Indira Gandhi National Open University MPYE – 001

School of Interdisciplinary and

Trans-disciplinary Studies Logic

Block 1

CLASSICAL LOGIC

UNIT 1
Types of Categorical Propositions A,E,I,O and Square of Opposition

UNIT 2
Categorical Syllogism

UNIT 3
Figure, Mood and the Possible Types of Syllogisms

UNIT 4
Validity, Invalidity and List of Valid Syllogisms

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Expert Committee
Dr. Jose Kuruvachira
Prof. Gracious Thomas Salesian College &
Director, School of IGNOU Study Centre
Social Work Dimapur, Nagaland
IGNOU

Prof. Renu Bharadwaj

School of Humanities Dr. Sathya Sundar
IGNOU Sethy
Dept of Humanities
Prof. George IIT, Chennai.
Panthanmackel,
Senior Consultant, Dr. Joseph Martis
IGNOU St. Joseph’s College
Jeppu, Mangalore – 2
Dr. M. R. Nandan
Govt. College for Dr. Jaswinder Kaur
Women Dhillon
Mandya - Mysore 147, Kabir park
Opp. GND University
Dr. Kuruvila Amristar – 143 002
Pandikattu
Jnana-deepa Prof. Y.S. Gowramma
Vidyapeeth Principal,
Ramwadi, College of Fine Arts,
Pune Manasagangotri
Mysore – 570 001

Dr Babu Joseph
CBCI Centre
New Delhi

Prof. Tasadduq Husain

Aligarh Muslim
University
Aligarh

Dr. Bhuvaneswari
Lavanya Flats
Gangai Amman Koil
St.
Thiruvanmiyur
Chennai – 600 041

Dr. Alok Nag

Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul
Varanasi

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Block Preparation

Units 1-4 Dr. Kuruvilla Pandikattu

Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth,
Pune – 14.

Content Editors
Dr. V. John Peter
IGNOU, New Delhi.
&
Dr. M.R. Nandan
Mysore.

Format Editor
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

Programme Coordinator
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

Logic as a tool for distinguishing between the true and the false, as said by Averroes, examines
the general forms which arguments may take, which forms are valid, and which are invalid. An
argument is made up of a certain number of propositions. And a proposition is made up of
obviously of a certain number of words. So we have to start our analysis of the formal structure
of an argument by an analysis of the smallest unit of an argument, ‘term’ and proceed to examine
‘propositions,’ and structure of arguments.

By ‘inference’ is meant that operation of reason by which from some known truth we arrive at
another truth. Everyday experience teaches us that it is the way man learns and that is the way
man argues for or against his beliefs and convictions. In mediate inference, deduction and
induction are used very well. Deduction is when from a more general truth one arrives at a more
particular fact. Induction is when from particular facts one arrives at a general truth. Logically
speaking ‘deduction’ and ‘induction’ differ considerably. Study of different kinds of syllogisms
is so crucial for finding the validity of an argument.

Unit 1 introduces the students to the basics of categorical propositions. This unit has introduced
us to terms, propositions, categorical propositions and Aristotle’s square of oppositions.

Unit 2 dwells on the central discussion of Logic, namely inference. Reasoning in a right way is
the focal point of Logic. Explaining the significance of inference in logic and in life, the unit
introduces the students to the basics of categorical syllogism, along with various kinds of
syllogisms.

Unit 3 deals with figures, mood and types of syllogisms. The epistemological assumptions of
inference by the ‘figure’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of syllogism which is determined by
the function the ‘middle term’ plays in the syllogism. By the ‘mood’ of a syllogism is meant that
kind of a syllogism which is determined by the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three propositions.

Unit 4 helps the students to understand the validity of syllogisms and thus sharpen the process of
inference. As Logic is concerned with the validity of an argumentation this unit provides tools
and different methods to point out the invalid syllogisms giving adequate arguments.

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COURSE INTRODUCTION

Logic is the systematic study of the general structures of sound reasoning and valid arguments;
the study of the methods and principles used for right reasoning. The proper study of logic will
enable the student to reason well and to pay due attention to the analysis of fallacies and natural
mistakes in reasoning. The study of logic gives the students techniques and methods for testing
the correctness of different kinds of reasoning. Logic will provide us with criteria to correct
reasoning with which we can test arguments for their correctness. Systematic study of arguments
has its origins in several ancient civilizations in ancient India, China and Greece. In the
development of Western logic we see Aristotle systematizing it as examining the general forms
of arguments with distinguishing them between valid and invalid. This course on Logic deals
with all the aspects of classical and modern logic as found in the Western tradition.

Block 1 gives a brief picture of the concerns of the traditional and classical logic as it emerged
from the Aristotelian period onwards. The basic understanding of terms, propositions and
syllogisms with figures and moods enables the students of philosophy to dwell in the realm of
right reasoning and validity and invalidity of argumentation.

Block 2 is concerned with the sentential Logic as in the Modern Logic. It brings home to the
students the importance of argument forms in Modern Logic as it is clear that arguments are
different from argument forms.

Block 3 brings home to the students the methods of proving validity of an argument using
different procedures and rules that are employed in sentential logic. The block elaborates on the
proving validity using rules of inference in the first unit. In the next, attempt is made to give an
idea about conditional proof, by giving definition, importance, and principles of this method. We
then proceed to have an essential understanding of Indirect Proof and the principles used in this
method. Finally, an idea about proving invalidity is given.

Block 4 is dedicated for Predicate Logic dealing with Quantifiers, Rules of Instantiation and
Generalization, Proof of validity and Proving Invalidity. It deals with the basic understanding of
predicate logic with the usage of quantifiers to symbolize the proposition. By doing so the
students would be able to progress their reasoning aptitude by identifying the internal structure of
the proposition. The proof of validity and proving the invalidity in predicate logic are well
covered in this block. Finally, the application part of symbolic logic in terms of digital logic in
the contemporary world brings home the practical use of logic.

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UNIT 1 TYPES OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS: A, E, I, AND O; SQUARE
OF OPPOSITION

Contents
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Terms and Their Kinds
1.3 Denotation and Connotation of Terms
1.4 Meaning and Supposition of terms
1.5 Propositions
1.6 Square of Opposition
1.7 Let Us Sum Up
1.8 Key Words
1.9 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

First objective of this unit is to introduce you to the elements of categorical proposition. This
is intended to be achieved through the introduction of the nature of terms and their distinction
from words. The second objective is to establish an important distinction between sentence
and proposition. The last, but not the least, objective is to familiarize you with certain forms
of logical relations called immediate inference which should in turn enable you to establish
and discover certain other important logical relations.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

As a form of critical thinking, logic has its origin in several ancient civilizations, like Indian,
Chinese, Greek, etc. In the Western tradition, logic was systematized by Aristotle and hence he is
credited with its origin. Logic, ‘the tool for distinguishing between the true and the false’
(Averroes), examines the general forms which arguments may take, and distinguishes between
valid and invalid arguments. An argument consists of two sets of statements called premise or
premises, on the one hand, and the conclusion on the other. The premises are designed to support
the conclusion. The presence of this complex relation (also called inference) makes a group of
statements an argument and with which logic is concerned. Thus mere collection of propositions
does not constitute an argument when this relation is absent. In this unit we shall confine
ourselves to an analysis of terms and propositions which are basic to our study of logic and
postpone a detailed study of inference to the next unit.

1.2 TERMS AND THEIR KINDS

Logic makes a sharp distinction between ‘word’ and ‘term’. All words are not terms, but all
terms are words. Terms refer to specific classes of objects or qualities whereas words refer to

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none of them. Further, a term may consist of more than one word. Table, planet, etc. are terms
which consist of one word only. The author of Hamlet is a term which consists of four words.
Words in different languages may express the same term; e.g. tree, vriksha etc. While there is
only one term in this example, there are two words. Traditional logic has recognized different
kinds of terms. A brief description of kinds of terms throws some light on the way in which
traditional logic understood ‘term’.

Positive and negative: Positive terms signify the presence of desirable qualities e.g., light,
health, etc.; negative terms signify, generally, undesirable qualities or qualities not desired,
rightly or wrongly. The clearest negative terms are those with the negative prefix ‘in’ (or ‘im’),
dis, etc. Inefficient, dishonest, etc. are negative terms. However, it is not always the case. For
example, immortal, invaluable, discover, to name a few, surely, are not negative. Therefore what
constitutes a negative term is, essentially, our attitude in particular and custom in general. In
other words, the distinction is not really logical, but it has something to do with value judgment.
That is why some words without such prefixes are regarded as negative since they too imply
negation: e.g. darkness (absence of light).

Concrete and abstract: Concrete terms are those which refer to perceptible entities; abstract terms
are those which do not; e.g. man, animal, tall etc., are concrete terms; mankind, animalism, etc.,
are abstract terms. However, this classification depends upon use. For example, the word
‘humanity’ is used not only to mean individual men but also the quality of man. Hence use or
meaning determines the class.

Relative and absolute: Relative terms are those which express a relation between two or more
than two persons or things, e.g. father, son, etc. Absolute terms do not express such relation, e.g.
nationality, cone, etc. Comparative terms are obviously relative: e.g., larger, prettier, etc.

Singular and General: Singular terms denote specific objects. It points to one object only. All
proper names are singular terms. Russellian proper names are also counted among singular
terms. ‘The author of Principia Mathematica, The farthest planet from the sun’, etc. are singular
terms. General terms are just class names. Vegetable, criminal, politician, etc., are examples for
general terms.

Univocal, and Equivocal terms: Univocal terms carry only one meaning. Entropy is an example
for univocal terms. Equivocal terms are burdened with at least two meanings. Gravity is
equivocal; so is astronomical. When natural language becomes the medium of expression,
equivocal terms pose hurdles in determining the validity of arguments because such terms cause
ambiguous structure of statements. Therefore in our study of logic we must ensure that the
arguments consist of only unambiguous terms. Later we will come to know that symbolic logic
became indispensable precisely for this reason.

1.3 DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION OF TERMS

By denotation of a term we mean the number of individuals to which the term is applied or
extended. For example, ‘society’ denotes the human society, a philanthropic society, the Society

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of Jesus, a political society (or a State), etc. Another word used for ‘denotation’ is extension. By
connotation or intension of a term we mean the complete meaning of a term as expressed by the
sum total of its essential as opposed to accidental characteristics. For example, consider the same
term; ‘society’ connotes (a) an association of persons and (b) united by a common interest.
Crowd does not mean the same as society because it lacks these characteristics. Complete
meaning, therefore, excludes accidental and figurative characteristics. The latter is misleading in
the sense that it is not a characteristic at all in the strict sense of the term. Denotation and
connotation together determine what is called class or set of objects. Therefore every term stands
for one class or the other.

In Scholasticism, connotation and denotation are reserved for terms and comprehension and
extension for concepts of which terms are signs, or expressions. Note that the word ‘connotation’
may vary in meaning from time to time. For example, ‘politician’ may acquire a different
meaning in different societies at a given point of time or in the same society at different points of
time. Therefore connotation is only conventional.

It is clear that greater the connotation (intension) of a term smaller the denotation (extension)
and, conversely, greater the denotation smaller the connotation. For example, the term ‘being’
connotes simply ‘existence’ and can be extended to everything that exists (man, animal, plant,
stone, etc.). But as soon as I say ‘human being’, thus increasing the connotation (i.e. ‘human’ and
‘being’), the term includes only human beings; not others. ‘Oriental human being’ is still less
extensive, for the term cannot be applied to Westerners. This is called the law of inverse
variation.

1.4 MEANING AND SUPPOSITION OF TERMS

There is a subtle difference between meaning and supposition. Meaning is what convention
accepts. Therefore many words have more than one meaning because convention is always
inaccurate. Xystus is one such word which has several meanings like covered portico used for
exercise by the athletes in antiquity, a garden walk on terrace, etc. Likewise, ‘Supposition’ of a
word is the function or the use of a word which depends upon the intention of the speaker.
Therefore meaning is objective whereas supposition is subjective. The Scholastics understood
‘supponit’ as the one which stands for the concept.
Check Your Progress I
Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Critically examine various classes of terms.

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

2. Analyse the meaning of connotation and denotation.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

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.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

1.5 PROPOSITIONS

In the previous section we came to know that all terms are words, but all words are not terms.
Similarly, all propositions are sentences, but all sentences are not propositions. Only those
sentences are propositions which grammar regards as assertive. A proposition is always either
true or false, but not both; and no proposition is neither true nor false. This means to say that a
proposition is a declarative sentence which gives certain information and it is this information
which makes a proposition true or false. It is equally important to note that there is no need to
know whether a given proposition is true or false. Further, several sentences may express one
proposition. Consider these groups of sentences.
A 1 Jealousy thy name is woman.
2 What is wrong with your car?
3 Copper sulphate is an organic compound.
4 Newton wrote Optiks.
B 1 Cogito Ergo Sum.
2 I think, therefore I am.
In group A, first two sentences are not assertive sentences (the first sentence is misleading. It
appears to be an assertive sentence, but in reality, it is not. Sentences which express emotional
outburst are, more or less, exclamatory). The third sentence is false whereas the fourth sentence
is true. Group B consists of two sentences which belong to different languages but give the same
meaning. Within the same language also it is possible to have two sentences which give the same
meaning. Consider this group.
C 1 Rama killed Ravana.
2 Ravana was killed by Rama.
Sentences in B and C groups show that a proposition is the meaning of a sentence. Although
several sentences can give one meaning, it is impossible in an unambiguous system to have one
sentence with more than one meaning.

A new word is introduced at this point. The truth-value of true proposition is said to be true and
that of a false proposition is said to be false. Here afterwards we frequently employ this term in
our study.

Let us turn to Aristotelian analysis of proposition. A proposition consists of two terms in his
system. The term (class) about which the proposition asserts something is called ‘Subject’ (S)
and what is said about it is called ‘Predicate’ (P). S and P are to be regarded as S-class and P-
class respectively. In a proposition these are related using the verb of the form ‘to be’ called
‘Copula’, which must be always in present tense. According to Aristotle a sentence becomes a
proposition only when it meets all these requirements, not otherwise. It is obvious that only the

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first example considered above (A3) falls within the limits of Aristotelian system. This sort of
restriction severely thwarted further progress of logic.

Traditional logic considers two kinds of propositions; categorical (unconditional) and

conditional. Assertion is of two types; affirmation and negation. Affirmation or negation is made
in the former without stating any condition, whereas in the latter it is stated with condition or
conditions. Initially, we shall restrict ourselves to the former kind. Affirmation or negation is
possible in this category in two ways; total or partial. If P is affirmed or negated of the whole
class of S, then it is total. On the other hand, if affirmation or negation applies to only a part of
the class, then it is partial. Consequently, we obtain four kinds of categorical proposition.
1 Universal affirmative (total affirmation)
2 Universal negative (total negation)
3 Particular affirmative (partial affirmation)
4 Particular negative (partial negation)
For the sake of simplicity and brevity (in logic these two are very important) these four kinds are
represented symbolically. From Affirmo, a Greek, word we choose A and I to represent first and
third kinds respectively and similarly, from Nego, another Greek word, we choose E and O to
represent second and fourth kinds respectively. It is a mere convention to prefix S and suffix P to
A, E, I and O. In modern parlance the first letters of S-term and of P-term are used in place of S
and P.

Each kind is illustrated below.

S Copula P
1 All (scientific theories) are (improvable). Universal Affirmative SAI
2 No (celestial bodies) are (static). Universal Negative CES
3 Some (fruits) are (bitter). Particular Affirmative FIB
4 Some (chemicals) are not (toxic). Particular Negative COT

The distinction between universal and particular depends upon what is called quantity and the
one between affirmative and negative on what is called quality. Not much discussion is needed to
know what quality is. If any negative word like no, not, etc., occurs in the proposition (2 and 3),
then quality is negative. Otherwise, it is affirmative. A word of caution is required. Sometimes
predicate carries negative force. But it does not make the quality of proposition negative. For
example ‘dishonest’, non-natural, etc. constitute terms in their own right. They have nothing to
do with the quality of proposition. Consider these two propositions.

5 Shakuni is dishonest.
6 Telepathy is a non-natural phenomenon.

These propositions are affirmative only. It means that a proposition is negative only when
negative word is a part of copula. However, quantity of proposition needs elaborate explanation
which becomes intelligible only after explication of what is called the distribution of term.

Distribution of terms is an indispensible concept in Aristotelian logic. A term is said to be

distributed if the proposition in which it occurs, either includes or excludes the said term
completely. Inclusion or exclusion is complete provided the proposition refers to every member

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of the class. If so, when is it said to be undistributed? Suppose that n is the number of members
in a given class. If the proposition includes or excludes (n – 1) members of that particular class,
say S, then S is said to be undistributed.

Let us turn to the pattern of distribution in categorical proposition. Quantity of any proposition is
determined by the extension or magnitude of S, i.e., the number of elements in the given set and
a term acquires magnitude only when it is a component of a proposition. Only sets have
magnitude (this is so as far as logic is concerned). A set is defined as the collection of well-
defined elements as its members. A null set or an empty set does not have any element. Let us
assume that term is synonymous with set. Then we can accept that a term has magnitude. If
magnitude of any term is total in terms of reference, then it is said that the term is distributed. If
magnitude is incomplete, then that term is undistributed. It shows that any term is distributed
only when the entire set is either included or excluded in such a way that not a single member is
left out. This is another way of explicating what complete magnitude means.

All universal propositions distribute S whereas particular propositions do not. Just as distribution
is explicated, undistribution also must be explicated. A term is undistributed only when
inclusion or exclusion is partial. The meaning of partial inclusion or exclusion is, again,
repeated, but in a very different manner. Let us attempt a formal explication of the same. Let the
magnitude of S be x. Let S* (to be read s-star) denote that part of S, which is included in or
excluded by a proposition. Now the formula, which represents the undistribution of S can be
represented as follows:

|x|>S*≥1 ………….(1)

This is the way to read (1): ‘The modulus of x ( |x| ) is greater than S* greater than or equal to 1’.
It is highly rewarding to use set theory here. (1) indicates that S* is a proper subset of S.
Therefore its magnitude must be smaller than that of x which is the magnitude of S. However,
S* is not a null set. (1) shows that there exists at least one member in S*. In the case of
undistribution, therefore, the magnitude of S* varies between 1 and | x-1|. Now it is clear that in
A and E, S is distributed while in I and O it is undistributed. Just to complete this aspect, let us
state that all affirmative propositions undistribute P whereas all negative propositions distribute
P.

A far better way of presenting the distribution of terms was invented by Euler, an 18th C. Swiss
mathematician and later, John Venn, a 19th C. British mathematician improvised the
representation further. An understanding of the techniques adopted by them presupposes some
aspects of set theory.
Let S and P be non-null (non-empty) sets with elements as mentioned below (it is important that
the status of set must be mentioned invariably, i.e., null or non-null). The following pairs shall
be considered.

1. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {g,h,i,j,k}

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All letters within parentheses are elements of respective sets. In the first grouping there is no
common element. Now, consider following groupings.

2. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i}
3. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {b,c,d,g,h}
4. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, S* = {a,b,c}, P = {m,n,g,h}
5. S = {a,b,c,d,e}, P = {a,b,c,d,e}

Fifth group is unique in the sense that these two sets possess exactly the same elements.
Therefore the magnitude of these sets also remains the same. Such sets are called identical sets.
Identity of elements and also the equality of magnitude make sets identical. In 1908, Zermelo
proposed what is called ‘Axiomatic Set Theory’. One of the principal axioms of this theory is
known as the Axiom of Extension or Extensionality. This Axiom helps us to understand the
structure of identical sets. This theory was modified later by A Fraenkal and T. Skolem. Let us
call this theory Zermelo – Fraenkel – Skolen theory (ZFS theory). This theory states the above
mentioned axiom as follows.

ZFS1: If a and b are non-null sets and if, for all x, x ∈ a iff x ∈ b, then a ≡ b

[Note ‘∈’ is read ‘element of’; ‘iff’ is read ‘if and only if’ and ‘≡’ is read identical.]
Symbolically, it is represented as follows:
{Sa Λ Sb} Λ {∀x (x ∈ A <=> x ∈ b) => a ≡ b
This is the way to read:
Sa = a is a set
Λ = and
∀ = for all values of
<=> = if and only if
=> = if …then
The summary of this formula is very simple. Whatever description applies to S (here a) also
applies to P (here b). When distribution of terms is examined, the magnitude and elements of
sets also are examined. Therefore it is wrong to assert that when S and P are identical sets, P is
undistributed in A. Let us designate this type of proposition as A+ (read A cross). Consider
these two propositions:

7 All bachelors are unmarried men. (BAU)

8 All spinsters are unmarried women. (SAU)

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Knowledge of English is enough to accept that B ≡ U and S ≡ U
These five groups are explained in terms of set theory. First group corresponds to ‘E’ whereas
second, third, fourth and fifth groups correspond respectively to A, I, O and A+. A brief
description will suffice. It is obvious that the first group differs from all other groups because in
this group nothing is common to ‘S’ and ‘P’.

S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {g,h,I,j,k}

No element of P is an element of S and no element of S is an element of P. The reader must be in

a position to notice that there is symmetric difference between S and P (What we have in this
case is, evidently, difference and nothing else), symbolized by:
S P (‘ ’ reads del)
The second group corresponds to A. Here S is a proper subset of P or P includes S, which is
symbolized as follows:

S ⊂ P or P ⊃ S

The third group corresponds to ‘I’. Here S and P intersect. So we have

S ∩ P = {b,c,d}
(∩ reads ‘intersect’)

Before we consider the fourth group, let us directly proceed to Euler’s diagrams through which
he represented the extension – status of terms in proposition.

1 SAP

a,b,c,
S d,e,f
S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i}
g,h,i P
∴ S ⊂ P or P ⊃ S

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 2 SEP

S S
a,b,c, g,h, P S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}

d,e,f I,j,k
P = {g,h,i,j,k}
∴S P

3 SIP

S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {b,c,d,g,h,i}
S∩P = {b,c,d}
4 SOP

S* = {a,b,c}
P = {m,n,g,h}

Now we are in a position to examine the fourth group. It requires a little explication to
understand the status of O with regard to distribution. In this instance S* is incomplete, i.e.,
undistributed and P is completely excluded by S*. It shows that P is distributed. Let us see how
this happens.

1. Let S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
2. Let S* = {a,b,c}; there is no information on d, e and f.
3. S* ⊆ S (S* ≤ S); S* is smaller than or equal to S. It also means that S* is only a subset, not a
proper subset, of S.
4. Let S – S* = S** (S** ≥ Φ ) or S = S* + S**
‘Φ’ reads phi which stands for null set.

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5. S** ⊆ P
6. S* || S**; || means that elements of subsets S* and S** are different.

∴ S* || P
∴ Elements of S* and P are different.

John Venn followed a very different method. We shall begin with this proposition.

9 All rabbits are herbivorous – RAH.

Since rabbits are animals, the universe of discourse is, obviously, ‘animals’. Venn represents the
universe of discourse with a rectangle. If rabbits are the elements of the set R, then all other
animals than rabbits constitute the complement of the set R. Complement of R is represented by
R and the same explanation holds good for all classes. Now a new term is introduced, viz.,
‘product class’. Any product class is an intersection of two or more than two sets (as far as logic
is concerned, the number is restricted to three). {RH} is the product class of R and H. Such
product classes may or may not be null sets. But {R R }, {H H } (for example, the set of animals
which are rabbits and other than rabbits at the same time) are invariably null sets. When there are
two terms, we get four product classes, which are as follows.

1 { RH } Set of rabbits, which are herbivorous.

2 { RH } Set of rabbits, which are not herbivorous.
3 { RH } Set of animals other than rabbits, which are herbivorous.
4 { RH } Set of animals which are neither rabbits nor herbivorous.

It is pertinent to note that if there are three terms, then there are not six product classes, but eight
product classes. If x is the number of terms, then 2x is the number of product classes. Now the
time is ripe to introduce Venn’s diagrams.
Fig.1 Fig.2
SAP SEP

SP = Φ SP = Φ

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Fig.3 Fig.4
SIP SOP

SP ≥ 1 SP ≥1
Or or
SP ≠ Φ S P≠ Φ
The statement (proposition is also called statement), ‘All rabbits are herbivorous’, does not really
mean that there are rabbits and all those rabbits are herbivorous. On the other hand, the statement
really means that if there are rabbits, then, they are herbivorous. Clearly, it means that in the set
{ }
of non-herbivorous not a single rabbit can be found. Therefore RH is a null set. Similarly, the
statement ‘No rabbits are herbivorous’ – (REH) indicates that in the set of herbivorous not a
single rabbit can be found. Therefore {RH} is a null set. In Figures 1 and 2, those parts of the
circle or circles which represent null sets are shaded. RAH and REH only demonstrate that there
are null sets, but they are silent on non-null sets. Therefore an important conclusion is imminent;
universal propositions do not carry existential import.

It is widely held that all scientific laws are universal. An important fall-out of this assumption is
that if universal propositions do not carry existential import, then it also means that scientific
laws do not carry existential import in which case they apply only to non-existing entities.
Therefore all physical objects only approximate to these laws. A scientific law, when stated in
absolute terms, has to be construed as a limiting point.

The case of particular proposition is different. The statement ‘Some rabbits are herbivorous –
RIH’ is true only when ‘there exists at least one rabbit which is herbivorous, not otherwise.
Therefore the product class {RH} is a non-null set. On the same lines, it can be easily shown
{ }
that ROH shows that RH is also a non-null set. Therefore particular propositions carry
existential import.
Let us proceed on a different line. Verbal description makes room for symbolic representation
because this method proves to be a boon at a later stage.

RAH: (∀x) {x∈R) => (x ∈ H)}

11
REH: (∀x) {x∈R) => (x∉H)}; ∉ is read ‘not an element of’
RIH: (∃x) ∋{(x∈R) Λ (x∈H)}; ∃x is read ‘there exists at least one x; ∋ is read ‘such that’.
ROH: (∃x) ∋{(x∈R) Λ (x∉H)}

∀ is known as universal quantifier and ∃ is known as existential quantifier. (x) can also be used
in place of (∀x).

1.6 SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

This is one type of immediate inference because in this type of inference conclusion is drawn
from one premise only. Eduction is another word used for immediate inference Opposition is a
kind of logical relation wherein propositions ‘stand against’ one another in terms of truth-value
when they have the same subject and the same predicate, but differ in quantity or quality or both.
Traditional logic called this relation square of opposition because these relations are represented
by a square. Four such relations are discussed in Aristotelian system.

1. Contradiction: When two propositions differ in both ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, the relation is
called contradiction, e.g. ‘All men are wise’ (A) – ‘Some men are not wise’ (O). It is the most
complete form of logical opposition because they are neither true nor false together. If one is
true, the other is necessarily false and vice versa. This sort of self - contradiction is due to
incompatibility between respective statements. Similarly, the statements, ‘No men are wise’ (E)
– ‘Some men are wise’ (I) are contradictory.
2. Contrariety: When two universal propositions differ only in ‘quality’, the opposition is called
contrary; e.g. ‘All men are wise’ (A) – ‘No men are wise’ (E). By definition, both contraries can
be false – precisely as in the example given – but they cannot be true at the same time. If one of
them is true, the other must necessarily be false, but if one is false, the other may be true or false.
One kind of proposition called singular proposition (also called simple), whose S is proper name,
has no contrary and its contradiction differs only in quality. One example is ‘Jo is bad – Jo is not
bad’. Another example is ‘The author of Hamlet, is an Englishman and ‘The author of Hamlet’ is
not an Englishman.

3. Subcontrariety: When two particular propositions differ only in ‘quality’, the opposition is
called subcontrariety. E.g. ‘Some men are wise’ (I) – ‘Some men are not wise’ (O). Subcontrary
propositions can be true together – as in the example given, but they cannot be false at the same
time. If one of them is true, the other may be true or false, but if one of them is false, the other
must necessarily be true. The inverse order of ‘contrary’ and ‘subcontrary’ propositions is
evident.

12
 4 Subaalternation: W When two proposition
p s differ onlyy in ‘quantiity’ (one is uuniversal annd the otherr
is particcular), the oopposition iss called subbalternation,, e.g. ‘All men
m are wisee’ (A) - ‘Some men aree
wise’ (II). Notice thhat ‘subalterrn’ proposittions can bee true togethher or false ttogether. And
A this is to o
say thatt though froom the truth of the univversal, one can c infer thee truth of thhe particularr the reversee
order do oes not holdd, namely thhat from thee truth of thhe particularr, one cannoot infer the truth of thee
universal. On the other
o hand, though from m the falsityy of the partticular, one can infer thhe falsity off
the univversal, one cannot
c inferr the falsity of the partiicular from the falsity oof the univeersal.

This type of
o relation iss expressed in the form
m of a squaree.

The following twoo schemes and a one diaggram offer visual

v aid too retain moore easily in
n mind whatt
we havee just said aabout the ‘oppposition’ of
o propositioons:

For thee sake of siimplicity thhe truth - reelation whiich holds good
g betweeen various relations iss
provideed in a nutshhell.

Inferencces in Subalternation

From truth of universaal Æ truth of

o particularr
From truth of particulaar /Æ truth of
o universal

From falsityy of particuular Æ falsity of universaal

From falsityy of universsal /Æ falsity of particulaar

Æ: Cann infer
/Æ: Cannnot infer

II. Mneemonic Devvice for rem

membering
g the Squarre of Oppossition (Land
der Univerrsity,
Greenwwood).

A. If yoou picture G
God at the toop of the squuare of opposition and the Devil aat the bottom
m of the
square and
a remembber the phraase ‘both caannot be ...’ for contrariies and subccontraries, the
t
followinng mnemonnic device might
m be hellpful.

133
B. The big ‘X’ acrooss the centter of the Sq
quare repressents contraadictories with oppositee truth –
values. This shouldd be very eaasy to rememmber.

C. Since God (or trruth) is at th

he top of thee diagram, bboth contrarries ‘cannott be true.’

D. Sincce the Devil (or falsity) is at the bo

ottom of the diagram, both
b subconttraries ‘cann
not be
false’.

E. With
h subalternaation, God can send trutth down, bu
ut we canno
ot know whaat it means for
f God to
send fallsity down (hence
( this would be in
ndeterminatte).

But, thee Devil can send falsity

y up (since this
t is what Devils are good at), annd we canno
ot know
what it means for the Devil to o send truth
h up. So thiss relation is indeterminaate.

III. ‘Boouncing Arround the Square

S of Opposition.
O ’
Suppose we know that O (Som me S is not P)
P is false. IIn how man ny ways cann we determ mine the
truth - value
v of I (‘Some S is P’)?
P
There are
a four way ys of determ
mining the truth-value.
t These fourr ways consiist in travellling
between n different ppoints (heree the propossitions are points). The four routes are as folloows.
(Noticee that we coould set an itinerary
i of our journeyy along the selected
s fouur routes. Thhe ‘reason,’’
given below, is, so to speak, ouro ‘inferencce ticket’ foor travel Cf. Lander Unniversity, Grreenwood).
Originnating Pointt Througgh Teerminating Point
P
1 SOOP Direcct SIP
2 SOOP SEP SIP
3 SOOP SAP to SEP SIP
4 SOOP SEP and
a SAP SIP

Route 1: O to I

Statemeent of Reason T
Truth -Valuee

1. Somee S is not P. Given false

2. Somee S is P. su
ubcontrariety
y true

Routee 2: O to I th
hrough E

Statem
ment Reason Truth - Value
V
1. Somee S is not P. given false
2. No S is P. su
ubalternatio
on false

14
4
3 Some S is P. contradictory true

Route 3: O to I through A and E

Statement Reason Truth - Value

1. Some S is not P. given false
2 All S is P. contradictory true
3. No S is P. contrariety false
4. Some S is P. contradictory true
One would think that if our logic were consistent, all possible routes from the false O to I would
result in a false truth - value for the I. But consider the following case--Route 4.

Route 4: O to I through E and A

Statement Reason Truth -Value

1. Some S is not P. given false
2. No S is P. subalternation false
3. All S is P. contrariety indeterminate
4. Some S is P. subalternation indeterminate

Variance of truth-value in the fourth instance of I proposition indicates a hidden part of the
nature of immediate inferences. There is no technique to determine the truth-value of the
conclusion when the premise is indeterminate. The logical relations involve deduction but not
reflection. Change in quantity or quality affects logical force. The logical force, consequently,
differs from one proposition to another. Further, the truth - value of the conclusion depends upon
the logical force of the given proposition. These factors explain variance in truth - value in the
above mentioned instance.

Traditional logic ignored asymmetry involved in universal – particular relation which was
pointed out by Susan Stebbing. On this ground, she replaced square by a figure:

Gaps at four corners point to asymmetry in this interpretation. The truth of A (or E) implies the
truth of I (or O), but the reverse order does not hold good. On the other hand, the falsity of I (or
O) implies the falsity of A (or E), but the reverse order does not hold good. This is what
precisely asymmetry is. These gaps, distinct lines for superaltern and subaltern relations and
unequal lines make this figure of opposition.

15
At this stage, it is important to become familiar with two other types of relation called
conversion and obversion. They are also known as equivalent relation because the truth-value of
both the premise and the conclusion remains the same, i.e. if the premise is true, the conclusion
is true and if the premise is false, the conclusion is also false. When there is a change in the
structure of sentences, on some occasions meaning remains unchanged. It only means that the
very same information is provided in different ways. Recognition of this simple fact helps us in
testing accurately the validity of arguments and also in avoiding confusions. There are two
primary forms of equivalent relation; conversion and obversion. The conclusion in conversion is
called converse and in obversion obverse. The processes of conversion and obversion are quite
simple. These operations deserve a close scrutiny.
Conversion: This is governed by three laws.
1st Law: S and P must be transposed.
After transposition P becomes subject and S becomes predicate. This is the 1st stage.
2nd Law: Quality of propositions should remain constant. If the premise is affirmative, the
conclusion must be affirmative. If the premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative.
3rd Law: A term, which is undistributed in the premise, should remain undistributed in the
conclusion. It can be stated in another way also. A term can be distributed in the conclusion
only if it is distributed in the premise. However, a term, which is distributed in the premise, may
or may not be distributed in the conclusion. The following examples illustrate these rules.
10 All philosophers are kings PAK
Converse: ∴ Some kinks are philosophers. KIP
11 No vegetables are harmful. VEH
Converse: ∴ No harmful things are vegetables. HEV
12 Some women are talkative. WIT
Converse: ∴ Some talkative people are women. TIW
There are three aspects to be noted. Conversion of A is conversion by limitation because the
quantity is reduced from universal to particular after conversion. Secondly, conversion of E and I
is simple because in these cases S and P are just transposed and no other change takes place.
Thirdly, while A, E and I have conversion, O does not have conversion. What happens when A
undergoes simple conversion and O is converted? In these cases conversion leads to a fallacy
called fallacy of illicit conversion. Fallacy in formal logic arises when a rule is violated. In both
these cases conversion violates a rule or rules.
Consider these statements.
13 All Europeans are white.
∴ All white people are Europeans.
14 Some gods are not powerful.
∴ Some powerful beings are not gods.

16
Conversion in these two cases is invalid because the terms, ‘white’ and ‘gods’ are distributed in
the respective conclusions while they are undistributed in the respective premises. This type of
conversion violates the third law. The terms ‘white’ and ‘gods’ remain undistributed in the
premises since the former is the predicate of an affirmative premise while the latter is the subject
of a particular premise. If we obtain affirmative converse from a negative premise in order to
undistibute predicate term, then we violate the second law of conversion. It only means that
when A undergoes simple conversion and when O is converted, in the case of A the third law is
violated and in the case of O second or third law of conversion, as the case may be is violated.
Therefore A becomes I after conversion and ‘O’ has no conversion.

Obversion: This is one technique of preserving the meaning of a statement after effecting
change of quality. The procedure is very simple; change the quality of the premise and
simultaneously replace the predicate by its complementary. We apply this law to the premises
(A, E, I, and O) to obtain the conclusions. The conclusion is called obversion.

15 All players are experts. PAE

∴No players are non-experts. PE E
16 No musicians are novelists. MEN
∴All musicians are non-novelists. MA N
17 Some scholars are women. SIW
∴ Some scholars are not non-women. SO W
18 Some strangers are not helpful. SO H
∴Some stranger are non-helpful. SI H

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1 Give symbolic representation of propositions? What do the symbols stand for?
.......................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................... ..........................
...........................
2. Determine all possible product classes of the following terms and their complements.

a) players and experts b) philosophers and kings c) fruits and vegetables d) actors and directors
........................... .................................................................................................................

17
1.7 LET US SUM UP

The basic units of argument are terms and proposition. All words are not terms; all terms are
words. All sentences are not propositions; all propositions are sentences. Subject and predicate
are the constituents of categorical proposition according to Aristotle. There are four kinds of
categorical proposition. Distribution of a term means total extension. Euler and Venn interpreted
distribution diagrammatically. Square of opposition, conversion and obversion are three kinds of
immediate inference.

1.8 KEY WORDS

Supposition: A ‘supposition’ of a word is the function or the use of a word has in a

presupposition depending on the intention of the speaker.
Term: Any word or group of words that stands for the subject or the predicate of a proposition.
Proposition: A statement affirming or denying something of somebody.

Categorical proposition: It is a proposition in which the predicate is affirmed or denied

unconditionally of all or part of the subject.
Copula: A ‘copula’ joins the subject and the predicate of the preposition. Normally it is the verb
‘is’ or ‘is not’.

1.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981].

Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Logic. 10th ed. New Jersy, 1998.
Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2007.
‘Introduction to Logic,’ University of Lander, http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/index.html,
accessed July, 2010.
Priest, Graham. Logic: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2001.
Shand, John. Arguing Well. London. Routledge, 2000.
Zegarelli, Mark. Logic For Dummies. New York: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated, 2006.

18
UNIT 2 CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

Contents:
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Reason and Inference: Meaning and Objections
2.3 Kinds of Inference
2.4 Deductive Reasoning and Syllogism
2.5 Kinds of Syllogism
2.6 Let Us Sum Up
2.7 Key Words
2.8 Further Readings and References

2.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit introduces you to the essence of Aristotelian logic. Since syllogism is the most
important form of inference, you ought to have a background of the nature of inference and
various issues associated with it. One objective of this unit is to give a brief explanation of the
nature of deductive inference and contrast it with inductive inference. Another objective is to
analyze different kinds of syllogism to enable you to understand variety in syllogism.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Categorical syllogism is the essence of traditional logic. This form of inference is called mediate
inference because the conclusion is drawn from two premises. Further, this is called categorical
because all propositions involved are categorical. Since syllogistic inference is nearly identical
with deductive inference, an exhaustive analysis of inference is required as a prelude to a proper
understanding of syllogism.

2.2 REASON AND INFERENCE: MEANING AND OBJECTIONS

Reasoning consists, essentially, in the employment of intellect, in its ability to ‘see’ beyond, and
within as well, what is available to senses. Reasoning, therefore, is a sort of bridge which
connects ‘unknown’ with ‘known’. While reasoning is regarded so, inference is regarded as the
process involved in extracting what is unknown from what is known. Reasoning is essentially a
psychological process which is, undoubtedly, not the concern of logic. Therefore some logicians
thought it proper to replace reasoning with inference. However, this replacement did not improve
matters much. The reason is obvious. If all human beings stop thinking, then there will be
nothing like inference. This dependence shows that inference is as much a psychological activity
as reasoning is. What is psychological is necessarily subjective. Logic, in virtue of its close
association with knowledge, has nothing to do with anything that is subjective. Therefore it was
imperative for logicians to discover an escape route.

1
Cohen and Nagel for this particular reason chose to use ‘implication’ instead of ‘inference’. The
difference in kind can be understood easily when we look at the usage. Statements always
‘imply’ but do not ‘infer’. Therefore implication is in the nature of relation between statements.
On the other hand, I ‘infer’, but I do not ‘imply’. This clearly shows that inference is an activity
of mind. Salmon fell in line with Cohen and Nagel when he said that the very possibility of
inference depends upon reasoning. Despite the fact that inference is subjective, logicians like
Copi, Carnap, Russell, etc., chose to retain the word inference. But, all along, they only meant
implication. Therefore keeping these restrictions in our mind let us use freely the word
‘inference’.

Though the use of the word ‘reason’ is not much rewarding, the word ‘reasonableness’ has some
weight. We often talk about reasonableness of the conclusion. In this context reasonableness
means ‘grounds of acceptability’. Surely, in this restricted sense, reasonableness is objective just
as inference is.

2.3 KINDS OF INFERENCE

In a broad sense, there are two kinds of inference; deductive and inductive. Deductive inference
regards the form or structure as primary and therefore it is called formal logic (inference and
logic are interchangeable). It remains to be seen what form means. Inductive logic regards matter
or content of argument as primary. Some logicians, like Cohen and Nagel, did not regard
induction as logic at all. Without considering the merits and demerits of their arguments, let us
consider briefly the characteristics of these two kinds.

Our study of formal logic begins with the distinction between truth and falsehood on the one
hand, and validity and invalidity on the other. This particular distinction is very prominent. Only
statements are true (or false) whereas only arguments are valid (or invalid). This distinction will
take us to this table.

Table 1:

Statements Arguments
1) True Valid
2) True Invalid
3) False Valid
4) False Invalid

This table helps us to understand the following possibility. a) A valid argument (1 and 3) may
consist of completely true statements or completely false statements. b) An invalid argument (2
and 4), similarly, may consist of statements in exactly the same manner mentioned above. It
shows that truth and validity, on the one hand, and falsity and invalidity, on the other, do not
coincide always. Similarly, we have to distinguish between material truth and logical truth.
Material truth is what characterizes matter of fact. Logical truth is determined by the structure of
argument. We shall consider examples which correspond to four combinations (see table1). Let

2
us call premises p1, p2, etc. and conclusion q.
Arg1:
p1: No foreigners are voters.
p2: All Europeans are foreigners.
q: ∴No Europeans are voters.
Arg2:
p1: Some poets are literary figures.
p2: All play writers are literary figures.
q: ∴Some play writers are poets.
Arg3:
p1: All politicians are ministers.
p2: Medha Patkar is a politician.
q: ∴Medha Patkar is a minister.
Arg4: p1: 3 is the cube root of – 27.
p2: - 27 is the cube root of 729.
q:∴ 3 is the cube root of 729.
These four arguments apply to arguments 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1 respectively. First and third
arguments have a definite structure in virtue of which they are held to be valid. Second and
fourth arguments have a different structure which makes them invalid. When an argument is
valid, the premise or premises imply the conclusion. If there is no implication, then the argument
is invalid. Validity is governed by a certain rule which is represented in a tabular form. [Let us
designate ‘true’ by ‘1’ and ‘false’ by ‘0’ as a matter convention].
p q
1) T(1) T(1) Valid
2) F(0) F(0) Valid
3) F(0) T(1) Valid
4) T(1) F(0) Invalid

We can also say that the premises necessitate the conclusion and when they necessitate the
conclusion there is implication. In this case, necessity is of a particular kind, viz., logical
necessity. Therefore, when there is implication, conclusion is necessarily true and vice versa.
Very often, deductive logic is identified with mathematical model. It is generally admitted that in
both these disciplines information provided by the conclusion is the same as the one provided by
the premises. It means that both are characterized by material identity. Deductive logic,
therefore, is an example for tautology. This characterization is highly significant and is in need
of some elaboration.

If, one can ask, the conclusion does not go beyond premises (it may go below or well within) and
no new information is acquired in the process, then why argue and what is the use of arguments?
The answer is very simple. Knowledge is not the same as mere acquisition of information. In
other words novelty is not a measure of knowledge. The legend is that Socrates extracted a
geometrical theorem from a slave purported to be totally ignorant of mathematics. The moral is
that knowledge is within, not in the sense in which brain or liver is within. Knowledge is the
outcome of critical attitude. It is discovered, not invented and so goes an ancient Indian maxim:
eliminate ignorance and become enlightened. If what is said is not clear, then consider this path.
Deductive argument helps us to know what is latent in the premises, i.e., the meaning of the

3
premises. It is an excursion into the analysis of their meaning or meanings. And the conclusion is
an expression of the same. If so, it is easy to see how the denial of the conclusion in such a case
amounts to denying the meaning or meanings of the premises which were accepted earlier. What
is called self-contradiction is exactly the same as the combination of the denial of the conclusion
and the acceptance of the premises. Therefore we say that a valid deductive argument is
characterized by logical necessity. If so a deductive argument is always true. This is the meaning
of tautology.

At this stage, two terms are introduced: analytic and a priori. Consider this example: ‘all men
with no hair on their heads are bald’. We know that this statement is true in virtue of the meaning
of the word ‘bald’; not otherwise. Such a statement is called analytic. In such statements the
predicate term (here ‘bald’) is contained in the subject term (here ‘men with no hair on their
heads’). Knowledge obtained from an analytic statement is necessarily a priori, meaning
knowledge prior to sense experience. In philosophical parlance, all analytic statements are
necessarily a priori. Deductive logic provides knowledge a priori, though the premises and the
conclusion considered independently are not analytic. It is the knowledge of the relation between
the premises and the conclusion which is a priori. Therefore deductive argument and analytic
statement share a common characteristic; in both the cases the denial leads to self-contradiction.

How can we say that deductive logic provides a priori knowledge? Consider an example.
Arg. 5: All saints are pious.
All philosophers are saints.
∴All philosophers are pious.
Evidently, there is no need to examine saints and philosophers to know that the conclusion is
true. Indeed, it is not even necessary that there should be saints who are pious as well as
philosophers. This being the case, arg. 5 takes the following form without leading to any
distortion of meaning.
Arg. 5a: If all saints are pious and all philosophers are saints, then all philosophers are pious.
The argument is transformed into a statement which involves relation. Implication (the present
relation is one such) is such that without the aid of sense experience, but with the laws of formal
logic alone, it enables us to derive the conclusion. Thus like an analytic statement, a valid
deductive argument provides a priori knowledge and hence it is devoid of novelty. It is this sort
of relation that precisely describes the relation between the premises and the conclusion in
deductive inference. This does not mean that deductive argument is absolutely certain. This is
because necessity is a logical property whereas certainty is a psychological state. The former is
objective and the latter is subjective.

When sense experience takes back seat, reason becomes the prime means of acquiring
knowledge. Following the footsteps of Descartes, who is regarded as the father of rationalism,
we can conclude, somewhat loosely, that deductive logic is rational. So we have sketched three
characteristics; logical necessity, a priori and rational. There is a thread which runs through these
characteristics. Therefore one character presupposes another.

Deductive argument is characterized by qualitative difference in opposition to quantitative

difference, i.e. the difference between valid and invalid arguments is only in kind but not in
degree. Further, validity is not a matter of degree. Let us make matters clear: a valid argument

4
cannot become more valid in virtue of the addition of premise or premises. On the other hand, if
any one premise is taken out of a valid argument, then the argument does not become ‘less
valid’; it simply becomes invalid. So an argument is either valid or invalid. A valid argument is
always satiated. In other words, the premises in a valid argument constitute the necessary and
sufficient conditions to accept the conclusion. An argument is invalid due to a ‘missing link’ in
the class of premises. Deductive argument, therefore, is regarded as demonstrative argument.
Acceptance of premises leaves no room for any reasonable or meaningful doubt.

We have learnt that validity is an important facet of deductive logic. Any account of validity is
incomplete without considering Strawson’s analysis of the nature of deductive logic. Strawson
lists three aspects of formal logic: generality, form and system. Generality is distinguishable,
clearly, from matter. Generality means that individual is not the subject matter of logic. Formal
logic concerns only with the relation between statements, but not objects. It is futile to embark
upon a study involving objects because such a study has only beginning but no end. Consider
two examples,
Arg. 6:
p1: The author of Abhijnana Shakuntala was in the court of king Bhoja.
p2: Kalidasa is the author of Abhijnana Shakuntala.
q : ∴Kalidasa was in the court of king Bhoja.

