Section 69 of the BNS is redundant

Without any change in the definition of rape and consent, the stand-alone
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita seems unsustainable
GS 1, GS 2: Issues Related to Women, Issues Related to Children,
Government Policies & Interventions
Cases of rape registered on the premise of false promise of marriage have been in the eye of
the storm for a long time. It is often alleged that despite the consent of some women to a
physical relationship, the men in those relationships are accused of rape. It was expected that
the Central government would do away with the provision of the law which undermines the
agency of women in giving their free and informed consent before entering into a sexual
relationship. Instead, it introduced a new provision in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
Section 69 (presumably) solely addresses cases involving sexual intercourse based on false
promise of marriage. This stand-alone offence did not exist in the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Limitations set by the Court
Section 69 has ostensibly reduced the gravity of cases of sexual intercourse registered on the
false promise of marriage by reducing punishment, compared to the offence of rape defined
under Section 63 BNS (or Section 375 of the IPC). Before discussing the redundancy of Section
69 BNS, it will be appropriate to see how the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of such
cases by imposing some restrictions. First, differentiating between giving a false promise of
marriage and committing breach of promise by the accused, the Court in a number of cases,
including Anurag Soni v. The State of Chhattisgarh (2019), has held that unless the accused has
no intention to fulfil the promise of marriage right from the beginning, it would not amount to
rape. There could be cases when the accused might have made a promise with all seriousness
to marry a woman, but subsequently encountered unforeseen circumstances. In the second
category of cases, when a woman knowingly maintains physical relations for a prolonged
period, it cannot be said with certainty that this was purely because of the alleged promise
made by the accused to marry her. In other words, the physical relationship must be traceable
directly to the false promise made, and it must not be qualified by other circumstances or
considerations (such as love or passion for the accused). In Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of
U.P. (2025), the Court quashed the FIR and all the proceedings against the accused. The
complainant had maintained a sexual relationship for about 15 years with the accused and
alleged sexual abuse only on learning that the appellant had married another woman. She had
also on many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant. The Court held that
the relationship was consensual and with no element of deceit or misconception. Third, if on
the date of developing a physical relationship, the prosecutrix was already a married woman,
surrendering before the man on a false promise of marriage will not fall within the definition of
consent obtained on misconception of fact. After quoting many precedents set by the Supreme
Court, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Abhishek Arjariya v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh (2025) quashed the FIR and further proceedings based on similar facts. ---→ How has
the Supreme Court differentiated between a false promise of marriage and a mere breach of
promise in cases involving sexual relationships? What judicial reasoning was applied in cases like
Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh and Rajnish Singh v. State of U.P.? How do these rulings
affect the interpretation of consent and the applicability of Section 69 BNS?
Examining Section 69
Section 69 states that “whosoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a
woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual
intercourse not amounting to rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” The explanation says
“deceitful means” include “inducement for or false promise of employment or promotion or
marrying by suppressing identity”. Section 69 of the BNS was introduced as a separate offence;
there were no changes to the definition of rape and consent. A man is said to commit rape
under Section 63 of the BNS under circumstances falling under seven descriptions, out of which
six are concerned with consent. While under five descriptions, the consent is vitiated under
given conditions, such as fear or death or intoxication, other cases of “without consent” fall
under “misconception of fact” as provided in Section 28 of the BNS. Consent defined under
Section 28 of the BNS is vitiated if given by a person under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, or under 12 years of age. It
therefore implies that false promise of marriage is covered under the generic term
“misconception of fact” given in Section 28 of the BNS. ----→ Section 69 BNS creates a separate
offence for sexual intercourse based on deceitful promises, including false promise of marriage.
However, such acts are already covered under “misconception of fact” in Section 28, which
affects consent under rape law (Section 63). This raises questions about the necessity and legal
validity of Section 69. Its overlap may cause confusion and redundancy in prosecuting such
offences.
Since the definition of rape and consent given in the BNS are pari materia to their definitions
given in the IPC, the offence of sexual intercourse committed consequent to the false promise of
marriage, i.e., misconception of fact, will still fall under the scope of the offence of rape. Once
an offence is justified to be covered under the scope of rape, it cannot hold ground as another
offence of lesser gravity as defined under Section 69 of the BNS. Thus Section 69 appears to be
redundant. Further, unless an “exception” is carved out in Section 63 to exclude cases falling
under Section 69, Section 69 cannot be held constitutionality valid. Also, Section 69 does not
have a non-obstante clause. It is therefore, likely to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
When Courts are quashing FIRs based on the precedents described above, it would be better for
the police not to charge-sheet such cases. A preliminary inquiry should be conducted to
establish whether a cognisable offence was committed or not. Such action will prevent
unnecessary hardship to the accused person and also save time for our constitutional courts.
↑
Section 69 of the BNS is seen as legally redundant, as cases of false promise of marriage already
fall under rape through the “misconception of fact” clause in Section 63. Without a clear
exception or non-obstante clause, Section 69 risks violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
Courts have narrowed the scope of such cases through precedent. A preliminary inquiry is
essential to prevent misuse and reduce judicial burden.

