990; Nef, 1995; Barton, 2002; Pion-Berlin and functions by military corporations in social, economic, and urban life?
Trinkunas, 2005). In contrast, the armies in other countries, such as How do we account for the increasing autonomy of the military from the

E-mail address: ahmed598@umn.edu.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2023.103846
Received 24 November 2022; Received in revised form 17 August 2023; Accepted 21 August 2023
Available online 13 September 2023
0016-7185/© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

rest of the state apparatuses and civilian oversight? mutually reinforce each other. The implications of these political and
Recent scholarship exploring the global linkages between rising economic arrangements are significant, as they bolster the military’s
authoritarianism and expanding neoliberal reforms has emphasized the role in economic activities, political control, and spatial organization of
state’s disciplinary role in the transition toward neoliberal economies cities, perpetuating a cycle of dominance and exploitation.
(Bruff, 2014; Tansel, 2017; Bogaert, 2018; Boffo, Saad-Filho, and Fine, The first section of the paper develops the idea of military neolib­
2019). Implementing so-called ‘free market’ reforms through privati­ eralism. It represents a ‘sub-set’ of authoritarian neoliberalism, which,
zation, deregulation, and liberalization has not always led to the ex­ while employing many of the characteristics of authoritarian neoliber­
pected outcomes of increased freedom and prosperity. These policies alism, also inserts new axioms into the capitalist society by directly
have often been accompanied by political repression and coercion. inducting the military as a capitalist class and as a political player that
Authoritarian neoliberalism involves using the state’s legal, adminis­ can operate above the law to deal with multiple economic and political
trative and coercive disciplinary practices to protect its policies and crises and expand its economic objectives. The second section of this
undermine democratic politics and dissent by oppositional forces paper reconstructs the genealogy of military neoliberalism and military
(Tansel, 2017; Bruff and Tansel, 2019). capital in Pakistan, tracing its roots back to a critical conjuncture in the
The idea of authoritarian neoliberalism has recently gained traction country’s history as it moved from socialist rule to military dictatorship
in academia. It has been used to understand diverse state forms in their in 1977. The last section explores the linkages between military capital
transition towards neoliberal economies, such as the military-dominated and neoliberalism by focusing on their articulation in Lahore’s real es­
regime of Egypt (De Smet and Bogaert, 2017), the authoritarian rule of tate market, where the Pakistani military has emerged as the largest land
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey (Özden et al., 2017), the developer over the last two decades. This section explores the spatial
expansive hold of Chinese Communist Party in the transition to a territorialization of military neoliberalism, focusing on the trans­
neoliberal economy (Lim, 2017; Sum, 2019), the austerity program of formation of the rural hinterlands surrounding Lahore into precious real
different Greek governments over the years (Sotiris, 2017), and several estate controlled by the Defense Housing Authority (DHA) and its
other countries in the Global North and South (Gonzales, 2017; Jenss, civilian capitalist collaborators.
2019; Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, 2020; Can and Fanton Ribeiro da The DHA is a military-controlled ‘private’ housing society started by
Silva, 2023). Furthermore, the term has been applied to explain the General Zia-ul-Haq in Karachi in the 1980s and has since expanded into
recent surge in authoritarianism worldwide, exemplified by the rise of other major cities of Pakistan. In Lahore alone, it controls approximately
far-right movements in various regions and the implementation of 60,000 acres of prime urban land. Its primary task is speculative urban
increasingly anti-democratic measures to suppress political opposition development on the peripheries of major cities. It controls hundreds of
(Boffo et al., 2019). While the concept has helped highlight the growing thousands of acres of prime real estate nationwide in present-day
intersection between neoliberalism and authoritarianism globally, it Pakistan. The DHA employs a mix of serving and retired army officers
collapses significantly different expressions of authoritarian neoliber­ with civilians across its various departments. A serving army officer of
alism between countries of the Global North and South. It does not fully the rank of brigadier functions as the Chief Administrator and key posts
allow us to capture the specificities of the variegated manifestations of are dominated by army officers. Organizationally, they have de­
neoliberalism across diverse geographical sites, especially those where partments for land acquisition, marketing and sales, security, strategic
the development of authoritarian neoliberalism has accompanied the planning, design and architecture, legal department, and health de­
expansion of military-corporate capital. partments. My research sheds light on the military’s involvement, along
I propose the idea of military neoliberalism to capture the inter­ with its local and foreign collaborators, in the land acquisition process,
twinement of authoritarian statism and neoliberal reforms. Military financialization of land, urban development, land dispossession, spatial
neoliberalism has emerged out of the various economic and political segregation, infrastructure development, and urban managerialism.
crises and contradictions that are endemic to capitalist societies and Tracing these spatial practices allows us to conceptualize how military
reflect a unique response to these crises by making the military the most capital has snatched urban governance, municipal services, and land
influential decision-makers in the direction of economic and political development from the local municipal authorities.
change and the first and last line of defense to protect such policies and This paper employs a multidisciplinary approach that combines
practices. It is the militaries in Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, ethnography, qualitative research methods, archival research, policy
Sudan, and others that have enforced neoliberal reforms over the de­ analysis, expert interviews, and life histories to examine the intricate
cades and fought back against progressive political movements, going as interplay between neoliberalism and military capitalism in Pakistan. I
far as to suspend democracy altogether (Mietzner, 2006; Jones, 2014; have been undertaking fieldwork since June 2016 and have conducted
Abul-Magd, 2017; Akhtar, 2022). 165 interviews with various actors. While the DHA management refused
The revolutionary aspect of military neoliberalism is ultimately the to provide me with any information regarding their projects, I found
transformation of the military into a gigantic capitalist corporation with state bureaucrats from other state departments willing to cooperate. I
vast stakes in financial, industrial, infrastructure, and real estate ven­ used a mixed method strategy on the field, combining a) expert in­
tures. The military has bent neoliberal reforms in its favor, benefiting terviews with officials from the Lahore Development Authority (LDA),
from privatization, financialization, deregulation, and liberalization of b) ethnographic techniques (semi-structured interviews and life his­
the markets. Riding on the back of authoritarianism, and cronyism, the tories) with local communities, especially the peasantry, informal
military can operate above the law to cement its position as a monop­ workers, migrant workers, women, middle-class residents c) semi-
olistic/oligopolistic player in the market and avoid accountability. It structured interviews with private real estate companies and lawyers
directs financial flows and public infrastructure development in the in­ that play a crucial role in acquiring land from the peasantry on behalf
terest of its corporations and civilian business partners. This has tied the of/for DHA. LDA is the local municipal authority in charge of urban
military to the broader capitalist objectives with an umbilical cord. It development, water management, and traffic control in Lahore. The
represents both the militarization of capital and the capitalization/corpo­ bureaucracy runs it and includes elected officials in the board of gov­
ratization of the military. The first aspect represents the increasing pro­ ernors that allows civil oversight. Most of my interviews took place in
pensity to use violence for capital accumulation and securitization of the villages and neighborhoods of Dhira, Gohawa, Lehna Singh, Lidhar,
capital. The second characteristic signifies the dilemma that the army Charar Pind, Dera Chahal, Bhangali, Jathol, Malak Pur, Al-Noor Town, and
has become a capitalist class that operates in the broader economy as a Sahaj Pal. I use a rich news archive to borrow from interviews conducted
sovereign, corporate entity that, apart from concentrating capital, also by journalists of local politicians, bureaucrats, and the military and draw
monopolizes the means of violence (Waitoolkiat and Chambers, 2017, upon court cases to build my research. Finally, I draw on archival ma­
40). The concentration of capital and the monopoly over violence terial from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the military’s