Arg. 7:
p1: The author of Monadology was in the court of the queen of Prussia.
p2: Leibniz is the author of Monadology.
q: ∴Leibniz was in the court of the queen of Prussia.
It is easy to decide prima facie that the structure of these arguments is identical. The difference
consists in subject matter only and it is possible to construct, at least theoretically, countless
arguments having an identical structure. Obviously, this is not a profitable exercise. The essence
of formal logic consists in saying that p1 & p2 together imply q or that q follows from or entails
p1 and p2 together. Only implication and entailment are relevant here. Strawson has made this
aspect very clear. Implication or entailment is independent of subject matter. Therefore it is
impossible to identify the subject matter in virtue of recognition of implication. This point can be
further clarified with the help of variables. Let us represent Abhijnana Shakunthala or
Monadology with x, Kalidasa or Leibniz with y and queen of Prussia or King Bhoja with z. Now
the argument takes this form.
Arg 7a : p1: The author of x was in the court of z.
p2: y is the author of x.
q : ∴y was in the court of z.
In this particular context, without knowing the contents of x, y, and z we can know that p1 and
p2 together imply q. Therefore it is possible to determine the validity or invalidity of an
argument without knowing the contents of the argument.

Let us call such forms logical forms. A logical form has two components: variables and
constants. x, y, z etc are variables. In the case of categorical proposition the words all, some, no
and not are constants. In the final analysis, the structure of an argument is determined by
constants, but not variables. The dependence of the laws of an argument on constants is
illustrated in this way. In life science the classification of animals is an important topic. The

5
anatomical features of birds and aquatic creatures differ and there is difference in the function of
those organs. Just as birds have some organs in common, aquatic creatures have certain other
organs in common. These common organs correspond to constants and individual creatures
correspond to variables. Similarly, every class of argument has definite constants. Just as the
structure of birds is different from the structure of aquatic creatures, the structure of one class of
arguments is different from the structure of some other class of arguments. The laws which
explain the function of the organs of birds are different from the laws which explain the function
of the organs of aquatic creatures. Similarly, in the case of arguments when the structure of an
argument differs from that of another, the corresponding laws also differ from one another.

Integration of rules is another characteristic of formal logic. The structures of argument and rules
are mutually dependent. If it is possible to decide the structure of an argument and also different
classes of arguments, then is possible to achieve what is called formalization or systematization
because formalization enables us to make a complete list of rules and also classify them so as to
correlate them with respective arguments..

On the contrary, induction, in the first place, stands for any non-demonstrative argument where
the premises, irrespective of their number, do not and cannot constitute conclusive evidences for
the conclusion. The word ‘induction’ is the translation of what Aristotle called ‘epagoge’. C.S.
Peirce used the term ‘ampliative’ for epagoge because in this type of argument the conclusion
always goes beyond the premises and the premises offer, at best, reasonable grounds to ‘believe’
such conclusion. Belief is not the same as proof, a distinction which was, more often than not,
completely ignored by the protagonists of induction. Nor is it a measure of proof. This is one
difference. Secondly, uncertainty and sense experience characterize inductive argument. Let us
consider the latter first. Inductive inference begins with sense experience. The premises,
therefore, can be called ‘observation-statements’ which directly result from experience.
However, the conclusion is not an observation-statement because it overshoots the material
provided by observation– statements, which is why they cannot justify the conclusion. No matter
how many black crows I have seen, they cannot prove that ‘all crows are black.’

At the stage, it is necessary to dispel a widespread and deep-rooted misconception. It is claimed

erroneously that inductive argument always produces universal statement. On the contrary, what
it provides is a statement which simply depends upon experience for further verification, but in
itself is not an experiential statement. On some occasions, experience vouches for the conclusion,
but on some other occasions, it does not. For example, considering the fact that, today I observed
5384 black crows, I may conclude that ‘tomorrow I will observe the same number of black
crows’. This type of conclusion is characterized by a sort of leap, leap from ‘observed to
unobserved or unobservable’. This is called inductive leap or simply generalization. But this is
not a universal statement as understood by traditional logic. It shows that induction is just
inconceivable in the absence of generalization though universal proposition is not necessary for
an inference to become inductive. It is possible to construct a universal statement within the
limits of sense experience without involving generalization, for example, when I conclude after
close scrutiny that every book in the library is a hardback edition. This has nothing to do with
induction. Therefore inductive inference may or may not yield universal proposition though it
has to yield necessarily generalization.

6
The examples considered above are future-oriented and in principle, they are verifiable.
However, inductive inference need not be so always. It can also be past-oriented which is surely,
‘unverifiable’. History, Anthropology, Geology, etc. consist of arguments which are past-
oriented. But the mechanism, involved in both the cases is exactly the same. Therefore the prime
characteristic of induction is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises
and that experience precedes inference which means that inductive inference is dubitable and a
posteriori. Whatever knowledge we acquire ‘after experience’, or whatever depends upon
experience is called a posteriori as opposed to a priori.

Uncertainty or dubious nature and a posteriori knowledge provided by inductive logic entitle it to
be called empirical- again loosely- a characteristic disputed by Popper. The uncertainty of
inductive conclusion brought in another term basic to the philosophy of science, viz.
‘probability’. According to some inductivists all inductive conclusions are only probable. It is
important to distinguish validity and probability. As mentioned earlier, validity is not a matter of
degree, whereas probability is a matter of degree. Therefore an inductive inference may be less
probable or highly probable.

2.4 DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND SYLLOGISM

In Aristotelian sense, syllogism is the kind of logical form to which every deductive inference is
reducible. On most of the occasions, when people reason, they reason in methods in which some
logical pattern runs as undercurrent. It is only logicians who discover these undercurrents
because they are capable of critical examination of these undercurrents. The so-called logical
pattern is extracted from a lay-man’s method. A system is evolved by formalizing apparently
disparate arguments. The difference in these methods is clearly perceptible. The difference is that
a logician determines the standard-form which such argument or arguments take whereas a lay-
man is unaware of such standard-form. A logician’s method generalizes various arguments and it
helps in discovering the common form to which all such arguments subscribe. It is important
remember that the process of generalization is an important characteristic of formal logic.
Otherwise, logic will be looked upon as a mere rhetoric and therefore with no practical value. If
this is the way logic is evaluated, then anyone will conclude that it is far removed from the way
people, as a matter of fact, talk and argue which is, no doubt, far from truth.

Logical analysis of syllogism

To make clear what we have just said, let us contrast these methods.
A Lay-man’s method: ‘Does God exist? Of course, he does not! No one has ever seen him,
heard him, talked to him; has any one?’

B Logician’s method:
8 All bodies which exist are perceivable. B AP
God is not perceivable. GEP
∴ God is not a body which exists. ∴G E B

7
A Lay-man’s method: ‘Was the Neanderthal a man? Yes he was. In fact we have proof to
assert that he made tools, could paint, lived in groups etc.’

B Logician’s method:

9 All beings who make tools, can paint, live in groups, etc. are men. BAM
The Neanderthal was a being who made tools, could paint, lived in groups, etc. N A B
∴The Neanderthal was a man. ∴ NAM

What do we notice in these arguments? We notice that these arguments consist of three
propositions (each with an S and a P). The statement to be proved is found in the last place in
logical sense, and hence its technical name is ‘conclusion’; the other two propositions function
as reasons. Hence their logical name is ‘premise’. Premises are found at the very beginning,
again in logical sense. The order of the statements, therefore, is immaterial. Suppose that the
conclusion appears at the end, as it happens generally. Then the conclusion is immediately
preceded by words like therefore, as a result, hence, consequently, etc. It indicates that the
‘consequentia’ (the inference itself, as distinct from the ‘consequence’ which is another word for
‘conclusion’) is valid. The conclusion can as well appear at the very beginning in which case it is
immediately succeeded by words like because, for etc. Any of these words in italics functions as
a bridge connecting the premises with the conclusion. Further, we notice that at least one
evidence is in the form of general principle which is invariably a universal proposition (‘For
somebody to exist….. in the first example and ‘A man is one…’ in the second example) and also
that it is applied it to a particular case. Consequently, syllogism is invalid in the absence of
universal proposition.

A close look at arguments considered above reveals an interesting aspect. Though there are three
propositions, there are only three terms. Each term occurs twice in the arguments. These terms
are named as follows. S and P of the conclusion are called the minor term (S) (or simply minor)
and major term (P) (or simply major) respectively. The premise in which the minor occurs is
called the minor premise and the premise in which the major occurs is called the major premise.
One term is common to both the premises. This is called the middle term (M). In the first
example ‘God’ is minor , ‘bodies which exist’ is major and ‘perceivable’ is middle and in the
second example ‘Neanderthal’ is minor, ‘man’ is major and ‘beings who…groups’ is middle.
Again, order of premises does not matter though, generally, major finds the first place.

Aristotle had convincing reason to choose these names. While the major has maximum
extension, minor has minimum extension. The middle is so called because its extension varies
between the limits set by the minor and the major. Aristotle argued that our inference proceeds
from minor to major through middle. This explains the meaning of mediate inference.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space for your answers.

8
1. Compare and contrast deduction and induction. ................................. ...............................
............................. .......................... ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................

............................. .....................................................
2. In a syllogism how do you relate the major, minor and middle terms?
........................................................................................................................ ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................

2.5 KINDS OF SYLLOGISM

Syllogism is a class name with several subclasses. The classification is determined by constants.
The types of constants vary from one class of syllogism to another class. Categorical syllogism is
an important subclass. In this subclass propositions with their constituent terms are variables and
quality and quantity of propositions are constants. Variables, i.e., propositions and their
constituent terms do not determine the logical status, i.e., validity or invalidity of arguments
because change of propositions does not affect the logical status as long as quality and quantity
remain the same. Only the latter determine the logical status of arguments. This is an important
aspect of formal logic. Let us first assume that every letter stands for a unique term and then
examine the following arguments.
1 Categorical syllogism:
10 All X are Y. 11 All P are Q. 12 All M are N.
All Y are Z. All Q are S. All N are O.
∴ All X are Z. ∴ All P are S. ∴ All M are O.
The logical status of 10, 11, and12 remains unchanged though terms differ. If terms are
different, then propositions also are different. In these arguments ‘All’ and ‘are’ are constants.
Suppose that ‘All’ is replaced ‘No’ in both the premises of 10. Then the argument becomes
invalid though variables remain unchanged. Even when the argument remains valid, its structure
may vary. This will become evident in the following example.

13 Some X are Y.
All Y are Z.
∴ Some X are Z.
The structure of 10 and 13 are different. It shows that the axioms which determine the logical
status of syllogism deal with quantity and quality of propositions and in turn distribution of
terms. ‘Some’ and ‘not’ are other constants. Constants mentioned above determine the structure
of categorical syllogism.

9
Before we turn to other subclass of syllogism called conditional syllogism we should consider an
important aspect. Modern logic makes a distinct classification of propositions; simple, general
and compound. If a grammatical sentence expresses one and only one proposition, then it is
simple. Categorical proposition is called general in modern logic and conditional proposition,
which is called compound in modern logic, is a combination of two or more than two
propositions of any kind. Those propositions which constitute a compound proposition are
components of such proposition. Several propositions are compounded using constants. Each
constant determines the species which belongs to this subclass. Let us restrict ourselves to
conditional syllogism and postpone further discussion of categorical syllogism to a later stage.

There are three kinds of conditional syllogisms which are discussed briefly.

2. Pure Hypothetical Syllogism (P. H. S.): In this subclass of syllogism all propositions are
hypothetical. They are called hypothetical because they express a condition. The words if ….
then constitute the condition and also constant because in the absence of this particular constant
the proposition ceases to be hypothetical. The statement which appears immediately after if is
called antecedent and the statement which appears immediately after then is called consequent.
P. H. S. is governed by one rule which says that one statement must be common to two premises.
If quality is constant, then it should appear in one premise as antecedent and in another as
consequent. The common statement can appear as antecedent in one and as consequent in
another provided it is affirmative in one and negative in another. In the latter case the conclusion
becomes negative.
P. H. S. is illustrated below.
14 If this party wins, then we shall have a good government. If A, then C.
If we shall have a good government, then we shall prosper. If C, then B.
∴Ιf this party wins, then we will prosper. ∴ If A, then B.
A and C constitute the components of the first premise, C and B constitute the components of
second and A and B constitute the components of the conclusion.

2 Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism (M. H. S.): If the major premise (usually the first one)
alone is hypothetical, then the syllogism is called M. H. S.. Second premise and the
conclusion are simple or general. M. H. S. is illustrated below.

15 If I do my duty, then I shall be happy. If A, then B.

I do my duty. A
∴ I shall be happy. ∴B

In these kinds, there is no ‘middle term’. However, middle term is replaced by a proposition
which is common to both the premises. In 14 ‘we shall have a good government’ is common to
both the premises and in 15 ‘I do my duty’ is common to both the premises. Hence we shall
introduce a new word; middle proposition. An important limitation should be noted at this stage
itself. It is fallacious to affirm B, in the minor premise instead of A and thereby affirm A in the
conclusion instead of B. It is a fallacy because it violates a rule of M. H. S. which states that
antecedent and consequent must be affirmed in the minor and the conclusion respectively. The
only legitimate alternative is to deny the consequent and the antecedent in the minor and the
conclusion respectively. In terms of prohibition it only means that the consequent and the

10
antecedent should not be affirmed in the minor and the conclusion respectively. When antecedent
and consequent are affirmed in the legitimate manner, the structure (technically known as mood)
of the argument is identified as Modus Ponendo Ponens (in brief Modus Ponens). When the
consequent and the antecedent are denied in the minor and the conclusion respectively, then the
structure is identified as Modus Tollendo Tollens ( in brief Modus Tollens). When we undertake a
study of symbolic logic, we will come to know the importance of these moods which are called
the Rules of Inference. If antecedent is denied in the minor instead of affirming, then the fallacy
committed is called the fallacy of denying the antecedent. If the consequent is affirmed in the
minor instead of denying, then the fallacy committed is called, the fallacy of affirming the
consequent. Modus Ponendo Ponens is illustrated by 15. The rest of the structures (both valid
and invalid) are given below.

Modus Tollendo Tollens

16 If C, then D.
not-D
∴ not-C

Fallacy of denying the antecedent Fallacy of affirming the consequent

17 If E, then F. 18 If G, then H.
not- E. H.
∴ not-F. ∴ G.

4. Disjunctive Syllogism (D.S.): In this subclass of syllogism the major premise (usually the first
one) expresses alternatives connected by connectives, ‘either… or’. So they are constants too.
Such a proposition is called disjunctive proposition. In disjunctive proposition the connective
either is implicit many times. Therefore its presence or absence does not alter the structure of the
proposition. Second premise and the conclusion are simple or general. In D.S. itself there are two
types. While regarding these two types the emphasis is on the connective or because as
mentioned above either is implicit many times. One use of or is called inclusive and another is
called exclusive. Or is used in inclusive sense if both alternatives are admissible and it is used in
exclusive sense when the alternatives are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive and the
acceptance of one alternative excludes the other. In the proposition ‘either he is stupid or
stubborn’ or is used in inclusive sense because the same person may be both stupid and stubborn.
However, in the proposition ‘either he is generous or miser’ or is used in exclusive sense because
no one can be both generous and miser at the same time. In order to bring both usages under one
class a rule is devised which says that one of the alternatives must be denied in the minor so that
the remaining alternative is affirmed in the conclusion. The following argument illustrates the
explanation.

19 Either he is stupid or stubborn. Either A or B .

He is not stupid. Not A.
∴ He is stubborn. ∴ B.
Here again there is no middle term. However, one component (A) appears in the first premise
in affirmative mode and in the second in negative mode. This occurrence corresponds to the
affirmative mode of common component in one premise and its negative mode in another in
PHS. A disjunctive argument with this structure is identified as Modus Tollendo Ponens.

11
In a disjunctive proposition the components are commutable, i.e., ‘either A or B’ means the same
as ‘either B or A’. Therefore in the minor premise any component can be denied. Affirming of a
component in the minor premise is not permissible. If this rule is violated, then the fallacy
committed is called the fallacy of Modus Ponendo Tollens. The following example illustrates this
fallacy.

20 Either I or J
I
∴ not-J
However, this is not a fallacy if the alternatives are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Describe the structure of Pure Hypothetical Syllogism with an example.

....................................................................................................................... ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................
2. Describe the structure of Disjunctive Syllogism with an example.
..................................................................................... ...........................

2.6 LET US SUM UP

Inference and implication are the essence of logic. Inference is psychological and implication is
logical. Deduction and induction are two forms of logic. Deduction is formal and induction is
material. Logical necessity characterizes the former and uncertainty characterizes the latter.
Categorical syllogism, P. H. S., M. H. S. and D.S. are the kinds of syllogism accepted by
traditional logic.

2.7 KEY WORDS

Inference: It is an operation of reason by which from some known truth we arrive at unknown
truth.
Major term: The term occurring in the predicate of the conclusion in a categorical syllogism.
Middle term: The term occurring in both the major and the minor premises of a standard-form
categorical syllogism.
Minor term: is the subject of the conclusion.

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Major premise: The premise of a categorical syllogism that contains an instance of the major
term and in conditional syllogism the conditional proposition.
Minor premise: The premise of a categorical syllogism that contains the minor term.

2.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981?].

Baronett, Stan. Logic. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2008.

Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2007.

Priest, Graham. Logic. New York: Sterling Publishing. 2010.

Yoder, Gil ‘Categorical Syllogisms’

http://www.oabs.org/classes/logic/categorical%20syllogisms.pdf accessed August 2, 2010.

13
UNIT 3 FIGURE, MOOD AND THE POSSIBLE TYPES OF SYLLOGISMS

Contents
3.0 Objectives
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Moods of Categorical Syllogism
3.3 Figures of Syllogism
3.4 Incomplete Syllogism and Compound Syllogism
3.5 Dilemma
3.6 Avoiding Dilemma
3.7 Let Us Sum Up
3.8 Key Words
3.9 Further Readings and References

3.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit proposes to introduce a very interesting aspect of syllogism, viz. figures and moods.
Through a study of figures and moods you will be in a position to gain an insight into the
intricacies of categorical syllogism. This is the main objective of this unit. Second objective is to
introduce you to the abridged and extended versions of syllogism.
Another equally important objective is to bring out the features of dilemma which is a sort of
pseudo- syllogism so that you will be in a position to contrast a genuine argument like syllogism
with a pseudo-argument. Thereby another objective is also served. Your acumen to evaluate the
logical significance is further sharpened. This is the most invaluable gift of logic.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Arguments are of complex nature. It is not possible to bring all arguments, even arguments of
one class, under a common head. A detailed analysis of syllogism reveals the hidden
complexities of the same. Such a study consists in the discussion of the structure of syllogism
which leads to figures and moods. A clear understanding of the structure of syllogism exposes
the wealth of syllogistic argument. As usual, the premises have to be taken as true, whether or
not they are factually true.

3.2 MOODS OF CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

In the previous unit a brief reference was made to what is known as ‘mood’. It is not possible to
fully appreciate the role played by moods in the study of syllogism without prior discussion of
what is known as figure. Figure and mood together determine the structure of syllogism. An
appraisal of the significance of structure in deductive inference in general and syllogism in

1
particular is made much easier when we deal with ‘figures and moods’ of syllogism. An analysis
of the structure of argument in deductive inference is a pre-requisite to the classification of
arguments into good (valid) and bad (invalid). Since the very function of logic is to distinguish
arguments in the aforesaid manner, a study of figure and mood occupies an important position in
our study of syllogism. In order to simplify the task, let us state the arguments in what is called
standard-form. Accordingly, the major premise is stated first followed by the minor premise and
ending with the conclusion. The following example illustrates what standard-form means:
1 All humans are mortal.
Joseph is a human.
∴ Joseph is mortal.
Although arguments in ordinary language appear in several forms, it is not at all difficult to
restate them in standard-form. First we identify the conclusion which is to be placed in the final
position. Whichever premise contains the predicate term of the conclusion automatically
occupies the first place because the major premise should be stated first (Kemerling 2010). We
notice that ‘mortal’ is the predicate of the conclusion which appears in the first place in the
argument followed by the minor premise. Therefore this type of arrangement subscribes to
standard-form.

The Mood of a Syllogism

As mentioned earlier, there are four types of categorical proposition; universal affirmative (A),
universal negative (E), particular affirmative (I), and particular negative (O). Since a syllogistic
argument consists of three categorical propositions, they may occur in any order in the
arguments. What is more interesting is the fact that the very same type of proposition may occur
thrice. There is no restriction on the number of occasions on which a particular type of
proposition occurs in an argument. For example, all three propositions in an argument may be A
only. Or they may be I only. Briefly said, the mood of a syllogism is simply a combination of
categorical propositions (A, E, I, or O) which the argument comprises of. Suppose that only O
proposition comprises of an argument, then the mood of the argument is said to be OOO.
Similarly, a syllogistic argument with a mood of OAO has an O proposition as its major premise,
an A proposition as its minor premise, and another O proposition as its conclusion; and EIO has
an E as its major premise, and an I as the minor premise, and an O as the conclusion; etc.
(Kemerling 2010).

Let us consider another example.

2 A: All rocks are hard things.

E: No rocks are liquid.
I: ∴ Some liquid things are not hard.
The mood of this argument is AEI. This shows that every letter states symbolically the
quantity and quality of propositions and every letter occurs in the very same order in which the
propositions occur in the argument. Therefore the order in which the three letters occur specifies
the mood of the syllogism. Consider the following syllogistic argument.

3 E: No women named Deepti are outer island Yapese women.

2
 A: All outer island Yapese women are weavers of the baskets.
O: ∴ Some weavers of the baskets are not women named Deepti.

In the above syllogism the minor term (subject of the conclusion) is ‘weavers of the baskets’, the
major term (predicate of the conclusion) is ‘women named Deepti’ and the middle term is ‘outer
island Yapese women’. Therefore the first premise is the major, second is the minor and the third
is the conclusion.

The structure of these arguments is considered for the purpose of illustration. While symbolizing
the propositions, let us use the first letter of the term. The letter which appears in the middle
stands for the quality and quantity of propositions.

1 Major premise: All H are M. HAM 2 All R are H. RAH

Minor premise: J is H. JAH No R are L. REL
Conclusion ∴ J is M. JAM ∴ Some L are not H. ∴LOH

3 Major premise: No W is Y. W EY
Minor premise: All Y is B. Y AB
Conclusion ∴ Some B is not W. ∴B OW

One question remains to be answered. How many moods can we list? For the time being, let
us restrict ourselves to an incomplete answer. Accordingly, we can list 64 Moods. (At this stage,
let us not restrict ourselves to valid Moods). There is no need to list all these 64 Moods. But what
is needed is to know how we arrive at this figure because the number is not fixed arbitrarily.
There are four kinds of propositions which have to take three positions in such a manner that any
proposition can occur in any one of the four different ways; 0, 1, 2 and 3. When we compute all
possible arrangements, we arrive at 64. There are two important aspects. First, we have
discovered a certain number of structures in which syllogistic arguments can be constructed, and
secondly, which we notice later, not all structures to which arguments subscribe are valid. It is in
this sense that the logical status of an argument is determined by the structure of that particular
argument.

3.3 FIGURES OF SYLLOGISM:

It is easy to understand the meaning and significance of figure. The ‘figure’ of a syllogism is
determined by the position of ‘middle term’. We have said that the ‘middle term’ appears both in
the major and in the minor premises. Therefore its possible positions in premises result in four
different configurations. A schematic representation is preferable to verbal description.
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
M–P P–M M–P P–M
S–M S–M M–S M–S
S–P S–P S–P S–P

3
From this scheme it is clear that neither P nor S determines the figure of syllogism. History has
recorded that Aristotle accepted only the first three figures. The origin of the fourth figure is
disputed. While Quine said that Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle, invented the fourth figure,
Stebbing said that it was Gallen who invented the fourth figure. This dispute is not very
significant. But what Aristotle says on the first figure is significant.

Aristotle regarded the first figure as most ‘scientific’. It is likely that by ‘scientific’ he meant
‘satisfactory’. One of the reasons, which Aristotle has adduced in defence of his thesis, is what
the nature of laws of mathematics and physical sciences suggest. According to him these
sciences establish laws in the form of the first figure. Second reason is that reasoned conclusion
or reasoned fact is generally found, according to Aristotle, in the first figure. Aristotle believed
that only universal affirmative conclusion can provide complete knowledge and universal
affirmative conclusion is possible only in the first figure. Aristotle quotes the fundamental
principle of syllogism. ‘One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing
that A inheres in B and B in C’. This principle can be expressed in this form:
Minor: A inheres in B

Major: B inheres in C

A inheres in C

Evidently, this argument satisfies transitive relation. This is made clear with the help of this
diagram:

Let us consider four examples, which correspond to four figures.

I
M P
Major Premise: All artists are poets. AAP
S M
Minor Premise: All musicians are artists. MAA

Conclusion: MAP
All musicians are poets.

4
 S P

II
P M
Major Premise: All saints are pious. SAP
S M
Minor Premise: No criminals are pious. CEP

Conclusion: CES
No criminals are saints.
S P

III
M P
Major Premise: All great works are worthy of study. GAW
M S
Minor Premise: All great works are epics. GAE

Conclusion: EIW
Some epics are worthy of study.
S P

IV
P M
Major Premise: No soldiers are traitors. SET
M S
Minor Premise: All traitors are sinners. TAS

Conclusion: SOS
Some sinners are not soldiers.
S P
We will consider figures in conjunction with moods. Then only knowledge of the ‘figure of
syllogism’ permits us to compute the total number of possible moods. Mood is determined by
quality and quantity of propositions, which constitute syllogism. Since there are four figures, in
all two hundred and fifty six ways of arranging categorical propositions is possible. These are
exactly what we mean by moods. However, out of two hundred and fifty-six, two hundred and
forty-five moods can be shown to be invalid by applying the rules and corollaries. So we have
only eleven valid moods. Even this is not sufficient to have a clear picture. There is no figure in
which all eleven moods are valid. Within the framework of traditional logic, in any given figure
only six moods are valid. They are as follows:

5
 I AAA, AAI, EAE, EAO, EIO and AII
II AEE, AEO, EAE, EAO, EIO and AOO
III AAI, AII, IAI, EAO, EIO and OAO
IV AAI, IAI, AEE, AEO, EAO, and EIO

In all these cases, first letter stands for the major premise, second for the minor and third for the
conclusion. Moods are represented above in three ways. Moods in italics and bold form are
called strengthened moods, and moods in mere italics are called weakened moods. All other
moods are represented in normal form. It is important to know the difference between the first
two types. When the laws of syllogism permit two universal premises to yield logically only
particular conclusion, then such moods are called strengthened moods. On the other hand, if we
deduce particular conclusion from two universal premises, even when the laws of syllogism
permit two universal premises to yield logically a universal conclusion, then such moods are
called weakened moods.

In this scheme, we notice that EIO is valid in all the figures. Interestingly, IEO is invalid in all
the figures. The only difference between EIO and IEO is that the minor and the major premises
are only transposed which clearly shows that the position of premises, which is a part of the
structure, determines the validity of argument. Though EIO is valid in more than one figure it is
one mood in one figure and some other in another figure. Likewise, AEE is valid in the second
and the fourth figures. But it is one mood in the second figure and a different mood in the fourth
figure.

Since Aristotle argued that the first figure is the perfect figure, he felt the need to transmute all
valid arguments in II and III figures to I figure so that if the transmuted mood is valid in I figure,
then the corresponding mood in any figure other than the first is also valid. Transmutation from
fourth figure to the first figure must have been evolved by the inventor of the former. Reduction
is the tool to test the validity of arguments. In the thirteenth century, one logician by name Pope
John XXI, devised a technique to remember the method of reducing arguments from other
figures to the first figure. This technique is known as mnemonic verses. Accordingly, each
mood, excluding weakened moods, was given a special name:

I. Fig: AAA BARBARA III. Fig: AAI DARAPTI

EAE CELARENT IAI DISAMIS
AII DARII AII DATISI
EIO FERIO EAO FELAPTON
OAO BOCARDO
EIO FERISON

II. Fig: EAE CESARE IV. Fig: AAI BRAMANTIP

AEE CAMESTRES AEE CAMENES

6
 EIO FESTINO IAI DIMARIS
AOO BAROCO EAO FESAPO
EIO FRESISON

The method is like this. If the names begin with C, then the syllogism has to be reduced to the
first figure which begins with a C. For example, CESARE (a syllogism of the second figure) has
to be reduced to CELARENT. Other consonants of the name have also their significance; ‘s’
(like in CESARE) signifies that the preceding ‘E’ needs to undergo simple conversion; ‘p’
signifies that the preceding proposition has to be converted by ‘limitation’; ‘t’ signifies that the
order of the premises has to be changed; ‘st’ indicates that two operations, viz., simple
conversion and transposition of the proposition represented by the preceding vowel are required
to be carried out. BAROCO and BOCARDO are reduced in a different manner. O propositions
in both the moods have to be obverted first and then follow the relevant path to effect reduction.

However, the situation in modern logic is very different. The logicians proved that from
universal propositions alone particular proposition cannot be derived and vice versa.
Accordingly, both strengthened and weakened moods become invalid. Thus in the new scheme
the number of valid moods reduces to fifteen.
Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. What are the factors which determine the mood of a syllogism?

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

2. Discuss the significance of the ‘figure’ of categorical syllogism.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

..............

3.4 INCOMPLETE SYLLOGISM AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISM

1. Enthymeme: Enthymeme is called an incomplete syllogism in which one or the other

proposition is not stated explicitly. As a matter of fact, such an incomplete syllogism is closer to
the way we generally argue in everyday life. If standard–form is the criterion, then it is not
logically valid unless what is implicitly understood is taken into consideration. That is, it must be
formally completed.

7
Examples: 1 You have hurt your neighbour.
Therefore you have sinned against God.
(Major premise implicitly understood: Those who hurt their neighbours sin against God).
2 Those who hurt their neighbours sin against God.
Therefore you have sinned against god.
(Minor premise implicitly understood: You have hurt your neighbour).
3 Those who hurt their neighbour sin against God.
And you have hurt your neighbour.
(Conclusion implicitly understood: Therefore you have sinned against God).

When the major premise is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded as the first-order
enthymeme. When the minor premise is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded as the
second-order enthymeme. When the conclusion is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded
as the third-order enthymeme. A question may arise in this context. If two propositions are
adequate to convey the information, where is the need to have full-fledged syllogism? This
question can be answered in two ways. When we deal with learned or well-informed persons or
with ourselves, enthymeme will surely serve the purpose. A full – fledged syllogism is needed
when we have to educate not so well – informed, if not ill – informed persons. We should not fail
to notice close similarity between enthymeme and svarthaanumana and paraarthaanumana
(inference for self and inference for others). The question can be answered in this way also.
Syllogism is formal and enthymeme is informal. Choice is subjective.

2 Sorites: If an argument consists of three or more than three premises, then such an argument is
called sorites. It is also called polysyllogism. There are two kinds of sorites: Aristotelian sorites
and Goclenian sorites. The primary rules which govern sorites are the rules of the categorical
Syllogism only.

Let us begin with the structure of sorites. In Aristotelian sorites the first premise is minor and the
last premise is major. In consecutive premises M is predicate in the first premise and in the next
premise subject. In sorites there are two or more than two conclusions which are implicit. Every
such hidden conclusion functions as the premise. Therefore a sorites consists of at least three
syllogistic arguments and hence it consists of a chain of syllogisms which are interrelated. In
order to arrive at the final conclusion these hidden conclusions also must be reckoned.
Consider this example.
1
Premises Hidden conclusions (a and b)
1. All A are B. a. All A are C.
2. All B are C.
3. All C are D. 3 All C are D.
__________
b. All A are D.
4. All D are E All D are E

All A are E.

8
It is easy to understand this structure. From (1) and (2) we have derived (a). This is hidden
because at no point of time is this expressed. When this is conjoined with (3), (a) becomes a
premise. So is the case with b. This shows that every hidden conclusion is, in fact, the premise of
next argument. In this argument ‘a’ and ‘b’ are hidden conclusions which become premises at
subsequent stages. In Aristotelian sorites, the subject of the first premise is also the subject of the
conclusion and the predicate of the last premise is also the predicate of the conclusion. In the set
of hidden conclusions also the same pattern can be noticed. This pattern shows that in
Aristotelian sorites the first premise is the minor and the last premise is the major.

Let us consider the rules of Aristotelian sorites.

1 Only major premise (last premise) can be negative.

2 only minor premise (first premise) can be particular.

In Goclenian sorites the order is reversed. Consider this example.

2
Premises Hidden conclusion (a and b)
1 All A are B. a All C are B.
2 All C are A.
3 All D are C. 3 All D are C.
b All D are B.
4 All E are D. 4 All E are D.
All E are B.
In this kind the predicate of the conclusion is the predicate of the first premise. Therefore the first
premise is major. The subject of the conclusion is the subject of the last premise. Therefore the
last premise is the minor. The rules of this kind are as follows.
1 Only the first premise (major) can be negative.
2 Only the last premise (minor) can be particular.
One point should become clear at this stage. One kind of sorites is the reversal of the other. If we
disregard the positions of premises, then the difference between these two kinds becomes
insignificant.

3.5 DILEMMA

The dilemma consists of three propositions of which two constitute premises and third one is the
conclusion. One of the premises is a conjunction of two hypothetical propositions and the other
one is disjunctive. The conclusion is either disjunctive or simple. Since the dilemma consists of
two hypothetical propositions conjoined by the word ‘and’, it is possible that two different
propositions are found in place of antecedents and two different propositions are found in place
of consequents. But it is not necessary that it should be so. It is likely that both propositions
have a common consequent. If such consequent becomes the conclusion, then, the conclusion is
a simple proposition.

9
Let us consider its so-called value before we proceed further with our analysis. The dilemma, in
the strict sense of the word validity, is neither valid nor invalid. This is so because in this
particular pattern there is no way of fixing the truth-value of the propositions. The dilemma does
not contribute to the growth of knowledge. Nor does it help in testing what is in need of testing.
Its significance is only restricted to rhetoric. The dilemma is an example of misuse or abuse of
logic. Such a situation arises when a person, who is ignorant of logic, is confronted by an
unscrupulous logician. It is most unlikely that the dilemma was ever seriously considered by any
professional committed to logic. It, then, means that the dilemma has only negative significance,
i.e., to know how not to argue.
The Structure of dilemma:
Let us begin with the structure of dilemma. Its uniqueness is quite interesting.
a. The first premise (p1) consists of two hypothetical propositions conjoined together.
b. The second premise (p2) is a disjunctive proposition. Its alternatives either affirm or deny the
consequents of the hypothetical major premise.
c. The conclusion is either simple or disjunctive. It either affirms the consequents or denies.

Kinds of Dilemma:
The kinds of dilemma are represented in the form of a table.

Dilemma

Constructive Distructive

Simple Complex Simple Complex

1. In a complex constructive dilemma (CCD) antecedents and consequents are different. In

the second premise antecedents are affirmed disjunctively and in the conclusion the
consequents are affirmed in similar fashion. In a simple constructive dilemma (SCD), both
hypothetical propositions have common consequents, though antecedents differ. These
antecedents are affirmed disjunctively in the second premise and the consequent is
affirmed in the conclusion. Since there is only one consequent, the conclusion is a simple
proposition.
2. The structure of complex destructive dilemma (CDD) differs slightly from the first kind.
The difference is that the consequents and antecedents are denied respectively in the minor
premise and the conclusion disjunctively. However, the structure of the first premise
remains the same.

3. The structure of simple destructive dilemma (SDD) differs slightly from the second kind.
In this type also the conclusion is a simple proposition, but negative. The second premise

10
 has structure similar to that of p2 of CDD. Now, we can make a list of common features of
different kinds of dilemma.

Dilemma Common Features

1. Constructive Different antecedents
2. Destructive Different consequents
3. Complex Disjunctive conclusion
4. Simple Simple conclusion

3.6 AVOIDING DILEMMA

Use of dilemma is restricted to some situations. When neither unconditional affirmation of

antecedent nor unconditional denial of consequent is possible, logician may use this route. It
indicates either ignorance or shrewdness. When we face dilemma, we only try to avoid, but not
to refute. There are three different ways in which we can try to avoid dilemma. All these ways
only reflect escapist tendency. Only an escapist tries to avoid a problematic situation. Therefore,
in logic they do not carry much weight.

1. Escaping between the horns of dilemma: Two consequents mentioned may be incomplete.
If it is possible to show that they are incomplete then we can avoid facing dilemma. This is
what is known as ‘escaping between the horns of dilemma’. It should be noted that even
when third consequent is suggested it does not mean that this new consequents is actually
true. In other words, the new consequent also is questionable.

2. Taking the dilemma by horns: In this method of avoiding dilemma, attempts are made to
contradict the hypothetical propositions, which are conjoined. A hypothetical proposition is
contradicted when antecedent and negation of consequent are accepted. However, in this
particular case it is not attempted at all. Moreover, since the major premise is a conjunction
of two hypothetical propositions, the method of refutation is more complex. (The negation
of conjunction will be introduced at a later stage. For the time being it is enough to know
that in this particular instance there is no such attempt.)

3. Rebuttal of dilemma: It appears to be the contradiction of dilemma. But, in reality, it is not.

In all these cases, the dilemma becomes a potent weapon to mislead the opponent in
debate. Therefore none of these methods amounts to the contradiction of opponent’s view.

We will consider examples for four kinds, which can be used to illustrate these
methods.

i). Complex Constructive Dilemma (CCD):

p
p1: If (any government wages war to acquire wealth), then (it becomes a
q r

11
 rogue government) and if (it wages war to expand its territory), then (it
s
becomes colonial).
p r
p2: (Any government wages war either to acquire wealth) or (to expand its

territory) q s
q: It (becomes a rogue government) or (colonial).

ii). Simple Constructive Dilemma (SCD):

p q
p1: If (taxes are reduced to garner votes), then (the government loses revenue).
r
and if (taxes are reduced in order to simplify taxation), then (the
q
government loses revenue).
p r
p2: (Taxes are reduced either to garner votes) or (to simplify taxation)
q
q: (The government loses its revenue).

iii). Complex Destructive Dilemma (CDD):

p q
p1: If (the nation wages war), then (there will be no problem of
r
unemployment) and if (the nation does not revise her industrial policy),
s
then (it will lead to revolution).

not- q not - s
p2: The (problem of unemployment remains unsolved) or (there will not be any
revolution).
not - p not - r
q: (The nation does not wage war) or (the nation will revise her industrial
policy).

iv). Simple Destructive Dilemma (SDD):

p q
p1: If (you are in the habit of getting up early), then (you are a
p r

12
 theist) and if (you are in the habit of getting up early), then (you are a labourer).
not - q not - r
p2: (you are not a theist) or (you are not a labourer).
not - p
q: (you are not in the habit of getting up early).

The first way of avoiding the dilemma, i.e., escaping between the horns of dilemma can be
illustrated using 1 (CCD). It is possible to argue that, when the government wages war, the
motive is neither to acquire wealth nor to expand its territory in which case, the government is
neither rouge nor colonial. The motive may be to spread its official religion or personal vendetta
or it may be to protect its interests. If the last one is the motive, then, it becomes difficult to find
fault with such government. Any one of the proposed alternatives or all alternatives to disjuncts
may be false. There is no way of deciding what the situation is. The reader can select remaining
examples to illustrate this method. Likewise, consider fourth argument to illustrate the second
method. I may concede that a person gets up early only because he wants to maintain health. So
the purpose is not to worship God. Nor is he a labourer. Again, this is also an assumption.

Rebutting of dilemma requires a different type of example. Consider this one:

i). p q
p1: If (teacher is a disciplinarian), then (he is unpopular among students) and
¬p r
if (he is not a disciplinarian), then (his bosses do not like him).
p ¬p
p2: (Teacher is a disciplinarian) or (he is not a disciplinarian).
q v r
q: (Teacher is unpopular among students) or (his bosses do not like him).
A witty teacher may respond in this way.

ii). ¬p q
p1 : If (teacher is not a disciplinarian), then (he is popular among students)

p r
and if (he is a disciplinarian) then (his bosses will like him.)

¬p p
p2 : (Teacher is not a disciplinarian) or (he is a disciplinarian)
q ¬r
q : (Teacher is popular among students) or (his bosses will like him)
Only a student of logic discovers that these conclusions of i and ii are not contradictories (you
will learn about it in the forthcoming units) in the strict sense of the term. Hence, there is really
no rebuttal.

13
Further, the dilemma, which an individual faces in day-to-day life, is very different. For
example, moral dilemma has nothing to do with the kinds of dilemma which we have discussed
so far.

Since the dilemma is a medley of both types of conditional propositions, i. e., hypothetical and
disjunctive, it should follow the basic rules of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. It should
affirm disjunctively the antecedents in the minor or deny disjunctively the consequents in the
minor. The dilemma is powerful if in the major there is a strong cause-effect relationship
between the antecedent and the consequent and in the minor the alternatives are exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. Again, the former is debatable.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. What are the characteristics of dilemma?

........................................................................................................................ ......................

........................................................................................................................ .....................

........................................................................................................................ ......................
2. What are the methods of avoiding dilemma?
....................................................................................................................... ......................

........................................................................................................................ ......................

........................................................................................................................ .....................

3.7 LET US SUM UP

The structure of syllogism is determined by figures and moods. The position of the middle term
determines the figure to which syllogism belongs. There are four figures and eleven valid moods.
Strengthened and weakened moods are not valid according to modern logic. The dilemma is a
shrewd way of getting out of trouble. Escaping between the horns of dilemma, taking the
dilemma by horns and rebuttal of dilemma are the ways of avoiding dilemma. Dilemma is not a
sound logical way of arguing.
________________________________________________________________________
3.8 KEY WORDS

Figure: ‘figure’ of a syllogism is determined by ‘middle term’.

14
Mood: ‘mood’ of a syllogism is determined by the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three
propositions.
Dilemma: A dilemma in logic means an argument that presents an antagonist with a choice of
two or more alternatives, each of which appears to contradict the original contention and is
inconclusive. The dilemma is a powerful instrument of persuasion and a devastating weapon in
controversy.

3.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981].

Kemerling, Garth Categorical Syllogisms’ Philosophy Pages, http
http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e08a.htm 2001. Accessed on July 2, 2010.
‘Introduction to Logic,’ University of Lander, http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/index.html,
accessed July, 2010.7

Ling, Lee ‘Categorical Syllogisms’

http://www.comfsm.fm/~dleeling/geometry/categorical_syllogisms.xhtml

Mathew, E.P., and Augustine Perumalil. Critical Thinking and Planned Writing. Chennai: Satya
Nilayam Publications, 2008.

15
UNIT 4 VALIDITY, INVALIDITY AND LIST OF VALID SYLLOGISMS

Contents

4.0 Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Rules of Categorical Syllogisms
4.3 Special Applications of General Rules
4.4 Reduction of Arguments to I Figure
4.5 Antilogism or Inconsistent Triad
4.6 Venn Diagram Technique
4.7 Boolean Analysis
4.8 Let us Sum up
4.9 Key Words
4.10 Further Readings and References

4.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit brings out the most important part of your study of categorical syllogism. You will be
introduced to the rules which determine the validity of arguments. While this is the most
important objective, the icing on the cake is the variety of the methods of determining the
validity of arguments. Both traditional and modern methods of testing the validity receive due
recognition in this unit. Therefore contribution of both John Venn and George Boole find place
in this unit. This particular study enables you to grasp the relation between logic and set theory
which is brought to the fore in this unit.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the second and third units we learnt two important aspects of categorical syllogism, viz.,
figures and moods. However, we did not develop the technique of distinguishing valid from
invalid arguments. Consequently, we could not know under what conditions a mood becomes
valid and what is still worse, we could not understand why a certain arrangement or
configuration of propositions in one figure is legitimate (only a legitimate combination of
propositions yields valid mood) and in some other figure illegitimate yielding only invalid
moods, and conversely, why a certain configuration of propositions is illegitimate in some
figures and legitimate in some other figure or figures. In other words, the question what makes
an argument valid was not raised at all. The point is that the validity of an argument depends on
whether or not the conclusion is a conclusion in the strict sense of the word, i.e. whether or not it
logically follows from the premises. This brings us to the vital aspect of our study. Just as
application or non-application of rules makes a game legitimate or illegitimate, mere application
or non-application of rules makes an argument valid or invalid. Application of rules demands
knowledge of rules. Therefore we must focus on the question what rules are there which
determine the validity of syllogism.

1
4.2 THE RULES OF CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

Classical Logic lists eight rules of valid categorical syllogism; four of them concern the terms,
and four of them concern the propositions. These rules are not provable. They have to be either
accepted or rejected. If they are rejected, syllogism is not possible. Therefore what is given is
only an explication of the rules. Classical logic classified these rules under rules of structure,
rules of distribution of terms, rules of quality, and rules of quantity.

I. Rules of structure

1. Syllogism must contain three, and only three, propositions

Syllogism is defined as a kind of mediate inference consisting of two premises which together
determine the truth of the conclusion. This definition shows that if the number of propositions is
more than two, then it ceases to be syllogism. Therefore by definition syllogism must consist of
two premises and one conclusion. Therefore together they make up for three propositions.

2. Syllogism must consist of three terms only

A proposition consists of two terms. However, three propositions consist of only three terms
because each term occurs twice. Suppose that there are four terms. Then there is no middle term,
a term common to two premises. In such a case the violation of rule results in a fallacy called
fallacy of four terms. Such a fallacy is never committed knowingly because knowing fully well
the fixed number of terms, we do not choose four terms. But we do it unknowingly. It happens
when an ambiguous word is used in two different senses on two different occasions. Then there
are really four terms, not three terms. If an ambiguous word takes the place of middle term, then
the fallacy committed is known as fallacy of ambiguous middle. Similarly, if an ambiguous term
takes the place of the major or the minor term, then the fallacy of ambiguous major or ambiguous
minor, as the case may be, is committed. The following argument illustrates the fallacy of
ambiguous middle.
Fallacy of ambiguous middle:
1
All charged particles are electrons.
Atmosphere in the college is charged.
Atmosphere in the college is an electron.
The word in italics is ambiguous. The other two fallacies are hardly committed. Therefore there
is no need to consider examples for them. The moral is that all sentences in arguments must be
unambiguous. This is possible only when all terms are unambiguous in the given argument. We
must also consider the inversion of ambiguous middle. Suppose that synonymous words are used
in place of middle term. Then apparently there are four terms. But, in reality, there are three
terms. For example starry world and stellar world are not two terms. Such usages also are
uncommon. Hence they deserve to be neglected.
II. Rules of distribution of terms:
1. Middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises. If this rule is violated, then the
argument commits the fallacy of undistributed middle. One example will illustrate this rule.

2
 2
All circles are geometrical figures.
All squares are geometrical figures.
 All circles are squares.
2. In the conclusion, no term may be taken in a more ‘extensive’ sense than in the premises. It
also means that a term which is distributed in the conclusion must remain distributed in the
respective premise. This rule can be stated this way also. A term which is undistributed in the
premise must remain undistributed in the conclusion. However, it is not necessary that a term,
which is distributed in the premise, must be distributed in the conclusion.

Suppose that the major term violates this rule. Then the argument commits the fallacy of illicit
major. When the minor term violates this rule, fallacy illicit minor is committed. The following
arguments illustrate these fallacies.
3

All philosophers are thinkers.

No ordinary men are philosophers.
No ordinary men are thinkers.
4

All aquatic creatures are fish.

All aquatic creatures swim.
All those which swim are fish.

