APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

Under the supervision of

PROF. RAHUL MISHRA

SUBMITTED BY - NAMAN JAIN (0029)

COURSE - BBALLB

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ABSTRACT

Interpretation is the art of discovering the true meaning of a law by giving the words of the law their natural
and ordinary meaning. It is the process of determining the true meaning of the words used in a law. The
Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and, as a result, certain principles have emerged from the
continued practice of the courts. These principles are sometimes called "rules of interpretation." The court
relies on any of the rules that produce an outcome that satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it.
While the literal rule is the one most often mentioned in express terms, the courts consider all three to be
valid and cite them as ad hoc requirements, but of course they do not give any reason for choosing one over
the other. For example, in some cases the literal rule would be preferred over the fatal rule, and in other
cases the opposite would be the case. It was not possible to predict with certainty which approach would be
followed in a particular case.

Research problem

With regard to the interpretation of the images, the question arises of where to look for the meaning of a law
that would be drafted in broader terms and would not be limited to whether only the words of a law should
be examined or examined. Also the intention of the legislator and the approach to be taken for interpretation
the static and dynamic nature of the act makes it difficult for the interpreter to interpret the images. General
laws are based on the principle that laws and codes are the basis of the legal system, just as companies are
the basis of the common law system. Due to the rule of written law, legal interpretation is at the heart of
legal statutes. Legal interpretation is very flexible and there are no strict interpretation fees. Many cases
handled by superior courts concern the meaning of words in a statute or delegated legislation.

Research Question

i) Whether courts should interpret statues so as to give effect to the intention or purpose of that
legislation following purposive approach or literal approach?

Hypothesis

Gone are the days when courts took a literal approach. Courts take a focused approach, intended to give
effect to the purpose of the law, and are prepared to consider many foreign documents that provide the
context in which the law is enacted. However, a focused interpretation should only be adopted if judges can
read the law as a whole or the material to which they are legally entitled to refer to help interpret an
expression of the purpose or policy of Parliament.

Methodology

The present study is based on doctrinal study based on secondary sources which includes books, e sources,
articles, journals and research Sections.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Thinini Khandawaarachi, Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 49(02) JOURNAL
OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE

The article talk about the purpose of legal interpretation, it is to determine the intent of the legislature. It can be found
by the meaning of legal language. So the question: "how do the courts define the significance of the legal statutes? It is
unavoidable. Legal fraternity for centuries argued about the use of legal history in law the interpretation and elements
of what constitutes legal history it may differ depending on the jurisdiction and state in question. Historically, the use
of legal history has been used to establish legislative intent underlying the meaning of a law and play a lot important
role in the search for the object or purpose of a law.

K. R. Chandratre, Supreme Court on Statutory Interpretation-: The Proper Function of a Provision,

41(01) TAX AND CORPORATE REFERENCE (2007)

This article talks about the rules to be followed while using any particular approach for the interpretation of
statues provided that Conjunctive or Disjunctive: says that "or" is generally considered disjunctive and "and"
is conjunctive. Therefore, it is not possible to deviate from the previous rule unless the contrary intention
appears or the object of the law so requires. Same word same meaning: the rule is based on the general
presumption of consistency in the statue, that is, under different clauses and different provisions of the
statute. That the principle works very well with subject bylaws. Non-Obstant Clause: this is the rule that
authorizes the legislator to use it as a device give priority to specific provisions over contradictory ones
present in the same statute or in a different law. It is used mainly to designate effect of all contradictory
provisions that ambiguity interpretation. Casus Missus: It literally means omitted case. Used as a solution
dealing with a particular situation was not specified in the law or the contract. Hence this rule give the court
the power to use precedent and a new judge passed laws to decide appeared on the current stage.
Assumptions about the interpretation of the statutes: Ejusdem generis: this line means "of the same type" so
general words of the same kind are considered in the same category. Noscitur a socis: also called "known by
the company that owns it". This line says that the meaning of the words can be deduced from other
surrounding words. Give importance read the law in its entirety, not separately. Expressio unius est
exclosio alterius: The maxim means "the expression of a thing is the exclusion of another”. According to
this rule, a member of a class is explicit referenced can remove the other member of the same class that is
not expressed.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………….05

LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION……………………………………………...06

RULES TO BE FOLLOWED……………………………………………………………..10

APPRAISAL OF PRINCIPLE…………………………………………………………….11

MERITS……………………………………………………………………………………..11

CRITICISMS OF THE LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION…………………..11

PURPOSIVE APPROACH………………………………………………………………..13

1. Advantages…………………………………………………………………………...16
2. Disadvantages………………………………………………………………………..16

TRANSITION FROM A LITERAL APPROACH TO PURPOSIVE

APPROACH.......................................................................................................................17