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A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

published records, including the financial statements of their major downsized and withdrawn, as well as those that have been expanded,
corporations. reoriented, and reinforced.
Nevertheless, like authoritarian neoliberalism, military neoliber­
2. Genealogy and Theory of Military Neoliberalism alism has involved the mobilization of administrative, legal, and puni­
tive apparatuses to protect its policies and suppress political opposition
Neoliberal ideology claims to limit the role of the state and the power and dissent. Under military neoliberalism, there is an increasing ten­
of corporate monopolies in favor of competition, free trade, and the free dency to use coercion and political repression to discipline working-class
market. Much of the conversation around neoliberalism within the dissent (Abul-Magd, 2017; Tawakkol, 2021). The use of force further
discipline of human geography has highlighted the proliferation of seeps into the markets the military capital targets, especially the land
market-led processes that promote competition between businesses, and urban development markets, where their territorial power is used to
nation-states, and subjects by pursuing policies of deregulation, privat­ advance the interests of military capital and its allies. The Pakistani
ization, and liberalization (Alfredo Filho and Johnston, 2005; Harvey, military has established itself as a monopolistic/oligopolistic economic
2005). Critical Anglo-American literature on urban neoliberalism has actor that can leverage state power and sovereign violence to accumu­
focused on the social and spatial inequalities engendered by entrepre­ late capital and suppress opposition. It has transitioned into a sovereign
neurial local politics and the growing role of private actors in influ­ capitalist power that operates independently from the rest of the state
encing the direction and scale of urban politics (Harvey, 1989; Brenner apparatuses and utilizes its authoritarianism for economic, territorial,
and Theodore, 2003). They have also shown that rather than the state and political purposes.
retreating from economic life, it has been reconfigured to play a regu­ Drawing on my research, I show that private market players
latory role that provides ‘spatial fixes’ for reterritorializing global cap­ collaborating with the military stand to gain exclusive access to the
italism (Harvey, 1985; Jessop, 2002; Davies, 2018). Other critical military’s land markets and generate rents and profits from joint infra­
scholars view neoliberalism as the expansion of “free markets” accom­ structure projects. Others who are left out of such arrangements
panied by a new economic discipline that inculcates a competitive, complain about the unfair market environment. This has resulted in a
egoistic, and entrepreneurial spirit, or subjectivity, in society at large new form of capitalism characterized by the increasing dominance of the
(Brown, 2015; Gago, 2017; Read, 2022). Against this approach, recent military, which functions as a critical player in the political and eco­
work on authoritarian neoliberalism has challenged the phenomena of nomic spheres and society at large. Military neoliberalism not only re­
“free markets,” highlighting the role coercion plays in implementing inforces existing class structures, as David Harvey (Harvey, 2005) has
neoliberal reforms. In the introduction to the edited volume States of argued in his understanding of neoliberalism but also reconfigures class
Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of relationships by positioning the military as a dominant capitalist class
Capitalist Order, Cemal Burak Tansel sets the agenda by stating that and a crucial component of the country’s security infrastructure. It has
“neoliberalism does not dismantle but thrives upon the institutional also transformed the ‘state’ since the repressive state apparatuses now
infrastructure of the state apparatuses through their remodeling in a function to accumulate capital for its military-bureaucratic class and its
competitive orientation and (re)positioning them as custodians of local and foreign allies, leading to the unprecedented fusion of military
accumulation” (Bruff and Tansel, 2019, 10). However, the dynamics and private capital. Military neoliberalism is characterized by cronyism,
playing out in Pakistan and other countries complicate such an under­ where businesses and corporations with close ties to the military gain
standing of the state’s role and the dynamics of capitalism under preferential access to markets, financing and joint-venture infrastruc­
authoritarian neoliberalism. ture, and urban development projects. This system is sustained by
Scholarship on military capital has shown that military capital enjoys corrupt practices, with high-ranking military and bureaucratic officials
several privileges that give them an unfair advantage in the market diverting land, capital, and assets from state and army corporations for
environment; they function as oligopolistic players as they concentrate personal gain, with little to no accountability (Catusse, 2009; Bünte,
the means of production, they can dictate prices, control supplies, and 2017; Waitoolkiat and Chambers, 2017). While class divisions between
employ violence to accumulate capital (Abul-Magd, 2017; Bünte, 2017; high- and low-ranking soldiers are heightened, several benefits trickle
Thayer et al., 2017; Waitoolkiat and Chambers, 2017). They also enjoy down to lower-ranking soldiers in the form of subsidized housing, sub­
tax benefits and can usually evade local laws governing businesses. Such sidized education for soldiers’ families, free healthcare for soldiers and
states thus exceed their role as “custodians of capital”. They are instead their families for life, access to tax-free goods, and pensions after
actively participating in practices of capital accumulation and, by retirement. Such mechanisms immunize against class discontent from
extension, competing and collaborating with other capitalist classes in developing within the military.
the markets. Smet and Bogaert argue that “neoliberal reform in Egypt The concept of military neoliberalism traces the evolution of the
did not at all entail a retreat of an ‘abstract state’ from an abstract Pakistani military into a major corporate organization since 1977.
‘market,’ but a redirection of state power and resources towards an Before this period, the Pakistani army owned a limited number of profit-
increased accumulation of capital achieved by an aggressive policy of making industries, including three sugar mills, three textile mills, a gas-
dispossession, which benefited only a small clique within the ruling bottling distribution company, and a food processing firm, with total
class” (De Smet and Bogaert, 2017, 222). Neoliberal policies such as assets worth $32.7 million (World Bank, 1978). However, with the rise
privatization, deregulation, and liberalization have not always served of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, the military expanded its presence in
their stated purpose of creating competitive and open markets. Instead, every sector of the economy. They hijacked the privatization process by
they have often been used as tools to concentrate power and wealth acquiring several SOEs. Recent estimates suggest that military-owned
among the upper echelons of society, including military and business industrial and financial corporations now control assets worth $10
elites. billion, with an additional $10 billion worth of real estate managed in
The resulting picture of the political economy of postcolonial coun­ major Pakistani cities (Siddiqa, 2017). The military has continued to
tries with the military at the helm paints a drastically different view of expand its portfolio by acquiring SOEs during military and civilian-led
authoritarian neoliberalism, where the loosening of state control of governments. It has incorporated new corporations under the Fauji
some markets has been substituted by military corporations’ capture of [Military] Foundation (FF) and Army Welfare Trust (AWT), which are
the very same markets. In other words, the limitations of this approach military-run ’welfare organizations.’ Military neoliberalism thus repre­
are that they conceptualize the state as an instrument of capital (usually sents the intersection of military and neoliberal power in Pakistan, with
private market players) rather than a set of apparatuses with their own significant implications for our understanding of capitalism in post­
logic, contradictions, interests, strategies, and power relationships. colonial countries.
Therefore, it is imperative to track the state apparatuses that have been