First argument illustrates the fallacy of undistributed middle; second illustrates the fallacy of
illicit major and the third illustrates the fallacy of illicit minor.

III. Rules of quality:

1. From two negative premises, no conclusion can be drawn. It only means that at least one
premise must be affirmative.
2. If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion cannot be negative. Negatively, it only means
that a negative conclusion is possible only when one premise is negative.

IV Rules of quantity:

If both premises are particular, no conclusion can be drawn or the conclusion must always follow
the weaker part. Here weaker part is particular. This rule shows that at least one premise must be
universal.

If one premise is particular, then the conclusion must be particular only. It means that universal
conclusion is possible only when both premises are universal. In practice, last three sets of rules
play an important role in determining the validity of categorical syllogism.

Check Your Progress I

3
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

Examine the following arguments.

1) All kings are thinkers.
Some ordinary men are not kings.
No ordinary men are thinkers.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) All stars are bright.
All bright objects are attractive.
 All attractive objects are stars.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

3) Some radicals are good men.

Some good men are honest.
Some radicals are honest.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .... 4
4) The monkey is nonhuman.
Some of those who are of capable of laughter are humans.
 The monkey is not capable of laughter.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
……………………………………………………………………………

4.3 SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL RULES

In the previous unit we learnt that a certain arrangement of categorical propositions is legitimate
in one figure and illegitimate in some other figure, the only exception being EIO. For the purpose
of contrast we should recognize that its reversal, IEO, is invalid in all the figures. One way of
recognizing valid or invalid arguments is the use of rules listed above. We have another method
known as ‘special rules of figures’. These rules are called special rules because they apply to
only that particular figure but not to others. These rules are dependent upon general rules.
Therefore it is possible to give proofs to these rules.

I Figure
a) The minor must be affirmative.
b) The major must be universal.
M–P
S-M
S–P

4
a) If the minor is negative, then the conclusion must be negative. In negative conclusion P is
distributed while it is undistributed in the major premise. This goes against the rule which asserts
that a term undistributed in the premise should remain undistributed in the conclusion. Therefore
minor must be affirmative.
b) That the major must be universal is clear from the fact that if the minor is affirmative, M in it
is undistributed and therefore the major must be universal if M must be distributed in it.

Now we shall apply these special rules to know how or why a certain mood is valid and certain
other moods invalid in a figure, a point which we discussed in the previous unit. Let us omit
weakened moods.
The valid moods of I figure are listed below.

I Fig: AAA BARBARA

EAE CELARENT
AII DARII
EIO FERIO

II Figure:
a) One premise must be negative.
b) The major must be universal.

P–M
S–M
S- P

a) One premise must be negative. Otherwise, M remains undistributed in both the premises. b)
The major must be universal because P is distributed in negative conclusion and hence it must be
distributed in the major.

The valid moods of II figure are listed below.

EAE CESARE
AEE CAMESTRES
EIO FESTINO
AOO BAROCO

III Figure:
a) The ‘minor’ must be affirmative.
b) The conclusion must be Particular.

M–P
M–S
S–P

5
 a) Minor must be affirmative because negative minor gives only negative conclusion in
which case P is distributed in the conclusion. P can be distributed in major only if it is
negative. Negative minor results in negative major which is not allowed. Therefore minor
must be affirmative.
b) The conclusion must be particular. Otherwise S becomes distributed in the conclusion
while it remains undistributed in affirmative minor.

The valid moods are listed below.

III Fig: AAI DARAPTI
IAI DISAMIS
AII DATISI
OAO BOCARDO
EIO FERISON
EAO FELOPTON

IV Figure:
a) If the ‘major’ is affirmative, the ‘minor’ must be universal.
b) If the minor is affirmative, the conclusion must be particular.
c) If the conclusion is negative, the major must be negative.
P–M
M–S
S–P

The valid moods are listed below.

AAI DARAPTI
AEE CAMENES
EAO FESAPO
IAI DIMARIS
EIO FRESISON

It would be good logical exercise for the student to take up these special rules and try to deduce
them from the general ones. This is the reason why we have left the special rules of figure 4
unexplained.

4.4 REDUCTION OF ARGUMENTS TO I FIGURE

Reducing arguments from other figures to the first figure is one of the techniques developed by
Aristotle and one of his followers to test the validity of arguments. After reduction, if the
argument is valid in the first figure, then it means that the original argument in the corresponding
figure is valid. This technique is quite mechanical. So we are only required to know what exactly
is involved in this method. We will learn this only by practice. Strengthened moods are included
for the sake of exercise though they are not required from the point of view of modern logic.
There is no need to consider weakened moods separately when the technique involved is

6
reduction. What is required is replacement of universal by its corresponding subaltern in the
conclusion.

1
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
CESARE CELARENT

PEM  Conversion MEP
SAM SAM
SEP SEP

No politicians are poets.  Conversion  No poets are politicians.

All girls are poets. All girls are poets.

No girls are politicians. No girls are politicians.

In CESARE ‘S’ after ‘E’ indicates simple conversion. It shows that ‘E’ (major premise) must
undergo simple conversion.
2
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
CAMESTRES CELARENT
PAM MES

S E M  conversion M E S PAM

SEP P E S conversionS E P

‘S’ and ‘T’ after ‘E’ show that ‘E’ (minor premise) should undergo simple conversion and both
premises be transposed. ‘S’ after second ‘E’ shows that this ‘E’ (conclusion) also should
undergo simple conversion. [The student is advised to construct arguments for this and
subsequent reductions.]
3
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
FESTINO FERIO
PEM  Conversion  MEP
SIM SIM
SOP SOP

FESTINO becomes FERIO when the major premise undergoes simple conversion. The kind of
reduction of the above mentioned moods is known as direct reduction. BAROCO becomes

7
FERIO through the process of indirect reduction. Indirect reduction includes, in addition to
conversion, obversion also.

4
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
BAROCO FERIO
P A M  obversion P E M  Conversion  MEP

S O M  obversion S I M SI M
SOP SOP
5
III Figure
III Figure I Figure
DARAPTI DARII
MAP MAP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SIP SIP
6
DATISI DARII
MAP MAP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SIP SIP
7
FELAPTON FERIO
MEP MEP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
‘P’ which follows ‘A’ in DARAPTI and FELAPTON shows that conversion by limitation
applies to ‘A’.
8
FERISON FERIO
MEP MEP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
9
DISAMIS DARII
MIP MAS MAS

MAS MIP  Conversion PIM

SIP PIS
 Conversion
SIP
While the reduction of the above-mentioned moods is direct, next one is indirect.
10

8
 BOCARDO
MOP  Obversion  MIP  Conversion  P IM MAS
MAS
M AS MAS PIM
SOP \\_
P IS
Conversion
SI P
Obversion
SOP

When BOCARDO undergoes reduction, conversion, obversion and transposition are required to
complete the process. Here OAO becomes AII. Further, when we consider obverted conclusion
of AII, we obtain AIO. This is, surely, a paradox.
11

IV Figure
IV Figure I Figure
BRAMANTIP Weakened mood
PAM MAS
MAS PAM
SIP P A S  Conversion S I P
12
CAMENES CELARENT
PAM MES

MES PAM
SEP SEP
13
DIMARIS DARII
PIM MAS

MAS PIM

SIP SIP
14
FESAPO FERIO
PEM  Conversion MEP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
As usual ‘S’ stands for simple conversion of ‘E’ (major Premise) and ‘P’ stands for conversion
by limitation of ‘A’ (minor premise). This process is similar to the one applied for first and third
moods of III figure.

9
15
FRESISON FERIO
P E M  Conversion MEP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP

From reduction technique one point becomes clear. Originally, there were twenty-four valid
moods. Later weakened and strengthened moods were eliminated on the ground that particular
proposition (existential quantifier) cannot be deduced from universal propositions (universal
quantifier) only, and the number was reduced to fifteen. Now after reduction to first figure the
number came down to four. Strawson argues that reduction technique is superior to axiomatic
technique to which he referred in the beginning of his work ‘Introduction to Logical Theory’. He
regards the moods as inference-patterns. He argues that the path of reduction should be an
inverted pyramid. Strawson also maintains that in addition to equivalence relation, we require
opposition relation also to effect reduction. What we gain in the process is economy in the
number of moods.

4.5 ANTILOGISM OR INCONSISTENT TRIAD

This technique was developed by one lady by name, Christin Lad Franklin. This technique
applies only to fifteen moods. The reason is, again, impropriety of deriving existential from
universals only. The method is very simple. Consider Venn’s results for all propositions. Replace
the conclusion by its contradiction. This arrangement constitutes antilogism. If the corresponding
argument should be valid, then antilogism should conform to certain structure. It must possess
two equations and one inequation. A term must be common to equations. It should be positive in
one equation and negative in another. Remaining two terms ought to appear only in inequation.
Consider one example for a valid argument.

Venn’s Results Antilogism

All Indians are Asians. IĀ=Ø IĀ=Ø

All Hindus are Indians. HĪ=Ø HĪ =Ø

HĀ=Ø HĀ≠Ø
All Hindus are Asians.

In this case, antilogism satisfies all the requirements. ‘I’ is common to equations; in one equation
it is positive and in another negative. There is only one inequation. Remaining terms appear in
10
inequation. In all cases, this is the method to be followed. If any one of these characteristics is
absent in antilogism, then the corresponding mood is invalid.

Now antilogism can be easily constructed for the remaining fourteen moods.

1 Fig.
1) CELARENT
Contradiction

MEP MP= Ø

SAM
SM=Ø
SEP → SIP SP ≠ Ø

2) DARII

MAP M P =Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

3) FERIO

MEP MP=Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

II Fig.
4) CESARE

11
 PEM PM=Ø

SAM S M =Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

5) CAMESTRES

PAM P M =Ø

SEM SM=Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

6) FESTINO

PEM PM=Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

7) BAROCO

PAM P M =Ø

SOM
S M ≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

III Fig.
8) DISAMIS

MIP MP≠ Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

12
9) DATISI

MAP M P =Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

10) BOCARDO

MOP M P≠ Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

11) FERISON

MEP MP=Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

IV Fig.
12) CAMENES

PAM P M=Ø

MES MS=Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

13) DIMARIS

13
 PIM PM≠Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

14) FRESISON

PEM PM=Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

Now consider a weakened mood.

II Fig.
Weakened mood:

PAM P M =Ø

SEM SM=Ø
SOP → SAP S M =Ø

There is no inequation in this antilogism. Hence, corresponding argument is invalid. It can be

shown that any other strengthened or weakened mood is invalid.

4.6 VENN DIAGRAM TECHNIQUE

Let us extend our knowledge of Venn diagram to the testing of arguments. If two terms yield
four product classes, then three terms should yield eight product classes according to the formula
2x = n, where x stands for the number of terms and n stands for the number of product classes.
Since syllogism consists of three terms, we have eight product classes. Let us begin with a valid
mood and list these product classes.
1 BARBARA
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  All S are P SP  

14
The product classes are as follows: -

SMP
SMP
SMP SMP SMP
S P
SM P SMP
S MP
S MP
SMP SMP
S MP
SM P SMP
SMP

M SMP
While listing product classes, sufficient care should be taken to ensure that no product class is
repeated. It is always advisable to make a list of product classes with diagrams and mark classes
accurately to avoid confusion.
Now let us use diagram to represent the propositions. The procedure is as follows. null sets are
shaded and non-null sets are starred. We should also note that product of null set and non-null
set is a null set. It is like saying that 4 x 0 = 0. But the union, i.e., addition of a non-null set and
null set is a non-null set. Remember 4 + 0 = 4.
Since M P is a null set, not only SM P , but also S M P is a null set. It does not mean that there
are two null sets. There is only one null set. S M is also a null set. Therefore not only the
product of S M & P, but also S M and P is a null set. Now we shall shade relevant subsets,
which are null.

SMP SMP SMP

S P
SMP
SMP SMP

SMP

Fig. 2. M SMP

15
p1 and p2 show that: S M P = SM P = S MP = S M P = Ø. The conclusion shows that S P also is
a null set. We did not specially shade S P . Shading of M P and S M included naturally the
shading of S P segment. This is what actually happens in the case of valid arguments. Marking
of premises naturally includes the conclusion. It is not marked separately. In other words
marking, of conclusion is inclusive. When we adopt Venn diagram technique, this important
condition should be borne in mind. Secondly, when any premise is particular, the segment, which
corresponds to the universal premise, should be shaded first. This is the initial step to be
followed. Now we shall consider some moods. Others are left for the student as an exercise. [In
all cases all product classes should be identified by the student even if there is no need. This is a
good exercise.]

2 BAROCO

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø

p2: Some S are not M. SM≠Ø
____________________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. SP≠Ø

q

p1

S * P
p2

3 DATISI

p1: All M are P. MP=Ø

p2: Some M are S. M S≠ Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø

16
 q

S P
*
p2

4 DISAMIS

p1: Some M are P. MP≠Ø

p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø
q

S P
*
p1

p2

17
 q

S P

p2 *
p1

M
5 FERISON
p1: No M are P. MP=Ø
p2: Some M are S. MS≠Ø
________________ ______________
q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø

6 BOCARDO

p1: Some M are not P. MP≠Ø

p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø

q

S P

p2
*
p2

M
18
7 CAMENES

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø

p2: No M are S. MS=Ø
_________________________________ ______________

q: No S are P. SP=Ø
q

S P
p1
p2

8 DIMARIS

p1: Some P are M. PM≠Ø

p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. SP≠Ø

19
 q

S P
*
p1

p2

9 FRESISON

p1: No P are M. PM=Ø

p2: Some M are S. MS≠Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø

q

S P

p2
*
p1

Let us examine a few weakened and strengthened moods using Venn’s diagram.

10 BRAMANTIP

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø

p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. SP≠Ø

20
S P
p1
?

p2

No information on S M P and SMP is available after the premises are diagrammed. Therefore
BRAMANTIP is invalid. Now consider a weakened mood.

AAI
p1: M A P. MP=Ø
p2: S A M. SM=Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: S I P. SP≠Ø

S ? P
p2

p1

In this case also no information is available on S M P and S M P after the premises are
diagrammed. Hence AAI is invalid.

4.7 BOOLEAN ANALYSIS:

21
George Boole published his work The Mathemaical Analysis of Logic in 1847. This work
provided not only the required breakthrough to logic but also a new direction to its development.
This analysis is known as The Boolean Algebra of Classes. It is a rewarding exercise to
understand this approach.

Boolean analysis presupposes some axioms. Basson and O’connor list thirteen axioms while
Alexander considers seven. However, for our purpose only four of them are sufficient to
understand this analysis. Let us begin with these axioms.
1 Law of multiplication: a) the product of a universal set and a non-null set(S) is a non-null set.
b) The product of null set and a non-null set is null set.

1 × S =S (where 1 is the universal set.) 1a

×S= 1b
2 Law of addition: The addition of complementary sets is universal set.
S S 1 2
3 Law of Commutation for a) addition and b) multiplication: Transposition of two or more than
two sets is equivalent to original structure.
a) (S+ P + M) = (S+ M +P) = (P + M + S) = (M+ S +P) ….. 3a
b) (S PM) = (SMP) = (MSP) = (MPS)……… 3b
(Instead of addition and multiplication we can also use union and product respectively.)
4 Law of distribution: The multiplication of a l set on the one hand and the addition of two non-
null sets on the other is equivalent to the addition of the product of two sets.
S(P+M) = SP+PM……. 4
Some valid moods are worked out and the rest are left as exercises for the student.

1) BARBARA
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  All S are P SP  
Boolean analysis begins with the expansion of statements. The first stage of the expansion
of major premise is as follows.

MP  MP  1 Rule 1b
 
 MP S  S  MP Rule 2
 MP S  MP S  MP Rule 4

Now we shall pass on to the second stage.

S  MP  SMP  Φ 
a)  Rule 1
S  MP  S MP  Φ 
MP  SMP  S MP  Φ
The last line corresponds to the expansion of major premise. While expanding these lines,
we must obtain the addition or union of the product of all relevant sets and their
complements as well. On these lines, we shall expand remaining lines.

22
 P  SM  PSM   
b)  Rule 1b
P  SM  P SM   
PSM  SMP   
 Rule 3b
P SM  SM P   

S M  S MP  S M P  
The last line corresponds to the expansion of minor premise.

SP  M  SPM   
c)  Rule 1b
SP  M  SP M   
SPM  SMP   
 Rule 3b
S P M  SM P   
SP  SMP  SM P  
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

Since the union of four product classes is null set any set in this group is null set. Consider
the union of relevant sets.
SMP  SM P  
Since this is equivalent to what we have obtained from the conclusion, the argument is valid.
This shows that the expansion of conclusion must be equal to or less than the union of premises
if the argument is valid. Hence this conclusion is not repeated further while dealing with some
arguments which are valid. Since we follow this method throughout, we should bear in our mind
all these details.

2 CELARENT

p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

SPM  SMP

23
 SMP  SPM  SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

3) DARII
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q : Some S are P. SP  
Expansion of major premise:
a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

SMP  S MP  

  SMP  
SMP  Φ
SMP  SMP  
a  b  SMP  SMP  
Since SMP is a non-null set, its union with null set yields a non-null set.
c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

4) FERIO
p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:

24
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:

c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

   SMP  

SMP  
SMP  SM P  
c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

5) CESARE
p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

6) CAMESTRES

p1: All P are M. PM  

p2 : No S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:

25
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
:c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

7) FESTINO

p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
   SMP  

 SMP  

c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

8) BAROCO

p1: All P are M. PM  

p2 : Some S are not M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:

26
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

   SM P  

 SM P  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

9) DISAMIS

p1: Some M are P. MP  

p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
 SMP    

SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

10) DATISI

p1: All M are P. MP  

p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
27
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

   SMP  

SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

11) BOCARDO
p1: Some M are not P. MP  
p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion.:
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
   SMP  

 SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

12) FERISON

p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. S P  
Expansion of major premise:

28
a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

   SMP  

 SMP  

 SMP  SMP  
ab c

13) CAMENES

p1: All P are M. PM  

p2 : No M are S. MS  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
ab c

14) DIMARIS

p1: Some P are M. PM  

p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion:

29
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
 SMP    
SMP  
 c  SMP  SMP  Φ
ab c

15) FRESISON

p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
   SMP  
 SMP  
 SMP  SMP  Φ
ab c
Let us examine an invalid mood which is regarded as valid in traditional framework.

16) AAI
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø

Expansion of major premise:

a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

30
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

abc
This is so because from equations alone it is not possible to obtain inequation.
Antilogism, Venn Diagram Technique and Boolean Analysis have one distinct advantage. They
do away with the concept of distribution of terms which is a cumbersome to apply. What is
required is only the application of some elements of set theory.

Apply these techniques for the following arguments to test their validity.

1 All dogs have four legs.

All animals have four legs.
All dogs are animals.

2 All dogs have four legs.

All chairs have four legs.
All dogs are chairs.

3 No bats are cats.

No rats are bats.
No rats are cats.

4 No fish are birds.

No golden plovers are fish.
No golden plovers are birds.

5 All Indians are people.

John is a person.
John is an Indian.

6 Some readers are philosophers.

Chanakya is a philosopher.
Chanakya is a reader.

7 No human being is perfect.

Some human beings are presidents.
Some presidents are not perfect.

8 All matter obeys wave equations.

All waves obey wave equations.
All matter is waves.

9 All human action is conditioned by circumstances.

All human action involves morality.
31
All that involves morality is conditioned by circumstances.

10 All that is good is pleasant.

All eating is pleasant.
All eating is good.

11 All patriots are voters.

Some citizens are not voters.
Some citizens are not patriots.

12 All potatoes have eyes.

John’s head has eyes.
John is a potato head.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. EIO is valid and IEO is invalid in all the figures. Explain.

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

2. If both premises are universal, then the conclusion must also be universal. Explain.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

................................................................................................................................................

4.8 LET US SUM UP

General rules apply to all figures whereas special rules apply to specific figures. Special rules
indirectly depend upon general rules only. Antilogism, Venn diagram technique and Boolean
analysis do away with the concept of distribution of terms. According to the last three methods
weakened and strengthened moods become invalid though traditional logic regards them as
valid.

4.9 KEY WORDS

Mood: By the ‘mood’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of a syllogism which is determined by
the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three propositions.

32
Figure: By the ‘figure’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of syllogism which is determined by
the function the ‘middle term’ plays in the syllogism.

4.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. ‘Logic.’ Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, n.d.

Copi, Irving M. and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. 12th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005.

Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007.

‘Introduction to Logic.’ University of Lander, http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/index.html,

accessed July, 2010.

Kemerling, Garth. ‘Categorical Syllogisms’ Philosophy Pages.

http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e08a.htm 2001. Accessed on July 2, 2010.
Ling, Lee ‘Categorical Syllogisms’
http://www.comfsm.fm/~dleeling/geometry/categorical_syllogisms.xhtml
Mathew, E.P. and Augustine Perumalil. Critical Thinking and Planned Writing. Chennai: Satya
Nilayam Publications, 2008.

33
Indira Gandhi National Open University MPYE – 001
School of Interdisciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies Logic

Block 2

SENTENTIAL LOGIC 1: INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1
Introduction to the Form of Arguments in Modern Logic

UNIT 2
Conjunction, Disjunction, Conditional and Biconditional

UNIT 3
Rules of Inference and Nature of Validity of Arguments

UNIT 4
Fallacies

1
Expert Committee
Dr. Jose Kuruvachira
Prof. Gracious Thomas Salesian College &
Director, School of IGNOU Study Centre
Social Work Dimapur, Nagaland
IGNOU

Prof. Renu Bharadwaj

School of Humanities Dr. Sathya Sundar
IGNOU Sethy
Dept of Humanities
Prof. George IIT, Chennai.
Panthanmackel,
Senior Consultant, Dr. Joseph Martis
IGNOU St. Joseph’s College
Jeppu, Mangalore – 2
Dr. M. R. Nandan
Govt. College for Dr. Jaswinder Kaur
Women Dhillon
Mandya - Mysore 147, Kabir park
Opp. GND University
Dr. Kuruvila Amristar – 143 002
Pandikattu
Jnana-deepa Prof. Y.S. Gowramma
Vidyapeeth Principal,
Ramwadi, College of Fine Arts,
Pune Manasagangotri
Mysore – 570 001

Dr Babu Joseph
CBCI Centre
New Delhi

Prof. Tasadduq Husain

Aligarh Muslim
University
Aligarh

Dr. Bhuvaneswari
Lavanya Flats
Gangai Amman Koil
St.
Thiruvanmiyur
Chennai – 600 041

Dr. Alok Nag

Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul
Varanasi

2
Block Preparation

Units 1-4 Dr. V.C. George

Content Editor
Dr. V. John Peter
IGNOU, New Delhi
&
Dr. M.R. Nandan
Mysore.

Format Editor
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

Programme Coordinator
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

3
BLOCK INTRODUCTION

Logic in the contemporary century has turned out to be as precise as mathematics in the hands
logicians of analytical and symbolic traditions. In place of propositions and premises, arguments
forms with symbols are used for right thinking. What are the advantages of using symbols?
What is the nature of arguments? This block shall briefly deal with questions of this kind.
Symbolic Logic is generally divided into two: Sentential Logic and Predicate Logic. In
Sentential Logic, two kinds of sentences are recognized: Simple and Compound. Block 2 deals
only with sentential logic. There are different kinds of compound sentences, each requiring its
own logical notation. Conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and bi-conditional are all different
ways of combining simple sentences into compound sentences. Each of them are symbolized in
order to determine their truth-value, using truth-tables or applying Rules of Inferences. Certain
Rules of Inference are applied for testing the validity of arguments. Among them there are 9
Rules of Inference and 10 Rules of replacement.

Unit 1 on ‘Introduction to the Form of Arguments in Modern Logic,’ introduces the form of
arguments and the symbols and techniques of modern logic. It clarifies a number of points like
main concern of Logic, context of emergence of symbolic logic, history of logic, difference
between classical and modern logic, use of symbols, and nature of arguments.

Unit 2 introduces to the students to the classification and symbolization of sentences in symbolic
logic, especially of compound sentences such as conjunction, disjunction, and implication. It
enables the students of logic to determine the truth-value of truth-functionally compound
sentences, with the skill to discriminate between valid and invalid arguments and argument
forms.

Unit 3 helps the students of logic to learn and recognize the Rules of Inference and the nature of
validity of arguments. The truth-table method helps one to test the validity of arguments and the
truth of compound sentences along with their sentence connectives. Rules of Inference become
another method of testing the validity of arguments.

Unit 4 enables the students to recognize fallacies that violate the Rules of correct thinking.
Fallacies as a method of arguing that appears to be valid but actually false. Understanding what a
fallacy is and developing the ability to identify different fallacies help us to judge the value of an
argument, to detect errors and to avoid mistakes in reasoning.

4
UNIT 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FORM OF ARGUMENTS IN MODERN
LOGIC

Contents

1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 A Short Story of Logic
1.3 Classical Logic and Symbolic Logic
1.4 Why use Symbols?
1.5 The Nature of Argument
1.6 Truth and Validity
1.7 Argument Forms
1.8 Truth - Table
1.9 Kinds of Sentence Forms and Sentences
1.10 Testing the Validity of Argument Forms
1.11 Exercises
1.12 Let Us Sum Up
1.13 Key Words
1.14 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this unit is to introduce the students to the importance of argument forms in
modern logic. Arguments and argument forms are not the same. In our study of modern logic this
distinction turns out to be crucial. This is so, mainly because all the Rules of Inference refer to
argument forms rather than to arguments. This will become evident as we go along. In short, this
block is designed to introduce the students of logic to the symbols and techniques of modern
logic.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since this is the first unit dealing with symbolic logic, we confront a number of questions before
we deal with the forms of argument in particular. What is the main concern of logic? What is the
context in which symbolic logic was born? What is the history of logic? How do the old and new
systems of logic differ? Why do we use symbols? What are the advantages of using symbols?
What is the nature of arguments? We shall briefly deal with questions of this kind before we
speak of argument forms proper.

The main question in logic, whether modern or ancient, has always been:

Does the conclusion follow from, (= a consequence of), the premise(s)?

1
We need a general theory of inference to answer effectively this prime question of deductive
reasoning. Explanation of the relation between the premises and the conclusions in deductive
arguments, on the one hand and discovery of techniques to distinguish between valid and invalid
deductive arguments, on the other, constitute such general theory. Two great logical theories
have emerged in order to achieve these goals: The first is Aristotelian (classical) Logic, and the
second is symbolic (modern) logic. The latter is an extension of the former. Though both these
bodies of logical theory aim at the discovery of truth, they adopt different techniques. This is one
difference. The second difference consists in the concept of proposition itself. Aristotle restricted
the meaning of proposition to subject-predicate form, which is why it is called predicate logic
whereas the second extends the concept of proposition to include simple and what is ordinarily
understood in grammar as compound sentence. Inclusion of relational proposition brought logic
and mathematics much closer. Since the technique invented by modern logic is much more
advanced than the technique adopted by Aristotelian system in terms of performance, modern
logic achieved what Aristotelian system could not. In this unit and in the units to follow a brief
exposition of methods will find the place they richly deserve.

The answer to the question whether the conclusion follows from the premise(s) is not at all easy
to deal with. This is so because of the linguistic fallacies such as equivocation, amphiboly,
metaphorical styles, and so on. That is to say, there are peculiarities in natural language (English
or any other) that make exact logical analysis rather difficult: Words may be vague or equivocal,
the construction of arguments may be ambiguous, metaphors and idioms may be confusing or
misleading, and emotional appeals may distract. Modern logic overcomes these difficulties with
the introduction of an artificial language. The symbols themselves are artificial in the sense that
they do not belong to any natural language. Symbolic logic achieved the breakthrough when it
formulated sentences of arguments in this language. This is the context in which symbolic logic
was born.

Symbols help us to get to the heart of the argument, unlike the natural language. It makes our
logical operations mechanical and easy. (It is like using Indo-Arabic numbers 1, 2, 3, … instead
of the Roman numerals I, II, III, etc. It is easier to multiply 113 by 9 than to multiply CXIII by
IX). Symbols thus greatly facilitate our thinking about arguments and argument forms. Though it
may sound paradoxical, symbolic language helps us to accomplish some intellectual tasks
without even having any knowledge of the content of statements. Even if linguistic difficulties
are thus overcome, the question of deciding the validity or invalidity of arguments remains, of
course.

1.2 A SHORT STORY OF LOGIC

The second point of clarification has to do with the history of Logic. Logic was first
systematized into a science by Aristotle, the Greek philosopher, in the fourth century BC. His
contribution had been regarded as the last word in logic for several centuries. Aristotle’s
contemporaries and the medieval scholastic thinkers followed him with some cosmetic changes
here and there. But nothing significant was added to the Aristotelian (Traditional) logic.

2
In the seventeenth century G. W. Von Leibniz, a mathematician and philosopher, however, felt
that Aristotelian logic needed some modification. His suggestion was a prelude to the path
which the development of logic took during subsequent centuries. It was only in the nineteenth
century that the logicians began actualizing the ideas conceived by Leibniz. Then on, the
development of logic has been unprecedented. This was due to the fast development in
mathematics and its extensive dependence on logic, thanks to a host of philosophers of
mathematics like Boole, Russell, Frege, etc. to name a few. It must be remembered that dissent
voice was not absent. Philosophers like Poincare did oppose this influential school of thought.

This particular revelation may be surprising, not just interesting for us. They established that
logic is the foundation of mathematics. This is the principal thesis of Principia Mathematica
written by Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead. Emphasis on this relation between logic and
mathematics may induce the feeling that one should have a mathematical background in order to
understand symbolic logic. But this belief is not really well-founded. However, sound knowledge
of mathematics is, surely, most useful.

1.3 CLASSICAL LOGIC AND SYMBODLIC LOGIC

Though these two systems differ with regard to the meaning of proposition which is of
fundamental importance, the fact is that modern logic makes explicit what was implicit in
Aristotelian logic. So, it may be said that the difference between the old and the new is one of
degree rather than of kind. Some examples will easily make this disclosure clear. The difference
between an adult and infant is a matter of degree. But the difference between a boy and a girl is
in kind. But the difference in degree, between the ancient and modern logic, is enormous since
particular class of symbols used by symbolic logic makes logic an immeasurably more powerful
tool for analysis and deduction. This class of symbols is what is known as sentential connective.
Of course, there are other symbols too which played crucial role in the development of logic.

How did it happen? Surely, it did not happen overnight. It is not revolution, but evolution that
took place. As mentioned earlier, the performative ability of symbols achieved this feat. The
special symbols in modern Logic permit us (i) to exhibit with greater clarity the logical structures
of arguments obscured by their formulation in ordinary language, (ii) to divide more easily
arguments into valid and invalid, for in it the peripheral problems of vagueness do not arise; and
(iii) establish the nature of deductive argument. Though we have said that both symbolic logic
and traditional logic are basically the same, these differences have to be taken note of. a)
Traditional logic takes the terms (in a proposition) as the basic unit of analysis and is concerned
with their relation. Symbolic logic takes proposition as the basic unit and is concerned with the
relation between propositions. b) Symbolic logic, while dealing with argument forms, uses
symbols instead of propositions which made the task much easier. It may be noted that we do
not, for practical purposes, make a distinction between sentences, statements, and propositions.
We use them interchangeably, though a clear distinction can be made between them since a
sentence is always a part of language while a proposition is what a sentence in any language
means.

3
1.4 WHY USE SYMBOLS?

As we have already said, the use of symbols is helpful i) to avoid peripheral linguistic
difficulties, ii) to economize space and time needed for writing, iii) to restrict the attention
needed for grasping the meaning of long sentences or equations, and so on. This distinct
advantage explains why various sciences have developed their own symbolic language. Thus, for
example, in mathematics the equation
AxAxAAxAxAxAxAxAxAxAxA=BxBxBxBxBxBxB
is expressed more briefly and intelligibly as A12 = B7. Logic too has evolved technical notations
to achieve the goal. Aristotle used certain abbreviations to facilitate his own investigations. But
then these are symbols which can perform only at elementary level. For that matter all terms are
symbols only. Therefore what matters is the performative ability of symbols.

Modern Logic, however, introduced many more symbols. Such a step enabled logicians to
simplify the most complex argument. Simplicity does not mean that something is devoid of
content. It only means that an argument is capable of being tested with minimum number of
Rules and within shortest possible time. In fact accomplishment of this task requires something
like creativity. What is the value of all this exercise, it may be asked. The answer is simple.
When mistakes are easily detected, they are less likely to be made.

1.5 THE NATURE OF ARGUMENTS

Having clarified some of the issues raised at the beginning of this unit, we now pass on to the
nature of arguments. This is better understood when it is contrasted with argument forms. What
is an Argument? An argument is a group of sentences where one sentence is claimed to follow
from others, which are regarded as supplying conclusive evidences for its truth. Every argument
has a structure, viz. premises and conclusion. Premises provide support to the conclusion.
Therefore premises can be regarded as evidences based on which conclusion is accepted. All
arguments involve the claim that their premises provide evidence for the truth of conclusions.
But it is important to note that only deductive argument claims that the premises provide
absolutely conclusive evidences for the truth of the conclusion. This is the reason why deductive
arguments are characterized as ‘valid’ or ‘invalid.’ However, inductive argument claims that the
premises constitute some evidences for the conclusion. Therefore, the characterization ‘valid’ &
‘invalid’ cannot properly be applied to inductive arguments. Here our main concern is with
deductive arguments. A deductive argument is valid when the premises and the conclusion are so
related as to make it absolutely impossible for the premises to be true unless the conclusion is
true too. The task of deductive logic is a) to clarify the nature of the relation which holds
between premises and the conclusion in a valid argument, and b) to provide techniques for
distinguishing valid from invalid arguments.

1.6 TRUTH AND VALIDITY

Truth and falsity are properties of propositions whereas validity and invalidity are properties of
arguments. This leads us to an important question; what is the relation between the validity or

4
invalidity of an argument and the truth or falsity of its premises and the conclusion? The answer
to this question has two parts.

A) Valid arguments with true propositions:

Here is an example.

All mammals have lungs.

All bats are mammals.

 All bats have lungs.

An argument may contain only false propositions and be still valid.

All mammals have wings.
All trout are mammals.
 All trout have wings.
This is valid. For, what it affirms is; if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true,
even though, as a matter of fact, they are all false.

Note: These two examples of arguments show that valid arguments may or may not have true
conclusions. Therefore the validity of an argument does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.
However, the truth of the conclusion does guarantee the validity.
B) Invalid arguments with true propositions:
If I am the
prime minister of India, then I am famous.
I am not the prime minister of India.
 I am not famous.

Here it is clear that although both premises and conclusion are true the argument is invalid. This
can be shown to be invalid by comparing it with another argument of the same form.

If Amitabh Bachchan is the prime minister of India, then he is famous.

Amitabh Bachchan is not the prime minister of India.
 Amitaba Bachchan is not famous.

This is invalid since its premises are true but its conclusion is false.

Last two examples show that although some invalid arguments have false conclusions, not all of
them are so. The falsehood of its conclusion does not guarantee the invalidity of an argument.
However, the invalidity of an argument does guarantee the falsehood of the conclusion. But the
falsehood of conclusion does guarantee that either the argument is invalid or at least one of its
premises is false. There is asymmetry involved between validity and invalidity which must be
noticed. Hence there are two conditions that an argument must satisfy to establish the truth of its
conclusion: (a) it must be valid. In this case logician is concerned with validity even for

5
arguments whose premises might be false; (b) all premises must be true. (It is the task of
scientific inquiry to determine the last condition).

Check your progress I.

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

Examine the following arguments.

1) Analyze the features of traditional logic and modern logic.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Distinguish between truth and validity.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

1.7 ARGUMENT FORMS

Argument forms are important in modern logic. For the Rules provided by the modern logicians
to test the validity of arguments are based primarily on the form of the argument and not on its
content. As we have already said, the primary task of deductive logic is to distinguish valid
arguments from invalid ones. We have already shown above that if the premises of a valid
argument are true, then the conclusion must be true. We have also seen that if the conclusion of
a valid argument is false, at least one of the premises must be false. In other words, the premises
of a valid argument give incontrovertible proof of the conclusion drawn. Now we need to make
this formal account of validity more precise. In order to do this we introduce the concept of
argument form. Let us consider two examples, which evidently have the same form:
1.
If Tagore wrote the plays attributed to Shakespeare, then Tagore is a great writer.
Tagore is a great writer.
Therefore Tagore wrote the plays attributed to Shakespeare.

Even if we agree with the premises of this hypothetical syllogism, we cannot agree with its
conclusion. For, we can clearly see that this argument is invalid. One of the ways of proving its
invalidity is to use the method of logical analogy. For we can as well argue:

2. If Nehru was assassinated, then Nehru is dead.

Nehru is dead.
Therefore Nehru was assassinated.

No one will seriously defend this argument because its premises are known to be true and the
conclusion is known to be false. Therefore, this argument is obviously invalid. The form of this

6
argument is the same as that of the first argument which is invalid. This way of refuting an
argument is very effective. This way of refutation is known as refutation by logical analogy.
This method points to an excellent technique of testing arguments. That is, to prove the invalidity
of an argument it is enough to formulate an argument that (i) has exactly the same form as the
first and (ii) has true premises and a false conclusion. This method is based on the fact that
validity and invalidity are purely formal characteristics of arguments. In other words, any two
arguments that have exactly the same form are either both valid or both invalid, no matter what
the differences are in the subject matter with which they are concerned.

A given argument becomes clear when the simple sentences in it are abbreviated by capital
letters. We may thus abbreviate the statements, ‘Tagore wrote the plays attributed to
Shakespeare,’ ‘Tagore was a great writer,’ ‘Nehru was assassinated,’ and ‘Nehru is dead,’ by the
letters, T, G, A, and D respectively. In this manner we can easily symbolize the two sample
arguments given above as

T=>G A=>D
G D
T A

Comparison of these two examples illustrates what we mean by argument form.

How do we obtain argument forms? We need a method to obtain them because we base our
study on the forms of arguments only rather than on particular arguments having those forms.
What applies to the form applies equally well to what conforms to such form. This is a sort of
generalization very much akin to mathematical induction. This is made feasible by way of
introducing the notion of variables. Modern logicians use, to avoid confusion, small or lowercase
letters from the middle part of the alphabet, p, q, r, s, … as statement variables. A statement
variable is simply a letter for which, we substitute a statement. Not only simple sentences but
compound sentences also can be substituted for sentence (statement) variables. In the light of
these considerations, we can now define what an argument form is: An argument form is any
array of symbols which contains sentence variables (p, q, r, s, t) such that when sentences are
substituted for the sentence variables – the same sentence replacing the same sentence variable
throughout – the result is an argument. The form of two arguments is as follows:

p=>q
q
p
This is an example for argument form. For, when the sentences T and G are substituted for the
sentence variables p and q respectively, the result is the first argument given above. Similarly, if
we substitute A and D for the sentence variables p and q, the result is the second argument given
above. This leads us to the idea of what logicians mean by a substitution instance: Any
argument that results from the substitution of statements for statement variables in an argument
form is called a substitution instance of that argument form. Therefore if the form is invalid, then
any argument which subscribes to this form is invalid.

7
We have become familiar with one argument form. It corresponds to what traditional logic calls
mixed hypothetical syllogism. Since we have already considered invalid argument form, it is
desirable that we consider now a valid argument form.
3.
If there is nuclear warfare, then humanity perishes.
There is nuclear warfare.
Therefore the humanity perishes.

It is obvious that this argument is valid. If this aspect is not clear, then we shall resort to
logical analogy and consider another example.
4.
If there is inflation, then the cost of living goes up.
There is inflation.
Therefore the cost of living will go up.
A cursory look at these arguments shows that they have identical structure. Therefore if one of
them is valid, then the other one also must be valid. It is obvious that (4) is valid. It means that
(3) also must be valid. Logical analogy is helpful only for a beginner who is not familiar with the
irrelevance of matter of argument in a study of deductive logic.
This is not the only argument form we come across. Traditional logic considered several other
types of arguments; categorical syllogism, mixed disjunctive syllogism and pure hypothetical
syllogism are the other types. All these types correspond to argument forms. Since in the last unit
we had studied exhaustively several aspects of categorical syllogism, we can restrict ourselves to
conditional arguments. Let us recall these arguments.

Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism:

a) p v q
¬p
 q
A disjunctive syllogism which conforms to this form is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. So we
shall consider the form of an invalid argument.

b) p v q c) p v q
p q
 q  p
In our study of logic we must have a clear perception of what we have to do. We may have to
examine several arguments and arguments with plurality of structures. In such a situation we
have to reduce every argument to the form to which it corresponds. Proper identification or
matching of argument and argument form is necessary. Any mismatch will lead us astray.
Therefore this is an important step in our endeavour. This will also explain why we should be
familiar with argument forms.

Against this background, we shall examine examples. Though this is a repetition of what we
studied earlier, considering the importance of argument form it is useful to do so.
5.
Voters are either indifferent or ignorant.
Voters are not indifferent.

8
  Voters are ignorant.

6.
Men are either humane or boorish.
Men are boorish.
 Men are humane.
How should we match? A little care reveals that (a) matches 9 (it is unimportant whether first
alternative is denied or second alternative is denied) whereas (b) and 10 match. Any argument is
examined in this fashion only.

Consider the form of pure hypothetical syllogism.

a) p => q b) p => q c) p => q

q=>r ¬ p => r p => r
 p => r  ¬ q => r  p => r
We have three argument forms. Among them first two are valid whereas the last form is invalid.
In fact except first two forms any other form is invalid. Let us construct arguments which match
these forms.
7.
If atmosphere is polluted, then life on this planet becomes extinct.
If life on this planet becomes extinct, then God does not exist.
 If atmosphere is polluted, then God does not exist.
8.
If scientists are honest, then science will progress.
If scientists are not honest, then religion is strong.
 If science does not progress, then religion is strong.
9.

If politicians are patriots, then the country becomes prosperous.

If politicians are patriots, then democracy does not fail.
 If the country prospers, then democracy does not fail.

7 and 8 are valid. Therefore corresponding argument forms are also valid. 9 is invalid. Therefore
corresponding argument form also is invalid. In other words, every argument has matter
(content) and form. But it is the form that is fundamental from the point of view of validity.
Modern logicians usually classify arguments according to the forms the arguments exhibit.
Since it is possible, theoretically, to construct any number of arguments it is impossible to
consider matter as the theme of deductive logic. Therefore form is the parameter to examine
arguments.

As is clear from the above description, variables are symbols which can be replaced. There are
three types of replaceable variables: class, individual, and sentential.

Class variables are those replaceable by names of classes. For example, cats, horses, mangoes
etc. are class variables.

9
Individual variables are those that are replaceable by the names of individuals. Newton, the
tallest animal in the world, the most massive star, etc. are individual names. In other words,
general terms signify class variables whereas singular terms signify individual variables. Later
we will understand that the difference between these variables contributes to the difference in
notations, a point which becomes clear when we undertake a study of quantification.

Sentential variables are those replaceable by the names of sentences. x is regarded as sentential
variable and when a proposition consists of ‘x’, it is called propositional function. Propositional
function is neither true nor false. It takes truth-value only when it is given some value. Value is
given when the propositional variable is replaced by a proposition. All propositions are constants
in contrast with propositional function. It is an accepted practice to represent constants with
upper case letters while propositional function is always represented with lower case x.

Similarly, we have already seen what is meant by a substitution instance. Let us clarify it a little
more now. A substitution instance is any argument, which results from the substitution of
sentences for the sentential variables of an argument form, is said to have that form, or to be a
substitution instance of that form. For example, the argument ‘U v W and ¬U; W’ has the
form
p v q and ¬ p, q

1.8 TRUTH-TABLE

The simplest way of understanding argument forms is through truth-table. This is important for
one more reason. Construction of truth-table is basic to our study of symbolic logic. We shall
construct truth-tables to distinguish between valid and invalid forms.
Mixed hypothetical syllogism: p => q; p; q

p q p => q p q
1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0

5th column stands for the conclusion. This table discloses that the conclusion is false only when
one of the premises is false. In all other circumstances the conclusion is true. This is the
condition of any valid inference. The same explanation holds good for the remaining argument
forms.

Mixed disjunctive syllogism: p v q; ¬ p, q

10
 p q pvq ¬p q
1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0

Pure hypothetical syllogism: p => q; q => r; p => r

p q r p => q q => r p => r

1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1

It is obvious that the conclusion is false only when at least one premise is false. In this particular
instance the last but one column shows the truth-values of the conclusion. Therefore this form is
a valid form.

Testing an argument form containing n distinct sentential variables requires a truth-table having
2n rows. How do we construct such a truth-table? It is convenient to do it by following the cyclic
method, i.e. practice of simply alternating pairs of 1s and 0s down the extreme right hand initial
column, alternating pairs of 1s with the pairs of 0s down the column directly to its left, next
alternating quadruples of 1s with quadruples of 0s… and so on. It is important to remember that
truth-values do not belong to sentence forms (propositional function) but to sentences.

1.9 KINDS OF SENTENCE FORMS AND SENTENCES

These are of three kinds: tautology, contradiction, and contingent. First, let us consider

(i) Tautology: It is a sentence form having only true substitution instance.

Example: p v ¬p
p ¬p pv ¬ p

1 0 1
0 1 1

This can be known to be true without empirical investigation. That is, it is necessarily true. Any
sentence, which is a substitution instance of a tautologous sentence form, is formally true; and is

11
itself said to be a tautology. Example: Balboa discovered the Pacific Ocean (B). In this case, B is
to be known empirical, whereas the truth of ‘B v ¬ B’ is necessarily known.

(ii) Contradiction: It is a kind of sentence form having only false substitution instances. (Its
substitution instances are also called ‘contradictory’ or a ‘contradiction’). Example: Cortex
discovered the pacific (C). This is known to be false empirically (happens to be) false whereas
‘C and ¬ C’ is formally false.

‘Contradiction’ may mean (a) relation between sentences (impossible for two sentences both to
be true); (b) Self-contradictory sentence: (logically impossible for a particular sentence to be
true, the sense in which it is presently used by us).

p ¬p p and ¬ p

1 0 0
0 1 0

(iii) Contingent: These are sentences or sentence forms that are neither tautologous nor
contradictory. p, ¬p, p v q, p => q, are all contingent. Their truth-values are not formally
determined but depend on what happens to be the case.

1.10 TESTING THE VALIDITY OF ARGUMENT FORMS

One of the methods of testing the validity of an argument is provided: An argument is valid if
and only if the conclusion is a consequence of the premises. In other words, it is valid if and
only if whenever the premises are true, so is the conclusion. So in order to determine whether a
given argument is valid or not, we must reduce the sentences of the argument to their logical
forms and run a joint truth - table for both the premises and the conclusion. If the truth - table
shows that whenever the premises are true, the conclusion is also true, then the argument is valid,
not otherwise.

Check your progress II.

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1 Distinguish between tautology and contradiction with examples.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Examine the role of truth-table in modern logic.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

1.11 EXERCISES

12
Use truth-table to determine the validity or invalidity of each of the following argument forms:
1) p  q /  p
2) p /  p  q
3) p v q /  p
4) p / p v q
5) p / p => q

1.12 LET US SUM UP

Logic has its beginning in the works of Aristotle. Leibniz laid the foundation for modern logic.
Aristotelian and modern logic differ with respect to method. Mathematicians contributed to the
evolution of modern logic. Symbols play a major role in modern logic. So it is also called
symbolic logic. Truth characterizes statements and validity characterizes argument. Argument
form and arguments are different. Tautology, contradiction and contingent are the forme of
sentences. Truth-table is the most convenient method of determining the equivalent forms of
compound propositions.

1.13 KEY WORDS

Tautology: An expression is said to be tautologous if it is true in all circumstances.