Brief about the article:

The introduction of Section 69 in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, criminalizes sexual
intercourse based on a false promise of marriage, prescribing a lesser punishment than rape.
This provision is new and was not part of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and it exists despite
existing Supreme Court rulings that already narrow the scope of such cases. Courts have held
that only when a man never intended to marry from the beginning does it constitute rape; long-
term consensual relationships do not qualify. Section 69 appears redundant, as false promise of
marriage already falls under “misconception of fact” in Section 28, which impacts the definition
of consent under Section 63 (rape). Without a clear legal exception or a non-obstante clause,
Section 69 risks being unconstitutional under Article 14 due to potential overlap and
arbitrariness. Legal experts argue that redundant and parallel provisions should be avoided to
maintain consistency in law. Courts are increasingly quashing FIRs in such cases, urging caution
in prosecution. Preliminary inquiries before filing charges are recommended to avoid
harassment. Section 69’s constitutional validity remains questionable unless harmonized with
existing provisions.
 Opposing imposition
Hindi can be promoted without making it mandatory
GS 2: Centre-State Relations, Dispute Redressal Mechanisms, Government
Policies & Interventions
The announcement of the BJP-led government in Maharashtra that English and Marathi
medium schools will begin teaching Hindi as a third language from Class 1, as part of the
implementation of the National Education Policy 2020, is running into significant political
opposition. Previously, Hindi was introduced as a third language only from Class 6 onwards.
Schools with other mediums of instruction have already been following the three-language
formula from Class 1. While some view the announcement as an instance of Hindi imposition,
others fear its potential in undermining Marathi. Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis defended
the move, stating that Hindi serves as an acceptable language of communication across India.
But there are concerns about the practical challenges of this mandate: the extensive logistics
involved in teacher recruitment and training, besides salary costs. ----→ The move to introduce
Hindi from Class 1 in Maharashtra has sparked concerns over language imposition and the
potential dilution of Marathi. Critics argue it may serve political interests rather than
educational needs. Practical issues like teacher recruitment and training pose major challenges.
The policy shift highlights tensions between national uniformity and regional linguistic identity.
Media reports and social media chatter have pointed to an emerging hostility towards Hindi,
which could be a response to the perceived imposition. There is resentment that the move is an
effort to appease the sizeable population of native Hindi speakers settled in Maharashtra.
Historically, the State has witnessed a strong regional political identity, epitomised by the Shiv
Sena since the 1960s. This identity has emphasised Marathi pride, cultural assertion, and
prioritisation of local employment. Yet, unlike Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra has not exhibited overt
hostility towards Hindi. Even the Shiv Sena, which has targeted various groups — south Indians,
Muslims, and north Indian migrant workers — at different times, did not cultivate animosity
towards Hindi. The current resentment, therefore, seems less organic and more a product of the
BJP’s centralising agenda, which seeks uniformity in a culturally and linguistically diverse nation.
↑
The growing resentment towards Hindi in Maharashtra stems from fears of cultural erosion and
political centralisation. Unlike Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra's past lacked overt anti-Hindi sentiment,
making the current backlash appear politically driven. The move is seen as catering to Hindi-
speaking migrants rather than respecting regional identity. This raises concerns about
undermining linguistic diversity in a federal setup.
While the Constitution is unitary in structure, it recognises and accommodates diversity in
numerous ways. Previous centralising efforts by Congress governments included the promotion
of Hindi, but there was enough institutional flexibility to balance divergent interests. Though the
BJP now governs with a reduced mandate, it has managed to secure support from allies for its
centralising vision, provoking resistance in States such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra.
Meanwhile, the educational landscape is undergoing a radical transformation with
developments in AI and neuroscience. Instead of creating divisions, the Fadnavis government
would do well to build consensus to address the evolving demands of school and higher
education. -----→ Though the Constitution allows for central authority, it also values India’s
linguistic and cultural diversity. The BJP’s push for uniformity, like early Hindi promotion by
Congress, now faces stronger regional pushback. In a time of rapid educational change,
imposing language mandates risks deepening divides. A consensus-driven approach is crucial to
align education with future needs.
Brief about the article:
The Maharashtra government's move to introduce Hindi from Class 1 under NEP 2020 has
triggered political opposition over concerns of linguistic imposition. Critics fear it may
undermine Marathi and prioritize the Hindi-speaking migrant population. Historically,
Maharashtra upheld Marathi pride without hostility towards Hindi, making current resistance
appear politically driven. The logistical burden of implementing Hindi from Class 1 — including
teacher recruitment and training — adds to practical challenges. The BJP’s centralising push
contrasts with India's cultural and linguistic diversity, risking backlash in states with strong
regional identities. Past Congress efforts promoted Hindi but allowed institutional flexibility.
Today’s education must evolve with AI and neuroscience advancements. Building consensus,
not enforcing uniformity, is crucial for inclusive educational reform.