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2.1. Birth of Military Neoliberalism need for a military government to counter the class politics that had
emerged during Bhutto’s rule and had shaken capitalist property re­
In rethinking Pakistan’s transformation, it is helpful to start by lationships (Akhtar, 2018, 14).
asking where this specific impetus for military neoliberalism came from: On the economic front, Zia’s government entered into an Extended
how did certain strategies emerge to assume dominance while many Fund Facility with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980 for
other political-economic narratives became marginalized? Is the mate­ $1.27 billion, three times the amount lent to Pakistan from 1947 to 1979
rialization of neoliberal policies in Pakistan a result of the diffusion of (Zaidi, 2005, 483). Such facilities were made available against political
such procedures by Western states and international markets? Or can we upheaval in Afghanistan and Iran and the changing geo-political posi­
locate the origin of military neoliberalism in Pakistan in the role played tion of Pakistan during the Cold War. Reagan’s administration propped
by state managers and capitalist classes in strategically adopting up Zia’s military regime with military and financial aid amounting to
neoliberalism to address existing or emerging economic and political $3.2 billion. It provided the Pakistani military with technical assistance
crises? for the proxy war executed by the army against the Soviets in
Diverse political movements consisting of working-class parties, Afghanistan by financially supporting and arming the mujahideen
labor unions and organizations, peasant associations, and student (Gardezi, 1983, 16; Achcar, 2004, 92).
unions coalesced to topple the military government of General Ayub The military junta halted Bhutto’s nationalization policy and began
Khan in 1968, which ruled Pakistan since the coup d’état of 1958 (Ali, the process of privatization by auctioning nationalized private in­
2015; Ali, 2018). Following Pakistan’s first independent elections, PPP dustries. Soon after coming into power Zia government denationalized
came into power, promising socialist rule and economic change to 2000 rice, flour, and cotton ginning mills (Zaidi, 2005, 134). These
millions of impoverished people. Their election promises of breaking the practices initiated the neoliberal pattern of the restoration of the capi­
back of monopoly capital, land reforms in the masses’ favor, and talist classes. For instance, the leader of the center-right PML, Nawaz
nationalizing large-scale industry found popular support amongst the Sharif, who would form government in 1991–1993, 1997–1999, and
masses. PPP launched nationalization reforms after coming into power then again in 2013–2017, reclaimed his industrial units under Zia’s
in 1971, aiming to break the power of industrial and financial monop­ patronage and began to expand his family’s industrial and landed in­
olies that had come to dominate Pakistan’s economy with the support of terests once he was made the governor of Punjab under Zia’s military
the military junta under Ayub Khan (Ahmad, 1983). As the pace of government (Bray, 1991). Extensive efforts led to a conducive envi­
nationalization gained momentum over the next few years, the state’s ronment for private investment at the expense of the public sector.
monopoly over large-scale manufacturing industries was established by Liberalization, deregulation, and export-led industrialization became
nationalizing iron and steel industries, primary metal industries, heavy the guiding principles for economic change, as incentives were given to
engineering industries, heavy electrical industries, power generation, oil private industry, such as low-interest credit, duty-free import of selected
and gas exploration, and some agro-based industries (Rashid and Gar­ capital goods, tax holidays, and accelerated depreciation allowances
dezi, 1983, 11). Nationalization of the industrial sector primarily (Zaidi, 2005, 134). Industrial sectors that were previously blocked were
focused on large-scale industrial units. The nationalized industries reopened for private investment and military capital. Exporters’ in­
comprised 18% of total large-scale manufacturing, and their contribu­ terests were favored when the government removed the fixed peg of the
tion to exports was 8.3% (Akhtar, 2018, 71). In the financial sphere, PPP Rupee to the Dollar in favor of a managed float of the currency that led to
nationalized private commercial banks and insurance companies. In the devaluation of the Rupee by 38.5% between 1982 and 1988 (Zaidi,
1974 the Bank Nationalization Ordinance was promulgated, according 2005, 138).
to which the federal government was given exclusive rights of owner­ More broadly, militaries in Chile, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt,
ship, management, and control of all banks in Pakistan (Rashid and Myanmar, and various other countries used state power to crush polit­
Gardezi, 1983, 12). Until then, three of the four largest banks were in the ical dissent during the Cold War era (Fox, 1980; Barton, 2002; Akça
hand of industrialist families, which had led to the fusion of the indus­ et al., 2014; Joya, 2020). The militaries collaborated with local and
trial and financial classes over the 1960s (Zaidi, 2005, 396). Most foreign capitalist classes to introduce strategic market-oriented reforms.
significantly, the nationalization of the financial sector severed the link Thus, the impetus of military neoliberalism came from the contingent set
between industry and finance that had emerged under Ayub Khan and of events triggered by local and global political and economic crises.
desolated the power of the financial classes (Zaidi, 2005, 397). However, Military neoliberalism in Pakistan further emerged as a response to the
foreign capital was exempt from nationalization in the industrial and threats posed to capitalist property relationships by working-class
financial sectors. By 1974–1975 military spending accounted for 55% of parties, student agitations, and peasant struggles in the 1970s.
budget allocations, and the combined expenditure on health and edu­
cation was a paltry $190.3 million, a quarter of the expenditure on the 2.2. The Consolidation of Military Neoliberalism (1988–2008)
military (Ahmad, 1983, 114).
Ahmad (1983, 106) notes that the nationalization of the means of Did the shift towards democracy in the 1990s change the direction of
production shattered the capitalist classes’ confidence in the institutions the economic policies instituted under Zia’s military regime? Did
of private property and precipitated a crisis of governability. The mili­ democratization halt the emerging neoliberal policies, or did demo­
tary coup d’état of General Zia in 1977 against the PPP’s government cratically elected governments continue to push through neoliberal re­
became a decisive moment in Pakistan’s history as the military gov­ forms in the 1990s? Despite the restoration of democratic rule in
ernment, with the support of far-right parties, launched widescale at­ the1990s, military neoliberalism flourished throughout the decade as
tacks against working-class organizations, trade unions, peasant several governments switched hands. It will receive a new impetus with
movements, student unions, and oppressed nationalities. After taking the return of military rule in 1999. This trend was further amplified
power, Zia declared martial law and suspended the national and pro­ through extensive aid and financing from North Atlantic Treaty Orga­
vincial assemblies in 1977. The superior courts of Pakistan gave Zia’s nization (NATO) countries to Musharraf’s regime in exchange for
military dictatorship a legal cover under the logic of the ’doctrine of Pakistan’s support in the War on Terror.
necessity,’ according to which state security is viewed as the supreme After the return of parliamentary elections held in 1988 after Zia’s
law (Jalal, 1995, 102). death in a plane crash, PPP returned to power, this time under the
He received plenty of support from conservative far-right parties, leadership of Benazir Bhutto. The party shifted to the right and entered
drawn variously from the landed, capitalists, and petit-bourgeoisie government when the first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in
classes and from fascist elements of the working classes (Ahmad, Pakistan had already been agreed to by the preceding interim govern­
1983). The state bureaucracies and propertied classes recognized the ment in power immediately after Zia-ul-Haq’s death (Zaidi, 2005, 483).