Contradiction: An expression is said to be a contradiction if it is false in all circumstances.

1.14 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Ackkermann, Robert John. Modern deductive logic. London: Macmillan

Balasubramanian P. Introduction to symbolic logic. Madras: Sri. Ramakrishna Mission, 1977.

Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic. Ed.13. New Delhi: Pearson, 2010.

Frege, Gottlob. Two Fundamental Texts in Math. Logic. Cambridge: Harvard, 1970.

Geach, P T. Logic matters. Oxford, 1972.

Gensler Harry J. Introduction to Logic. London: Routledge, 2002.

Jain,Krishna. Text Book of Logic. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2009.

Layman, C. Stephen. Power of logic. London: Mayfield Publ., 1999

Massey, Gerald J. Understanding symbolic logic. New York : Harper & Row, 1970.

Quine, Willard. Mathematical logic. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979.

13
Singh, Arindama and Goswami, Chinmoy. Fundamentals of Logic. New Delhi: ICPR, 1998.

Tigert, Jno. Handbook of Logic. New Delhi: Cosmo Pub., 2006.

Tomassi, Paul. Logic. London: Routledge, 1999.

14
UNIT 2 CONJUNCTION, DISJUNCTION, CONDITIONAL AND BICONDITIONAL

Contents
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Negation
2.3 Conjunction
2.4 Disjunction
2.5 Exercises
2.6 Implication
2.7 Biconditional
2.8 Let Us Sum Up
2.9 Key Words
2.10 Further Readings and References

2. 0 OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this module is to introduce students to the classification and symbolization of
sentences in symbolic logic. In this context it may be noted that we use sentences, statements,
and propositions interchangeably. Recognition of compound sentence as a distinct class of
proposition is a sort of line of demarcation between traditional logic and modern logic, which
places symbolic logic on a different pedestal. Therefore through this unit we intend to introduce
you to the elements of symbolic logic. Various species of compound proposition are introduced
which serve as spring board for further study of logic. Thereby another objective is served. You
will become familiar with different techniques which help you to test more complex arguments.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
We have already discussed in the previous unit the importance of argument forms in modern
logic. Several classes of proposition constitute arguments. The complexity of arguments is just
without bounds. A good deal of groundwork is required before we confront such arguments
which is, undoubtedly, an intellectually challenging task. In order to achieve this task we have to
familiarize ourselves with distinction between kinds of proposition and several ways in which
sentences are combined and more importantly we have to determine the truth-conditions of such
sentences accurately. These are the pre-requisites for further analysis.
Modern logic recognizes three kinds of proposition; simple, compound and general. Let us deal
with the last kind first. Propositions recognized by classical logic, viz. A, E, I and O are called
general in modern logic. Simple sentence in logical sense is equivalent to what is simple in
grammar. In other words, a simple sentence consists of one clause only and singular term in the
place of subject. Consider these statements.

1 . Rathi is neat.
2 . Rathi is neat and Rathi is sweet.

1 is a simple sentence whereas 2 is a compound sentence. A compound sentence consists of at

least two components. Hence compound sentence in logical sense is equivalent to what grammar
regards as compound sentence. Of course, the components of compound statement may
themselves be compound.

1
It is important to notice one subtle distinction between compound sentence in grammatical sense
and compound sentence in logical sense. This distinction has nothing to do with the structure of
sentences but with our perception of sentences. In grammar we are not concerned with the truth-
conditions of compound proposition. But in logic it is our primary task. The truth-value of a true
compound proposition is TRUE and the truth-value of a false compound proposition is FALSE.
There is a technique of determining the truth-value of compound proposition. In effect, the truth-
value of a compound proposition is a function of the truth-value of its constituents. Logic which
deals with this particular function is called truth-functional logic. Barring a few cases, which are
exceptions, in all other cases the truth-value of compound proposition is functional. “A
compound proposition is said to be truth-functionally compound if and only if its truth-value is a
function of the truth-value of its components.” In some exceptional cases we find compound
propositions which are not truth-functionally compound. Consider this proposition, “John
believes that lead is heavier than zinc.” This is a non-truth-functionally compound sentence. Its
truth-value is completely independent of its component simple sentences. Such propositions are
not significant in logic. Hence we shall ignore such propositions.

There are different kinds of compound sentences, each requiring its own logical notation.
Negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional (implication), and biconditional are the kinds of
compound sentence with which we are concerned. In this module an exhaustive description of
the method of determining the truth-condition is attempted.

How are compound propositions formed? Sentences are conjoined using connectives called
sentential connectives. Symbolic logic has recognized five such connectives; not, and, or,
if…then, and if and only if. These five connectives generate respectively negation, conjunction,
disjunction, implication, and biconditional (bicondition) or double implication. Propositions are
replaced by lower case letters like p, q, r, etc. or simply p1, p2, p3, etc. Since proposition is the
central theme of our study, this is called propositional calculus or calculus of propositions. While
propositions are called variables, sentential connectives are called logical constants. Later we
will understand that these constants determine the truth-values of compound propositions.

2.2 NEGATION

Negation deserves our special attention because it is a compound proposition in a unique sense
though grammatically it is simple only. It is also a pointer to the exact meaning of and also the
sense in which we use the term compound. Let us consider the following sentence.
3. India is not a member of the UN Security Council.

This is a negative sentence. It is evident that only in grammatical sense it is simple. Why does
logic understand this sentence as compound? This way of understanding stands in need of
clarification. Negation is not merely a compound sentence. It is truth-functionally compound, i.e.
the truth of 3 depends upon the truth of some other statement. We must find out what that
statement is.

4. India is a member of the UN Security Council.

2
Suppose that 4 is true. Then 3 is false. If we suppose that 4 is false, then 3 is true. Therefore we
say that 3 is truth-functionally dependent upon 4 and vice versa. Earlier we said that p, q, r,….
are variables. This is so because in their places we can insert any propositions of our choice. If a
sentence replaces the variable, then such proposition is replaced by the first letter of first word or
any subsequent word. While doing so, we disregard articles or verbs. Further, we must ensure
that the same letter is not repeated.

This is one step in the process of symbolization. Second step is very important. We
symbolize connectives too.

Connective symbol
Not ¬

Now 3 and 4 become ¬ I and I respectively.

Since the negation of a true sentence is false and the negation of a false sentence is true, the
following truth-table defines the symbol „¬„ thus:
Table 1:
p ¬p

1 0
0 1

Hence the Rule of negation is:

A negation is true if what is negated is false,
and is false if what is negated is true.
In the symbolization of negation, it is important to remember that there are other words and
phrases besides „not‟ such as „it is false,‟ „it is untrue,‟ and so on. So there are different natural
ways of writing negation, such as:
- It is not the case that indiscipline is tolerated.
- It is false that an honest man is a man of millions.
- It is untrue that that Indians are lazy.

2.3 CONJUNCTION
In conjunction sentences are joined by „and‟. The sentences so combined are called conjuncts.
Sometimes propositions are misleading. The statement given below illustrates the point.

5. Shasi is intelligent and a hardworking student.

You may be tempted to think that 5 is a simple sentence. In reality, it is a compound sentence.
The break-up is as follows.

3
5a. Shasi is intelligent.
5b. Shashi is a hardworking student.

The symbol we use for conjunction in this module is „‟ (and), and not the dot „.‟as is
customary. There are many other words besides „and‟ for which the symbol „‟ is used. Some of
these words are; but, yet, both, although, however, moreover, as well as, while, etc. Some
examples are given below:

6 Hari is poor, but he is honest. PH

7 It is hot, yet tolerable HT
8 Shasi is intelligent although not very careful. I¬C
9 Both Mohan and Mini are students of Logic. MR

Since conjunction is a truth-functionally compound sentence, its symbol A is a truth-functional

connective. The truth-table of conjunctive proposition provides the truth-condition of
conjunctive proposition.

Table 2:

p q pq
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0

Since this truth-table specifies the truth-value of p  q in every possible case it can be taken as
defining the symbol „ ‟
We may take note of one important aspect: Conjunction has mathematical properties.
That is, a conjunctive function is commutative, associative (or distributive) idempotent.

p  q if and only if q  p Commutative

p  (q  r) if and only if (p  q)  r Associative
p  p if and only if p Idempotent

In terms of relation the properties of conjunction can be stated as follows. Symmetry, transitivity
and reflexive are the relations which conjunction satisfies. It is symmetric in virtue of its
commutative property. It is transitive because if the statement „A and B‟ is true and the statement
C and D‟ is true, then the statement „A and D‟ is true. It is reflexive because if A is true, then A
and A is also true. A relation which is symmetric, transitive and reflexive is known as
equivalence relation. Therefore conjunction can be said to satisfy the parameters of equivalence
relation.

2.4 DISJUNCTION

4
Disjunction (also called alternation) is a combination of two sentences with connective or
linking the sentences. The two sentences so combined are called disjuncts (or alternatives). The
symbol used for disjunction is „v‟ (called wedge). Here are some examples and their symbolic
representation:
10 . Either I will send him an email or I will telephone him. MvT
11 . Either it rains or we shall not go for an outing. Rv¬G
12 . Either A is not honest or B is not telling the truth. ¬Hv¬T

The sentential connective „v‟ can be used in two senses:

a) Weak or inclusive sense. In this sense it means not only either-or, but can be both. Examples:

13. Either Ramu is a cynic or he is a liar.

14. Either Sita is poor or she is sincere.

Let us make this inclusive sense more concrete: We can think of a mother asking her daughter to
choose one of the two dresses A or B. The mother wants her daughter to choose one and reject
the other. But we will not be surprised if the daughter says that she would take both. In contracts
and other legal documents, this weak sense is made explicit by the use of the phrase „and/or.‟

b) Strong or exclusive sense. In this sense disjunction excludes third possibility. This is possible
only when the alternatives stated are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. Consider this
example.

15. Either a line is straight or it is curved.

Let us take a concrete example to explain the exclusive sense of „or‟. Suppose you have a guest
and you ask him or her „what will you have, tea or coffee?‟ You will be certainly surprised if
your guest says „both.‟ This means that we use both the inclusive and exclusive senses of „v‟ not
only in logic but also in our ordinary life.

Latin has two different Words corresponding to the two different senses of „or‟: vel (inclusive)
and aut (exclusive). We use „p v q‟ in its inclusive sense. A weak disjunction is false only if both
of its disjuncts are false. Therefore the Rule is:

a) At least one disjunct is true (weak).

b) One disjunct is true and the other disjunct is false (strong).

Exclusive disjunction is symbolized by A. H. Lightstone in his work „Set Theory and Real
Number System’ in this manner.
pvq

This notation helps us to distinguish strong from weak.

Consider the following disjunctive syllogism:

Arg. 1

5
U.N.O. will be strengthened or there will be the III World War.
U.N.O. will not be strengthened.
Therefore, there will be the III World War.

It is clear that this argument is valid on either interpretation of „or‟. So, we symbolize „or‟ by „˅‟
(wedge) regardless of which sense of „or‟ is intended. We can therefore write „p ˅ q‟ and define
it as:

Table 3:
p q pvq
1 1 1
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0

It may be noted here that, like conjunction, disjunction too has the very same mathematical
properties. The disjunctive function has commutative, associative as well as idempotent
properties.

p v q if and only if q v p Commutative

p v (q v r) if and only if (p v q) v r Associative
p v p if and only if p Idempotent

Idempotent property is the same as reflexive property in mathematical language. Therefore

disjunction satisfies the parameters of equivalence relation.

Now a word about correct punctuation; Punctuation becomes relevant when two or more than
two sentential connectives are involved. As in mathematics, in logic also parentheses perform
the function of punctuation. Since mathematics is more familiar to you, we shall begin with an
example from mathematics.

a) (5+6) 4
b) 5+ (6) 4

It is obvious that a) and b) are not equal. This is because the positions of parentheses determine
the meaning of the given expression. Similarly, in symbolic logic parentheses play a decisive role
in determining the exact meaning of expressions. When two or more than two connectives are
involved, we should first understand the exact meaning of expression and then use parentheses
properly. Otherwise, we will go wrong.

2.5 EXERCISES
So far we have considered negation, conjunction, and disjunction. Before we go further, let us
work out some exercises.

6
1. If A and B are true sentences and X and Y are false, discover the truth-value of the compound
sentence ¬ [ (¬A v X) v ¬ (B  Y) ] .

This is how it can be worked out: Since A is true, ¬A is false, and since X is false also, the
disjunction (¬A v X) is false. Since Y is false, the conjunction (B  Y) is false and so its
negation ¬(B  Y) is true. Hence the disjunction ( ¬A v X) v ¬ (B  Y) is true and its
negation, which is the original sentence, is false. (We always begin with the innermost
component).

Check your progress I.

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.
a) If p is true and q is false, then work out the value of the following expressions:

1. ¬ (p  q)
2. (p v q)  (p  q)
3. ¬ (p  q) v (p  q)
4. ¬ (p v ¬q)  (q  ¬q)
5. ¬ (p  p) v ¬ (q v p)

b) If A and B are true sentences and X and Y are false sentences, which of the following
compound sentences are true?

1. ¬ (A v X)
2. ¬A v ¬X
3. ¬B  ¬Y
4. ¬ (B  Y)
5. A v (X  Y)
6. (A  X) v Y
7. (A v B)  (X v Y)
8. (A  B)  (B v Y)
9. (A v X)  (B v Y)
10. A  {X v (B  Y)}
11. A v (X  (B v Y)
12. X  (A v (Y v B))
13. ¬ ( ¬ ( ¬ (A  ¬ X) v ¬A)  ¬X)
14. ¬ ( ¬ ( ¬ (A v ¬B)  ¬A) v ¬A)
15. {(X v A)  ¬Y)} v ¬ {(X v A)  ¬Y}
16. {A v (X  Y)} v ¬ {(A v X)  (A  Y)}
17. {(X  (A  Y)}  ¬ {(X v A)  (X v Y)}
18. {(X v (A v B)} v ¬ {(X  A) v (X  B)}
19. {X  (A v Y)}  ¬ {(X v A)  (X v Y)}
20. {X v (A v Y)} v ¬ {(X  A) v (X  Y)}

7
2.6 IMPLICATION

Conditional statement is a compound statement of the form „if the train is late, then we will miss
the connection.‟ In the strict sense of the term disjunction also is a conditional statement.
However, for the time being we shall restrict ourselves to the form mentioned above. Other
words for a conditional statements are implication and hypothetical proposition. Here we will be
using them interchangeably. The component before „then‟ is called antecedent (implicant, or
rarely protasis) and the component after „then‟ is called consequent (implícate, or rarely
apodosis). In an implication, antecedent is said to imply the consequent, or the consequent is said
to be implied by the antecedent.

A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, then its consequent must be true.

While symbolizing implication, it is important to identify antecedent and the consequent

correctly. Some examples will be of help:

a. If it rains, then we shall go for a picnic. R => G

b. If it does not rain, then we shall not go for a picnic. ¬ R => ¬ G
c. You will get the job only if you pass the test. P => G

All the following sentence forms are symbolized as

p => q
q only if p
q if p
q provided that p
q on condition that p
q in case p
p hence q
p implies q
Since p, q
p is a necessary condition for q
p is a sufficient condition for q

There are at least four senses in which „if-then‟ is used:

- Logical: For example, „If all cats like liver and Dinah is a cat, then Dinah likes liver.‟
- Definitional: In this sense, the consequent follows from by the very definition of a
Word. For example, „If the figure is a triangle then it has three sides.‟
- Causal: In this sense, there is a causal connection between and the consequent. For
example, „If gold is placed in aqua ragia, then gold dissolves.‟
- Decisional: „If you shave your head, then I will change my name.‟

How do we find out the meaning which is common to these four senses of „if-then‟? In order to
find out an answer to this question, we must ask: What circumstances would suffice to establish
the falsehood of a conditional? Hence the Rule: A conditional is false only in one case:

8
Any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent is false.

Incidentally, it is important to note that this is the chief characteristic of deductive logic. If all the
premises are true and the conclusion is false, then the deductive argument is invalid. A true
proposition can imply only a true proposition.

The truth - condition of implication is represented in the form of a table.

Table 4:
p q p => q
1 1 1
0 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 0

This table shows that implication is false under only one circumstance i. e., when a false
conclusion is derived from a true premise. Under all other circumstances it is true.

Compare any truth-table with any other truth-table. You will notice that the truth-value of any
two compound propositions differ though variables remain the same. Compound propositions
differ only with regard to sentential connectives. This is an important aspect which proves that
only sentential connectives determine the truth-value of compound propositions independent of
variables.

Here are some examples worked out. In all cases assume that p is1 and q is 0.
a. (p => q) v p
= (1 => 0) v 1
= 0v1
= 1

b. q => (p  ¬ q)
= 0 => (1  ¬ 0)
= 0 => (1  1)
= 0 => 1
= 1

c ¬ (p  q) => ¬ q
= ¬ (1  0) => ¬ 0
= ¬ 0 => 1
= 1 => 1
= 1

Material Implication

9
We have considered the different senses of „if …. then.‟ Not all conditional statements need
assert one of the four kinds of implication mentioned earlier. Material implication constitutes a
fifth type that may be asserted in ordinary discourse as follows: „If Gandhiji was a military
genius, then I am a monkey‟s uncle.‟ Conditional proposition of this sort is often used as an
emphatic or humorous way of denying its antecedent. So the full meaning of this conditional
seems to be the denial that „Gandhiji was a military genius‟ is true when „I am a monkey‟s uncle‟
is false. What it means is simply this: since the consequent is so obviously false, the conditional
must be understood as denying the antecedent.

The use of material implication (=>) as the common and partial meaning is justified on the
ground that the validity of valid arguments involving conditionals is preserved when the
conditionals are regarded as asserting material implication only. (It must, of course, be admitted
that such symbolizing abstracts from or ignores part of the meaning of most conditional
sentences. But the justification for doing so is demonstrated by some of the Rules of Inference
such as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens and Hypothetical Syllogism.

However, „if … then‟ relation, like „either or‟, is not as simple as it appears. For, the ordinary
people and the logicians do not look at it in the same way. For an ordinary person two simple
sentences are related conditionally only under two conditions: i) Their meanings must be related;
and ii) the consequent must follow from antecedent. However, a logician is not particular about
these conditions provided antecedent should not be true if the consequent is false. The logician‟s
main focus is on the logical properties of an implicative relation.

Though the truth-value of implication is thus worked out indirectly, the problem is not over. For,
if we look at the truth-value of implication carefully, there appears to be a paradox:
The first three rows in it are saying that any sentence, true or false, can imply a true proposition.
Further, only a false conclusion from a true premise is not admissible. This is the result of the
logical properties of an implication. But this is not acceptable to an ordinary person: How can
any sentence, true or false, imply any true proposition? This is paradoxical. Similarly, the third
row is saying that any sentence, true or false, can be implied by a false proposition. This again is
paradoxical.

But we must look at the reason behind these paradoxes: In the cases of conjunction, disjunction,
negation, (and, also, biconditional or equivalence, as we shall see later), the ordinary language
helps the logicians in framing their truth-values. But they could establish the truth of implication
only indirectly. This, however, does not fit in with the ordinary use of „if then‟, and hence the
paradox of material implication. This problem can be solved if we keep the logical standpoint
and the ordinary standpoint separate. For logical purposes, we take the former standpoint of „if ….
then‟ called material implication.

It is quite rewarding to consider a few examples as exercises. This is the only way to learn logic.

If A and B are true sentences and X and Y are false sentences, which of the following
compound sentences are true?

10
1. X => (X => Y)
2. (X => X) => Y
3. (A => X) => Y
4. (X => A) => Y
5. A => (B => Y)
6. A => (X => B)
7. (X => A) => (B => Y)
8. (A => X) => (Y => B)
9. (A => B) => (¬A => ¬B)
10. (X => Y) => (¬X => ¬Y)
11. (X => A) => (¬X => ¬A)
12. (X => ¬Y) => (¬X => Y)
13. ((A  X) => Y) => (A => Y)
14. ((A v B) => X) => (A => (B => X))
15. ((X  Y) => A) => (X=> (Y => A))
16. ((A  X) => B) => (A => (B=>X))
17. (X => (A => Y)) => ((X => A) => Y
18. (X => (X => Y)) => ((X =>X) => X)
19. ((A => B) => A) => A
20. {(X=>Y) => X} => X

2.7 BICONDITIONAL
A biconditional is a compound statement which is a combination of two sentences. The
connective used to obtain this proposition is if and only if. For example, „you will catch the train
if and only if you reach the station on time.‟ is a biconditional statement. This is symbolized as C
<=> R. Such sentences are true when both the components have the same truth-value. A
biconditional is true in two cases only. Both the components must be either true or false, as is
clear from the following truth-table:

Table 5:

p q p <=> q
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

It must be noted that bi-conditional is a conjunction of two implicative propositions.

p if and only if q is logically equivalent to (p => q)  (q => p). Truth-table assists us to find out
how it is so.

Table 6:

11
 p q p <=> q p => q  q => p
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1

Compare the truth-values of columns 3 and 5 in each row. Since the values have remained the
same, we conclude that p if and only if q is logically equivalent to „if p, then q and if q, then p‟.

Here are some more examples that have similar but logically different forms; and therefore we
have to be very careful in symbolizing them:

i) Mr. X will catch the bus if he reaches on time. R => C

ii) Mr. X will catch the bus only if he reaches on time. C => R
iii) Mr. X will catch the bus if and only if he reaches on time. C <=> R

Equivalent Forms:
It is possible to transform compound proposition without changing the meaning of proposition.
Such transformation yields equivalent propositions. Let us construct a truth-table for each
compound proposition to understand how this works.

Implication:

Table: 7

Implication Disjunction Negation

p q ¬p ¬q p => q ¬pvq ¬ (p  ¬ q)
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

The advantage of truth-value method is obvious. Without any verbal explanation and with least
effort it is possible to identify equivalence between propositions. The equivalence relation,
which exists between implication and disjunction, is self-explanatory. However, relation with
negation requires some clarification. There are two columns under negation, which reflect truth-
values. Suppose that we ignore negation sign and corresponding truth-values and consider the
last column then we are not considering negation but conjunction. The last column in the
absence negation preceding first bracket is the same as the following one:

Table 8

p ¬q
0
1
12
 0
0

However, the required form is not conjunction but negation. The truth-value of negation form,
of course, truth-functionally depends upon the truth-value of conjunction form. Therefore while
selecting the column, which corresponds to negation form, we should exercise a little caution.

It is necessary to consider another form of equivalence relation and this is relevant only with
respect to implication. Examine this table.

Table: 9

Implication Contraposition
p q ¬p ¬q p => q ¬ q => ¬ p
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1

In this transformation the components are replaced by their complements and transposed
simultaneously. It will be an error to just transpose without effecting the change in quality
because implication does not satisfy the symmetric property. What happens exactly when p => q
becomes q => p? The reader is advised to construct truth-table and see the result.

The reader must be in a position to discover the equivalent form for disjunction. It is plain from
table7 that if p, then q (p => q) is logically equivalent to ¬ p or q (¬ p v q). We shall express in
the form of equations.

Disjunction Implication Negation of conjunction

(¬ p v q) ≡ (p => q) ≡ ¬ (p  ¬q)

The formula is simple. Replace the first disjunct by its negation and simultaneously „v‟ by „=>‟.
We get implication. Therefore the equivalent form for „p v q‟ must be „¬ p => q.‟ Contraposition
for disjunctive proposition is superfluous because it satisfies the symmetric property. Let us
construct truth-table for the equivalent forms for this proposition.

Table 10

13
p q ¬p ¬q pvq ¬ p => q ¬ ( ¬ p Λ ¬q)

1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1

It is quite interesting to note that conjunction and biconditional do not have equivalent forms.
Truth-table again comes to our rescue to know why it is so. It is sufficient if we consider any
one-form, say, implication to know why it is so. If one equivalent form is absent, it is imperative
that other forms are also absent.

Table 11

p q ¬ p ¬ q p Λ q p => q ¬ p => q p => ¬ q ¬ p => ¬q

1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1

Except that truth-values of conjunction do not tally with any possible arrangement in implication
form, no other explanation is conceivable for the absence of equivalent forms to conjunction.
The students are advised to test other forms with respect to disjunctive syllogism to convince
themselves of the veracity of this statement.

Biconditional proposition also does not have any equivalent form. The reason is very simple.
Biconditional is, in reality, a conjunction two implications. First we shall know why it is a
conjunction.
Table 12

p q ¬ p ¬ q p <=> q (p => q)  (q => p)

1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1

The method of computing is as follows; first, we shall compute the truth-values of first
implication (p => q) and then we will compute the truth-values of second implication (q => p).
These two sets of truth-values together determine the truth-value of conjunction. When we
compare columns 5 and 7, we will come to know that these two expressions have identical truth-
values in all instances. It shows that biconditional is also a conjunctive proposition where the
conjuncts themselves are compound propositions. Therefore what applies to conjunction
naturally, applies to biconditional also.

14
 Check your progress II.
Note: Use the space provided for your answer.
1. If p is true and q is false, then work out the values of the following statements:

1. p => (q <=> p)
2. ¬ p <=> (p => p)
3. (p => q) <=> (¬ p v q)

2. Which of the following sentences are true?

a) (New Delhi is the capital of India) or (Rome is the capital of Italy).
b) (New Delhi is the capital of Spain) and ¬ (Paris is the capital of France).
c) (New Delhi is the capital of India)  ¬ (Paris is the capital of France v New Delhi is
the capital of India).
d) ¬ { ¬ (Stockholm is the capital of Norway  Paris is the capital Spain)} v
¬{ ¬(London is the capital of England)  ¬ (New Delhi is the capital of Spain)}.
e) (Paris is the capital of France) v ¬{(New Delhi is the capital of Spain)  ¬ ( ¬Paris is
the capital of France  ¬ New Delhi is the capital of Spain)}.

3. If A, B, and C are true statements and X, Y, and Z are false statements, which of the
following are true?
1 ¬A v B
2. (A  X) v (B v Y)
3 ¬(X  ¬Y)  (B v ¬C)
4. ¬(X v Y)  (¬X  Y)
5. ¬ ( (A v B) v ¬ ( B  A))
4. If A, B, and C are true statements and X, Y, and Z are false statements, determine which of the
following are True.

1. A => B
2. (A => B) => Z
3. X => (Y => Z)
4. ((X => Z) => C) => Y
5. {(A v X) ¬Y} => ((X => A) => (A => Y))

2.8 LET US SUM UP

There are five kinds of compound propositions. Compound proposition in grammatical
sense is different from compound sentence in logical sense. All compound propositions
do not have equivalent forms. The truth of any compound proposition is determined by
the truth-values of components. Sentential connectives determine the truth-value of
compound propositions.

2.9 KEY WORDS

Truth-table: It is a technique with the help of which we determine the truth- values of compound
propositions.

15
Biconditional proposition: biconditional is a conjunction of two implicative propositions.

2.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanyan, B. An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Rama Krishna Vivekananda

College, 1977.

Jain, Krishna. Text Book of Logic. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2009.

Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic 13th ed., New Delhi : Pearson, 2010.

Singh, Arindama and Goswami, Chinmoy. Fundamentals of Logic. New Delhi: ICPR, 1998.

Gensler, Harry J. Introduction to Logic. London: Routledge, 2002.

Layman, C. Stephen. Power of Logic. London: Mayfield Publ, 1999.

16
UNIT 3 RULES OF INFERENCE AND THE NATURE OF VALIDITY OF
ARGUMENTS

Contents

3.0 Objectives
3.1 Introduction – Tools of Testing Arguments
3.2 Methods of Testing the Validity of Arguments
3.3 Application of Elementary Rules of Inference
3.4 Exercises
3.5 Let Us Sum Up
3.6 Key words
3.7 Further Readings and References

3.0 OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this module is to help students to familiarize with the Rules of Inference which
can be regarded as the pivot of the study of logic. The central theme of logic consists in the
classification of arguments. Through this unit this main aim is achieved. In the previous unit we
learnt the technique of determining the truth of compound sentences and the decisive role played
by sentential connectives. Second objective of this unit is to demonstrate the latent relation
between Rules of Inference and the truth of compound sentences. This method is devised to
show that the Rules of Inference are demonstratively certain. If the Rules are demonstratively
certain, then scrupulous adherence to these Rules produce arguments with unquestionable
validity. The aim of this unit is to discover such arguments.
3.1 INTRODUCTION– TOOLS OF TESTING ARGUMENTS
In modern logic an argument is regarded as a sequence of statements. When proof is constructed
to test the argument, the proof also takes the same form, which the argument takes. In this type
of proof there is correspondence between the scheme of the given argument and the scheme of
the proof. Every step, which is adduced while constructing proof, is the conclusion of the
preceding statements, and in turn, becomes the premise for statements, which follow it (if not all,
at least to some). Rules, which govern the process of deducing hidden conclusion, constitute
what are known as ‘Rules of Inference’ in modern logic. Many of these Rules have their origin
in traditional logic.

There is a certain way of constructing proof in modern logic. More descriptive method, which
consumes both space and time, has given way to much shorter and simpler method. Whatever
conclusion can be drawn from any one or two given premises is written on the left hand side
(LHS) while the Rule and the premises to which this particular Rule is applied to derive the
conclusion used in further proof are written on the right hand side (RHS). Quite often, Rule of
Inference is applied to one line only. As an economy measure, instead of premises,
corresponding serial numbers are written. Thereby we save time. We must ensure that drawn
conclusion, the respective premises and the Rule applied are always juxtaposed. This procedure
is the simplest and most economical in terms of time and effort to grasp the argument.

1
We have learnt in the previous unit the technique of conjoining simple sentences to generate
compound sentences, and also we learnt the method of fixing the truth or falsity of such
sentences. This knowledge is the pre-requisite for our further study.

We make use of twenty two Rules. Out of them nine are called Rules of Inference. There are ten
Rules which are called Rules of Replacement (also can be called Transformation or
Equivalence Rules). Reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof, Conditional Proof and the
Strengthened Rule of Conditional Proof are the other Rules. The application of Rules is not
at random. The unique composition of argument determines the kind of Rule to be applied. We
will begin with Rules of Inference and also we shall examine the logical status of two Rules later.

Rules of Inference:
1 Modus Ponens (M.P.)

p => q
p
∴q

2 Modus Tollens (M.T.)

p => q
¬ q
∴¬ p

3 Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.)

p => q
q => r
∴p => r
4 Disjunctive Syllogism (D.S.)

pvq
¬p
∴q
5 Constructive Dilemma (C.D.)

(p => q) Λ (r => s)
pvr
∴ qvs
6 Destructive Dilemma (D.D.)
(p => q) Λ (r => s)
¬qv¬s
∴¬ p v ¬ r

2
 7 Simplification (Simp.)
pΛ q
∴p
8 Conjunction (Conj.)

p
q
∴p Λ q

9 Addition (Add.)

p
∴ vq
p
Copi I. M. has replaced D. D. with another Rule called
Absorption.
10. Absorption (Abs.)
p => q

∴p => (p Λ q)
Since it is not possible to dispense with either of these Rules, Copi’s decision to replace D.D.
with Absorption is not clear. Hence it is obvious that nine becomes ten. A Rule becomes
indispensable only because arguments, more often than not, consist of steps with diverse
structure, which demand acceptance of different Rules. Of course, law of parsimony stipulates
that not a single superfluous law is admissible. Therefore in accordance with this stipulation it
must be maintained that if any new Rule is added, it is presumed that the addition is necessitated
by the complexity of the argument.

We may have nine or ten Rules. The number is really immaterial. This is so because they are
insufficient to test arguments with every conceivable structure. Therefore Rules of Replacement
are added. Before listing these Rules we must become familiar with a subtle distinction between
these two sets. Suppose that a premise (also understood as line) in an argument consists of
several connectives. In such a case, Rule of Inference must be applied to only whole line. It
will be a mistake to apply to a part of the line. Why is it a mistake? Consider this example.
(A Λ B) => (C v D)
According to the Rule of Inference even if A or B or both are false, 1st line remains true only
irrespective of the truth-value of the second component. Suppose that the Rule of
Simplification is applied to the first component. Then suppose that A Λ B becomes A. If A is
false, then we are including a false proposition which does not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion because when a premise is false the conclusion can as well be false though the
argument is valid. Rule of M. P. or M. T. to the 1st line can be applied provided one of the lines
consists of either affirmation of the 1st component or denial of the 2nd component without
omitting any proposition within parentheses. However, this restriction does not apply to the
second set of Rules which will be considered later.

Before we proceed further let us examine the logical status of these Rules. What applies to one
Rule also applies to any Rule of Inference or Replacement. So we can restrict ourselves to just
two Rules. Consider M.P. The Rule can be put in the form of an expression in this way.

3
 Argument form compound statement
p => q [(p => q) Λ p] => q
p
∴q

Construct truth-table for R.H.S.

Table1:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
p ¬ p q ¬ q (p => q) Λ p => q
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0

Consider the truth-value of implication on the extreme right (column 8 which is actually called
main column in propositional calculus) to determine the truth-value of compound expression.
Since it takes the value 1 in all cases, the compound proposition and its corresponding Rule of
Inference is a tautology which means that it is true always.

Now examine the expression for C.D.: [(p => q) Λ (r => s) Λ (p v r)] => (q v s).
The truth-table is constructed as follows. Negation of proposition is not considered in this case in
order to reduce the number of columns and they are not required in this case.
Table2:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Sl. p q r s {(p => q) Λ (r => s) Λ (p v r)} => (q v s)
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
4 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
9 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
11 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
12 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
14 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
15 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1

There are sixteen rows and in all these rows the truth-value in the 11th column, i.e. main column,
is 1 only and hence it is a tautology. Since we have made a random selection of Rules, this

4
 conclusion must hold good for all Rules of Inference and Rules of Transformation. The student is
advised to test this property in other cases to satisfy natural curiosity

3.2 METHODS OF TESTING THE VALIDITY OF ARGUMENTS

Why Look for an Alternative to the Truth-table Method?

Any attempt to test an argument by the use of logical analogy or by the method of
truth-table to see whether there is any substitution instance with true premises and a false
conclusion is fraught with difficulties. A given argument is proved invalid if a refuting analogy
can be found for it. But discovering such refuting analogies is not always that easy. Fortunately,
it is not necessary. For, there is a simpler, and a purely mechanical test for arguments of this kind
based on the same principle.

Similarly, testing the validity of arguments by using the truth-table method is simple and
convenient only when there are two or three variables. But the situation is very different when
there are several variables. Suppose that there are two variables. We require only four rows and
eight columns (see table 1). If there are three variables, then we require eight rows and eight
columns (provided we do not include the negation of variables). It means that if there are ‘n’
number of variables, then the length of the rows is given by the formula

2n
So if there are five variables, we have to construct thirty two rows. Then proof construction
becomes highly complex. One of the priorities during construction of proof is economy in time
and effort. What is brief is simple. Economy, simplicity clarity are the parameters of accepted
proof construction. This is what is called law of parsimony. Therefore an alternative is required.

3.3 APPLICATION OF ELEMENTARY RULES OF INFERENCE

Let us consider an example:
p => (q v r)
¬r
¬q
-------
∴¬p
The meaning of proof construction should become clear now. It is a sequence of statements each
of which is either a premise of that argument or follows from preceding statements of the
sequence by an elementary valid argument, and the last statement in the sequence is the
conclusion of the argument whose validity is being proved.
1.
1 p => (q v r)
2 ¬r
3 ¬q /∴¬p
4¬qΛ¬r 3, 2, Conj.
5∴¬p 1, 4, M.T.

5
 Since this is the first argument, let us elaborate the process.

¬ r appears in 2nd line. Therefore the Rule of ‘Conj. permits us to include ¬ r . We get
¬ q Λ ¬ r.

This forms the fourth line in the sequence. Now we shall consider 1st and 4th line together.
2.
1). p => (q v r)
2). ¬qΛ¬r
∴¬p

In (1), (q v r) is the consequent. q v r being a d i s junction, when it is denied, it becomes a

conjunction with original disjuncts being replaced by their respective negation. This is a law
called de Morgan’s law about which more will be said later. Since consequent is denied in the
second premise, the antecedent has to be denied in the conclusion and it is done. Hence the Rule
followed is M. T. It is clear that the form of (1) and (2) corresponds exactly to the form of Rule
2. The conclusion, which we obtained through formal proof, is the same as the conclusion of the
given argument. This is how an argument is tested for validity. This is a model of explanation,
which suits any argument.
Consider an argument in natural language.
1.
If Ravi is nominated, then she will go to Delhi.
If she goes to Delhi, then she will campaign there.
If she campaigns there, then she will meet Shibu.
Ravi will not meet Shibu.
Either Ravi will be nominated or someone more eligible will be selected.
Therefore someone more eligible will be selected.’
The validity of this argument may be intuitively obvious. But we must prove it. In
order to do so, we must first translate the argument into our symbolism which takes this form.

1 A => B
2 B => C
3 C => D
4 ¬D
5AvE/ ∴ E
6 A => C 1,2, H.S.
7 A => D 6,3, H.S.
8 ¬A 7.4, M.T.
9 ∴E 5, 8, D.S.
From these examples it is clear that in this method the conclusion always follows ‘/’ and ‘/’
Immediately succeeds the last premise. This is an important aspect because all premises are
numbered whereas the conclusion is not numbered. Therefore it is written adjacent to the
last premise. Steps involved in the construction of proof are also the elements of the set of
premises. This method requires very few steps and Rules. On the L. H. S., steps, which are
involved in the construction of proof, are written. Every line after the last premise stands in
need of justification and the justification is provided by one or the other Rule listed above. It
must be noted that the same Rule can be applied any number of times. This method of proof
6
is called formal method of proof which becomes clear very shortly.

From the first two premises A => B and B => C we validly infer A => C using the Rule of
Hypothetical Syllogism. From A => C and the third premise, C => D we validly infer A => D,
using again the Rule of Hypothetical Syllogism. From A => D and the fourth premise, ¬D we
validly infer ¬A using the Rule of Modus Tollens. We apply the Rule of Disjunctive Syllogism
to ¬A and the fifth premise A v E and validly infer E, the conclusion of the original argument.
That the conclusion can be deduced from the five premises of the argument with the help of three
elementary Rules proves that this method is the most useful method. From the description given
above it becomes evident that the Rule of H. S. is applied twice.

[The rest of the arguments are worked out for which explanation is not provided. The student is
expected to construct the same.]

2 1 (B v N) => ( K Λ L) 3 1 (K => A) Λ (M => D)

2 ¬K 2 ¬A /∴ ¬K v ¬M
3 ¬M / ∴ ¬B Λ ¬M 3 ¬A v ¬D 2, Add.
4 ¬K v ¬L 2, Add. 4 ∴ ¬K v ¬M 1, 3 D.D.
5 ¬B Λ ¬N 1, 4, M.T.
6 ¬B 5, Simp.
7 ∴ ¬B Λ ¬ M 6, 3, Conj.

4 1 (M v N) => (P Λ Q) 5 1 (A Λ B) => (C v D)
2 N /∴ P Λ Q 2 A
3 MvN 2, Add. 3 B / ∴C v D
4 ∴P ΛQ 1, 3, M.P. 4 A ΛB 2, 3, Conj.
5 ∴CvD 1,4, M.P.

6 1 ( T => K) Λ (R => S) 7 1 (A v B) Λ(¬D ΛE)

2 S => D 2 A v B =>K /∴KΛ(¬D ΛE)
3 D => T 3 A v B) 1, Simp.
4 R / ∴T 4 K 2, 3, M.P.
5 R => S 1 Simp. 5 ¬D ΛE 1, Simp.
6 S 5,4, M. P. 6 ∴ K Λ ( ¬D Λ E) 4, 5, Conj.
7 D 2, 6, M. P.
8 ∴T 3, 7, M.P.

8 1 (P =>Q) Λ(R=>S) 9 1 A v (B Λ C)
2 ¬A=> ¬Q 2 A=>P
3 A => B 3 ¬P / ∴C
4 ¬B /∴ ¬P V ¬ S 4 ¬A 2,3, M.T.

7
 5 ¬A 3,4, M.T. 5 BΛC 1,4, D.S.
6 ¬Q 2,5, M.P. 6 ∴C 5, Simp.
7 P=>Q 1, Simp.
8 ¬P 7, 6, M.T.
9 ∴¬Pv¬S 8 Add.

10 1 A Λ (B v C) 11 1 ¬B
2 A=>P 2 ¬D
3 Q / ∴PΛQ 3 (A=>B) Λ(C=>D)
4 A 1, Simp. 4 K / ∴ C (¬K Λ¬A)
5 P 2,4, M.P. 5 A=>B 3, Simp.
6 ∴PΛQ 5,3, Conj. 6 ¬A 5, 1, M.T.
7 C=> D 3, Simp.
8 ¬C 7, 2, M.T.
9 (¬ K Λ ¬A) 4,6, Conj.
10 ∴¬CΛ (¬KΛ¬A) 8, 9, Conj.
Conj. Conj.
12 1 (B ≡ K) => (Z Λ D) 13 1 (K Λ T) => (A v B)
2 ¬ (Z Λ D) /∴¬ (B ≡ K) 2 (A v B) => (P Λ ¬ L)
3 ∴¬ (B ≡ K) 1,2, M.T. 3 (P Λ¬L)=>D
4 ¬(D) /∴¬(K ΛT)
5 (KΛT)=>(P Λ¬L) 1,2, H.S.
6 (K Λ T) => D 5,3, H.S.
7 ∴¬ (K Λ T) 6,4 M.T.

14 1 (K Λ A) => (¬ B v C) 15 1 A=>D
2 M=> (K Λ A) 2 B=>C
3 M /∴¬ B v C 3 A v B /∴ D v C
4 M => (¬B v C) 2,1, H.S. 4 (A=>D)Λ (B=>C)1,2,Conj.
5 ∴¬ B v C 4,3, M.P. 5 ∴D v C 4,3, C.D.

16 1 A => D 17 1 (A=>G) => (K v ¬ D)

2 B => C 2 ¬ (K v ¬ D) / ∴¬(A => G)
3 ¬ D v ¬ C/∴¬A v ¬ B 3 ∴¬ (A=> G) 1,2, M.T.
4 (A=>D)Λ(B=>C)1,2,Conj.
5 ∴¬Av ¬B 4,3, D.D.

18 1 J V (K Λ L) 19 1 D v (A=> B)
2 J=>D 2 (A=> B) => (C v K)
3 ¬D /∴K Λ L 3 ¬(C v K) /∴D
4 ¬J 2,3, M.T. 4 ¬(A=>B) 2,3, M.T.
5 ∴ (K Λ L) 1,4 D.S. 5 ∴D 1,4, D.S.

20 1 A Λ (B => C) 21 1 (A => B) Λ (C=>D)

2 B /∴C 2 A/∴B v D

8
 3 B => C 1, Simp. 3 AvC 2, Add.
4 ∴C 3,2, M.P. 4 ∴B v D 1,3, C.D.

22 1 A v (B Λ C) 23 1 A => B
2 A=> D 2 B => C
3 ¬D /∴B 3 ¬ C /∴¬ A
4 ¬A 2,3, M.T. 4 ¬B 2,3, M.T.
5 BΛC 1,4 , D.S. 5 ∴¬A 1,4, M.T.
6 ∴B 5, Simp.

24 1 (A v B) => C 25 1 (A=> C) Λ (B => D)

2 D => ¬ C 2 K => A
3 D /∴¬ (A v B) 3 K /∴ C v D
4 ¬C 2,3, M.P. 4 A 2,3, M.P.
5 ∴ ¬ (A v B) 1,4, M.T. 5 AvB 4, Add.
6 ∴CvD 1,5, C.D.

Not all arguments can be tested only with the Rules of Inference, though as shown above
somewhat complex and diverse arguments succumb to these Rules. Just as modern logic tried to
supplement traditional logic, within modern logic, the need was felt to supplement the Rules of
Inference. Hence we have the Rules of Replacement. The structure of argument is such that it
may require only the Rules of Replacement or only the Rules of Inference or both. We have ten
such Rules, which are called the Rules of Replacement. The difference between these two sets
of Rules is that the Rules of Inference are themselves Inferences whereas Rules of Replacement
are not. This is because the Rules of Replacement are restricted to change or changes in the form
of statements. For example, A or B is changed to B or A; A Λ (B v C) is changed to (A Λ B) v
(A Λ C). Also, in the mode of application of Rules there is a restriction. Unlike Rules of
Inference which should be applied to the whole line only any Rule of Replacement can be
applied to any part of the line a difference pointed out earlier. All Rules of Replacement are,
logically, equivalent.

Check your progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

Examine the following arguments.

1) Analyze the significance of Rules of Inference.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Distinguish between the application of Composition and Simplification.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

9
 Now let us list Rules of Replacement.

1 De Morgan’s Law (De.M.) ¬ (p Λ q) ≡ ¬ p v ¬q

¬ (p v q) ≡ ¬ p Λ ¬q

2 Commutation Law for addition (Com.) p v q ≡ q v p

Commutation Law for multiplication pΛq≡qvp
3 Double Negation(D.N.) ¬ (¬ p) ≡ p
4 Transposition (Trans.) (p => q) ≡ (¬q => ¬ p)
5 Material Implication (Impl.) (p => q) ≡ ¬ p v q
6 Material Equivalence (Equiv.) (p ≡ q) ≡ (p => q) Λ (q => p)
{(p ≡ q) ≡ {(p Λ q) v (¬ p Λ ¬q)}
≡pΛp
7 Exportation (Exp.) {(p Λ q) => r} ≡ {p => (q => r)}
89 Tautology
Association(Taut.)
(Ass.) p ≡v p(qvvpr)} ≡ {(p v q) v r}
{p
{p Λ (q Λ r)} ≡ {p Λ q) r}

10 Distribution (Dist.) {p Λ (q v r)} ≡ {(p Λ q) v (p Λ r)}

{p v (q Λ r)} ≡ {p v q) Λ (p v r)}
[Note: When the expression includes both ‘Λ’ and ‘v’ only distribution law can be applied but
not association law.]

If we construct truth-table for any Rule (for both sides of the equation), we will understand that
they are equivalent expressions. The student is advised to construct truth-table for any Rule of
Replacement to verify the same. Our immediate task is to become familiar with the technique of
testing arguments. Wherever Rule of Replacement applies to a part of the line the transformed part
is italicized.
26. 1 {I => (J => K)} Λ (J => ¬I) / {(I Λ J) => K} Λ (J => ¬I)}
2 {(I Λ J) => K} Λ (J => ¬I) 1, Exp.

27.
1 (R Λ S) => (¬R v ¬S) / (¬R v ¬S) => (R Λ S)
2 (¬R v ¬S) => (R Λ S) 1,De.M.
28.
1 (T v ¬U) Λ {(W Λ ¬V) => ¬T}/ (T v ¬U) Λ {(W=>(¬V=>¬T)}
2 (T v ¬U) Λ {(W=>(¬V=>¬T)} 1, Exp.
29.
1 X v Y) Λ (¬X v Z)/ (X v Y Λ ¬X) v {(X v Y) Λ Z}
2 (X v Y Λ ¬X) v {(X v Y) Λ Z} 1,Dist.
30.
10
 1 Z => (A => B) / Z => ¬{ ¬ (A => B}
Z => ¬{ ¬ (A => B} 1,D.N.
31.
1 (¬F v G) Λ (F => G) / F => G.).
2 (F => G) Λ (F => G) 1, Impl.
3 F => G 2, Taut.

Now we3 shall¬R => P different types of arguments,/ which

consider R may involve both kinds of Rules.
32. 41 ¬(OQ=>
v O¬P) Λ (P => Q) 2, Impl.
5 Ov¬Q 4, Com.
26 Q => O
(O => ¬ P ) Λ (¬ Q => ¬P) 1, Trans,
7 ¬P v ¬P 6, 5, C.D.
8 ¬P 7, Taut.
9 ¬¬R 3, 8, M.T.

