Monday,

May 7, 2001

Part II

Department of
Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 21 et al.

Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System
Design Review, Flammability Reduction
and Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements; Final Rule

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 23086 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION electronic Docket Management System incorporated instructions for

(DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/ maintenance and inspection of the fuel
Federal Aviation Administration search). tank system into their inspection
(2) On the search page type in the last programs.
14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 91, 121, 125, and four digits of the Docket number shown Third, for new designs, the proposal
129 at the beginning of this notice. Click on included a requirement for minimizing
[Docket No. FAA–1999–6411; Amendment
‘‘search.’’ the flammability of fuel tanks, a
Nos. 21–78, 25–102, 91–266, 121–282, 125– (3) On the next page, which contains requirement concerning detailed failure
36, 129–30] the Docket summary information for the analysis to preclude the presence of
Docket you selected, click on the final ignition sources in the fuel tanks and
RIN 2120–AG62 rule. including mandatory fuel system
(4) To view or download the maintenance in the limitations section
Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System document click on either ‘‘Scanned of the Instructions for Continued
Design Review, Flammability Image (TIFF)’’ or ‘‘Adobe PDF.’’ Airworthiness.
Reduction, and Maintenance and You can also get an electronic copy
Inspection Requirements using the Internet through FAA’s web Issues Prompting This Rulemaking
page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/ Activity
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT. nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal On July 17, 1996, a 25-year old Boeing
ACTION: Final rule. Register’s web page at http:// Model 747–100 series airplane was
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/ involved in an inflight breakup after
SUMMARY: This rule requires design aces140.html. takeoff from Kennedy International
approval holders of certain turbine- You can also get a copy by submitting Airport in New York, resulting in 230
powered transport category airplanes, a request to the Federal Aviation fatalities. The accident investigation
and of any subsequent modifications to Administration, Office of Rulemaking, conducted by the National
these airplanes, to substantiate that the ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
design of the fuel tank system precludes SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by indicated that the center wing fuel tank
the existence of ignition sources within calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to exploded due to an unknown ignition
the airplane fuel tanks. It also requires identify the amendment number or source. The NTSB issued
developing and implementing docket number of this final rule. recommendations intended to:
maintenance and inspection • Reduce heating of the fuel in the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
instructions to assure the safety of the center wing fuel tanks on the existing
Fairness Act
fuel tank system. For new type designs, fleet of transport airplanes,
this rule also requires demonstrating The Small Business Regulatory • Reduce or eliminate operation with
that ignition sources cannot be present Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of flammable vapors in the fuel tanks of
in fuel tanks when failure conditions are 1996 requires FAA to comply with new type certificated airplanes, and
considered, identifying any safety- small entity requests for information or • Reevaluate the fuel system design
critical maintenance actions, and advice about compliance with statutes and maintenance practices on the fleet
incorporating a means either to and regulations within its jurisdiction. of transport airplanes.
minimize development of flammable Therefore, any small entity that has a The accident investigation focused on
vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent question regarding this document may mechanical failure as providing the
catastrophic damage if ignition does contact their local FAA official, or the energy source that ignited the fuel
occur. These actions are based on person listed under FOR FURTHER vapors inside the tank.
accident investigations and adverse INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out The NTSB announced their official
service experience, which have shown more about SBREFA on the Internet at findings of the TWA 800 accident at a
that unforeseen failure modes and lack our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/ public meeting held August 22–23,
of specific maintenance procedures on sbrefa.htm. For more information on 2000, in Washington, DC. The NTSB
certain airplane fuel tank systems may SBREFA, e-mail us at 9–AWA– determined that the probable cause of
result in degradation of design safety SBREFA@faa.gov. the explosion was ignition of the
features intended to preclude ignition of flammable fuel/air mixture in the center
Background wing fuel tank. Although the ignition
vapors within the fuel tank.
On October 26, 1999, the FAA issued source could not be determined with
EFFECTIVE DATE: June 6, 2001.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) certainty, the NTSB determined that the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 99–18, which was published in the most likely source was a short circuit
Michael E. Dostert, FAA, Propulsion/ Federal Register on October 29, 1999 outside of the center wing tank that
Mechanical Systems Branch, ANM–112, (64 FR 58644). That notice proposed allowed excessive voltage to enter the
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft three separate requirements: tank through electrical wiring associated
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue First, a requirement was proposed for with the fuel quantity indication system
SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; the design approval holders of certain (FQIS). Opening remarks at the hearing
telephone (425) 227–2132, facsimile transport category airplanes to conduct also indicated that:
(425) 227–1320; e-mail: a safety review of the airplane fuel tank ‘‘* * * This investigation and several others
mike.dostert@faa.gov. system and to develop specific fuel tank have brought to light some broader issues
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: system maintenance and inspection regarding aircraft certification. For example,
instructions for any items determined to there are questions about the adequacy of the
Availability of Final Rules require repetitive inspections or risk analyses that are used as the basis for
You can get an electronic copy using maintenance. demonstrating compliance with many
the Internet by taking the following Second, a requirement was proposed certification requirements.’’
steps: to prohibit the operation of those This accident prompted the FAA to
(1) Go to the search function of the airplanes beyond a specified time, examine the underlying safety issues
Department of Transportation’s unless the operators of those airplanes surrounding fuel tank explosions, the

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 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 23087

adequacy of the existing regulations, the Existing Regulations/Certification occurring within a fleet of aircraft. The
service history of airplanes certificated Methods following guidance involving failures is
to these regulations, and existing The current 14 CFR part 25 offered in that AC:
maintenance practices relative to the regulations that are intended to require • In any system or subsystem, a single
fuel tank system. designs that preclude the presence of failure of any element or connection
ignition sources within the airplane fuel during any one flight must be assumed
Flammability Characteristics without consideration as to its
tanks are as follows:
The flammability characteristics of Section 25.901 is a general probability of failing. This single failure
the various fuels approved for use in requirement that applies to all portions must not prevent the continued safe
transport airplanes results in the of the propulsion installation, which flight and landing of the airplane.
presence of flammable vapors in the • Additional failures during any one
includes the airplane fuel tank system.
vapor space of fuel tanks at various flight following the first single failure
It requires, in part, that the propulsion
times during the operation of the must also be considered when the
and fuel tank systems be designed to
airplane. Vapors from Jet A fuel (the probability of occurrence is not shown
ensure fail-safe operation between
typical commercial turbojet engine fuel) to be extremely improbable. The
normal maintenance and inspection
at temperatures below approximately probability of these combined failures
intervals, and that the major
100°F are too lean to be flammable at includes the probability of occurrence of
components be electrically bonded to
sea level; at higher altitudes the fuel the first failure.
the other parts of the airplane.
vapors become flammable at As described in the AC, the FAA fail-
Sections 25.901(c) and 25.1309
temperatures above approximately 45°F safe design concept consists of the
provide airplane system fail-safe
(at 40,000 feet altitude). following design principles or
requirements. Section 25.901(c) requires
However, the regulatory authorities techniques intended to ensure a safe
that ‘‘no single failure or malfunction or
and aviation industry have always design. The use of only one of these
probable combination of failures will
presumed that a flammable fuel air principles is seldom adequate. A
jeopardize the safe operation of the
mixture exists in the fuel tanks at all combination of two or more design
airplane.’’ In general, the FAA’s policy
times and have adopted the philosophy principles is usually needed to provide
has been to require applicants to assume
that the best way to ensure airplane fuel a fail-safe design (i.e., to ensure that
the presence of foreseeable latent
tank safety is to preclude ignition catastrophic failure conditions are not
(undetected) failure conditions when
sources within fuel tanks. This expected to occur during the life of the
demonstrating that subsequent single
philosophy has been based on the fleet of a particular airplane model).
failures will not jeopardize the safe • Design integrity and quality,
application of fail-safe design operation of the airplane.
requirements to the airplane fuel tank including life limits, to ensure intended
Certain subsystem designs must also function and prevent failures.
system to preclude ignition sources comply with § 25.1309. That section
from being present in fuel tanks when • Redundancy or backup systems that
requires airplane systems and associated provide system function after the first
component failures, malfunctions, or systems to be:
lightning encounters occur. failure (e.g., two or more engines, two or
Possible ignition sources that have ‘‘* * * designed so that the occurrence of more hydraulic systems, dual flight
any failure condition which would prevent controls, etc.)
been considered include:
• Electrical arcs,
the continued safe flight and landing of the • Isolation of systems and
airplane is extremely improbable, and the components so that failure of one
• Friction sparks, and occurrence of any other failure conditions
• Autoignition. (The autoignition element will not cause failure of the
which would reduce the capability of the
temperature is the temperature at which airplane or the ability of the crew to cope other (sometimes referred to as system
the fuel/air mixture will spontaneously with adverse operating conditions is independence).
improbable.’’ • Detection of failures or failure
ignite due to heat in the absence of an
indication.
ignition source.) Compliance with § 25.1309 requires • Functional verification (the
Some events that could produce an analysis, and testing where capability for testing or checking the
sufficient electrical energy to create an appropriate, considering possible modes component’s condition).
arc include: of failure, including malfunctions and • Proven reliability and integrity to
• Lightning, damage from external sources, the ensure that multiple component or
• Electrostatic charging, probability of multiple failures and system failures will not occur in the
• Electromagnetic interference (EMI), undetected failures, the resulting effects same flight.
or on the airplane and occupants, • Damage tolerance that limits the
• Failures in airplane systems or considering the stage of flight and safety impact or effect of the failure.
wiring that introduce high-power operating conditions, and the crew • Designed failure path that controls
electrical energy into the fuel tank warning cues, corrective action and directs the failure, by design, to
system. required, and the capability of detecting limit the safety impact.
Friction sparks may be caused by faults. • Flightcrew procedures following
mechanical contact between certain This provision has the effect of the failure designed to assure continued
rotating components in the fuel tank, mandating the use of ‘‘fail-safe’’ design safe flight by specific crew actions.
such as a steel fuel pump impeller methods, which require that the effect of • Error tolerant design that considers
rubbing on the pump inlet check valve. failures and combinations of failures be probable human error in the operation,
Autoignition of fuel vapors may be considered in defining a safe design. maintenance, and fabrication of the
caused by failure of components within Detailed methods of compliance with airplane.
the fuel tank, or external components or §§ 25.1309(b), (c), and (d) are described • Margins of safety that allow for
systems that cause components or tank in Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309–1A, undefined and unforeseeable adverse
surfaces to reach a high enough ‘‘System Design Analysis,’’ and are flight conditions.
temperature to ignite the fuel vapors in intended as a means to evaluate the These regulations, when applied to
the fuel tank. overall risk, on average, of an event typical airplane fuel tank systems, are

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 23088 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

intended to prevent ignition sources Section 25.981 requires that the and extent of inspections necessary to
inside fuel tanks. The approval of the applicant determine the highest provide for the continuing airworthiness
installation of mechanical and electrical temperature allowable in fuel tanks that of the airplane (including the fuel tank
components inside the fuel tanks was provides a safe margin below the lowest system). As required by Appendix H to
typically based on a qualitative system expected autoignition temperature of part 25, the ICA must also include an
safety analysis and component testing the fuel that is approved for use in the FAA-approved Airworthiness
which showed that: fuel tanks. No temperature at any place Limitations section enumerating those
• Mechanical components would not inside any fuel tank where fuel ignition mandatory inspections, inspection
create sparks or high temperature is possible may then exceed that intervals, replacement times, and
surfaces in the event of any failure; and maximum allowable temperature. This related procedures approved under
• Electrical devices would not create must be shown under all probable § 25.571, relating to structural damage
arcs of sufficient energy to ignite a fuel- operating, failure, and malfunction tolerance. Before this amendment, the
air mixture in the event of a single conditions of any component whose Airworthiness Limitations section of the
failure or probable combination of operation, failure, or malfunction could ICA applied only to airplane structure
failures. increase the temperature inside the and not to the fuel tank system.
Section 25.901(b)(2) requires that the tank. Guidance for demonstrating
components of the propulsion system be One method of establishing initial
compliance with this regulation has scheduled maintenance and inspection
‘‘constructed, arranged, and installed so been provided in AC 25.981–1A,
as to ensure their continued safe tasks is the Maintenance Steering Group
‘‘Guidelines For Substantiating (MSG) process, which develops a
operation between normal inspection or Compliance With the Fuel Tank
overhauls.’’ Compliance with this Maintenance Review Board (MRB)
Temperature Requirements.’’ The AC document for a particular airplane
regulation is typically demonstrated by provides a listing of failure modes of
substantiating that the propulsion model. Operators may incorporate those
fuel tank system components that provisions, along with other
installation, which includes the fuel should be considered when showing
tank system, will safely perform its maintenance information contained in
that component failures will not create
intended function between inspections the ICA, into their maintenance or
a hot surface that exceeds the maximum
and overhauls defined in the inspection program.
allowable fuel tank component or tank
maintenance instructions. surface temperature for the fuel type for Section 21.50 requires the holder of a
Section 25.901(b)(4) requires which approval is being requested. design approval, including a TC or
electrically bonding the major Manufacturers have demonstrated supplemental type certificate (STC) for
components of the propulsion system to compliance with this regulation by an airplane, aircraft engine, or propeller
the other parts of the airplane. The testing and analysis of components to for which application was made after
affected major components of the show that design features, such as January 28, 1981, to furnish at least one
propulsion system include the fuel tank thermal fuses in fuel pump motors, set of the complete ICA to the owner of
system. Compliance with this preclude an ignition source in the fuel the product for which the application
requirement for fuel tank systems has tank when failures such as a seized fuel was made. The ICA for original type
been demonstrated by showing that all pump rotor occur. certificated products must include
major components in the fuel tank are instructions for the fuel tank system. A
electrically bonded to the airplane Airplane Maintenance Manuals and design approval holder who has
structure. This precludes accumulation Instructions for Continued modified the fuel tank system must
of electrical charge on the components Airworthiness furnish a complete set of the ICA for the
and the possible arcing in the fuel tank Historically, manufacturers have been modification to the owner of the
that could otherwise occur. In most required to provide maintenance-related product.
cases, electrical bonding is information for fuel tank systems in the
accomplished by installing jumper Type Certificate Amendments Based on
same manner as for other systems. Prior
wires from each major fuel tank system to 1970, most manufacturers provided Major Change in Type Design
component to airplane structure. manuals containing maintenance Over the years, design changes have
Advisory Circular 25–8, ‘‘Auxiliary Fuel information for large transport category been introduced into fuel tank systems
Tank Installations,’’ also provides airplanes, but there were no standards that may affect their safety. There are
guidance for bonding of fuel tank prescribing minimum content, three ways in which major design
system components and means of distribution, and a timeframe in which changes can be approved:
precluding ignition sources within the information must be made available
1. The TC holder may be granted an
transport airplane fuel tanks. to the operator.
Section 25.954 requires that the fuel amendment to the type design.
Section 25.1529, as amended by
tank system be designed and arranged to Amendment 25–21 in 1970, required the 2. Any person, including the TC
prevent the ignition of fuel vapor within applicant for a type certificate (TC) to holder, wanting to alter a product by
the system due to the effects of lightning provide airplane maintenance manuals introducing a major change in the type
strikes. Compliance with this regulation (AMM) to owners of the airplanes. This design not great enough to require a new
is typically shown by incorporation of regulation was amended in 1980 to application for a TC, may be granted an
design features such as minimum fuel require that the applicant for type STC.
tank skin thickness, location of vent certification provide Instructions for 3. In some instances, a person may
outlets out of likely lightning strike Continued Airworthiness (ICA) also make an alteration to the type
areas, and bonding of fuel tank system prepared in accordance with Appendix design and receive a field approval. The
structure and components. Guidance for H to part 25. In developing the ICA, the field approval process is a method for
demonstrating compliance with this applicant is required to include certain obtaining approval of relatively simple
regulation is provided in AC 20–53A, information such as a description of the modifications to airplanes. In this
‘‘Protection of Aircraft Fuel Systems airplane and its systems, servicing process, an authorized FAA Flight
Against Fuel Vapor Ignition Due to information, and maintenance Standards Inspector can approve the
Lightning.’’ instructions, including the frequency alteration by use of FAA Form 337.

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Maintenance and Inspection Program the system is maintained and that the accident investigation. This
Requirements airplane is in an airworthy condition. unexplained accident occurred on a
Historically, for fuel tank systems newer airplane, in contrast to the July
Airplane operators are required to
these required programs include: 17, 1996, accident that occurred on an
have extensive maintenance or • Operational checks (e.g., a task to
inspection programs that include older Boeing Model 747 airplane that
determine if an item is fulfilling its was approaching the end of its initial
provisions relating to fuel tank systems. intended function);
Section 91.409(e), which generally design life.
• Functional checks (e.g., a The Model 747 and 737 accidents
applies to other than commercial quantitative task to determine if
operations, requires an operator of a indicate that the development of an
functions perform within specified ignition source inside the fuel tank may
large turbojet multiengine airplane or a limits);
turbopropeller-powered multiengined be related to both the design and
• Overhaul of certain components to maintenance of the fuel tank systems.
airplane to select one of the following restore them to a known standard; and
four inspection programs: • General zonal visual inspections National Transportation Safety Board
1. A continuous airworthiness conducted concurrently with other (NTSB) Recommendations
inspection program that is part of a maintenance actions, such as structural Since the July 17, 1996, accident, the
continuous airworthiness maintenance inspections. FAA, NTSB, and aviation industry have
program currently in use by a person However, specific maintenance been reviewing the design features and
holding an air carrier operating instructions to detect and correct service history of the Boeing Model 747
certificate, or an operating certificate conditions that degrade fail-safe and certain other transport airplane
issued under part 119 for operations capabilities have not been deemed models. Based upon its review, the
under parts 121 or 135, and operating necessary because it has been assumed NTSB has issued the following
that make and model of airplane under that the original fail-safe capabilities recommendations to the FAA intended
those parts; would not be degraded in service. to reduce exposure to operation with
2. An approved airplane inspection flammable vapors in fuel tanks and
program approved under § 135.419 and Design and Service History Review
address possible degradation of the
currently in use by a person holding an The FAA has examined the service
original type certificated fuel tank
operating certificate and operations history of transport airplanes and
system designs on transport airplanes.
specifications issued under part 119 for performed an analysis of the history of The following recommendations
part 135 operations; fuel tank explosions on these airplanes. relate to ‘‘Reduced Flammability
3. A current inspection program While there were a significant number Exposure’’:
recommended by the manufacturer; or of fuel tank fires and explosions that ‘‘A–96–174: Require the development
4. Any other inspection program occurred during the 1960’s and 1970’s of and implementation of design or
established by the registered owner or on several airplane types, in most cases, operational changes that will preclude
operator of that airplane and approved the fire or explosion was found to be the operation of transport-category
by the Administrator. related to design practices, maintenance airplanes with explosive fuel-air
Section 121.367, which is applicable actions, or improper modification of mixtures in the fuel tanks:
to those air carrier and commercial fuel pumps. Some of the events were LONG TERM DESIGN
operations covered by part 121, requires apparently caused by lightning strikes. MODIFICATIONS:
operators to have an inspection Extensive design reviews were (a) Significant consideration should
program, as well as a program covering conducted to identify possible ignition be given to the development of airplane
other maintenance, preventative sources, and actions were taken that design modification, such as nitrogen-
maintenance, and alterations. were intended to prevent similar inerting systems and the addition of
Section 125.247, which is generally occurrences. However, fuel tank system- insulation between heat-generating
applicable to operation of large related accidents have occurred in spite equipment and fuel tanks. Appropriate
airplanes, other than air carrier of these efforts. modifications should apply to newly
operations conducted under part 121, On May 11, 1990, the center wing fuel certificated airplanes and, where
requires operators to inspect their tank of a Boeing Model 737–300 feasible, to existing airplanes.’’
airplanes in accordance with an exploded while the airplane was on the ‘‘A–96–175: Require the development
inspection program approved by the ground at Nimoy Aquino International of and implementation of design or
Administrator. Airport, Manila, Philippines. The operational changes that will preclude
Section 129.14 requires a foreign air airplane was less than one year old. In the operation of transport-category
carrier and each foreign operator of a the accident, the fuel-air vapors in the airplanes with explosive fuel-air
U.S. registered airplane in common center wing tank exploded as the mixtures in the fuel tanks:
carriage, within or outside the U.S., to airplane was being pushed back from a NEAR TERM OPERATIONAL
maintain the airplane in accordance terminal gate prior to flight. The (b) Pending implementation of design
with an FAA-approved program. accident resulted in 8 fatalities and modifications, require modifications in
In general, the operators rely on the injuries to an additional 30 people. operational procedures to reduce the
TC data sheet, MRB reports, ICA’s, the Accident investigators considered a potential for explosive fuel-air mixtures
Airworthiness Limitations section of the plausible scenario in which damaged in the fuel tanks of transport-category
ICA, other manufacturers’ wiring located outside the fuel tank aircraft. In the B–747, consideration
recommendations, and their own might have created a short between 115- should be given to refueling the center
operating experience to develop the volt airplane system wires and 28 volt wing fuel tank (CWT) before flight
overall maintenance or inspection wires to a fuel tank level switch. This, whenever possible from cooler ground
program for their airplanes. in combination with a possible latent fuel tanks, proper monitoring and
The intent of the rules governing the defect of the fuel level float switch, was management of the CWT fuel
inspection and/or maintenance program investigated as a possible source of temperature, and maintaining an
is to ensure that the inherent level of ignition. However, a definitive ignition appropriate minimum fuel quantity in
safety that was originally designed into source was never confirmed during the the CWT.’’

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‘‘A–96–176: Require that the B–747 the fuel tank system installations on a which required inspection of electrical
Flight Handbooks of TWA and other representative sample of airplanes wiring routed within conduits to fuel
operators of B–747s and other aircraft in within the transport fleet. The fuel tanks pumps located in the wing fuel tanks
which fuel tank temperature cannot be of more than 800 airplanes were and replacement of any damaged
determined by flightcrews be inspected. Data from inspections wiring. Inspection reports indicated that
immediately revised to reflect the conducted as part of this effort and many instances of wear had occurred on
increases in CWT fuel temperatures shared with the FAA have assisted in Teflon sleeves installed over the wiring
found by flight tests, including establishing a basis for developing to protect it from damage and possible
operational procedures to reduce the corrective action for airplanes within arcing to the conduit.
potential for exceeding CWT the transport fleet. Inspections of wiring to fuel pumps
temperature limitations.’’ In addition to the results from these on Boeing Model 737 airplanes with
‘‘A–96–177: Require modification of inspections, the FAA has received over 35,000 flight hours have shown
the CWT of B–747 airplanes and the fuel reports of anomalies on in-service significant wear to the insulation of
tanks of other airplanes that are located airplanes that have necessitated actions wires inside conduits that are located in
near heat sources to incorporate to preclude development of ignition fuel tanks. In nine reported cases, wear
temperature probes and cockpit fuel sources in or adjacent to airplane fuel resulted in arcing to the fuel pump wire
tank temperature displays to permit tanks. conduit on airplanes with greater than
determination of the fuel tank The following provides a summary of 50,000 flight hours. In one case, wear
temperatures.’’ findings from design evaluations, resulted in burnthrough of the conduit
The following recommendations service difficulty reports, and a review into the interior of the 737 main tank
relate to ‘‘Ignition Source Reduction’’: of current airplane maintenance fuel cell. On May 14, 1998, the FAA
‘‘A–98–36: Conduct a survey of fuel practices. issued a telegraphic AD, T98–11–52,
quantity indication system probes and which required inspection of wiring to
wires in Boeing Model 747’s equipped Aging Airplane Related Phenomena
Boeing Model 737 airplane fuel pumps
with systems other than Honeywell Fuel tank inspections initiated as part routed within electrical conduits and
Series 1–3 probes and compensators and of the Boeing Model 747 accident replacement of any damaged wiring.
in other model airplanes that are used investigation identified aging of fuel Results of these inspections showed that
in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations tank system components, wear of the wiring occurred in many
Part 121 service to determine whether contamination, corrosion of components instances, particularly on those
potential fuel tank ignition sources exist and sulfide deposits on components as airplanes with high numbers of flight
that are similar to those found in the possible conditions that could cycles and operating hours.
Boeing Model 747. The survey should contribute to development of ignition The FAA also has received reports of
include removing wires from fuel sources within the fuel tanks. Results of corrosion on bonding jumper wires
probes and examining the wires for detailed inspection of the fuel pump within the fuel tanks on one in-service
damage. Repair or replacement wiring on several Boeing Model 747 Airbus Model A300 airplane. The
procedures for any damaged wires that airplanes showed debris within the fuel manufacturer investigating this event
are found should be developed.’’ tanks consisting of lockwire, rivets, and did not have sufficient evidence to
‘‘A–98–38: Require in Boeing Model metal shavings. Debris was also found determine conclusively the level of
747 airplanes, and in other airplanes inside scavenge pumps. Corrosion and damage and corrosion found on the
with fuel quantity indication system damage to insulation on FQIS probe jumper wires. Although the airplane
(FQIS) wire installations that are co- wiring was found on 6 out of 8 probes was in long-term storage, it does not
routed with wires that may be powered, removed from one in-service airplane. explain why a high number of damaged/
the physical separation and electrical In addition, inspection of airplane corroded jumper wires were found
shielding of FQIS wires to the maximum fuel tank system components from out- concentrated in a specific area of the
extent possible.’’ of-service (retired) airplanes, initiated wing tanks. Further inspections of a
‘‘A–98–39: Require, in all applicable following the accident, revealed limited number of other Airbus models
transport airplane fuel tanks, surge damaged wiring and corrosion buildup did not reveal similar extensive
protection systems to prevent electrical of conductive sulfide deposits on the corrosion or damage to bonding jumper
power surges from entering fuel tanks FQIS wiring on some Boeing Model 747 wires. However, they did reveal
through fuel quantity indication system airplanes. The conductive deposits or evidence of the accumulation of sulfide
wires.’’ damaged wiring may result in a location deposits around the outer braid of some
where arcing could occur if high power jumper wires. Tests by the manufacturer
Service History
electrical energy was transmitted to the have shown that these deposits did not
The FAA has reviewed service FQIS wiring from adjacent wires that affect the bonding function of the leads.
difficulty reports for the transport power other airplane systems. Airbus has developed a one-time-
airplane fleet and evaluated the While the effects of corrosion on fuel inspection service bulletin for all its
certification and design practices tank system safety have not been fully airplanes to ascertain the extent of the
utilized on these previously certificated evaluated, the FAA has initiated a sulfide deposits and to ensure that the
airplanes. An inspection of fuel tanks on research program to better understand level of jumper wire damage found on
Boeing Model 747 airplanes also was the effects of sulfide deposits and the one Model A300 airplane is not
initiated. Representatives from the Air corrosion on the safety of airplane fuel widespread.
Transport Association (ATA), tank systems. On March 30, 1998, the FAA received
Association of European Airlines (AEA), Wear or chafing of electrical power reports of three recent instances of
the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines wires routed in conduits that are located electrical arcing within fuel pumps
(AAPA), the Aerospace Industries inside fuel tanks can result in arcing installed in fuel tanks on Lockheed
Association of America, and the through the conduits. On December 23, Model L–1011 airplanes. In one case,
European Association of Aerospace 1996, the FAA issued Airworthiness the electrical arc had penetrated the
Industries initiated a joint effort to Directive (AD) 96–26–06, applicable to pump and housing and entered the fuel
inspect and evaluate the condition of certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes, tank. Preliminary investigation indicates

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that features incorporated into the fuel or the installation of shielding and cause damage to the rotating blades of
pump design that were intended to separation of fuel quantity indicating the inducer. The inlet check valves also
preclude overheating and arc-through system wiring from other airplane had significant damage. An operator
into the fuel tank may not have system wiring. After reviewing the reported damage to the inlet adapter so
functioned as intended due to comments received on the proposed severe that contact had occurred
discrepancies introduced during requirements, the FAA issued AD 98– between the steel disk of the inlet check
overhaul of the pumps. Emergency AD 20–40 on September 23, 1998, that valve and the steel screw that holds the
98–08–09 was issued April 3, 1998, to requires the installation of shielding and inducer in place. Wear to the inlet
specify a minimum quantity of fuel to separation of the electrical wiring of the adapters has been attributed to contact
be carried in the fuel tanks for the fuel quantity indication system. On between the inlet check valve and the
purpose of covering the pumps with April 14, 1998, the FAA proposed a adapter. Such excessive wear of the
liquid fuel and thereby precluding similar requirement for Boeing Model inlet adapter can lead to contact
ignition of vapors within the fuel tank 737–100, –200, –300, –400, and –500 between the inlet check valve and
until such time as terminating corrective series airplanes in Docket No. 98–NM– inducer, which could result in pieces of
action could be developed. 50–AD, which led to the FAA issuing the check valve being ingested into the
AD 99–03–04 on January 26, 1999. The inducer and damaging the inducer and
Unforeseen Fuel Tank System Failures
action required by those two impellers. Contact between the steel
After an extensive review of the airworthiness directives is intended to disk of the inlet check valve and the
Boeing Model 747 design following the preclude high levels of electrical energy steel rotating inducer screw can cause
July 17, 1996, accident, the FAA from entering the airplane fuel tank sparks. To address this unsafe
determined that during original wiring due to electromagnetic condition, the FAA issued an
certification of the fuel tank system, the interference or electrical shorts. Several immediately adopted rule, AD 98–16–
degree of tank contamination and the manufacturers have been granted 19, on July 30, 1998.
significance of certain failure modes of approval for the use of alternative Another design anomaly was reported
fuel tank system components had not methods of compliance (AMOC) with in 1989 when a fuel tank ignition event
been considered to the extent that more these AD’s that permit installation of occurred in an auxiliary fuel tank
recent service experience indicates is transient suppressing devices in the during refueling of a Beech Model 400
needed. For example, in the absence of FQIS wiring that prevent unwanted airplane. The auxiliary fuel tank had
contamination, the FQIS had been electrical power from entering the fuel
shown to preclude creating an arc if been installed under an STC.
tank. All later model Boeing Model 747 Polyurethane foam had been installed in
FQIS wiring were to come in contact and 737 FQIS’s have wire separation
with the highest level of electrical portions of the tank to minimize the
and fault isolation features that may potential of a fuel tank explosion if
voltage on the airplane. This was shown meet the intent of these AD actions.
by demonstrating that the voltage uncontained engine debris penetrated
This rulemaking will require evaluation those portions of the tank. The accident
needed to cause an arc in the fuel of these later designs and the designs of
probes due to an electrical short investigation indicated that electrostatic
other transport airplanes. charging of the foam during refueling
condition was well above any voltage Other examples of unanticipated
level available in the airplane systems. resulted in ignition of fuel-air vapors in
failure conditions include incidents of
However, recent testing has shown portions of the adjacent fuel tank system
parts from fuel pump assemblies
that if contamination, such as impacting or contacting the rotating fuel that did not contain the foam. The fuel
conductive debris (lock wire, nuts, pump impeller. The first design vapor explosion caused distortion of the
bolts, steel wool, corrosion, sulfide anomaly was identified when two tank and fuel leakage from a failed fuel
deposits, metal filings, etc.) is placed incidents of damage to fuel pumps were line. Modifications to the design,
within gaps in the fuel probe, the reported on Boeing Model 767 including use of more conductive
voltage needed to cause an arc is within airplanes. In both cases objects from a polyurethane foam and installation of a
values that may occur due to a fuel pump inlet diffuser assembly were standpipe in the refueling system, were
subsequent electrical short or induced ingested into the fuel pump, causing incorporated to prevent reoccurrence of
current on the FQIS probe wiring from damage to the pump impeller and pump electrostatic charging and a resultant
electromagnetic interference caused by housing. The damage could have caused fuel tank ignition source.
adjacent wiring. These anomalies, by sparks or hot debris from the pump to Review of Fuel Tank System
themselves, could not lead to an enter the fuel tank. To address this Maintenance Practices
electrical arc within the fuel tanks unsafe condition, the FAA issued AD
without the presence of an additional 97–19–15. This AD requires revision of In addition to the review of the design
failure. If any of these anomalies were the airplane flight manual to include features and service history of the
combined with a subsequent failure procedures to switch off the fuel pumps Boeing Model 747 and other airplane
within the electrical system that creates when the center tank approaches empty. models in the transport airplane fleet,
an electrical short, or if high-intensity The intent of this interim action is to the FAA also has reviewed the current
radiated fields (HIRF) or electrical maintain liquid fuel over the pump inlet fuel tank system maintenance practices
current flow in adjacent wiring induces so that any debris generated by a failed for these airplanes.
EMI voltage in the FQIS wiring, fuel pump will not come in contact with Typical transport category airplane
sufficient energy could enter the fuel fuel vapors and cause a fuel tank fuel tank systems are designed with
tank and cause an ignition source explosion. redundancy and fault indication
within the tank. The second design anomaly was features such that single component
On November 26, 1997, in Docket No. reported on Boeing Model 747–400 failures do not result in any significant
97–NM–272–AD, the FAA proposed a series airplanes. The reports indicated reduction in safety. Therefore, fuel tank
requirement for operators of Boeing that inlet adapters of the override/ systems historically have not had any
Model 747–100, –200, and –300 series jettison pumps of the center wing fuel life-limited components or specific
airplanes to install components for the tank were worn. Two of the inlet detailed inspection requirements, unless
suppression of electrical transients and/ adapters had worn down enough to mandated by airworthiness directives.