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A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

With the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF, a local consensus Turkey, have historically benefited from privatization reforms by pro­
emerged between like-minded political parties and the military estab­ curing SOEs (Bienen and Moore, 1987; Akça, 2016; Abul-Magd, 2017).
lishment that pursued liberalization policies to varying degrees Furthermore, they also started joint ventures with local and foreign
throughout the 1990s. These policies broke the Pakistani state’s mo­ corporations, leading to their increasing market dominance.
nopoly over various industries through privatization, such as trans­ After their capture of state power in 1977, the Pakistani military
portation, electric power, finance, logistics, and urban development. started receiving financial support for military-led business initiatives
They diminished the state’s capacity to regulate the market (Zaidi, 2005, from local and foreign capitalist classes and institutions. These included
483–88). The military did not remain a bystander in this brief period of vast industrial operations producing cement, fertilizers, food, and other
democracy. Instead, it continued to dictate political processes by ille­ commodities. In 1982 the Pakistani military’s Fauji Fertilizer Company
gally financing and supporting the Islamic Democratic Alliance, led by (FFC) inaugurated its first fertilizer plant in a joint venture with a Danish
the PML, against the sitting government of PPP in the elections of 1990 firm Haldor Topsoe that cost $272 million. The plans for this project
(Jalal, 1995, 1:111; Nasr, 2004, 198). were drawn up in 1978, a year into Zia’s government, and supported by
In 1991 PML came into power with the support of the military and the WB with a generous loan of $55 million and backed by foreign and
unraveled further neoliberal reforms, setting up the Privatization local commercial banks (World Bank, 1978). Under Musharraf, FFC
Commission as a governmental department under the finance division successfully bid for the state-owned Pak Saudi Fertilizers Limited in
(Zaidi, 2005, 171). Privatizing the financial sector kicked off with selling 2002 (Masood, 2014, 88). Now, it is the largest fertilizer production
the Muslim Commercial Bank and Allied Bank to industrialists. Under complex, with 51% of the market share in urea and Di-ammonium
Musharraf’s regime (1999–2008), United Bank Limited was sold to U.K.- Phosphate under its control. Likewise, military-owned Askari Cement
based cash and carry chain Bestway, and the country’s largest bank, acquired the state-owned Wah Cement Company in 1996 during the
Habib Bank Limited, was privatized at a loss of $251 million (K. Munir government of PML after negotiation with the privatization commission,
and Naqvi, 2017, 16). The military entered banking in 1991, launching in effect acquiring the oldest cement plant in Pakistan that had under­
its first commercial bank, the Askari Bank. It was set up as a public taken recent upgrades with the support of the WB between 1991 and
limited company with 560 branches all over Pakistan. The privatization 1997 (World Bank, 1996).
and liberalization of the banking sector thus restored the class power of In 1984, the Mari Gas Company Limited was incorporated with the
the financial class that was devastated due to nationalization in the military-run FF, Government of Pakistan, and the state-owned Oil & Gas
1970s. It also allowed the military to surface as a market competitor in Development Company Limited as its shareholders, having 40%, 40%,
the financial sector. and 20% shareholding, respectively (Siddiqa, 2017, 140). FF acquired
During General Musharraf’s rule, the non-military apparatuses of the all the assets of the U.S-based Esso Eastern in the process, which was the
state were further realigned along neoliberal lines (Akhtar, 2005). main stakeholder of the Mari Gas fields, Pakistan’s second-largest gas
Musharraf’s government accelerated the sale of SOEs by putting up state field. Since the deregulation of the power sector in the 1990s, the mil­
oil companies, banks, mining units, and steel mills for sale. The influx of itary has started several coal, wind, gas, and oil power plants to sell
foreign capital for these industries was boosted by a healthier economy electricity to consumers. It is also the second biggest shareholder of Hub
resulting from Pakistan’s decision to join the War on Terror. With the Power Company, Pakistan’s largest private power producer.
changing geopolitical dynamics after 2001 and Pakistan’s decision to The most stunning development of military capital has been in
support NATO’s agenda in the war, the Paris Club undertook $12.5 infrastructure projects and logistics. Frontiers Work Organization (FWO)
billion of debt rescheduling with a new repayment period of 38 years and National Logistics Cell (NLC) are military-operated firms. FWO is
and generous loan write-offs (Zaidi, 2005, 525). The military was given the largest infrastructure development firm, while NLC is the leading
$12 billion in aid, of which 75% was designated for military expendi­ logistical company in Pakistan, founded in 1966 and 1981, respectively.
ture, and the rest was used for development purposes (Zaidi, 2011, 5). Initially tasked to build the Karakorum highway in 1966, the FWO
Irrespective of which government has been in power since 1977, evolved into a profit-making entity in the 1980s and carries out public
neoliberal reforms gathered speed as the state’s finances continued to and private infrastructure development projects with the help of local
crumble and Pakistan got slotted into IMF programs. As a result of these and foreign capitalist classes. They are involved in constructing and
dynamics, the growth in real wages that had been occurring since the managing dams, national highways, dry ports, oil exploration projects,
1960s was finally reversed in the 1990s as neoliberalism accelerated (K. airports, irrigation canals, toll plazas, border terminals, and private
A. Munir et al. 2015). Informal employment in the non-agricultural housing societies. Over a span of two decades, they have executed
sector has risen to 73% since the neoliberal onslaught (Bonnet et al., strategic and developmental operations linked to various conflicts in the
2018). Under democratically elected governments, public sector Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), serving both the Pakistani
employment halved between 1991 and 1998 (Munir et al., 2015, 179) military and American imperial objectives.
These dynamics led to the restoration of class power of the capitalists With the assistance of the United States Agency for International Aid,
that had lost their private industries to the state during the period of they have built roads, bridges, power plants, dams, and other in­
nationalization. As the following sections show, it is beginning in this frastructures, following multiple military offensives in this region. Lo­
period of expanding neoliberal reforms that military capital expanded cals have accused the military of committing several atrocities,
into different sectors of the economy by acquiring different SOEs displacing millions of Pashtun people, militarizing their region by sup­
through the privatization process and by creating new industrial, porting the Taliban, and staging a fake war to get military- and devel­
financial, and real estate corporations through which they permeated opment aid from the West (Dawar, 2020).
the everyday lives of the citizenry.
2.4. Military Neoliberalism as Urban Strategy
2.3. The Genesis of Military Capital
The expansion of military neoliberalism in Pakistan has been ach­
The transition toward increasing neo-liberalization in Pakistan was ieved with close collaboration between the army and local and foreign
simultaneously accompanied by the protrusion of the military into a capital, IFIs, and foreign states, which have played different roles in
corporate organization that continued to develop upon the Pakistani expanding neoliberal reforms and supporting military capital. This
state’s long-standing authoritarianism. The Pakistani military army section captures the geographical expression of military neoliberalism
expanded into and captured the mass consumer goods market by and military capital in the urban sphere, where the close alliances be­
acquiring SOEs and benefited from the liberalization and deregulation of tween the military and local and foreign financial classes have allowed
the markets. Armies in other countries, such as Egypt, Sudan, and them to monopolize the urban land market in major cities of Pakistan

5
A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

(see Figs. 1-3).