10 R 9, D.N.

33.
1 X => (Y => Z)
2 X => (A => B)
3 X Λ (Y v A)
4 ¬Z / B
5 (X Λ Y) => Z 1, Exp.
6 (X Λ A) => B 2, Exp.
7 (X Λ Y) v (X Λ A) 3, Dist.
8 {(X Λ Y) => Z} Λ {(X Λ A) => B} 5,6, Conj.
9 ZvB 8, 7, C.D.
10 B 9, 4, M.T.

34
1 C => (D => ¬ C)
2 C≡D / ¬C v ¬D
3 C => (¬ ¬C => ¬D) 1, Exp.
4 C => (C => ¬D) 3, D.N.
5 (C Λ C) => ¬D 4, Exp.
6 C => ¬D 5, Taut.
7 ¬C v ¬D 6, Impl.

35
1 E Λ (F v G)
2 (E Λ G) => ¬ (H v I)
11
 3 ¬ (¬H v ¬I) => ¬ (E Λ F) / H ≡ I
4 (E Λ G) => (¬H Λ ¬I) 2, De.M.
5 ¬ (H Λ I) => ¬ (E Λ F) 3, De.M.
6 (E Λ F) => (H Λ I) 5, Trans.
7 {(E Λ F) => (H Λ I)} Λ {(E Λ G) => (¬H Λ ¬I)} 6,4,Conj.
8 (E Λ F) v (E Λ G) 1, Dist.
9 (H Λ I) v (¬H Λ ¬I) 7,8, C.D.
10 H≡I 9, Equiv.

36
1 J v (¬K v J)
2 K v (¬J v K) / J≡K
3 (¬K v J) v J 1, Com.
4 ¬k v (J v J) 3, Ass.
5 ¬K v J 4, Taut.
6 K => J 5, Impl.
7 (¬J v K) v K 2, Com.
8 ¬J v (K v K) 7, Ass.
9 ¬J v K 8, Taut.
10 J => K 9, Impl.
11 (J => K) Λ (K => J) 10, 6, Conj.
12 J≡K 11, Equi.

37
1 (E Λ F) Λ G
2 (F ≡ G) => (H v I) / IvH
3 E Λ (F Λ G) 1, Ass.
4 (F Λ G) Λ E 3, Com.
5 (F Λ G) 4, Simp.
6 (F Λ G) v (¬ F Λ ¬ G) 5, Add.
7 F≡G 6, Equiv.
8 HvI 2, 7, M.P.
8 IvH 8, Com.

38
1 (M => N) Λ (¬ O v P)
2 Mv¬O / NvP
3 NvP 1, 2,C. D.

12
 39
1 (L v M) v (N Λ O)
2 (¬ L Λ O) Λ ¬ (¬ L Λ M) / ¬L Λ N
3 ¬ L Λ [O Λ ¬ (¬ L Λ M)] 2,Ass.
4 ¬L 3,Simp.
5 L v {(M v (N Λ O)} 1, Ass.
6 M v (N Λ O) 5,4, D.S.
7 ¬ (¬ L Λ M) 2, Simp.
8 Lv ¬ M 7, De. M.
9 ¬M 8, 4, D.S.
10 NΛO 6, 9, D.S.
11 N 10, Simpl.

12 ¬LΛN 4,11, Conj.

40
1 E => (F => G) / F => (E => G)
2 (E Λ F) => G 1, Exp.
3 (F Λ E) => G 2, Com.
4 F => (E => G) 3, Exp.

41
1 H => (I Λ J) / H=>I
2 ¬ H v (I Λ J) 1, Impl.
3 (¬ H v I) Λ (¬ H v J) 2, Dist.
4 ¬HvI 3, Simp.
5 H => I 4, Impl.

42
1 N => Q / (N Λ P) => O
2 ¬NvO 1, Impl.
3 ¬Pv¬NvO 2, Add.
4 ¬ (P Λ N) v O 3, De.M.
5 (P Λ N) => O 4, Impl.
6 (N Λ P) => O 5, Com.

43
1 (Q v R) => S / Q => S
2 (¬ Q Λ ¬R) v S 1, Imp.
3 (¬ Q v S) Λ (¬ R v S) 2, Dist.
4 ¬QvS 3, Simp.
5 Q => S 4, Impl.

44
1 T => ¬ (U => V) / T => U
2 T => ¬ {¬ U v V} 1, Impl.
3 ¬T v (U Λ ¬V) 2, De. M.

13
 4 (¬T v U) Λ (¬T v ¬V) 3, Dist.
5 ¬T v U 4, Simp.
6 T => U 5, Impl.

45
1 W => (X v ¬Y) / W => (Y => X)
2 W => (¬Y v X) 1, Com.
3 W => (Y => X) 2, Exp.

46
1 H => (I v J)
2 ¬I / H => J
3 ¬H v (I v J) 1, Impl.
4 ¬H v (J v I) 3, Com.
5 (¬H v J) v I 4, Ass.
6 ¬H v J 5, 2, D.S.
7 H=> J 6, Impl.

47
1 (K v L) => ¬ (M Λ N)
2 (¬M v ¬N) => (O ≡ P)
3 (O ≡ P) => (Q Λ R) / (L v K) => (R Λ Q)
4 (L v K) => ¬ (M Λ N) 1, Com.
5 (L v K) => (¬M v ¬N) 4, De.M.
6 L v K) => (O ≡ P) 5, 2, H.S.
7 (L v K) => (Q Λ R) 6, 3, H.S.
8 (L v K) => (R Λ Q) 7, Com.

48

1 (D Λ E) => F
2 (D => F) => G / E=>G
3 (E Λ D) => F 1, Com.
4 E => (D => F) 3, Exp.
5 E => G 4,2, H.S.

49
1 (H v I) => {J Λ (K Λ L)}
2 I / JΛK
3 IvH 2, Add.
4 HvI 3, Com.
5 J Λ (K Λ L) 1, 4, M.P.
6 (J Λ K) Λ L 5, Ass.
14
 7 JΛK 6, Simp.

50
1 (M v N) => (O Λ P)
2 ¬O / ¬M
3 ¬Ov¬P 2, Add.
4 ¬ (O Λ P) 3, De.M.
5 ¬ (M v N) 1, 4, M.T.
6 ¬M Λ ¬N 5, De.M.
7 ¬M 6, Simp.

51
1 T Λ (U v V)
2 T => {U => (W Λ X)}
3 (T Λ V) => ¬ (W v X) / W≡X
4 (T Λ U) => (W Λ X) 2, Exp.
5 (T Λ V) => (¬W Λ ¬X) 3, De.M.
6 {(T Λ U) => (W Λ X)} Λ {(T ΛV) => (¬W Λ ¬X)} 4, 5, Conj.
7 (TΛU) v (TΛV) 1, Dist.
8 (W Λ X) v (¬WΛ¬X) 6,7, C.D.
9 W≡X 8, Taut.

52
1 Y => Z
2 Z => {Y => (R v S)}
3 ¬ (R Λ S) / ¬Y
4 Y => {Y => (R Λ S)} 1,2, H.S.
5 (Y Λ Y) => (R Λ S) 4, Exp.
6 Y => (R Λ S) 5, Taut.
7 ¬Y 6, 3, M.T.

53
1 AvB
2 C v D / {(A v B) Λ C} v {( (A v B) Λ D )
3 (A v B) Λ (C v D) 1, 2,Conj.
4 {(A v B) Λ C} v {(A v B) Λ D} 3, Dist.
54
1 (I v ¬ ¬J) Λ K
2 {¬ L => ¬ (K Λ J)} Λ {K => ( I=> ¬M)} / MΛ¬L
3 {(K Λ J) => L} Λ {K => (I => ¬ M)} 2, Trans.
4 {(K Λ J) => L} Λ {(K Λ I) => ¬ M} 3, Exp.
5 (I v J) Λ K 1 D.N.
6 K Λ (I v J) 5 Com.
7 (K Λ I) v (K Λ J) 6 Dist. 15
8 (K Λ J) v ( K Λ I) 7 Com.
9 L v ¬M 4, 8 C. D.
 10 ¬MvL 9, Com.
11 M Λ ¬ L) 10, De. M.

3.4 EXERCISES

A. For the following valid arguments, state the Rule of Inference by which its conclusion
follows from their premise(s):

1 (A Λ B) => C
¬ ¬ (A Λ B) = > C

2 [N => (O Λ P)] Λ [Q => (O Λ R)]

NvQ
(O Λ P) v (O Λ R)

3 ¬ (H Λ ¬I) => (H => I)

(I < => H) => ¬ (H Λ ¬I)
(I <=> H) => (H => I)

4 (J => K) Λ (K => L)
L=> M
J => K) Λ (K => L)] Λ (L => M)

5 [(O => P) => Q] => ¬ (C v D)

C v D) =>¬ [(O => P) => Q]
B. Construct a formal proof of validity for the following arguments by adding additional
premise or premises.

1MvN
¬M Λ ¬N
N

2 A => B
A => C

3 (P => Q) Λ (R => S)
QvS

4 ¬ (H v I) v J
¬(¬H v I)

16
 J v ¬H
5 (W Λ X) => (Y Λ
Z)
¬ (W Λ
X)

6
Q => (R v
S) (T Λ U)
=> R
(R v S) => (T Λ U)
Q => R
Check your progress II.
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Distinguish between distributive law and commutative law.

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Explain de Morgan’s law with example.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

3.5 LET US SUM UP

There are nine Rules of Inference. Six of them are those accepted by traditional logic. Remaining
three Rules are the inventions of modern logic. Rules of Inference must be applied to the whole
line only whereas the Rules of Replacement can be applied to a part of the line. Any complex
argument can be examined easily with the help of these Rules.

3.6 KEY WORDS

Replacement: It means that there is internal change within a line which does not alter the
meaning of the compound proposition.
3.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES
Balasubramanyan, B. 1977. An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Rama
Krishna
Vivekananda College
Jain,Krishna. 2009. Text Book of Logic. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld.
Copi, Irving M. 2010. Introduction to Logic Ed.13. New Delhi :

17
Pearson.
Singh, Arindama ; Goswami, Chinmoy. 1998. Fundamentals of Logic. New Delhi:
ICPR Gensler Harry J. 2002. Introduction to Logic. London: Routledge Layman,
C. Stephen. 1999. Power of logic. London: Mayfield Publ.
Massey, Gerald J 1970. Understanding symbolic logic. New York : Harper & Row
Carnap, Rudolf 1958. Introduction to symbolic logic and its applications. NY:
Dover. Ambrose, Alice 1954. Fundametals of symbolic logic.. New York :
Rinehart , 1954
Bachhuber, Andrew H SJ 1957. Introduction to Logic. New York : Appleton
Balasubramanian P 1977. Introduction to symbolic logic. Madras: Sri. Ramak. Mission
Clark, Joseph T SJ 1952. Conventional logic & modern logic- a prelude to
transition. Woodstock : Woodstock College Press
Geach, P T 1972. Logic matters.Oxford
Walsh, Joseph B SJ 1940. Logic. New York
Ackermann, Robert John 1970. Modern deductive logic. London:
Macmillan Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1955. Language, Truth and Logic. London:
V. Gollancz Stebbing, L Susan. 1961. Modern introduction to Logic. New
York: Barnes Walsh, Joseph B SJ 1940. Logic. New York
Quine, Willard 1979. Mathematical logic. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press
Stebbing, L Susan. 1961. Modern introduction to Logic. New York: Barnes
Langer, Susanne K. 1953. Introduction to Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover
Frege, Gottlob. 1970. Two Fundamental Texts in Math. Logic. Cambridge:
Harvard
Bradley, Francis Herbert. 1928. Principles of Logic. 2 Vol. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Wolf, A. 1930. Textbook of Logic. London: George Allen and Unwin
Tomassi, Paul. 1999. Logic. London: Routledge
Tigert, Jno. 2006. Handbook of Logic. New Delhi: Cosmo Pub.
Sola, M. SJ. 1934. Compendium of the Science of Logic. London: Macmillan

18
UNIT 4 FALLACY

Contents

4.0 Objective
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Classification of Fallacies
4.3 Fallacies of Relevance
4.4 Fallacies of Induction
4.5 Fallacies of Presumption
4.6 Fallacies of Ambiguity
4.7 Exercises
4.8 Let Us Sum Up
4.9 Key Words
4.10 Further Readings and References

4.0 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this unit is to enable the students to recognize fallacies. This is necessary because
it is possible to distinguish valid arguments from invalid arguments only when we can identify
invalid arguments. In other words, you can know what is good only when you know what is bad
and if you know what is bad you, surely, will avoid the same. This is what, precisely, Socrates
said. Fallacy is the class name given to bad (illogical) arguments. Fallacies are like plastic
flowers: They give you the impression that they are valid. But, a student of logic, like a bee,
should be able to distinguish between the real (valid) and the artificial (invalid).

4.1 INTRODUCTION

There are as many types of fallacies as there are types of errors in arguing. Falsehood has many
faces whereas truth has only one. Therefore our task is clear. What do we mean by fallacy? How
do they arise? How are they classified? How can we avoid them? These are some of the
questions to which we turn now.

Logic deals with the Rules of correct thinking. Hence fallacy arises when we violate any of
these Rules. Strictly speaking, a fallacy is a type of arguing which appears to be valid, but
actually invalid. The term fallacy comes from the Latin word ‘fallo,’ meaning ‘I deceive.’

We reason incorrectly when the premises of an argument fail to support its conclusion. Every
fallacy can be a Non-sequitur (‘it does not follow’). Examples: ‘This man is not clever because
he cannot talk fast’ or ‘He is not a patriot because he does not wear khadi.’ Any argument of this
sort is fallacious.

1
Therefore any error in reasoning is a fallacy. Logicians use the term ‘fallacy’ to mean typical
errors, that is, mistakes in reasoning that exhibit a pattern that can be identified and named. The
great logician Gottlob Frege, regarded as the father of Modern Logic, has made this observation:
One of the tasks of a logician is to ‘indicate the pitfalls laid by language in the way of the
thinker.’ Every fallacy is a type of incorrect argument. The particular argument that violates
some known or unknown Rule is commonly said to be a fallacy because it is an individual
example of that typical mistake. When the Rule is unknown, it is the business of logician to
discover or frame the Rule.

Illustration: Suppose one argues, ‘All science is essentially materialistic; Karl Marx who was
certainly a materialist, must therefore have been scientific.’ This is a bad reasoning, fallacious,
because conclusion does not follow from the premise. If every P is a Q, it does not follow from
the fact that one is a Q that he is a P. All cats are mammals, but not every mammal is a cat. Here
we can easily identify a pattern of mistake. We call this pattern ‘the fallacy of affirming the
consequent.’

This is a formal fallacy that violates one of the Rules of mixed hypothetical syllogism.
Examples of some other formal fallacies are: undistributed middle, illicit major and illicit minor.
Most fallacies, however, are not formal but informal; they are patterns of mistakes that arise
from confusions concerning the content of the language used. Such informal fallacies arise in
very many ways and they are often more difficult to detect than formal ones because language is
slippery and imprecise, and can set traps. In this unit, we consider only informal fallacies, since
the students are already familiar with the formal fallacies in their study of classical logic.

A word of caution: In ordinary speaking and writing people sometimes make mistakes without
being aware of them. Therefore, though our logical standards should be high, in their application
to arguments in ordinary life we should also be generous and fair. The sources of fallacies in our
daily life are misinterpretations, false assumptions, lack of knowledge, distraction of the mind,
prejudices, and so on.

4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES

Fallacies are numerous. Logicians are not unanimous as to the number and manner of the
classification of fallacies. Some logicians have distinguished up to 112 different fallacies!
Different logicians classify them differently. So, there is no correct taxonomy of fallacies. Often
their grouping is arbitrary.

In our discussion we follow the latest classification done by Copi (2010, 395-461). He groups
them into four main categories: fallacies of (i) relevance, (ii) induction, (iii) presumption, and
(iv) ambiguity. What follows is an outline of these fallacies:

4.3 FALLACIES OF RELEVANCE

2
Fallacies of relevance are so called because relevance is ignored in such cases. Six of such
mistakes are of interest here.

R1. APPEAL TO EMOTION (ARGUMENTUM AD POPULUM) is making use of the

feelings and prejudices of people (‘to the populace’) rather than their reason. This is perhaps the
most common of fallacies. Example: In campaigning for election in India one might ask:
‘Should you not vote for the Congress? Did not the congress men suffer imprisonment for the
sake of the country?’ Thus, the speaker (or writer) appeals to patriotism, an honorable emotion,
without clear evidence to appeal to the feelings of his audience. The oratory of Adolph Hitler,
whipping up the racist enthusiasm of his German listeners, is another classic example.

Besides politicians, many others, like advertisers, commit this fallacy. Advertising industry has
raised it almost to the status of a fine art. Example: beauty products are associated with youth
and captivating personalities, and self-confidence; men depicted using the products are generally
handsome and famous, the women graceful and charming. They arrest our attention by relentless
appeals to our emotions of every kind. Their suggestion is that the product – say soft drinks, or
soap,– is sexy, or is associated with wealth or power, or some other admired traits, and therefore
we, in purchasing it, will acquire some of that same merit.

Sometimes they use what is known as ‘bandwagon fallacy’ – to imitate others in action or
thought or speech (fashion also can be included) because so many others are doing it. This is
very common in media. Example: look at the following advertisement: ‘Smooth sailing is all
that’s there to LIFE with LIC’s JEEVAN SARAL (easy life). (The Week, 22 Feb. 2005).

A variant of this frequent fallacy is called argumentum ad misericordiam (appeal to pity). This is
used very much in criminal trials. There may be cases where it may be justified. But, when the
argument boils down to no more than an appeal to ‘merciful heart’ it is plainly fallacious. All
sections of people use this fallacy some time or other. Very often parents use this sort of
argument to secure their child’s admission in prestigious schools. This is a familiar instance of
this fallacy. Though often successful, the appeal to pity is ridiculed in the story of the trial of a
youth accused of murdering his parents with an axe. Confronted with overwhelming proof of his
guilt, his attorney appealed for leniency on the grounds that his client is now an orphan!

R2. THE RED HERRING is distracting the attention of listeners from the topic under
discussion. As the story goes, red herring is used to distract or confuse dogs. It means a trail
which is left to mislead deliberately. So whatever can keep the listener off the track may serve as
a red herring. In a popular novel and movie, The Da Vinci Code, one of the characters, a
Catholic Bishop, enters the plot in ways that very cleverly mislead. His name aptly suits the
mission; Bishop Aringarosa – meaning ‘red herring’ in Italian.

R3. THE STRAW MAN is a way of arguing against some view by presenting an opponent’s
position as one that is easily torn apart. That is, it is very much easier to win a fight against a
man made of straw than against one made of flesh and blood. To argue that one should not join
the civil services since some civil servants are corrupt and by joining the service one would be
supporting this systematic corruption is an example of a straw man argument. But this argument

3
is not justifiable because someone may decide to join administration with the laudable intention
of eradicating corruption in public life. This fallacy results when we adopt the most extreme
view possible – that every act or policy of a certain kind is to be rejected. This argument is easy
to win, but not relevant to the conclusion originally proposed.

R4. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE PERSON (ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM) consists

in attacking the character of the opponent instead of proving or disproving the point at issue.
Instead of proof, the argument merely refers to his conduct. The thrust of the argument which
commits the fallacy of ad hominem is not on the disputed conclusion, but on some person who
defends it. This kind of personal attack is hurting, and might be conducted in either of two ways:
One is abusive and the other circumstantial.

Abusive attack means ‘questioning the integrity of the opponent’. But the character of an
adversary is logically irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the reasoning employed. A proposal may
be attacked as unworthy because it is supported by ‘extremists,’ or by ‘fundamentalists.’ But
such allegations, even when plausible, are not relevant to the merit of the proposal itself.
Socrates was convicted of impiety partly because of his long association with persons known to
have been disloyal to Athens and rapacious in conduct.

Circumstantial ad hominen is to argue that you are as bad as I am; just as guilty of whatever it is
that you complained about. Example: A hunter, accused of needless slaughter of harmless
animals, sometimes replies by noting that his critics eat the flesh of harmless cattle. But the fact
that the critics eat meat is totally irrelevant to the question raised, viz. whether needless killing is
ethical. Another example: it may be unfairly suggested that a member of the clergy must accept a
given proposition because its denial would be incompatible with the Scriptures.

The circumstances of an opponent are not properly the issue in serious arguments. It is the
substance of what is claimed, or denied, that must be addressed. It may be rhetorically effective
but that does not make up for its error. However, sometimes in court room proceedings, for
example, it is acceptable, and often effective to call a judge’s attention to the unreliability of a
witness, and by so doing undermine the claims upheld by the testimony of that witness. But
even this attack on the person of the witness does not establish the falsehood of what had been
asserted.

R5. APPEAL TO FORCE (ARGUMENTUM AD BACULUM) consists in appealing to

physical force to make the opponent to submit. ‘Appeal to the stick’ is hardly logic, though
sometimes very effective, for example, in making the criminals confess their crimes. However,
no one would agree that ‘might is right.’ The threat of force in any form is unreasonable and
therefore fallacious. It is indeed very odd if someone says, ‘When you have no case, well get
angry and threaten.’ This is equal to saying: the best policy of defending yourself is to become
offensive.

Right from the domestic front to the international forum, threat, a ‘subtle’ weapon, is used as a
powerful instrument of persuasion. Many powerful nations are using ‘arm twisting’ policy like
reducing financial aid, cutting the technical assistances, and so on, if the opponent countries do
not sign a particular treaty. Though threats are used implicitly on a large scale by all sections of

4
society, accepting a conclusion merely on the basis of threat is not at all sound from a logical
point of view.

R6. MISSING THE POINT (IGNORATIO ELENCHI) is diverting attention from the real
point at issue. It is arguing beside the point. This applies to many kinds of arguments where the
conclusion does not follow from the premises. Example: ‘The object of war is peace; therefore,
soldiers are the best peacemakers.’ Even if it is assumed that the object of war is peace, still it
does not imply that soldiers are the best peacemakers.

Of the various informal fallacies of relevance, ignoratio elenchi is perhaps the most difficult to
describe with precision. It is confusion in reasoning that the speaker does not fully recognize.
Aristotle, who classified fallacies, explained it as a mistake made in trying to refute another’s
argument; defender tries to argue for P and the opponent counters it with an irrelevant Q.

In a sense, every fallacy is an ignoratio elenchi because there is a gap between the premises and
the conclusion, and thus the debator misses the point. So, ignoratio elenchi is a catch-all class of
fallacies: Non sequitur is similar fallacy in which the conclusion does not simply follow from
the premises. Non sequitur is more often applied when the failure of argument is obvious. ‘A
great, rough non sequitur,’ Abraham Lincoln observed in a speech in 1854, ‘was sometimes
twice as dangerous as a well polished fallacy.’

R7 ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE (ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIAM) is taking

advantage of the ignorance of the opponent. Example: ‘there is neither heaven nor hell because
no one has seen it.’ Or, ‘Ghosts do not exist because no one has proved its existence so far.’ If a
proposition has not yet been disproved, can we conclude that it is true? If we say yes, then we
are arguing from the supposed absence of disproof to the presence of proof. This is what the
examples given above show. Or, if some proposition has not yet been proved true, then can we
conclude that it is false? If we can, then we are arguing form the absence of disproof to the
presence of proof. The following example falls under this category. ‘Since no one has disproved
a supernatural being, the supernatural being exists.’

Both these inferences are defective. For, ignorance or absence of evidence is taken as evidence
for the conclusion. Unfortunately, our daily life is sprinkled with this fallacy. The customer asks
the shopkeeper concerning the quality of an item like cloth. The spontaneous reply is that so far
no one has complained against it. Similarly, a customer asks the manufacturer about the quality
of the glass he is buying. The standard answer is: ‘I have been making and selling glass for
nearly ten years and since then I have not heard any complaint against it.’

Even in science this fallacy crops up. In archeology, for example, evidences mighty have been
destroyed over a period of time. But we cannot, therefore, conclude that an otherwise plausible
claim is false. This fallacy has been very attractive to pseudo-scientists who make unverifiable
claims about psychic phenomena. Their claims regarding telepathy or clairvoyance are examples
of this sort of fallacy. They justify their proposition by arguing that critics have been unable to
disprove it.

5
This fallacy can be a major hindrance to progress. Galileo, whose newly invented telescope
revealed the mountains and valleys of the moon, was confronted with this sort of fallacious
argument by his opponents. Similarly, whenever some change is proposed, within an institution
or in society at large, those threatened by it are likely to counter it with this type of fallacy thus:
‘How can we know whether it will work? How can we know whether it is safe? We do not
know. So, we should not adopt the change proposed.’ True, it is often impossible to prove the
workability or safety in advance. But it is not the ground for rejection.

R8 THE APPEAL TO INAPPROPRIATE AUTHORITY (ARGUMENTUM AD

VERECUNDIAM) is also known as ‘ipse dixit’ (the master has said it). If I argue that ‘the soul
is immortal because Plato says so, then I commit this fallacy. This fallacy occurs when the
premises appeal to the judgment of some person(s) or text(s) that have no legitimate claim to
authority in the matter at hand. This is a very common and crafty fallacy because a person who is
an expert in one field is taken as an expert in some other, comparatively, unrelated field. If, for
example, we take Bertrand Russell, a great authority on philosophy, as an authority on the matter
of shoes, we commit this fallacy.

The most blatant examples of misplaced appeals to authority appear in advertising ‘testimonials.’
Since Sachin Tendulkar, an authority in cricket, says that a particular cool drink is good, we
should accept that drink as superb.’ This is fallacious. If Sachin had recommended a particular
brand of cricket bat, then his words would have been authoritative. But when it comes to the
matter of drinks he is no better than any other. Likewise, we cannot take a scientist, an expert in
making nuclear weapons, as an authority on international economical or political matters. Nor
can we consider a great religious leader as an expert on financial matters

R9 MISERICORDIAM: This is an appeal to pity. From Plato’s dialogues we understand that in

ancient Greece, the criminals followed this method to escape punishment. It is doubtful whether
this was followed by one who was not guilty.

Of course, no fallacy is committed when we are guided by the judgment of acknowledged

experts. In fact, such recourse to authority is necessary for most of us on very many matters.
Taking expert opinion is surely one of the reasonable ways of supporting a conclusion though
not conclusive.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1 Explain the meaning of fallacy? Distinguish between formal and informal fallacies...............
.................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Give examples for ARGUMENT AGAINST THE PERSON (ARGUMENTUM AD
HOMINEM) and APPEAL TO INAPPROPRIATE AUTHORITY (ARGUMENTUM AD
VERECUNDIAM)
.

6
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... .............................

4.4 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION

In the strict sense of the term there is nothing like inductive fallacy though several fallacies are
included under this category. A fallacy arises when a Rule of inference is violated. This can be
put in this way also. An argument is invalid if and only if it is fallacious. Distortion of meaning
in the process of understanding can also be regarded as a fallacy because distortion of meaning
can be construed as violation of grammatical or syntactical Rules. On the contrary, inductive
inference is not governed by any logically certain Rule as such. In other words, inductive
argument is neither valid nor invalid. It is either probable or improbable. Further, probability or
improbability is a matter of degree. An argument may be very highly improbable. In terms of
truth-value its value can never reach ‘0’ when the truth-value of premises is ‘1’. In other words,
regarding improbable argument as fallacious is itself fallacious. Therefore fallacy of an inductive
argument stands or falls with disputed Rule or Rules. Without going into the merits or demerits
of this criticism, let us use the term fallacy in a loose sense and consider briefly some supposed
inductive fallacies.

D1 ANALOGY: An argument which infers unobserved similarity from observed similarity or

similarities between two or more than two objects or persons is known as analogy. It is true that
Rules are laid down to distinguish strong analogy from weak analogy. But the point is that the
logical status of strong and weak arguments remains the same. Therefore if one of them is
fallacious, then the other one also is fallacious. Only pragmatic considerations help us to retain
one at the cost of the other.

D3. FALSE CAUSE (ARGUMENTUM NON CAUSA PRO CAUSA): The fallacy of false
cause is committed when two events are causally connected when, in reality, such connection
does not exist. This is a very common mistake. Superstition, for example, suffers from this
fallacy. Suppose that someone says that a black cat crossed the path of a traveler and shortly
afterwards he broke his head and therefore the black cat crossing the path is cause. This is an
example of this fallacy.

Post hoc ergo propter hoc (‘after this, therefore because of this’) is another form of this fallacy.
Every antecedent of an event is not necessarily the cause of the consequent event. Example:
‘thunder is heard after the lightning. Therefore lightning is the cause of thunder.’ Mistakes of
this kind are rather common. Unusual weather conditions are blamed on some unrelated celestial
phenomenon that happened to precede them; an infection caused by a virus is thought to be
caused by a chill wind, or wet feet, and so on.

False cause is also the fallacy committed when one mistakenly argues against some proposal on
the ground that any change in a given direction is sure to lead to further changes in the same
direction – and thus to grave consequences. Taking this step, it may be said, will put us on a
slippery slope to disaster – and such reasoning is therefore called the fallacy of the slippery
slope.

7
A brief criticism is required. Identification of causal necessity with logical necessity is now
history. Failure at two levels accounts for this sort of identification; one, failure to distinguish
sequence from consequence and second, failure to recognize the dominant role played by the
way in which human mind can perceive and cannot perceive the pattern of events. Again, causal
necessity has only pragmatic significance. Mistaking pragmatic necessity to logical necessity is
the real fallacy.

D4. HASTY GENERALIZATION: In reality, the term hasty generalization is a misnomer.

Generalization, whether or not hasty, does not conform to any Rule. In the strict sense of the
word, generalization becomes fallacious when association of events within fair sample is taken to
represent association within the larger population. Quite often, generalization raises its head,
sometimes ugly, when we pass judgment on humans divided by creed or nationality. Unless it is
proved that dividing factors are the defining elements of character or personality no judgment
can be accepted as authoritative. This explains why widespread stereotypes about people, who
come from certain countries, with certain ethnic background, are and commonly mistaken and
also why hasty generalizations about foreign cultures is illogical.

4.5 FALLACIES OF PRESUMPTION

These are fallacies that assume the truth of some unproved propositions. Such presumption often
goes unnoticed. It is, therefore, usually sufficient to call attention to the smuggled assumption
and to its doubtfulness or its falsity to expose such a fallacy. There are three common fallacies of
this kind.

P1. ACCIDENT arises due to a lack of clarity regarding the meaning of terms used. It has two
forms: (i) direct or simple fallacy of accident consists in arguing that what is true of a thing
under normal circumstance is also true of it under special circumstances. Consider this example:
‘Freedom is the birth right of man; so no one should be imprisoned.’ This is ordinarily true but it
is not applicable to a man who has committed a serious crime. Another example is more
educative. ‘Such and such a person should be fined for ignoring a ‘No Swimming’ sign when the
purpose of jumping into water is to rescue some one from drowning.’

(ii) The Converse fallacy of Accident is the opposite of the direct fallacy of accident. It occurs
when we argue that what is true of a thing under special circumstances is also true under normal
circumstance. Consider this example. ‘Liquor is beneficial in certain cases of diseases; they
must, therefore, be beneficial for all persons and so its prohibition must be lifted.’ This is similar
to hasty generalization.

In the realm of morals, the fallacy of accident occurs if one is not careful in applying the general
moral dictum. For instance, it is true that telling a lie is wrong but in order to save one’s life, it is
not wrong to tell lie. We have to consider the distinction between general Rule and special
circumstances with greater care. Logician’s job is to warn the arguer that the fallacy can creep in
reasoning when we argue from an unqualified statement to a qualified one. We cannot simply
assume that a generalization applies universally. For instance, there is a general principle in law,

8
‘hearsay Rule,’ that hearsay evidence may not be accepted in court. But this does not apply
when the person, whose communications are reported, is dead.

P2. COMPLEX QUESTION is also called fallacy of many questions. It is a deceitful device.
This fallacy consists in asking a question in such a way as to presuppose the truth of some
proposition buried in the question. This is a favorite device of layers. For instance, a lawyer asks
a defendant: ‘have you stopped beating your wife.’ It assumes that you are married, and that your
wife is alive, and that you used to beat your wife, and so on. But none of these may be the case.
The truth may be that you are a bachelor. The best way to face this fallacy is to refute all the
presuppositions hidden in the question one by one, instead of giving a straight yes or no answer
which might land you in trouble.

The appearance of a question in an editorial or headline often has the purpose of suggesting the
truth of the unstated assumptions on which it is built: ‘Judge Took Bribe?’ This technique is a
common mark of what is known as ‘yellow journalism.’ And in debate, whenever a question is
accompanied by the aggressive demand that it be answered ‘yes or no,’ there is reason to suspect
that the question is ‘loaded’ – that it is unfairly complex.

P3. BEGGIGNG THE QUESTION (PETITIO PRINCIPII) consists in cleverly assuming the
conclusion in the premises instead of proving it. Example: ‘I should not do this because it is
wrong.’ This argument does not prove why the action is wrong but merely assumes it to be evil.
Thus, if we assume what needs proof, then we are mere beggars, begging what we ought to earn
by proof. This fallacy ends where it begins.

A celebrated example of the fallacy which occurs in the philosophical writings is the argument
that everything in the world has a cause, since if it did not; we should have effects without
causes. This fallacy is a subtle one because it assumes rather than restate the conclusion.

J. S. Mill argued that categorical syllogism commits the fallacy of petitio principii. For example,
consider this argument. ‘All men are mortal; Ram is a man; Therefore, Ram is mortal.’ Here
while establishing the truth of the premises, the conclusion is already taken into account. Without
disputing this comment, let us take a non-syllogistic argument committing this fallacy: A man
registered a woman in a hotel as his wife and replied, when asked for proof, ‘Certainly she’s my
wife because I am her husband.’

This fallacy is not limited to common man. Sometimes even powerful minds are snared by this
fallacy. For instance, logicians have, for long, sought to prove the reliability of the law of
uniformity of Nature. This is an inductive principle which says that the laws of nature will
operate tomorrow as they do today and therefore in basic ways nature is uniform, ‘That the
future will essentially be like the past’ is the claim at stake. This is never doubted in ordinary
life, but it turns out to be very difficult to justify on philosophical grounds. If we ask ‘why
conclude that the future will be like the past?’, then the answer would be, ‘because it always has
been like the past.’

4.6 FALLACIES OF AMBIGUITY

9
These fallacies arise as a result of the shift of meaning of words and phrases, shift from the
meanings that they have in the premises to different meanings ascribed to them in the
conclusion. Such mistakes are called fallacies of ambiguity. The deliberate use of such devices
is usually crude and readily detected; but at times the ambiguity may be obscure, the error
accidental, and the fallacy subtle. Five varieties are distinguished blow.

A1. EQUIVOCATION is the fallacy which consists in using words or phrases with two or more
meanings, deliberately or accidentally, while formulating an argument. Fallacies related to
ambiguous terms discussed in categorical syllogism serve as examples in this context also. The
Rule is: ‘In a categorical syllogism there should be three and only three terms, each used twice in
the same sense.’ The violation of this Rule is the simplest way of committing this fallacy.

A2. AMBHIBOLY consists in a misunderstanding due to the ambiguous grammatical

construction of propositions. Many advertisements inadvertently commit this fallacy. ‘Why go
elsewhere to be cheated? Come to us.’ Consider another example: Suppose we are told that a
number is equal to three times five plus four. This is an example of amphiboly since the answer
might be either [(3x5) + 4 = 19] or [3 x (5 + 4) = 27].

A3. ACCENT consists in lifting a word out of context resulting in illegitimate emphasis upon it.
For example consider this sermon. ‘Thou shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.’ If
we emphasize unduly the word neighbour, then it would mean that you are free to bear false
witness against others. On the other hand, if against is stressed, then it would mean that you
may bear false witness for your neighbor, and so on.

The accent may be oral, or may make use of italics, or other devices in the language. Often much
of what we mean depends on the accent of words in an argument. Propagandists deliberately
distort statements to mislead audiences. Example: tabloid newspapers often use bold and large
print to attract the reader’s attention. Advertising relies on this device heavily. Consider this
advertisement in a newspaper: ‘TAKE ABSOLUTELY FREE’ the contest entry form. If we consider
the extent of the uses of emphasis in various forms and the use of meanings deliberately taken
out of context, we can rename accent as ‘the fallacy of emphasis.’

A4. COMPOSITION occurs when what is true of the parts taken separately is said to be true of
the whole taken collectively. Example: ‘cotton cannot be strong enough to make clothes of; for,
look, I can break this cotton thread quite easily.’ It is true that when each thread is taken
separately, but not true when they are taken together. Another example: J. S. Mill commits this
fallacy when he argues that the general happiness is the greatest good because each individual
desires happiness.

A5 DIVISION is the opposite of composition: what is true of the whole is taken to be true of its
parts. Here is an example. ‘He must be a catholic, for he is an Italian and Italy is a catholic
country.’ True, Italy as a whole is Catholic but the same need not be true of every Italian.
Another example is given below. Some people argue that what is best for the nation must
necessarily be advantageous for each citizen.

10
Check Your Progress II
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1 Explain the meaning of composition and division..................... ...............................

............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) Give examples for amphiboly and accent.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... .............................

4.7 EXERCISES

Name the fallacies in the following:

R1. (i) One of Patrick Henry’s famous speeches (in Virginia on 23 March 1775) concludes with
this appeal: …There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. The next gale that sweeps from
the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms. …Is life so dear, or peace so sweet,
as to be purchased at the price chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what
course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death.’ It is reported that the
crowd, upon hearing his speech, jumped up and shouted: ‘To arms! To arms!’

(ii) At his trial in Athens, Socrates referred with disdain to other defendants who had appeared
before their jury accompanied by their children and families, seeking acquittal by evoking pity.
Socrates continued: ‘I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. …and
I have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost a man, and two others
who are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them here to petition you for acquittal. (Plato,
Apology. 34)

R2. In the world of finance, a prospectus is issued to attract investors in a company about to go
public, which speaks much about the company but does not mention the price of its shares.

R4. Mr. X has no appreciation of music; for, has he ever purchased a ticket for a musical
performance?

R5. (i) The father tells his son, ‘Sunny, next time before giving you pocket money, I will see
your report card.’

(ii) The union workers threaten the establishment that if their demands are not met, they will go
on a strike.

R6. Suppose a person emphasizes the importance of increasing funding for the public schools.
His opponent responds by insisting that a child’s education involves much more than schooling
and gets underway long before its formal schooling begins.

11
D1. (i) ‘All experiments with recombinant DNA must be stopped immediately,’ said one
scientist, who asked: ‘If Dr. Frankenstein must go on producing his little biological monsters …
how can we be sure of what would happen once the little beasts escape from the laboratory?’

(ii) Another scientist who wanted to block any further experimentation with DNA made his
appeal explicitly: ‘Can we predict the consequences? We are ignorant of the broad principles of
evolution … We simply do not know. We are ignorant of the various factors we currently
perceive to participate in the evolutionary process. We are ignorant of the depth of security of
our own environmental niche … We do not know.’

D2. ‘We admire the depth and insight of great fiction, say, in the novels of R. K. Narayan.
Therefore we resort to his judgment in determining the real culprit in some political dispute.’

D3. (i) ‘The death penalty in the U.S. has given us the highest crime rate and greatest number of
prisoners per 100,000 populations in the industrialized world.’ Therefore death penalty is the
cause of the highest crime rate.

(ii) ‘The slippery slope argument, although influential, is hard to deal with rationally. It suggests
that once we allow doctors to shorten the life of patients, who make such request, doctors could
and would wantonly kill burdensome patients who do not want to die. This suggestion is not
justified….’

D4. The owner of a ‘fish and chips’ shop in England defended the healthfulness of his deep-fried
cookery with this argument: ‘Take my son, Martin. He’s been eating fish and chips his whole
life, and he just had a cholesterol test, and his level is below the national average. What better
proof could there be than a fryer’s son?’

P1. i) ‘To charge interest on the money loaned is quite legitimate. Therefore to take interest
loaned to a friend in distress is quite legitimate.’

ii) ‘All killers of humans are murderers. Soldiers are killers of humans in war. Therefore the
soldiers are murderers.’

iii) ‘To give charity to young, healthy beggar is wrong. Therefore, charity is bad.’

P2. i). ‘How exactly did you feel when you murdered your brother?’
ii) ‘Why are our politicians so corrupt?’
iii) ‘How can we change our education system to make our studies more effective?’

P3. ‘You ought to give alms because it is a duty to be charitable.’

A1. ‘Idle men are inefficient. Idle men are incapable. Therefore, idle men are invaluable.’

A2. ‘The farmer blew out his brains after receiving an affectionate farewell of his family with a
shotgun.

12
A3. ‘Since every part of a certain machine is light in weight the machine as a whole is light in
weight.’

A4. i) ‘That cricket team is a good team. So, each of its players must be good.’
ii) This corporation is very important and Mr. Das is an official of this corporation and
therefore Mr. Das is very important.’

4.8 LET US SUM UP

Fallacy is an illogical way of arguing. Formal informal fallacies are two kinds of fallacy. A
formal fallacy is committed when a Rule of inference is committed. Ambiguity in expression
results in informal fallacy. If we know when a fallacy is committed we are less likely to err.
Therefore knowledge of erroneous thinking has positive advantage. Inductive inference is not
governed by any Rule of inference. Therefore in the strict sense of the word there is nothing like
inductive fallacy.

4.9 KEY WORDS

Fallacy: An argument which violates a Rule of inference is called a fallacy.

4.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Ackkermann, Robert John. Modern deductive logic. London: Macmillan, 1970.

Ambrose, Alice. Fundametals of symbolic logic. New York: Rinehart, 1954.

Bachhuber, Andrew H. Introduction to Logic. New York: Appleton, 1957.

Balasubramanyan, B. An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Rama Krishna

Vivekananda College, 1977.

Carnap, Rudolf. Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications. NY: Dover. 1958.

Clark, Joseph T. Conventional Logic & Modern Logic- a Prelude to Transition. Woodstock:
Woodstock College Press, 1952.

Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic. Ed.13. New Delhi: Pearson, 2010.

Gensler Harry J. Introduction to Logic. London: Routledge Layman, 2002.

13
Jain,Krishna. Text Book of Logic. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2009.

Longer, Susanne K. 1953. Introduction to Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover, 1953.

Massey, Gerald J. Understanding Symbolic Logic. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Quine, Willard 1979. Mathematical Logic. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press,
1979.

Singh, Arindama &; Goswami, Chinmoy. Fundamentals of Logic. New Delhi: ICPR, 1998.

Stebbing, L Susan. Modern introduction to Logic. New York: Barnes, 1961.

Stephen. Power of Logic. London: Mayfield Publ, 1999.

Walsh, Joseph B. Logic. New York, 1940.

14
 1

Indira Gandhi National Open University MPYE – 001

School of Interdisciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies Logic

Block 3

SENTENTIAL LOGIC 2: PROVING VALIDITY

UNIT 1
Proving Validity Using Rules of Inference

UNIT 2
Conditional Proof

UNIT 3
Indirect Proof

UNIT 4
Proving Invalidity
 2

Expert Committee
Dr. Jose Kuruvachira
Prof. Gracious Thomas Salesian College &
Director, School of IGNOU Study Centre
Social Work Dimapur, Nagaland
IGNOU

Prof. Renu Bharadwaj

School of Humanities Dr. Sathya Sundar
IGNOU Sethy
Dept of Humanities
Prof. George IIT, Chennai.
Panthanmackel,
Senior Consultant, Dr. Joseph Martis
IGNOU St. Joseph’s College
Jeppu, Mangalore – 2
Dr. M. R. Nandan
Govt. College for Dr. Jaswinder Kaur
Women Dhillon
Mandya - Mysore 147, Kabir park
Opp. GND University
Dr. Kuruvila Amristar – 143 002
Pandikattu
Jnana-deepa Prof. Y.S. Gowramma
Vidyapeeth Principal,
Ramwadi, College of Fine Arts,
Pune Manasagangotri
Mysore – 570 001

Dr Babu Joseph
CBCI Centre
New Delhi

Prof. Tasadduq Husain

Aligarh Muslim
University
Aligarh

Dr. Bhuvaneswari
Lavanya Flats
Gangai Amman Koil
St.
Thiruvanmiyur
Chennai – 600 041

Dr. Alok Nag

Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul
Varanasi
 3

Block Preparation

Unit 1 Dr. V.S. George Joseph

Department of Philosophy
Loyola College, Chennai.

Unit 2-4 Dr. Ananda Vijay Sarathi

Department of Philosophy
Vivekananda College, Chennai.

Content Editor
Dr. V. John Peter
IGNOU, New Delhi
&
Dr. M.R. Nandan
Mysore

Format Editor
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

Programme Coordinator
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.
 4

BLOCK INTRODUCTION

Building proofs is an efficient mode to show that an argument of the propositional calculus is
valid. Using the Rules of Inference and replacement proof of validity is established. There are
also conditional proofs with its application of its Rules to establish validity. The Indirect Proof,
as its name suggests, is a proof procedure that establishes the validity of an argument indirectly.
It does not show how a given conclusion can be directly derived. Rather, it allows us to assume
the negation of the given conclusion as an extra premise in the argument. Reducio proof consign
in assuming the contradictory of what is to be proved. If such a postulation leads to explicit
contradiction, or diminish to an absurdity, then what is assumed must be false, and what is to be
proved must be true. This method was introduced by Euclid in elementary Geometry. He insisted
that to prove a theorem no need to use direct method, by denying and reducing to the absurd we
can prove them. This was insisted in the Reducio ad absurdum (R.A.A). The conclusion ought to
be negated and assumed as an additional premise (R.A.). Once it is reduced to absurd, we have to
restate the conclusion and name it as Reduction proof (R.P.). If an argument happen to be
invalid, of course, it would be not possible to construct a proof of its validity. We can find the
invalidity of an argument by using a truth-table to show that the specific form of that argument is
invalid. The truth-table confirms invalidity. If there is more than three variables it will become
extremely large. It will waste our time and stationeries. A method that is quicker and easier than
writing out the entire truth-table is needed. Hence there is a method of proving invalidity.

Unit 1 trains the students to apply nine Rules of Inference which are dealt in the previous block.
These Rules are used to prove the validity of an argument. Besides these, other Rules of
replacement are also given in this unit for proving validity.

Unit 2 gives a basic understanding of Conditional Proof, its definition, its procedure operating on
the possibility. Generally, it tries to improve the reasoning capability by identifying the validity
of an argument. Conditional proof is a deviation of formal proof of validity with a condition that
if the conclusion of a given argument is a conditional proposition, then conditional proof can be
adopted.