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..18

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………..19

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INTRODUCTION

The legislator makes the law and the court interprets it when justice is done. Interpretation is the main
function of a court. When a dispute is taken to court and there is uncertainty as to the true meaning of the
law, the court interprets the law. Interpretation means giving the best meaning to the words or expressions
used in the law because the will of the legislator is expressed in the form of law. The statute is the starting
point for interpretation. The statute includes elements such as the short title, the long title, the preamble, the
marginal notes, the titles of a group of sections or of individual sections, the definition of interpretation
clauses, the provisions, the illustrations, the explanations, appendices, punctuation, etc. Each element
expressed in the law constitutes a basis for interpretation. To interpret, the court must read the law as a
whole. The court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily. And you need to follow some approaches mentioned
as general approaches which are literal approach and purposive approach. Chief Justice John Marshall said
in Marbury v. Madison: "Clearly it is the county and the Judicial Department's duty to say what the law is."
Court rulings on statutes are often the last word on legal meaning and will determine how the law is applied,
at least, unless the parliament takes steps to change the law. In terms of legal interpretation, many members
of the judiciary consider that their role of "saying what the law is" is subordinate to the position of
parliament as the creator of the law. In fact, the legitimacy of a particular exercise of legal interpretation is
often judged by how it carries out the will of parliament. Judges have taken different approaches to
determining the meaning of a law. The two theories or approaches to legal interpretation that prevail today
are a purposive and literal approach.

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LITERAL APPROACH OF INTERPRETATION

The main approach of the interpretation of the statutes is called "literal interpretation". It is also known as
the "plain rule of interpretation". In this form of interpretation, "words" are used in the state is interpreted
according to its "literal" meaning or according to the dictionary meaning of the term, in other words, its clear
meaning. Chief Justice Jervis in Abley v Gale1 explained the expression "literal meaning." He points out that
"as the exact words used are clear and unambiguous, in our opinion we are obliged to interpret them
ordinary feeling, although in our opinion it also leads to the absurd or injustice. The words of a law must
first be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. Meanings and expressions and sentences are
interpreted according to their grammatical meaning, unless which leads to an absurdity or unless there is
something in the context or the object of the law suggests otherwise2. The trend is for courts to implement
the intention and presumption of the legislator is that the words themselves do it; in such case it is preferable
to express the intention of the legislator3. It is a rule of interpretation of the statutes that is above all the
grammatical meaning of the word it must be respected. The terms of a law must, at first glance, take their
ordinary meaning4. Where the grammatical construction is clear and clear and without a doubt this
construction must prevail unless there is a strong and clear reason to do otherwise5. In other words the best
possible interpretation of a law would be to give its clear meaning. When the If the wording of the law is
clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to consider the legislative intent or purpose of the law. When the
wording is vague, the legislator intends to consider. There is no room for construction if there is no
ambiguity. If that the wording of a law is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply it and has no rights
extend its operation to achieve the real or perceived intention of the legislator When the language is not only
clear but recognizes a single meaning, the interpretation task can he just said to ask. The duty of the court is
simply to take the law as it is, and to interpret your words according to their natural meaning. When the
terms of the law are in they are in themselves precise and clear, so just explain these words its natural and
ordinary meaning. A restrictive and exhaustive definition must be expanded or developed to encompass
things that are not strictly speaking in the sense of the word as determined.

This approach Look no further than the written words. If the words of the law are clear and explicit, It is not
for the judges to go beyond that language or words to try to determine what the he could have meant
legislative using that word. It is also known as "Grammatical Interpretation”. Courts must follow this
principle, even if it leads to irrationality or even if it goes against policy or the intention of the legislator.
Look no further than the literary law means letter of the Law. It only refers to what the Law says. Words and
phrases must be understood by the courts in their ordinary sense, and the ordinary rules of grammar and