At the time of independence, the Pakistani military took control of
different lands held under the British colonial army during its rule over
the Indian Subcontinent. These lands included strategic cantonments in
many cities and towns and agricultural lands and farms used by the
military officers to feed its large army (Ali, 2014). The colonial gov­
ernment also leased or awarded agricultural plots to military personnel
in return for their services (Khan and Akhtar, 2014, 110). Granting land
to military personnel based on rank persists even in the postcolonial
state. In today’s Pakistan, the Chief of the Army gets several urban
residential plots and one square mile of agrarian land upon retirement.
Whereas generals, brigadiers, and colonels retire with numerous resi­
dential and commercial properties worth millions of dollars (Siddiqa,
2017, 195). As a single group, the present-day Pakistani armed forces
manage more land than any other institution or group, controlling 11.58
million acres, approximately 12% of the total 93.67 million acres of state
land (Siddiqa, 2017, 174). These lands were inherited from the
departing British colonial machinery that had enclosed millions of acres
in present-day Pakistan (Ali, 2014). Asides from inheriting land from the
Fig. 2. Village Hapalke walled off. Walls have been instrumental in urban
British, another long-standing legacy of colonialism has been the insti­ strangulation, segregating the DHA from low-income communities. In the
tutionalization of the military’s role in the city’s politics by empowering process, hundreds of miles of walls have been built around 40 or more villages
the cantonment to manage areas under its control. However, the and slums in Lahore alone. (Ateeb Ahmed 2018)
contemporary rush to accumulate, develop, and sell land can only be
traced to the military’s expansion into land development in the 1980s functioning in Karachi since the 1960s and shifted its assets and control
under its private housing schemes. Consequently, these dynamics signify to the military high command under a new body (Hasan et al., 2015, 13).
a departure from colonial practices, given that the British army was not Controversially, the authority was given the power of eminent domain,
involved in extensive corporate endeavors or delved into the urban real even though the DHA was pursuing real estate development for the
estate sector to sell land to the populace. military and financial classes involved in land development and specu­
Beginning in the 1980s, the urban land market in Pakistan under­ lation. It was additionally given the power to tax and impose penalties
went drastic and long-lasting changes that continue to shape the ur­ upon residents and to implement development charges for the upkeep of
banization process in major cities. Zia’s regime led the deregulation of the housing enclave. DHA Lahore was established by General Musharraf
the land market, and such practices were carried forward by following in 2002. Under Musharraf, the DHAs emerged as the leading market
civilian and military-led governments with the support of IFIs in the contender for elite gated housing societies catering to the needs of the
1990s and 2000s. Zia founded the DHA in Karachi in 1980 as an inde­ upper and middle classes, outpacing both the local municipal authorities
pendent municipal authority under the control of the military, with far- and the private real estate developers in land development.
reaching powers. He passed a presidential order that dissolved the In Lahore, the DHA has expanded towards the rural areas in the East
Pakistan Defense Officer’s Cooperative Housing Society which had been of Lahore, adjacent to the cantonment. The DHA functions as an
authoritarian municipality, as none of the residing civilian members of
the housing society have formal representation within the DHA. The
DHA further operates in a zone of exception, independently of the local
municipal authority and other legal and institutional bodies operating in
the city. The Chief Metropolitan Planner of the LDA informed me how
the DHA violated the Master Plan of Lahore, using its own self-designed
master plans, planning techniques, and bylaws. In contradistinction to
private housing societies that must get approval from LDA for land
development, DHA is exempt from such procedures (interview with
author, February 2019). He also told of numerous land conflicts between
the LDA and DHA, where the latter took over LDA’s land without
compensation. In conversations with private housing developers, I was
told that those investors seeking to develop land in areas around the
DHA face the hurdle of getting a No Objection Certificate from the
military-controlled cantonment board. Since DHA was established as an
authority endowed with statutory powers, it can decide which areas will
be designated as residential or commercial zones and which rural areas
will be earmarked for future urban development. This gave active duty
and retired military officers unprecedented economic and political
control over urbanization. Such practices cause friction and conflicts
between separate state departments, military entrepreneurs, and private
market players as they compete over land development and territorial
control.
Massive amounts of investment in the DHAs come from foreign re­
mittances, middle classes, and local financial classes that invest heavily
in residential and commercial properties in the DHAs for speculative