Unit 3 offers an experience of Indirect Proof which is the basic for all other direct and indirect
proof. In this unit not only basic information about the definition and the importance of Indirect
Proof are given, but also various examples and exercises are given

Unit 4 briefly deals with methods of proving invalidity. An argument is invalid if there is some
way that all of its premises are true when its conclusion is false. The unit enables students not
only to have an essential understanding of proving Invalidity, it procedures but also to identify
the difference between proving tautology and proving invalidity.
 1

UNIT 1 PROVING VALIDITY USING RULES OF INFERENCE

Contents
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Necessity of Rules of Inference
1.3 Meaning of Proof of Validity
1.4 Nine Rules of Inference
1.5 Usage of Rules of Inference to test Validity
1.6 Converting Verbal Forms of Argument into Symbols
1.7 Examples for Using Rules of Inference
1.8 Rules of Replacement
1.9 Let Us Sum Up
1.10 Key Words
1.11 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The principal objective of this unit is to illustrate the Rules of Inference with examples
and to make explicit the art of testing arguments, though these are dealt in the unit 3 of
previous block. Here the focus is on formulating verbal form of arguments in their
symbolic form and then prove the validity of argument. Such an exercise exposes the
students to various Rules of Inference in proving validity of given argument.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Logic is a science of right reasoning. All type of reasoning may not be valid. Hence, testing the
rightness and wrongness of an argument becomes necessary. Logic classifies arguments as valid
or invalid. We need a set of criteria for testing the validity of certain arguments. The symbolic
logicians have spelt out certain Rules of Inference which would help us to see the correctness of
certain arguments. In modern logic an argument is regarded as a sequence of statements. When
proof is constructed to test the argument, the proof also takes the same form, which the argument
takes. In this type of proof there is correspondence between the scheme of the given argument and
the scheme of the proof. Every step, which is adduced while constructing proof, is the conclusion of
the preceding statements, and in turn, becomes the premise for statements, which follow it (if not all,
at least to some). Rules, which govern the process of deducing hidden conclusion, constitute what are
known as ‘Rules of Inference’ in modern logic. Many of these Rules have their origin in traditional
logic.

1.2 NECESSITY OF RULES OF INFERENCE

As we have already seen that there are various types of syllogism, disjunctive, hypothetical etc.,
the Rules of Inference have classified them into various forms of criteria using symbols.
 2

However, only limited types of arguments are covered by classical logic. All types of arguments
is not alike in all respects. Some are Simple enough so that the truth-table technique is adequate
for the purpose of testing. Generally, any argument, which consists of two or three simple but
different propositions, can be easily put to test by truth-table method. If the argument consists of
more than three different propositions, then the truth-table method is bit difficult and confusing.
In those cases, the symbolic logicians have proposed an alternative.

Look at the following examples that makes this point clear. An argument, which is complex in
this sense, is nothing but an aggregate of several simple (by simple, in this context, we mean
short) arguments.
1) p => q 2) q => r 3) p =>q
p q q => r
∴q ∴r ∴

(3) is the sum of (1) and (2) in which the conclusions, q & r is hidden. In classical logic we have
‘complex’ type of argument in the form of sorites. (We should remember that complex, simple,
etc. are relative). An example for sorites is given:

All Indians are Asians.

All Dalits are Indians.
All Mahars are Dalits.
∴ All Mahars are Asians.
In this poly-syllogistic arrangement of argument there are three premises and a conclusion.
Usually any sorites consists of at least two syllogistic arguments and therefore, two conclusions.
So it is more complex than an ordinary syllogism. This point becomes clear when we break
sorites into constituent syllogisms.

All Indians are Asians.

] → All Dalits are Asians.
All Dalits are Indians.
All Mahars are Dalits → All Mahars are Dalits
∴All Mahars are Asians

1.3 MEANING OF PROOF OF VALIDITY

The Rules of Inference in the sentential logic are based on the classical traditional logic. In
symbolic or modern logic, an argument is regarded as a sequence of statements. While
constructing the proof to test the argument, the proof has to take the same form of the argument
to which it corresponds. So there is a correspondence between these two, the scheme of the
argument and the proof to test it. Every step, which is adduced while constructing proof, is the
conclusion of the preceding statements, and in turn, becomes the premise for statements, which
follow it (if not all, at least to some). Rules, which govern the process of deducing hidden
conclusion, constitute what are known as ‘Rules of Inference’ in modern logic.
 3

A particular pattern of proof construction is devised by modern logic. Discarding more

descriptive method, which consumes both space and time, modern logic has discovered much
shorter and simpler method. Whatever conclusion can be drawn from any two given premises is
written on left had side (LHS), while the Rule and the premises to which this particular Rule
applies to derive the conclusion used in further proof, are written on the right hand side (RHS).
The serial numbers are used instead of premises to make the procedure simpler and more
economical in terms of time and effort to grasp the argument. Yet, one must ensure that the
premises, the conclusion drawn from them and corresponding Rule are always juxtaposed.

For instance let us look at the following argument.:

p => (q v r)
¬r
¬q
-------
∴¬p
There is a standard form in which we write the argument. After we write down the last
premise we use a slash on the RHS which is followed by the conclusion. The given premises
are numbered and the subsequent conclusions which are drawn also are progressively
numbered. We enter the numbers on the RHS accordingly, we shall rewrite the argument.
1). p => (q v r)
2). ¬ r
3). ¬ q / ∴ ¬ p
4). ¬ r Λ ¬ q 2, 3, Conj.
5). ∴ ¬ p 1, 4, M.T.
M.T. stands for modus tollens. The Rule, which is familiar to those who have studied traditional
logic. 1 and 4 signify 1st and 4th lines to which this Rule is applied. We need not mention which
is the premise and which is a conclusion because except the last line all other lines consist of
statements, which are regarded as premises.

It is not necessary that the premises should be written in the given order only. Care should be
taken to omit conclusion from numbering. Finally, a word about symbols: We need not stick on
to proposition form only. Hence when arguments are symbolized we use only uppercase letters.

1.4 NINE RULES OF INFERENCE

This section may be a repetition of a unit in the previous block which also lists out the same
Rules of Inference. Modern logic considers nine Rules of Inference. It is sufficient to know them
and how and where they should be applied. There is no need to prove them.

1). Modus Ponens (M.P.)

p => q
P
∴q
 4

2). Modus Tollens (M.T.)

p => q
¬q
∴¬p

3). Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.)

p => q
q => r
∴ p => r

4). Disjunctive Syllogism D.S.)

pvq pvq
¬p Or ¬q
∴¬q ∴¬p

5). Constructive Dilemma

(C.D.)

(p => q) Λ (r => s)
Pvr
∴q v r

6). Destructive Dilemma

(D.D.)

(p => q ) Λ (r => s)
¬qv ¬s
∴¬p v ¬r

7). Simplification (Simp.)

p Λq
∴p
 5

8). Conjunction (Conj.)

p
q
∴p Λq

9). Addition (Add.)

P
∴pvq

Absorption Rule was added by Copi to the remaining Rules. In these Rules, the first six Rules
are standard Rules of traditional logic. The last three Rules need a little explanation. In
simplification, since p Λ q is given to us, we accept that p is true, and q is true as well. So there
is no harm in dropping any of them. The case of conjunction is slightly different. p is given to
us, so we take it as true; q is given to us. So we take q also as true. Since both are taken as true
we can conveniently conjoin them. The case of addition is slightly different. Suppose that we
have only p in the premises. Since it is a premise, we take it as true. Suppose that we require q
to be added to p. We do not know whether q is true or not. There is no harm in adding q to p
because even if q is false p v q still remains true because p is true. After all, one true component
can make disjunction true. But what is important is that conjunction does not mean addition. In
logical language, addition means disjunction but not conjunction.

1.5 USAGE OF RULES OF INFERENCE TO TEST VALIDITY

1). p => (q v r)
2). ¬r
3). ¬q/∴¬p
4). ¬rΛ ¬q 2, 3 Conj.
5). ∴¬p 1, 4, M.T.

Since this is the first argument, let us elaborate the process.

¬ r appears in 2nd line and ¬ q appears in 3rd line. Therefore the Rule of ‘Conjunction’ is applied.
We get ¬ r Λ ¬ q

This forms the fourth line in the sequence. Now we shall consider 1st and 4th line together.

1). p => (q v r)
4). ¬rΛ ¬q
 6

∴¬ p
In (1), (q v r) is the consequent. q v r being a disjunction, when it is denied, in accordance with
de Morgan’s law, it becomes a conjunction with original disjuncts being replaced by their
respective negation. Since consequent is denied in the second premise, the antecedent has to be
denied in the conclusion and it is done. Therefore in traditional logic it is a valid mood, viz.,
modus tollendo tollens, which has become a Rule of Inference in modern logic. For brevity, we
say modus tollens. The form of (1) and (4) corresponds exactly to the form of Rule 2. The
conclusion, which we obtained through formal proof, is the same as the conclusion of the given
argument. This is how an argument is tested for validity. This is a model of explanation, which
suits any argument.

1.6 CONVERTING VERBAL FORMS OF ARGUMENT INTO SYMBOLS

For change, let us start with verbal form of argument and symbolize the statements and logical
constants before proceeding to test the validity of the arguments.

Example 1
I ). If Raja joins, then the club’s social prestige will rise; and if Pandiyan joins, then the club’s
financial position will be more secure. Either Raja or Pandiyan joins. If the club’s social
prestige rises, then Pandiyan will join; and if the club’s financial position becomes more
secure, then Suresh will join. Therefore either Pandiyan or Suresh will join.

1 Raja joins =R
2 The club’s social prestige will rise =S
3 Pandiyan joins =K
4 The club’s financial position rises =F
5 Suresh will join =G

Now the argument becomes:

1 (R=>S) Λ (K=>F).
2 R v K.
3 (S=>K) Λ (F=>G)/∴ K v G.
4 SvF 1, 2, C.D.
5 ∴ K v G 3, 4, C.D.

Answer to the first argument makes one point very clear. Verbal expression is naturally very
long and tedious, whereas symbolic representation is short and clear.

Example 2

II ). If Arivazhagan received the wire, then he took the plane; and if he took the plane, then he
will not be late for the meeting. If the telegram was incorrectly addressed, then
Arivazhagan will be late for the meeting. Either Arivazhagan received the wire or the
 7

telegram was incorrectly addressed. Therefore either Arivazhagan took the plane or he
will be late for the meeting.

1. Arivazhagan received the wire =V

2. He took the plane =P
3. He will not be late of the meeting = ¬L
4. Telegram was incorrectly addressed = ¬T
5. Arivazhagan will be late for the meeting =L

Now the arguments becomes:

1 (V=>P) Λ(P=>¬L)
2 (¬T=>L)
3 V v ¬T /∴P v L
4 V=>P 1, Simp.
5 (V=>P) Λ (¬T=>L) 4, 2, Conj.
6 PvL 5, 3, C.D.

Check your progress I.

Construct the symbolic forms of the following arguments.

1. If Nallan buys the plot, then an office building will be constructed; whereas if Mahesh buys
the plot, then it quickly will be sold again. If Ponvanan buys the plot, then a store will be
constructed; and if the store is constructed, then Lakshmi will offer to lease it. Either Nallan or
Ponvanan will buy the lot. Therefore either an office building or a store will be constructed.

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2. If Arumugam goes to the meeting, then a complete report will be made; if Arumugam
does not go to the meeting, then a special election will be required. If a complete report is made,
then an investigation will be launched. If Arumugam going to the meeting implies that a
complete report will be made, then if the making of a complete report implies that an
investigation will be launched, then either Arumugam goes to the meeting and an investigation is
launched or Arumugam does not go to the meeting and no investigation is launched. If
Arumugam goes to the meeting and an investigation is launched, then some members will have
to stand trial. But if Arumugam does not go to the meeting and no investigation is launched then
the organization will disintegrate very rapidly. Therefore either some members will have to
stand trial or the organization will disintegrate very rapidly.

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 8

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3. If Mr. Vetriselvan is the Kumar’s next-door neighbour, then Mr. Vetriselvan’s annual earnings
are exactly divisible by three. If Mr. Vetriselvan’s annual earnings are exactly divisible by 3,
then Rs.20, 000/= is exactly divisible by 3. But Rs.20,000/= is not exactly divisible by 3. If Mr.
Karuppaiah is Kumar’s next-door neighbour, then Mr. Karuppaiah lives half way between
Bengaluru and Chennai. If Mr. Karuppaiah lives in Bengaluru, then he does not live half way
between Bengaluru and Chennai. Mr. Karuppaiah lives in Bengaluru. If Mr. Vetriselvan is not
Kumar’s next-door neighbour, then either Mr. Karuppaiah or Mr. Andiappan is Kumar’s next-
door neighbour. Therefore Mr.Andiappan is Kumar’s next-door neighbour.
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1.7 EXAMPLES FOR USING RULES OF INFERENCE

1) 1. (B v N) => ( K Λ L) 6) 1. (K => A) Λ (M => D)

2. ¬K 2. ¬A /∴ ¬K v ¬M
3. ¬M / ∴ ¬B Λ ¬M 3. ¬A v ¬D 2, Add.
4. ¬K v ¬L 2, Add. 4. ¬K v ¬M 1, 3 M.T.
5. ¬B Λ ¬N 1, 4, M.T.
6. ¬B 5, Simp.
7. ¬N Λ ¬M 6, 3, Conj.

2) 1. (M v N) => (P Λ Q) 7) 1. (A Λ B) => (C v D)
2. N /∴ P 2. A
3. MvN 2, Add. 3. B / ∴C v D
4. P ΛQ 1, 3, M.P. 4. A ΛB 2, 3, Conj.
5. ∴P 4, Simp. 5. CvD 1,4, M.P.

3) 1. ( T => K) Λ (R => S) 8) 1. (A v B) Λ(¬D ΛE)

2. S => D 2. A v B =>K/∴K Λ(¬D ΛE)
3. D => T 3. A v B) 1, Simp.
4. R / ∴T 4. K 2, 4, M.P.
5. R => S 1 Simp. 5. ¬D ΛE 1, Simp.
6. S 5,4, M. P. 6. K Λ( ¬D ΛE) 4, 5, Conj.
7. D 2, 6, M. P.
8. ∴T 3, 7, M.P.

4) 1. (P =>Q) Λ(R=>S) 9) 1. Av(B ΛC)

 9

2. ¬A=> ¬Q 2. A=>P
3. A => ¬B 3. ¬P / ∴C Λ (¬Λ)
4. ¬B /∴ ¬PV ¬S 4. ¬A 2,3, M.T.
5. ¬A 3,4, M.T. 5. B ΛC 1,4, D.S.
6. ¬Q 2,5, M.P. 6. C 5, Simp.
7. P=>Q 1, Simp.
8. ¬P 7, 6, M.T.
9. ¬P v ¬S 9, Add.

5) 1. A Λ (B v C) 10) 1. ¬B
2. A=>P 2. ¬D
3. Q / ∴PΛQ 3. (A=>B) Λ(C=>D)
4. A 1, Simp. 4. K / ∴ C (¬K Λ¬A)
5. P 2,4, M.P. 5. A=>B 3, Simp.
6. PΛQ 5,3, Conj. 6. ¬A 5, 1, M.T.
7. C=>D 3, Simp.
8. ¬C 7, 2, M.T.
9. ¬CΛ(¬K Λ¬A) 8,4,6, Conj.

11) 1. (B≡K)=>(Z ΛD) 18) 1. (K ΛT)=>(A v B)