1
20 L.J.C.P (N.S) 233 (1851).
2
Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179.
3
DEEPAK JAIN, Interpretation of Statutes: A Treatise http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/interpretation-of-
statutes-a-treatise/.
4
Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44.
5
PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363.
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punctuation must be applied. If a clear meaning appears when applying this rule, you must applied, and the
courts will not consider whether what the law says represents their intent the Law. To determine the literal
meaning of a law, courts must be sure the ordinary meaning of a word in a law referring to a dictionary or
scientist or any other technical work where words are used. This rule is also widely followed in India. It is an
elementary principle of the interpretation of the laws that the words must be read its literal meaning. So
generally the words and sentences would be clear and ordinary meanings that can only be decomposed or
truncated if they are clearly limiting in themselves. If the terms of the law are clear and unambiguous, it is
clearer duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. When the
meaning of the words is clear, it is not the duty of the courts to address the alleged issues intentions. It
therefore seems inadmissible to examine the advantages and disadvantages of apply the ordinary meaning,
whether in the interest of the prosecutor or in the interest of the accused the construction of a legal provision,
the first rule of interpretation is the literary rule building. All we need to see from the beginning is what this
provision says provision is unequivocal, and if Parliament's intention is clear from this provision, there is no
to invoke other rules for the construction of the statutes6. Absoluta sentantia expositore no simple and needy
words need no explanation. Such language better explains, without further ado, intention of the legislator,
and is decisive in this The literal rule follows the legal maxim, verbis wet non est recelendum, which means
Right words, there should be no beginning. The meaning of a word is also influenced by its context, which
is reflected in the legal maxim noscitur a sociis which means the meaning of an unclear word or phrase must
be determined by the words immediately surrounding it7. Courts interpret a particular word in the context in
which it was used.

CASES

The use of the literal rule is illustrated in the case of Fisher v Bell (1960)8. The Offensive Weapons
Restriction Act of 1959 made it a listing violation for certain assault weapons for sale, including knives.
James Bell, a Bristol merchant, displayed one of these weapons in his display case at Broadmead Arcade.
The Divisional Court ruled that he could not be convicted of failing to put the knives up for sale by Mr. Bell
because he gave the words of the law a strict literal meaning. Under contract law, placing something in a
shop window is not technically an offer to sell; it's just an invitation to try. (An invitation to negotiate is an
invitation to make offers, such as displaying merchandise in a shop window.) The customer makes an offer
to the store when they offer money to sell an item. The court confirmed that the merchant did not make an
offer to sell in the literal sense of an offer and was therefore not guilty of the crime. Later, Parliament
amended the law to make it clear that displaying a knife in a store window was a crime.

6
Hira Lal Ratanlal v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034
7
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1084(17TH ed.).
8
1 QB 394,, 3 All ER 731
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In Keshavnanda Bharti c. State of Kerala9 J. Ray stressed that a word acquires its "colour" in the context in
which It was used. The word derives its meaning not only from the context in which it is used, but also from
the words used in similar circumstances10. Salmond points out that a word acquires its meaning by being
context and that is why the technical word "void" can be interpreted as "nullable".

Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar11, The Supreme Court noted: “It is also well organized that
when interpreting a law, the Court should not limit itself to its literal meaning of the words used, but also
take into account the past history of the legislation, its purpose and the errors it seeks to suppress. "

In All Saints High School Hyderabad et al Vs. Government from Andhra Pradesh12, it was noted: “When an
action is expressed in a language of universality allow it to be applied, read literally, to matters that go
beyond the relevant legislation power, the Court will interpret it in a more limited sense to keep you in
power.

The literal rules of interpretation prevent the courts from accepting the natural meaning of the given words.
They should be limited to the exact meaning of the words used in the bylaws. The judge cannot change the
language of the law with the intention of aligning it with yours beliefs about what is fair and reasonable. The
court must give a common meaning to the Statute even if it amounts to the absurd or the irrational. If the
interpretation leads to the absurd, it is not the It is the duty of the Judiciary to correct it, but it is the burden
or, in other words, the burden or burden of legislator to correct it. Under purely literal rules, the court should
always avoid reading with context, but contextual interpretation may be a minor change. In case the meaning
of a word has changed due to the passage of time, the word must be understood as what it meant the status
has been published. Since the language changes from time to time, there can be no quick rule of thumb for
legislative diction13. If technical words are used in a particular provision, then in such situations, the
technical meaning of these words should be used. The traditional role of the rule of literal interpretation
prohibits the court from using a meaning other than Ordinary.