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 23092 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Most of the components are ‘‘on contrary to the manufacturer’s the plumbing from wing movement and
condition,’’ meaning that some test, recommended procedures. corrosion.
check, or other inspection is performed • Use of steel impellers that may 7. Electrostatic charge:
to determine continued serviceability, produce sparks if debris enters the • Use of non-conductive reticulated
and maintenance is performed only if pump. polyurethane foam that holds
the inspection identifies a condition • Debris lodged inside pumps. electrostatic charge buildup.
requiring correction. Visual inspection • Arcing due to the exposure of • Spraying of fuel into fuel tanks
of fuel tank system components is by far electrical connections within the pump through inappropriately designed
the predominant method of inspection housing that have been designed with refueling nozzles or pump cooling flow
for components such as boost pumps, inadequate clearance to the pump cover. return methods.
fuel lines, couplings, wiring, etc. • Thermal switches resetting over Fuel Tank Flammability
Typically, these inspections are time to a higher trip temperature.
• Flame arrestors falling out of their In addition to the review of potential
conducted concurrently with zonal
respective mounting. fuel tank ignition, the FAA has
inspections or internal or external fuel
• Internal wires coming in contact undertaken a parallel effort to address
tank structural inspections. These
with the pump rotating group, the threat of fuel tank explosions by
inspections normally do not provide
energizing the rotor and arcing at the eliminating or significantly reducing the
information regarding the continued
impeller/adapter interface. presence of explosive fuel air mixtures
serviceability of components within the
• Poor bonding across component within the fuel tanks of new type
fuel tank system, unless the visual
interfaces. designs, in-production, and the existing
inspection indicates a potential problem
• Insufficient ground fault current fleet of transport airplanes.
area. For example, it would be difficult, On April 3, 1997, the FAA published
if not impossible, to detect certain protection capability.
• Poor bonding of components to a notice in the Federal Register (62 FR
degraded fuel tank system conditions, 16014) that requested comments
such as worn wiring routed through structure.
2. Wiring to pumps in conduits concerning the 1996 NTSB
conduit to fuel pumps, debris inside recommendations regarding reduced
fuel pumps, corrosion to bonding wire located inside fuel tanks:
• Wear of Teflon sleeving and wiring flammability listed earlier in this notice.
interfaces, etc., without dedicated That notice provided significant
intrusive inspections that are much insulation allowing arcing from wire
through metallic conduits into fuel discussion of service history,
more extensive than those normally background, and issues relating to
conducted. tanks.
3. Fuel pump connectors: reducing flammability in transport
Listing of Deficiencies • Electrical arcing at connections airplane fuel tanks. Review of the
within electrical connectors due to bent comments submitted to that notice
The list provided below summarizes
pins or corrosion. indicated that additional information
fuel tank system design deficiencies, was needed before the FAA could
malfunctions, failures, and • Fuel leakage and subsequent fuel
fire outside of the fuel tank caused by initiate rulemaking action to address the
maintenance-related actions that have recommendations.
been determined through service corrosion of electrical connectors inside
On January 23, 1998, the FAA
experience to result in a degradation of the pump motor which lead to electrical
published a notice in the Federal
the safety features of airplane fuel tank arcing through the connector housing
Register that established and tasked an
systems. This list was developed from (connector was located outside the fuel
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
service difficulty reports and incident tank).
Committee (ARAC) working group, the
and accident reports. These anomalies • Selection of improper materials in
Fuel Tank Harmonization Working
occurred on in-service transport connector design.
4. FQIS wiring: Group (FTHWG), to provide additional
category airplanes despite regulations information prior to rulemaking. The
and policies in place to preclude the • Degradation of wire insulation
(cracking), corrosion and sulfide ARAC consists of interested parties,
development of ignition sources within including the public, and provides a
airplane fuel tank systems. deposits at electrical connectors
• Unshielded FQIS wires routed in public process to advise the FAA
1. Pumps: concerning development of new
• Ingestion of the pump inducer into wire bundles with high voltage wires.
5. FQIS probes: regulations.
the pump impeller and generation of
debris into the fuel tank. • Corrosion and sulfide deposits Note: The FAA formally established ARAC
• Pump inlet case degradation, causing reduced breakdown voltage in in 1991 (56 FR 2190, January 22, 1991), to
allowing the pump inlet check valve to FQIS wiring. provide advice and recommendations
• Terminal block wiring clamp (strain concerning the full range of the FAA’s safety-
contact the impeller. related rulemaking activity.
• Stator winding failures during relief) features at electrical connections
operation of the fuel pump. Subsequent on fuel probes causing damage to wiring The FTHWG evaluated numerous
failure of a second phase of the pump insulation. possible means of reducing or
resulting in arcing through the fuel • Contamination in the fuel tanks eliminating hazards associated with
pump housing. causing a reduced arc path between explosive vapors in fuel tanks. On July
• Deactivation of thermal protective FQIS probe walls (steel wool, lock wire, 23, 1998, the ARAC submitted its report
features incorporated into the windings nuts, rivets, bolts; or mechanical impact to the FAA. The full report is in the
of pumps due to inappropriate damage to probes). docket created for this ARAC working
wrapping of the windings. 6. Bonding straps: group (Docket No. FAA–1998–4183).
• Omission of cooling port tubes • Corrosion to bonding straps. This docket can be reviewed on the U.S.
between the pump assembly and the • Loose or improperly grounded Department of Transportation electronic
pump motor assembly during fuel pump attachment points. Document Management System on the
overhaul. • Static bonds on fuel tank system Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. The full
• Extended dry running of fuel plumbing connections inside the fuel report is also in the docket for this
pumps in empty fuel tanks, which was tank worn due to mechanical wear of rulemaking.

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 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 23093

The report provided a practical means of complying with the of the fuel and a significant increase in
recommendation for the FAA to initiate regulation proposed by the ARAC. the formation of flammable vapors in
rulemaking action to amend § 25.981, In addition to its recommendation to the tank. The FAA considers that fuel
applicable to new type design airplanes, revise § 25.981, the ARAC also tank safety can be enhanced by reducing
to include a requirement to limit the recommended that the FAA continue to the time fuel tanks operate with
time transport airplane fuel tanks could evaluate means for minimizing the flammable vapors in the tank and is
operate with flammable vapors in the development of flammable vapors therefore adopting a requirement to
vapor space of the tank. The within the fuel tanks to determine provide means to minimize the
recommended regulatory text proposed, whether other alternatives, such as development of flammable vapors in
‘‘Limiting the development of ground based inerting of fuel tanks, fuel tanks, or to provide means to
flammable conditions in the fuel tanks, could be shown to be cost effective. prevent catastrophic damage if ignition
based on the intended fuel types, to less To address the ARAC does occur.
than 7 percent of the expected fleet recommendations, the FAA initiated Fourth, the FAA considers that it is
operational time, or providing means to research and development activity to necessary to impose operational
mitigate the effects of an ignition of fuel determine the feasibility of requiring requirements so that all required
vapors within the fuel tanks such that ground-based inerting. The results of maintenance or inspection actions will
any damage caused by an ignition will this activity are documented in report be included in each operator’s FAA-
not prevent continued safe flight and No. DOT/FAA/AR–00/19, ‘‘The Cost of approved maintenance or inspection
landing.’’ The report discussed various Implementing Ground-Based Fuel Tank program.
options of showing compliance with Inerting in the Commercial Fleet.’’ A These regulatory initiatives are being
this proposal, including managing heat copy of the report is in the docket for codified as a Special Federal Aviation
input to the fuel tanks, installation of this rulemaking. In addition, on July 14, Regulation (14 CFR part 21),
inerting systems or polyurethane fire 2000 (65 FR 43800), the FAA tasked the amendments to the airworthiness
suppressing foam, and suppressing an ARAC to conduct a technical evaluation regulations (14 CFR part 25), and
explosion if one occurred, etc. of certain fuel tank inerting methods amendments to the operating
The level of flammability defined in that would reduce the flammability of requirements (14 CFR parts 91, 121, 125,
the proposal was established based the fuel tanks on both new type designs 129)
upon comparison of the safety record of and in-service airplanes.
The FAA is also evaluating the Part 21 Special Federal Aviation
center wing fuel tanks that, in certain
potential benefits of using directed Regulation (SFAR)
airplanes, are heated by equipment
ventilation methods to reduce the Historically, the FAA works with the
located under the tank, and unheated
flammability exposure of fuel tanks that TC holders when safety issues arise to
fuel tanks located in the wing. The
are located near significant heat sources. identify solutions and actions that need
FTHWG concluded that the safety
record of fuel tanks located in the wings Discussion of the Final Rule to be taken. Some of the safety issues
was adequate and that if the same level The FAA review of the service that have been addressed by this
could be achieved in center wing fuel history, design features, and voluntary cooperative process include
tanks, the overall safety objective would maintenance instructions of the those involving aging aircraft structure,
be achieved. Results from thermal transport airplane fleet indicates that thrust reversers, cargo doors, and wing
analyses documented in the report aging of fuel tank system components icing protection. Although some
indicate that center wing fuel tanks that and unforeseen fuel tank system failures manufacturers have aggressively
are heated by air conditioning and malfunctions have become a safety completed these safety reviews, others
equipment located beneath them issue for the fleet of turbine-powered have not applied the resources
contain flammable vapors, on a fleet transport category airplanes. The FAA is necessary to complete these reviews in
average basis, for up to 30 percent of the amending the current regulations in four a timely manner, which delayed the
fleet operating time. areas. adoption of corrective action. Although
During the ARAC review it was also The first area of concern encompasses these efforts have frequently been
determined that certain airplane types the possibility of the development of successful in achieving the desired
do not locate heat sources adjacent to ignition sources within the existing safety objectives, a more uniform and
the fuel tanks. These airplanes provide transport airplane fleet. Many of the expeditious response is considered
significantly reduced flammability design practices used on airplanes in necessary to address fuel tank safety
exposure, near the 5 percent value of the the existing fleet are similar. Therefore, issues.
wing tanks. The group therefore anomalies that have developed on While maintaining the benefits of
determined that it would be feasible to specific airplane models within the fleet FAA-TC holder cooperation, the FAA
design new airplanes such that fuel tank could develop on other airplane models. considers that a Special Federal
operation in the flammable range would As a result, the FAA considers that a Aviation Regulation (SFAR) provides a
be limited to near that of the wing fuel one-time safety review of the fuel tank means for the FAA to establish clear
tanks. The primary method of system for transport airplane models in expectations and standards, as well as a
compliance with the requirement the current fleet is needed. timeframe within which the design
proposed by the ARAC would likely be The second area of concern approval holders and the public can be
to control heat transfer into and out of encompasses the need to require the confident that fuel tank safety issues on
fuel tanks such that heating of the fuel design of future transport category the affected airplanes will be uniformly
would not occur. Design features such airplanes to more completely address examined.
as locating the air conditioning potential failures in the fuel tank system This final rule is intended to ensure
equipment away from the fuel tanks, that could result in an ignition source in that the design approval holder
providing ventilation of the air the fuel tank system. completes a comprehensive assessment
conditioning bay to limit heating and Third, certain airplane types are of the fuel tank system and develops
cool fuel tanks, and/or insulating the designed with heat sources adjacent to any required inspections, maintenance
tanks from heat sources, would be the fuel tank, which results in heating instructions, or modifications.

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 23094 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

Safety Review be included in the system safety The number and scope of any possible
The SFAR requires the design analysis. AD’s may vary by airplane type design.
approval holder to perform a safety The intent of the safety review is to For example, wiring separation and
review of the fuel tank system to show assure that each fuel tank system design shielding of FQIS wires on newer
that fuel tank fires or explosions will that is affected by this action will be technology airplanes significantly
not occur on airplanes of the approved fully assessed and that the design reduces the likelihood of an electrical
design. In conducting the review, the approval holder identifies any required short causing an electrical arc in the fuel
design approval holder must modifications, added flight deck or tank; many newer transport airplanes do
demonstrate compliance with the new maintenance indications, and/or not route electrical power wiring to fuel
standards adopted for § 25.981(a) and maintenance actions necessary to meet pumps inside the airplane fuel tanks.
(b) (discussed below) and the existing the fail-safe criteria. Therefore, some airplane models may
standards of § 25.901. As part of this not require significant modifications or
Maintenance Instructions
review, the design approval holder must additional dedicated maintenance
The FAA anticipates that the safety procedures.
submit a report to the cognizant FAA
review will identify critical areas of the Other models may require significant
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) that
fuel tank and other related systems that modifications or more maintenance. For
substantiates that the fuel tank system is
require maintenance actions to account example, the FQIS wiring on some older
fail-safe.
for the affects of aging, wear, corrosion, technology airplanes is routed in wire
The FAA intends that those failure
and possible contamination on the fuel bundles with high voltage power supply
conditions identified earlier in this
tank system. For example, service wires. The original failure analyses
document, and any other foreseeable
history indicates that sulfide deposits conducted on these airplane types did
failures, should be assumed when
may form on fuel tank components, not consider the possibility that the fuel
performing the safety review needed to
including bonding straps and FQIS quantity indication system may become
substantiate that the fuel tank system
components, which could degrade the degraded, allowing a significantly lower
design is fail-safe. The safety review
intended design capabilities by voltage level to produce a spark inside
should be prepared considering all
providing a mechanism by which arcing the fuel tank. Causes of degradation
airplane inflight, ground, service, and
could occur. Therefore, it might be observed in service include aging,
maintenance conditions, assuming that
necessary to provide maintenance corrosion, or undetected contamination
an explosive fuel air mixture is present
instructions to identify and eliminate of the system. As previously discussed,
in the fuel tanks at all times, unless the
such deposits. the FAA has issued AD actions for
fuel tank has been purged of fuel vapor
The SFAR requires the design certain Boeing Model 737 and 747
for maintenance. The design approval
approval holder to develop any specific airplanes to address this condition.
holder is expected to develop a failure
maintenance and inspection Modification of similar types of
modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for
instructions necessary to maintain the installations on other airplane models
all components in the fuel tank system.
design features required to preclude the may be required to address this unsafe
Analysis of the FMEA would then be
existence or development of an ignition condition and to achieve a fail-safe
used to determine whether single
source within the fuel tank system. design.
failures, alone or in combination with
These instructions must be established It should be noted that any design
foreseeable latent failures, could cause
to ensure that an ignition source will changes might, in themselves, require
an ignition source to exist in a fuel tank.
not develop throughout the remaining maintenance actions. For example,
A subsequent quantitative fault tree
operational life of the airplane. transient protection devices typically
analysis should then be developed to
determine whether combinations of Possible Airworthiness Directives require scheduled maintenance in order
failures expected to occur in the life of The safety review may also result in to detect latent failure of the
the affected fleet could cause an ignition identification of unsafe conditions on suppression feature. As a part of the
source to exist in a fuel tank system. certain airplane models that would required safety review, the manufacturer
Because fuel tank systems typically require issuance of airworthiness is expected to define the necessary
have few components within the fuel directives. For example, the FAA has maintenance procedures and intervals
tank, the number of possible internal required or proposed requirements for for any required maintenance actions.
sources of ignition is limited. The safety design changes to the following Applicability of the SFAR
review required by this final rule airplanes:
includes all components or systems that • Boeing Models 737, 747, and 767; The requirements of the SFAR are
could introduce a source of fuel tank • Boeing Douglas Products Division applicable to holders of TC’s, and STC’s
ignition. This may require analysis of (formerly, McDonnell Douglas) Model for modifications that affect the fuel
not only the fuel tank system DC–9 and DC–10; tank systems of turbine-powered
components, (e.g., pumps, fuel pump • Lockheed Model L–1011; transport category airplanes, for which
power supplies, fuel valves, fuel • Bombardier (Canadair) Model CL– the TC was issued after January 1, 1958,
quantity indication system probes, 600; and the airplane has either a maximum
wiring, compensators, densitometers, • Airbus Models A300–600R, A319, type certificated passenger capacity of
fuel level sensors, etc.), but also other A320, and A321; 30 or more, or a maximum type
airplane systems that may affect the fuel • CASA Model C–212; certificated payload capacity of 7,500
tank system. For example, failures in • British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model pounds or more.
airplane wiring or electromagnetic 4100; and The SFAR is also applicable to
interference from other airplane systems • Fokker Model F28. applicants for type certificates,
that were not properly accounted for in Design practices used on these models amendments to a type certificate, and
the original safety assessment could may be similar to those of other airplane supplemental type certificates affecting
cause an ignition source in the airplane types; therefore, the FAA expects that the fuel tank systems for those airplanes
fuel tank system under certain modifications to airplanes with similar identified above, if the application was
conditions and therefore would have to design features may also be required. filed before the effective date of the

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SFAR and the certificate was not issued systems, and the objectives of this rule conduct the safety review and develop
before the effective date of the SFAR. would not be achieved unless these the compliance documentation and any
The FAA has determined that turbine- systems are also reviewed and their required maintenance and inspection
powered airplanes, regardless of safety ensured. The service experience instructions. (Applicants whose
whether they are turboprops or noted in the background of this rule applications have not been approved as
turbojets, should be subject to the rule, indicates modifications to airplane fuel of the effective date would be allowed
because the potential for ignition tank systems incorporated by STC’s may 18 months after the approval to
sources in fuel tank systems is unrelated affect the safety of the fuel tank system. comply.) The FAA expects each design
to the engine design. This results in the Modifications that could affect the approval holder to work with the
coverage of the large transport category fuel tank system include those that cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification
airplanes where the safety benefits and could result in an ignition source in the Office (ACO) and Aircraft Evaluation
public interest are greatest. This action fuel tank. Examples include installation Group (AEG) to develop a plan to
affects approximately 7,000 U.S. of auxiliary fuel tanks and installation complete the safety review and develop
registered airplanes in part 91, 121, 125, of, or modification to, other systems the required maintenance and
and 129 operations. such as the fuel quantity indication inspection instructions within the 18-
The date January 1, 1958, was chosen system, the fuel pump system month period. The plan should include
so that only turbine-powered airplanes, (including electrical power supply), periodic reviews with the ACO and AEG
except for a few 1953–1958 vintage airplane refueling system, any electrical of the ongoing safety review and the
Convair 340s and 440s converted from wiring routed within or adjacent to the associated maintenance and inspection
reciprocating power, will be included. fuel tank, and fuel level sensors or float instructions.
No reciprocating-powered transport switches. Modifications to systems or During the 18-month compliance
category airplanes are known to be used components located outside the fuel period, the FAA is committed to
currently in passenger service, and the tank system may also affect fuel tank working with the affected design
few remaining in cargo service would be safety. For example, installation of approval holders to assist them in
excluded. Compliance is not required electrical wiring for other systems that complying with the requirements of the
for those older airplanes because their was inappropriately routed with FQIS SFAR. However, failure to comply
advanced age and small numbers would wiring could violate the wiring within the specified time would
likely make compliance impractical separation requirements of the type constitute a violation of the
from an economic standpoint. This is design. Therefore, the FAA intends that requirements and may subject the
consistent with similar exclusions made a fuel tank system safety review be violator to certificate action to amend,
for those airplanes from other conducted for any modification to the suspend, or revoke the affected
requirements applicable to existing airplane that may affect the safety of the certificate in accordance with 49 U.S.C.
airplanes, such as the regulations fuel tank system. The level of evaluation § 44709. In accordance with 49 U.S.C.
adopted for flammability of seat that is intended would be dependent § 46301, it may also subject the violator
cushions (49 FR 43188, October 24, upon the type of modification. In most to a civil penalty of not more than
1984); flammability of cabin interior cases a simple qualitative evaluation of $1,100 per day until the SFAR is
components (51 FR 26206, July 21, the modification in relation to the fuel complied with.
1986); cargo compartment liners (54 FR tank system, and a statement that the
7384, February 17, 1989); access to Changes to Operating Requirements
change has no effect on the fuel tank
passenger emergency exits (57 FR system, would be all that is necessary. This rule requires the affected
19244, May 4, 1992); and Class D cargo In other cases where the initial operators to incorporate FAA-approved
or baggage compartments (63 FR 8032, qualitative assessment shows that the fuel tank system maintenance and
February 17, 1998). modification may affect the fuel tank inspection instructions in their
In order to achieve the benefits of this system, a more detailed safety review maintenance or inspection program
rulemaking for large transport airplanes would be required. required under the applicable operating
as quickly as possible, the FAA has Design approvals for modification of rule within 36 months of the effective
decided to limit the applicability of the airplane fuel tank systems approved by date of the rule. If the design approval
SFAR to airplanes with a maximum STC’s require the applicant to have holder has complied with the SFAR and
certificated passenger capacity of at knowledge of the airplane fuel tank developed an FAA-approved program,
least 30 or at least 7,500 pounds system in which the modification is the operator can incorporate that
payload. Compliance is not required for installed. The majority of these program, including any revisions
smaller airplanes because it is not clear approvals are held by the original needed to address any modifications to
at this time that the possible benefits for airframe manufacturers or airplane the original type design, to meet the
those airplanes would be commensurate modifiers that specialize in fuel tank proposed requirement. The operator
with the costs involved. For now, the system modifications, such as also has the option of developing its
applicability of the rule will remain as installation of auxiliary fuel tanks. own program independently, and is
proposed in the notice. The FAA will Therefore, the FAA expects that the data ultimately responsible for having an
need to conduct the economic analysis needed to complete the required safety FAA-approved program, regardless of
to determine if the rule should be review identified in the SFAR would be the action taken by the design approval
applied to smaller airplanes. Should the available to the STC holder. holder.
results of the analysis be favorable, the The rule prohibits the operation of
Compliance With SFAR certain transport category airplanes
FAA will develop further rulemaking to
address the smaller transports. This rule provides an 18-month operated under parts 91, 121, 125, and
compliance time from the effective date 129 beyond the specified compliance
Applicability of SFAR to Supplemental of the final rule, or within 18 months time, unless the operator of those
Type Certificate (STC) Holders after the issuance of a certificate for airplanes has incorporated FAA-
The SFAR applies to STC holders as which application was filed before the approved fuel tank maintenance and
well, because a significant number of effective date of this SFAR, whichever inspection instructions in its
STC’s effect changes to fuel tank is later, for design approval holders to maintenance or inspection program, as

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applicable. The rule requires approval approval by the cognizant PMI or other fuel tank system in its approved
of the maintenance and inspection cognizant airworthiness inspector. maintenance or inspection program, as
instructions by the FAA ACO, or office 5. The maintenance and inspection applicable. The operational
of the Transport Airplane Directorate, instructions developed by the TC holder applicability was established so that all
having cognizance over the type under the rule generally do not apply to airplane types affected by the SFAR,
certificate for the affected airplaneThe portions of the fuel tank systems regardless of type of operation, are
operator would need to consider the modified in accordance with an STC, subject to FAA approved fuel tank
following five issues: field approval, or otherwise, including system maintenance and inspection
1. The fuel tank system maintenance any auxiliary fuel tank installations. procedures. As discussed earlier, this
and inspection instructions that would Similarly, STC holders are required to rule includes each turbine-powered
be incorporated into the operator’s provide instructions for their STC’s. The transport category airplane model,
existing maintenance or inspection operator, however, is still responsible provided its TC was issued after January
program must be approved by the FAA for incorporating specific maintenance 1, 1958, and it has either a maximum
ACO having cognizance over the type and inspection instructions applicable type certificated passenger capacity of
certificate or supplemental type to the entire fuel tank system of each 30 or more, or a maximum type
certificate. If the operator can establish airplane that meets the requirements of certificated payload capacity of 7,500
that the existing maintenance and this rule. This means that the operator pounds or more.
inspection instructions fulfill the must evaluate the fuel tank systems and
any alterations to the fuel tank system Affect on Field Approvals
requirements of this rule, then the ACO
may approve the operator’s existing not addressed by the instructions A significant number of changes to
maintenance and inspection provided by the TC or STC holder, and transport category airplane fuel tank
instructions without change. then develop, submit, and gain FAA systems have been incorporated through
approval of the maintenance and field approvals issued to the operators
2. The means by which the FAA-
inspection instructions to evaluate of those airplanes. These changes may
approved fuel tank system maintenance
changes to the fuel tank systems. also significantly affect the safety of the
and inspection instructions are
The FAA recognizes that operators fuel tank system. The operator of any
incorporated into a certificate holder’s
may not have the resources to develop airplane with such changes is required
FAA-approved maintenance or
maintenance or inspection instructions to develop the fuel tank system
inspection program is subject to maintenance and inspection program
for the airplane fuel tank system. The
approval by the certificate holder’s instructions and submit it to the FAA
rule therefore requires the TC and STC
principal maintenance inspector (PMI) for approval, together with the
holders to develop fuel tank system
or other cognizant airworthiness maintenance and inspection necessary substantiation of compliance
inspector. The FAA intends that any instructions that may be used by with the safety review requirements of
escalation to the FAA-approved operators. If however, the STC holder is the SFAR.
inspection intervals will require the out of business or otherwise
operator to receive approval of the Compliance With Operating
unavailable, the operator will
amended program from the cognizant Requirements
independently have to acquire the FAA-
ACO or office of the Transport Airplane approved inspection instructions. To This rule establishes a 36-month
Directorate. Any request for escalation keep the airplanes in service, operators, compliance time from the effective date
to the FAA approved inspection either individually or as a group, could of the rule for operators to incorporate
intervals must include data to hire the necessary expertise to develop FAA-approved, long-term, fuel tank
substantiate that the proposed interval and gain approval of maintenance and system maintenance and inspection
will provide the level of safety intended inspection instructions. Guidance on instructions into their approved
by the original approval. If inspection how to comply with this aspect of the program. The FAA expects each
results and service experience indicate rule will be provided in AC 25.981–1B. operator to work with the airplane TC
that additional or more frequent After the PMI having oversight holder or STC holder to develop a plan
inspections are necessary, the FAA may responsibilities is satisfied that the to implement the required maintenance
issue AD’s to mandate such changes to operator’s continued airworthiness and inspection instructions within the
the inspection program. maintenance or inspection program 36-month period. The plan should
3. This rule does not impose any new contains all of the elements of the FAA- include periodic reviews with the
reporting requirements; however, approved fuel tank system maintenance cognizant ACO and AEG responsible for
normal reporting required under 14 CFR and inspection instructions, the approval of the associated maintenance
121.703 and 125.409 still applies. airworthiness inspector will approve the and inspection instructions.
4. This rule does not impose any new maintenance or inspection program The fuel tank safety review may result
FAA recordkeeping requirements. revision. This approval has the effect of in maintenance actions that are overdue
However, as with all maintenance, the requiring compliance with the prior to the effective date of the
current operating regulations (e.g., 14 maintenance and inspection operational rules. The plan provided by
CFR 121.380 and 91.417) already instructions. the operator should include
impose recordkeeping requirements that recommended timing of initial
apply to the actions required by this Applicability of the Operating inspections or maintenance actions that
rule. When incorporating the fuel tank Requirements are incorporated in the long term
system maintenance and inspection This rule prohibits the operation of maintenance or inspection program. An
instructions into its approved certain transport category airplanes analysis of and supporting evidence for
maintenance or inspection program, operated under 14 CFR parts 91, 121, the proposed timing of the initial action
each operator should address the means 125, and 129 beyond the specified should be provided to the FAA. For
by which it will comply with these compliance time, unless the operator of example, it may be determined that an
recordkeeping requirements. That those airplanes has incorporated FAA- inspection of a certain component
means of compliance, along with the approved specific maintenance and should be conducted after 50,000 flight
remainder of the program, are subject to inspection instructions applicable to the hours. Some airplanes within the fleet