2. ¬(Z ΛD) /∴¬(B≡K) 2. (A v B)=>(P Λ¬L)
3. ∴¬ (B≡K) 1,2, M.T. 3. (P Λ¬L)=>D

``` ¬(D) /∴¬(K ΛT)

5. (K ΛT)=>(P Λ¬L) 2, H.S.
 10

6. (K ΛT)=>D 5,3, H.S.

7. ∴¬(K ΛT) 6,4 M.T.

12) 1. (K ΛA)=>(¬ B v C) 19) 1. A=>D

2. M=>(K ΛA) 2. B=>C
3. M /∴¬B v C 3. A v B /∴ D v C
4. M=> (¬B v C) 2,1. H.S. 4. (A=>D)Λ(B=>C)1,2, Conj.
5. ∴¬B v C 4,3, M.P. 5. ∴D v C 4,3, C.D.

13) 1. A=>D 20) 1. (A=>G)=>(K v ¬D)

2. B=>C 2. ¬(K v ¬ D) /∴¬(A=>G)
3. ¬D v ¬C/∴¬A v ¬B 3. ∴¬(A=>G) 1,2, M.T.
4. (A=>D)Λ(B=>C)1,2,Conj.
5. ∴¬Av ¬B 4,3, D.D.

14) 1. JV(K Λ L) 21) 1. D v (A=>B)

2. J=>D 2. (A=>B)=>(C v K)
3. ¬D/∴K Λ L 3. ¬(C v K) /∴D
4. ¬J 2,3, M.T. 4. ¬(A=>B) 2,3, M.T.
5. ∴ (K ΛL) 1,4 D.S. 5. ∴D 1,4, D.S.

15) 1. A Λ(B=>C) 22) 1. (A=>B) Λ(C=>D)

2. B /∴C 2. A/∴B v D
3. B=>C 1, Simp. 3. AvC 2, Add.
4. ∴C 3,2, M.P. 4. ∴B v D 1,3, C.D.

16) 1. Av(B ΛC) 23) 1. A=>B

2. A=>D 2. B=>C
3. ¬D /∴B 3. ¬C /∴¬A
4. ¬A 2,3, M.T. 4. ¬B 2,3, M.T.
5. B ΛC 1,2, D.S. 5. ∴¬A 1,4, M.T.
6. ∴B 5, Simp.

17) 1. (A v B)=>C 24) 1. (A=>C) Λ(B=>D)

2. D=>¬C 2. K=>A
3. D /∴¬(A v B) 3. K /∴C v D
4. ¬C 2,3, M.P. 4. A 2,3, M.P.
5. ∴¬(A v B) 1,4, M.T. 5. AvB 4, Add.
6. ∴C v D 1,5, C.D.
 11

1.8 RULES OF REPLACEMENT

Not all arguments can be tested if restricted to Rules of Inference only, though as shown
above somewhat complex and diverse arguments succumb to these Rules. Just as modern
logic tried to supplement traditional logic, within modern logic, the need was felt to
supplement the Rules of Inference. Hence we have the Rules of Replacement. The
structure of argument may be such that it may require only one of the kinds or both. We
have ten such Rules, which are called the Rules of Replacement. The difference between
these two sets of Rules is that the Rules of Inference are themselves inferences whereas
Rules of Replacement are not. This is because the Rules of Replacement are restricted to
change or changes in the form of statements. For example, if A or B is changed to B or
A, then such change is governed by one Rule. Similarly, if A Λ (B v C) is changed to (A
Λ B) v (A Λ C), then this change is governed by some other Rule. Also, in the mode of
application of Rules there is a restriction. Unlike Rules of Inference which should be
applied to the whole line only any Rule of Replacement can be applied to any part of the
line. This is because all Rules of Replacement are, logically, equivalent expressions.

Now let us list Rules of Replacement.

1. De Morgan’s Law (De.M.) ¬ (p Λ q) ≡ ¬ p v ¬q

¬ (p v q) ≡ ¬ p Λ ¬q

2. Commutation Law (Com.) pvq≡qvp

pΛq≡qvp

3. Double Negation(D.N.) ¬ (¬ p) ≡ p

4. Transposition (Trans.) (p => q) ≡ (¬q => ¬ p)

5. Material Implication (Impl.) (p => q) ≡ ¬ p v q

6. Material Equivalence (Equiv.) (p ≡ q) ≡ (p => q) Λ (q => p)

{(p ≡ q) ≡ {(p Λ q) v (¬ p Λ ¬q)}

7. Exportation (Exp.) {(p Λ q) => r} ≡ {p => (q => r)}

8. Tautology (Taut.) p≡pvp

p≡pΛp

9. Association (Ass.) {p v (q v r)} ≡ {(p v q) v r}

{p Λ (q Λ r)} ≡ {p Λ q) r}
 12

10. Distribution (Dist.) {p Λ (q v r)} ≡ {(p Λ q) v (p Λ r)}

{p v (q Λ r)} ≡ {p v q) Λ (p v r)}

[Note: When the expression includes both ‘Λ’ and ‘v’ only distribution law can be
applied but not association law.]

Let us restate de Morgan’s law differently. Negation of a conjunction is equivalent to the

disjunction of the negation of components and negation of disjunction is equivalent to
the conjunction of negation of components. Similarly, in the case of implication the
expression is equivalent to the transposition of the negation of components. Likewise the
rest of the Rules can be interpreted. This relation becomes further clear if we construct
truth-table for any Rule (for both sides of the equation). The student is advised to
construct truth-table for any Rule of Replacement to verify the equivalence. Our
immediate task is to become familiar with the technique of testing arguments.

(1).

1. {I => (J => K)} Λ (J => ¬I) / ∴{(I Λ J) => K} Λ (J => ¬I)}

2. {(I Λ J) => K} Λ (J => ¬I) 1, Exp.

(2.)
1. (R Λ S) => (¬R v ¬S) / ∴¬ (¬R v ¬S) => ¬ (R Λ S)
2. ¬ (¬R v ¬S) => ¬ (R Λ S) 1, De.M.

(3.)

1. (T v ¬U) Λ {(W Λ ¬V) => ¬T} /∴ (T v ¬U) Λ {(W=>(¬V=>¬T)}

2. (T v ¬U) Λ {(W=>(¬V=>¬T)} 1, Exp.

(4.)

1. X v Y) Λ (¬X v Z) /∴ (X v Y Λ ¬X) v {(X v Y) Λ Z}

2. (X v Y Λ ¬X) v {(X v Y) Λ Z} 1,Dist.
(5.)
1. Z => (A => B) /∴Z => ¬{ ¬ (A => B}
2. Z => ¬{ ¬ (A => B} 1,D.N.
(6.)

1. (¬F v G) Λ (F => G) /∴F => G.).

2. (F => G) Λ (F => G) 1, Impl.
3. F => G 2, Taut.
Now we shall consider different types of arguments, which may involve both kinds of
Rules.

(1.)
 13

1. (O => ¬P) Λ (P => Q)

2. Q => O
3. ¬R => P /∴ R
4. ¬ Q v O 2, Impl.
5. O v ¬ Q 4, Com.
6. (O => ¬ P ) Λ (¬ Q => ¬P) 1, Trans,
7. ¬P v ¬P 6, 5, C.D.
8. ¬P 7, Taut.
9. ¬ ¬ R 3, 8, M.T.
10. ∴R 9, D.N.

(2.)

1. X => (Y => Z)
2. X => (A => B)
3. X Λ (Y v A)
4. ¬Z /∴ B
5. (X Λ Y) => Z 1, Exp.
6. (X Λ A) => B 2, Exp.
7. (X Λ Y) v (X Λ A) 3, Dist.
8. {(X Λ Y) => Z} Λ {(X Λ A) => B} 5,6, Conj.
9. Z v B 8, 7, C.D.
10. ∴ B 9, 4, M.T.

(3.)

1. C => (D => ¬ C)
2. C ≡ D /∴ ¬C v ¬D
3. C => (¬ ¬C => ¬D) 1, Trans.
4. C => (C => ¬D) 3, D.N.
5. (C Λ C) => ¬D 4, Exp.
6. C => ¬D 5, Taut.
7. ¬C v ¬D 6, Impl.

(4.)

1. E Λ (F v G)
2. (E Λ G) => ¬ (H v I)
3. ¬ (¬H v ¬I) => ¬ (E Λ F) / ∴H ≡ I
4. (E Λ G) => (¬H Λ ¬I) 2, De.M.
5. ¬ (H Λ I) => ¬ (E Λ F) 3, De.M.
6. (E Λ F) => (H Λ I) 5, Trans.
7. {(E Λ F) => (H Λ I)} Λ {(E Λ G) => (¬H Λ ¬I)} 6,4, Conj.
8. (E Λ F) v (E Λ G) 1, Dist.
9. (H Λ I) v (¬H Λ ¬I) 7,8, C.D.
10. ∴ H ≡ I 9, Equiv.
(5.)
 14

1. J v (¬K v J)
2. K v (¬J v K) / ∴J ≡ K
3. (¬K v J) v J 1, Com.
4. ¬K v (J v J) 3, Ass.
5. ¬K v J 4, Taut.
6. K => J 5, Impl.
7. (¬J v K) v K 2, Com.
8. ¬J v (K v K) 7, Ass.
9. ¬J v K 8, Taut.
10. J => K 9, Impl.
11. (J => K) Λ (K => J) 10, 6, Conj.
12. ∴J ≡ K 11, Equi.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) 1. Av(B=>C) 4) 1. (A=>B)=>(C=>D)
2. A=>D 2. (E=>F)=>(A=>B)
3. ¬D /∴B=>C 3. ¬(C=>D) /∴¬ (E=>F)
4. ¬A 4. (E=>F)=>(C=>D)
5. ∴B=>C 5. ∴¬(E=>F)

2) 1. (K≡L)=>A ΛB 5) 1. A ΛB
2. D=>(K≡L)/ ∴A 2. (A v C)=>D/∴A ΛD
3. AΛB 3. A
4. ∴A 4. AvC
5. D
6. AΛD

3) 1. I=>J 6) 1. (E v F) Λ(G v H)
2. J=>K 2. (E=>G) Λ(F=>H)
3. L=>M 3. ¬G /∴H
4. I v L /∴ K v M 4. EvF
5. I=>K 1,2 HS 5. GvH
6. (I=>K)Λ(L=>M) 6. ∴H
7. ∴K v M

1.9 LET US SUM UP

 15

Modern Logic is an extension of traditional logic. However, there is qualitative difference in

testing. Difference consists in accuracy and clarity of proof. Nine Rules of Inference include
many Rules from traditional logic like modus ponens. All nine Rules are not required always.
Only some Rules are required. There is no Rule, which says that one line must be considered
only once.

1.10 KEY WORDS

Modus Ponens (MP) : It is a valid and simple argument form sometimes referred to as affirming
the antecedent or the law of detachment.

Modus Tollens (MT): It is a valid and simple argument form that is denying the consequent.

Validity: An argument is valid if and only if the truth of its premises entails the truth of its
conclusion.

1.11 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Basson, A.H. & O’connor, D.J. Introduction to Symbolic Logic. Calcutta: Oxford University
Press, 1976.
Copi, I.M. Symbolic Logic. 4th Ed. New Delhi: Collier Macmillan International, 1973.
------------. Introduction to Logic. 9th Ed. New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1995.
Joseph, H.W.B. An Introduction to Logic. Oxford: 1906.
Lewis, C.I. & Longford, C.H. Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover Pub. Inc.,1959.
 1

UNIT 2 CONDITIONAL PROOF

Contents
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Conditional Proof (C.P.)
2.3 Exercises I
2.4 The Strengthened Rule of C. P.
2.5 Exercises II
2.6 Let Us Sum Up
2.7 Key Words
2.8 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

There are as many kinds of techniques as there are arguments. This unit is designed
to introduce you to two new Rules which help you to compare the new technique or
techniques with the earlier techniques. This comparative appraisal is possible only
when you use both methods and consider suitable examples. This is the main
objective of this unit. This unit enables you to understand that what is regarded as
elementary valid argument forms or Rules of Inference and Rules of Replacement are
also fundamental and hence indispensable. This is the second objective intended to be
achieved.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

It is wrong to think that there is a single technique which is applicable on all occasions
irrespective of the structure of arguments. On some occasions Rules of Inference and
Replacement are useful and on some other occasions the technique known as Conditional
Proof (C. P.) is useful. But there is no single method which is indispensable for all
occasions. It is important to recognize this simple fact which prevents us from following a
particular method blindly. When the advantage of new technique becomes clear, the
significance of new Rule or Rules also becomes clear and it will be put into use. When we
know that it is disadvantageous, we refrain from using that particular method. This means
that a method is not to be used just because it has worked on earlier occasions. Instead, we
try to apply a different method which is thought to be useful. The method of Conditional
Proof (C.P.) is different in kind from the Rules of Inference or Replacements in one sense.
There are a certain types of arguments, which can be tested with any of the Rules discussed
in the previous chapters only with great difficulty or it may be practically impossible to test
them at all. In all such cases C. P. comes to our rescue. Let us apply these methods and
compare the results in order to understand the fact that the relevance of method is
determined by the structure of argument.
 2

1).
1 (A v B) => (C Λ D)
2 (D v E) => F/ ∴ A => F
3 ¬ (A v B) v (C Λ D) 1, Impl.
4 (¬ A Λ ¬ B) v (C Λ D) 3, De. M.
5 (¬ A v C) Λ ( ¬ A v D) Λ (¬ B v C) Λ (¬ B v D) 4, Dist.
6 ¬ (D v E) v F 2, Impl.
7 ¬AvD 5, Simp.
8 (¬D Λ ¬ E) v F 6, De. M.
9 (¬D v F) Λ (¬E v ¬ F) 8, Dist.
10 ¬D v F 9, Simp.
11 A => D 7, Impl.
12 D => F 10, Impl.
13 ∴ A => F ` 11, 12, H. S.
It is obvious that we have used at present only Rules of Inference and Rules of
Replacement. What is the position? It may be noted that from 3rd line to 13th line there are
one hundred and twelve words and five Rules are used on eleven occasions. These figures
become significant when we use new set of Rules and then calculate the length of proof
construction which helps us to compare the length, number of words and others involved in
these methods mentioned above. An important restriction is that the Rules of Inference are
useful generally only when the arguments, have unconditional conclusions. So an
argument, which has conditional conclusion, falls out of their purview on many occasions
if simplicity is the yardstick. The most familiar example for conditional proposition is
implicative proposition. Since implicative propositions have equivalent disjunctive and
negation forms, they are also to be regarded as conditional propositions. Therefore if the
conclusion is any one of these forms, then either the construction of proof may be very
long and complex or may even be impossible. On such occasions we are likely to err.
Therefore in order to insulate ourselves against highly probable errors we have to look for
safer routes. C. P. is one such path. Again, C.P is not a system of proof, which is absolutely
independent of nineteen Rules. Only, the number increases to twenty. Among them one
Rule is called Rule of C. P. which is compulsorily used to test the validity when the
conclusion is conditional. This Rule is unique in the sense that nowhere else it is used.

There are two Rules under this category. They are known as C. P., and the Strengthened
Rule of C. P. This classification does not imply that the former is weak. The difference lies
only in scope. We shall begin with the former first.

2.2 CONDITIONAL PROOF (C.P.)

Any deductive argument, whether valid or invalid, can be expressed in the form of a
conditional proposition. What is more important to know is that the original argument is
valid only when the corresponding conditional statement satisfies a condition known as
„tautology‟. Otherwise, the argument is invalid. Consider this example:
 3

2).
All A are B
All B are C / ∴ All A are C

Its corresponding conditional form is as follows:

“If all A are B and all A are C, then all A are C”. (1)
Let the first premise be symbolized as P1 and second as P2. Conclusion is symbolized as C.
Now (1) becomes:
(P1 Λ P2) => C (2)
(2) is said to be tautologous because its corresponding proposition form is tautologous. A
proposition form is said to be tautologous when it has only true substitution. There are two
conditions to be satisfied if C. P. should be used to show that the argument is valid.
1) Conclusion must be a conditional proposition.
2) It should be possible to deduce a conditional proposition from a conjunction of premises
by a sequence of elementary valid arguments, which satisfy the relevant Rules of
Inference. That is, all premises in C.P. should be supported by these Rules. The additional
premise, which is a characteristic mark of C. P., is always the antecedent of the conclusion
and the construction of proof always begins with antecedent of the conclusion as the
premise. This premise itself is called C.P. An example of argument, which requires C.P.,
is given below.

P => (A => B) (3)

When P stands for the conjunction of premises, one of the Rules of Replacement, i.e.,
Exportation Rule permits us to rewrite (3) as:
(P Λ A) => B (4)

It is obvious that the conclusion of (4) is the consequent of the conclusion of (3). Since
you start with an assumed premise, the proof is known as C.P. Here is the difference. All
other premises are taken as true. The assumption should not really matter. Even if the
assumed premise is false, it is possible to deduce a valid conclusion. If B can be validly
drawn from P Λ A, then not only (4) is valid its corresponding original argument (3) also
must be valid because (3) and (4) are logically equivalent.

Now consider the argument considered above.

3)
1. (A v B) => (C Λ D)
2. (D v E) => F / ∴ A => F
3. A /∴ F C. P.
4. AvB 3, Add.
5. CΛD 1, 4, M.P.
6. D 5, Simp.
7. DvE 6, Add.
 4

8. ∴ F 2, 7, M.P.
Now compare the lengths of 1 and 3. In 3 there are thirty five words whereas in 1 there are
one hundred and twelve words and in 3 four Rules are used on six occasions whereas in 1
five Rules are used on eleven occasions. This comparison helps us to know the advantage
of new technique.
A brief explanation of steps involved in proof construction in this method is necessary.
You should start from assuming A which is the antecedent of the conclusion. Always the
first line must have this structure in C. P. Slash against line 3 in, ∴ and (C.P) indicate that
the method of C. P. is being used.

If there is only one condition in the conclusion, then C.P is used once. If there are two
conditions in the consequent component of the conclusion, then C.P. is used twice. It
means that the number of times the C. P. has to be used is equivalent to the number of
conditions that appear in the consequent of the conclusion. Now it is plain that the
complexity of argument increases with the increase in the number of conditions in the
conclusion. The following example illustrates the procedure to be followed in such cases.

4)
1 A => (B => C)
2 B => (C => D) /∴ A => (B => D)
3 A /∴ B => D (C.P.)
4 B /∴ D (C.P.)
5 B => C 1, 4, M.P.
6 C 5, 4, M.P.
7 C => D 2, 4, M.P.
8 ∴D 7, 6, M.P.
The student is advised to use the Rules of Inference or Replacement or both depending
upon the need and compare the lengths of proof construction.

Consider an argument with a disjunctive conclusion and use both the methods without
making any presumption to compare the lengths and complexity of proof construction. we
shall begin with earlier method.
5)
1 A=>B
2 C=>D
3 (¬ B v ¬ D) (¬ A v ¬ B) /∴ (¬ A v ¬ C)
4 (A = > B) Λ (C = > D) 1, 2, Conj.
5 ¬Bv¬D 3, Simp.
6 ∴¬Av ¬C 4, 5, D. D.
A = > ¬ C is equivalent to the original conclusion. Therefore if C. P. method has
to be used, then A = > ¬ C must replace ¬ A v ¬ C. Now you shall construct proof
using C. P. method.
 5

4 A /∴ ¬ C (C.P.)
5 ¬Bv¬D 3, Simp.
6 B 1, 4, M. P.
7 ¬D 5, 6, D.S.
8 ∴¬C 2, 7, M.T.
In the former method thirty three words, three lines and three Rules are involved whereas in the
latter thirty four words, five lines and four Rules are involved. This comparison illustrates the
fact that just because the conclusion is conditional the method of C. P. is not necessarily
preferable.

Now let us consider a more complex example with multiple variables and more number of
premises. Again we will begin with the Rules of Inference.

1 H => (I => J) `
2 K => ( I => J)
3 (¬ H Λ ¬ K) => (¬ L v ¬ M)
4 (¬ L => ¬ N) Λ (¬ M => ¬ O)
5 (P => N) Λ (Q => O)
6 ¬ (I => J) /∴ ¬ P v ¬ Q
7 ¬H 1,6, M.T.
8 ¬K 2,6, M.T.
9 ¬HΛ¬K 7,8, Conj.
10 ¬Lv¬M 3,9, M.P.
11 ¬Nv¬O 4,10, C.D.
12 ∴ ¬ P v ¬ Q 5,11, D.D.
In this method there are forty three words, six lines and five Rules. Now apply the method of
C.P. Before we do so the conclusion must be transformed into implicatory form. Hence the
conclusion is P => ¬ Q.

6) ¬ (I => J) / P => ¬ Q
7) P / ∴ ¬ Q (C. P.)
8) P => N 5, Simp.
9) N 5, 7, M. P.
10) ¬ L => ¬ N 4, Simp.
11) L 10, 9, M.T.
12) ¬H 1, 6, M.T.
13) ¬K 2, 6, M.T.
14) ¬H Λ ¬K 12, 13, Conj.
15) ¬Lv¬M 3, 14, M.P.
16) L => ¬ M 14, Impl.
17) ¬M 16, 11, M.P.
18) ¬ M => ¬ O 4, Simp.
19) ¬O 18, 17, M.P.
20) Q => O 5, Simp.
 6

21) ∴¬Q 20, 19, M.T.

We know prima facie that this method is very long with ninety seven words, fifteen lines
and five Rules and we know that with the exception of Conjunction other Rules recur again
and again. Therefore C.P. must be used only when it is economical in terms of space and
effort.

2.3 EXERCISES I
I. Some arguments are considered below which are tested using the method of C. P.
1)
1. P => (Q => R) /∴ (P => Q) => (P => R)
2. P => Q /∴ P => R (C.P.)
3. P /∴ R (C.P.)
4. (P => Q) => R 1, Exp.
5. ∴R 4, 2, M.P.
2)
1. P => (Q => R) / ∴ Q => (P => R)
2. Q /∴ P => R (C.P.)
3. P /∴ R (C.P.)
4. Q => R 1, 3, M.P.
5. ∴R 4, 2, M.P.
3)
1. P => Q / ∴ ¬ Q => ¬ P
2. ¬ Q /∴ ¬P (C.P.)
3. ∴¬P 2, 1, M.T.

4)
1. P => ¬ ¬ P
2. ¬ ¬ P /∴ P (C.P.)
3. ∴ P 2, D.N.

5)
1. A => B / (B => C) => (A => C)
2. B => C /∴ A => C (C.P.)
3. A /∴C (C.P.)
4. B 1, 3, M.P.
5. ∴C 2, 4, M.P.

6)
1. (A => B) Λ (A => C) /∴ A => (B v C)
 7

2. A /∴B v C (C.P.)
3. A => B 1, Simp.
4. B 3, 2, M.P.
5. ∴B v C 4, Add.
7)
1. (A => B) Λ (A => C) / ∴ A => (B Λ C)
2. A /∴B Λ C (C.P.)
3. A => B 1, Simp.
4. B 3, 2, M.P.
5. A => C 1,Simp.
6. C 5, 2, M.P.
7. ∴B Λ C 4, 6, Conj.
8)
1. A => B /∴ (¬ A => B) => B
2. (¬ A => B) /∴B (C.P.)
3. ¬A /∴B (C.P.)
4. ∴B 2, 3, M.P.

9)
1. (A => B) /∴ (A Λ C) => (B Λ C)
2. AΛC /∴B Λ C (C.P.)
3. A 2, Simp.
4. B 1, 3, M.P.
5. C 2, Simp.
6. ∴B Λ C 4, 5, Conj.
10)
1. B => C /∴ (A v B) => (C v A)
2. AvB /∴C v A (C.P.)
3. ¬ A => B 2, Impl.
4. ¬ A => C 3, 1, H.S.
5. AvC 4, Impl.
6. ∴C v A 5, Com.

11)
1. (A v B) => C /∴ [(C v D) => E] => (A => E)
2. (C v D) => E / ∴ A => E (C.P.)
3. A /∴ E (C.P.)
4. AvB 3, Add.
5. C 1, 4, M.P.
6. CvD 2, Add.
7. ∴E 2, 6, M. P.

12)
1. (P Λ Q) => P
 8

2. P / ∴ Q => P
3. Q /∴P (C.P.)
4. P Λ Q 2, 3, Conj.
5. ∴P 4, Simp.
[Note: You can apply M. P. to 1 and 4 to obtain the same result.]

13)
1. P => Q /∴ (¬ Q v R) => ¬ (R Λ P)
2. (R Λ P) => (Q Λ R) 1, Trans.
3. RΛP /∴Q Λ R (C.P.)
4. P 3, Simp.
5. Q 1, 4, M.P.
6. R 3 Simp.
7. ∴Q Λ R 5, 6, Conj.

Check your progress I.

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Explain the significance of Conditional Proof.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. What is the advantage of C. P. method?

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2.4 THE STRENGTHENED RULE OF C. P.

In Conditional Proof method, the conclusion depends upon the antecedent of the conclusion.
There is another method, which is called the Strengthened Rule of Conditional Proof. In this
method, the construction of proof does not necessarily assume the antecedent of the conclusion.
The structure of this method needs some elaboration. An assumption is made initially. There is
no need to know the truth-status of the assumption because an assumption may be false, but the
conclusion can still be true. Further, the assumption can be any component of any premise or
conclusion. This method is called the Strengthened Rule because we enjoy more freedom in
making assumption or assumptions which means that plurality of assumptions is allowed. It
strengthens our repertoire of testing equipments. In this sense, this method is called the
Strengthened Rule of C.P. Another feature of this method is the limit of assumption. The last
step is always outside the limits of assumption. If there are two or more than two assumptions in
an argument, then there will be a separate last step for each assumption. This last step can be
 9

regarded as the conclusion relative to that particular assumption. It shows that the last step is
deduced with the help of assumption in conjunction with the previous steps in such a way that
the Rules of Inference permit such conjunction. Before the conclusion is reached the function of
assumption also ceases. Then it will have no role to play. Then, automatically, the assumption is
said to have been discharged. When the Strengthened Rule of C. P. is used adjacent to the line of
assumption, the word assumption is not mentioned unlike as in the case of C.P. Here the head of
the bent arrow points to „assumption‟. In case of the Strengthened Rule of C.P., the conclusion is
always a conditional statement which consists of statements from the sequence itself.

Thus the range of the application of condition is defined. In order to easily identify the range of
its application, a slightly different method is used. An arrow is used to indicate what is assumed
and with the help of the same arrow its range also is defined. The application of C.P. is restricted
to the space covered by the arrows. All steps, which are outside this arrow, are also independent
of the condition. While the head of the arrow makes the assumption, its terminus separates the
lines, which depend upon the condition from the line, which does not depend. Since the
conclusion does not depend upon its own antecedent, it has to depend upon the first assumption
only. In this sense, it is a strengthened condition. In this case there is no reason to mention C.P.
because the arrow helps us to identify the assumption. Consider this example:

1).
1 (A v B) =>{(C v D) =>E} /∴ A=>[(CΛD) => E]
2 A
3 AvB 2, Add.
4 (C v D)=>E 1, 3, M.P.
5 (CΛD)
6 C 5, Simp.
7 CvD 6, Add.
8E 4, 7, M.P.

9 (C v D)=>E 5, 8, C.P.

10 ∴ A=> [CΛD) =>E] 2, 9, C.P.

Rules mentioned on the RHS make it clear that all lines from 3 to 9 depend on A either directly
or through lines which depend A. In lines 9 and 10 implication makes them C.P.

One advantage of C.P. in its strengthened form is that it has an extended application. It can be
used in all those cases where conclusions are conditional but do not appear to be so. Using the
strengthened Rule of C. P. let us solve some problems.
 10

2).
1. (E v F) = > G
2. H => (I ∧ G) / ∴ (E => G) ∧ (H ∧ I)
3. E
4. EvF 3, Add
5. G 4, 3, M. P.

6. E => G 3, 5, C. P.
7. H
8. I∧G 2, 7, M. P.
9. I 8, Simp.

10. H => I 7, 9, C. P.
11. ∴ (E => G) ∧ (H => I) 6, 10, Conj.
3).

1. Q v (R => S)
2. {R => (R ∧ S)} => (T v U)
3. (T => Q) ∧ (U => V) / ∴ Q v V
In this argument, in reality, the conclusion is conditional. We know that disjunction can be
translated to implication form. When it so translated, the conclusion becomes
¬ Q => V
Now let us construct proof for this argument.
4. ¬ Q
5. R => S 1, 4, D. S.

6. R
7. S 5, 6, M. P.
8. R ∧ S 6, 8, Conj.

9. R => (R ∧ S) 6, 8, C. P.
10. T v U 2, 9, M. P.
11. ∴Q v V 3, 10, C. D.
 11

4).
1. (C v D) => (E => F)
2. {E => (E ∧ F)} => G
3. G => {(¬ H v ¬ ¬ H)} => (C ∧ H)} / ∴ C ≡ G
4. C
5. C v D 4, Add
6. E => F 1, 5, M. P.
7. E
8. F 6, 7, M. P.
9. E ∧ F 7, 8, Conj.
10. E => (E ∧ F) 7, 9, C. P.
11. G 2, 10, M. P.
12. H
13. ¬ ¬ H 12, D. N.
14. ¬ ¬ H v ¬ H 13, Add
15. ¬ H v ¬ ¬ H 14, Com.
16. G => (¬ H v ¬ ¬ H) 11, 15, C. P.
17. C ∧ H 3, 16, M. P.
18. C 17, Simp.

19. C => G 18, 11, C. P.

20. G => C 11, 18, C. P.
21. (C => G) ∧ (G => C) 19, 20, Conj.
22. ∴C ≡ G 21, Equiv.

5)
1. (E v F) = > G
2. H => (I ∧ G) / ∴ (E => G) ∧ (H ∧ I)
3. E
4. EvF 3, Add
5. G 4, 3, M. P.

6. E => G 3, 5, C. P.
7. H
8. I∧G 2, 7, M. P.
9. I 8, Simp.

10. H => I 7, 9, C. P.
11. ∴ (E => G) ∧ (H => I) 6, 10, Conj.
 12

6)
1. (C v D) => (E => F)
2. {E => (E ∧ F)} => G
3. G => {(¬ H v ¬ ¬ H)} => (C ∧ H)} / ∴ C ≡ G
4. C
5. C v D 4, Add
6. E => F 1, 5, M. P.
7. E
8. F 6, 7, M. P.
9. E ∧ F 7, 8, Conj.
10. E => (E ∧ F) 7, 9, C. P.
11. G 2, 10, M. P.
12. H
13. ¬ ¬ H 12, D. N.
14. ¬ ¬ H v ¬ H 13, Add
15. ¬ H v ¬ ¬ H 14, Com.
16. G => (¬ H v ¬ ¬ H) 11, 15, C. P.
17. C ∧ H 3, 16, M. P.
18. C 17, Simp.

19. C => G 18, 11, C. P.

20. G => C 11, 18, C. P.
21. (C => G) ∧ (G => C) 19, 20, Conj.
22. ∴C ≡ G 21, Equiv.
 13

7).
1 ¬ P (Q => R)
¬ Q  (¬ R  D) / ∴P => (Q => D)

1. ¬ P  (Q => R)
2. ¬ Q  (¬ R  D) /  P => (Q => D)
3. P /  (Q => D)
4. Q / D
5. ¬ ¬ Q D.N 4.
6. ¬ R  D D.S. 2 &5
7. ¬ ¬ P D.N 3
8. Q => R D.S 1&7
9. R M.P. 8&4
10. ¬ ¬ R D.N. 9
11. D D.S.6&10
12. Q => D C.P. 4-11
13. ∴P => (Q => D) C.P. 3-12

8)

(P => ¬ Q)  R
(R => S)
¬ S / ∴Q => ¬ P
1. (P => ¬ Q)  R

2. (R => S)
3. ¬ S / Q => ¬ P
4. Q / ¬ P
5. ¬ R M.T 2&3.
6. R  (P => ¬ Q) Com 1.
7. (P => ¬ Q) D.S 6&5
8. ¬ ¬ Q D.N 4.
9. ¬ P M.T. 7&8

10. ∴Q => ¬ P C.P 4&9

 14

9)

¬ A(B => C)
¬ B (¬ C  D) Q => ¬ P /  A => (B => D)

1. ¬ A (B => C)
2. ¬ B  (¬ C  D) /  A => (B => D)
3. A / (B => D)
4. B / D
5. ¬ ¬ B D.N 4.
6. ¬ C D D.S. 2 &5
7. ¬ ¬ A D.N 3
8. B => C D.S 1&7
9. C M.P. 8&4
10. ¬ ¬ C D.N. 9
11. D D.S.6&10
12. B => D C.P. 4-11
13.  => (B => D) C.P. 3-12

10)
¬P (Q => R)
¬Q  (¬R  S) /P => (Q => S)
1. ¬P  (Q => R)
2. ¬Q  (¬R  S) / P => (Q => S)
3. P / (Q => S)
4. Q / S
5. ¬ ¬ Q D.N 4.
6. ¬R  S D.S. 2 &5
7. ¬ ¬ P D.N 3
8. Q => R D.S 1&7
9. R M.P. 8&4
10. ¬ ¬ R D.N. 9
11. S D.S.6&10
12. Q => S C.P. 4-11
13. P => (Q => S) C.P. 3-12

Check your progress II.

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

 15

1. Write a brief note on the salient aspects of the Rule of Strengthened Proof.

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2. What do you mean by „discharging of assumption‟?

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2.5 EXERCISES II

1. (A B) => (C∧D)

(D  E) => F /  (A => F)

2. [A => (B => C)]

[B => (C => D)] / [A => (B => D)]

3. C => D / [(D => E) => (C => E)]

4. (N => P) ∧ (B => S) / [(N ∧ B) => (P ∧S)]

5. (E => F
[E => ( F => G )]
[E => ( G => H )] /  (E => H)

6. [¬ (P Q)  (R∧S)]
[¬ (S  T)  U] /  (P => U)

7. [P => (¬Q  R)]

[Q => (¬S =>¬R)] / [P => (Q => S)]

8. ¬C  D / [(¬D  E) => (C => E)]

9. (M => Q) ∧ (B => S) / [(M ∧ B) => (Q ∧S)]

10. (p => q)
[P => ( Q => R )]
[P => ( R => S )] /  (P => S)

11. (¬A B) => (C∧D)

(D  E) => ¬ F /  (¬A => ¬ F)
 16

12. [A => (~B => C)]

[¬ B => (C => D)] / [A => (¬ B => D)]

13. ¬ X => ¬ D / [(¬ D => E) => (¬ X => E)]

14. (B => S) ∧ (N => P) / [(N ∧ B) => (P ∧S)]

15. (X => F)
[X => ( F => G )]
[X => ( G => H )] /  (X => H)

16. [¬ (V Q)  (R∧X)]

[¬ (X  T)  U] /  (V => U)

17. [¬P => (¬ X  R)]

[X => (¬ S => ¬ R)] / [¬ P => (X => S)]

18. ¬ Y  Z / [(¬Z  E) => (Y => E)]

19. (B => S) ∧ (M => Q) / [(M ∧ B) => (Q ∧S)]

20. (P => M)
[P => ( M => R )]
[P => ( R => ¬ S )] /  (P => ¬ S)

2.6 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have tried to understand the significance of Conditional Proof. Its advantages and
limitations were assessed in comparison with Rules of Inference and Replacement. A distinction
was made between C. P. and the Strengthened Rule of C. P. We have learnt that logicians allow
us to assume or introduce any proposition and not necessarily the antecedent of a conditional as a
conditional assumption. But all assumptions must be discharged by applying the Rule of
conditional proof.

2.7 KEY WORDS

Discharging the assumption: Ending an assumption when its truth is no longer being assumed
as a maneuver within the proof.

2.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

 17

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________. Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of
Madras, 1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd., 2007.
Copi, M. Irvin. Symbolic Logic. Fourth edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________. Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co.,
1968.
_____________ & James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1972.
 1

UNIT 3 INDIRECT PROOF

Contents
1.0 Objectives
3.1.Introduction
3.2.The Meaning of Indirect Proof
3.3.Application of Indirect Proof
3.4.Examples
3.5.Exercises on Indirect Proof
3.6 Indirect Proof and Proof of Tautology
3.7 Let Us Sum Up
3.8 Key Words
3.9 Further Readings and References

3.0. OBJECTIVES

The central theme of this unit is to provide an exposition of Indirect Proof. This will bring us to
the last Rule with which we are concerned in our analysis of arguments which comprise of
compound and simple propositions. As mentioned in the previous units, this is another tool
devised to test arguments in as simple manner as possible.

3.1.INTRODUCTION

Indirect Proof, as its name suggests, is a proof procedure that establishes the validity of an
argument indirectly when it is either very difficult to prove directly or just impossible. Modern
logic adapted this method from geometry when arguments with which it is concerned were of
varying complexities. This addition rendered the task of logician much easier.

3.2. THE MEANING OF INDIRECT PROOF

The method of indirect proof is often called Reductio ad Absurdum (R A A), a method quite
common in the construction of proof of geometrical theorems. This method is characterized by a
special feature. In order to prove a certain statement, its contradiction is assumed to be true from
which the conclusion is logically deduced which in turn contradicts our assumption. Suppose that
A is derived from certain premises. If A contradicts ¬ B, then either A must be false or ¬ B must
be false. A cannot be false because it is logically deduced from what is purported to be true.
Therefore ¬ B must be false, which means that A must be true. This is how a theorem in
geometry or an argument in logic is, sometimes, proved.

This method has a distinct advantage. Sometimes the length of proof is too long. In logic it is
important that we use least number of steps. Second requirement is clarity. Combination of these
two is what is most desired and also desirable. In such circumstances this method is most useful.
 2

The use of this method consists in beginning with the contradiction of what is to be proved. A
point to be noted here is that, the contradiction of what has to be proved is marked by writing I.P.
or R. A. on the right hand side (R.H.S.) just adjacent to the assumption. In this unit both
abbreviations are used for the sake of familiarity. Here, the expression R.A. and R.P. stand for
‘Reductio assumption’ and ‘Reductio proof’ respectively. The denial of conclusion is named as
Reduction Proof (R.P.).

In C.P. also we begin with an assumption. The difference is that in I. P. what is assumed is the
contradiction of the conclusion whereas in the case of C. P. it is the antecedent of the conclusion.
Consider this argument.
1)
1. A => (B Λ C)
2. (B v D) => E
3. D v A /∴E
4. ¬ E I.P. (R. A.)
5. ¬ (B v D) 2, 4, M.T.
6. ¬B Λ ¬ D 5, De. M.
7. ¬ D 3, Simp.
8. A 3, 7, D.S.
9. B Λ C 1, 8, M.P.
10. B 9, Simp.
11. B v D 10, Add.
12. E 2, 11, M.P.
13. E Λ ¬ E 12, 4, Conj.

From 10th Step onwards the problem can be reworked in this manner.
11. ¬B 6, Simp.
12. B Λ ¬ B 10, 11, Conj
13. ∴ E R. P.

Whether we get E Λ ¬ E or B Λ ¬ B, the result remains the same. In both the cases there are two
steps in the argument whose conjunction leads to contradiction. Whenever there is contradiction
one conjunct must be false so that the other one has to be true.

3.3. APPLICATION OF INDIRECT PROOF

We learnt the application of Rules on earlier occasions when we considered arguments with
varied structure. On similar lines, Indirect Proof is applied to arguments and thereby validity of
arguments is tested.
2).
1. (A  C)
2. (A => C) / C
3. ¬C R.A
4. ¬A 2, 3, M.T.
 3

5. CA 1, Com.
6. A 5, 3, D.S.
7. A∧¬A 6, 4, Conj.
8. C R.P.

7th step involves contradiction. The final step in which the conclusion is repeated is
redundant, but it is permitted for the sake of comprehensiveness. The names ‘reductio
assumption’ and ‘reduction proof’ are not very frequent and we have several other usages.
Yet the names introduced here will serve the purpose. Accomplishing an explicit
contradiction itself is more than adequate to show that the preferred conclusion is derivable,
because (A∧~A)  C is tautology. The unique conclusion can be derived after
accomplishing an explicit contradiction by taking the negation of the conclusion in question
as a conditional assumption.

3)
1. Av (B Λ C)
2. A => C /∴C
3. ¬ C I.P.
4. ¬ A 2, 3, M.T.
5. B Λ C 1, 4, D.S.
6. C 5, Simp.
7. C Λ ¬ C 6, 3, Conj.
8. ∴C R. P.
th
7 step involves contradiction; therefore ¬ C is false which means that C is true.

4)
1. (D v E) => (F => G)
2. (¬ G v H) => (D Λ F) /∴G
3. ¬ G I.P.
4. ¬ G v H 3, Add.
5. D Λ F 2, 4, M.P.
6. D 5, Simp.
7. D v E 6, Add.
8. F => G 1, 7, M.P.
9. ¬ F 8, 3, M.T.
10. F 5, Simp.
11. F Λ ¬ F 10, 9, Conj.
12. ∴G R. P.
11th step is contradiction. Therefore ¬ G is false; which means that G is true
5).
1. (H => I) Λ (J => K)
2. (I v K) => L
3. ¬ L /∴¬ (H v J)
4. H v J I.P.
5. I v K 1, 4, C.D.
 4

6. L 2, 5, M.P.
7. L Λ ¬ L 6, 3, Conj.
8. ∴¬ (H v J) R. P.

7th step involves contradiction. Therefore 4 is false; which means that ¬ (H v J)

is true.

6).
1. (M v N) => (O Λ P)
2. (O v Q) => ¬ R Λ S
3. (R v T) => (M v N) /∴¬R
4. R I.P.
5. R v T 4, Add.
6. M v N 3, 5, M.P.
7. O Λ P 1, 6, M.P.
8. O 7, Simp.
9. O v Q 8, Add.
10. ¬ R Λ S 2, 9, M.P.
11. ¬ R 10, Simp.
12. R Λ ¬ R 4, 11, Conj.
13. ∴¬ R R. P.

12th step involves contradiction. Therefore R is false which means that ¬ R is true.

7).
1. (V => ¬ W) Λ (X => Y)
2. (¬ W => Z) Λ (Y=> ¬ A)
3. (Z => ¬ B) Λ (¬A => C)
4. VΛ X / ∴¬ B Λ C
5. ¬ (¬ B Λ C) I.P.
6. B v ¬ C 5, De. M.
7. ¬ Z v A 3, 6, D.D.
8. W v ¬Y 2, 7, D.D.
9. ¬V v ¬X 1, 8, D.D.
10. (VΛ X) Λ (¬ V v ¬ X) 4, 9, Conj.
11. ∴¬ B Λ C R. P.

10th Step involves contradiction. According to de Morgan’s law (VΛ X) and (¬ V v ¬ X) are
contradictories. Therefore ¬ (¬ B Λ C) is false, which means that (¬ B Λ C) is true. We can also
prove these arguments using formal proof of validity. Consider the 5th argument.

8).
1. (H => I) Λ (J => K)
2. (I v K) => L
3. ¬ L /∴¬ (H v J)
 5

4. ¬(I v K) 2, De. M.
5. ¬IΛ¬K 4, De. M.
6. ¬I 5, Simp.
7. ¬I v¬K 6, Add.
8. ∴¬ H v ¬ J 1, 7, D. D.

When the 5th argument was solved using IP method, it involved thirty three words and five steps,
whereas formal proof required forty words and nine steps. Therefore the former is shorter and
preferable.

Now consider the seventh argument.

9).
1. (V => ¬ W) Λ (X => Y)
2. (¬ W => Z) Λ (Y => ¬ A)
3. (Z=> ¬B) Λ (¬A=> C)
4. V Λ X /∴¬ B Λ C
5. V => ¬ W 1, Simp.
6. V 4, Simp.
7. ¬ W 5, 6, M.P.
8. X => Y 1, Simp.
9. X 4, Simp.
10. Y 8, 9, M.P.
11. ¬ W=> Z 2, Simp.
12. Z 11, 7, M.P.
13. Y => ¬ A 2, Simp.
14. ¬ A 13, 10, M.P.
15. Z => ¬ B 3, Simp.
16. ¬ B 15, 12, M.P.
17. ¬ A => C 3, Simp.
18. C 17, 14, M.P.
19. ∴¬ B Λ C 16, 18, Conj.

When the 7th argument was solved using I.P. method, it involved fifty seven words and seven
steps, whereas formal proof required ninety words and nineteen steps. Therefore the former is
shorter and preferable.

We learnt in the earlier unit that sometimes C. P. is shorter than formal proof and sometimes it is
longer than formal proof. Same situation prevails in the case of I. P. also. Consider the following
example.

1 H => (I => J) `
2 K => ( I => J)
3 (¬ H Λ ¬ K) => (¬ L v ¬ M)
4 (¬ L => ¬ N) Λ (¬ M => ¬ O)
5 (P => N) Λ (Q => O)
 6

1 ¬ (I => J) /∴ ¬ P v ¬ Q
2 ¬H 1,6, M.T.
3 ¬K 2,6, M.T.
9 HˬK 7,8, Conj.
10 ¬ L v ¬ M 3,9, M.P.
11 ¬ N v ¬ O 4,10, C.D.
12 ∴ ¬ P v ¬ Q 5,11, D.D.

This proof construction consists of forty two words, six lines and five Rules used six times. Let
us use Indirect Proof method to know which method is shorter and simpler.

1 H => (I => J) `
2 K => ( I => J)
3 (¬ H Λ ¬ K) => (¬ L v ¬ M)
4 (¬ L => ¬ N) Λ (¬ M => ¬ O)
5 (P => N) Λ (Q => O)
6 ¬ (I => J) /∴ ¬ P v ¬ Q
7 ¬ (¬ P v ¬ Q) I.P.
8 PΛQ 7, De. M.
9 P 8, Simp.
10 P v Q 9, Add.
11 N v O 5, 10, C.D.
12 L v M 4, 11, D.D.
13 ¬ H 1, 6, M. T.
14 ¬ K 2, 6, M.T.
15 ¬ H Λ¬ K 13, 14, Conj.
16 ¬ L v ¬ M 3, 15, M. P.
It must be more than obvious that even after ten steps and sixty nine words and the application of
nine Rules I. P. did not yield the expected results. It must be noted that ¬ L v ¬ M does not
negate the twelfth step i.e. L v M is not the contradictory of the sixteenth step i.e., ¬ L v ¬ M.
Therefore even if subsequent steps yield the desired result, it is, surely, not profitable to follow
the I. P. method in this case.

3.4 EXAMPLES

1).

1(PvQ)
2 ( P = > Q) /Q
3 ¬Q R.A
4¬P 2, 3, M.T.
5QP 1, Com.
6 P 5, 3, D.S.
 7

7 P Λ¬ P 6 , 4, Conj.
8Q R.P.

2).

1 ( A B )
2 ( A = > B) / B
3 ¬B R.A
4¬A 2, 3,M.T.
5BA 1, Com.
6A 5, 3, D.S.
7AΛ ¬A 6 , 4, Conj.
8B R.P.

3).
1. P => (Q => R)
2. S  (P  R)
3. P => Q / (S  R)
4. ¬ (.S R) R.A.
5. ¬ S Λ ¬ R 4, De .M.
6. ¬ S 5, Simp.
7. P  R 2, 6, D.S
8. (P Λ Q) => R 1, Exp.
9. P => (P Λ Q) 3, Abs.
10 P => R 9, 8, H.S.
11 ¬ R Λ ¬ S 5, Com.
12. ¬ R 11, Simp.
13. ¬ P 10, 12, M.T.
14. R  P 7, Com.
15. P 14, 12, D.S .
16. P Λ ¬ P 15, 13, Conj.
17. S  R R.P.

Check your progress I.

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Explain the scope of Indirect Proof.

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 8

2. Give the meaning of R.A and R.P?

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___________________________________________________________________
3.5 EXERCISES ON INDIRECT PROOF
_____________________________________________________________________
Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of formal proof and I. P. methods with the
help of following arguments.
1.
(B v N) => ( K Λ L)
¬K
¬M /∴¬B Λ ¬M
2.
(M v N) => (P Λ Q)
N /∴ P

3. A=> (B Λ C)
¬B /¬A

4. PQ
P¬Q / P

5. A => B
AB /B

6. (M  ¬ M) => ¬ ( ¬ N Λ ¬ O)
(N  O) => ¬ P / ¬ P

7. [(W  X) => (Y Λ W)]

(X => Y)
[¬ Z => (W  X)] /  (Z  W)

8. P => (Q Λ R)
¬Q /¬P

9. ¬ (¬ P Λ ¬ Q)
¬ P => ¬ Q / P

10. ¬ B => ¬A
¬ (¬ A Λ ¬ B) /B

11. (A  ¬ A) => ¬ (¬ B Λ ¬ O)
 9

(B  O) => ¬Q / ¬ Q

12. [(X  W) => (W Λ Y)]

(¬ Y => ¬ X)
[¬Z => (X  W)] /  (W  Z)

13. ¬ A  (C Λ X)
¬X /¬A

14. BA
¬BA / A

15. ¬ A D
AD /D

16. (P  ¬ P) => ¬ (¬ N Λ ¬ O)
(N  O) => ¬ Q / ¬ Q

17. [¬ (¬ W Λ ¬ X) => ¬ (¬Y  ¬ W)]

(¬ Y => ¬ X)
[¬ Z => ¬ (¬ W Λ ¬ X)] /  ¬ (¬Z Λ ¬W)

18. A v (B Λ C)
A => C / C

19. (D v E) => (F => G)

(¬ G v H) => (D Λ F) / G

20. (G => H) => (I v J)

K v ¬ (L=> M)
(G => H) v ¬ K
N => (L => M)
¬ (I v J) / ¬ N

3.6 INDIRECT PROOF AND PROOF OF TAUTOLOGY

Just as arguments are classified as valid and invalid, statements are classified as tautologous and
nontautologous. Under the latter category there is further classification into contingent and
contradiction. All conditional arguments can be transformed into statement forms. If an argument
is valid, then its corresponding statement form is tautologous and if a statement form is
tautologous, then its corresponding conditional argument is necessarily valid. Such statement
form also is conditional whose premise is the antecedent and conclusion is the consequent of the
original argument. We must remember that disjunctive form also is conditional.

Consider the simplest conditional argument with two variables; p and q.

 10

p => q
p
q
Since this argument is valid we should first determine the truth-value of the premises and
conclusion in order to ensure that false conclusion is not derived from true premises. This can be
achieved with the help of truth-table.

p q ¬ p ¬ q p => q
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1
There are four rows in which the truth-value of p => q needs to be determined. If there are three
variables, then we will have eight rows. It means that the number of rows is expressed in the
form of formula
2n
where n stands for the number of variables. Against this background, we shall consider statement
form for the conditional argument of the form mentioned above.
(For the sake of simplicity we can omit negations of p and q since they are not required). We
obtain the statement form by conjoining premises to which the conclusion is connected using
implication again.

p q p => q [{(p => q) Λ p} => q ]

1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 01 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 00 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 00 1 0

It should be noticed that in the last but one column the truth-value obtained is 1 in all instances.
Therefore we say that the statement form is tautologous. If the value happened to be 0 in all
instances, then, the statement form becomes contradictory. On the other hand, if the statement
form takes 1 and 0 in different instances, then the statement form is said to be contingent. Let us
restrict ourselves to tautology. When there are many variables truth-table method becomes quite
complex and not viable on practical grounds. In such circumstances I.P. method becomes useful.
Consider an example.
1).
1 (A => B) v (A => ¬ B)
2 ¬ {(A => B) v (A => ¬ B)} I. P.
3 ¬ (A => B) Λ ¬ (A => ¬ B) 2, De. M.
4 ¬ (¬ A v B) Λ ¬ (¬ A v ¬ B) 3, Impl.
5 (A Λ ¬ B) Λ (A Λ B) 4, De. M.
6 AˬB 5, Simp.
7 ¬B 6, Simp.
8 AΛB 5, Simp.
9 B 8, Simp.
10 B Λ ¬ B 9, 7, Conj.
 11

11 In tenth step there is contradiction. Therefore ¬ {(A => B) v (A => ¬ B)} is false which
shows that (A => B) v (A => ¬ B) is tautologous.

2).
1 (A => B) v (B => A)
2 ¬ [ (A => B) v (B => A) ] I. P.
3 ¬ (A => B) Λ ¬ ( B => A) 2, De. M.
4 ¬ (¬ A v B) Λ ¬ (¬ B v A) 3, Impl.
5 (A Λ ¬ B) Λ (B Λ ¬ A) 4, De. M.
6 AˬB 5,Simp.
7 A 6, Simp.
8 BˬA 5, Simp.
9 ¬A 8, Simp.
10 A Λ ¬ A 8, 9, Conj.
Result is similar to the first argument.

3).

1 (A => B) v (¬ A => B)
2 ¬ [ ( A => B) v (¬ A => B)] I. P.
3 ¬ ( A => B) Λ ¬ (¬ A => B) 2, De.M.
4 ¬ (¬ A v B) Λ ¬ (A v B) 3, Impl.
5 (A Λ ¬ B) Λ (¬ A Λ ¬ B) 4, De. M.
6 AˬB 5, Simp.
7A 6,Simp.
8¬AΛ¬B 5, Simp.
9¬A 8, Simp.
10 A Λ ¬ A 7, 9, Conj.
In this proof system also we have obtained the same result. It means that the second and
third statements are tautologous.

Combination of Reductio ad absurdum and truth- table methods is another technique of testing
arguments. While doing so we have to make two assumptions. In the first place we must assume
that all premises are true. Secondly, the conclusion must be assumed to be false. If this
combination can be achieved, then the given argument is invalid. Otherwise, the argument must
be valid. Examine this argument.
1).
1 (A v B) => (C Λ D)
2 (D v E) => F/ ∴ A => F
The conclusion is false only if A is true and F is false. The second premise can be true provided
D and E are false because F is false. If the first premise must be true then false consequent
should not be implied by true antecedent. In the first premise the consequent is false because D is
false and conjunction of which D is a component is false. Since the consequent is false the
antecedent must be false so that the implication is true. But the antecedent is true because one of
 12

the components of the antecedent is true. Therefore antecedent fails to satisfy the requirement.
This shows that the consequent cannot be false.

Now consider an argument with conjunctive conclusion.

2).
(B v N) => ( K Λ L)
¬K
¬M /∴¬B Λ ¬M
Assume that the conclusion is false. Then at least one component must be false. Let us assume
that ¬ B is false. Then B must be true. Therefore ( K Λ L) must be true. This is possible when
both K and L are true. But when K is true ¬ K is necessarily false. We have assumed that every
premise must be true. The obtained result contradicts our assumption. Therefore the conclusion
must be true. Therefore the argument is valid.

Now consider an argument with simple conclusion.

3).
(M v N) => (O Λ P)
(O v Q) => ¬ R Λ S
(R v T) => (M v N) /∴¬ R
Let ¬ R be false. Then ¬ R Λ S is false. Therefore the second premise can be true only if (O v Q)
is false. (O v Q) can be false only when both the components are false. Since O is false, (O Λ P)
is also false. Therefore the first premise can be true only if (M v N) is false. Now we shall
examine the last premise. Since the consequent is false, the antecedent also must be false if the
premise must be true. However, R is true since ¬ R is false. (R v T) is true since R is true. When
we derive false conclusion from true antecedent the premise becomes false which contradicts our
assumption which states that all premises must be true. Therefore the conclusion must be true.

If verbal explanation is replaced by assigning of truth-values to all the variables and sentential
connectives, then the determination of validity becomes far simpler than one can imagine. This is
left for the reader as an exercise.

Check your progress II.

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

Use I. P. and formal methods to test the following arguments.

1 ¬AB
¬ (¬A Λ ¬ B) /B

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 13

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2 ¬ (P Λ ¬ Q)

¬ (¬ Q Λ ¬ P) /Q

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3.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have provided an exposition of indirect proof, by giving definition and principles
of this method. The conclusion ought to be negated and assumed as an additional premise (R.A.).
Once it is reduced to absurdity, we restated the conclusion and named it as Reduction proof
(R.P.). With the help of this method we have learnt that logicians use indirect method to prove an
argument with least effort.

3.8 KEY WORDS

Theorem: A logical truth.

Valid argument form: An argument form which has no invalid substitution instance.
Contradiction: An obvious contradiction that is a substitution instance of the statement form (A
Λ ¬ A)
Reductio Ad Absurdum (R.A.A): Proof technique of reducing an assumption to absurdity by
deriving explicit contradiction from it.

3.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________. Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of
Madras, 1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd., 2007.
 14

Copi, M. Irvin. Symbolic Logic. Fourth edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________. Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co.,
1968.
_____________ & James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York: The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
_____________. & Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Tenth Edition. New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2001.
___________________________. Introduction to Logic. Eleventh Edition. New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2004.
 1

UNIT 4: PROVING INVALIDITY

Contents
4.0 Objectives
4.1.Introduction
4.2.Proving Invalidity – the Method
4.3 Advantages of the Method of Proving Invalidity
4.4 Assumptions of Proving Invalidity
4.5 Second Method of Proving Invalidity; Examples
4.6 Exercises
4.7 Let Us Sum Up
4.8 Key Words
4.9 Further Readings and References

UNIT 4.0 OBJECTIVES

The central endeavor of this unit is to explicate the significance of proving invalidity. Proving
invalidity is significant not in negative sense, but in positive sense. The singular objective of this
unit is very clear. If we know what is wrong, we will know what is right in the right sense of the
word and we will avoid consciously the pitfalls of illogical ways of arguing. Otherwise, we may
walk into the trap of fallacies. Thus by the end of this unit one should be able to establish
invalidity of seemingly valid arguments. Further, one should be able to identify the difference or
differences between proving tautology and proving invalidity.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Building up of proof system is an efficient mode to show that an argument is valid. Suppose that
an argument happens to be invalid. Then it is not possible to construct proof of its invalidity
using any rule applied so far. If it is not possible to show that given argument is not valid,
then it should be possible to demonstrate its invalidity. Let us consider two cases to make
the point clear. Suppose that we fail to demonstrate that God exists. Then half the battle is won
(or half the battle is last). Next stage is to demonstrate that God does not exist. In contrast
consider this case. Suppose that the prosecution fails to establish that the accused has
committed the crime. The court does extend the benefit of doubt and acquits the accused. But
this is not an accepted position in logic. The function of logic is two-fold; prove a certain
proposition and disprove some other. Inability to prove (or disprove) is not tantamount to
contradiction. At worst, it can only be a contrary. In modern logic contrary is not an accepted
relation. Only contradiction is logically sound. When the logician accomplishes both the tasks,
his victory is complete. Against this background, we must regard the relevance of proof of
invalidity.
 2

The foregoing discussion makes one point clear. If the method of proving invalidity is construed
as a rule, then in addition to the rules we have become familiar with, we are in possession of one
more tool to test arguments.

UNIT 4.2 PROVING INVALIDITY

Construction of truth-table is the foundation of propositional calculus. It is not possible to prove

invalidity without its help. The method is quite simple. Irrespective of the number of
propositions, the entire operation can be completed in one straight line. We devise a single, row
represented by a straight line. All variables, their negations and all compound propositions are
arranged horizontally above the straight line. The truth-value is entered exactly below the
respective proposition. It is not necessary that the truth-value of every variable has to be entered.
It depends upon the situation. The straight line separates the variables and the respective truth-
values. Calculation of truth-value of propositions follows the elementary principles of
propositional calculus. Since we have to prove that the argument is invalid, ‘0’ is the truth-value
to be assigned necessarily to the conclusion. This is the first step to be followed. If the
conclusion is a compound proposition, then the sentential connective must be assigned the value
‘0’. Suppose that in the conclusion there are multiple sentential connectives. Then the sentential
connective which has maximum range must be assigned the designate value. If implication links
the antecedent and the consequent, then implication will have maximum range. Therefore in such
case the implication must be assigned this value. In all other cases a little examination is
adequate to identify the connective with maximum range. In the next step, all premises must be
assigned the truth-value ‘1’ only. Again, if any premise is a compound proposition then same
method which is applicable to compound conclusion also applies to the premise or premises. A
word of caution is required. It may not be possible to assign the required truth-value always in
the very first attempt. We may have to take to trial-and-error method at times. This is more so
when the premises are quite lengthy with multiple sentential connectives. It is also possible that
more than one combination of truth-values for the variables of the premises may yield the
desired result. Suppose that it is impossible to assign the truth-values in any the manner
described above. Then the argument must be regarded as valid. Therefore this method can be
used to prove validity also. However, we are concerned with proving invalidity at present.

At this stage one clarification is required. Unlike validity, invalidity is not governed by any rules.
Of course, it is more than obvious that errors do not have any rules, which govern. On the other
hand, only violation is possible. Hence the method of proving invalidity is different. The
principle of inference dictates that a true premise and a false conclusion together result in
invalidity. This is the reason why in order to determine invalidity we should assign truth-values
in such a way that the premise or premises are true and the conclusion is false. If we succeed in
doing so then the argument is invalid. This method is so simple that the test can be completed in
one line (or two lines depending upon the number of variables and constants) as it happens in the
case of truth-table.

So far we concentrated on the theoretical aspect. We shall apply now this method to an
argument. The conclusion finds place at the end of the line always.

I
 3

1. E => (F v G)
2. G => (H Λ I)
3. ¬H /∴ E => I

4 7 5 8 6 3 1 2

E F G H I {E => (F v G)} Λ {G => (H ΛI)} Λ ¬H E=> I

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0

While following this method ‘0’ should be assigned to the conclusion making the premises true.
If this combination cannot be achieved, then the argument is valid, i.e., after making the
conclusion 0 if the conjunction of premises cannot take the value 1, then the argument is valid.
There is no need to look for too many false premises. It is enough if one premise is false. The
components of conclusion and the components of the premises should be paired properly to carry
out the test.
We know the way of filling up the truth-values. Since the conclusion is a compound proposition
the conclusion is false only when the sentential connective of the conclusion is false. Therefore
this column is filled up first. Since the truth-values of the components determine the truth-value
of any compound proposition, those respective columns are filled up next. Exactly on similar
lines, the truth-values of premises are filled up. Accordingly, last but one column shows that the
conclusion is false. 4, 5 and 6 show that first, second and third premises are true. 7 and 8 show
that the conjunction of all the premises is true. We have begun our job with assigning the truth-
value to the conclusion and the rest of the steps logically followed the first one. This being the
case, false conclusion should not be derivable from the conjunction of true premises in the case
of a valid argument. Since this has happened the argument is invalid. We shall consider some
more examples. The order of filling up of truth-values is not given for the remaining arguments.
The student is advised to find out the same. From now on conjunction linking the premises must
be treated as implicit.

1. J => (K => L)
2. K => (¬ L => M)
3. (L v M) => N /∴ J => ¬N
Note that J => (K => L) ≡ (J Λ K) => L according to the Rule Material Equivalence. Therefore
the truth-value is fixed for the second implication in similar cases.
 4

J K L ¬L M N ¬N {J => (K => L)}{K => (¬L => M)}(L v M) => N} (J => ¬N)
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 0 0

Here the conclusion is ‘0’ whereas the combination of premises is 1. Hence the argument is
invalid.
3
1. (O v P) => Q
2. Q => (P v R)
3. O => (¬ S => P)
4. (S => O) => ¬ R /∴P ≡ Q
In accordance with the Rule of Material Equivalence, the conclusion can be restated as
follows.
(P ≡ Q) ≡ {(P => Q) Λ (Q => P )}. In other words, equivalence relation satisfies the truth-
condition of biconditional proposition. For the sake of convenience we shall use the
statement on R. H. S. This expression is very long. A little care while assigning the truth-
values to the propositions is required.

Suppose that the first component of the conclusion is taken as false. That is sufficient for the
entire conclusion to become false since the conclusion is a conjunction. There is no need to
fill up the truth-value of the last component. Let us assume, therefore, that P => Q is false.
We shall work out the rest as per the procedure and find out the result. The truth-values for
the individual variables are omitted for the remaining examples. The student is advised to fill
up the same for the sake of practice.

{(O v P) => Q} {Q => P v R}{O=>¬S=>P}{S=>O=>¬R}(P => Q) Λ(Q => P)

111 0 0 1 0 0 0
Note that O => ¬ S => P ≡ ( O Λ ¬ S) => P. Accordingly fix the truth-value.
The very first premise is false when the conclusion is false (when the premise turns out to be 0,
there is no need to assign the truth-values to the remaining premises since the result remains
unaltered). Therefore according to the assumption we made the conclusion must be valid.
However, there is one more component which has to be examined before arriving at final
judgment. Let us assume that Q => P is false and then proceed to show the invalidity.

{(O v P) => Q}{Q => (P v R)}{O => (¬S=>P)}S => (O=> ¬R)}(P => Q)Λ(Q => P)
0 00 1 1 1 1 0 11 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
4
1. X ≡ (Y => Z)
2. Y ≡ (¬ X Λ ¬ Z)
3. Z ≡ (X v ¬ Y)
4. Y /∴ X v Z
 5

We should be in a position now to deal with the premises. Since components on L.H.S. and
R.H.S. of all the premises become consequent all of them must have same truth-value. Keeping
this point in mind let us assign truth-values.

{X≡ (Y => Z)}{Y≡ (¬XΛ¬Z)} {Z≡ (Xv¬Y)} Y (X v Z)

0 1 1 0 0 111 1 1 01 0 00 1 0 00
It is important to note that the truth-values entered below equivalence relations correspond to the
truth-values of the premises.

The explanation remains the same in all cases.

5
1. T ≡ U
2. U ≡ (V Λ W)
3. V ≡ (T v X)
4. T v X /∴T Λ X
The conclusion is conjunction. Therefore, again, we have two options which are required to be
tested. Suppose that T takes the value 0 and X takes 1. Then we will get the following result.

(T≡U) (U ≡ V ΛW) {V≡ (T v X)} (T v X) (TΛX)

0 10 01 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 00 1
The third premise is false when the conclusion is false. Hence according to this assumption the
argument turns out to be valid. Let us make second assumption. Accordingly, X takes the value
0. Then we will get the following result.

(T≡U) (U≡ VΛW) {V≡ (T v X)} (T v X) (TΛX)

1 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 110 110 10 0
One aspect becomes clear. When the conclusion is a compound proposition, we have to try all
possibilities till we get the desired result. Even after exhausting all possibilities if a premise
cannot become false, only then can we conclude that the argument is valid. The student is
advised to find out the result when T and X are 0.

6
1. (A => B) Λ (C => D)
2. AvC
3. (B v D) => (E Λ F)
4. E => (F => G)
 6

5. G => (A => H) /∴H

{A =>B)Λ(C =>D)}(A v C){(B v D =>(EΛ F)}{(E=> (F =>G)}{G => (A => H) H
0 1 1 1 11 1 0 11 1 11 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0

The argument is invalid.

7
1. I v (J Λ K)
2. (I v J) => (L ≡ ¬ M)
3. (L => ¬ M) => (M Λ ¬ N)
4. (N => O) Λ (O => M)
5. (J => K) => O /∴O
{I v (JΛK)}{(I v J)}=> (L≡¬M)}{(L=>¬M) => (MΛ¬N)}{(N => O) Λ
11 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
(O=>M)} {J => (K => O) O
01 1 0 0 1 0 0

8
1. P ≡ (Q ≡ ¬ R)
2. Q => (¬R v ¬ S)
3. {R => (Q v ¬ T} Λ (P => Q)
4. {U => (S Λ T)} Λ (T => ¬ V)
5. {(Q Λ R) => ¬ U} Λ {U => (Q v R)}
6. (Q v V) Λ¬ V /∴ ¬ U Λ ¬ V
{P≡(Q≡¬R)}{Q => (¬Rv¬S)}{R => (Qv¬T)}Λ(P => Q)}[{U=>(SΛT) }
11 111 1 1 1 10 0 1 110 1 1 1 1 1 111

Λ(T=>¬V)] [{(Q ΛR) => ¬U} Λ{U = > (Q v R)}]{(Q v V) Λ ¬V(¬UΛ¬V)

1 11 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 10 11 0 1 1 0 0 1

9
1. A=> B
2. C=> D
3. B v C /∴ A v D
 7

{A=> B} {C=> D} {B v C} {A v D}
0 1 1 0 1 0 110 000

II

It is a very good exercise to consider arguments in verbal form and then translate them to the
usual symbolic form.

10

If pressure increases, then volume decreases.

Pressure has not increased.

Therefore volume does not decrease.

First we shall symbolize the variables.

a) pressure increases ---------- P

b) pressure has not increased ------ ¬ P

c) volume decreases ------- V

d) volume does not decrease ------- ¬ V

In the form of symbols the argument is represented as follows.

P=>V

¬P

∴ ¬V

As mentioned earlier we shall assign the truth-values as follows.

{P = > V} ¬P ¬V

0 1 1 1 0

Consider now a polysyllogistic argument.

2
 8

1 All ministers are politicians. ----------- M

2 All politicians are voters.---------- P

3 All voters are educated.-------- V

4 No educated persons are honest.-------- ¬E

Therefore no ministers are honest. ------- ¬ M

We must remember that all universal propositions are hypothetical in nature. Therefore the first
proposition actually means that if there is anyone who is a minister, then he must be a politician.
Accordingly, we shall symbolize the statements.

1M=>P

2P=>V

3V=>¬E

∴ ¬
E

{M = > P} {P = > V} {V=>¬E} ¬E

0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0

Since all three implications are true, when the conclusion is false, the argument is invalid. It is
advantageous to mark the conclusion at the end of R. H. S. and enter its truth-value first followed
by the truth-values of premises. Only then we will be in a position to fix without confusion the
truth-values of component propositions.

One distinct advantage of this method must now be more than obvious. There is no need to
remember the distribution pattern of terms in categorical proposition. When this is abandoned the
laws of syllogism or polysyllogism are rendered superfluous. It is sufficient if we are familiar
with the truth-conditions of compound propositions.

Consider now a slightly complex argument.

3 If tax evaders are not punished, then either development takes back seat or the government is
compelled to keep tax slab high. If the government is compelled to keep tax slab high, then
common man becomes the victim of inept administration in democratic set-up. Common man
does not become a victim of inept administration in a democratic set-up. Therefore either
development does not take back seat or the tax evaders are punished in a democratic set-up.
 9

This argument deserves to be split into individual components and then symbolized.

1 tax evaders are not punished --------- ¬ T

2 development takes back seat -------- D

3 the government is compelled to keep tax slab high ------- H

4 common man becomes the victim of inept administration in democratic set-up ---- C

5 common man does not become the victim of inept administration in democratic set-up ------- ¬
C

6 development does not take back seat --------- ¬ D

7 the tax-evaders are punished in a democratic set-up ------- T

We can now symbolize each proposition.

1st premise: If tax evaders are not punished, then either development takes back seat or the
government is compelled to keep tax slab high. ¬ T = > (D v G)

2 nd premise: If the government is compelled to keep tax slab high, then common man becomes
the victim of inept administration in democratic set-up. G = > C

3rd premise: Common man does not become a victim of inept administration in a democratic set-
up. ¬ C

Conclusion: Therefore either development does not take back seat or the tax evaders are
punished in a democratic set-up. ¬ D v T

Even a professional cannot discover easily fallacy in this argument. This argument can be easily
shown to be invalid if the method of assigning the truth-value is followed.

1 ¬ T = > (D v G)

2G=>C

3¬C

∴¬ D v T
 10

{¬T=>(D v G)} { G = > C} ¬C {¬Dv T}

1 1 11 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0

There is no other way of showing the invalidity of this argument. For confirmation let us use I. P.
method.

1 ¬ T = > (D v G)

2G=>C

3 ¬ C / ∴¬ D v T

4 ¬ (¬ D v T) I. P.

5 DˬT 4, De. M.

6¬T 5, Simp.

7 DvG 1, 6, M.P.

8¬G 2, 3, M.T.

9 D 7, 8, D. S.

10 D Λ ¬ T 9, 6, Conj.

We only succeeded in returning to the fifth step. Since the argument is supposed to be invalid,
instead of showing contradiction we should have succeeded in showing consistency with the help
of I. P. method. We could show neither validity nor invalidity of this argument since we
encountered sort of stalemate.

4 Let us slightly alter Berkeley’s argument on immaterialism and find out its logical status.

‘If things are material, then they are bundle of qualities. All qualities are ideas. All ideas are
equivalent to mental entities. Therefore there is no matter’.

We shall split the argument into its components.

1st premise: If things are material, then they are bundle of qualities. --------- M = > Q

2nd premise: All qualities are ideas. -------- Q = > I

 11

3rd premise: All ideas are equivalent to mental entities. ----- I = > E

Conclusion: Therefore there is no matter. ----- ¬ M

We shall put the argument in formal manner.

1M=>Q

2Q=>I

3I=>E/∴ ¬
M

To an unsuspecting mind no error is noticeable in this argument unless the argument is expressed