As long as there is no ambiguity in it legal language, resorting to any process of interpretation to reveal the
intention of the legislator it becomes inadmissible14. It is a well-established rule of interpretation that when
the terms of the law are clear, clear and unambiguous, the courts should express that meaning, whatever the
consequence. They say the words themselves are better intended15. If a legal provision can only be
interpreted one way, then be free for the court to impose another interpretation of that provision, simply
because another construction would lead to irrational or even absurd consequences the question of political
implications and considerations would only be relevant when the installation to be interpreted is susceptible
9
(1973) 4 SCC 225
10
(1973) 4 SCC 225
11
Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd.v.State of Bihar A.I.R.1955 S.C.661
12
All Saints High School Hyderabad & others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh,(1980) 25 C.C p.478s
13
B.N.MANI TRIPATHI, ,JURISPRUDENCE-LEGAL THEORY 253 (17th ed Allahabad Law Agency,Faridabad,2006).
14
Keshavji Ravji & Co. vs. CIT [1990] 49 Taxman 87 (SC)
15
Spl Deputy Collector, LA Unit v. Dasari Ramulu 2001 AIHC 387 (AP).
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to two constructions. In such a case, the court will not concern about results that might make their clear
meaning important words used by the legislature. If these results are unfortunate, it is the legislator who
must decide measures to correct the defects of the adopted law; it is not for the courts to usurp the functions
of the legislature, and stretching the meaning and ignoring the clear terms of the law Avoid consequences
that, according to the court ruling, may be insignificant. Legal provisions may be poorly formulated in law
and this may not be the case express the real intention of the legislator, but this is a matter with which the
court is not. It is an established principle of interpretation that the court must transmit to presume that the
legislature was not wrong and did what it wanted16. If the result of the interpretation of a law by this rule is
not what the legislator intended, it is intended the legislator changes the law, instead of the courts trying to
do what is necessary change by investing in clear language in a way other than natural result that he believes
the legislator must have intended17. However, this is another element Rule according to which the
interpretation of a legislative text must be made of all the parts together and not of a single part. This
doctrine is always essential, even if the words are clear, because the truth the meaning of each passage of a
law is the one that best harmonizes with the subject and with each one part, so that inconsistencies can be
avoided and effective effect can be given to all determination of law, if reasonable interpretation allows.
Where there is no alternative but to admit that the fact is inconsistent and incomprehensible, it is legitimate
to interpret the law in a way that could be considered dangerously close to the process of legislative
enactment. Yes however, an intelligible construction can be applied to an installation; there is no
justification for a construction that would require the insertion of words that do not appear there Courts
should not assume intention before construction. Nothing remains dangerous and misleading in interpreting
a law to first assume that the legislature had a certain intention, then decided what that intention was
conclude that the intention must be expressed in law, then proceed to investigate it. Words they must acquire
their natural meaning, even if they do not conform to the intent of the law. If that the legislator has clearly
indicated his intention, it is our duty to try to However, it is natural that if the word they used does not allow
such an interpretation, their intention must fail. The only alternative construction offered to us would lead to
this result the clear intention of the legislator completely failed due to a small inaccuracy language of the
section. If we took over this construction, we would enter into law beat your goal. The ordinary and natural
meaning of words should not be governed by the spirit of the law. The spirit of the law may be an elusive
and insecure guide, and the so-called spirit certainly cannot be executed in violation of the plain language of
the articles of the law and the established norms below18. Clear meaning must be subject to context. The
literal importance to an individual the language may be subject to change and variation depending on the
context, i.e. the language around and at the level of the concepts in question. A law should not be understood
with reference to grammar, but must be interpreted reasonably, in particular, to give effect to the structure

16
Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors (2001) 7 SCC 71.
17
8 HALSBURY‟S LAWS OF ENGLAND,( 4thed, vol 44, para 864.)
18
Rananjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh AIR 1954 Sc 749
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and purpose of the legislation, language permitting19. The interpretation that leads to unconstitutionality or
nullity must be avoided.

RULES TO BE FOLLOWED

As for the literal rules of interpretation, they tend to be restrictive. The following rules must be observed.
These are the subordinate rules to apply the literal rule of interpretation20.

1. Conjunctive or Disjunctive: This line says that "or" is generally considered disjunctive and "and" is
conjunctive. Therefore, it is not possible to deviate from the previous rule unless the contrary intention
appears or the object of the law so requires.

2. Same word same meaning: the rule is based on the general presumption of consistency in the statue, that
is, under different clauses and different provisions of the statute. That the principle works very well with
subject bylaws.

3. Non-Obstant Clause: this is the rule that authorizes the legislator to use it as a device give priority to
specific provisions over contradictory ones present in the same statute or in a different law. It is used mainly
to designate effect of all contradictory provisions that ambiguity interpretation.

4. Casus Omissus: It literally means omitted case. Used as a solution dealing with a particular situation was
not specified in the law or the contract. Hence this rule give the court the power to use precedent and a new
judge passed laws to decide appeared on the current stage.

5. Assumptions about the interpretation of the statutes:

Ejusdem generis: this line means "of the same type" so general words of the same kind are considered in
the same category.

Noscitur a socis: also called "known by the company that owns it". This line says that the meaning of the
words can be deduced from other surrounding words. Give importance read the law in its entirety, not
separately.

Expressio unius est exclosio alterius: The maxim means "the expression of a thing is the exclusion of
another”. According to this rule, a member of a class is explicit referenced can remove the other member of
the same class that is not expressed.