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may have accumulated over 50,000 temperature providing a safe margin is § 25.901(c) and the systems failure
flight hours. The timing of the initial at least 50°F below the lowest expected analysis requirements of § 25.1309, as
inspection must be approved by the autoignition temperature of the fuel they have been applied to powerplant
FAA and would be dependent upon an throughout the altitude and temperature installations. This additional
evaluation of the safety impact of the envelopes approved for the airplane requirement is needed because the
inspection. It is desirable to incorporate type for which approval is requested. general requirements of §§ 25.901 and
these inspections in the current heavy This rulemaking also adds a new 25.1309 have not been consistently
maintenance program, such as a ‘‘C’’ or paragraph (a)(3) to require that a safety applied and documented when showing
‘‘D’’ check, without taking airplanes out analysis be performed to demonstrate that ignition sources are precluded from
of service. However, it may be that the presence of an ignition source transport category airplane fuel tanks.
determined that more expeditious in the fuel tank system could not result Compliance with § 25.981 requires an
action is required, which may be from any single failure, from any single analysis of the airplane fuel tank system
mandated by AD. failure in combination with any latent using analytical methods and
failure condition not shown to be documentation currently used by the
Changes to Part 25 extremely remote, or from any aviation industry in demonstrating
Currently, § 25.981 defines limits on combination of failures not shown to be compliance with §§ 25.901 and 25.1309.
surface temperatures within transport extremely improbable. In order to eliminate any ambiguity as
airplane fuel tank systems. In order to These new requirements define three to the necessary methods of compliance,
address future airplane designs, § 25.981 scenarios that must be addressed in the rule explicitly requires that the
is revised to address both prevention of order to show compliance with existence of latent failures be assumed
ignition sources in fuel tanks, and paragraph (a)(3). The first scenario is unless they are extremely remote, which
reduction in the time fuel tanks contain that any single failure, regardless of the is currently required under § 25.901, but
flammable vapors. The first part probability of occurrence of the failure, not under § 25.1309. The analysis
explicitly includes a requirement for must not cause an ignition source. The should be conducted assuming design
effectively precluding ignition sources second scenario is that any single deficiencies listed in the background
within the fuel tank systems of transport failure, regardless of the probability section of this document, and any other
category airplanes. The second part occurrence, in combination with any failure modes identified within the fuel
requires minimizing the formation of latent failure condition not shown to be tank system functional hazard
flammable vapors in the fuel tanks. at least extremely remote (i.e., not assessment.
shown to be extremely remote or Based upon the evaluations required
Fuel Tank Ignition Source—Section
extremely improbable), must not cause by § 25.981(a), a new requirement is
25.981
an ignition source. The third scenario is added to paragraph (b) to require that
The title of § 25.981 is changed from that any combination of failures not critical design configuration control
‘‘Fuel tank temperature’’ to ‘‘Fuel tank shown to be extremely improbable must limitations, inspections, or other
ignition prevention.’’ The substance of not cause an ignition source. procedures be established as necessary
existing paragraph (a), which requires For the purpose of this rule, to prevent development of ignition
the applicant to determine the highest ‘‘extremely remote’’ failure conditions sources within the fuel tank system, and
temperature that allows a safe margin are those not anticipated to occur to that they be included in the
below the lowest expected auto ignition each airplane during its total life, but Airworthiness Limitations section of the
temperature of the fuel, is retained. which may occur a few times when ICA required by § 25.1529. This
Likewise, the substance of existing considering the total operational life of requirement is similar to that contained
paragraph (b), which requires all airplanes of the type. This definition in § 25.571 for airplane structure.
precluding the temperature in the fuel is consistent with that proposed by the Appendix H to part 25 is also revised to
tank from exceeding the temperature ARAC for a revision to FAA AC add a requirement to provide any
determined under paragraph (a), is also 25.1309–1A and that currently used by mandatory fuel tank system inspections
retained. These requirements are the JAA in AMJ 25.1309. ‘‘Extremely or maintenance actions in the
redesignated as (a)(1) and (2) improbable’’ failure conditions are those Airworthiness Limitations section of the
respectively. so unlikely that they are not anticipated ICA.
Compliance with these paragraphs to occur during the entire operational Critical design configuration control
requires the determination of the fuel life of all airplanes of one type. This limitations include any information
flammability characteristics of the fuels definition is consistent with the necessary to maintain those design
approved for use. Fuels approved for definition provided in FAA AC features that have been defined in the
use on transport category airplanes have 25.1309–1A and retained in the draft original type design as needed to
differing flammability characteristics. revision to AC 25.1309–1A proposed by preclude development of ignition
The fuel with the lowest autoignition the ARAC. sources. This information is essential to
temperature is JET A (kerosene), which The severity of the external ensure that maintenance, repairs, or
has an autoignition temperature of environmental conditions that should alterations do not unintentionally
approximately 450°F at sea level. The be considered when demonstrating violate the integrity of the original fuel
autoignition temperature of JP–4 is compliance with this rule are those tank system type design. An example of
approximately 470°F at sea level. Under established by certification regulations a critical design configuration control
the same atmospheric conditions, the and special conditions (e.g., HIRF), limitation for current designs discussed
autoignition temperature of gasoline is regardless of the associated probability. previously would be maintaining wire
approximately 800°F. The autoignition The rule also requires that the effects of separation between FQIS wiring and
temperature of these fuels increases at manufacturing variability, aging, wear, other high power electrical circuits. The
increasing altitudes (lower pressures). and likely damage be taken into account original design approval holder must
For the purposes of this rule, the lowest when demonstrating compliance. define a method to ensure that this
temperature at which autoignition can These requirements are consistent essential information will be evident to
occur for the most critical fuel approved with the general powerplant installation those that may perform and approve
for use should be determined. A failure analysis requirements of repairs and alterations. Visual means to

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alert the maintenance crew must be flammable vapors will develop in fuel 2, ‘‘Fuel Tank Flammability
placed in areas of the airplane where tanks when other practicable design Minimization.’’
inappropriate actions may degrade the methods are available that can reduce AC 25.981–1B includes consideration
integrity of the design configuration. In the likelihood of such development. For of failure conditions that could result in
addition, this information should be example, the rule does not prohibit sources of ignition of vapors within fuel
communicated by statements in installation of fuel tanks in the cargo
tanks, and provides guidance on how to
appropriate manuals, such as Wiring compartment, placing heat exchangers
Diagram Manuals. substantiate that ignition sources will
in fuel tanks, or locating a fuel tank in
the center wing. It does, however, not be present in airplane fuel tank
Flammability Requirements systems following failures or
require that practical means, such as
The FAA agrees with the intent of the transferring heat from the fuel tank (e.g., malfunctions of airplane components or
regulatory text recommended by the use of ventilation or cooling air), be systems. This AC also includes
ARAC. However, due to the short incorporated into the airplane design if guidance for developing any limitations
timeframe that the ARAC was provided heat sources were placed in or near the for the ICA that may be generated by the
to complete the tasking, a sufficient fuel tanks that significantly increased fuel tank system safety review.
detailed economic evaluation was not the formation of flammable fuel vapors AC 25.981–2 provides information
completed to determine if practical in the tank, or if the tank is located in and guidance concerning compliance
means, such as ground based inerting, an area of the airplane where little or no with the new requirements identified in
were available to reduce the exposure cooling occurs. The intent of the rule is
below the specified value of 7 percent this rulemaking pertaining to
to require that fuel tanks are not heated, minimizing the formation or mitigation
of the operational time included in the and cool at a rate equivalent to that of
ARAC proposal. The FAA is adopting a of hazards from flammable fuel air
a wing tank in the transport airplane mixtures within fuel tanks.
more objective regulation that is being evaluated. This may require
intended to minimize exposure to incorporating design features to reduce Discussion of Comments
operation with flammable conditions in flammability, for example cooling and
the fuel tanks. ventilation means or inerting for fuel Thirty four commenters responded to
As discussed previously, the ARAC Notice 99–18, including private citizens,
tanks located in the center wing box,
has submitted a recommendation to the foreign aviation authorities,
horizontal stabilizer, or auxiliary fuel
FAA that the FAA continue to evaluate manufacturers of inerting equipment,
tanks located in the cargo compartment.
means for minimizing the development individual airplane manufacturers and
At such time as the FAA has completed
of flammable vapors within the fuel operators (both foreign and domestic),
the necessary research and identified an
tanks. Development of a definitive an organization representing the
standard to address this appropriate definitive standard to
address this issue, new rulemaking will interests of manufacturers of general
recommendation will require additional
effort that will likely take some time to be considered to revise the standard aviation airplanes, an airline pilots
complete. In the meantime, however, adopted in this rulemaking. representative, an organization
the FAA is aware that historically Applicability of Part 25 Change representing the consolidated interests
certain design methods have been found of the aviation industry worldwide, and
acceptable that, when compared to The amendments to part 25 apply to the National Transportation Safety
readily available alternative methods, all transport category airplane models Board. The majority of commenters
increase the likelihood that flammable for which an application for type agree in principle with the proposals. A
vapors will develop in the fuel tanks. certification is made after the effective discussion of these comments follows,
For example, in some designs, including date of the rule, regardless of passenger including FAA’s response, grouped by
the Boeing Model 747, air conditioning capacity or size. In addition, as subject matter.
packs have been located immediately currently required by the provisions of
below a fuel tank without provisions to § 21.50, applicants for any future Discussion of Comments on Proposed
reduce transfer of heat from the packs to changes to existing part 25 type SFAR
the tank. certificated airplanes, including STC’s,
that could introduce an ignition source For ease of reference, throughout the
Therefore, in order to preclude the following discussion, the term
future use of such design practices, in the fuel tank system are required to
provide any necessary Instructions for ‘‘designer’’ is used to refer to all persons
§ 25.981 is revised to add a requirement
Continued Airworthiness, as required subject to the requirements of the
that fuel tank installations be designed
to minimize the development of by § 25.1529 and the change to the Special Federal Aviation Regulation
flammable vapors in the fuel tanks. Airworthiness Limitations section, (SFAR).
Alternatively, if an applicant concludes paragraph H25.4 of Appendix H. In General Favorable Comments
that such minimization is not cases where it is determined that the
advantageous, it may propose means to existing ICA are adequate for the Several commenters, including
mitigate the effects of an ignition of fuel continued airworthiness of the altered representatives of manufacturers and
vapors in the fuel tanks. For example, product, then it should be noted on the operators, agree in principle with the
such means might include installation STC, PMA supplement, or major safety review that would be required by
of fire suppressing polyurethane foam. alteration approval. the proposed new SFAR to part 21 and
This rule is not intended to prevent FAA Advisory Material have, in fact, already engaged in an
the development of flammable vapors in industry-wide initiative in this area.
fuel tanks because total prevention has In addition to the amendments These commenters state that they
currently not been found to be feasible. presented in this rulemaking, the FAA believe firmly that the objective of the
Rather, it is intended as an interim is continuing development of AC proposed safety review will enhance the
measure to preclude, in new designs, 25.981–1B, ‘‘Fuel Tank Ignition Source level of safety that already exists in the
the use of design methods that result in Prevention Guidelines’’ (a revision to transport fleet.
a relatively high likelihood that AC 25.981–1A), and a new AC 25.981–

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Request to Include Smaller Part 25 Request to Exclude Mitsubishi YS–11 and inspection instructions into their
Airplanes, Rotorcraft, and Part 23 Airplanes and Lockheed Electra current maintenance or inspection
Airplanes in SFAR Applicability Airplanes program of transport category airplanes
Several commenters disagree with the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, type-certificated after January 1, 1958.
proposal to limit applicability of the Inc., requests that the Mitsubishi Model That date was chosen so that all turbine-
SFAR to larger airplanes (30 or more YS–11 airplane be excluded from the powered transport category airplanes
passengers) due to the time needed to SFAR applicability. The commenter’s would be included, except for a few
conduct a thorough economic analysis justification for this exclusion is that 1947 vintage Grumman Mallards, and
and the possible impact it would have none of these airplane models is 1953–1958 vintage Convair Model 340
currently being operated in the U.S. and and 440 airplanes converted from
on small businesses. However, the
none are likely to be operated in the reciprocating to turbine power.
commenters request that this evaluation
future. The commenter further states We do not consider the information
be completed and that smaller transport presented by either of the commenters
airplanes be included because of the that there has never been a fuel tank-
related incident or accident on any of sufficient to warrant a general exclusion
design similarities of the smaller of either the Model YS–11 or the Model
airplanes to larger airplanes. these airplane models. The commenter
refers to the FAA’s statement in the L–188 Electra from the applicability of
Additionally, one commenter notes
preamble to the notice that certain older the SFAR. We do acknowledge,
that, because the proposal excludes a
reciprocating engine-powered and however, that the current operations of
significant portion of the fleet, the
converted turbine-powered transport Model L–188 Electra airplanes to remote
proposal is not in keeping with the
airplanes should be excluded from the Aleutian points and on military contract
FAA’s stated goals of the ‘‘One level of
rule because: flights do involve unique circumstances
Safety’’ initiative. This commenter also
worthy of further consideration. For
notes that the FAA stated in the notice ‘‘* * * the few remaining such airplanes example, we might conclude that, while
that applying the proposed are in cargo service and because their full compliance is not cost effective,
requirements to certain regional advanced age and small numbers would
make compliance impractical from an some lesser degree of fuel tank system
airliners would not significantly
economic standpoint.’’ evaluation is necessary.
increase the expected quantitative While there is insufficient basis on
benefits of the rule because there have The commenter asserts that the same which to exclude the Model L–188
been no in-flight fuel tank explosions on rationale should be applicable to the Electra airplanes in general, the TC
those airplanes. The commenter is Model YS–11 because not one such holder may petition the FAA for an
concerned that the FAA may be using airplane is currently operating in the exemption from the provisions of this
‘‘faulty reasoning’’ to eliminate the need U.S. and the possibility of such final rule showing that it would be in
for any follow-on action to address this airplanes ever returning to cargo service, the public interest. Similarly, we would
segment of the fleet. much less passenger service, in the U.S. consider petitions for exemption from
Another commenter strongly is virtually non-existent. Therefore, the SFAR for the Model YS–11 or any
recommends that the SFAR be extended there are no benefits to be achieved by other airplane not currently operated
to include part 23 aircraft and part 27 the design review. under U.S. registry. Such requests for
rotorcraft because these types of aircraft Similarly, Lockheed Martin also exemption would be handled outside of
may be susceptible to fuel tank system requests that its airplane model, the this rulemaking action. Even if an
problems similar to those addressed in Lockheed Model L–188 Electra airplane, exemption were granted from the SFAR
the proposed rule. be excluded from the applicability of to a design approval holder, operators of
FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that, the SFAR. Like the first commenter, this the affected airplanes would still be
even though the fuel tank systems of commenter refers to the statement in the subject to the requirements of the
smaller transport category airplanes may preamble to the notice that certain older operating rules established by this final
be simpler, similarities in the designs of reciprocating and turbine-powered rule. Petitions for exemption by the
the fuel systems of those airplanes may airplanes should be excluded because operators would involve different
result in a need to apply the standard to compliance would be impractical from considerations.
them. As discussed in the notice, we an economic standpoint. The
plan to conduct the appropriate commenter suggests that the Model L– Request to ‘‘Harmonize’’ the Rule With
economic analysis to determine if the 188 Electra also falls into this category European Authorities
rule should be applied to smaller and should be excluded from the rule’s Several commenters, including
transport airplanes. Should the results applicability. The commenter further representatives from aviation officials of
of that analysis indicate that the SFAR suggests that the retroactive application the JAA and Transport Canada, state
requirements should be applied to of the new requirements to any older that the proposed SFAR should have
smaller transports, we will consider model include provisions in the rule been developed through the Aviation
developing further rulemaking to that would permit favorable service Rulemaking Advisory Committee
address those airplanes. For now, the experience to be submitted instead of (ARAC) and its harmonization process.
applicability of the final rule will extensive failure analysis. The These commenters contend that
remain as proposed in the notice. commenter refers to a safety study harmonizing the proposed rule would:
We do not agree that the proposed conducted of the Model L–188 Electra • simplify operations,
SFAR should be applied to part 23 fuel system which shows that the fuel • reduce the cost of compliance
aircraft and part 27 rotorcraft at this system service experience is excellent. without compromising safety, and
time. Service experience has not FAA’s Response: The FAA does not • extend the latest safety benefits
indicated that immediate action is concur with these commenters’ requests more broadly in the world fleet.
necessary to address the fuel tank to revise the applicability of the SFAR. The commenters also state that
systems of those types of aircraft at this As stated in Notice 99–18, parts 91, 121, issuing the rule under the
time. However, we may reconsider this 125, and 129 would be amended to harmonization process would have
action if future service experience require operators to incorporate FAA- facilitated eventual delegation of the
indicates that it is warranted. approved fuel tank system maintenance SFAR compliance findings between the

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FAA and the JAA. Some commenters bilateral countries choose to become commenter regards the proposal as
request that the disposition of public involved in reviewing submissions for essentially a requirement to re-certify
comments be handled through the compliance with the SFAR, we will the fuel systems of all turbine-powered
ARAC process. work closely with them. This should commercial transports, with respect to
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not facilitate the harmonization efforts avoiding fuel tank fires and explosions.
concur with the commenters. When this described previously. However, under The commenter points out that, while
rulemaking was initiated, we faced a the SFAR the FAA must approve the more than 450 million hours of service
choice between proceeding unilaterally design approval holder’s submission. experience on these airplanes have
or proceeding through the identified valuable lessons learned, this
harmonization process involving the Request for Definition of Safety Review same service experience also
JAA and the public through ARAC. At One commenter notes that the terms demonstrates the largely successful
that time, we chose to proceed ‘‘safety review,’’ ‘‘design review,’’ outcome of the previously certified
unilaterally in order to address the ‘‘safety analysis,’’ and ‘‘functional designs. The extent of the safety review
important safety need on an expedited hazard assessment’’ appear to be used that the proposed SFAR would require
basis. In a separate action, we did task interchangeably throughout the notice. goes beyond what is commensurate with
ARAC with developing proposed However, each of these terms could the historical data.
regulatory text to eliminate or reduce have significantly different meanings. FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
flammability in airplane fuel tanks. The The commenter requests that, if it is the concur with the commenter that the
fundamentals of ARAC’s proposal are intent of the FAA to have different service history of the affected airplanes
included in this rule. meanings for these terms, then the does not warrant the type of safety
With the issuance of this rule, we definitions should be clearly stated and review proposed. Specifically, we
consider that the safety need has been the terms should be used in the disagree that past service has been
addressed and we are now open to a appropriate context. ‘‘largely successful.’’ While the
harmonization effort. To facilitate The commenter offers the following commenter states that the fleet has
harmonization, we have coordinated the definitions in an attempt to establish a achieved a good safety record, we point
proposal with the JAA and Transport unified understanding of the objectives: out that, as discussed in detail in the
Canada. Comments from the JAA and • ‘‘Safety Review’’—a comprehensive preamble to the notice, there has been
Transport Canada indicate their assessment of the fuel tank system that extensive service history data related to
agreement in principle with our actions, meets all the requirements of the anomalies, system failures, aging-related
and they have stated their intention to Special Federal Aviation Regulation. problems, etc., of the fuel tanks of
mandate similar fuel tank safety actions. • ‘‘Safety Analysis’’—process of transport category airplanes. Service
While we will ensure compliance with ensuring that the fuel system is fail-safe data show that there have been 16 fuel
the SFAR, the operating rules, and the by conducting a design review and tank explosion events. Further, the fact
part 25 design standards as adopted in failure modes and effects analysis. that the FAA has issued over 40
this final rule, we will continue • ‘‘Design Review’’—process of airworthiness directives to correct fuel
discussions with Transport Canada and reviewing all relevant engineering tank safety hazards affecting a large
the JAA concerning possible design drawings to ensure that cross section of the transport airplane
harmonization efforts relating to the part appropriate design practices have been fleet indicates that extensive
25 change. used and identify failure modes. revalidation of the fuel tank systems, as
The safety improvements provided by • ‘‘Failure Modes Analysis’’—process proposed, is necessary.
this rule are as urgent now as they were of evaluating all identified failure
when we decided to proceed modes resulting from the design review Question on Quantitative vs. Qualitative
unilaterally. The comments do not by conducting a failure modes and Safety Review of Older Airplane Designs
persuade us that the policy judgments effects analysis (FMEA) and a fault tree One commenter suggests that the
reflected in the notice were incorrect. analysis (FTA). proposed SFAR should allow aircraft
Because expedited adoption of this final The commenter requests that a similar certificated prior to Amendment 25–23
rule is necessary, and because further set of definitions be provided in the and § 25.1309 reliability requirements to
discussion of comments within ARAC SFAR to clarify the intentions of the undergo a qualitative—rather than
would not change the FAA’s policy regulation. quantitative—safety review. Then, from
determinations, further review of the FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs the results of the review, an inspection
proposed rule by ARAC would not be that clarification is appropriate. The or maintenance plan could be
appropriate. objective of the SFAR is to require developed, and, finally, a one-time
designers to conduct ‘‘safety reviews,’’ inspection of the entire fleet could be
Request To Delegate Compliance which is the broadest term defined by performed. The commenter supports
Findings the commenter. The term ‘‘safety this type of assessment for several
Several commenters request that the review’’ is the correct term that is used reasons:
FAA delegate SFAR compliance in the text of the SFAR. For clarification 1. The current version of § 25.1309
findings to the prime certification sake, we have used the term ‘‘safety requires a safety review and a
authority in accordance with the review’’ throughout the discussions in quantitative assessment to validate that
approved bilateral agreement. this preamble to describe the action a system is fail-safe. However, accurate
FAA’s Response: The FAA interprets required by the SFAR. No change to the statistical reliability information needed
the reference to ‘‘prime certification final rule text is necessary in this regard, to conduct the safety analysis is likely
authority’’ to mean the ‘‘state of design,’’ however. to be unavailable for fuel system
as that term is used in ICAO Annex 8. components used nearly 30 years ago.
Because the SFAR imposes Question on the Need for a System 2. When conducting a safety review,
requirements on existing designers, the Safety Review conservative assumptions are required
bilateral airworthiness agreements, One commenter considers that the when accurate reliability data is
which address new certifications, do not proposed safety review required under unavailable. These conservative
directly apply. To the extent that the new part 21 SFAR is excessive. This assumptions could lead to false and

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detrimental failure probability results. technical archives of pre-amendment safe requirement for the fuel pump
This circumstance could occur multiple 25–23 aircraft may be limited in their mechanical components, although it
times during the analysis, or even cause usefulness to support a formalized would not necessarily address fuel
compounded error effects, requiring analysis. pump motor failure modes. (Advisory
even more severe corrective actions. These commenters also state that re- Circular 25.981–1B provides additional
3. By the methods proposed in the evaluation of older aircraft types using guidance on the acceptability of
proposed rule, a ‘‘representative’’ fuel today’s quantitative analysis qualitative assessments where fail-safe
tank system would be created based on methodologies, such as a failure modes features are provided.)
30-year-old drawings that would be and effects analysis (FMEA), would be Additionally, if fail-safe features are
‘‘fraught with unavoidable impractical and present incorporated into the design in such a
assumptions,’’ while at the same time be ‘‘insurmountable difficulties,’’ given the way that the effects of other systems on
required to meet the ‘‘extremely unavailability of data and the resources the fuel tank system can be shown to be
improbable’’ failure condition required. One commenter states that this benign, then no additional design
probability criteria of 1 × 10 ¥9. This type of safety review would be assessment and inspections would be
would lead to unnecessary inspections, extremely labor-and resource-intensive, required. Designers using this approach
maintenance, repairs, and and would have both short- and long- would be required to provide
modifications. term adverse economic effects on the substantiation that the design features
To meet the intent of the SFAR more aviation industry. preclude the need for detailed design
effectively, the commenter proposes that Another commenter states that the assessment of the system and future
a qualitative safety review be proposal does not provide a simple inspections. Designers considering
conducted, based on: design-assessment method that is using this approach should coordinate
• The investigative efforts of the FAA compatible with the technical as early as possible with the cognizant
and NTSB, information available to TC and STC ACO.
• AD’s, holders. (The commenter gave no On the other hand, the fact that a
• Service bulletins, examples of incompatibility, however.) quantitative assessment and related data
• Lessons learned, FAA’s Response: The FAA recognizes do not currently exist for some older
• Performance history of the aircraft, that the fuel tank systems of most older airplane types does not mean that a
and transport airplane designs were not similar safety assessment cannot be
• Results of the recent industry-wide evaluated during certification using the accomplished on these airplanes. It is
fuel tank inspection program. quantitative safety assessment methods feasible to use a modern safety
In addition, the labor and time costs associated with § 25.1309. For these assessment method on older airplanes
for a qualitative analysis would be airplanes, the FAA agrees that a that will recognize and evaluate
dramatically lower than for a qualitative, rather than quantitative, potential failures and their effects, and
quantitative analysis. A qualitative approach can and should be used where will identify actions that could
analysis could be conducted using the possible for the fuel tank system safety eliminate or reduce the chance of a
knowledge and experience of current in- review. The level of analysis required to potential failure from occurring.
house personnel and applying familiar show that ignition sources will not Methods for conducting a quantitative
methods of evaluation. It likely would develop will depend upon the specific analysis of any system are well-
take less time, as well. design features of the fuel tank system established and readily available. For
Several other commenters also being evaluated. Detailed quantitative example, the FMEA and fault tree
question the practicality of requiring the analysis should not be necessary if a analysis methodology is widely
proposed safety review if the latest qualitative safety assessment shows that accepted and understood. In fact, there
standards are to be applied to older features incorporated into the fuel tank currently are several software packages
airplane designs. These commenters system design protect against the available commercially that are
maintain that the proposed SFAR development of ignition sources within specifically designed for assisting in
effectively requires recertification of the fuel tank system. For example, for developing FMEA’s; these have proven
older airplanes’ fuel tanks to show wiring entering the fuel tanks, to be particularly useful in reducing the
compliance with the quantitative system compliance demonstration could be amount of time, labor, clerical support,
safety assessment requirements shown in three steps. and monetary burden that normally
introduced in § 25.1309 of Amendment • First, the wiring could be shown to would be entailed.
25–23. The commenters point out that have protective features such as In light of this, we anticipate that all
those requirements were neither separation, shielding, or transient affected TC and STC holders will be
developed nor in effect for the airplanes suppression devices; fully capable of complying with the
whose certification basis was approved • Second, the effectiveness of those SFAR requirements.
prior to the time that Amendment 25– features could be demonstrated; and No change to the final rule is
23 was issued in May 1970. The • Third, any long-term maintenance necessary with regard to these
majority of the airplanes affected by the requirements or critical design comments. The rule requires that
proposed SFAR fall into this category. configuration limitations could be applicants ‘‘conduct a safety review’’ of
Further, the commenters note that defined so that the protective features the airplane, but does not specify any
quantitative analysis methods for are not degraded. particular method of review.
showing compliance with the Another example would be showing
requirements of Amendment 25–23 that fuel pumps are installed in such a Question on Intent of Safety Review
were not even developed or approved way that the fuel pump inlet remains One commenter questions the FAA’s
by the FAA until June 1988, when the covered whenever the fuel pump is intent regarding the safety review. This
FAA issued guidance on this subject in operating throughout the airplane commenter notes that the proposed
Advisory Circular 25.1309–1A. These operating attitude envelope, including SFAR states, ‘‘ * * * single failures will
methods were not necessarily applied to anticipated low fuel operations and not jeopardize the safe operation * * *
aircraft certified before that date. Thus, ground conditions. This could be a ‘‘ and ‘‘ * * * latent failures have to be
the certification documentation and satisfactory method of meeting the fail- assumed * * *’’ However, there are a

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number of single failures identified in regulated as a ‘‘prescriptive-type rule.’’ address problems that were known to
the SFAR that have the capability to As an example, the commenters suggest have occurred in the past; however, it
create an ignition source within the fuel that the FAA first define a would not necessarily address potential
tank. Examples include: comprehensive list of items that may problems and risks that could occur in
• Various mechanical pump failure not have been considered adequately in the future. Thus, a lessons learned focus
modes, the original fuel system design and for is a reactive, not a proactive, approach.
• Various electrical pump failure which there is some service experience. There may be unforeseen failure modes
modes, and The list could include such items as: that would not necessarily be accounted
• Arcing of pump power cables to the • Fuel pumps, for by only evaluating failure modes that
conduit. • Wiring to pumps in conduits have occurred in the past, as would be
There are a number of single failures located inside fuel tanks, done with a lessons-learned approach.
within the examples listed above that • Fuel pump connectors, One example is in AC 25.981–1A,
would not be acceptable to show • Fuel quantity indicating system published originally in 1971, which
compliance in accordance with the wiring and probes, and included a list of failure modes, based
current application of § 25.1309, which • Component bonding. upon lessons learned at that time, that
requires that ‘‘ * * * failure of any The FAA could then require that fuel should have been considered in
single component should be assumed system designs be evaluated against this showing compliance with the
* * * and not prevent continued safe ‘‘checklist’’ to determine if adequate requirements of § 25.981. Since that AC
flight * * *’’ In light of this, the consideration has been made regarding was published, however, numerous
commenter asks if the FAA is expecting the potential effects of each item listed. unforeseen failures have occurred, thus,
modifications to cover all these cases; if Any single failures shown to cause an resulting in a much longer list that is
not, there is a risk that the interpretation ignition source in the fuel tank would now included in the revision to that AC.
of § 25.1309 may be degraded. warrant a design change. A quantitative While such a list is valuable in
The commenter further states that fault tree analysis could then be providing guidance for conducting a
there are a number of latent failures in developed for combinations of failures safety assessment, it is not all-inclusive
fuel tanks that could create an ignition shown to cause ignition sources, to and we do not consider it adequate for
source within the fuel tank, for example: determine if such failure combinations conducting a comprehensive safety
• Loss of pump over-temperature could be expected to occur in the assessment.
protection, and remaining fleet life of the affected On the other hand, the qualitative
• Loss of bonding (electro-static and aircraft type. approach to the required safety review
lightning protection). These commenters state that among will result in consideration of, and
These types of latent failures are not the benefits of this prescriptive design means to address, potential failure
easy to detect without a physical review approach would be: modes, even if they have not yet been
inspection inside the tank. The • A common evaluation criterion for encountered in service. For example, if
commenter asks how these types of each aircraft type, regardless of its a qualitative assessment indicated that a
latent failures will be considered when certification basis. particular design feature could result in
assessing the safety of fuel tanks. • A more objective evaluation process a high voltage electrical surge into the
Clearly, frequent internal inspections of that simplifies delegating the fuel tank, then the assessment would
fuel tanks are not acceptable, and some compliance-finding task by the FAA and conclude that measures should be taken
means for agreeing to certain design ensures equal treatment for each to prevent such an occurrence,
practices on existing aircraft may be manufacturer and operator. regardless of whether it is a ‘‘lesson
needed. • Faster completion of the task, learned’’ based on past occurrences.
FAA’s Response: The intent of the submittal of the report to the FAA, and
safety review, as stated in the notice, is resolution of any deficiencies in the Request for Risk Assessment Only of
to apply current system safety existing fleet. Remaining Fleet Life
assessment standards to the affected • Development of a standardized One commenter suggests that the
airplanes in the existing transport fleet. report or checklist to ease the safety review methodology proposed by
We fully expect that, where fail-safe compliance-finding process. the FAA should provide a risk
features do not exist, modifications to • A far greater pool of people able to assessment over the remaining fleet life
designs and changes to maintenance accomplish the task, because a of each aircraft type. Many of the
practices will be required for a prescriptive review method would not aircraft types that would be affected by
significant portion of the fleet to address demand engineers with detailed the proposed SFAR are approaching the
the single and multiple failures noted by expertise in fuel systems and safety end of their fleet lives. The commenter
the commenter. If inspections to detect assessment methodology. asserts that, when determining if safety
latent failures are impractical, it would These commenters maintain that the reviews and resulting design changes
be necessary to modify the design to FAA’s safety review proposed in the are warranted, the consideration should
provide fail-safe features or indications SFAR would be merely an additional be based upon a risk assessment based
to eliminate latency. burden that could interfere with on the remaining fleet life.
realizing the benefits of lessons learned. FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that
Request for a Lessons Learned They consider that their suggested the remaining fleet life could be one
Approach alternative approach is more practical, consideration in establishing a basis for
Certain commenters state that the and equally effective in enhancing fuel an exemption from the requirement to
proposed safety review would be more system safety. perform a safety review for particular
useful if it were based strictly on lessons FAA’s Response: The FAA does not models, but it is not a general basis for
learned, and request that the proposal concur with these commenters’ request. limiting the applicability of the
be changed accordingly. The To conduct a safety review based solely proposal. While some models of
commenters propose an alternative on lessons learned would not provide airplanes have exceeded their economic
method that would be based on service the level of safety that is intended by the design goal (for example the Boeing
experience (lessons learned) and proposal. A lessons learned focus would Model 727 and McDonnell Douglas