purposes (Siddiqa, 2017, 186). Unlike other countries, where the state
Fig. 1. Advertisement for DHA Homes. typically brokers land for local and foreign corporations for urban
Source: https://www.dhai-r.com.pk/phase-detail/dha-valley

6
A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

Fig. 3. The Master plan of DHA shows the planned development of infrastructure (scools, parks, police station) over the village of Lehna Singh.
Source: https://dhalahore.org/about-us/dha-phases/

development (Goldman, 2011; Levien, 2013; Shatkin, 2014), the 2.5. Speculation, Dispossession, and Class-Based Segregation
financial classes in Pakistan lead the way for land acquisition. They
operate as intermediaries directing local and foreign financial flows to Beneath the hustle and bustle of urbanization and profit-making
raid the rural land markets. This dynamic allows them to acquire land reside the sinister underside of land acquisition, dispossession, and
from peasant classes and transfer it to the DHA in return for property spatial segregation that military neoliberalism mobilizes using state
titles for future residential and commercial development. For the DHA, powers. While much of the agrarian land is acquired through the market,
the advantage is that the labor and costs of land acquisition are out­ those landowners that refuse to sell their village properties are pres­
sourced to these land brokers. It also creates the conditions under which surized by the DHA’s private security force, or else, they are threatened
families of army personnel can broker deals for the DHA. The land by civilian real estate agents (land mafia) that work in collusion with the
brokers seek to speculate on increasing land values and make a profit military (interview with author, June 2018).
once they sell their property titles, only to repeat the cycle. The DHA’s urban planners deliberately target pre-existing villages
The construction sector procures land from the DHA for the purpose using coercion, infrastructure development, cartographic techniques,
of erecting residential properties and shopping complexes intended for and land surveys (fieldwork notes). During my fieldwork, a resident
resale. Although the DHA initiates its own housing ventures, a signifi­ from Dhira asked, “Why does the DHA have to pass the roads through
cant portion of housing development within these areas is undertaken by our villages? There is so much agrarian land around the village to build
private builders, which includes military personnel and their families. infrastructure, but they want to build roads over the village so that we
Local and international capitalist entrepreneurs, especially from the are forced to move out”. Over the decades, many villages have been
food, education, healthcare, retail, banking, and entertainment industry, demolished to make way for golf courses, roads, schools, police stations,
find it exceptionally advantageous to buy or rent commercial land in the and health care facilities, such as Jalalabad, Heera Singhwala, and Gobin
DHAs to gratify the consumption patterns of residents, leading to the Pura. Another resident from Lehna Singh objected that “when we refused
high concentration of capital in commercial areas. Aside from Pakistan’s to sell our village properties, the DHA sent construction workers to build
largest banks, Dubai and Abu Dhabi banks also maintain several DHA walls around our village, leaving us with a single point of entry and
branches. Like other places (Goldman, 2011; Leitner and Sheppard, exit.” Villages that resist the military’s expansionary have faced enclo­
2023), speculative capital has driven urbanization, triggering gentrifi­ sures through these walls. Consequently, several villages now exist
cation by transforming rural areas into shopping plazas, cinemas, res­ within or along the edges of the DHA’s boundaries.
taurants, and sports complexes. Such practices allow the DHA to control the movement of the in­
The military’s ability to deploy sovereign powers for strategic eco­ habitants and decrease the values of village properties. “Are we crimi­
nomic and territorial objectives makes it an attractive partner for in­ nals that the DHA uses security barriers, check posts, CCTV, and private
vestors from the private financial, industrial, and landed groups. They security to monitor us? Why must we show them receipts for goods we
seek to maximize returns on their investment by gaining access to take to our communities? Don’t we have the right to come and go as we
different industries interlinked with the management and control of please?” asked another resident from Dhira. Such practices allow the
critical processes of military-led urbanization, such as land develop­ DHA to segregate spaces from other adjoining poor neighborhoods and
ment, finance, infrastructure development, utility services provision, impose unprecedented social control over local communities. Domestic
and other commercial activities. Increasing land prices, and high rental servants working in the DHA are forced to register themselves with the
incomes, have become the source of revenue for a whole host of classes DHA. Local police supplement these policing initiatives by patrolling
tied to the expanding military empire against the background of military these spaces and ensuring that the luxurious lifestyle of the rich is not
neoliberalism. interrupted by the undeserving poor. “They have erased all fields and
parks around our village, and DHA’s security hounds us if we are found