19
M Satyanarayana v State of Karnataka AIR 1986 SC 1162.
20
K. R. Chandratre, Supreme Court on Statutory Interpretation-5: The Proper Function of a Provision, 41(01) TAX AND
CORPORATE REFERENCE 28, 29 (2007)
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APPRAISAL OF PRINCIPLE

For the avoidance of doubt, legislatures often include definitions of sections in a law, which explicitly define
the key terms used in that law. But some laws omit a definition section entirely, or more often, and fail to
define a particular term. The plain meaning rule seeks to guide courts facing disputes that undermine the
meaning defined by law, or in that of a word that appears in a definition itself. According to the rule of
clarity, they must be applied even if the intention of the legislator was different or the result is harsh or
undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says rather than what the law was supposed to say.

MERITS

Rule of literal interpretation as it is a traditional rule of interpretation, often defended by lawyers who claim
the rule of clear meaning that prevents the courts from taking sides in legislative or political matters. They
also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have wide access to secondary sources. It is also
argued that extrinsic evidence should not be allowed around the words used by the testator or its meaning.
This can help ensure a consistent interpretation.

CRITICISMS OF THE LITERAL APPROACH OF INTERPRETATION

There are certain loopholes in the rule of literal interpretation. Faults can be of two type Logical failure
consisting of ambiguity, inconsistency and incompleteness and the second the type is the absurd or
irrationality. Ambiguity occurs when a term or phrase is used in the law has not one, but several meanings,
and it is not known which precise meaning it represents in what specific context or place. So here the court
will have to go further than the statute, and yet they adhere to the very literal words of the law to establish
their meaning. Too ambiguity is sometimes "syntactic"21, which means that the vagueness comes from words
like "or", "and", "all" and other similar words. For example, if a punishment for a particular crime is "okay"
or imprisonment or both”, the court may imprison the suspect or impose a fine or fine as well as imprisoning
him. If the wording of the law is clear and unambiguous, the court cannot be able to ignore the obvious
meaning, even if it leads to injustice22. Words can't be well understood without the context in which it is
used. Strict respect for this principle can cause injustice and sometimes produce results contrary to the legal
intent or common sense. In the event of a loophole or omission in the law so that you cannot give a complete
idea, or make it logically incomplete, it is the duty court to correct the defect by adding or changing
something, but the court is not authorized to do so do more than that. It is only authorized in cases where the
statutes do not apply in your current form, which is incomplete. The court will seek the change, amendment
or addition in this sense; it is likely to help establish legislative intent. Is not necessarily that judges always
find a way to help them in cases of faulty texts. There will be cases where you may not find these kinds of

21
FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 136
22
CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar [1975] 101 ITR 764 (SC)
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things. They are allowed to verify what the legislature intended, who likely would have been if the breach
had occurred observe.

One of the problems with literal rules is that they provoke the absurd. Sometimes the court can do it give the
law a meaning that was never intended by the legislator. The traditional rule of literal interpretation prohibits
the court from having any meaning other than Ordinary. It closes the doors to any type of legal innovation,
making it limitation of courts. Since the rule is to follow the exact terms of the law, there are few legislators
saying it's like making a rule even when you know it's not fair. If the court applies literal rule and feel that
the interpretation is morally wrong, then they cannot. Some criticize this rule, saying that the rule
emphasizes the erroneous assumption that the words they have a fixed meaning. In fact, the words are
imprecise, leading the judges to impose their own prejudices in determining the meaning of a law.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, “This Construction type deals with legal and contractual words with
very restrictive readings”23. Provided there is no ambiguity in the legal language, use a process of
interpretation displaying the legislator's intention becomes inadmissible24. As for the principle of clear
meaning, it has been observed more than often that it seems somewhat paradoxical that a rule of clear
meaning should be unclear and needs some explanation. With a change in policy and legislation, the statutes
still cannot be interpreted according to the common sense of words created long ago, this makes it unsuitable
today.

23
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY,17TH ed; p.308
24
Keshavji Ravji & Co. vs. CIT [1990] 49 Taxman 87 (SC).
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PURPOSIVE APPROACH

The purposive approach is also known as "purposive interpretation" or "purposive construction." It is

generally called the "principle of modern construction" because it refers to statutes and constitutions (be it a
statute, part of it, or a clause of the constitution) to clarify its enactment purpose. The teleological rule was
created to replace the three rules: the rule of destiny, the rule of regular reading, and the golden rule, while
the rule of exclusion was rejected. In this form of interpretation, the Court uses pre-established legislation,
such as draft reports and commission reports. The criticism behind this rule is that the distribution of powers
between the legislative and the judiciary is fully taken into account. The role of the legislator is to make
laws, while the role of the judiciary is to interpret these laws in cases. However, through a focused approach,
the judiciary can go beyond the words of the images, creating an assumption in which the image is applied
with what is believed to be the intention of the legislators. This rule gives judges the power to investigate
foreign affairs and apply the law according to the assistance they deem appropriate. Parliament intends for a
piece of legislation to correct a certain infringement, and Parliament is therefore seen as intending the court,
when considering in relation to the facts of this case, which of the opposing concepts of the law corresponds
the legal finds an interpretation that applies the remedy offered to eliminate the irregularity25.