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Model DC–9), there are individual require ‘‘all maintenance and inspection maintenance program for each airplane
airplanes of those models that are still instructions necessary’’ to be submitted model.
in service, and extensive future service as part of the safety review report. Certain other commenters request that
life is planned for them. Consequently, However, the commenters assert that the proposal be changed to include the
exposure to the risk of fuel tank effective development of a maintenance following text:
explosions remains as valid for these program cannot practically start until ‘‘Compliance time:
models as for any others in service. the safety review is completed, and it (a) All design review reports must be
Regarding whether resulting design must be developed in coordination with submitted to the Administrator no later than
changes are warranted, those changes the operators and regulatory agencies. 36 months after the effective date of this rule
would necessarily be mandated by Therefore, submittal of the maintenance or within 18 months of the issuance of a
separate regulatory actions (AD’s). and inspection instructions as part of certificate for which application was filed
Therefore, whether the changes are the safety review report is not feasible. before [effective date of the rule], whichever
warranted will be assessed in the The commenters request that the is later.
context of those actions. (b) Maintenance and inspection
proposal be revised to allow a period of
instructions must be submitted to the
Request for Change in Compliance Time 6 to 8 months for the development of Administrator no later than 8 months after
for Conducting Safety Review these instructions once the FAA has the FAA has approved the design review
approved the safety review report. report for the applicable aircraft type.’’
Several commenters state that the 12- Fourth, necessary design changes
month compliance time for completing identified as a result of the safety review Others request that the compliance
the required actions proposed under the could not be developed, evaluated, and time for completion of the safety review
SFAR is unrealistic, and request a shown to comply with the new should be extended to 54 months.
longer period for compliance. The requirements within the proposed FAA’s Response: The FAA has
reasons that these commenters give are compliance time. The commenters considered the reasons for the
as follows: request that the compliance time for commenters’ requests and concurs that
First, industry lacks the resources to design change activity be treated the compliance time should be extended
accomplish the requirements within the separately from the SFAR review somewhat. We have revised the final
proposed timeframe. There are limited activity. rule to provide a compliance time of 18
qualified personnel to conduct the level Fifth, the FAA itself lacks resources to months for conducting the safety
of safety review that the proposed SFAR support timely review of the safety reviews and submitting them to the
would require. Formalized system safety review reports required by the SFAR FAA. Even for those designers who
analysis of the type outlined in AC within the 12-month time proposed to work closely with the appropriate
25.1309–1A requires specialists with complete the review. The commenters ACO’s in conducting their reviews, we
extensive knowledge of the system believe that the FAA has grossly acknowledge that, following
architecture, component details, and underestimated its own flow times submission, some time will be required
service history, as well as the analysis regarding coordination and approval of for FAA review and for any necessary
methodology. the SFAR-mandated safety reviews and revisions, and we consider that 6
Second, the flow time necessary to resulting compliance substantiation months should be adequate for those
perform the proposed safety review documents. Experience has shown that activities. We are aware that when the
would exceed the proposed compliance the FAA typically takes 60 to 90 days FAA has mandated maintenance
time. The commenters point out that to review and approve of documents of program changes in the past, we have
over 100 airplane models would need to this kind. Multiplied by 100 reports or typically allowed operators 12 months
be reviewed, and the proposed safety more, it would appear that the FAA to incorporate those changes into their
review methodology would require two itself would require more than the programs. Therefore, we have revised
to four years of effort per major model proposed 12 months compliance time to the operating rules to require that
for large transport aircraft. Some major complete its review and approval cycle operators incorporate the maintenance
models of airplanes have numerous once the reports are submitted by the program changes within 36 months after
minor model variations. These minor industry. the effective date.
model variations would add significant Another commenter considers that the Designers may allocate the 18-month
additional review effort. Availability of proposed compliance time for compliance time between the safety
qualified engineers does not allow these developing the maintenance and review and the development of
reviews to be conducted in a completely inspection program is inadequate. The maintenance and inspection
parallel fashion. Assuming a 9-month commenter asserts that, without the instructions as they deem appropriate.
flow time to accomplish each review insights gained through the SFAR In evaluating the information presented
and the capability to conduct up to design review assessment process, any by the commenters and the relevant
three reviews simultaneously, some attempts to accurately revise existing safety concerns, we have determined
manufacturers would require well in maintenance and inspection programs that this revision can be made without
excess of 45 months to complete the would be ‘‘counterproductive’’ to the significantly affecting safety.
proposed reviews. In other instances, goals of the proposed rule. The These revised compliance times are
the resources available to some TC or commenter maintains that the FAA not as long as those requested by the
STC holders may limit their capability underestimates the time necessary to commenters for the following reasons:
to one safety review at a time. These prepare and develop the maintenance • The commenters based their
estimates take into account work program, receive approval, and estimates on the assumption that a
already accomplished by the industry implement the program. This quantitative assessment would be
over the past 4 years. commenter requests that the proposed required. As discussed previously, in
Third, development of the rule be changed to allow more time for most cases a less time-consuming
maintenance instructions could not revising the operator’s maintenance or qualitative assessment will be sufficient.
possibly be accomplished within the inspection programs, and that this time • There is a substantial degree of
proposed 12-month compliance time. start only after the completion of the commonality in design features of the
As written, the proposed SFAR would design review and the manufacturers’ affected models. Such commonality will

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allow analysis to be conducted by that the SFAR applies not just to fuel • At the next heavy-maintenance
similarity to previously reviewed system STC’s, but to all STC’s that could inspection interval where the area or
designs. In light of this, we do not affect the fuel system. zone is opened and accessed, or
foresee designers needing to conduct a FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs • In conjunction with any downtime
separate safety analysis ‘‘from scratch’’ with the commenters that a change in necessitated by a modification program
for each model. the text of the SFAR is necessary to resulting from the safety review
• Since the TWA 800 accident over 4 clarify the intent. It was the FAA’s required by the proposed SFAR.
years ago, many manufacturers already intent that the SFAR requirements were The objective of the suggested
have completed significant reviews of to apply to holders of STC’s that may inspection would be to examine wiring
service history and analysis of fuel tank affect the fuel system or result in a fuel that enters the fuel tank and assess
designs for many airplane types. This tank ignition source. This was explained whether any STC modifications
will significantly reduce the time and in detail in the preamble to the notice, introduce non-conformities that may
resources that will be needed to and that discussion is repeated in this compromise the fail-safe design concept
complete the requirements of the SFAR. final rule under the heading, or may be a possible fuel tank ignition
• We expect that industry will work ‘‘Supplemental Type Certificates,’’ source. (Only the wiring external to the
closely with the cognizant ACO in above. tank would need to be inspected.) The
planning the safety review, and Based on the comments, we recognize nonconformity would be established
providing feedback as the evaluation that the proposed text could be based on a listing of specific inspection
progresses. This should allow expedited construed too narrowly; that is, guidelines issued by either the FAA
approval by the local office. construed to mean that the requirements (possibly in the revised AC 25.981–1B)
Given the additional time provided in apply only to STC modifications that or the OEM’s for each aircraft model. As
the final rule, we are confident that the actually change the fuel tank system. with the SFAR safety review, any non-
technical capability exists and that We also recognize that it may not be conformity would be identified and
industry will expend the resources possible to determine whether a reported to the design approval holder.
needed to address this critical safety modification actually affects the safety As alternatives to this one-time
issue in a timely manner. of the fuel tank system without inspection, the commenter suggests:
As for the compliance time for conducting at least a rudimentary • A qualitative design review could
development of needed design changes, qualitative evaluation. In order to clarify be conducted, if sufficient technical
we have revised the text of the final rule this point, we have revised the text of information is available regarding the
to include a provision that would allow the final rule to state that the SFAR installation of the pertinent STC’s.
extensions of the compliance time on a applies to all holders of type certificates • Alternative methods could be
case-by-case basis. The final rule states and supplemental type certificates that conducted that ensure the continued
that the FAA may grant an extension of ‘‘may affect’’ the safety of the fuel tank airworthiness of the airplane (with
the compliance time if: system. respect to wiring that enters the fuel
• The safety review is completed Request for Clarification of SFAR tank). For example, installation of a
within the compliance time, and Requirements for STC’s Not Directly transient suppression device should
• Necessary design changes are eliminate the need to inspect or conduct
Related to Fuel Tanks
identified within the compliance time, design reviews of modifications that
and One commenter raises concerns about might otherwise affect FQIS wiring.
• Additional time can be justified. the requirements of the proposed rule as 2. The effect of modifications to the
they apply to STC approvals of environmental control system (ECS) and
Request for Clarification of SFAR modifications that are not specifically other system modifications capable of
Applicability to STC Holders fuel tank system modifications. These generating autoignition temperature into
Two commenters state that, as types of approvals are referred to as the tank structure. The commenter
worded, the proposed SFAR text does ‘‘non-ATA 28 STC approvals.’’ (‘‘ATA states that a qualitative review of these
not clearly specify that it applies to 28 STC’s’’ refers to approvals that systems should be conducted by
holders of STC modifications that may actually change the fuel tank system.) reviewing whether the approved
have no direct relationship to the fuel Specifically, the commenter questions configuration has been altered. If it has
system, but could have an effect on fuel the feasibility of conducting a safety been altered, the operator would
tank safety. The commenters are review on the types of modifications identify the alteration and ‘‘report it to
concerned that some readers may whose installation(s) do not actually the person responsible’’ (i.e., the design
misconstrue the current text as referring change, but could affect, the airplane approval holder of the design
only to STC’s for modifications directly fuel tank system. modification).
to the fuel tank system, and not STC’s The commenter requests that the FAA The commenter states that a one-time
that are adjacent to the fuel tank and consider a separate requirement in the inspection process, as described above,
may indirectly affect them. SFAR for assessing the effect of these would need to be developed using:
One of these commenters non-ATA 28 STC’s on the fuel system. • The OEM’s or STC holder’s list of
recommends that the proposed phrase The commenter asserts that airplanes on general design practices and precautions
‘‘supplemental type certificates affecting which non-ATA 28 STC’s are installed obtained during their SFAR safety
the airplane fuel tank system’’ be should only be assessed qualitatively or reviews, and
revised to ‘‘supplemental type by inspection, and that only two key • The revised maintenance program
certificates capable of affecting the areas need to be examined: produced from the SFAR safety review.
airplane fuel tank system.’’ The other 1. The modification of wiring next to The commenters foresee this
commenter suggests that the phrase be or near wiring that enters the fuel tank. information as providing operators with
revised to ‘‘supplemental type These commenters suggest that the guidelines on what to inspect, how to
certificates modifying the airplane fuel effects of these STC’s could be assessed inspect, and what the pass/fail criteria
tank system.’’ by a one-time inspection performed on are.
The commenters consider that adding each aircraft model by a specific time, The commenter suggests that this
the suggested words would make it clear such as: inspection should not repeat the

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inspections that have been performed to insurmountable burden’’ for the retained permanently, and § 121.380a,
date by the operator. (For example, the following reasons: which requires that these records be
operator should receive credit for any • A full review of modifications transferred with the airplane.
inspections performed because of an accomplished by the operators over the This rulemaking originated from the
airworthiness directive or part of the decades that some of the affected FAA’s conclusion that fuel tank systems
industry-wide Fuel System Safety airplanes have been operated is on current transport category airplanes
Program.) impracticable. may not be airworthy, and that the
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not • Where operators have sold aircraft seriousness of this safety issue warrants
concur with the commenter’s suggestion to another party, it is possible that the substantial efforts to identify safety
for several reasons. Although the current owner of the airplane may come problems in order to prevent future
commenter characterizes its proposal as back to the operator and require such an accidents such as TWA 800. It is
a ‘‘qualitative review,’’ it would only evaluation. This situation is unacceptable for operators to claim not
result in an inspection for ‘‘non- unmanageable. only that they are currently unable to
conformities,’’ with the inspection • Operators will have difficulty understand the configurations of these
results forwarded to the design approval performing any type of quantitative systems on their airplanes, but that it is
holder. The suggestion does not specify analysis due to lack of intensive unreasonable to expect them to gain that
what, if any, obligation the design familiarity with these types of methods. understanding. The objective of this
approval holder would have to address • The technical information required rulemaking would be defeated if
these non-conformities, which, by to perform a quantitative or qualitative operators of airplanes with
definition, are not part of the holder’s analysis may not be available or may not configuration changes were allowed to
approved design. It would be pertain to the specific aircraft model. rely solely on the instructions
unreasonable to impose an obligation on • Involvement by the original developed by TC and STC holders that
design approval holders to conduct equipment manufacturer (OEM) in may not reflect the actual
reviews of designs for which they are providing operators with assistance is configurations. This would allow for
not responsible. In light of this viewed by the operators as likely to be hazards introduced by the configuration
commenter’s adverse comments minimal. changes to remain unaddressed.
regarding imposing a requirement for The commenters are particularly As discussed previously, this same
such holders to review their own concerned that the OEM’s are probably commenter suggests a one-time
designs, imposing an additional not familiar with many of the STC’s that inspection to identify certain aspects of
obligation is inconsistent. have been incorporated on the aircraft. the configuration. We concur that, for
In addition, the commenter’s Further, the chance of obtaining an those operators who cannot otherwise
suggestion would result in a long delay assistance contract with the OEMs is identify their airplanes’ configurations,
in completion of the safety review of the slim because they will be stretched for a one-time inspection of the entire
fuel tank system. For example, the manpower supporting OEM system may be an appropriate means of
commenter suggests that the inspection responsibilities relating to the proposed determining the configurations. Once
take place during a heavy maintenance SFAR. the configuration is known, the operator
inspection; however, the heavy Additionally, the commenters are can perform a safety review of
maintenance inspection intervals are concerned that technical assistance from configuration changes not included in
typically every 4 to 5 years. Once the the FAA’s fuel system specialists cannot the TC holder and relevant STC holder
airplane configuration was determined, be ensured for the operators. The FAA reviews. As discussed previously, this
additional time would be needed to may be prepared to work with the type of review may be qualitative and
complete the assessment and to develop affected type certificate holders to assist does not require a quantitative analysis.
any necessary maintenance and them in complying with the In performing this review, the operator
inspection programs or design changes. requirements of the proposed SFAR, but can use the guidance provided in AC
The alternative process suggested by the such assistance may not be possible for 25.981–1B and the TC and relevant STC
commenters could effectively postpone operators in this situation due to a lack holder maintenance and inspection
addressing the effects of wiring on the of manpower. programs.
fuel tank system by as much as 7 or 8 FAA’s Response: The FAA does not These operators could begin
years. The elapsed time to complete this agree that the proposed rule would inspecting these airplanes immediately
process would not provide the level of impose ‘‘insurmountable burdens’’ on so that the differences from the TC and
safety intended by the FAA or expected operators. As with all operating rules, STC configurations can be documented
by the public. the person ultimately responsible for and taken into consideration in the
compliance is the operator. But this system safety assessment and any
Question on SFAR Requirements for rulemaking is unique in the extent to subsequent maintenance and inspection
STC’s Where No Technical Data Is which current designers are required to instructions. While operators may not
Available provide operators with analysis and have adequate engineering resources to
Several commenters raise a concern documentation of maintenance complete the evaluations and may not
about the proposed SFAR requirements programs to support operators in be able to rely on TC holders for support
as they pertain to a safety review of fulfilling their obligations. in evaluating these changes, technical
pertinent STC’s where the STC holder is The existing operating rules generally assistance contracts and use of
out of business and the necessary require operators to maintain their Designated Engineering Representatives
technical data is not readily available. aircraft in an airworthy condition. A (DERs) are possible methods of
The commenters expect that, for these prerequisite for maintaining an airplane completing the necessary work.
cases, the burden would fall on the is the ability to understand its While we are confident that operators
operators to conduct the review configuration, at least with respect to are capable of complying with these
required by the SFAR. The commenters safety critical systems. This is reflected requirements, we recognize the validity
are concerned that, for a large number in operating rules such as of the operators concerns regarding the
of these operators, the review process § 121.380(a)(2)(vii), which requires a list compliance time. Because it is
for these types of STC’s may present ‘‘an of current major alterations to be important that this review be done

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properly, the compliance time for approval does not have the same cases. To help the operators, the
implementing the resulting maintenance visibility as an STC, and it could be manufacturers should be required to
and inspection programs is extended substantially more difficult to identify provide for an alternative to the safety
from 18 months to 36 months. This which of these types of modification assessment.
provides the operators an additional 18 could affect the fuel systems.
FAA’s Response: As discussed above,
months after the TC and STC holders Furthermore, many might have been
the FAA intends that the instructions
are required to complete their programs, approved by an inspector, without
to complete the safety review of any certification engineering analysis and required by the operating rules address
field approvals on their airplanes, data; this would certainly complicate the actual configurations of the
develop a comprehensive maintenance the safety review analysis required by airplanes. As required by 14 CFR 43.13,
or inspection program, and implement the SFAR. Such modifications are of a repair must restore the airplane to its
the FAA approved maintenance or interest even to foreign parties as they original or properly altered condition.
inspection program. We consider this might have been incorporated on Therefore, repairs should not adversely
sufficient to address any design changes aircraft that are now on foreign affect fuel tank system safety. To the
identified by the operators. registries. The commenter requests that extent that known repairs may have
the FAA provide more details as to how changed design features affecting fuel
Question on Applicability of SFAR to
it intends to apply the SFAR to the tank system safety, they should be
Modifications Installed via Field
modifications approved under a field addressed in the maintenance and
Approvals
approval. inspection instructions. We recognize
One commenter points out that, in the FAA’s Response: The FAA recognizes that, unlike records of major alterations,
preamble to the notice where changes to that some clarification is necessary. The repair records are not required to be
the operating requirements were preamble to the notice and the retained permanently. If operators are
explained, the FAA included a Discussion of the Final Rule section of unaware of such repairs, this rule does
discussion of the effect of those this preamble state that the proposed
requirements on field approvals. [‘‘Field not require that inspections be
requirements are intended to apply to
approvals’’ are defined as those design conducted solely for the purpose of
type designs, supplemental type
changes approved by an authorized designs, and field approvals. identifying them. On the other hand, if
FAA aviation safety inspector (e.g., The FAA is aware that a significant such repairs are identified as a result of
Principal Maintenance Inspector, PMI) number of changes to transport category inspections performed to identify
on an FAA Form 337, ‘‘Major Repair airplane fuel tank systems have been configuration changes, those repairs
and Alteration,’’ or other document incorporated through field approvals. must be addressed in the instructions.
(e.g., an airline engineering order).] These changes may significantly affect Request for Clarification on Role of the
However, the preamble did not include the safety of the fuel tank system. As
Principal Maintenance Inspector in
a discussion of field approvals in the discussed previously, the operator of
context of the proposed SFAR. Further, SFAR Actions
any airplane with such changes would
the proposed text of neither the SFAR be required to identify them, complete One commenter requests a
nor the operating requirements contains a safety assessment taking into clarification of the role of the principal
any mention of field approvals. Thus, consideration the safety assessments maintenance inspector (PMI) in the fuel
the commenter questions whether the completed by the TC and STC holders, tank safety review process that would be
proposed rule actually applies to field and to develop applicable maintenance
required by the SFAR. The commenter
approvals whose installations may affect and inspection instructions and submit
the airplane fuel tank system. states that there must be technical
them to the FAA for approval, together
Additionally, the commenter questions with the necessary substantiation of information available at the airline or
whether other forms of repairs or compliance with the safety review PMI level to effectively carry out the
modifications permitted on in-service requirements of the SFAR. To eliminate objective of the proposed SFAR.
aircraft and not specifically mentioned any misunderstanding, the operational However, the commenter is concerned
in the SFAR (for example, approvals final rules have been revised to state that, even though there will be
used by airlines via SFAR 36 repairs) that the instructions for maintenance guidelines available in the new AC
need to be considered within the and inspection of the fuel tank system 25.981–1B, a PMI ‘‘will not have the
context of the proposed rule. must address the actual configuration of expertise to be able to evaluate whether
If the FAA intends that all repairs be each affected airplane. an alternative truly satisfies the SFAR.’’
considered under the rule’s FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
requirements, then the commenter Question on Applicability of SFAR to
Repairs intend that the PMI would evaluate the
requests that field approvals, approved
technical design information. As stated
repairs, and so on, be considered in the One commenter requests more details
concerning how the proposed safety in the preamble to the notice and the
same fashion as non-ATA 28 STC’s
review required by the SFAR would be Discussion of the Final Rule section of
(discussed above).
Similarly, another commenter states applicable to repairs that currently exist this preamble, the FAA would require
that modifications approved under a on an airplane. The commenter points that this information be submitted to the
field approval may prove to be out that the proposed SFAR text omits cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification
problematic when attempting to comply any mention of repairs. The commenter Office (ACO). The maintenance and
with the safety review analysis that states that it would be very difficult to inspection program that is generated
would be required by the proposed trace back all the repairs, and their also would be approved by the
SFAR. These types of modifications supporting engineering data, so that a cognizant ACO. The PMI would be
were discussed in the preamble to the proper safety analysis could be carried responsible for oversight of the operator
notice, but were not accounted for in the out. The commenter believes that these to verify that any mandatory
economic analysis. The commenter repairs, like ‘‘orphan STC’s,’’ might maintenance or inspection actions are
considers that more details are needed render the design review by safety incorporated into the operators’
as to how to address them. The field analysis approach unworkable in many maintenance or inspection programs.

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Request for a One-Time Inspection type design; improperly installed parts; because the essence of the requirement
Program improperly routed wiring; etc. of the proposed SFAR is captured in
One commenter requests a revision to We do not consider that the another passage that appeared
the proposed rule to require that, prior commenters’ suggested one-time immediately after the cited phrase in the
to conducting a system safety review inspection is necessary for airplanes for preamble to the notice, which read:
and analysis for each aircraft type, a which the configuration can be * * * In conducting the review, the design
detailed inspection should be identified by other means. Nevertheless, approval holder would be required to
conducted of the fuel tanks of several the development of critical design demonstrate compliance with the standards
configuration control limitations and proposed in this notice for § 25.981(a) and (b)
representative airplanes for each type * * * and the existing standards of
certificated aircraft. The purpose of the mandatory maintenance and inspection
items will likely result in eventual § 25.901.’’
inspection would be to determine the
specific health of the fleet. The inspection of all critical fuel tank The commenter points out that the
inspection should span both old and system-related areas of airplanes in the standards proposed in the notice neither
newer airplanes, and include at least transport fleet. suggest nor require that the probability
two operators and at least 10 airplanes. of the occurrence of a fire or explosion
Question on Redundant vs. Single-
The commenter suggests that this should be zero.
Thread Fuel Tank Systems Alternatively, the commenter suggests
should be a very aggressive inspection,
One commenter questions a statement that the intent of the regulation could be
which would involve removal and
in the preamble to the notice that clarified to require practical elimination
teardown of components and inspection
introduced the FAA’s discussion of its of ignition sources with the intent to
of difficult-to-reach areas. The
review of maintenance practices for the eliminate all sources by use of new
deficiencies and failures listed in the technology and design architecture.
fuel tank system. The statement read,
notice, as well as the findings of the FAA’s Response: The FAA considers
industry-wide inspections of the Boeing Typical transport category airplane fuel
tank systems are designed with redundancy that some clarification is necessary. We
747 fuel tanks, could provide a starting agree with the commenter that it is
and fault indication features such that single
point for defining the nature of the impossible to show that the probability
component failures do not result in any
inspections. Based on findings of these significant reduction in safety. of a fuel tank explosion is equal to zero
inspections, appropriate corrective in numerical terms. The statement cited
action could be determined and The commenter maintains that just
the opposite is true: Current designs are in the notice was intended to express in
mandated. Required design changes very general terms the objective of the
would become apparent as a result of single-thread systems. That is because
proposed rule—that ‘‘fuel tank fires or
this inspection program. there will be an explosive mixture in the
explosions will not occur.’’ The
The commenter states that there are tank on a regular basis, and there is
intended level of safety is clearly
precedents to this type of inspection. likely to be debris in the tank, so any
defined in the regulatory text. We
For example, the United States Air single failure, such as a hot short, will
concur with the clarification of intent
Force conducted aggressive inspections compromise safety. The same is true for
provided by the commenter.
of B–52 and KC–135 aircraft in the pump insulation failures.
1980’s to establish the condition of FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees Request To Address Third Party
these aircraft, and required corrective with this commenter’s observations in Maintenance Activity in Safety Review
action for continued safe operation of part. Regulations applicable to airplanes One commenter notes that experience
these aging aircraft. These inspection affected by this rulemaking require that has shown that unauthorized processes
programs, referred to as Condition ‘‘no single failure or likely combination and materials are sometimes used by
Assessment/Inspection Programs (CA/ of failures may result in a hazard.’’ third party repair businesses, possibly
IP), were conducted for many of the However, we do agree that the even unknown to the designer. This
same concerns that were raised in the investigation of fuel tank system designs may result in service problems that
notice, although the programs covered has shown certain installations do not would be unforeseen by the designer,
other aircraft systems as well (i.e., meet this requirement. This is one of the and possibly a reduced level of safety.
electrical, avionic, hydraulic, purposes for the requirements of this The commenter argues that it does not
pneumatic, etc.). The CA/IP findings rulemaking action. seem reasonable to expect a survey of
resulted in numerous fuel system Request for Clarification of Statement of the safety of fuel system designs to take
corrective actions to enhance safety, Probability into account the effect of unauthorized
including maintenance actions and and, therefore, unforeseeable
intervals, and design improvements. One commenter disagrees with a maintenance activities. There may be
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not statement that appeared in the preamble features of the design that are critical to
concur with the suggestions of this to the notice, which stated: the safe operation of the equipment, but
commenter for several reasons: The proposed SFAR would require the not obvious to a third party. The
There already have been ample design approval holder to perform a safety commenter requests that the FAA
inspections, service history reviews, and review of the fuel tank system to show that consider revising the proposed
other assessments of the transport fleet fuel tank fires or explosions will not occur regulation to ensure that maintenance
that have confirmed, without question, on airplanes of the approved design.
action carried out by parties not
that the safety of the fuel tank systems The commenter states that it is cognizant of the safety consequences of
on these airplanes must be improved. impossible to show that ‘‘fuel tank fires their procedures do not jeopardize the
Most recently, the industry-led Fuel or explosions will not occur,’’ because safety of aircraft in service.
Tank Safety Team conducted an the probability of such an event, in FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees in
inspection of over 800 transport terms of a system safety analysis, cannot part with this commenter. The fuel tank
category airplane fuel tanks, which be shown to be equal to zero. The safety review required by this rule must
revealed such things as repairs and commenter believes that this is not what include failures that are foreseeable as
alterations that may result in a fuel tank the FAA intended. The commenter well as any that have occurred in
system that does not meet the original suggests that this phrase be removed service. The evaluation also must

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include consideration of susceptibility anticipated to originate with pre- on any transport category airplane.
to maintenance errors. The requirement existing failures. However, we recognize While a rule sets a minimum standard
to develop critical design configuration that the meaning of ‘‘any one flight’’ has for all the airplanes to which it applies,
control limitations, discussed later, is been a contentious issue for many years, compliance determinations are
intended to provide maintenance and we have agreed to work within necessarily limited to individual type
personnel with precisely the type of ARAC to try and resolve the issue of designs. Consequently, all that has been
safety critical information identified by ‘‘specific risk’’ for the more generally required of applicants is a sufficiently
the commenter. applicable rules, such as § 25.901(c) and conservative demonstration that a
§ 25.1309. Furthermore, as noted earlier, condition is not anticipated to occur in
Discussion of Comments on § 25.981, if a more appropriate means of service on the type design being
Fuel Tank Ignition Prevention addressing this issue should result from assessed.
Request for Revision to Requirement for these ARAC activities, this rule will be The means of demonstrating that the
Addressing Latent Failures amended accordingly to retain occurrence of an event is extremely
consistency. This commitment to ARAC improbable varies widely, depending on
One commenter believes that the the type of system, component, or
notwithstanding, the FAA is also
proposed § 25.981(a)(3), which would situation that must be assessed. There
committed to assuring that transport
require demonstrating that an ignition has been a tendency, as evidenced by
category airplane designs are acceptably
source could not result from single or the comment, to confuse the meaning of
fail-safe on each flight, not just on a
latent failures, is too severe. The this term with the particular means used
typical flight of mean duration or on
commenter asserts that it presents to demonstrate compliance in those
flights where the airplane initially has
requirements that are outside the scope no failures present. various contexts. This has led to a
of § 25.1309 and § 25.901(c); these are The FAA disagrees with the misunderstanding that the term has a
the same standards that the FAA states commenters’ assertion that the different meaning in different sections
in the preamble to be the baseline for requirements of § 25.981(a)(3) are of part 25.
the proposed requirements relative to ‘‘outside the scope of § 25.1309 and As a rule, failure conditions arising
the ignition source prevention § 25.901(c).’’ As stated previously in the from a single failure are not considered
assessment. These regulations provide a notice and in this final rule, the FAA’s extremely improbable; thus, probability
defined method for assessing latent policy for compliance with § 25.901(c), assessments normally involve failure
failures (although the regulations do not in general, has been to require conditions arising from multiple
specifically address latent failures). The applicants to assume the presence of failures. Both qualitative and
commenter favors the continued use of foreseeable latent (operationally quantitative assessments are used in
the fail-safe design concept as defined undetected) failure conditions when practice, and both are often necessary to
in AC 25.1309–1A. The commenter demonstrating that subsequent single some degree to support a conclusion
maintains that the new wording failures will not jeopardize the safe that an event is extremely improbable.
proposed by the FAA imposes a operation of the airplane. This Qualitative methods are techniques
requirement on latent failure conditions requirement (referred to as ‘‘latent plus used to structure a logical foundation
that are just one part of a larger set of one’’) simply provides the same single for any credible assessment. While a
combinations leading to the hazard of fault tolerance for aircraft operating best-estimate quantitative analysis is
‘‘ignition sources present in fuel tanks.’’ with an anticipated latent failure as often valuable, there are many situations
It is the larger set that § 25.1309 imposes would be provided by FAA Master where the qualitative aspects of the
a requirement on, thus taking into Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) assessment and engineering judgment
account the complete set of all policies if that failure is known to exist must be relied on to a much greater
combinations. The commenter states (i.e., not latent). degree. These situations include those
that the proposed wording of As for § 25.1309, the commenter where:
§ 25.981(a)(3) ‘‘adversely penalizes’’ the appears to be confusing the objective of • There is insufficient reliability
resulting outcome of the analysis, in the rule (i.e., to prevent the occurrence information (e.g., unknown operating
particular the definition of maintenance of catastrophic failure conditions that time or conditions associated with
intervals and the means for determining can be anticipated) with a conditionally failure data);
whether an added safety feature is acceptable means of demonstrating • Dependencies among assessment
required to mitigate or prevent the compliance, as described in AC variables are subtle or unpredictable
event. 25.1309–1A (i.e., that catastrophic (e.g., independence of two circuit
FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees failure conditions must have an failures on the same microchip, size and
with the commenter’s assertion that ‘‘average probability per flight hour’’ of shape of impact damage due to foreign
current industry practice is adequate to less than 1×10¥9). Since this same objects);
address fuel tank safety issues. misconception has presented itself • The range of an assessment variable
Paragraph 5.a.1. of AC 25.1309–1A, many times before, the following is extreme or indeterminate; and
which the commenter supports, states in discussion is intended to clarify the • Human factors play a significant
part: intent of the term ‘‘extremely role (e.g., safe outcome dependent
In any system or subsystem, the failure of improbable’’ and the role of ‘‘average totally upon the flightcrew immediately,
any single element, component or connection probability’’ in demonstrating that a accurately, and completely identifying
should be assumed to occur during any one condition is ‘‘extremely improbable.’’ and mitigating an obscure failure
flight regardless of the likelihood that it The term ‘‘extremely improbable’’ (or condition).
would fail. Any such single-failure should its predecessor term, ‘‘extremely Qualitative compliance guidance
not prevent the continued safe flight and remote’’) has been used in 14 CFR part usually involves selecting combinations
landing of the airplane, nor significantly 25 for many years. The objective of this of failures that, based on experience and
impair the ability of the crew to cope with term has been to describe a condition engineering judgment, are considered to
the resulting conditions. (usually a failure condition) that has a be just short of ‘‘extremely improbable’’,
Consequently, if ‘‘any one flight’’ is probability of occurrence so remote that and then demonstrating that they will
taken literally, this includes flights it is not anticipated to occur in service not cause a catastrophe. In some cases,