7
A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

using the DHA’s parks or just going for a walk in their streets,” said an are not uncommon. Following General Bajwa’s retirement in 2022, the
aspiring cricketer from the village of Lidhar. former Chief of the Army’s tax records were leaked, indicating that his
Common lands within village communities in the form of ponds, family’s net worth had soared from negligible to USD 50 million in just
grazing land, swamps, and open fields for recreational purposes are five years. Most of this wealth was in the form of land in the DHA
targeted by the military through enclosures. A resident complained, (Noorani, 2002). Notwithstanding these unethical actions, the parlia­
“The DHA would confiscate my cows and goats when they wandered off ment united to facilitate a three-year extension for the Army Chief, who
from the village for grazing around the developing DHA. I had to pay was approaching retirement, through the passage of bills.
many fines to get them back before I finally decided to sell them all
together”. Distressed villagers from Dhira, Charar Pind, Bhangali,
Gowaha, and Hussainabad regularly conflict with the DHA and large 2.6. Military Cronyism and Overpowering the Public State
landowners as they attempt to enclose common land around their vil­
lages. A resident from Charar Pind recounted events that led to an urban Due to cronyism and predatory practices, the military uses state
riot in 2004 after clashes with the DHA left one man dead “They wanted power to direct public resources to develop urban infrastructure that
to demolish our graveyard to build a police station and school, but we benefits its private enclaves. The Lahore Ring Road (LRR), a 100-mile
did not let them do it, the whole village came out and pushed back the long 6-lane highway circling Lahore, was inaugurated by General
police and DHA security.” With its expansion alongside the cantonment, Musharraf in 2002 and directly led to uneven results for different clas­
the DHA has encroached upon military training grounds and various ses. Its spatial layout benefitted the military housing estates that raced to
categories of land under military jurisdiction, contrary to the military’s buy agricultural land for speculative real estate development, and its
established code of conduct outlining the appropriate management of spatial arrangement was designed to cater to the needs of the upper-class
such lands. (Siddiqa, 2017, 175–80). In Lahore alone, there are 10,000 gentry. The military housing estates enjoy interchange access to their
court cases over the land the DHA has acquired—representing 56% of all gated enclaves (fieldwork notes). At the same time, poorer neighbor­
urban land acquisition-related cases (World Bank, 2020, 62). hoods and villages were contrarily walled off, and their mobility was
Despite the widespread prevalence of private real estate corporations restricted with the development of the LRR, which primarily caters to
that have emerged since the 1980s, the DHA and Bahria Town have inter-city high-speed traffic. LRR was further used to cut to size various
arisen as the predominant contenders in the market (Khan, 2022, 466). villages around the newly developing DHA, such as Gohawa, Leel, and
They have effectively dominated the realm of high-end residential Kamahan. The master plan for the ring road strategically targeted village
projects and garnered the favor of the aspiring middle and upper classes communities to maximize real estate values and minimize the resistance
seeking refuge from the dilapidated and consistently troubled neigh­ to the shifting built environment through the deployment of security
borhoods. Bahria Town is owned and run by the property tycoon Malik infrastructure. The FWO and private developers, including Kamran
Riaz. Bahria Town’s management is filled with retired high-ranking Kayani’s company, were given contracts worth millions to complete
army officers (Khan and Akhtar, 2014, 97). It is the second-largest pri­ different LRR sections.
vate housing development firm, only behind the DHA. An 80-meter Since the 1980s, the role of city municipal authorities in land and
replica of the Eiffel Tower, the third largest mosque in Pakistan, and a housing development has dramatically diminished. The main reasons for
gated community promising ancient Egyptian culture and architecture LDA’s lack of urban development have been the deregulation and
in Lahore have been marketed to the public with much fanfare. Although liberalization of the land market, which has allowed the private real
both these entities compete for financial investments and land, there is estate industry to flourish since the 1980s, especially the DHA. Until
nonetheless extensive collaboration between these two corporations. then, LDA was the primary state-operated urban authority involved in
They have various agreements that allow them to integrate each other’s developing residential and commercial plots for sale to the general
infrastructure (roads, highways). In 2008 DHA Islamabad outsourced public in Lahore. For instance, LDA was aided by the Punjab Acquisition
infrastructure development to Bahria Town for a DHA project, much to of Land (Housing) Act 1973, passed under the PPP regime of Bhutto,
the public’s surprise. This was the case for DHA Valley, a 2000-acre which allowed the state to acquire land at a low rate of $4000 per acre
residential and commercial project planned illegally around the Dha­ (Anjum and Hameed, 2016). However, Zia’s regime changed the field of
docha dam near Islamabad (Khan, 2022, 468). Thousands of people land development by replacing it with the Land Acquisition Act of 1985,
invested their money into this speculative housing development floated which compelled government development agencies to pay compensa­
by the DHA, only later to find out that the land adjacent to the lake had tion at one year’s average market price to landholders from whom the
been earmarked for conservation purposes, and the courts halted its land was acquired for residential and public purposes (Anjum and
development. Both entities function as land cartels that have monopo­ Hameed, 2016, 25). Since then, the role of LDA has diminished signifi­
lized the real estate market for high-end urban development. cantly as it has been given fewer finances to undertake developmental
DHA City Lahore, another project planned over 25,000 acres, re­ work.
mains controversial after 12 years. The funds acquired from investors for In my interviews with LDA officials from the planning department,
land development in 2010 were reportedly not utilized for their inten­ many confessed that they aspire to follow the DHA’s speculative land
ded purpose. Instead, they were diverted toward companies owned by development model but are unable to get enough speculative financiers
Kamran Kayani, the brother of the former Chief of the Army, Ashfaq on board to back their projects. They also believe that the DHA can flout
Pervaiz Kayani (2009–2012). A comprehensive investigation by the local laws, enjoy sales tax exemptions and grab land without facing any
anti-corruption agency National Accountability Bureau (NAB) discov­ repercussions from the local courts, which gives them an unfair
ered a series of fraudulent activities by Kamran Kayani’s front com­ advantage compared to other developers in the market (Interview with
panies. These entities purportedly agreed with the DHA and Bahria author, November 2018). As a result of these dynamics, the military
Town to purchase land on their behalf. The DHA then publicized the operates autonomously from the state’s non-military apparatuses that
project, enticing individuals to buy property titles for these initiatives cannot exercise any accountability or control over military-led real es­
(Raza, 2018). The capital generated was subsequently transferred to tate projects.
Kayani’s firms. However, the money was not used for the planned pur­
poses, and Kayani absconded the funds and fled Pakistan (NAB vs Murad 3. Conclusion: Excrescence of Military Apparatuses
Arshad & others). In the Supreme Court case on this matter in 2018, the
court directed the DHA to complete the project and hand over developed “Other countries have an army; here in Pakistan, the army has its own
plots to the affectees. However, the DHA has not followed the court’s country.”
order and refuses to complete the project. Such instances of malfeasance (A common proverb in Pakistan)