The rule of legal interpretation is simple. If all words and phrases are clear and unambiguous, they should be
interpreted as written. No words should be added and there should be no rejection. If this is not followed, the
interpretation could be misleading when the intentions of the legislators completely diverge. Legislative
wisdom cannot be replaced by the opinion of a judge; this is the first line of interpretation. As the Supreme
Court points out in a slightly different context, “when a procedure is prescribed by the legislator, it is not for
the court to substitute another according to its notion of justice. When the legislature has spoken, the justices
cannot afford to be wiser26. However, this is an exception to the intentional approach. When the words used
in the legal provision are vague and ambiguous or when the clear and normal meaning of the words or their
grammatical interpretation causes confusion, absurdity and aversion to others. Instead of adopting a simple
and grammatical interpretation, courts can use interpretation tools to correct the situation by adding, omitting
or replacing the words of the Statute. This does not mean that the Court assumes that the legislator
introduced an absurd or irrational provision; instead, it only assumes that the error committed lies with the
editors who drafted the article in such a way that the provision becomes grammatically incorrect or
ambiguous; the court will determine the objective rule to derive the meaning of what the legislation intends
when drafting the provisions.

25
As written in HALSBURY‟S LAWS OF ENGLAND, (4th Edn., Vol. 44(1), Law Publishers, Canada 1984) at paragraph 1474, on page
906-907.
26
From the article of Rajgat Agarwal „INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE- THE PURPOSIVE RULE‟ (Legal Service India, 30 July 2012)
available online at http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/print.php?art_id=1223 accessed on 21-11-2022
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According to Maxwell27,

When the drafting of a law, in its ordinary sense and in its grammatical interpretation, leads to a manifest
contradiction of the apparent object of the determination, or to inconveniences or absurdities, difficulties or
injustices, which can hardly be claimed, an interpretation may change the meaning of words, and even the
structure of the sentence, which can be done by deviating from the rules of grammar, giving unusual
meanings to certain words, or rejecting them altogether, on the grounds that the legislator could not have
meant what their words mean, and that the changes made are just corrections of reckless language and
actually convey the true meaning. When the main object and intention of a law are clear, it should not be
reduced to a lack of competence on the part of the designer or a lack of knowledge of the law, except in
cases of necessity or evidence of the language used. ''

In India, the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh V. Bachittar Singh28 approved and adopted the purposive
approach. Bombay High Court in Shamrao Parulekar V. District Magistrate Thana29, held that

"If one interpretation leads to an absurdity, while another implements what common sense would clearly
show, the construction that would go against the aims of the law must be rejected, even if the same words
are in the same section are used. and even the same sentence must be interpreted differently. The law goes
so far as to require the courts to change even the grammatical and ordinary meaning of words, to avoid
absurdity and inconsistency."
The Court also noted an exception to the rule in Molar Mal V. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd30, where it stated that
“the exception comes into play when the application of the literal interpretation of the words of the statute
leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which the words are used or the
reading of the law in its entirety requires a different meaning31."

The Privy Council had also ruled that the purpose of making a law, though that of establishing the will of the
legislator could not be presumed as an injustice or an absurdity, and that a literal interpretation would
produce such a result, and the language allows an interpretation that would avoid, then such an interpretation
can be adopted.

27
Peter Benson Maxwell, „INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES‟ (12th Edn., LexisNexis Butterworths Publications, Wadhwa Nagpur,
August 1969) at page 228.
28
1955 AIR 830, 1955 SCR (2)
29
(1952) 54 BOMLR
30
(1998) 120 PLR 579
31
Ibid 877
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According to Judge G.P. Singh, there must be four conditions to justify a departure from the clear terms of
the law32:

1. There is a clear and crude balance of anomalies;

2 Parliament, the legislative initiators and the draftsman could not have foreseen such an anomaly and could
not have accepted it in the interests of a legislative objective of control;