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examples of combinations of failures when combined with a conservative not necessarily mean that a condition is
necessary for a qualitative assessment assessment and good engineering extremely improbable; it is simply
are directly provided in the rule. For judgment, it has been an effective evidence that can be used to support the
example, § 25.671 (concerning flight indicator that a condition is not conclusion that a condition is extremely
controls) sets forth several examples of anticipated to occur, at least not for the improbable. Wherever part 25 requires
combinations of failures that are reasons identified and assessed in the that a condition be ‘‘extremely
intended to help define the outermost analysis. Furthermore, decreasing this improbable,’’ the compliance method,
boundary of events that are not criterion to anything greater than whether qualitative, quantitative, or a
‘‘extremely improbable.’’ Judgment 1×10¥12 would not result in combination of the two, along with
would dictate that other combinations, substantially improved designs, only engineering judgment, must provide
equally likely or more likely, would also increased line maintenance. The FAA convincing evidence that the condition
be included as not ‘‘extremely has concluded that the resulting will not occur in service.
improbable.’’ However, combinations increased exposure to maintenance error
less likely than the examples would be would likely counteract any benefits Request To Revise Definition of Critical
considered so remote that they are not from such a change. An ARAC working Design Configuration Control
expected to occur and are, therefore, group has validated these conclusions. Limitations
considered extremely improbable. When using ‘‘averages,’’ care must be One commenter requests that
Another common qualitative taken to assure that the anticipated proposed § 25.981(b) be changed to
compliance guideline is to assume that deviations around that ‘‘average’’ are not revise or delete the reference to ‘‘critical
any failure condition anticipated to be so extreme that the ‘‘peak’’ values are design configuration control
present for more than one flight, unacceptably susceptible to inherent limitations.’’ This commenter cannot
occurring in combination with any other uncertainties. That is to say, the risk on agree with the definition stated in the
single failure, is not ‘‘extremely one flight cannot be extremely high notice as:
improbable.’’ This is the guideline, often simply because the risk on another
* * * any information necessary to
used to find compliance with flight is extremely low. An important maintain those design features that have been
§ 25.901(c), that the FAA is adopting as example of the flaw in relying solely on defined in the original type design as needed
a standard in § 25.981(a)(3). consideration of ‘‘average’’ risk is the to preclude development of ignition sources.
Quantitative methods are those ‘‘specific risk’’ that results from
numerical techniques used to predict operation with latent (not operationally The commenter raises several
the frequency or the probability of the detectable) failures. It is this risk that is concerns regarding the definition and
various occurrences within a qualitative being addressed by § 25.981(a)(3), as implications of critical design
analysis. Quantitative methods are vital adopted in this final rule. For example, configuration control limitations:
for supporting the conclusion that a latent failures have been identified as First, the commenter is concerned
complex condition is extremely the primary or contributing cause of that within the definition, ‘‘any
improbable. When a quantitative several accidents. In 1991, a thrust information necessary’’ can be
probability analysis is used, one has to reverser deployment occurred during interpreted as being not only the
accept the fact that the probability of climb from Bangkok, Thailand, on a provision of maintenance and
zero is not attainable for the occurrence Boeing Model 767 due to a latent failure inspection instructions, but also the
of a condition that is physically in the reversing system. In 1996, a thrust provision of the fuel tank design
possible. Therefore, a probability level reverser deployment on a Fokker Model features itself. This could include
is chosen that is small enough that, F–100 airplane occurred following material specifications, specific
when combined with a conservative takeoff from Sao Paulo, Brazil, due to a manufacturing processes, dimensions,
assessment and good engineering latent failure in the system. As noted etc. The commenter states that this
judgment, it provides convincing earlier, the NTSB determined that the means the type certificate holder would
evidence that the condition would not probable cause of the TWA 800 accident be required to list its proprietary design
occur in service. was ignition of fuel vapors in the center approach, which could lead to a loss of
For conditions that lend themselves to wing fuel from an ignition source: competitive edge and an infringement
average probability analysis, a guideline on proprietary intellectual property. The
* * * The source of ignition energy for the
on the order of 1 in 1 billion is commenter objects to this requirement
explosion could not be determined with
commonly used as the maximum certainty but, of the sources evaluated by the because it would allegedly sacrifice the
average probability that an ‘‘extremely investigation, the most likely was a short hard earned competitive advantage that
improbable’’ condition can have during circuit outside of the center wing tank that manufacturers derive through their
a typical flight hour. This 1 in 1 billion allowed excessive voltage to enter it through expertise and continuing investment in
‘‘average probability per flight hour’’ electrical wiring associated with the fuel research and development. As an
criterion was originally derived in an quantity indication system [FQIS]. example, the commenter asserts, ‘‘if a
effort to assure the proliferation of A latent failure or condition creating certain pump is qualified on the
critical systems would not increase the a reduced arc gap in the FQIS would airplane, the industry does not believe
historical accident rate. This criterion have to be present to result in an it is appropriate or necessary to list all
was based on an assumption that there ignition source. This rule is intended to of the features inherent to that pump
would be no more than 100 catastrophic require designs that prevent operation of itself that were qualified as part of the
failure conditions per airplane. This an airplane with a preexisting condition units approval. This approved parts list
criterion was later adopted as guidance or failure such as a reduced arc gap in and the associated installation and
in AC 25.1309. The historical derivation the FQIS (latent failure) and a maintenance manuals suffice for
of this criterion should not be subsequent single failure resulting in a maintaining the airworthiness of this
misinterpreted to mean that the rule is short circuit that causes an electrical arc pump.’’
only intended to limit the frequency of inside the fuel tank. Second, the commenter is concerned
catastrophe to that historic 1×10¥7 Due to variability and uncertainty in that this would put an unprecedented
level. The FAA conditionally accepts the analytical process, predicting an liability risk on the type certificate
the use of this guidance only because, average probability of 1 in 1 billion does holder if it omits some features, either

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 23110 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

through error or because it did not applicants subject to this requirement information we are requiring the design
realize a supplementary function should be required to develop this approval holder to provide to the
provided by the features. (The information and make it available to operator is basic information needed by
commenter provided no further operators of affected airplanes. This is the industry to operate airplanes safely.
explanation or substantiation of this consistent with the policy regarding It will provide operators with a baseline
concern, however.) airworthiness limitations required by document to develop a maintenance and
Third, the commenter states that the § 25.571 (‘‘Damage-tolerance and fatigue inspection program that will enhance
notion of critical design configuration evaluation of structure’’). safety within the fleet. It will also aid
control limitations goes beyond the 2. Concern about liability of type the operator in establishing the
notion of inspection and maintenance. certificate holders. The FAA disagrees configuration requirements that must be
In this regard, it does not imply the that risk of liability is an issue. If accounted for during any subsequent
same compliance requirement as conscientiously implemented, this alterations to the airplane.
§ 25.571, which is the FAA’s stated requirement will significantly reduce 5. Concern about covering
precedent for the proposed rule. the risk of accidents from fuel tank deficiencies in the STC and
Fourth, the commenter considers that explosions. This, in turn, will reduce modification approval process by
critical design configuration control the liability risk of design approval indirectly implicating the manufacturer.
limitations go against standard industry holders. The FAA disagrees that the definition of
practice regarding what manufacturers 3. Concern about new inspection and critical design configuration control
should provide to users. maintenance requirements. The FAA limitations ‘‘implicates’’ the TC holder
Fifth, the commenter states that the agrees in part with the commenter. in configuration changes made by
notion of critical design configuration While it is true that the term ‘‘critical others. On the contrary, these
control limitations attempts to cover design configuration control limitations provide TC holders with the
deficiencies in the STC and the airline limitations’’ is new and may result in ability to limit the types of changes that
modification approval process by new inspection and maintenance may be made to their designs that could
indirectly ‘‘implicating’’ the requirements, the very intent of this rule adversely affect their safety.
manufacturer in changes to the is to require mandatory maintenance
certificated configuration that the and inspection for the fuel tank system. Request To Delete Use of Placards and
manufacturer may not have known We agree that the compliance Decals
about or performed. requirements are different between One commenter requests that
For these reasons, the commenter § 25.571 and § 25.981. However, these § 25.981(b) of the proposed rule be
requests that the proposed rule be differences are due to the differences revised to delete the requirements
revised to delete or change the between structures and systems. For concerning placement of placards or
requirement concerning critical design example, service experience indicates decals in the areas where ‘‘maintenance,
configuration control limitations. that alterations have been made to repairs, or alterations may violate the
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not systems affecting fuel tank safety critical design configuration
concur with the commenter’s request to without consideration of the effects of limitations.’’ The commenter agrees that
revise the rule, and provides the the alterations. One purpose of critical adequate information regarding general
following disposition of each of the design configuration control limitations design practices and precautions must
commenter’s concerns. is to ensure that maintenance personnel be available to those who perform and
1. Concern about release of are informed of and address these approve repairs and alterations to the
proprietary information. The FAA has effects. In the context of structures, the airplane. However, the commenter
always required manufacturers to primary concern has been aging argues that placing placards and decals
provide information that is necessary to phenomena such as fatigue, and the on the airplane may not be practical,
maintain the safety of a product. For limitations are intended to ensure that considering that they might not remain
example, information that is contained these phenomena are identified and in place or be readable over time. The
in many maintenance manuals might be addressed before they become critical. commenter suggests that a more
considered proprietary in nature, but The result in both instances is effective way to convey fuel system
the FAA requires each manufacturer to mandatory maintenance and inspection general practices information to
develop instructions for continued requirements for both fuel tank systems operators is via the standard-practices
airworthiness for their products and structures. We have determined that section of the Aircraft Maintenance
containing this information. Defining the fuel tank system warrants Manual (or a similar section of another
features of an airplane design, such as mandatory minimum maintenance appropriate manual). The commenter
wire separation, explosion proof criteria to prevent catastrophic failure. does agree that the fuel quantity
features of a fuel pump, maintenance By placing these requirements in the indicating system (FQIS) wiring could
intervals for transient suppression Airworthiness Limitations section of the be better identified, and suggests that
devices, minimum bonding jumper Instructions for Continued manufacturers work with the
resistance levels, etc., is needed so that Airworthiness, the design approval appropriate agencies to develop a
any maintenance actions or subsequent holder provides consistent mandatory standardized system (similar to that for
changes to the product made by baseline maintenance standards for the oxygen lines) to identify critical fuel
operators or the manufacturer do not fleet. systems wiring for future aircraft
degrade the level of safety of the original 4. Concern that the requirement goes designs.
type design. The definition of critical against standard industry practice FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs in
design configuration control limitations regarding what manufacturers should part with the commenter. The rule is
does not include ‘‘all of the features provide to users. The FAA agrees that meant to be a performance-based rule;
inherent’’ in the design; it only includes the proposed rule may differ from therefore, the FAA’s objective is not to
information that is necessary to ensure historical industry practice. However, mandate the use of any specific means
safety of fuel tank systems. The policy the purpose of this rule is to improve of providing visual identification of
determination underlying this both the safety of the fleet and the critical design control limitations.
requirement is that design approval practices within the industry. The Although the text suggests the use of

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placards and decals, the rule allows that must be documented. The (‘‘Certification Maintenance
visible means other than placards and commenter asserts that this proposed Requirements,’’ issued November 28,
decals to be used. Placards are normally requirement fails to recognize that 1994), to allow operators to absorb tasks
used in many locations of transport equivalent systems-related tasks are within the existing maintenance
airplanes to convey information to already defined under Certification programs if a MSG–3 task is identified.
maintenance personnel, but placards are Maintenance Requirements (CMR), a This reduces costs associated with
only one option of identifying critical process that has been in place since the tracking additional Airworthiness
design configuration limitations. The early 1980’s and formalized in 1994. Limitations, which would be required in
FAA also recognizes that installation [CMR’s are maintenance requirements accordance with the proposed
and maintenance of placards in certain that identify aircraft system-related Appendix H requirements.
locations of the airplane may not be safety tasks for ‘‘dormant’’ (latent) FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
practical. failure conditions related to hazardous concur that the rule should be revised
The objective of this requirement is to and catastrophic failure conditions.] to include the CMR process. The
provide a means to assist maintenance The commenter states that CMR’s are concept of this rule goes beyond the
personnel in reducing maintenance considered the systems equivalent of the current CMR process. CMR’s only
errors. Adverse service experience structural airworthiness limitations and address mandatory maintenance that is
demonstrates that modifications have are part of today’s certification process, applied to the airplane at the time of
inadvertently resulted in routing of high even though CMR’s are not included in original certification. The requirement
power wiring with FQIS wiring. The part 25. The FAA Aircraft Certification of this rule for configuration design
need to provide visible identification of Offices (ACO) and other prime control limitations will address not only
critical design configuration control certifying authorities regularly approve mandatory maintenance actions, but
limitations will depend upon the CMR’s, and all operators’ maintenance also design features (e.g., wire
particular airplane configuration. programs use these same CMR’s. This separation, pump impeller material
As an example, the FAA anticipates commenter states that the proposed specification) that cannot be altered
that the requirements of this rule will requirement indirectly regroups all except in accordance with the
result in modifications either to separate maintenance tasks associated with the Instructions for Continued
FQIS wiring from high power sources, prevention of fuel tank ignition sources Airworthiness (ICA). The configuration
or to install transient suppression under the responsibility of the ACO, design control limitations will be made
devices. If transient suppression devices and this undermines the MRB process part of the Airworthiness Limitations
are incorporated into the FQIS, the FAA as well as the FAA’s Aircraft Evaluation section of the ICA; therefore, they will
would not consider separation of the Groups’ (AEG) responsibility in be mandatory in accordance with
wiring from other high power wiring a approving maintenance programs. § 91.403(c).
critical design configuration item and, In light of this, the commenter Further, the current MRB process
therefore, would not require visible suggests that rather than regulate the does not provide a mandatory, legally
identification. If separation of FQIS CMR concept system-by-system as the enforceable means to require mandatory
from high power sources wiring is proposed Appendix would do, the FAA maintenance tasks; nor does it provide
critical, the FAA will require a visible should pursue a separate regulatory the critical control limitations that are
means of identification. One acceptable initiative that would give official needed to assist operators when making
means of compliance in this case would recognition of the CMR’s and make future repairs and alterations to an
be to install color-coded tape at them enforceable. The commenter states aircraft.
specified intervals along critical wiring. that doing so would ‘‘fix a long-standing There would be some value in
To clarify the intent of this regulatory deficiency.’’ The advantage of changing the regulations to mandate
requirement, we have revised the such an alternative rulemaking either application of the CMR process to
wording within the rule to eliminate approach is that it would: all systems or including all systems in
reference to placards and decals. The • Keep current procedures and the Limitations Section of the ICA.
text of the final rule states only that a processes in place and avoid the However, such action is beyond the
visible means of identification must be creation of another bureaucratic scope of the current rulemaking, and
provided. approval process; would significantly delay action to
• Accomplish the FAA objective of
address fuel tank safety issues. We are
Discussion of Comments on Appendix requiring manufacturers to create an
considering tasking ARAC to address
H25.4, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Limitations section in the
this issue. If the ARAC process develops
Airworthiness Instructions for Continued
an improved proposal, amendment of
Airworthiness similar to that approved
Request To Mandate Certification the regulations to adopt an alternative to
under § 25.571 for structure; and
Maintenance Requirements Instead of • Eliminate the need to enforce the actions required by this final rule
Appendix mandatory inspection or other can be made at that time.
One commenter opposes the proposed procedures via § 25.981(b). Discussion of Comments on Operating
Appendix H25.4(a)(2), which would Similarly, another commenter Rules
require revising the Instructions for believes that the FAA should formally
Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to set recognize the CMR concept in the Request To Revise Maintenance
forth each mandatory replacement time, proposed rule. This commenter states Operations Requirements
inspection interval, related inspection that in doing so, the concept of One commenter agrees in principle
procedure, and all critical design declaring ‘‘critical configuration control with the intent of the proposed changes
configuration control limitations limitations,’’ as proposed in § 25.981(b), to §§ 91.410, 121.370, and 125.248, and
approved under § 25.981 for the fuel would be unnecessary. The commenter supports the concept of reviewing and
tank system. The commenter considers recommends the rule be revised to allow revising, if necessary, the fuel tank
that singling out just the fuel system for use of the Certification Maintenance system maintenance and inspection
this requirement is not justified because Coordination Committee (CMCC) program. However, the commenter
all systems have their own criticalities process, as described in AC 25–19 disagrees with the FAA’s proposed

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methodology and time frame for Based on this suggested alternative, • For approval of the individual
fulfilling this intent. the commenter requests that the rule be operator’s maintenance program, ‘‘the
As for the FAA’s methodology, the revised to delete the proposed Administrator’’ is the Principal
commenter opposes mandating changes § § 91.410, 121.370, and 125.248. Maintenance Inspector (PMI).
to maintenance programs via operations FAA’s Response: The FAA does not FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs
rules. Instead, the commenter requests concur with this commenter. First, the that clarification is necessary. Part 1 of
that mandatory maintenance tasks be MRB process is not a means to mandate 14 CFR does define the Administrator to
introduced using current industry compliance; it is a means to identify include those delegated the authority to
practices, such as the use of the manufacturers’ recommended minimum act on her behalf. However, in the case
Maintenance Review Board (MRB) initial scheduled inspection and of this rule, we have determined that the
process and MSG guidelines. The maintenance tasks for new aircraft. cognizant ACO is the appropriate entity
commenter states that the inspection Further, in light of service history that can address the myriad of technical
programs developed using these regarding fuel tank events, it is apparent and practical issues faced by
processes are based on a foundation of that the MRB using the MSG–3 process implementing and enforcing compliance
information derived from various has previously been unable to develop with this rule. As discussed elsewhere,
sources using a defined process. adequate maintenance procedures to neither the PMI nor the MRB process is
Further, the commenter states that the address various fuel tank safety issues. authorized to perform these duties. The
manufacturers’ recommended Second, for the reasons discussed final rule has been revised to
maintenance and inspection programs previously, the FAA does not agree that specifically reference the cognizant
already serve as the basis for developing changing the current approach to CMR’s ACO, or office of the Transport Airplane
operators’ individual maintenance and is appropriate in this rulemaking. Third, Directorate, as the appropriate official
inspection programs. Within these while AD’s are enforceable, they for approving the initial and any
established programs, safety issues are generally are limited to safety issues of revisions of the instructions for
identified and addressed at both the specific aircraft models. As discussed in maintenance and inspection of the fuel
type certification and continued- the preamble to the notice and tank systems required by the rule.
airworthiness levels. The FAA has previously in this final rule, there is no
internal processes for managing the advantage in addressing this industry- Request for Extension of Compliance
approval of manufacturer-developed wide safety issue in a piecemeal Time
maintenance and inspections programs, fashion. We anticipate that in Several commenters request that the
safety tasks, and the final individual- complying with this rule both designers proposed compliance time for the
operator maintenance and inspection and operators will take advantage of required actions of § § 91.410, 121.320,
programs. many of the methods developed in 125.248, and 129.14 be extended. These
However, the commenter maintains existing cooperative programs noted by commenters state that incorporating the
that it appears that the proposed the commenter. new instructions into maintenance and
requirements will ‘‘dissolve’’ this inspection programs cannot possibly be
existing process only to require meeting Request for Definition of
‘‘Administrator’’ accomplished within 18 months as
a calendar deadline. The commenter would be provided by the proposal.
does not consider that this will lead to One commenter requests clarification These commenters request a minimum
a safety enhancement. of the term ‘‘the Administrator,’’ as it is compliance time of 54 months.
This commenter suggests the used in proposed § § 91.410, 121.320, FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs
following alternative for implementing a 125.248, and 129.14. The commenter that the compliance time can be
new or revised maintenance program: interprets the term ‘‘Administrator’’ to extended somewhat. As discussed
First, the fuel tank system mean ‘‘the Federal Aviation previously in this preamble, we have
maintenance programs should be Administration or any person to whom revised the compliance time to 36
reexamined in context both with the he has delegated his authority in the months.
results of the required SFAR safety matter concerned.’’ This is consistent
review and with the existing MRB and with the definition of the term that Request To Issue Airworthiness
other mandated programs [such as the appears in 14 CFR part 1 (§ 1.1). Directives To Change Maintenance
Corrosion Protection Control Program The commenter objects to the Programs Instead of Operating Rules
(CPCP) and Supplemental Structural inconsistent definition that appeared in One commenter disagrees with the
Inspection Program (SSID)]. the proposal that identified ‘‘the proposed requirement to change
Second, the approval process Administrator’’ as ‘‘the manager of the operators’ maintenance programs
described in AC 25–19, ‘‘Certification cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification through changes to the operating
Maintenance Requirements (CMR),’’ Office (ACO).’’ Instead, the commenter requirements. The commenter suggests
should be used, as appropriate, to requests that the FAA revise the that the FAA mandate such
determine the task classification, proposed rule to reflect the formalized, maintenance actions via Airworthiness
interval, and method of task industry-recognized roles of other Directives specific to each model type,
transmission (for example, via service authority entities, such as the PMI and rather than by modifying the operational
bulletins or via the existing program the MRB process. Specifically, the rules. The AD’s will allow both the FAA
update process). commenter requests the following and the industry to:
Third, the FAA should mandate via revision: • Assess the actual impact of the
AD’s the service bulletins or program • For approval of the development of maintenance program (cost versus
interval changes developed as an the designer’s maintenance and benefit);
outcome of this process. This way, any inspection program, ‘‘the • Ensure that the appropriate
changes in maintenance and inspection Administrator’’ is the FAA ACO, the compliance time scale is mandated
programs can be communicated to FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG), versus the effective date of the rule and
operators in an approved format that is or the non-U.S. airworthiness authority the resources available; and
compatible with the aircraft certification (if the FAA ACO has delegated its • Ensure that foreign authorities and
basis. authority via a bilateral agreement). operators are notified of the mandatory

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continuing-airworthiness information timeframe within which the design mitigation, potentially allowing
via a recognized document (ICAO approval holders and the public can be designers to assume the absence of a
obligation, Annex 8, paragraph 4.2.2). confident that fuel tank safety issues on flammable ullage under certain
Similarly, another commenter states the affected airplanes will be uniformly conditions.’’ This commenter considers
that the proposed operating rule examined. that that affordable technology is remote
changes are not needed. This This rule ensures that the designer and, therefore, it should be made clear
commenter asserts that, if the completes a comprehensive assessment that the design philosophy behind the
instructions for maintenance and of the fuel tank system and develops proposed § 25.981 has firmly retained
inspections are developed through the any required inspections, maintenance the assumption of flammable ullage.
MSG–3 process, there is no need to instructions, and modifications, if FAA’s Response: As noted by the
include them in the Airworthiness needed. As such, the requirements of commenter, we affirmed that we are not
Limitation section, as would be required this final rule are intended to provide considering a change to the current
by the proposed rule. If they should be maintenance requirements that will philosophy of assuming a flammable
mandatory, then the FAA should prevent unsafe conditions from ullage. However, if technological
mandate them by AD’s. developing. This proactive approach changes are developed, such as full-time
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not provides predictability and efficiency. fuel tank inerting, and prove to be a
concur with either of these commenters. superior method of eliminating the risk
As discussed in the notice and Discussion of Comments on of fuel tank ignition, the FAA could
elsewhere in this final rule, we will Flammability Minimization— consider a change in this philosophy in
issue AD’s to mandate any design § 25.981(c) future rulemaking.
changes identified as needed as a result General Agreement With Reducing
of the design review required by the Request To Mandate Means to
Flammability Preventing Flammable Vapors—Inerting
SFAR established by this final rule.
However, the FAA considers it All comments received support the Several commenters suggest that
inappropriate to delay requiring overall goal of reducing fuel tank flammable vapors in the fuel tank
implementation of the maintenance flammability. Several commenters should be prevented and that practical
programs developed as a result of the strongly support the FAA’s position technologies currently exist that should
SFAR. It is evident that existing that, despite compliance with the be mandated. One commenter suggests
maintenance programs are generally proposed flammability reduction that even with § 25.981(c) in place,
inadequate to ensure the safety of fuel portion of the rule, the applicant must circumstances might occur
tanks systems and that program ensure compliance with the ignition operationally in which even an
improvements are necessary. As source prevention requirements. unheated wing tank has a flammable
reflected in the regulatory evaluation Other commenters support the ullage with a relatively low ignition
prepared for this rulemaking, this proposed rule, but suggest other energy threshold, and that these
approach has been found to be cost alternatives. For example, one conditions may warrant attention
effective. commenter asks the FAA to consider through amending the rule to further
As discussed previously, we have increasing the scope of the proposal to reduce flammability in the future.
carefully considered the first minimize fuel tank flammability to FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
commenters’ concerns regarding totally preventing operation of fuel concur that mandating fuel tank inerting
compliance times, and have extended tanks with flammable vapors. Similarly, technology has been shown to be
the times to address those concerns. another commenter requests that the feasible at this time. This was discussed
Finally, foreign authorities have been applicability of the proposal be in detail in the preamble to the notice.
fully informed of the FAA’s activities, increased so that the flammability of We are continuing to evaluate further
and we will continue to include foreign vapors in certain in-service airplanes safety improvements, and are
authorities in future discussions of these would be reduced. Other commenters conducting research and development
issues. suggest the FAA mandate the to investigate the feasibility of
Unlike AD’s, the operating rule installation of means to mitigate the incorporating nitrogen inerting on both
changes adopted by this final rule do effects of fuel tank ignition, such as in-service and new type design
not require the adoption of particular metal foils or polyurethane foam should airplanes. As noted previously in this
programs developed by design approval be mandated. Each of these proposals is preamble, we tasked the ARAC on July
holders. Rather, the rules require discussed below. 14, 2000 (65 FR 43800), to evaluate both
adoption of programs that meet the on-board and ground-based fuel tank
Request To Retain Assumption of
objective of providing an acceptable inerting systems. If further improvement
Flammable Ullage
level of safety for fuel tank systems. is found to be practicable, we may
While the programs developed by Several commenters recognize that consider initiating further rulemaking to
design approval holders will provide a fuel system design has been based on address such improvements. In the
foundation for operators’ programs, the the assumption that the ullage fuel/air meantime, this final rule requires a
individual operator is responsible to mixture is always flammable. However, means to minimize flammability or a
ensure that its programs address the these commenters express concern that means to mitigate the effects of ignition.
actual configurations of its fuel tank the proposal to require minimization of As a performance-based regulation, this
systems. fuel tank flammability could result in a allows the use of any effective,
In the preamble of the notice, we also relaxation of the requirements for approved means, but does not require
discussed use of a SFAR and changes to precluding ignition sources within the the use of any one particular means.
the operating rules, instead of AD’s, as fuel tanks. One commenter asserts that
the primary means of achieving the the FAA has retained this assumption Request To Revise Proposed
regulatory objective. As we stated, we for now, but ‘‘seems to indicate a Flammability Standard
consider that an SFAR provides a means willingness to eventually entertain One commenter believes that the
for the FAA to establish clear designs that would rely more on ARAC report referenced in the preamble
expectations and standards, as well as a flammability minimization and to the notice is flawed in its logic,

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which arrived at a suggested exposure In the context of this rule, ’minimize’ FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
time to explosive conditions not to means to incorporate practicable design agree with either the commenter’s
exceed ‘‘7 percent’’ of fleet operating methods to reduce the likelihood of proposal to delay the rule relating to
flammable vapors.
time. This recommendation was based fuel tank flammability or the
on comparison of the incident rate of ‘‘Practicable design methods’’ are commenter’s proposed regulatory text.
fuel tank explosions and ignition events feasible means, such as transferring heat The proposal offered by the commenter
for center tanks to that for wing tanks. from the fuel tank (e.g., use of would require only that a ‘‘means to
The commenter states that, due to ventilation or cooling air). We have reduce heating of fuel tanks by adjacent
operating procedures, the wing tanks are provided further guidance in AC systems shall be provided * * *’’ The
seldom empty and are not located near 25.981–2, which describes how proposed text suggested by the comment
any heat sources. While wing tank demonstrating that the flammability of does not require any measurable
vapors may be explosive when taxiing the fuel tank is equivalent to that of an reduction in flammability, which is the
on a hot runway for extended periods, unheated wing fuel tank would be one objective of this rulemaking. For
they are never as explosive as are those acceptable means of showing example, under the commenter’s
that often exist in empty center tanks. compliance. As with all new suggested standard, if a fuel tank
The most serious situation for wing fuel performance based standards, it will be initially contains a flammable fuel-air
tanks would be when the airplane lands necessary for the Transport Airplane mixture, a ‘‘means to reduce heating of
on a hot runway with nearly empty Directorate to participate in the review the tank’’ may reduce the temperature of
tanks. However, taxi time at landing is of proposed means of compliance to the fuel, but not necessarily to the
usually short. At takeoff, even with a ensure standardization. extent that the temperature would
long taxi, the wing tanks will be nearly Request That Rule Based on remain below the flammable range for
full with relatively cool fuel. The Flammability Be Delayed Until the duration of the flight.
commenter concludes that to have Standard Is Established The commenter asserts that there is
comparable safety margins for center no standard for assessing flammability
tanks as for wing tanks, the degree of One commenter representing of airplane fuel tanks. However,
explosiveness would have to be manufacturers and operators agrees in industry members represented by the
equivalent. principle with the FAA’s overall intent commenter were members of the ARAC
to enhance the fuel system safety of group that recommended that the
Another commenter asserts that the
future aircraft designs through measures regulatory text mandate a maximum fuel
proposed flammability requirement is
to reduce fuel tank flammability tank flammability of 7 percent of the
not sufficiently detailed to ensure that
exposure. The commenter agrees that operating time. The ARAC report
compliance can be achieved without
action should be taken, as identified by provides numerous calculations of fuel
having to resort to external guidance,
the ARAC Fuel Tank Harmonization tank flammability that were conducted
not published in the rule. The
Working Group, ‘‘to address by industry representatives. We are
commenter is concerned that the
flammability mitigation as a new layer confident that industry is capable of
proposed rule text is sufficiently vague
of protection to the fuel system.’’ assessing fuel tank flammability, and we
to promote lack of standardization in
However, the commenter disagrees with have provided guidance in AC 25.981–
findings of compliance with the
the proposed § 25.981(c) that would 2, which defines methods of
regulation. Although relevant material is
require minimization of fuel tank demonstrating compliance with the
available in the associated AC 25.981–
flammability, because ‘‘there is not an flammability requirements of the rule.
2, the commenter is aware that guidance
agreed-to definitive industry standard One method described in the AC for
in the AC is not mandatory and is
for assessing flammability of aircraft showing compliance is to demonstrate
concerned that the wording of the rule
fuel tanks.’’ that the flammability of the tank is equal
essentially requires an interpretation of In light of this, the commenter
‘‘minimize flammability’’ from the to or less than that of an unheated wing
requests that a rule based on
relevant AC. tank on the airplane type. As discussed
flammability be delayed until a standard
FAA’s Response: The FAA considers previously, § 25.981(c) has been
is defined. In its place, the commenter
that additional clarification is necessary. clarified by adding a definition of
recommends a new rule that would
As for the first comment, the ARAC ‘‘minimize.’’ For applicants who are
accomplish some degree of flammability
recommendation of a 7 percent unable to demonstrate equivalent
reduction, even though a definitive
flammability standard did not provide flammability to an unheated wing tank,
flammability standard does not exist.
an equivalent level of flammability to the use of ‘‘practicable design methods,’’
The commenter suggests that the new
that of the wing (main) tanks, which the such as transferring heat from the fuel
rule should require practical measures
ARAC determined were the tanks with tank, will be required. The final rule is
to reduce heat transfer from adjacent
an acceptable level of fuel tank safety in adopted with the change noted.
heat sources into fuel tanks, and
relation to ignition or explosion events. proposes the following text for the rule: Request Not To Mandate Fuel Tank
The ARAC calculated a range of 3 to 5 Flammability to the Level Proposed
§ 25.981(c):
percent for wing tanks. We considered If systems adjacent to fuel tanks could
this concern when developing the The commenter does not agree with
cause significant heat transfer to the tanks:
regulatory text for this rule, and this is (1) Means to reduce heating of fuel tanks
the FAA’s statement in the preamble to
why the proposal requires flammability by adjacent systems shall be provided; or (2) the notice that read:
to be ‘‘minimized’’ rather than accepting Equivalent flammability reduction means ‘‘* * * the intent of the proposal is to
the ARAC recommendation of 7 percent. shall be provided to offset flammability require that fuel tanks are not heated, and
In response to the second commenter, increases that would otherwise result from cool at a rate equivalent to that of a wing tank
heating; or in the transport airplane being evaluated.’’
we consider it appropriate to further (3) Means to mitigate the effects of an
clarify the intent of the rule by ignition of fuel vapors within fuel tanks shall For example, directed ventilation
incorporating a definition of the term be provided such that no damage caused by systems may reduce heating of adjacent
‘‘minimize’’ in the text of § 25.981(c), as an ignition will prevent continued safe flight fuel tanks, but they do not eliminate
follows: and landing. heating. Furthermore, the commenter