8
A. Ahmed Geoforum 146 (2023) 103846

In conclusion, it is worth asking how military neoliberalism has villages. As a result of such dynamics, military-produced commodities
modified the state’s structures and what unchartered avenues does this penetrate the everyday lives of its citizenry. At the same time, military-
open for prospective research? It has been argued that the state is controlled housing estates enflame desires for limitless consumption,
relatively autonomous from civil society by Marxist (Althusser, 2014; physical security, and total social exclusion. Thus, the increasing mili­
Poulantzas, 2000) and postcolonial scholars (Alavi, 1972; Coronil, tarization of the economy, and the corporatization of the military, have
1997). Under military neoliberalism, the military has amplified its in­ produced a new system of socioeconomic and political control that relies
dependence from civil society and the non-military apparatuses of the upon repeated interventions of the military in politics to resolve class
state (municipal authorities, judiciary, accountability commissions, antagonisms, subdue working-class movements, strengthen the power of
audit committees, parliamentary bodies, police, etc.). This newfound local capital, and intensify the reach of global financial capital in
autonomy does not stem from the state’s role in safeguarding the ‘gen­ different markets of Pakistan.
eral interest’ against competitive individualism (Hegel, 1991) or solely
from its role as a representative of capitalist classes (Marx and Engels, CRediT authorship contribution statement
1971; Marx, 2014). Neither does it emerge from the state’s role as a
mediator between different classes that populate postcolonial capitalism Ateeb Ahmed: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis,
(Alavi, 1972; Chatterjee, 1993). Instead, the source of this independence Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administra­
lies in the unique class structures, the corporatization of the military, the tion, Visualization, original draft, writing, reviewing and editing.
instrumentalization of violence for the advantage of military capital,
and the internal disintegration of some state apparatuses with the
expansion of military neoliberalism. This fragmentation, a consequence Declaration of Competing Interest
of civilian- and military-led administrations’ assaults on the public
sector, is further exacerbated by the military’s endeavors to dominate The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
other classes, acquire SOEs, and subordinate non-military state com­ interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
ponents. This power imbalance between state institutions means that the work reported in this paper.
non-military state apparatuses progressively lose their autonomy,
impeding their capacity to fulfill their mandates or regulate military- Data availability
driven developmental initiatives. These dynamics are leading to a
novel epoch of politics where the military increasingly conflicts with Data will be made available on request.
other state departments and the citizenry. For example, Musharraf’s
confrontation with the judiciary was the catalyst for a widespread Acknowledgments
popular movement that ultimately resulted in his downfall (Ghias,
2010). However, strategic alliances with the propertied classes have This paper would not have been possible without the meticulous
ensured the continuity of military neoliberalism and reinforced their comments of my advisors, Professor Arun Saldanha and Professor Vinay
power over the propertyless classes for now. Gidwani. I am also grateful to Professor Michael Goldman for his
With its transition towards a corporate behemoth, the Pakistani thoughtful suggestions on an early draft of this paper. Finally, I would
military has permanently solidified its political and economic role in the like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions.
national polity, even when it is not directly in power through a military This study was supported by the International Journal of Urban and
strongman. As an urban municipal authority and real estate developer, Regional Research (IJURR) Studentship, the American Institute of
combined with its intimate relationships with the financial classes, the Pakistan Studies (AIPS) Junior Fellowship award, and the Institute of
military has become the leading actor in developing gated communities Advanced Study’s (IAS) Interdisciplinary Doctoral Fellowship at the
for the middle and upper classes. Military neoliberalism in the urban University of Minnesota, Twin Cities campus. These sponsors had no role
domain has led to the privatization of public and common lands and the in the study design, collection, or analysis of the data; in the writing of
dispossession of low-income communities. Civilian governments and the report, or in the decision to submit this article.
private capitalist classes have been instrumental in legitimizing and
expanding military neoliberalism and the military’s role in the eco­
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