3. The irregularity can be overcome without prejudice to said legislative objective;

4. The wording of the statute is subject to any changes necessary to correct the anomaly.

It has since been established that, in order to fulfil the purpose of interpreting a law, such requests must be
made. In such cases, the principle of purposive construction should be applied. In the case of the Chief
Justice of Andhara Pradesh V. L.V.A. Dikshitulu33 pointed out to the Court that the main principle of
interpretation is that a constitutional or legal provision must be interpreted according to "the intention of who
drafted it." This intention is normally inferred from the language of the establishment. When the language
and phrase used by the legislation are clear and precise, and when, through a simple reading of the provision,
the intention of the legislator can be summarized in ambiguous terms, it should be applied in this way,
without putting anything on the board change when its interpretation is made by the Court, regardless of the
possible consequences. However, if the words used in the provision are not precise, protean, or suggestive,
have more than one meaning, or contain grammatical errors that prevent the legislative intent from being
realized, then, in such cases, reveal the true meaning and intent behind expressions used, the Court may need
to go beyond limiting the literal interpretation of expressions and use other generally accepted rules of
interpretation, such as the legislative history behind the law and why the law was drafted, enlightening each
party and addressing to pursue the objective and avoid any other form of interpretation.

The Court held in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)34 That if the terms of the provisions are ambiguous,
uncertain and raise doubts as to the terms used, the Court considers it its primary duty to use the language of
the rational meaning of the legislature. Then every word, every part, and every provision is discussed. In this
context, the law will be examined as a whole. Furthermore, it also examines the need that arises with the
law, the mess that the legislator is trying to rectify, the whole situation and not just the individual
relationship. Any provision outside the scope of the Statute will not be taken into account and the provisions
will not be considered as abstract principles separate from the engine that supports them. When evaluating
the provisions, the circumstances giving rise to them are taken into account and consistency and coherence
within the legislation as a whole is ensured to avoid undesirable consequences.

32
Justice G.P Singh, „PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION‟ (12th Edn., LexisNexis Publications, Nagpur, 2010) at page
144 from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [1978] 1 WLR 231.
33
AIR 1979 SC 193
34
AIR 1988 SC 1883
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The Supreme Court also stated in District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co that:

“Legislation focuses mainly on the problems of the legislator on the basis of information drawn from past
and present experiences. We can also design it with general words to deal with similar problems that will
arise in the future. But, given the nature of things, it is impossible to fully anticipate the various situations
that will arise in the future in which the application of current legislation may be required and the words
chosen to convey such indefinite references will emerge. It will certainly happen in many cases. , lacks
clarity and precision and thus raises controversial construction issues. The construction process combines
both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, legislative intent, that is, the true or legal meaning of
a statute, is inferred by considering the meaning of the words used in the statute in light of a purpose or an
observable object that defines evil and the remedy for which it is determination, we understand."

Advantages

1. It allows the law to develop to cover advances in modern science.

2. It is a flexible approach which allows judges to develop the law in with Parliaments intentions

3. It allows judges to cope with situations unforeseen by Parliament.

Disadvantages

1. Judges are given too much power to develop the law and usurping (without legal authority) the power of
Parliament.

2. Judges become law makers infringing the Separation of Powers.

3. There is scope for judicial bias in deciding what Parliament intended.

TRANSITION FROM A LITERAL APPROACH TO PURPOSIVE APPROACH

This is the latest recent trend that the literal rule may not be effective enough and therefore, the

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interpretation must be object-based35. There are certain gaps in the literal rule interpretations that lead
interpreters to prefer an approach directed at literal rules. There are two types of failures, Logical defect
creating ambiguity ,inconsistency and incompleteness and the second type is absurd or irrationality36.So
the rule of literal interpretation was adopted by a purposive approach such as Unique interpretive features
that are most effective for practical purposes. The problems with literal rules of interpretation were solved
by focused interpretation. The advantage of objective-based interpretation is that it takes individual cases
to court. Can be says it is broadly applicable, allowing the law to cover more situations than literally
apply the words. We can say that this fills in the gaps in the law. Deliberation The approach is mainly
constructive, as it can also cope with any unknown circumstances, as it is it is applied depending on the
purpose of the law at that time. Hence a targeted approach it has become one of the most important
elements of recent interpretive trends.

CONCLUSION

35
K. R. Chandratre, Supreme Court on Statutory Interpretation-9: The Proper Function of a Provision, 41(06) TAX AND
CORPORATE REFERENCE 238, 239 (2007)
36
Thinini Khandawaarachi, Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 49(02) JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW
INSTITUTE 223, 239 (2007).
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Courts now use purposive approach rather than literal approach, seeking to give effect to the purpose of the
law and willing to consider a large number of foreign documents related to the context in which the law was
enacted. However, a purposive interpretation should only be adopted if judges can read the law as a whole or
the material to which they are legally entitled to refer to help interpret an expression of the purpose or policy
of Parliament.Several changes have been made to the method of legal interpretation and there are important
effects on our legal system in the context of a literal, interpretation and purposive approach. This has reached
the point where the judiciary and the legislature converge. Parliament has enacted many laws that have more
or less told the judiciary how to interpret the laws, and in return the judiciary has also read words in the
legislation that could be seen as what they believe is the purpose of power. Legislative behind the statute but
it can be a way of promoting your own personal political agenda.