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asserts that there should not be a The commenter adds that, if an time is needed to perform the in-depth
requirement to ‘‘cool at a rate equivalent unheated wing fuel tank does not exist research and economic evaluations
to that of a wing tank.’’ The studies on a particular design, then one could necessary to determine if certain
conducted by the ARAC Fuel Tank be modeled and used as the reference technologies that could reduce or
Harmonization Working Group did not standard for all tanks on that design. eliminate fuel tank flammability would
conclude that such a requirement was The second commenter recommends be practical for use on the existing fleet
necessary or achievable. The commenter that the FAA consider an alternative to of transport airplanes. As noted
requests that the FAA not mandate have the applicant determine an previously, we also are studying
minimizing fuel tank flammability to acceptable heat transfer rate at a critical concepts such as ventilating spaces
the level proposed in the notice, fuel load, rather than determining if a adjacent to fuel tanks, and recently
because it would not be practical to cool temperature limitation is exceeded, tasked the ARAC to evaluate inerting
tanks within the fuselage to the same given that the tank ullage is considered systems for possible retrofit into the
level as tanks located in the wing. flammable. This would alleviate the existing transport fleet. We will
FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees. difficulties of working with a high consider initiating additional
The rule only affects new type designs. number of parameters inherent in the rulemaking if further improvements are
Therefore, possible design numerous aircraft types and conditions found to be effective and practicable.
considerations to comply with the rule (including the effects of pumping,
vibration, altitude, fuel load, etc.) by Request To Ban Use of Low Flash Point
would include: Fuels
• Locating heat sources away from considering a generic installation.
fuel tanks; FAA’s Response: The FAA does not Several commenters suggest that the
• Introduction of cool air from agree with either commenter. use of lower flash point fuels, such as
outside sources into air gaps between Minimizing flammability is the ultimate JP–4 or Jet B, should be disallowed
heat sources and fuel tanks to transfer objective of the rule. We considered because these fuels cause a much greater
heat from tanks while inflight; and many options when establishing the exposure to flammable vapors. One
• Introducing cool air from ground or regulatory text, and determined that a commenter notes that while it appears
airplane sources during ground performance-based rule is most that these fuels are no longer commonly
operations. appropriate because it allows the used, they may still exist as approved
Some of these features are already designer to control fuel tank alternative fuels for several transport
incorporated into certain models of the flammability by using any number of aircraft. If any operators routinely use
transport fleet. These methods are methods. It also allows the use of new Jet B or JP–4 type fuel, then their risk
technically feasible and could provide technology designs that may be would be much greater than the risk for
an equivalent level of exposure to developed in the future. On the other operators using Jet A.
operation with flammable vapors to that hand, the commenters’ proposals focus FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that
of unheated wing fuel tanks—the fuel only on heat balance and heat transfer, use of lower flash point fuels increases
tanks with a safety level that the ARAC rather than flammability. Their the exposure to operation with
defined as an acceptable standard. The proposals would not allow the designer flammable fuels in the fuel tank. In fact,
commenter provided no data to support the flexibility to introduce other means this rule does require consideration of
the assertion that ‘‘it would not be of reducing flammability, other than fuel type. The limited use of these fuels
practical to cool tanks within the controlling heating/cooling of the tank, on a temporary basis to allow operation
fuselage to the same level as tanks such as with nitrogen inerting. Further, from remote airports is discussed in AC
located in the wing.’’ the commenters’ proposals would not 25.981–2. The FAA does not agree that
significantly simplify the compliance use of these fuels should be banned for
Request To Provide Alternatives to demonstration over that of the options in-service airplanes. Data available
Minimizing Flammability described in AC 25.981–2X. In light of indicates that these fuels are not
Two commenters request that this, the commenters’ proposals are not routinely used in U.S. operations.
alternative regulatory text be included accepted. However, in some cases, airplanes may
in the proposed rule concerning the divert into locations where JP–4 fuel is
Request To Require Retroactive the only fuel available. Use of this fuel
requirement to minimize flammability.
The first commenter believes that the Reduction in Flammability on a temporary basis allows
FAA’s intent, as stated in the preamble One commenter states that the designs continuation of the flight without
to the notice and restated in draft AC of some in-service airplanes have shown requiring tankering of Jet A fuel to a
25.981–2X, is ‘‘to require that the undesirable characteristics. Because the remote alternate airport and the
exposure to formation or presence of proposed flammability requirements associated delays and inconvenience to
flammable vapors is equivalent to that would only affect new airplane type the flying public. If use of lower flash
of an unheated wing tank in the designs, this commenter seeks insurance point fuels increases due to market
transport airplane being evaluated.’’ The from the FAA that older and current conditions, the FAA will consider
commenter considers this a reasonable designs also will be assessed, and rulemaking to limit their use.
objective. The commenter recommends suggests a case-by-case approach.
FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that Request To Require Use of Means To
that the FAA reword the proposed rule
some in-service airplanes have Prevent Fire Within Fuel Tank
text to clearly frame the intent within
the rule itself, and believes that the undesirable levels of fuel tank Several commenters request that the
wording would be more specific and flammability. To address this issue, we FAA revise § 25.981(c)(2) to require the
less prone to misinterpretation if it tasked the ARAC in 1998 to provide use of specific means to address the
contained the following statement: advice and recommendations on requirement to mitigate the effect of an
A means must be provided to ensure that
methods that could eliminate or ignition of fuel vapors within the fuel
the net heat balance within any tank will be significantly reduce the exposure of tanks. Some of the commenters’
equivalent to that of an unheated wing fuel transport airplane fuel tanks to suggestions include flame quenching
tank during any portion of the passenger flammable vapors. Our review of the metallic foils and polyurethane foam.
carrying operation. ARAC report indicates that additional These commenters state that such

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technologies as these are available and We agree with the commenter that our evaluation of their effects on the fuel
consider them effective in preventing analysis had not included any Fokker tank system. We also have determined
propagation of flame or explosion Model F27 Mark 50 or Boeing Model that 325 non-fuel tank system STC
within the fuel tanks 717 airplanes in the fleet. The reason holders will each need to conduct a
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not was that the fleet data set that we used more detailed engineering review that
agree that a change to the proposed rule contained no U.S.-registered Model F27 will involve an average of 75 hours of
is necessary. As stated previously, the Mark 50 airplanes. The more recent data engineering time. The economic
final rule is a performance-based set we used for the final regulatory analysis has been revised accordingly.
regulation. As such, it may permit the evaluation also contains no U.S.-
registered Model F27 Mark 50 airplanes; Cost of Use of Proprietary Data
use of such means as those suggested by
commenters, but the rule does not thus, those airplanes are not included in One commenter raises concerns
require the use of any one particular the analysis. We did not include any regarding the costs associated with STC
means. AC 25.981–2 provides guidance Model 717 airplanes because that fleet holders obtaining data from the type
on use of these means. data was based on a 1996 listing when approval holder. The commenter points
no Model 717 airplanes had yet been out that, in the ‘‘Regulatory Evaluation’’
Discussion of Comments Concerning manufactured. The airplane data set that section of the notice, the FAA stated:
Cost of the Rule we used in the final regulatory Many STC holders would be able to
The detailed responses and the evaluation is based on 1999 data and incorporate a large portion of a TC holder’s
impacts of the comments on the costs of contains Model 717 airplanes. We also fuel tank system assessment into its
the rule are contained in the Final note that even though the 1999 fleet assessment.
Regulatory Evaluation, which is data set reported no U.S. registered
The commenter states that, in
available in the docket. The quantitative Airbus Model A321, A330, or A340
practice, the release of such proprietary
effects of the comments on the airplanes, we assumed that these
information to a third party would need
assumptions and the cost estimates are models will enter the U.S. fleet
to occur under a technical assistance
summarized in the Economic Evaluation eventually and, therefore, the costs to
review these fuel tank systems were contract. Therefore, the cost of this
discussion later in this final rule. The transaction should be added to the
following discussion is a more general included in the analysis.
We agree with the commenter that the FAA’s cost analysis.
disposition of the comments concerning FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees
the cost of the rule. analysis had not included all of the fuel
tank system STC’s. After further with this commenter. While a technical
Number of Airplanes, TC’s, and STC’s research, we discovered one fuel tank assistance contract may be needed to
Affected system STC for an Airbus airplane obtain this information, the overall cost
model, one fuel tank system STC for a to the aviation industry is not affected
One commenter notes that the FAA because the payment to the data holder
assumed that a U.S. fleet size of 6,006 Bombardier airplane model, and no fuel
tank system STC’s for Fokker or will offset some of the engineering costs
airplanes would be affected by the associated with the fuel tank system
proposed rule. While this number may Aerospatiale airplane models. The
economic analysis has been adjusted design review. As a result, the overall
have been appropriate in 1996, the cost of the rule is not affected by these
accordingly.
commenter states that by the time the contracts, although the distribution of a
We do not agree with the commenter
final rule is issued, there likely will be part of these costs will shift from certain
regarding consideration of worldwide
more than 7,000 affected airplanes. TC holders to certain STC holders.
impact of this rulemaking. The FAA is
Additionally, the commenter notes not required to account for costs to
that the number of affected type Cost of Fuel Tank System Safety Review
foreign operators not operating in the Required by SFAR
certificates counted by the FAA did not U.S. because those operators are not
include the Fokker Model F27 Mark 50 subject to these rules. One commenter disagrees with the
or the Boeing Model 717. Further, the FAA’s estimate of $14.4 million for the
FAA’s listing of fuel system STC’s was Cost of Evaluating Non-Fuel System- costs of completing the fuel tank system
incomplete; for example, there were no Related STC’s reviews required by the proposed SFAR.
fuel tank system STC’s listed for any One commenter agrees with the FAA The commenter points out that the FAA
Airbus, Fokker, Bombardier, or that only a small number of non-fuel- estimated that the review would require
Aerospatiale airplanes. system STC’s will require a system 0.5 to 2 engineering years per airplane
Finally, the commenter states that the assessment. However, the commenter model. However, the commenter
FAA’s cost estimate should take into asserts that the FAA’s analysis does not calculates the actual level of effort
account the worldwide impact that the account for the significant effort and required will be more like 2 to 4
proposed rule will have, as other associated cost that would be required engineering years for each major model.
regulatory authorities adopt identical or to determine whether or not these non- Minor model variation will add
similar rules. Thus, the true cost of this fuel system-related STC’s affect the fuel additional effort that is difficult to
activity will far exceed the cost system and thus merit further attention. quantify, but could easily increase the
associated with only the U.S. fleet. Such a determination would be required total effort by 30 to 50 percent. In
FAA’s Response: The FAA concurs under the proposed SFAR requirements. addition, the commenter states that
with the commenter that the number of FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that systems do evolve with time, leading to
airplanes in the U.S. fleet has increased the costs to determine which STC’s additional permutations that must be
since the data set used in the notice was affect the fuel tank system should be considered.
collected. As a result, we now estimate included in the economic analysis. In light of this, the commenter
that 7,875 U.S.-registered airplanes will However, we have determined that 90 believes that the basic safety reviews
undergo the fuel tank system percent of the non-fuel tank system will require two to three times more
inspections beginning in the year 2004. STC’s will need only a minimal degree effort and cost than identified by the
The economic analysis has been of engineering effort (with a resultant FAA. Accordingly, the cost of the basic
modified accordingly. minimal cost) for a qualitative design review may be in the range of

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$28 million to $52 million, plus an that have twenty or thirty operators and Cost of Safety Review of STC’s on Older
additional $14 million to account for the hundreds of operating aircraft. (They Airplanes
variations within models. commenter reports that there are only While commenters generally agree
FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that 13 Model L–188 Electras currently that the design review should apply to
the number of engineering hours to operating in the U.S.) STC’s and field modifications, several
review the fuel tank systems should be commenters express concern that the
increased but disagrees about the The commenter requests that the FAA
take into consideration the following design review will be difficult to
amount of the increase. As discussed
information when finalizing the conduct on older airplanes. In
later in more detail in the Economic
economic analysis of the proposed rule: particular, reviewing non-fuel tank
Evaluation section of this preamble, we
related STC’s and field approvals could
determined that there were two types of 1. The FAA’s cost benefit analysis
be unmanageable for airplanes with a
fuel tank system reviews: identifies an engineering effort to
• The first, which is referred to as the long service life and with multiple
perform the SFAR safety review and owners. The commenters note that the
‘‘full-scale’’ review, is the first fuel tank preparation of documents as taking from
review done for a model that has several FAA did not make any accounting in
three-quarters to three person years to the notice for the cost of addressing
series. perform. However, because the Model
• The second, which is referred to as these modifications.
L–188 Electra was certified prior to the One commenter proposes an
the ‘‘derivative’’ review, are the reviews issuance of § 25.901 and § 25.1309, the
of the other series in that model. alternative approach: A one-time
Using the Boeing Model 737–300/– SFAR safety review will require all new inspection to determine the
400/–500 as an example, we determined analysis and possibly testing to prove configuration of the airplane and to
that this model will involve one ‘‘full- that the design meets the requirement verify that wiring entering the fuel tank,
scale’’ review and two ‘‘derivative’’ for all operating conditions. The effort and systems capable of generating auto-
reviews. In addition, the fuel tank to do this will likely exceed the ignition temperature into fuel tank
system reviews performed for all maximum FAA estimate of three person structure, have not been compromised
‘‘extended range’’ series and freighter years. by STC modifications. The commenter
series are evaluated as ‘‘derivative’’ 2. Then, the time to familiarize a new asserts that such an inspection would
reviews. On that basis, we determined staff with the design, to locate pertinent require about 50 to 100 labor hours to
that, depending upon the model, it will files, to relate those files to the long perform. The resultant inspection labor
take 6 months to 4 years of engineering history of the aircraft, and to develop costs alone could amount to $28 million
time to perform a ‘‘full-scale’’ fuel tank to $52 million, depending upon the
test and compliance documents for new
system review. The FAA also number of airplanes to be inspected (for
regulations are time-consuming tasks
determined that it will take 6 months to example, 7,000 airplanes × 100 hours
that will add significant time and costs
1 year of engineering time to perform a per airplane × $70 per labor-hour). This
to the FAA’s estimates.
‘‘derivative’’ fuel tank system review. estimate does not include the cost of the
(See the commonality of design 3. If the analysis shows that the downtime (and resultant revenue loss)
discussion presented earlier in this design does not meet the newly required to accomplish such an
preamble for an engineering explanation imposed requirements, redesign will be inspection; yet the proposed compliance
why the review of a model’s series after necessary. Such redesign would time of 12 months would require
the first review will take less time than increase the expense by a factor of 3 to airplanes to be pulled from revenue
the first review.) 5, depending on the detail. It would also service for special inspection. In the
The FAA agrees that the number of increase considerably the expense to the notice, the FAA had estimated that an
fuel tank system reviews needs to be operator of installing the new design. annual increase in out-of-service time of
increased, but disagrees about the extent FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that 11.5 hours to 32 hours would occur,
of the increase. The FAA determined additional time and costs will be depending upon the model, and that
that the rule will require 46 ‘‘full-scale’’ this would result in lost net revenues of
required to review the designs on some
reviews and 52 ‘‘derivative’’ reviews. $6.4 million for a 12-month period. The
airplane types where design information
The impact on the total cost of these commenter maintains that the one-time
is not readily available. However, the
reviews is provided in the Economic inspection alternative would also
FAA does not agree that all of the work
Evaluation section of this preamble. require this much downtime.
identified by the commenter is FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees that
Cost of Safety Review of Older Type necessarily required. As discussed the costs associated with reviewing non-
Designs previously in this preamble, the FAA fuel tank-related STC’s and field
One commenter, Lockheed Martin, extended the compliance time for approvals needs to be addressed.
considers that the FAA clearly conducting the actions required by the However, we disagree with the
underestimated the costs to conduct the SFAR, which addresses the commenter as to the direction and
safety review required under the new commenter’s concern about the needed magnitude of the effort that will be
SFAR on older airplanes, such as the time. Further, the FAA increased the needed to evaluate these factors.
Lockheed Model L–188 Electra. The number of engineering years to Specifically, we agree that a ‘‘paper
commenter notes that the FAA’s complete a Model L–188 fuel tank review’’ of the airplane’s service history
economic analysis of the cost of the system design review to 4 years. will be needed for compliance. We
design review proposed in the notice is Additionally, as noted in the earlier disagree that this review will necessitate
based on a fleet-wide consideration. disposition of the comment relating to an airplane inspection that is separate
This approach results in a per-aircraft- the applicability of the SFAR, the FAA from the initial fuel tank system
cost basis that does not appear will consider the merits of exemptions inspection and that the labor hours for
unreasonable. However, the expense to to the requirements of the SFAR based any such airplane inspection have been
perform the design reviews and prepare upon the number of airplanes in service included in the labor hours to complete
service documents will be the same for and the safety benefits that could be the initial fuel tank inspection. We agree
Lockheed as for other manufacturers achieved by a safety review. that the amount of effort to complete

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this ‘‘paper review’’ will vary across airplanes), and new design change costs Cost To Comply With the SFAR
individual airplanes. Airplanes that averaged $40,000 per airplane, the total One commenter asserts that the
have been in near-continuous operation cost would be $140 million. combined cost of the safety review and
by major, national, and regional airlines The commenter acknowledges that it development of instructions may well
(the majority of the airplanes affected by is not possible to predict what effect the be $180 to $330 million, rather than the
the rule) should possess well- proposed rule would actually have on $16 million estimated by the FAA.
documented service history records the fleet, but the potential obviously FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees
such that those operators will need a exists for costs that range between $100 with the underlying assumptions made
minimal amount of time to complete the million and $200 million, or more. by the commenter to develop this
paper reviews for those airplanes. estimate. The commenter’s first
However, we realize that there will be FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees
that the cost of new design change assumption is that $100 million to $200
smaller operators that will spend more million of these costs are based on the
time to trace their airplanes’ service requirements should be included in the
cost analysis for this rule. As discussed commenter’s argument that, ‘‘Should
histories—particularly if the airplane compliance with this specific rule
has had multiple operators and owners. in the notice, new design change
requirements will be implemented require design changes broadly across
As a result, we have determined that it the fleet, the costs would be substantial.
will take an average of one engineering through the AD process, during which
the FAA will fully analyze the costs and For example, if [emphasis FAA] this
day (a cost of $880 per airplane) for an rule were to impact half the U.S. fleet
operator to complete this paper review the public will have an opportunity to
comment on the FAA’s estimates. (about 3,500 airplanes) and modification
for every airplane. costs averaged $40,000 per airplane, the
Cost of Design Changes Cost of Developing Maintenance and total cost would be $140 million. It is
Inspection Instructions not possible to predict what effect this
Several commenters raise concerns
new rule would actually have on the
about accounting for the costs of new One commenter disagrees with the fleet, but the potential obviously exists
design changes that could be required FAA’s assumption that the development for costs that range between $100
under the proposed SFAR requirements. of maintenance and inspection million and $200 million, or more.’’
One commenter representing instructions would simply be part of the [The commenter is referring to the
manufacturers and operators agrees, in required SFAR safety review. On the requirements of § 25.981(a)(3) of the
general, that any design changes contrary, this commenter states that this rule, which involve evaluating the
resulting from the safety review should work, in fact, must be done after effects of latent failures.]
be handled outside the scope of the completion of the safety review. This argument assumes that the cost
SFAR. However, there would be However, the commenter states that, if of the potential future AD’s should be
additional costs associated with one assumes that this effort represents attributed to this rule. As stated earlier,
developing the necessary design 20 to 30 percent of the effort associated we maintain that the cost of complying
changes identified by the SFAR safety with the basic safety review, then the with potential future AD’s is attributed
reviews. The commenter points out that, cost could be on the order of $10 specifically to those individual AD’s
in the notice, the FAA stated: million. when they are issued. As a result, we
* * * the design review may identify FAA’s Response: The FAA partially have determined that there are no
conditions that would be addressed by disagrees that the costs of developing compliance costs attributable to this
specific service bulletins or unsafe the maintenance instructions were not rule for any future design changes that
conditions that would result in FAA issuance
of an airworthiness directive (AD). However,
included in the cost analysis of the rule. will be accomplished through an AD.
those future costs would be the result of The estimated labor hours required for The commenter’s second assumption
compliance with the service bulletin or the the design review specifically included is that the fuel tank system review costs
AD and are not costs of compliance with the an estimate of 0.15 year to one year of will be two to three times the $16
proposed rulemaking. Those costs would be engineering time for the TC holders, and million estimated by the FAA, plus
estimated for each individual AD, when 0.1 year to 0.25 year for the fuel tank there will be an additional $14 million
proposed. system STC holders, to develop the to review the fuel tanks for the
This commenter does not consider it inspection and maintenance variations within models. As noted
appropriate for the FAA to assert that recommendations. Further, we had earlier, we disagree with the amount of
none of these costs are attributable to assumed that the design approval holder engineering time assumed by the
the proposed rulemaking. In those recommendations would have been commenter, as well as the number of
instances where new rules are created completed after the fuel tank system fuel tank reviews that will be
that go beyond existing rules— review. Nevertheless, as the proposed performed. We have recalculated the
essentially raising the current level of compliance time was 1 year, the fact estimated compliance cost and
safety—the cost of any design change that developing the recommendations determined that it will be about $30
driven by these new rules should be after completing the fuel tank system million.
considered as part of the total cost of the review had no effect on the present Finally, the commenter assumes that
rule. value of the estimated costs because all each airplane will need a one-time
The commenter points to of the expenditures would have inspection to verify that previous
§ 25.981(a)(3) as such a rule that occurred in the first year. This is not the airplane modifications have not
proposes new, more-stringent case for the 18-month compliance time compromised the wiring entering the
requirements associated with evaluating provided in the final rule. We have fuel tank and entering the systems
the effects of latent failures. Should determined that all of the engineering capable of generating autoignition
compliance with this specific rule costs to develop the recommendations temperatures into fuel tank structure.
require design changes broadly across will occur during the second year after The commenter estimates this will cost
the fleet, the costs would be substantial. the effective date of the rule. We have $28 million to $52 million for labor, and
For example, if this rule were to affect included those costs in the final $6.4 million for lost net revenue due to
half the U.S. fleet (about 3,500 economic analysis. out-of-service time. As noted earlier, we

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agree that an individual airplane review associated with this should be of components (e.g., pumps). The
will be needed, but we disagree in that considered in the rule. Also, the costs of commenter notes that the FAA did not
the labor hours have been included as preparing tanks for entry should be consider either of these possibilities in
part of the labor hours to perform the considered. the cost analysis; however, the
initial fuel tank system inspection. We FAA’s Response: The FAA agrees magnitude of the cost impact could
have, however, calculated a $5.5 million with the first commenter. Assuming the extend into the billions of dollars.
cost for a ‘‘paper review’’ of every commenter’s airplanes were FAA’s Response: The FAA does not
airplane’s service history. manufactured between 1960 and 1980, concur. The conclusion of this
Based on these figures, we conclude we calculated that the initial fuel tank commenter that the costs of compliance
that the costs to comply with the SFAR system inspection, plus the two with § 25.981(a)(3) ‘‘could extend into
will be $35.5 million. (More details reinspections that will occur during a the billions of dollars’’ is based upon an
concerning these costs are explained 12-year period, will result in a total assumption concerning the impact of
later in this preamble.) number of 330 labor hours per airplane. the requirement. The example provided
We disagree with the second by the commenter, which assumes that
Cost of Operating Rule Changes commenter. The commenter states that the requirement limits the probability of
One commenter agrees with the 60 percent of the initial fuel tank system latent failure to less than 1×10¥7,
statement in the notice that read: inspections will be performed during a indicates a misinterpretation of the
The FAA intends that any additional fuel
‘‘C’’ check , which will require that the requirement. The rule does not allow a
tank system inspection and maintenance fuel tank be opened, drained, and single failure to hazard the airplane,
actions resulting from the SFAR review vented. We included these costs in the regardless of the probability of its
would occur during an airplane’s regularly number of labor hours for the initial occurrence. The FAA expects that
scheduled major maintenance checks. From inspection, which are twice the number designs that have single failures that can
a safety standpoint, repeated entry increases of labor hours for the later reinspections result in an ignition source will be
the risk of damage to the airplane. Thus, the that will be performed during ‘‘D’’ modified to include fail-safe features.
proposal would not require air carriers to checks. Further, we included a value for Modifications may also be necessary to
alter their maintenance schedules, and the the lost net revenue to the aviation address combinations of failures. If a
FAA anticipates that few or no airplanes system as a result of the additional
would be taken out of service solely to
fuel tank system is designed such that
comply with the proposal unless an
number of out-of-service days (from one the safety level is heavily dominated by
immediate safety concern is identified. to three days) for the initial fuel tank one of the components or features in the
system inspections performed during combinations of failures, then added
This commenter strongly recommends the ‘‘C’’ check. inspections, hard-timing, or installation
that the FAA ensure that the final rule of annunciation features to eliminate
does not penalize the industry by Cost of Complying With New Method of
Addressing Latent Failures latency are exactly what was intended
requiring inspection intervals more by the regulation. The need for
frequent than truly necessary, or lead to One commenter states that the new inspections and hard-timing can be
unnecessary hard-timing of (placing life- treatment of latent failures (to maintain limited by providing redundancy and
limits on) components. the probability of occurrence of a given fail-safe features and/or by eliminating
FAA’s Response: The FAA responds latent failure to less than 1×10¥7), as latency. Therefore, inspection or
to this commenter by reiterating that the would be required by § 25.981(a)(3), will replacement of components at the rate
intent is to have the maintenance and lead to enormous costs with no noted by the commenter would not be
inspections generated by this rule be attendant benefit. As an example, a required.
developed so that the tasks can be component with a latent failure rate of The FAA position is supported by
performed during regularly scheduled 1 × 10¥9 per flight-hour would have to another commenter who provided
maintenance. be inspected (or hard-timed) every 100 information regarding transient
hours (or 200 hours, if an average suppression units (TSU) developed for
Cost of Inspections
exposure time is assumed to be T/2) to the Boeing Model 737 and 747
One commenter disagrees with the keep the probability of failure under airplanes. The commenter states, ‘‘The
number of hours that the FAA estimated 1×10¥7. A component failure rate of TSU eliminates the need to inspect
would be required to conduct the added 1×10¥8 per flight-hour would require harnesses, probe terminations, etc. The
inspections required by the rule. The inspection every day (10 hours). The TSU itself would be subject to periodic
commenter calculates that the metric commenter asserts that the benefit (25,000 hours) inspections.’’ It should
will be 300 to 500 labor hours per derived from performing such be noted that heavy maintenance checks
airplane every 9 to 11 years, plus any inspections or hard-timing is nil, and typically occur on transport airplane
parts replacement costs yet to be the implications of such a rule are self- models prior to accumulating 25,000
defined by the manufacturer. evident. hours time in service; therefore, the cost
Another commenter suggests that the Further, this commenter points out of inspections for the TSU units would
cost analysis needs to be adjusted to that the FAA’s cost estimate for the be low.
address in-tank inspections. The operational rule changes is $154 million The speculation by the commenter
commenter asserts that the FAA over 10 years, and that is based upon that ‘‘the magnitude of the cost impact
assumes that much of the in-tank the assumption that the required could extend into the billions of
inspection work will be accomplished maintenance and inspection programs dollars’’ is based on a misunderstanding
during heavy maintenance checks when will coincide with an airplane’s of the final rule and, therefore, was not
the tanks are open and purged. regularly scheduled major maintenance considered in the final economic
However, for some aircraft, the tanks are checks. However, the commenter states analysis.
opened only once every eight years for that the situation described above
scheduled maintenance. Therefore, if in- would result in numerous inspections Costs of New Modifications
tank inspections are mandated, some that would not align with these One commenter expresses concern
aircraft will have to be removed from regularly scheduled checks. In addition, that the cost analysis is ‘‘greatly flawed’’
scheduled service and the costs it could lead to widespread hard-timing because it did not consider all the costs

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that will result from the requirements of with redundancy and fault indications because compliance with the proposed
the SFAR, such as high cost items like features such that single component change would be done during the design
aircraft modifications and ‘‘hard timing’’ failures do not result in any significant phase of the airplane model before any new
airplanes would be manufactured.
of components. The cost analysis takes reduction in safety. Therefore, fuel tank
credit for the benefits that will result systems historically have not had any The commenter considers that the
from these modifications; however, the life-limited components or specific FAA’s assumption is incorrect.
commenter considers that the costs detailed inspection requirements unless Proposed § 25.981(c)(1) would require
should be included as well. mandated by AD.’’ We agree that some that the fuel tank installation include ‘‘a
As an example of the potential costs past design practices have been means to minimize the development of
of modifications, this commenter deficient and that adding the specific flammable vapors in the fuel tanks.’’
provided the following specific requirement in § 25.981(a)(3) to address Moreover, the FAA states that it intends
information concerning how the latent failures may require new design that the body tanks ‘‘cool at a rate
proposal would affect its fleet of features for existing airplanes. We also equivalent to that of a wing tank.’’
airplanes: The commenter owns agree with the commenter that The commenter asserts that, based on
approximately 160 Boeing Model 727 modifications to the FQIS and/or any this requirement, the cost impact to
airplanes. As a result of the proposed other wiring entering the fuel tank future airplane designs could be
SFAR safety review, some of the system may be required (such as substantial. As an example, the
modifications that might be mandated separation and shielding of FQIS wiring commenter presents a preliminary cost
for these airplanes are: or, for older airplanes, installation of assessment of a directed ventilation
• Replacement of the analog FQIS transient suppression devices). We do system, below. The commenter derived
with a digital FQIS; not agree that the rule would mandate the cost estimates from a report
• Installation of current suppression replacement of analog FQIS with digital prepared by an ARAC working group
devices; systems, although this may be one (Fuel Tank Harmonization Working
• Installation of flame arrestors; and method used on certain portions of the Group). These fuel tank cooling cost
• Possibly, replacement of fuel boost fleet. However, because correcting those estimates are divided into the categories
pumps. design deficiencies will be indicated. The analysis considers the
The cost of these modifications alone, accomplished through the AD process, costs associated with small, medium,
based on data received from the those compliance costs will be and large airplane designs. (It should be
equipment manufacturers, is estimated when the relevant AD is noted that directed ventilation systems
approximately $125,000 per airplane. proposed. of the type evaluated would not cool a
Since some of the commenter’s The SFAR does not require center wing tank at a rate equivalent to
airplanes already have a FQIS installed, installation of flame arrestors in fuel that of a wing tank.)
the cost to modify the commenter’s fleet tank vents. We have initiated tasking an 1. Development costs per airplane
would be approximately $17,000,000. ARAC group to provide design = $2.8 million.
This figure does not include other recommendations addressing both a part
modifications that might be mandated 2. Installation costs per production
25 amendment and retroactive
for the airplanes. The commenter points airplane = $21,200.
operational requirement for installation
out that this is the modification cost for 3. Additional airplane operational costs
of flame arrestors in fuel tank vent
only one aircraft type for one airline. If per airplane per year:
outlets. If any rulemaking is
all costs for all U.S. registered aircraft subsequently proposed based on the • Small airplane = $30,408.
were to be included, the result would be recommendations, the FAA will • Medium airplane = $39,295.
far greater than the total indicated in conduct separate economic analyses for • Large airplane = $50,518.
FAA’s cost analysis presented in the those proposals. Using these numbers, a simple
notice. calculation may be performed to
FAA’s Response: The FAA does not Cost of Changes to Part 25 on Future estimate the recurring costs associated
agree that the cost analysis concerning Designs with such a system over a 10-year
possible modifications was flawed. One commenter disagrees with the period. These costs would consist of the
Section 25.901(b)(2) requires that the FAA’s cost analysis regarding the affects installation costs per production
‘‘Components of the installation must be of changes to part 25 requiring airplane and the additional operational
constructed, arranged and installed so ‘‘minimizing flammability.’’ This costs per airplane per year, applied to a
as to ensure their continued safe commenter points to a statement in the fleet of a new airplane design with an
operation between normal inspections notice that read: assumed production rate. The following
and or overhauls.’’ As stated in the The FAA anticipates that the proposed part table presents the results of this simple
notice, ‘‘Typical transport category 25 change would have minimal effect on the estimate for a 10-year period (ignoring
airplane fuel tank systems are designed cost of future type certificated airplanes inflation, cost of capital, and so on):

Annual produc- Operational

Size Production cost Total cost
tion rate cost

Small ........................................................................................................ 180 $38,160,000 $301,039,200 $339,199,200

Medium .................................................................................................... 72 15,264,000 155,608,200 170,872,200
Large ........................................................................................................ 60 15,264,000 129,673,500 144,937,500

Although the above example is are indeed substantial, even if the initial of the final rule should result in very
simplistic in nature, the commenter developmental costs are not. little increased production costs. Certain
maintains that the conclusion may be FAA’s Response: The FAA disagrees airplane models in production today
drawn that the overall potential costs with the commenter. The requirements locate sources of heat away from the

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center wing fuel tanks. Other models International Compatibility • Back Aviation Solutions (Fleet PC,
locate the air conditioning packs below In keeping with U.S. obligations Version 4.0);
the center wing fuel tank, but under the Convention on International • Information from service bulletins;
incorporate air gaps that are ventilated Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to and
such that heat transfer into the center comply with International Civil • FAA discussions with industry
wing tank is significantly reduced. Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards engineers.
Other airplane models incorporate and Recommended Practices to the Affected Airplanes and Aviation Sectors
directed ventilation means for areas maximum extent practicable. The FAA
below the heated center wing tanks. In the notice, the FAA, using 1996
determined that there are no ICAO
The FAA does not agree with the cost data, estimated that the proposal would
Standards and Recommended Practices
assessment provided by the commenter. have affected 6,006 airplanes. Of this
that correspond to these regulations.
The cost estimate referenced by the number:
commenter is stated to apply to ‘‘present Economic Evaluation, Regulatory • 5,700 airplanes were operated by
airplane designs.’’ It assumes that the Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 114 air carriers under part 121 service,
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates • 193 airplanes were operated by 7
environmental control system (ECS)
Assessment carriers that operated under both part
packs will be located adjacent to the
Changes to Federal regulations must 121 and part 135,
center wing tank, and that heat shields
undergo several economic analyses. • 22 airplanes were operated by 10
and ventilation air would be used to
First, Executive Order 12866 directs carriers under part 125 service, and
remove heat from the center wing fuel
each Federal agency to propose or adopt • 91 airplanes were operated by 23
tank. This approach results in added
a regulation only if the agency makes a carriers operating U.S.-registered
weight and drag penalties. New designs
reasoned determination that the benefits airplanes under part 129.
allow the designer numerous options to At that time, the FAA did not have
achieve an optimized design. Air of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility information on airplanes operating
conditioning equipment can, and has under part 91 that would have been
been, located away from fuel tanks. Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze
the economic impact of regulatory affected by the proposal; however, the
Cooling air is available from the ECS FAA had stated its belief that very few
system, ground sources and outside air changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. airplanes operating under part 91 would
in flight. Incorporation of these features have been affected by the proposal.
in the initial design would result in section 2531–2533) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create The FAA also estimated that the
little added cost over that of features proposed rule would have affected:
noted in the preceding paragraph on unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In • 12 manufacturers holding 35 part
many airplane designs. 25 type certificates (TC’s);
developing U.S. standards, this Trade
The ARAC report, from which the
Act requires agencies to consider • 26 manufacturers, airlines, and
commenter has gathered data for its cost repair stations holding 168
estimates, includes a discussion to international standards. Where
appropriate, agencies are directed to use supplemental type certificates (STC’s)
‘‘locate significant heat sources away for part 25 fuel tank systems, of which
from fuel tanks.’’ The report states that, those international standards as the
basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 69 were for different modifications;
‘‘* * * quantifying the impact of this
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 • Manufacturers of future, new part
method would only be possible for 25 type certificated airplane models;
specific new designs,’’ and the report requires agencies to prepare a written
assessment of the costs, benefits, and and
provides little data regarding the costs
other effects of proposed or final rules. • Holders of future, new part 25
for locating packs away from fuel tanks. STC’s for new fuel tank systems.
This requirement applies only to rules
We agree with the commenter that At that time, the FAA was unable to
that include a Federal mandate on State,
cooling air may be needed to meet the predict the number of new airplane TC’s
local, or tribal governments, likely to
requirements of this regulation and this but, based on the average of the
result in a total expenditure of $100
can result in additional operating costs previous 10 years, the FAA had
million or more in any one year
during certain flight operations. anticipated that 17 new fuel tank system
(adjusted for inflation).
However, these costs are airplane model In conducting these analyses, the FAA STC’s would be granted annually. The
design-specific and could not be has determined that this rule: (1) Has FAA had requested comments on these
estimated without input from the benefits which justify its costs and is a estimates.
industry. Nevertheless, in the absence of ‘‘significant regulatory action;’’ (2) will In order to update the aviation
specific industry design and cost data, have a significant impact on a industry data, the FAA used a different
we maintain that these additional substantial number of small entities; (3) database for this final rule from what it
operating costs will be minimal. has minimal effects on international used for the analysis of the proposed
Further, these costs will occur on trade; and (4) does not impose an rule. However, as this more current
airplanes that will be manufactured unfunded mandate on state, local or database does not report the same
many years in the future and, as a result, tribal governments or the private sector. information as that reported in the
the present value of those operating The FAA has placed these analyses in previous database, an exact comparison
costs will be even less. the docket and summarizes them as between the two databases is not
follows. possible. Consequently, using 1999 data,
Paperwork Reduction Act
the FAA determined that the final rule
There are no new requirements for Data Sources affects 6,971 airplanes, of which 6,252
information collection associated with • The principal data sources used for are turbojets and 719 are turboprops. Of
this amendment that would require this analysis are: these 6,971 airplanes:
approval from the Office of Management • The public comments submitted to • 6,485 (5,802 turbojets and 683
and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork the notice for this rulemaking action; turboprops) are operated by 143
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. • The World Jet Inventory at Year- scheduled and non-scheduled air
3507(d)). End 1999; carriers,

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• 117 are operated by 76 private would prevent between 75 percent and would be expected to occur during the
operators (primarily corporations), and 90 percent of the future fuel tank 10-year time period of 2004 through
• 369 are currently held by 112 explosions. The basis for this prevention 2013. Further, the FAA determined that
manufacturers and brokers and leasing is derived primarily from the the probability that the first accident
companies. incorporation of design changes to would occur on or before the year 2008
The FAA also determined that the enhance fail-safe features of design and is the same as the probability that it
final rule affects: enhanced fuel tank system inspections would occur after 2008.
• 13 manufacturers holding 37 part that will discover conditions that could Thus, based on a loss of $401 million
25 type certificates (TC’s); result in an ignition source before for a ‘‘representative’’ accident, the FAA
• 46 manufacturers, airlines, and ignition of flammable fuel vapors could calculated that the present values of the
repair stations holding 173 occur. The fuel tank system review, by losses from future mid-air explosions
supplemental type certificates (STC’s) itself, will have little direct effect on that would occur between 2004 and
for part 25 fuel tank systems, of which preventing these future accidents, 2013 are:
79 are for different fuel tank system unless it uncovers an immediately • $233.7 million for one prevented
modifications; hazardous condition that results in an accident and
• 325 non-fuel tank system STC AD being issued. As stated earlier, the • $400.4 million for two prevented
holders that will need to evaluate their FAA has initiated 40 AD’s to address accidents
STC’s to determine their impacts on fuel unsafe fuel tank system features on (The statistically expected value is
tank systems; numerous airplane types within the $248.9 million for the 1.09 accidents.)
• Manufacturers of future, new part current fleet. While the FAA expects For this final rule analysis, the FAA
25 type certificated airplane models; these actions will significantly improve reviewed the public comments and its
and safety, an in-depth analysis of all previous analysis for the notice, and
• Holders of future, new part 25 airplane models required by this rule determined that the data are insufficient
STC’s for new fuel tank systems. has not been completed and it would be to permit a credible estimate of the
Based on the previous 10 years, the difficult to predict the overall effect on percentage of future mid-air explosion
FAA projects that there will be between the accident rate. Therefore, the cost/ accidents that the final rule would
two and four new part 25 TC airplane benefit analysis assumes that the prevent. The uncertainty of the causes
models during the next 10 years. Using accident rate for fuel tank explosions of the two accidents and the uncertainty
the same methodology, the FAA projects will remain constant until the reviews of the effects of the 40 AD’s on
that there will be three to four new fuel are complete. preventing future explosions does not
tank system STC’s annually granted With the proposed 18-month allow a quantitative estimate of the
during the next 10 years. compliance time, the FAA estimated the potential effectiveness of the final rule.
benefits based on these inspections Thus, although the FAA believes that
Benefits
starting in 2001. The resulting the rule will significantly reduce the
In the notice, the FAA had assumed probability analysis indicated that the risk of a future accident, the FAA does
that the potential U.S. fuel tank first such accident would occur in 2006 not calculate quantified benefits
explosion rate due to an unknown and the second accident (if a second one resulting from the final rule.
internal fuel tank ignition was the same would occur) in 2009. On that basis, the
as that rate for the worldwide fleet over estimated present value of the expected Sources of Compliance Costs for the
the years 1989 through 1998. On that benefits discounted over 10 years to Proposal and the Final Rule
basis, the FAA had estimated that, if no 1999 at 7 percent would have been: The costs to comply with the SFAR
preventative actions were to be taken, • $260 million for one prevented derive from the engineering time to
then between one and two (the accident and comprehensively review fuel tank
statistically expected value was 1.25) • $520 million for two prevented system designs by the design approval
fuel tank explosions would be projected accidents. holders (i.e., part 25 TC holders, part 25
to occur during the next 10 years (2000 For the final rule, the FAA revised fuel tank system STC holders, and
through 2009) in U.S. operations. The these earlier estimates to include the certain part 25 non-fuel tank system
FAA also determined that the effect that lengthening the compliance STC holders). There also are costs to
probability that such an accident would time from 18 months to 36 months has operators that derive from the
have occurred prior to 2006 was equal on the potential benefits. As a result, the engineering time to conduct the design
to the probability that it would have 3-year compliance time indicates that, review for any field approvals on their
occurred after 2006. with the exception noted in the airplanes and to develop any necessary
In order to quantify the potential previous paragraph, the first benefits fuel tank system inspections and
benefits from preventing a from improved fuel tank system maintenance recommendations for
‘‘representative’’ commercial aviation inspections will not occur until 2004. operators and repair stations.
mid-air explosion, the FAA had used: The FAA also revised the earlier These reviews may also identify
• A value of $2.7 million to prevent estimates to substitute more current conditions that will subsequently need
a fatality, fleet and operations data into the to be addressed by specific service
• An average of 130 passengers and calculations. The FAA also noted that 2 bulletins, or unsafe conditions that
crew on a commercial flight, years without a mid-air explosion have would subsequently require the FAA to
• A value of $20 million for a passed since the analysis of the issue AD’s. However, those future costs
destroyed airplane, and proposal, which makes the years 1989 are not the costs of compliance with this
• A cost of $30 million for an through 2000 (rather than 1989 through SFAR; rather, they are costs to conform
investigation of a mid-air explosion 1998) the appropriate timeframe for to the service bulletin or to comply with
accident. calculating the historical accident rate. the AD, and would be estimated for
Thus, a total loss would be $401 On that basis, the FAA calculated that, each individual service bulletin or AD
million. if no preventative actions were taken, when it is issued or proposed.
In the notice, the FAA had assumed between one and two (the expected The costs to comply with the
that compliance with the proposal value is 1.09) fuel tank explosions operational rule changes of this final

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 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 23123

rule derive from the requirements that certificate airplane (for example, a • The third action involves the lost
operators incorporate these Model 737); whereas, an airplane net revenue from an airplane’s increased
recommendations into their ‘‘series’’ is defined to refer to a version out-of-service time due to the enhanced
maintenance manuals and then inspect (often under an Amended TC) of a fuel tank system inspection.
and maintain the fuel tank systems model (for example, a Model 737–300). • The fourth action involves the labor
accordingly. As a result, additional In the notice, the FAA had estimated time to provide the increased
airplane mechanic labor time will be that 35 TC’s and 68 fuel tank system documentation, recording, and reporting
needed during an airplane inspection to STC’s would have needed a fuel tank the results from the fuel tank system
perform an enhanced inspection of the system design review. Depending upon inspections and tests.
fuel tank system and components. the airplane model, the FAA had The FAA had assumed that each
However, the costs to repair and replace estimated that a fuel tank system design operator has one maintenance manual
equipment and wiring that the review would have taken between 0.5 to for each airplane model in its fleet. The
inspection identifies as needing repair 2.0 engineer years for a TC holder, and FAA then determined that there were
or replacement is not a cost of an average of 0.25 engineer year for a 290 individual airplane model/operator
compliance with the operational rules fuel tank system STC holder. The FAA combinations. The FAA estimated that
changes. Although these costs can be had also estimated that developing it would have taken 5 engineer days (at
substantial, they are attributable to manual revisions and service bulletins a cost of $4,000 per manual) to
existing FAA regulations that require would have taken between 0.25 to 1.0 incorporate these recommendations into
such repairs and replacements to be engineer years for a TC holder, and an the various maintenance manuals. On
made in order to assure the airplane’s average of 0.1 engineer year for a fuel that basis, the FAA had calculated that
continued airworthiness. tank system STC holder. this total cost would have been $1.16
Finally, the part 25 revisions of this Using a total engineer compensation million. As these expenses would have
final rule may require some future TC rate (salary and fringe benefits, plus a occurred in the second year, the present
and STC’s to employ designs of fuel mark-up for hours spent by value of these costs was $1.084 million.
tank systems and other aviation systems management, legal, etc. on the review) With respect to the costs of fuel tank
that would not have been used were it of $100 an hour, the FAA had estimated system inspections, the FAA had
not for these revised certification that the one-time fuel tank system estimated that it would have taken
requirements. design review would have cost TC between 60 and 330 additional labor
holders $9.5 million, and it would have hours per airplane to complete the
Estimated Total Compliance Costs for cost STC holders $4.9 million. initial fuel tank system inspection, and
the Proposal it would have taken between 30 and 180
Proposed Costs of Fuel Tank System additional labor hours per airplane for
As seen in Table 1, the FAA had Inspections—Operational Rule Changes
estimated in the notice that the present later fuel tank system reinspections. All
value in 1999 of the compliance costs The costs to operators of complying of the initial inspections would have
with the proposal during the time with the proposed operational been completed during the first 3 years
period 2000–2011 would have been requirements would have been the after the maintenance manual changes
about $170 million ($9.5 million for TC additional airplane mechanic labor had been approved by the FAA (i.e.,
holders, $4.9 million for STC holders, hours and the lost net revenue from the during the years 2002 through 2004).
and $153 million for operators). The airplane’s additional time out-of-service Each airplane would have been
following sections briefly summarize in order to complete the fuel tank reinspected every 3 years after the
the discussions in the notice about these system inspections and maintenance. initial fuel tank system inspection.
various cost estimates. The FAA had assumed that the design Using a total compensation rate (wages
approval holders’ recommendations and fringe benefits, plus a mark-up for
TABLE 1.—PRESENT VALUE IN 1999 would have required fuel tank systems time spent by supervisors, management,
to be inspected only during the etc. on the inspections) of $70 an hour
OF THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE
regularly scheduled major maintenance for airplane mechanics, the FAA had
WITH THE PROPOSED RULE estimated that the initial fuel tank
checks. As a result, the FAA had
[As estimated in the preliminary regulatory expected that no airplanes would have system inspection would have cost
evaluation] between $4,200 and $23,100 per
been taken out of service solely to
inspect the fuel tank system unless the airplane and fuel tank system
Present value
in 1999 of the fuel tank system review would have reinspections would have cost between
compliance identified an immediate safety concern. $2,100 and $12,600 per airplane. The
Source of cost costs In that case, the corrective action would present value of the total fuel tank
(in 1998 system inspection costs, discounted at 7
$ millions) have been mandated by an AD.
On that basis, the FAA had percent over the period 2002 through
Fuel Tank Review (Total) ..... 14.4 determined that operators would have 2011, would have been $99 million.
[For TC Holders: 9.5] needed to take four actions to comply In the notice, the FAA had assumed
[For STC Holders: 4.9] with the proposal that would have that the initial fuel tank system
Maintenance and Inspection 100.0 either required an expenditure of inspection would have been performed
Lost Net Revenue ................. 35.6 resources or lost revenue: during a ‘‘C’’ or a ‘‘D’’ check. On that
Additional Recordkeeping ..... 17.4 • The first action involves the labor basis, the FAA had estimated that the
time to incorporate the design approval additional out-of-service time would
Total ............................... 167.4
holders’ recommendations into the have been between 36 hours and 96
maintenance manuals. hours per airplane for each airplane
Proposed Costs of Fuel Tank System • The second action involves the inspected during a ‘‘C’’ check, and
Design Review labor time to perform the enhanced fuel would have been zero hours for each
By way of explanation, for the tank system inspections, which includes airplane inspected during a ‘‘D’’ check.
purpose of this analysis, an airplane testing of fuel tank system equipment Similarly, the FAA had estimated that
‘‘model’’ is defined to refer to a type and wiring. the additional out-of-service time would

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have been between 24 hours and 72 discounted at 7 percent over 10 years, determined that the part 25 changes
hours for each airplane fuel tank system would have been $35.6 million. would have a minimal impact on future
reinspection that would have occurred The FAA had determined that the fuel tank system STC’s because current
during a ‘‘C’’ check, and would have increased annual documentation and industry design practices could be
been zero hours if the reinspection reporting time would have been 1 hour adapted to allow compliance with the
would have occurred during a ‘‘D’’ of recordkeeping for every 8 hours of requirement.
check. labor time for the initial fuel tank Differences in Assumptions and Values
The economic cost of out-of-service system inspection, and would have been Between the Notice and the Final Rule
time is the lost net revenue to the 1 hour of recordkeeping for every 10
aviation system. Most of the passengers hours of labor time for the The most significant difference
who would have flown on an airplane reinspections. Thus, the per airplane between the proposal and the final rule
that has been taken out of service will documentation cost would have been is that the proposal allowed only 12
take another flight. As a result, most of between $450 and $2,550 for the initial months for design approval holders to
the lost revenue for that out-of-service fuel tank system inspection and $300 to complete their fuel tank system reviews
airplane is actually captured by other $1,620 for a fuel tank system and recommendations. The proposal
airplane flights. The cost of the rule is reinspection. The present value of the also allowed operators only 6 months to
the loss to the aviation system—not to total recordkeeping cost discounted at 7 incorporate these recommendations into
the individual airplane operator. On percent for 10 years would have been their maintenance manuals. The final
that basis, the FAA computed the lost $17.4 million. rule allows design approval holders 18
revenue to the aviation system by using months to be in compliance and also
Proposed Costs of Future Fuel Tank allows operators 18 months after that to
the Office of Management and Budget
System Design Changes—Revised Part incorporate the recommendations into
(OMB) determination that the average
25 their maintenance manuals.
annual risk-free productive rate of
return on capital is 7 percent of the The FAA had determined that the part Table 2 lists the most significant
average value of the airplane model. 25 changes would have a minimal effect differences in the assumptions made,
Thus, the FAA had calculated that the on the cost of future type certificated data used, and the different
out-of-service lost aviation net revenue airplanes because compliance with the requirements between the proposal and
per fuel tank system inspection would proposed changes would be done during the final rule. Although there are other
have ranged from $50 to $9,750 per the design phase of the airplane model differences that have altered the
airplane per day. The present value of before any new airplanes would be calculated costs, the differences listed in
this total lost aviation net revenue, manufactured. In addition, the FAA had Table 2 are the significant ones.

TABLE 2.—SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES BETWEEN THE PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
EVALUATION AND THE FINAL REGULATORY EVALUATION
Assumption or value Preliminary regulatory analysis Final regulatory analysis

Number of Airplanes .......................................... 6,006 (in 1996) ................................................. 6,971 (in 1999).
Timeframe for Analysis ...................................... 2000–2011 ....................................................... 2001–2013
Net Rate of Fleet Growth ................................... 4.3 percent ....................................................... 3.0 percent.
Hourly Compensation per: Engineer; Mechanic $100; $70 ......................................................... $110; $75.
Number of Fuel Tank System TC Reviews ....... 35 ..................................................................... 98 (46 ‘‘full-scale’’ and 52 ‘‘derivative’’).
Number of Engineering Years for TC Review ... 0.5 to 2 ............................................................. 0.5 to 3.
Number of Fuel Tank System STC Reviews .... 68 ..................................................................... 74
Number of Engineering Years for Fuel Tank 0.35 .................................................................. 0.15
System STC Review.
Number of Non-Fuel tank system STC Reviews None (Asked for Comments) ........................... 325
Number of Engineering Years for Non-Fuel None (Asked for Comments) ........................... 0.0375
tank system STC Review.
Operator Paper Review of Airplane Fuel Tank None ................................................................. 1 engineer day per existing airplane.
System-Field Approvals/STC’s.
Number Months to Compete Safety Review 12 ..................................................................... 18
Fuel Tanks.
Number Months to Revise Maintenance Manual 6 ....................................................................... 18
(After Review).
Number Years to Complete Initial Inspection 3 years (Completed between 2002 and 2004) 2 years (Completed during 2004 and 2005).
(After Manual Revision).
Determinants of Number Inspection Hours ....... Airplane Model ................................................. Airplane Model plus Year Manufactured.
Time before Initial Inspections Begin ................ 18 months ........................................................ 36 months.
Number Years to Complete Initial Inspection .... 3 years ............................................................. 2 years.
Number Labor Hours for Initial Inspection ......... 50 to 198 .......................................................... 49 to 218.
Number Days Out-of-Service for Initial Inspec- 0 to 4 (40 percent inspections done at ‘‘C’’ 0 to 4 (60 percent of inspections done at ‘‘C’’
tion. checks). checks).
Year Reinspections Start ................................... 2004 (immediately after initial inspections) ...... 2008 (2 years after initial inspections).
Reinspection Frequency .................................... Every 3 years (Some done during ‘‘C’’ Every 5 years (All done during ‘‘D’’ checks).
checks).
Number Hours for Reinspection ........................ 40 to 160 .......................................................... 25 to 87.
Reduced Inspection Hours Due to AD’s Already All Model 747 hours not included; 50 hours for No adjustment.
Issued. Mode 737’s not included.
Number Days Out-of-Service for Reinspection 0 to 3 (40 percent of reinspections done at 0 (All reinspections done at ‘‘D’’ checks).
‘‘C’’ checks).

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Cost of Compliance With the Final Rule the ‘‘full-scale’’ fuel tank system design first year (2002) and one-half will occur
As seen in Table 3, based on the review: in the second year (2003), while all of
public comments and the changes in • 3 years for large turbojets (1969– the time to develop recommendations
assumptions and values listed in Table 1980), will occur in the second year (2003). On
• 2 years for large turbojets (1980– that basis, the present value of the total
2, the FAA has determined that the
1988), one-time cost of compliance will be $2.5
present value of the costs of compliance
• 1 year for large turbojets (post- million.
with the rule over the time period
1988), Certain part 25 non-fuel tank system
2001—2013 are $165.1 million. This • 0.5 to 0.75 year for regional jets,
figure includes: STC holders will also need to complete
• 0.5 to 0.75 year for large turboprops,
• $27.1 million for TC holders, and
more than a cursory review of their
• $2.8 million for fuel tank system • 0.5 year for small turbojets and
modifications for the potential impact
STC holders, on the fuel tank system. The FAA
turboprops.
• $2.6 million for non-fuel tank With respect to the ‘‘derivative’’ fuel
determined that there are 325 non-fuel
system STC holders, and tank system STC’s that will need to
tank system design reviews, the FAA
• $132.5 million for operators. undergo a review. The FAA also
The following sections summarize the determined that these will take between
determined that this review will take
results in the Final Regulatory 0.5 year and one year for large turbojets,
one quarter of the engineer time to
Evaluation. and 0.5 year for regional turbojets and
complete a fuel tank system STC review
for turboprops.
The FAA determined that the amount (or 0.375 engineer year). On that basis,
TABLE 3.—PRESENT VALUE OF THE the FAA determined that the average
of engineering time to develop the
COSTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE recommendations for the maintenance cost for a non-fuel tank system STC
FINAL RULE manuals will be 20 percent of the review will be $8,250.
amount of time to complete the fuel As the non-fuel tank system STC
Present value holder will have 18 months to comply
in 2001 of the tank system review.
Using a total engineer compensation with the final rule, the FAA determined
compliance
Source of cost that one-half of the review costs will
costs rate of $110 an hour, the FAA calculated
(in 2000 that the one-time fuel tank system occur in the first year (2002) and one-
$ millions) half will occur in the second year
design review will cost between
$200,000 and $1.525 million per (2003), while all of the time to develop
Part 25 Fuel Tank Design .... 0.315
airplane model, with most of the recommendations will occur in the
(For TC Airplanes: Mini-
mal). individual costs in the range of second year (2003). On that basis, the
(For Fuel Tank STC Hold- $500,000 to $800,000. These costs will present value of the total one-time cost
ers: 0.315). be about $125,000 to $150,000 for of compliance will be $2.6 million.
Fuel Tank Review (Total) ..... 38.157 turboprops. Finally, based on the comments, the
(For TC Holders: 27.107). As the TC holder will have 18 months FAA determined that each operator will
(For Fuel Tank STC Hold- perform a paper review of each airplane
to comply with the final rule, the FAA
ers: 2.522). to determine the modifications
(For Non-Fuel-Tank STC determined that one-half of the review
Holders: 2.594). costs will occur in the first year (2002) (including field approvals) that have
(For Operators: 5.934). and one-half will occur in the second been made on the airplane. Although
Maintenance and Inspection 92.043 year (2003), and all of the costs to the vast majority of these airplanes have
Lost Net Revenue ................. 24.224 develop recommendations will occur in been purchased by major, national, and
Additional Recordkeeping ..... 10.338 the second year (2003). On that basis, regional airlines that should possess
the present value of the total one-time well-documented maintenance history
Total ............................... 165.077 records, a significant minority of these
cost of compliance to TC holders will be
$27.1 million, of which $22.7 million airplanes have had multiple owners or
Costs of Fuel Tank System Design will be for the fuel tank system review lessors and the maintenance records
Review and $4.390 million will be to develop may not be quite as complete. Thus, the
In the Final Regulatory Evaluation, recommendations for the maintenance FAA determined that, on average, this
the FAA has determined that existing manuals. paper review will take one day per
TC holders will need to complete 46 For part 25 fuel tank system STC airplane. On that basis, the average cost
‘‘full-scale’’ fuel tank system reviews for holders, the FAA determined that there per airplane will be $880.
the individual airplane models, and 52 are 74 fuel tank system STC’s that will In order to meet the 36-month
‘‘derivative’’ fuel tank system reviews need to undergo a review. The FAA also compliance date, operators will need to
for the separate series in the models. determined that it will take an average discover if their airplanes have any
Using the Model 737–300/400/500 of 0.15 engineering year to complete the ‘‘orphan’’ STC’s or if there are any field
family of airplanes as an illustration, the review because the STC holder had to approvals that affect the fuel tank
FAA determined that Boeing will need complete a substantial amount of system. Completing these paper reviews
to complete one ‘‘full-scale’’ review and engineering work to obtain FAA will then give the operators 18 months,
two ‘‘derivative’’ reviews for this family approval of the STC, and many of the after the TC and STC holders complete
of airplanes. In addition, each airplane STC’s affect only a part of the fuel tank their required reviews, to complete any
series that has an extended range system. On that basis, the FAA additional fuel tank system engineering
modification or a freighter modification determined that the average cost for a reviews and to make the resultant
will require a ‘‘derivative’’ fuel tank fuel tank system STC review will be changes to their maintenance manuals.
system review. $33,000. Therefore, the FAA determined that
Depending upon the airplane model As the fuel tank system STC holder one-half of the review costs will occur
and the date it was first manufactured, will have 18 months to comply with the in the first year (2002) and one-half will
the FAA determined the following final rule, the FAA determined that one- occur in the second year (2003). On that
average numbers of engineer years for half of the review costs will occur in the basis, the present value of the total one-