With regard to the literal approach of interpretation or the purposive approach to interpretation, "it is the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature and the judiciary with respect to the powers
conferred on the legislature by its legislation." While these rules of interpretation can be beneficial to some
extent, it is quite possible that they are misused and cause significant legal problems in India.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS A MODE OF INTERPRETATION

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Frequently, the legislative history of a statute is the most fruitful source of instruction as to its proper
interpretation.

It is also well-settled that in interpreting an enactment, the court should have regard not merely to the literal
meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its
purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress.

In construing a statute, the court is not bound to forget its history or the background against which it was
enacted.
Historical background (law commission recommendations etc) may sometimes have to be looked in to
discover the 'real intent' of the legislature, while 'Keeping the diction of the statute intact', held the Supreme
Court in Itdayam v RC Bizli

For interpreting un amended provisions, historical background of the amendment may be relevant. In the
matter of interpretation of a statute, the history of the legislation and the surrounding circumstances, which
existed at the time and demanded a change of law or the enactment of a new one can all be taken into
consideration. Legislative debates can be cited before the court 'at least for the purpose of finding out the
historical background and the environmental circumstances in which the law was made', said the Punjab
High Court in a case under Punjab Gram Panchayat Act 1953.

In interpreting words and phrases, it is permissible to refer to the previous history and decided cases as also
to external evidence such as extraneous circumstances

Therefore, it is amply clear that1.

 Legislative History is a sound mode of interpretation2.

 However, such interpretation can only be done when the language of the statue itself is unclear.

 Present day circumstances, while important, will have less impact on the interpretation, than
legislative history.

 Aspects of legislative history may include a wide array of sources, including the bill(including the
speeches during the passage of such a bill) the statement of object sand reasons (in a limited manner),
Commission reports and Inquiry reports and Parliamentary Debates
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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LIST OF CASES

(1952) 54 BOMLR
(1954) 1 All ER 201.
(1958)1LLJ500S.C
(1973) 4 SCC 225
(1973) 4 SCC 225
(1998) 120 PLR 579
1 QB 394,, 3 All ER 731
1955 AIR 830, 1955 SCR (2)
A.I.R 1952 S.C 362
A.I.R 1980 S.C 481
AIR 1958 SC 532.
AIR 1979 SC 193
AIR 1988 SC 1883
All Saints High School Hyderabad & others Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh,(1980) 25 C.C p.478s
Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd.v.State of Bihar A.I.R.1955 S.C.661
CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar [1975] 101 ITR 764 (SC)
Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179.
Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors (2001) 7 SCC 71.
Hira Lal Ratanlal v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034
Keshavji Ravji & Co. vs. CIT [1990] 49 Taxman 87 (SC).
L.J.C.P (N.S) 233 (1851).
M Satyanarayana v State of Karnataka AIR 1986 SC 1162.
Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44.
PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363.
Rananjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh AIR 1954 Sc 749
Smt. Tarulata Shyam vs. CIT [1971] 108 ITR 345 (SC).
Spl Deputy Collector, LA Unit v. Dasari Ramulu 2001 AIHC 387 (AP).

ARTICLE/JOURNAL

 A.N SAHA,, MITRAS LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY (5th ed1994).

 As written in HALSBURY‟S LAWS OF ENGLAND, (4th Edn., Vol. 44(1), Law Publishers, Canada 1984) at
paragraph
 B.N.MANI TRIPATHI, ,JURISPRUDENCE-LEGAL THEORY 253 (17th ed Allahabad Law
Agency,Faridabad,2006).
 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY,17TH ed;

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  DEEPAK JAIN, Interpretation of Statutes: A Treatise
http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/interpretation-of-statutes-a-treatise/.
 From the article of Rajgat Agarwal „INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE- THE PURPOSIVE RULE‟ (Legal Service
India, 30 July 2012) available online at http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/print.php?art_id=1223
accessed on 21-11-2022
 HALSBURY‟S LAWS OF ENGLAND,( 4thed, vol 44.)
 Justice G.P Singh, „PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION‟ (12th Edn., LexisNexis Publications,
Nagpur, 2010)
 K. R. Chandratre, Supreme Court on Statutory Interpretation-9: The Proper Function of a Provision, 41(06)
TAX AND CORPORATE REFERENCE 238, 239 (2007)

 Peter Benson Maxwell, „INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES‟ (12th Edn., LexisNexis Butterworths Publications,
Wadhwa Nagpur, August 1969).
 Thinini Khandawaarachi, Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 49(02) JOURNAL OF THE
INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE (2007).

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