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time cost of compliance will be $5.9 model/operator combinations, which based on the date the airplane was
million. produces a cost of $726,400. As these manufactured.
There is also the potential that this manual changes will not be made until • For the 1960–1980 group, the
‘‘paper review’’ will reveal a field the year 2003, the present value of these number of labor hours estimated in the
approval or an ‘‘orphan’’ STC that compliance costs is $635,000. notice plus 20 hours was used.
affects the safety of the fuel tank system. The FAA also determined that 15 • Airplanes manufactured between
In that case, the operator would be repair stations will perform these fuel 1981 and 1995 require 20 percent fewer
responsible for the engineering review tank system inspections for the smaller labor hours than those for the 1960–
and for developing inspection and operators and, on average, each repair 1980 group.
maintenance procedures for the station will perform these inspections • Airplanes manufactured between
maintenance manual. The FAA did not for 10 different airplane models. The 1995 and 2003 will require 30 percent
receive any data on this factor, but compliance costs for these repair fewer labor hours than those for the
maintains that it is likely to infrequently stations will be $660,000, which will be 1960–1980 group.
occur and, further, the amount of passed on to the operators. However, as The third adjustment is that the
engineering needed would be relatively these manual changes will not be made number of labor hours to reinspect fuel
minor. until the year 2003, the present value of tank systems will be one-half of the
these compliance costs is $576,475. number of labor hours needed for the
Costs of Fuel Tank System The FAA determined that it will take, initial fuel tank system inspection,
Inspections—Operational Rule Changes on average, one engineer day (or $880) based on the last year that the airplane
As was true for the analysis in the for each maintenance manual to model was manufactured.
notice, the costs to operators of incorporate the recommendations from The fourth adjustment is that the
complying with the final rule’s a fuel tank system STC holder. The FAA number of labor hours for the first
operational requirements do not include also determined that each of the 79 fuel inspection of a future manufactured
the costs of corrective actions tank system STC’s will produce airplane’s fuel tank system will be the
undertaken to repair deficiencies in the inspection and maintenance same as for later reinspections, and is
fuel tank system that were found recommendations that will affect, on the same number as that to reinspect the
because of a fuel tank system average, two maintenance manuals. On newest airplane category.
inspection, because the airplanes are that basis, the compliance costs will be Using those adjustments and the
required to be maintained as airworthy. $139,000. However, as these manual changes listed in Table 2, the FAA
On that basis, the FAA determined changes will not be made until the year determined that it will take between 49
that operators will take four actions that 2003, the present value of these and 218 labor hours to complete an
will generate costs or lost revenue to compliance costs is $121,450. initial fuel tank system inspection, and
comply with the final rule. The FAA anticipates that it will take between 25 and 108 labor
• The first action involves the labor implementation of the final rule will hours to complete a fuel tank system
time to incorporate the design approval result in the initial fuel tank system reinspection. Using a total
holders’ recommendations into the inspection to be performed at the first compensation rate (wages plus fringe
maintenance manuals. major maintenance check after the benefits) of $75 an hour for airplane
• The second action involves the maintenance manual modifications have mechanics, the FAA estimated that the
labor time to perform the enhanced fuel been approved by the FAA. As the FAA initial fuel tank system inspection will
tank system inspections, which includes defines a ‘‘C’’ check (or its equivalents) cost between $3,625 and $16,350 per
testing of fuel tank system equipment as a major maintenance check, the FAA airplane, and fuel tank system
and wiring. determined that all of the affected reinspections will cost between $1,875
• The third action involves the lost airplanes will receive an initial fuel tank and $8,100 per airplane. The present
net revenue from an airplane’s increased system inspection by 2 years after the value of the total labor cost discounted
out-of-service time due to the enhanced maintenance manuals have been at 7 percent for the period 2004 through
fuel tank system inspection. modified. Thus, the FAA determined 2013 is $92.043 million.
• The fourth action involves the labor that all of the initial fuel tank system As stated earlier, the FAA had
time to provide the increased inspections will be performed in either determined that the initial fuel tank
documentation, recording, and reporting 2004 or 2005. system inspection will be performed
the results from the fuel tank system The FAA made four adjustments to during a ‘‘C’’ or a ‘‘D’’ check. The
inspections and tests. the number of airplane mechanic hours duration and process of major
In calculating the compliance costs for an initial fuel tank system inspection inspections varies by airline and
for maintenance manual revisions due as estimated in the notice: airplane type. Some airlines choose to
to TC holder recommendations, the The first adjustment is that the FAA conduct these checks during one time
FAA revised its assumption made in the added 20 labor hours across the board block of typically 7 to 10 days for a ‘‘C’’
notice that each operator has one in order to account for any check and 20 to 25 days for a ‘‘D’’ check.
maintenance manual for each model in unanticipated inspection Other airlines conduct segmented
its fleet. However, the FAA determined recommendations from the product checks where the airplane is taken out
that its assumption of 5 days of engineer approval holders. of service for several shorter time
time to modify a maintenance manual is The second adjustment is that the intervals that allow the overall task to be
valid. Since the issuance of the notice, FAA varied the number of labor hours completed. The FAA has determined
the FAA has been informed that nearly not only by certification date but also by that an airplane undergoing a segmented
all airlines with fewer than 20 airplanes manufactured date of the airplane. ‘‘C’’ check is, on average, out-of-service
contract their major maintenance checks Older airplanes of an airplane model for two days, whereas a segmented ‘‘D’’
to third party (or other operators’) repair will require, on average, more labor check takes an airplane out of service
stations. The FAA determined that 49 hours to complete an initial fuel tank for 14 to 21 days. The FAA determined
airlines (each with 20 or more airplanes) system inspection than will newer that two mechanics can simultaneously
perform their own maintenance. For airplanes. As a result, the FAA work on a fuel tank system inspection.
those 49 airlines, there are 165 airplane separated airplanes into 3 categories On that basis, the FAA determined that

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no additional out-of-service days will industry design practices could be specifically requested public comment
occur for 1 to 48 additional labor hours. adapted to allow compliance with the on the potential impact of the proposed
Each additional 48 labor hours after the requirement. rule on small entities.
first 48 labor hours will add one day to
Benefit-Cost Comparison Need for and Objectives of the Rule
the out-of-service time. On that basis,
the initial fuel tank system inspection As noted, the FAA has not quantified The final rule is being issued in order
will produce between 0 and 4 additional the potential benefits from this final rule to reduce the risk of a mid-air airplane
out-of-service days. because there is uncertainty about the fuel tank explosion with the resultant
The economic cost of out-of-service actual ignition sources in the two fuel loss of life (as evidenced by TWA Flight
time is the lost services from a capital tanks. However, using a 800). Existing fuel tank system
asset, which is computed by ‘‘representative’’ commercial airplane, inspections have not provided
multiplying the airplane value by the the FAA calculated that the losses from comprehensive, systematic prevention
number of days out of service and by 7 a mid-air explosion would be $401.6 and control of ignition sources in
percent (the OMB risk-free rate of million. In addition, the FAA airplane fuel tanks, thereby allowing a
return). The average residual value of determined that the present value of the small, but unacceptable risk of a fuel
the turbojet models is based on the compliance costs is $165.1 million. tank explosion.
AVITAS 2nd Half 1999 Jet Aircraft If the final rule would prevent one The objective of the final rule is to
Values, and the average value of the such accident by the year 2014, the ensure the continuing airworthiness of
turboprop models is based on the present value of the prevented losses airplanes certificated for 30 or more
AVITAS 2nd Half 1997 Turboprop would be greater than the present value passengers or with a payload of more
Aircraft Values. Thus, the FAA of the compliance costs. than 7,500 pounds. Design approval
calculated that the out-of-service lost Therefore, based on these factors and holders (including TC holders, fuel tank
capital services from the initial fuel tank analysis, the FAA considers the final system STC holders, and holders of
system inspection will be between $200 rule to be cost-beneficial. certain non-fuel tank system STC’s) will
and $86,000 per airplane per day. be required to complete a fuel tank
Regulatory Flexibility Act system design review and to provide
As noted earlier, the FAA determined
that one-half of the airplanes will The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 recommendations and instructions to
undergo an initial fuel tank system (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of operators and repair stations concerning
inspection in 2004 and one-half will regulatory issuance that agencies shall fuel tank system inspections and
undergo an initial fuel tank system endeavor, consistent with the objective equipment and wiring testing. This
inspection in 2005. However, 20 percent of the rule and of applicable statutes, to review may result in the development of
of these airplanes each year will receive fit regulatory and informational service bulletins and AD’s. All operators
this inspection during a ‘‘D’’ check, in requirements to the scale of the covered by Title 14, Code of Federal
which there are no additional out-of- business, organizations, and Regulations (CFR) parts 91, 121, and
service days due to the fuel tank system governmental jurisdictions subject to 125, and all U.S.-registered airplanes
inspection. As a result, the FAA regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, used in scheduled operations under part
calculated that the present value of the the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 129, will be required to incorporate
total lost net revenue from the consider flexible regulatory proposals these recommendations into their
additional out-of-service days is $24.224 and to explain the rationale for their maintenance manuals and to perform
million. actions. The RFA covers a wide range of the inspections and tests as required. In
For the final rule, the FAA small entities, including small addition, repair stations that are
determined that its original estimate businesses, not-for-profit organizations, contracted to perform maintenance are
that every 8 hours of airplane mechanic and small governmental jurisdictions. also required to comply with these
labor for the initial fuel tank system Agencies must perform a review to requirements.
inspection will produce one hour of determine whether a proposed or final
documentation and recordkeeping labor rule will have a significant economic Summary of Comments Made in
hours is valid. However, the FAA impact on a substantial number of small Response to the Initial Regulatory
determined that it had overestimated entities. If the determination finds that Flexibility Analysis
the amount of recordkeeping for it will, the agency must prepare a There were two commenters that
reinspections, and used the ratio of 12 Regulatory Flexibility Analysis as indirectly discussed issues of concern in
hours of reinspection airplane mechanic described in the RFA. the Initial Regulatory Flexibility
labor time for 1 hour of documentation However, if an agency determines that Analysis:
and recordkeeping. On that basis, the a proposed or final rule is not expected The General Aviation Manufacturing
present value of the recordkeeping cost to have a significant economic impact Association (GAMA) supported the
is $10.338 million. on a substantial number of small FAA’s decision to exclude airplanes
entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act certificated for 30 passengers or fewer
Costs of Future Fuel Tank System provides that the head of the agency from the final rule. Although they did
Design Changes—Revised Part 25 may so certify, and a Regulatory not address the small business aspect of
The FAA had determined that the part Flexibility Analysis is not required. The this decision, nearly every operator of
25 change will have a minimal effect on certification must include a statement these excluded airplanes is a small
the cost of future type certificated providing the factual basis for this entity. However, GAMA opposed the
airplanes because compliance with the determination, and the reasoning should proposed part 25 future design
proposed change would be done during be clear. requirements as not appropriate for
the design phase of the airplane model For the proposed rule, the FAA had business jets and stated that these
before any new airplanes would be conducted an Initial Regulatory airplanes should be excluded from the
manufactured. In addition, the FAA Flexibility Analysis, which established part 25 requirements. The FAA
determined that the part 25 changes will that it would have a significant impact disagreed with this comment because a
have a minimal impact on future fuel on a substantial number of small future business jet that has a 7,500
tank system STC’s because current entities. As a result, the FAA had pound payload is a large airplane and

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 23128 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

its fuel tank system faces the same Reporting and Recordkeeping addressed the IRFA, the FAA addresses
potential for explosion as other large Requirements comments related to small entities.
transport category airplanes. The final rule requires that operators As published in the notice, the FAA
The Regional Airline Association maintain a record of the results of the did not require fuel tank inspections for
(RAA) supported the FAA’s decision to fuel tank system inspections and aircraft with a payload under 7,500
exclude airplanes certificated for 30 maintenance done on the airplane. For pounds. The primary difference
passengers or fewer from the final rule. the small operators that contract their between the proposed rule and the final
They, too, did not directly address the maintenance to third party repair rule is that the FAA extended operator
stations (nearly all of the small airlines compliance time from 18 to 36 months.
small business aspect of this decision.
and other operators), they will be In addition, the FAA determined that
However, they opposed the FAA’s
required to keep a copy of the report fewer fuel tank reinspections will be
decision to include airplanes
that the repair station will give them. needed than originally estimated in the
certificated for fewer than 60 passengers
Small entities will not need to acquire NPRM.
or for less than a 15,000 pound payload.
additional professional skills to prepare As a result of these changes, about
Their primary argument in favor of this
these reports. 140 airplanes that would have been
exclusion is that these airplanes do not required to undergo a fuel tank
have a history of these types of Description of the Alternatives inspection under the proposed rule will
accidents. The FAA disagreed with this Evaluated not be required to undergo a fuel tank
comment because, by itself, the accident inspection under the final rule because
In the Initial Regulatory Flexibility
histories of specific types and classes of they will have been retired during the
Analysis, the FAA had evaluated three
airplanes are insufficient to demonstrate additional 18 months allowed for
alternatives to the proposed rule:
that their fuel tank systems attain the
• The first alternative was to require compliance. In addition, all of the
required level of safety. An important all airplanes with 10 or more seats be inspections and reinspections would
consideration in these accident histories covered by the proposed rule. have had to be completed 18 months
is that these airplanes have not • The second alternative was to earlier under the proposed rule than
accumulated the number of flight hours require all airplanes with 30 or more under the final rule, resulting in a
as those of the larger transport category seats and all airplanes with 10 or more higher present value of the compliance
airplanes. As fuel tank explosions are seats in commercial service be covered costs. Consequently, recalculating (due
rare events, there is the possibility that by the proposal. to the greater number of airplanes and
such an accident has not occurred in • The third alternative was to require other values) the present value of the
these airplanes because not enough only turbojet airplanes in commercial costs to operators to comply with the
hours have been flown. In addition, it service be covered by the proposal. proposed rule would result in a cost of
may be that the fuel tank system design There were no comments from the $172.2 million, which is approximately
review will reveal that these systems do public in support of these alternatives. 36 percent more than the $126.6 million
not have the same risk as the risk A complete discussion of these costs to operators to comply with the
associated with larger transport category alternatives is available in the public final rule.
airplanes. In that case, the impact of the docket for this rulemaking. Trade Impact Assessment
rule on operators of these airplanes will
Differences Between the Proposed Rule The Trade Agreement Act of 1979
be much less than estimated by the
and the Final Rule Requirements prohibits Federal agencies from
FAA. However, until the fuel tank
system design review is completed, the The primary change from the engaging in any standards or related
FAA does not know what the potential proposed rule is that the final rule activities that create unnecessary
is for these airplanes to have a mid-air allows operators 36 months to comply obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
explosion and, as the FAA cannot rule whereas the proposed rule had required United States. Legitimate domestic
out the possibility, the FAA cannot compliance within 18 months. In objectives, such as safety, are not
exclude these airplanes from coverage addition, the FAA determined that considered unnecessary obstacles. The
under the final rule. fewer fuel tank reinspections will be statute also requires consideration of
needed than the FAA had estimated in international standards and, where
Description and Estimate of the Number the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation. appropriate, that they be the basis for
of Small Entities Affected by the Final As a result, the present value of the U.S. standards. In addition, consistent
Rule costs to operators will be approximately with the Administration’s belief in the
20 percent less per airplane under the general superiority and desirability of
The FAA determined that there are a final rule than they would have been free trade, it is the policy of the
total of 143 U.S. airlines, 76 private under the proposed rule. Administration to remove or diminish
operators (primarily corporations with to the extent feasible, barriers to
corporate jets), and 112 manufacturers, Conclusion international trade, including both
airplane brokers, and airplane leasing Both the proposed and final rule will barriers affecting the export of American
companies affected by the final rule. Of have a significant impact on a goods and services to foreign countries,
the 143 U.S. airlines, 107 are small substantial number of small entities. and barriers affecting the import of
airlines. Nearly all of the 76 private Consistent with SBA guidance, the FAA foreign goods and services into the
operators are large corporations that can conducted an initial regulatory United States.
afford to operate and maintain a flexibility analysis (IRFA) and a final In accordance with the above statute
corporate jet airplane. Most of the regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA). and policy, the FAA assessed the
airplane brokers and airplane leasing The initial regulatory flexibility analysis potential effect of this final rule and
companies are privately held provided a detailed analysis of the determined that it will have only a
corporations or partnerships, and the impact on small entities. The FRFA domestic impact and, therefore, a
FAA was unable to establish whether or directly addresses five requirements. minimal effect on any trade-sensitive
not most of them are small entities. While no comments specifically activity.

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Unfunded Mandates Assessment extent to which Alaska is not served by payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.
transportation modes other than This SFAR also applies to applicants for type
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act certificates, amendments to a type certificate,
of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub. L. aviation, and to establish such
and supplemental type certificates affecting
104–4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, regulatory distinctions as she considers
the fuel tank systems for those airplanes
among other things, to curb the practice appropriate. The FAA, therefore, identified above, if the application was filed
of imposing unfunded Federal mandates specifically requested comments on before June 6, 2001, the effective date of this
on State, local, and tribal governments. whether there is justification for SFAR, and the certificate was not issued
Title II of the Act requires each applying the proposed rule differently before June 6, 2001.
Federal agency to prepare a written to intrastate operations in Alaska. 2. Compliance: No later than December 6,
statement assessing the effects of any Although one commenter expressed a 2002, or within 18 months after the issuance
concern related to a particular Alaskan of a certificate for which application was
Federal mandate in a proposed or final filed before June 6, 2001, whichever is later,
agency rule that may result in a $100 intrastate operation involving Lockheed
each type certificate holder, or supplemental
million or more expenditure (adjusted Model L–188 Electra airplanes, no type certificate holder of a modification
annually for inflation) in any one year comments were received concerning affecting the airplane fuel tank system, must
by State, local, and tribal governments, such justification in general. Since no accomplish the following:
in the aggregate, or by the private sector; comments in that regard were received, (a) Conduct a safety review of the airplane
such a mandate is deemed to be a and since the FAA is not aware of any fuel tank system to determine that the design
‘‘significant regulatory action.’’ justification for such regulatory meets the requirements of §§ 25.901 and
As seen in Table IV–13 in the Final distinction, the final rule is not applied 25.981(a) and (b) of this chapter. If the
current design does not meet these
Regulatory Evaluation (contained in the differently to intrastate operations in
requirements, develop all design changes to
docket to this rule), this final rule does Alaska. the fuel tank system that are necessary to
not contain such a mandate. Therefore, meet these requirements. The FAA (Aircraft
List of Subjects
the requirements of Title II of the Certification Office (ACO), or office of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 91, and 125 Transport Airplane Directorate, having
do not apply. Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting cognizance over the type certificate for the
affected airplane) may grant an extension of
Executive Order 3132, Federalism and recordkeeping requirements. the 18-month compliance time for
The FAA has analyzed this final rule 14 CFR Part 121 development of design changes if:
under the principles and criteria of (1) The safety review is completed within
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, the compliance time;
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We
Reporting and recordkeeping (2) Necessary design changes are identified
determined that this action will not within the compliance time; and
requirements, Safety, Transportation.
have a substantial direct effect on the (3) Additional time can be justified, based
States, or the relationship between the 14 CFR Part 129 on the holder’s demonstrated aggressiveness
national Government and the States, or Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, in performing the safety review, the
on the distribution of power and complexity of the necessary design changes,
Reporting and recordkeeping
responsibilities among the various the availability of interim actions to provide
requirements. an acceptable level of safety, and the
levels of government. Therefore, we
The Amendment resulting level of safety.
determined that this final rule does not
(b) Develop all maintenance and inspection
have federalism implications. In consideration of the foregoing, the instructions necessary to maintain the design
Environmental Analysis Federal Aviation Administration features required to preclude the existence or
amends parts 21, 25, 91, 121, 125, and development of an ignition source within the
FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA fuel tank system of the airplane.
actions that may be categorically 129 of Title 14, Code of Federal
(c) Submit a report for approval to the FAA
excluded from preparation of a National Regulations, as follows: Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), or office
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of the Transport Airplane Directorate, having
PART 21—CERTIFICATION cognizance over the type certificate for the
environmental impact statement. In PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND
accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, affected airplane, that:
PARTS (1) Provides substantiation that the
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this
airplane fuel tank system design, including
rulemaking action qualifies for a 1. The authority citation for Part 21 all necessary design changes, meets the
categorical exclusion. continues to read as follows: requirements of §§ 25.901 and 25.981(a) and
Energy Impact Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 40105; 40113; (b) of this chapter; and
44701–44702, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, (2) Contains all maintenance and
The energy impact of this final rule 44715, 45303. inspection instructions necessary to maintain
has been assessed in accordance with the design features required to preclude the
2. In part 21, add SFAR No. 88 in existence or development of an ignition
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
numerical order at the beginning of the source within the fuel tank system
(EPCA) Public Law 94–163, as amended
part to read as follows: throughout the operational life of the
(42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1.
* * * * * airplane.
It has been determined that the final
rule is not a major regulatory action SFAR No. 88—Fuel Tank System Fault PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS
under the provisions of the EPCA. Tolerance Evaluation Requirements STANDARDS: TRANSPORT
Regulations Affecting Intrastate 1. Applicability. This SFAR applies to the CATEGORY AIRPLANES
Aviation in Alaska holders of type certificates, and supplemental
type certificates that may affect the airplane 3. The authority citation for part 25
Section 1205 of the FAA continues to read:
fuel tank system, for turbine-powered
Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. transport category airplanes, provided the Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
3213) requires the Administrator, when type certificate was issued after January 1, 44702, and 44704.
modifying regulations in Title 14 of the 1958, and the airplane has either a maximum
CFR in a manner affecting intrastate type certificated passenger capacity of 30 or 4. Section 25.981 is revised to read as
aviation in Alaska, to consider the more, or a maximum type certificated follows:

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 23130 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

§ 25.981 Fuel tank ignition prevention. H25.4 Airworthiness Limitations section. or office of the Transport Airplane
(a) No ignition source may be present (a) The Instructions for Continued Directorate, having cognizance over the
at each point in the fuel tank or fuel Airworthiness must contain a section titled type certificate for the affected airplane.
Airworthiness Limitations that is segregated
tank system where catastrophic failure Operators must submit their request
and clearly distinguishable from the rest of
could occur due to ignition of fuel or the document. This section must set forth—
through the cognizant Flight Standards
vapors. This must be shown by: (1) Each mandatory replacement time, District Office, who may add comments
(1) Determining the highest structural inspection interval, and related and then send it to the manager of the
temperature allowing a safe margin structural inspection procedures approved appropriate office. Thereafter, the
below the lowest expected autoignition under § 25.571; and approved instructions can be revised
temperature of the fuel in the fuel tanks. (2) Each mandatory replacement time, only with the approval of the FAA
(2) Demonstrating that no temperature inspection interval, related inspection Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), or
at each place inside each fuel tank procedure, and all critical design office of the Transport Airplane
where fuel ignition is possible will configuration control limitations approved Directorate, having cognizance over the
exceed the temperature determined under § 25.981 for the fuel tank system.
(b) If the Instructions for Continued
type certificate for the affected airplane.
under paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Operators must submit their request for
Airworthiness consist of multiple
This must be verified under all probable revisions through the cognizant Flight
documents, the section required by this
operating, failure, and malfunction paragraph must be included in the principal Standards District Office, who may add
conditions of each component whose manual. This section must contain a legible comments and then send it to the
operation, failure, or malfunction could statement in a prominent location that reads: manager of the appropriate office.
increase the temperature inside the ‘‘The Airworthiness Limitations section is
tank. FAA-approved and specifies maintenance PART 121—OPERATING
(3) Demonstrating that an ignition required under § § 43.16 and 91.403 of the REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG,
source could not result from each single Federal Aviation Regulations, unless an AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS
failure, from each single failure in alternative program has been FAA
combination with each latent failure approved.’’ 8. The authority citation for part 121
condition not shown to be extremely continues to read:
PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND
remote, and from all combinations of Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119,
failures not shown to be extremely FLIGHT RULES
44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711,
improbable. The effects of 6. The authority citation for part 91 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, 44903–
manufacturing variability, aging, wear, continues to read: 44904, 44912, 46105.
corrosion, and likely damage must be 9. Amend § 121.370 by revising the
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1301(7), 1303, 1344,
considered. section heading; redesignating the
1348, 1352 through 1355, 1401, 1421 through
(b) Based on the evaluations required introductory text, paragraphs (a)
1431, 1471, 1472, 1502, 1510, 1522, and 2121
by this section, critical design through 2125; Articles 12, 29, 31, and 32(a) introductory text, (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3),
configuration control limitations, of the Convention on International Civil and paragraphs (b) through (l) as
inspections, or other procedures must Aviation (61 Stat 1180); 42 U.S.C. 4321 et paragraph (a) introductory text,
be established, as necessary, to prevent seq.; E.O. 11514; 49 U.S.C. 106(g) (Revised paragraphs (a)(l) introductory text,
development of ignition sources within Pub. L. 97–449, January 21, 1983). (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), and (a) (1)(iii), and
the fuel tank system and must be 7. Amend § 91.410 by revising the paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(12); and
included in the Airworthiness section heading; redesignating the adding a new paragraph (b) to read as
Limitations section of the Instructions introductory text, paragraphs (a) follows:
for Continued Airworthiness required introductory text, (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3),
by § 25.1529. Visible means to identify and paragraphs (b) through (l) as § 121.370 Special maintenance program
critical features of the design must be requirements.
paragraph (a) introductory text,
placed in areas of the airplane where paragraphs (a)(l) introductory text, * * * * *
maintenance actions, repairs, or (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), and (a)(1)(iii), and (b) After June 7, 2004, no certificate
alterations may be apt to violate the paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(12); and holder may operate a turbine-powered
critical design configuration limitations adding a new paragraph (b) to read as transport category airplane with a type
(e.g., color-coding of wire to identify follows: certificate issued after January 1, 1958,
separation limitation). and either a maximum type certificated
(c) The fuel tank installation must § 91.410 Special maintenance program passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a
include either— requirements. maximum type certificated payload
(1) Means to minimize the * * * * * capacity of 7,500 pounds or more,
development of flammable vapors in the (b) After June 7, 2004, no person may unless instructions for maintenance and
fuel tanks (in the context of this rule, operate a turbine-powered transport inspection of the fuel tank system are
‘‘minimize’’ means to incorporate category airplane with a type certificate incorporated in its maintenance
practicable design methods to reduce issued after January 1, 1958, and either program. These instructions must
the likelihood of flammable vapors); or a maximum type certificated passenger address the actual configuration of the
(2) Means to mitigate the effects of an capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum fuel tank systems of each affected
ignition of fuel vapors within fuel tanks type certificated payload capacity of airplane and must be approved by the
such that no damage caused by an 7,500 pounds or more, unless FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
ignition will prevent continued safe instructions for maintenance and or office of the Transport Airplane
flight and landing. inspection of the fuel tank system are Directorate, having cognizance over the
5. Paragraph H25.4 of Appendix H to incorporated into its inspection type certificate for the affected airplane.
part 25 is revised to read as follows: program. These instructions must Operators must submit their request
address the actual configuration of the through an appropriate FAA Principal
Appendix H to Part 25—Instructions for fuel tank systems of each affected Maintenance Inspector, who may add
Continued Airworthiness airplane, and must be approved by the comments and then send it to the
* * * * * FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), manager of the appropriate office.

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 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 88 / Monday, May 7, 2001 / Rules and Regulations 23131

Thereafter, the approved instructions instructions for maintenance and adding a new paragraph (b) to read as
can be revised only with the approval of inspection of the fuel tank system are follows:
the FAA Aircraft Certification Office incorporated in its inspection program.
(ACO), or office of the Transport These instructions must address the § 129.32 Special maintenance program
requirements.
Airplane Directorate, having cognizance actual configuration of the fuel tank
over the type certificate for the affected systems of each affected airplane and * * * * *
airplane. Operators must submit their must be approved by the FAA Aircraft (b) For turbine-powered transport
requests for revisions through an Certification Office (ACO), or office of category airplanes with a type certificate
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance the Transport Airplane Directorate, issued after January 1, 1958, and either
Inspector, who may add comments and having cognizance over the type a maximum type certificated passenger
then send it to the manager of the certificate for the affected airplane. capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum
appropriate office. Operators must submit their request type certificated payload capacity of
through an appropriate FAA Principal 7,500 pounds or more, no later than
PART 125—CERTIFICATION AND Maintenance Inspector, who may add June 7, 2004, the program required by
OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A comments and then send it to the paragraph (a) of this section must
SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE manager of the appropriate office. include instructions for maintenance
PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM Thereafter, the approved instructions and inspection of the fuel tank systems.
PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000 can be revised only with the approval of These instructions must address the
POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES the FAA Aircraft Certification Office actual configuration of the fuel tank
GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD (ACO), or office of the Transport systems of each affected airplane and
SUCH AIRCRAFT Airplane Directorate, having cognizance must be approved by the FAA Aircraft
10. The authority citation for part 125 over the type certificate for the affected Certification Office (ACO), or office of
continues to read: airplane. Operators must submit their the Transport Airplane Directorate,
requests for revisions through an having cognizance over the type
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance certificate for the affected airplane.
44702, 44705, 44710–44711, 44713, 44716–
44717, 44722. Inspector, who may add comments and Operators must submit their request
then send it to the manager of the through an appropriate FAA Principal
11. Amend § 125.248 by revising the
appropriate office. Maintenance Inspector, who may add
section heading; redesignating the
introductory text, paragraphs (a) comments and then send it to the
PART 129—OPERATIONS: FOREIGN manager of the appropriate office.
introductory text, (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3), AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN
and paragraphs (b) through (l) as Thereafter the approved instructions
OPERATORS OF U.S.-REGISTERED can be revised only with the approval of
paragraph (a) introductory text, AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON
paragraphs (a)(l) introductory text, the FAA Aircraft Certification Office
CARRIAGE (ACO), or office of the Transport
(a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), and (a) (1)(iii), and
paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(12); and Airplane Directorate, having cognizance
12. The authority citation for part 129
adding a new paragraph (b) to read as over the type certificate for the affected
continues to read:
follows: airplane. Operators must submit their
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40104–40105, requests for revisions through an
§ 125.248 Special maintenance program 40113, 40119, 44701–44702, 44712, 44716– appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance
requirements. 44717, 44722, 44901–44904, 44906. Inspector, who may add comments and
* * * * * 13. Amend § 129.32 by revising the then send it to the manager of the
(b) After June 7, 2004, no certificate section heading; redesignating the appropriate office.
holder may operate a turbine-powered introductory text, paragraphs (a)
Issued in Washington, DC, on April 19,
transport category airplane with a type introductory text, (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3),
2001.
certificate issued after January 1, 1958, and paragraphs (b) through (l) as
and either a maximum type certificated paragraph (a) introductory text, Jane F. Garvey,
passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a paragraphs (a)(l) introductory text, Administrator.
maximum type certificated payload (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), and (a) (1)(iii), and [FR Doc. 01–10129 Filed 5–4–01; 8:45 am]
capacity of 7,500 pounds or more unless paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(12); and BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

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