in formal way. It is easy to conclude that the valid conclusion should have been M = > E. But if
we consider what M and E stand for in Berkeley’s system, then it becomes a different story
altogether. That is not our concern now. It is enough if we mention that if H. S. is applied twice
(to 1 and 2 and later to 2 and 3), we obtain M = > E. But this is not the conclusion which is
required to be tested.

{ M = > Q} {Q = > I} {I = > E} ¬M

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
 12

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Define and explain the proof of Invalidity.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. How do we confirm an argument as Invalid?

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------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------

4.3 ADVANTAGES OF THE METHOD OF PROVING INVALIDITY

Suppose that we opt for truth-table method. What will be the situation? Consider, for example,
the following argument:

P => (Q v R)
S => (T v U)
¬ Q => (U v V)
(U => S) Λ (¬ T => ¬ S)
¬ V

∴P => (Sv U)

A truth-table for this argument will have 128 rows according to the formula 2n where n= 7 and n
is the number of variables and 10 columns of truth-values. Therefore if the truth-table method
has to be followed, then the number of boxes to be filled up it is, incredibly, 1280. The distinct
advantage of this method lies precisely here. Let us begin by assuming that P=> (Sv U) is
false. Given that the only way for a conditional statement to be false is; its antecedent must be
true and its consequent must be false which means that ‘P’ must be true and (S U) must be
 13

false, and since a disjunction is false only when both of its disjuncts are false, ‘S’ and ‘U’ must
both be false on our crucial line of the truth-table. Notice how far we have come already:

P => (Q v R) P Q R S T U V
S => (Tv U) 1 0 0
¬ Q => (U v V)
(U => S) Λ (¬ T => ¬ S)
¬ V

P => (S v U)

At the second stage, we consider true premises. The fifth premise is s i m p l e for our
purpose. ‘¬ V’ is true if and only if ‘V’ is false. And, since ‘U’ and ‘V’ are both false, the
consequent of the third premise is false; in order to make that premise true, its antecedent, ‘¬ Q’
must also be made false, which entails that ‘Q’ must be true. Thus, we have narrowed our search
even further:

P => (Q v R) P Q R S T U V
S => (T v U) 1 1 0 0 0
¬ Q => (U v V)
(U => S) Λ (¬ T => ¬ S)
¬V

P => (S v U)
We have restricted ourselves only to the required propositions. That is the way to economize
time and effort.

Thus, we have proved that the argument is invalid. When ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ are true and ‘S’,
‘U’, and ‘V’ are false, the premises are true and the conclusion is false. We have discovered the
easiest way of proving invalidity, no matter how complex is the argument.

4.4 ASSUMPTIONS OF PROVING INVALIDITY

Let is restate the assumptions to be followed.
i. Assume the conclusion as False and at the same time given premises as True.
ii. Using Basic Truth-Table Method to substitute the truth-values for all variables.
iii. Proceed from conclusion to premises.
iv. If we find no false premise, then the given argument is invalid.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Elucidate the advantages of proving invalidity.

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 14

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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Write down the assumptions of proving invalidity.

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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4.5 SECOND METHOD OF PROVING INVALIDITY; EXAMPLES

We shall consider a second method of proving invalidity.

1
0 0 1 1 0
(¬A Λ B ) => C
1 0 0 1 0
( A => C ) => D
1 1 1
B => E

∴B => (D Λ E )
1 0 0 0 1

1 1 1 1 0
(A => B ) v C
1 0 0 1 0
(A => C) => D
1 1 1
B => E

∴ B => (D Λ E)
1 0 0 0 1
 15

Same type of method is adopted in this argument also and found that there is no contradiction, in
the given premises. Hence the argument is invalid.

3
0 0 1 1 0
(¬ P Λ Q) => R
1 0 0 1 0
( P => R ) => S
1 1 1
Q => T

∴Q => (S Λ T )
1 0 0 0 1

1 1 1 1 0
(P Λ ¬Q) v R
1 0 0 1 0
( P => R ) => S
1 1 1
¬ Q => ¬ T

∴¬ Q => (S Λ ¬ T)
1 0 0 0 1

4.6 EXERCISES

1. P => Q
R => S
QvR /∴ PvS
2. E => (F v G)
G => (H Λ I)
¬ H /∴ E => I
3. J => (F => L)
K => (¬ L => M)
(L v M) => N / ∴J => N
4. (A v ¬ A) => ¬ (¬ B Λ ¬ C)
(B v C) => ¬ D / ∴ ¬ D v A
5. [(¬ W v X) => (Y Λ W)]
(X => Y)
[¬ Z => (¬ W v X)] / ∴ (Z v ¬ W)
6. A => B
 16

C => D
 17

BvC /∴ AvD
7. ¬ E v (F v G)
¬ G v (H Λ I)
¬H /∴EvI
8. ¬ J v (¬ F v L)
¬ K v (L v M)
¬ (L v M) vN /∴ ¬ J v N
9. (X v ¬ X) => ¬ (¬ B Λ ¬ C)
(B v C) => ¬ Y / ∴ ¬ Y v X
10. [(X v W) => (¬ W Λ Y)]
(¬ X v Y)
[¬ Z => (X v W)] / ∴ (W v Z)
11. ¬ P => ¬ Q
¬ R => ¬ S
¬Qv¬R /∴ ¬Pv¬S
12. (Fv G) v ¬ E
¬ (H Λ I) => ¬ G
¬ H / ∴ ¬ I => ¬ E
13. (¬ F v L) v ¬ J
(L v M) v ¬ K
¬ (L v M) v N / ∴ N v ¬ J
14. (P v ¬ P) => ¬ (¬ Q Λ ¬ R)
(Q v R) => ¬ S /∴ ¬ S v P
15. [(¬ P v Q) => (R Λ P)]
(Q => R)
[¬ Z => (¬ P v Q)] / ∴ (Z v ¬ P)

4.7 LET US SUM UP

In this Unit we have tried to give an idea about proving invalidity, by giving definition,
importance, and principles of this method. This new method of proving invalidity is shorter
than writing out a complete truth-table, and the amount of time and work saved is
proportionally greater for more complicated arguments. In proving the invalidity of more
extended arguments, a certain amount of trial and error may be needed to discover a truth-
value assignment, which works. But even so, this method is quicker and easier than writing
out the entire truth-table. It is obvious that the present method will suffice to prove the
invalidity of any argument, which can be shown to be invalid by a truth-table.

4.8. KEY WORDS

Argument: A structure composed only of statement variables and symbols such that all
 18

its substitution instances will be arguments.

Invalid argument form: An argument form, which has at least one false substitution
instance.

4.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna

Mission
Vivekananda College, 1977.
. Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University
of
Madras, 1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New
Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd., 2007.
Copi, M. Irvin. Symbolic Logic. Fourth edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
. Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing
Co.,
1968.
& James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York:
The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
. & Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Tenth Edition. New Delhi:
Pearson
Education, 2001.
. Introduction to Logic. Eleventh Edition. New Delhi:
Pearson
Education, 2004.
 1

Indira Gandhi National Open University MPYE – 001

School of Interdisciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies
Logic

Block 4

PREDICATE LOGIC
UNIT 1
Introducing the Quantifiers “All” and “Some” and their Symbolic
Representation

UNIT 2
Rules of Universal Instantiation and Generalization, Existential Instantiation
and Generalization, and Rules of Quantifier Equivalence

UNIT 3
Proof of Validity

UNIT 4
Proving Invalidity

UNIT 5
Applications of Symbolic Logic
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Expert Committee
Dr. Jose Kuruvachira
Prof. Gracious Thomas Salesian College &
Director, School of IGNOU Study Centre
Social Work Dimapur, Nagaland
IGNOU

Prof. Renu Bharadwaj

School of Humanities Dr. Sathya Sundar
IGNOU Sethy
Dept of Humanities
Prof. George IIT, Chennai.
Panthanmackel,
Senior Consultant, Dr. Joseph Martis
IGNOU St. Joseph’s College
Jeppu, Mangalore – 2
Dr. M. R. Nandan
Govt. College for Dr. Jaswinder Kaur
Women Dhillon
Mandya - Mysore 147, Kabir park
Opp. GND University
Dr. Kuruvila Amristar – 143 002
Pandikattu
Jnana-deepa Prof. Y.S. Gowramma
Vidyapeeth Principal,
Ramwadi, College of Fine Arts,
Pune Manasagangotri
Mysore – 570 001

Dr Babu Joseph
CBCI Centre
New Delhi

Prof. Tasadduq Husain

Aligarh Muslim
University
Aligarh

Dr. Bhuvaneswari
Lavanya Flats
Gangai Amman Koil
St.
Thiruvanmiyur
Chennai – 600 041

Dr. Alok Nag

Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul
Varanasi
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Block Preparation

Units 1-5 Dr. Ananda Vijay Sarathi

Department of Philosophy
Vivekananda College, Chennai.

Content Editors
Dr. V. John Peter
IGNOU, New Delhi
&
Dr. M.R. Nandan
Mysore

Format Editor
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

Programme Coordinator
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.
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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

The block introduces predicate logic and its quantifiers along with the proof and its
Universal Instantiation, Universal Generalization, Existential Instantiation and Existential
Generalization are helpful to remove and add the quantifiers and the appropriate variables. These
rules that are meant especially for quantified statements of Predicate logic are useful for proofs.
We also attempt to give a perceptive of Predicate logic and its quantifiers. Proving validity in
predicate logic involves proving something about the truth value of statements on each and every
one of their interpretations and on every possible interpretation, not just on a selected few. In
general, therefore, neither the method of interpretation nor that of constructing a truth-functional
expansion can be used to prove that a quantified argument is valid. Formal proof of validity is
useful to prove the validity of a given argument. It is not useful to prove the invalidity of an
argument.

Unit 1 deals with the basic knowledge about the universal and existential quantifiers. There are
arguments whose validity rests on the internal structure of propositions. Since the propositional
logic does not deal with the internal structure of proposition we try to find symbolic
representation.

Unit 2 gives a detailed treatment on Universal Instantiation and Generalization, and Existential
Instantiation and Generalization. In addition to this we have also rules of quantifiers equivalence
which are used to replace a quantified expression by its equivalent expression.
Unit 3 lists out various proofs for validity used in predicate logic. An argument is valid if there is
some way that all of its premises are true when its conclusion is true. The lesson gives the
explanation of proofs of validity and their significance.

Unit 4 introduces the methods used in predicate logic to establish the invalidity of arguments
having truth-functional compound statements by conveying truth values to the simple statements
in such a way as to make their premises true and their conclusions false. In this unit examples are
also explained to make that the premises all true and show the conclusion as false.

Unit 5 highlights the application of Symbolic Logic in the Modern Era. The instrumental value
of logic is well known in many disciplines. We present a range of binary systems suitable for
representing information in digital components. The role of symbolic logic is decorated in the
multi-value logic. Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic is a true magnum work.
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UNIT 1 INTRODUCING THE QUANTIFIERS ‘ALL’ AND ‘SOME’ AND

THEIR SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION

Contents

1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Symbolization of Propositions
1.3 Logical Relations involving Quantifiers
1.4 Fall-out of Universal and Existential Quantifiers
1.5 Examples
1.6 Exercises
1.7 Let Us Sum Up
1.8 Key Words
1.9 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

One of the principal objectives of this unit is to bring to the fore the limits of Aristotelian logic
and the way in which modern logic succeeded in extending the boundaries of Aristotelian logic.
Against this background, a brief reference to historical element in ‘Introduction’ becomes
significant. It is not only significant but also necessary. Second objective of this unit is to show
how in the absence of new set of rules the Rules discussed in the previous units do not help us to
test a particular class of argument. In the third place, this unit aims at explaining the role played
by quantifiers in the restructuring of traditional square of proposition. Thus by the end of this
unit we should be able to have a basic understanding of predicate logic. Secondly, we must be in
apposition to symbolize the proposition using quantifiers. Finally, we must be able to identify the
internal structure of the proposition.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Predicate logic, is a branch of logic, which is concerned with predicates or with predication of
properties, and also with things or objects to which the predicates may be ascribed. This
statement, in general, and the words in italics, in particular, must act as springboard for our
further study and its significance becomes evident shortly. Quantification logic has its roots in
‘Set Theory’. Set theory itself is of recent origin. This theory took its birth in the nineteenth
century in the works Georg Cantor. However, other mathematicians, most notably, Boole, Venn
and de Morgan meant it though they did not develop the theory. Nor did they use the term in the
sense in which Cantor used. Such things are not uncommon in the development of science. For
example, Michael Faraday did not use the word field in his work on physics though he meant it.
This piece of fact from the History of Mathematics must be borne in mind in order to pay what is
due to Aristotle. Prior to this, we must understand that the important concepts developed by
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Cantor viz. subset, proper subset, the difference between the two, null set (empty set),
denumerable and equivalence are some of the key concepts which play key role in our study.

Where did Aristotle err? This question needs to be addressed. As a matter of fact, Aristotle did
not err. That is the reason why the word defect is not the right word to be used while assessing
Aristotelian system. Instead, limitation is the apt word to be used in our analysis of Aristotelian
system. Aristotle had an idea of class at elementary level. He evolved the concepts of class
inclusion (total or partial) and class exclusion (total or partial), but could not proceed further.
This explains the limits of his analysis of categorical proposition based on quality and quantity of
proposition and the outcome of his analysis. Since Set theory in the sense in which Cantor
developed was unknown during Aristotle’s age, it, surely, would be anachronistic to criticize
Aristotle for his limited perspective of predicate logic. Therefore let us first identify the loose
ends in Aristotelian system. This will help us to understand the significance of ‘Quantification
Logic’ in particular and modern logic in general.

Aristotle did not differentiate between universal proposition and singular proposition. A
proposition is singular when the subject is a proper name. In this respect, singular proposition
differs from particular proposition, though later we understand that both are existential
propositions. In his analysis these two are, more or less, the same. An understanding of subtle
difference and its consequences is quite illuminating. Any universal proposition of the form ‘All
S are P’ or ‘No S are P’ reveals that S and P are merely class-names. If the concept of denotation
is closely examined, then it becomes clear that all class-indicators include or exclude a certain
number of elements known as members of a particular class, otherwise called sets. Therefore
every set represented by a term in the proposition is very much similar to denumerable set which
is a set of positive integers. A set is said to be denumerable when it is a set of positive integers
because only then members are countable. If members are countable, then denotation makes
sense, not otherwise. Similarly, the concept of intension reveals that to be a well-defined member
the member must possess a definite set of properties without which it ceases to be a member of
that particular set.

Against this background, we should try to know what the difference or differences between
universal and singular on the one hand and particular and singular propositions on the other
signify. First let us consider universal and singular propositions. The proposition ‘All men are
mortal’ has both contrary and contradictory relations. However, the proposition ‘Socrates is
mortal’ has only contradictory relation, but not contrary. It may be necessary to point out that,
though it amounts to repetition, two propositions are contraries only when two conditions are
satisfied; when p is true, q is false and when p is false q is doubtful. On the other hand,
contradiction arises when p is true, q is false and when p is false q is true and vice versa. Suppose
that the second proposition, ‘Socrates is mortal’ is negated. We get ‘Socrates is not mortal’.
When the first statement is true, the second statement is false. Though the first condition is
satisfied, the second condition is not satisfied because when the first statement is false, the
second statement is not doubtful, but turns out to be true. If logical relations matter, then the
distinction between universal and singular proposition also ought to matter. This is a point which
Aristotle failed to notice. Further, both particular and singular are existential propositions which
make matters still worse. Like universal propositions, particular propositions also have two
distinct relations which distinguish them from singular propositions. Instead of contrary, sub-
contrary explains one type of relation between two particular propositions. If ‘some men are
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mortal’ is true, then ‘some men are not mortal’ is doubtful and if ‘some men are mortal’ is false,
then ‘some men are not mortal’ is true. Of course, contradiction explains the relation between
universal and particular. Here is the difference. Though both particular and singular propositions
are existential, sub-contrary relation is not common to both. This means that universal and
particular propositions, on the one hand, and particular and singular, on the other, deserve to be
classified separately. They are called general propositions distinct from singular propositions
because the subject of such propositions is a general term. A term which refers to an indefinite
number of things is a general term which is called common noun in grammar. What we call
quantifiers are applicable to general propositions, but not to singular propositions.

This is one difference. Second difference is crucial. In this context, the emphasis is on the word
existence. If a certain proposition is characterized as existential, how do we understand such
characterization? When we discussed Venn’s diagram in connection with the distribution of
terms, we learnt that universal propositions do not carry existential import whereas particular
propositions carry existential import. The statement ‘All men are mortal’ does not affirm the
existence of men whereas ‘Some men are….’ affirm the existence of men irrespective of the
quality of proposition. Same is the case with ‘No men are…’ No assertion is made about the
existence of men. Existence presupposes the presence of members in a given class. If existence
makes sense, then in negative sense nonexistence also must make some sense. Suppose that a set
does not contain a single member. Then what is its status? Till nineteenth century this question
did not occur to anyone. In other words, the concept of null set paved the way for further
progress in Aristotelian logic. How did it happen?

The concept of null set plays crucial role in distinguishing Aristotelian system from modern
logic. Let us recall the very first statement of introduction; ‘Predicate logic, is a branch of logic,
which is concerned with predicates or with predication of properties, and also with things or
objects to which the predicates may be ascribed’. In the strict sense of the term, predicate may be
ascribed to only things or individuals actually existing. Otherwise, the commonplace difference
between fact and fiction will be completely obliterated. Therefore in a restricted sense existential
propositions make matters of fact relevant. When matters of fact become relevant, purely formal
character of formal logic makes room for the relevance of content to a certain extent. But
generalization, which is a characteristic of deductive inference, does not lose its significance.
The only requirement is that the content of the argument must be factual, but not fictitious.

Where does null set figure in this discussion? One fundamental relation between propositions
with which we are concerned, presently, is contradiction. The law of contradiction holds good
when terms include members as a matter of fact. However, the situation is different when the
terms represent null sets. Consider this proposition.

1. All female philosophers of Karnataka are the residents of New York.

This sentence is obviously false. Therefore according to the law of its contradiction, the
statement mentioned below must be true.

2. Some female philosophers of Karnataka are not the residents of New York.
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Statements 1 and 2 are supposed to be contradictories. The second statement ought to be true
according to the law of contradiction since the first statement is false. But, in reality, this
statement is also false. But two contradictories cannot be false. This problem arises because we
are dealing with nonexistent members. Therefore in the strict sense of the word second statement
also, like universal statement, does not carry existential import. Within the framework of
traditional logic this problem remains unnoticed because there was no concept of set at all-
whether null set or non-null set. Modern logic corrected this mistake by making null set a distinct
entity. The underlying principle is that all existential propositions should include only non-null
sets. This stipulation marks one difference between traditional and modern systems.

Equivalence is second major factor. Consider these propositions.

3. All triangles are plane figures.

4. All equilateral triangles are equiangular triangles.

Statements 3 and 4 assume the forms as follows.

3a. If any figure is a triangle, then it is a plane figure.

4a. A figure is equilateral triangle if and only if it is equiangular.

Let us symbolize these statements.

3a ≡ F => P

3b ≡ F <=> P

Again, traditional logic did not distinguish these propositions. The difference between 3a and 3b
becomes clear only within the framework of modern logic. This is another important progress
made by modern logic over traditional logic. Such differences matter in quantification logic.

This aspect has something to do with the difference between subset and proper subset.
Proposition 3 discloses that the set of triangles is a proper subset of the set of plane figures.
However, the set of equilateral triangles is equivalent to the set of equiangular triangles. This
explains why the sentential connectives differ from 3a to 3b.

Traditional logic made one type of distinction among propositions; conditional and unconditional
and within the latter four kinds of propositions. Modern logic not only discovered a new aspect
in conditional proposition but also it added new kinds of propositions which were not considered
by traditional logic. Hence it could evolve new set of rules. But these rules had limitations. In the
absence of further augmentation of new rules they could not be applied to arguments which
consisted of singular propositions. So the search for relevant rules did not stop.

Let us turn to basic difference between propositional logic and predicate logic. This difference
lies in dealing with the internal structure of simple as well as compound propositions. Therefore
predicate logic includes rules hitherto used and also a new set of rules. Predicate logic is
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concerned with the internal structure of propositions. It is not the case with propositional logic.
In strict technical terms, this is also known as Quantification Theory or the Predicate Calculus. It
has its own syntax, which helps us to devise statements, which are considered well-formed
statements. We are now concerned with this new syntax.

1.2 SYMBOLIZATION OF PROPOSITIONS

How do we symbolize the statement ‘Socrates is a philosopher? A unique method is devised

which is merely a convention. The subject term is represented by first letter of the same which is
always a small letter and predicate is represented by the first letter of the same which is always a
capital letter. The proposition considered above now becomes

Ps

The singular terms are represented in predicate logic by the individual constants. These are small
letters from ‘a’ to ‘w’, with or without numerical subscripts. Their function is to denote only one,
unique individual or object from the domain of discourse. Since their reference remains fixed or
constant within a given context, they are called individual constants.

Predicates are linguistic expressions of properties. In other words, predicates are words or
expressions that we use to refer to properties or attributes that things have. For example, we may
use the predicate term ’red’ to refer to the property of ‘being red’ that a flower has. Predicate
logic we are discussing is called the First Order Predicate Logic. Within the limits of this order
only simpler predications such as properties of individuals or objects are considered. There can
be complicated predications where we need to consider properties of properties and quantity of
properties, and that would be the Second Order Predicate Logic. In higher order logic, we have
variables standing for properties such as ‘F’, ‘G’, etc., and property constants.

There are three ways in which change can be effected; i) change S or ii) change P or iii)
change both S and P. accordingly we have the following possibilities.

i) Pa, Pb, Pc,… etc.

ii) Gs, Ga, Gb… etc.
iii) Ab, Cd, Ef, … etc.

It is easy to notice that any kind of change is just indefinite in the sense that the list can be
extended to include the whole of humanity though it is not intended. This process is just
simplified by using the variable ‘x’ in place of constants. When we do so, we obtain Px. When
variable is used in place of individual constants, we get what is called propositional function.
Propositional function is neither true nor false. Truth-value can be assigned only when constants
replace the variable. Consider the following replacements.
1. Pa where a stands for Aristotle
2. Pb where b stands for Berkeley
3. Ph where h stands for Hitler
4. Pc where c stands for Churchill
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It is evident that 1 and 2 are true whereas 3 and 4 are false. That 1 and 2 are true is known only
when we know what a and b stand for. Similar is the case with 3 and 4. Therefore in
quantification logic we should ascertain the actual truth-status of propositions. If h stands for
Himalayas, then the statement does not make any sense. Pa, Pb, etc. result from propositional
function by an operation called instantiation. Accordingly, a, b, c, etc. are called substitution
instances. Further, a and b are true substitution instances whereas h is not a true substitution
instance.

We learnt the way to symbolize singular propositions. There is a different way of symbolizing
general statements which are, doubtless, compound propositions. Quantifiers are used in this
connection. A general proposition is of two types; universal and particular. So we have two
quantifiers denoting these two. Since each of them may be affirmative or negative, we have four
kinds of propositions, which are represented as follows:

1. All Indians are mortal.: (x) Mx

2. No Indians are mortal.: (x) ¬ Mx
3. Some Indians are moral.: (∃x) Mx
4. Some Indian are not mortal.: (∃x) ¬ Mx

‘∀’ also can be used in place of (x).The symbols used on the R. H. S. need some explanation.

The symbol (x) is expanded in several ways. It can read ‘for all values of x’ or ‘Given any x’ or
simply ‘for every x’, etc. where ‘x’ stands for individual constant, ‘Indians’ and ‘M’ stands for
mortal. Therefore ¬ M x is read ‘x is not mortal’. The symbol ∃x is read ‘there exists at least
one x such that ….’ ( ) is called universal quantifier and ∃ is called existential quantifier. If we
substitute I (Indians) or P (Pakistanis) for x then we get a proposition, which may be true or
false. It may be noted that universal quantifier is true only when every substitution instance of
the same is true or it has only true substitutions whereas the existential quantifier is true when at
least one substitution instance of the same is true.

Just as x is used as individual variable to denote the subject, two Greek letters ‘Φ’ (Phi) and ‘Ψ’
(Psi) are used to denote predicate. So they are called predicate variables. Using these variables
A, E, I and O propositions can be represented as follows:

1. All Indians are mortal.: (A) (x) Φx

2. No Indians are mortal.: (E) (x) ¬ Φx
3. Some Indians are mortal.: (I) (∃x) Φx
4. Some Indians are not mortal.: (O) (∃x) ¬ Φx

Using class membership relation, general propositions are represented as follows:

1. (x) Φx ≡ (x){x є Φ => x є Ψ} Where є is read ‘element of’

2. (x) ¬ Φx ≡ (x){x є Φ => x є Ψ} Where є is read ‘not an element of’
3. (∃x) Φx ≡ (∃x){x є Φ Λ x є Ψ}
4. (∃x) ¬ Φx≡ (∃x){x є Φ Λ x є Ψ}
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1.3 LOGICAL RELATIONS INVOLVING QUANTIFIERS

Our study begins with traditional square of opposition, which does not need any explanation.
We know how A, E, I and O are denoted with the help of quantification theory. Let us replace
A, E, I and O by these quantifiers in the square:

A Contraries E
(x) Φ x (x) ¬ Φ x

Subaltern Contradictions Subaltern

I O
(∃x) Φ x Sub-contraries (∃x) ¬Φ x

Later we will learn that this square is altered when we make the assumption that there is only one
individual. Therefore all relations are not discussed. Against this background, we shall restrict
ourselves to only two important logical relations; viz., equivalence and contradiction. They are
represented as follows:

1. Equivalence:
1) (x) Φ x ≡ {¬ (∃x) ¬ Φ x}
2) (x) ¬ Φ x ≡ {¬ (∃x) Φ x}
3) (∃x) Φ x ≡ {¬ (x) ¬ Φ x}
4) (∃x) ¬ Φ x ≡ {¬ (x) Φ x}

2. Contradiction:
1) (x) Φ x (∃x) ¬ Φ x
2) (x) ¬ Φx (∃x) Φ x
3) ∃x Φ x (x) ¬ Φ x
4) ∃x ¬ Φ x (x) Φ x

When we use predicate variable, the propositional forms are expressed as follows:

1) (x) Φ x ≡ (x){ Φx => Ψx}

2) (x) ¬ Φ x ≡ (x){ Φ x => ¬ Ψx}
3) (∃x) Φ x ≡ (∃x){ Φx Λ Ψx}
4) (∃x) ¬ Φ x ≡ (∃x {Φx Λ¬ Ψx}

When we represent A, E, I & O with this new set, their equivalent forms also undergo changes.

1) (x){ Φx => Ψx} ≡ ¬ ∃x{Φx Λ ¬ Ψx}

2) (x){ Φx => ¬ Ψx} ≡ ¬ ∃x{Φx Λ Ψx}
3) (∃x){ Φx Λ Ψx} ≡ ¬ (x){Φx => ¬ Ψx}
4) ∃x{Φx Λ ¬ Ψx} ≡ ¬ (x){Φx => Ψx}
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If negations placed behind the quantifiers on the R. H. S. are removed, then automatically they
become contradictories of respective propositions.

A predicate like mortal is called simple predicate because the propositional function which, if
used, has true and false substitutions. All substitutions to variable are called ‘substitution
instances’. When such predicates are negated, such formula or statement is called ‘normal form
formula’.

What is the function of quantifiers? Quantifiers are expression in Predicate logic which state that
a certain number of the individuals or objects have the property in question. They do not state
which one of the individuals have the property. A quantifier consists of:
• A left parenthesis ‘(‘
• A quantifier symbol
• One of the individual variable symbols
• A right parenthesis ‘)’
• In predicate logic, we have two quantifier symbols: ‘(x)’ or ‘∀’ and ‘∃’

These quantifiers are in non-natural language the symbols of quantity indicators; ‘all’, ‘some’,
and ‘no’, which may occur in statements about predications. Predicate Logic uses only two kinds
of quantifier symbols: universal quantifier and existential quantifier.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Explain the quantification theory.

------------------------

------------------------

2. How do we classify the quantifiers?

----------------------------------------

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1.4 FALL-OUT OF UNIVERSAL AND EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFIERS

An important aspect needs to be clarified at this stage. Suppose that there is only one individual
in the universe, which is something not logically impossible. There is a difference between
saying that ‘there is only one individual in the universe’ and saying that ‘there is at least one
individual’. In the latter case we commit ourselves to the possibility of a second or third thing
 9

which exists. Let us exclude this possibility. Then traditional square of opposition undergoes
change automatically. Let us see how it happens. We shall use two predicates instead of one and
consequently implication steps in. First let us draw the figure.
A E
(x) {Φ x => Ψx} (x){Φx => ¬ Ψx}

Contradictions

I O
(∃x) {Φ x Λ Ψx} (∃x){Φx Λ ¬ Ψx}

According to this figure of four relations mentioned earlier only contradiction holds good. We
only know that there is x. Suppose that Φx does not have true substitution instance. Then both A
and E are true because Φ x, i. e., antecedent is false and a false antecedent makes all implications
in which it occurs always true. Therefore they are not contraries. Similarly, I and O are not sub-
contraries. When Φ x does not have true substitution, both I and O are false whether Ψ is the
predicate or not because one of the conjuncts in I and O is false. Subaltern (or superaltern)
disappears in a different way.

When we assume that there is only one individual in the universe, it results in a unique
implication. (x) {Φ x => Ψx}implies in a unique way the statement (∃x) {Φ x => Ψx}. This
statement actually means that there is definitely one x and this x has the property Ψ or does not
have the property Φ. Here care is required. Suppose that instead of making this disjunctive
assertion we assert that x has Φ or it does not haveΨ. Then the implication becomes false. A true
implication cannot imply a false consequence with true antecedent. Such an assertion is,
evidently, different from the assertion (∃x) {Φ x Λ Ψx}.

Modern logic admits different types of general proposition with which we have already become
familiar while learning the technique of testing arguments. A proposition like ‘All A are B or C’
is not the same as the proposition, ‘All A are B or All A are C’. It only means that if x is A, then
x is B or C whereas the second statement means that if x is A, then x is B or if x is A, then x is C.
Again, we must construct truth-table to know how they differ. (This is left as an exercise for the
student). On the other hand, the proposition, ‘Some A are B or C’ means the same as saying
‘Some A are B or some A are C. This means that when the kind of quantification of a proposition
changes, correct transformation of proposition also changes.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Explain the importance of universal quantifier.

------------------------------------

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2. Expose the worth of existential quantifier.

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-------------------------------------

1.5 EXAMPLES

1. Symbolize the following using universal quantifier.

a) All physical things are temporary.
(x){Px =>Tx}
b) No system is permanent.
(x) {Sx => ¬ Tx}
c) All dogs are mammal.
(x) {(Dx => Mx])
d) No dogs are fish.
(x) {(Dx => ¬ Mx)}
e) No men are immortal.
(x) {(Mx => ¬ Ix)}

2. Symbolize the following using Existential quantifier.

a) Some jobs are temporary.
(∃x) {Jx Λ Tx}
b) Some fish are not mammals.
(∃x) {Fx Λ ¬ Mx}
c) Some dogs are Black.
(∃x){Dx Λ Bx}
d) Some dogs are not fish.
(∃x) {Dx Λ ¬ Fx}
e) Some men are not tall.
(∃x) {Mx Λ ¬ Tx}

1.6 EXERCISES
Symbolize the following using quantifier.

1. All books are interesting.

2. No good books are useless.

3. Not every book is expensive.

4. No expensive things are good.

5. Ram is an ambitious person.

6. Ravi is a ruthless person.

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7. Some horses are not black.

8. Rose is a colourful flower.

9. All horses are four legged.

10. Some good books are rare and expensive.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Symbolize the following using quantifier.

a) Some sheep are not white.

b) Every flower is beautiful and attractive.

c) All cattle are four legged.

d) Some good books are also not expensive.

e) All Humans are mortal.

1.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have discussed the function of quantifiers. The universal quantification of a
propositional function is true if and only if all of its substitution instances are true, and that the
existential quantification of a propositional function is true if and only if it has at least one true
substitution instance. If we grant that there is at least one individual, then every propositional
function has at least one substitution instance (true or false). Under this assumption, we can say
that if the universal quantification of a propositional function is true then its existential
quantification must be true also. According to our discussion of quantifiers, contraries and sub-
contraries do not stand; only contradiction remains acceptable.

1.8 KEY WORDS

Predicate logic: Logic of predicates or properties, and things or objects to which the predicates
may be ascribed.

First order predicate logic: It is the elementary kind of predicate logic, in which only simpler
predications such as properties of individuals or objects are considered.

Quantifiers: Symbols that state how many of the individuals have the property in question.
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Universal quantifier: Universal quantifier is the symbol in non-natural language which

represents universal proposition (both affirmative and negative)

Existential quantifier: It is the symbol in non-natural language which represents particular

proposition (both affirmative and negative).

1.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________ Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of Madras,
1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd., 2007.
Copi, M. Irvin. Symbolic Logic. Fourth edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________ Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co.,
1968.
_____________ & James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York: The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
_____________. & Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Tenth Edition. New Delhi: Pearson Education,
2001.
 1

UNIT 2 RULES OF UNIVERSAL INSTANTIATION AND

GENERALIZATION, EXISTENTIAL INSTANTIATION AND GENERALIZATION,
AND RULES OF QUANTIFIER EQUIVALENCE

Contents

2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Rules of Quantification
2.3 Rules of Quantifier Equivalence
2.4 Application of the Quantification Rules
2.5 Examples
2.6 Exercises
2.7 Quantification Rules and Arguments
2.8 Let Us Sum Up
2.9 Key Words
2.10 Further Readings and References

2.0 OBJECTIVES
The first objective of this unit is to emphasize the need to have a new set of rules. Before we
apply these rules a brief explanation of these rules is needed. Therefore there is another
important objective. This second objective is to provide a theoretical basis for the application
of these rules. However, these rules only supplement the rules discussed in detail in the
preceding unit. Hence the third objective is to demonstrate how the integration of the new set
of rules with the rules with which we are already familiar is necessary. Thus by the end of
this unit we should be able to have a basic understanding of the significance of quantifiers.
Secondly, we must succeed in identifying the quantified statements. Finally, we must
succeed in testing successfully the validity of arguments with the help of quantifiers

2.1 INTRODUCTION

A quantifier is a tool with the help of which we will be in a position to measure the magnitude of
the subject of a proposition. What do we mean by ‘magnitude’? The term magnitude applies to
any physical quantity which is measurable. In this particular case the measurable physical
quantity is things to which the proposition in question refers. If we translate this term to
traditional mould, then it just signifies the concept of the distribution of terms. The difference,
however, is that in traditional analysis this concept turns out to be quite clumsy and ambiguous.
Various synonymous words make matters further worse. The use of quantifiers in non-natural
language resolves all these difficulties at one stroke. It is also possible to do away with
mathematical interpretation of distribution of terms if we wish so. Further, this technique renders
the application of distribution to the predicate term superfluous. The significance of the rules of
quantification must be understood against this background.
 2

There are four rules of quantification. They are as follows; Universal Instantiation (UI),
Universal generalization (UG), Existential Instantiation (EI.) and Existential generalization (EG).
The first two rules involve the quantifier which is called Universal quantifier which has definite
application. Whenever an affirmative proposition contains words like ‘all’, ‘every’ ‘each’, etc.
and propositions contain words like ‘No’, ‘None’, etc., universal quantifier replaces all such
words. This sort of economy also achieves simplicity. This is the distinct advantage of the use of
quantifiers. On the other hand, whenever propositions irrespective of quality contain words like
‘someone’, ‘many things’, ‘a few, etc., existential quantifier is used. In symbolic logic these
quantifiers are symbolized as follows. ‘(x)’ or ‘(∀x)’ is the symbol for universal quantifier and
‘(∃x)’ is the symbol for existential quantifier. The symbolic representation of these quantifiers
removes ambiguity in addition to achieving economy and simplicity. The difference between the
instantiation and generalization rules with respect to both the quantifiers is that for universal
quantifier UI allows the elimination of the universal quantifier whereas UG allows us to
introduce a universal quantifier and similarly, for existential quantifier EI allows the elimination
of an existential quantifier and EG allows us to introduce the same.

Every quantifier has a certain range. The range of ‘(x)’ or ‘(∀x)’ is indefinite whereas the range
of ‘(∃x)’ is definite in the sense that in the latter case we are definite that there is at least one
member whereas in the former case we are not.

2.2 RULES OF QUANTIFICATION

In predicate calculus the letter ‘x’ signify individual variable. The aforementioned four rules
permit the transformation of non-compound into equivalent compound propositions to which the
Rules of Inference and Equivalence are applicable. They also permit the transformation of
compound propositions into equivalent non-compound propositions. These additional rules thus
make it possible to construct formal proofs of validity for arguments whose validity depends
upon the inner structure of some non-compound statements contained in those arguments. These
rules stand in need of brief explanation.

Universal Instantiation (UI)

This rule says that any substitution instance of a proposition function can be validly deduced
from a universal proposition. A universal proposition is true only when it has only true
substitution instances. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for any true universal
proposition. Therefore any true substitution instance can be validly deduced from the respective
universal proposition. A propositional function always consists of variable ‘x’. At times z also is
used as a variable and y has a definite role to play other than that of constant. Therefore any
instance which is a substitution for x is regarded as a constant and letters from ‘a’ through ‘w’
are symbols for constants. These letters signify subject in traditional sense, and in modern sense,
an ‘instance of a form’. To obtain such an instance of a form ‘x’ is replaced by another Greek
letter ‘ν’ (nu) which is another symbol for an individual constant. It is also an example for
universal instantiation because the universal quantifier is instantiated here.
This rule is symbolically represented as follows:

(x) Φx
∴Φ ν
 3

This rule requires a little elaboration. Let us replace ν by a more familiar constant, say, a, and Φ
by F. When Fa is inferred from (x) Fx, the quantifier (x) is dropped. The reason is that the
universal quantifier has indefinite extension whereas constant is restricted to one particular
individual. Therefore in this context it is wrong to use universal quantifier. The rule of UI allows
such of those instances where we replace all variables bound by a universal quantifier with
individual constant. Thus (x) (Sx => Px) will yield (Sa => Pa) where a is the constant used in
place of the variable. The application of UI goes with a few stipulations. The quantifier (x) in (x)
Fx should not be within the range of a negation (¬). It should not also be within the extent of
another quantifier. The span of (x) in (x) Fx must extend to the complete expression. A violation
of any one of these limitations will lead to an incorrect utilization of UI. In other words, if we
say that ¬ (x) Fx implies ¬ Fa, then it must be viewed as a wrong understanding of UI.

We may use the UI rule in the following way:

a) First, remove the universal quantifier.

b) Next, replace the resulting free variable by a constant.

Universal Generalization (UG)

This rule helps us to proceed to generalization after an arbitrary selection is made to substitute
for x. In UG, ‘arbitrary selection’ is very important because as the name itself suggests,
generalization always proceeds from individual instances. Arbitrary selection always means
‘any’. And there is no specific choice involved. In this sense, selection is ‘random’ or arbitrary.
The letter y is the symbol of ‘arbitrary’ selection. This is the reason why ‘y’ is not regarded as a
constant. This process is called generalization because the conclusion is a universal proposition.
The underlying principle is that what holds good in the case of any variable selected at random
must hold good in all instances. In other words, the variable y is equivalent to saying ‘any’. If we
recall the traditional rules of syllogism, universal conclusion follows from universal premises
only. It only means that we need prior universal proposition. Let us club UI with this step. Then
we are allowed to say that if universal proposition is true then any variable selected at random
must be true. Therefore it must be understood that in this case the process is from universal to
universal through an individual. When ‘x’ replaces ‘y’ there is generalization. When universal
quantifier describes the proposition it becomes UG. The procedure is as follows.

Φy
∴ (x) Φx
In the above given rule the letter ‘y’ in Φy (or Fy) stands for any arbitrarily selected individual.
It is only a pseudo name and not the name of a particular individual. This letter ‘y’ in UG is not a
constant but an individual variable only. But it is different from x in the sense that it is an
indefinite replacement for x. In UG we substitute first all pseudo names with variables and then
bind them with universal quantifiers.

We apply UG to the statement in the following manner:

a) First add the universal quantifier.

 4

b) Then ensure that in the conclusion the variable is bound by this newly introduced universal
quantifier.

Existential Instantiation (EI)

This rule is applicable when the proposition has existential quantifier and in this case any symbol
ranging from a through w is used as a substitute for the individual variable x. We can infer the
truth of any substitution instance from existential quantification because existential
quantification is true only when there is at least one true substitution instance. However, this rule
has a clause when it is applied to an argument. The constant, say ‘a’ which we use to substitute
for x should not have occurred anywhere earlier in that argument. It only means that in the same
argument EI cannot be used twice when it is assumed that there is only one true substitution
instance. The rule is represented as follows.

(∃x) Φx
∴Φ ν
This formula says that there is at least one or some unspecified number of members in the
domain in question have a certain property, say, ‘Φ’. The letter ‘ν’ in Φν stands for that
unspecified number of members and hence it is in a sense sort of pseudo name and not the name
of any particular individual. Therefore this may be called an existential pseudo name. It is
necessary to adhere to certain stipulations while implementing this rule. In the first place, the
formula (∃x) in (∃x) Φx should not be within the range of negation (¬). Secondly, (∃x) in (∃x)
Φx should not be within the extent of another quantifier. Thirdly, the quantifier (∃x) must cover
the complete expression. We may use the rule EI in a statement in the following way:

a) First, remove the existential quantifier.

b) Next, replace the resulting free variable with a constant.

Existential Generalization (EG)

This rule states that from any true substitution instance of a propositional function, the existential
quantification of that function can be validly deduced. Only then the existential quantification
can become true. When the existential quantification is so deduced, the individual constant
which appeared in earlier steps is replaced by x in the conclusion. The unique feature of this rule
is that though there is generalization, the conclusion continues to be existential. The rule is
represented as follows.
Φν
∴ (∃x) Φ x
In the rule EG the letter ‘ν’ may be the name of a particular individual or again a pseudo name.
(∃x) Φx states that there is at least one x such that x is Φ. When we apply EG, we have to follow
some conditions. Each happening of ‘ν’ in Φ x must be substituted by ‘x’ and the scope of (∃x)
must extend to the entire expression.
 5

The method of application of EG is simple:

a) Insert an existential quantifier.

b) Ensure that at least one occurrence of the individual variable which we have generalized
is bound by the newly introduced existential quantifier.

Earlier, it was stated that the EI should not have occurred earlier in any argument. But no
explanation was given for this stipulation. We should know why there is this particular
restriction on the use of EI. Suppose that ‘a’ is the constant whose existence is definite. We are
sure of the existence of a, but we are not sure whether there is any other constant. In an
argument in an earlier step a constant, say, ‘a’ is regarded as ‘b’. The fact that ‘a’ is ‘b’ is not
adequate enough to conclude in some other step that ‘a is c’ when there is no reference of any
kind to ‘c’ in the premise. Since the logical constant ‘a’ is used in existential mode, it is
mandatory that EI should be used in the very first step of the proof. If it occupies any other
position, then it is a mistake.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Explain UI and EG.

-------------------------

------------------------

2. Explain the significance of random variable.

-----------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------

2.3 RULES OF QUANTIFIER EQUIVALENCE

In the previous unit we learnt the technique of framing the equivalence for quantifiers. In this
unit we shall consider examples for equivalence forms. The standard forms of categorical
statements are A, E, I and O. Let us start with A statement: “Every cat is a mammal.” In this
statement there are two individuals, viz., ‘a cat’ and ‘a mammal. We also know that these
propositions are symbolized as follows.
Cx: x is a cat.
Mx: x is a mammal.

We should also note that the predicate of ‘being a mammal’ is predicated to every member which
has the property of being a cat. We need universal quantifier in this case. On Boolean
 6

interpretation, universal statements are actually conditional statements with no existential

commitment. We may paraphrase it as: For every x, if x is a cat then x is a mammal.

The expression ‘if x is a cat, then x is a mammal’ is translated with a truth-functional symbol
‘=>’. Thus translated, it becomes (x) (Cx => Mx). Using the same symbolization key, we
symbolize the ‘E’ statement ‘No cat is a mammal’ as, (x) (Cx => ¬ Mx). It must be remembered
that “No cat is a mammal” can be paraphrased as: For every x, if x is a cat, then x is not a
mammal. This proposition does not deny the predication of the property of ‘being a cat’, but it
denies the property of ‘being a mammal’ to any cat. This is the reason why the negation sign is
placed before ‘Mx’ in the statement ‘(x) (Cx => ¬ Mx)’.

Let us consider the ‘I’ and ‘O’ statements. ‘Some cats are mammals’ is an illustration for ‘I’.
When paraphrased, we have to admit the existential import and also the property predication. It
has to be stronger in assertion than the conditional we state for the universal statements.
Considering these aspects, we translate I and O propositions to symbolic form.

There is (exists) at least one x such that x is a cat and x is a mammal. This is symbolized as
follows:

(∃x) (Cx Λ Mx)

Note that a truth-functional symbol ‘Λ’ from propositional logic has been used to denote that
both properties belong to ‘x’.

We translate the ‘O’ statement, ‘Some cats are not mammals’ in the following way.

There is (exists) at least one x such that x is a cat and x is not a mammal; and this expression is
symbolized as follows:

(∃x) (Cx Λ ¬ Mx)

As a matter of convention these propositions are represented symbolically as follows:

1. (A) (x) Φx
2. (E) (x) ¬ Φx
3 (I) (∃x) Φx
4 (O) (∃x) ¬ Φx

Using class membership relation, these propositions are represented as follows:

1. (x) Φx ≡ (x){x є Φ => x є Ψ} Where є is read ‘element of’

2. (x) ¬ Φx ≡ (x){x є Φ => x є Ψ} Where є is read ‘not an element of’
3. (∃x) Φx ≡ (∃x){x є Φ Λ x є Ψ}
4. (∃x) ¬ Φx ≡ (∃x){x є Φ Λ x є Ψ}
 7

Where Φ and Ψ are the symbols for attributes. These are the four rules of quantifier
equivalence. They are also known as Quantifier Negation Rules because if negation is placed
behind quantifier, then it becomes the contradiction of the original statement.

2.4 APPLICATION OF THE QUANTIFICATION RULES

Before we proceed further let us recapitulate what we learnt in the previous unit. In order to
relearn we shall apply these rules to statements. This will be a good introduction to the next stage
of our learning.

I. We shall apply ‘UI’ for the statements mentioned below and remove the quantifier.
a) (x) (Hx => Mx)
___________
(Ha => Ma)

b) (x) (Hx => ¬ Mx)

___________
(Ha => ¬ Ma)

c) (x) (Mx => ¬ Ix)

___________
(Ma => ¬ Ia)

II. We shall now apply ‘UG’ for the statements mentioned below to add quantifier and then
generalize. Very soon we ought to discover that this is really the reverse process.

d) (Ha => Ma)

___________
(x) (Hx => Mx)

e) (Ha => ¬ Ma)

___________
(x) (Hx => ¬ Mx)

f) (Ma => ¬ Ia)

___________
(x) (Mx => ¬ Ix)

III. We shall apply ‘EI’ for the statements mentioned below to remove the quantifier.
g) (∃x) (Hx Λ Mx)
___________
(Ha Λ Ma)
 8

h) (∃x) (Hx Λ ¬ Mx)

___________
(Ha Λ ¬ Ma)

i) (∃x) (Mx Λ ¬ Ix)

___________
(Ma Λ ¬ Ia)

IV. We shall apply EG for the statements mentioned below to add quantifier and to generalize:

j) (Ha Λ Ma)
___________
(∃x) (Hx Λ Mx)

k) (Ha Λ ¬ Ma)
___________
(∃x) (Hx Λ ¬ Mx)

l) (Ma Λ ¬ Ia)
___________
(∃x) (Mx Λ ¬ Ix)

[Note: Whenever universal quantifier has to be symbolized instead of (x) we can also use (∀x).
However, the former is more extensively used.]

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Explain the significance of rules quantifier equivalence.

------------------------

-----------------------

2. Briefly explain the uses of instantiation and generalization.

------------------------

-----------------------

2.5 EXAMPLES
 9

1. Symbolize the following using universal quantifier.

a) Every Human is a mammal

(x) (Hx => Mx)

b) No Horse is a mammal.
(x) (Hx => Mx)

c) All dogs are four legged.

(x) (Dx => Fx)

d) No donkeys are birds.

(x) (Dx=> ¬ Bx)

e) No men are immortal.

(x) (Mx=> ¬ Ix)

2. Symbolize the following using existential quantifier.

a) Some flowers are red.

(∃x) (Fx Λ Rx)

b) Some flowers are not red.

(∃x) (Fx Λ ¬ Rx)

c) Some birds are White.

(∃x) (Bx Λ Wx)

d) Some fish are not snake.

(∃x) (Fx Λ ¬ Sx)

e) Some men are tall.

(∃x) (Mx Λ Tx)

2.6 EXERCISES

Symbolize the following using quantifiers.

1. Some animals are dogs.

2. All cats are mammals.

3. No donkeys are blues.

 10

4. All crows are black.

5. All parrots are not black.

6. Some philosophers are not Indians.

7. All Indians are not Tamilians.

8. All Tamilians are Indians.

9. All horses are not four legged.

10. Some good books are not expensive.

(Note: when a statement contains the words All…. not the corresponding proposition is ‘O’.)

2.7 QUANTIFICATION RULES AND ARGUMENTS

It is quite interesting and also rewarding to learn how quantification rules can be applied to
various arguments studied by traditional logic. This will also help us to discover the limits of
traditional logic.

As mentioned earlier, out of five relations under square of opposition only contradiction survives
and this has already been explained. Therefore let us concentrate on conversion and obversion
among equivalence relation and categorical syllogism among mediate inference. While doing so,
let us remind ourselves of the restriction imposed by modern logic which stipulates that from
universal quantifier alone existential quantifier cannot be deduced and vice versa. Therefore A –
I and I – A are excluded. However, a special form of A is considered where both S and P are
equivalent sets and is examined with the help of quantification rules.
Consider the following proposition.

1. All spinsters are unmarried female persons.

∴ All unmarried female persons are spinsters.

Since the rule of distribution is adhered to, the argument is valid. Let us see how the rule of
quantification can be applied to this example.

There are two ways of symbolizing. They are as follows

a) (x){x є S => x є U}
b) (x){ x є S <=> x є U}
a) does not completely convey the meaning of 1. Therefore we have to consider b). It can be
reformulated as follows:
c) (x){ x є S => x є U} Λ { x є U => x є S }
For the sake of simplicity let us drop the quantifier. Applying commutative law, we get
d) { x є U => x є S } Λ { x є S => x є U}
This is an instance of simple conversion. Now apply simplification law.
 11

e) { x є U => x є S }
Translate ‘e’ to natural language. We get

All unmarried female persons are spinsters.

It may be noted that if this method is followed, we do not get the existential conclusion.
Therefore conversion by limitation does not find place in this interpretation. (It is possible to get
the identical result if commutative law is not used. But then it will not be clear to an untrained
mind that the proposition is converted. It must be noted that commutative law is nothing but
conversion). Examination of E proposition is left for the student as an exercise.

The case of existential proposition is simple. Examine this statement.

2. Some bananas are sweet.

Translate this statement to symbolic form.
a) (∃x) {(x є B) Λ (x є S)}
Again, drop the quantifier for the sake of simplicity and apply commutative law. We get
b) {(x є S) Λ (x є B)}
When b) is translated to natural language, we get conversion in traditional sense.
Some sweet objects are bananas.
The case of O is a special case. It is quite illuminating to apply the quantification rules to know
why it does not have conversion.

3. Some bananas are not sweet.

Translate this statement to symbolic form.

a) (∃x) {Bx Λ ¬ Sx}

(For the sake of simplicity class-membership is not considered in this particular case).

In this case simple conversion is possible in a different way altogether. We can only say
(∃x) {¬ Sx Λ Bx}
If we reflect for a while we easily discover that this is, in reality, the symbolic form of partial
contraposition. Suppose that we restrict ourselves to conversion. We are only entitled to convert
(or commute) Bx and Sx. The negation sign ought to remain unaffected. For further clarity, let us
compare the scene with algebra. a + b = - c becomes c = - (a + b). Just as negative sign is not
disturbed in algebra while interchanging, so also in modern logic the negation sign remains
undisturbed when we interchange the terms. But this is not conversion. In the case of algebraic
equation, signs on both sides change. Therefore it is not equivalent to commutation.
Commutation and conversion are technically identical. The upshot of the argument is that when
there is negation on any one side or term, conversion or commutation is not possible. In other
words, commutation holds good only when the relation is symmetric.
On similar lines, obversion can be explained. If x is not an element of S, then it means that x is
an element of the complement of S.
 12

The position of equivalence relation has now become clear. We have learnt that along with
quantification rules we also require Rules of Inference and Rules of Replacement. We use the
same technique to test the validity of syllogism. It is a matter of great interest to know that the
rules of quantification project syllogism in a new perspective, which helps us to abandon the rule
of distribution of terms, which is not only cumbersome in presentation but also time consuming.
Further, quantification rules can be used to test non-syllogistic arguments also subject to the
condition that general and singular propositions find place in such arguments. Let us use the
following arguments to illustrate these rules.
1.
1) All Indians are Asians.
2) Tendulkar is an Indian.
3) ∴Tendulkar is an Asian.

This is symbolized as follows: (x) {Ix => Ax}

It
∴At
The formal proof is constructed as follows:
1) (x){Ix => Ax}
2) It / ∴At
3) It => At 1, UI
4) ∴At 3, 2, M.P.
In this particular argument only one premise is general. However, the argument may consist of
only general proposition in which case slightly different procedure has to be followed. Consider
this argument.

2.
1) All politicians are voters.
2) All ministers are politicians.
3) ∴All ministers are voters.

When symbolized it becomes:

1) (x){Px => Vx}

2) (x){Mx => Px} / ∴ (x){Mx => Vx}
The formal proof is as follows:
1) (x){Px => Vx}
2) (x){Mx => (Px} / ∴ (x){Mx => Vx}
3) Pa => Va 1, UI
4) Ma => Pa 2, UI
5) Ma => Va 4, 3, H.S.
6) ∴ (x){Mx => Vx} 5, UG
When the individual variable x is instantiated by any constant, then quantifier goes and we do
not quantify individual or individuals. Now coming to the 6th step, it may be mentioned that if
one substitution instance is true for a given structure then all substitution instances must be true
for that structure. Further the universal quantification of a propositional function is true if and
only if all substitution instances are true. (The 6th line is not a part of the proof).
 13

In the third and the fourth steps we have applied universal instantiation because both premises
are universal and therefore we have substituted the constants for variables.

UG can be applied in the following manner. Add the sixth line to the proof system after we
replace x by y at all stages. Then we have the application of UG

1) (x){Px => Vx}

2) (x){Mx => Px} / ∴ (x){Mx => Vx}
3) Py => Vy 1, UI
4) My => Py 2, UI
5) My => Vy 3, 4, H.S.
6) ∴ (x){Mx => Vx} 5 UG
These two examples suggest that while testing the validity of arguments in general, UI has to be
used necessarily though EI may not be necessary. The situation is similar to the traditional
formation of rules of syllogism, which hint that without particular propositions it is possible to
construct an argument, but not without universal propositions.

Now consider an argument, which has a particular proposition. Since one proposition is
particular, it is imperative that the conclusion must be particular.

3.
1) All politicians are voters.
2) Some ministers are politicians.
∴Some ministers are voters.

By now the method of symbolization should be familiar.

1) (x){Px => Vx}

2) (∃x{Mx Λ Px} / ∴ (∃x{Mx Λ Vx}
3) Ma Λ Pa 2, E.I.
4) Pa => Va 1, UI
5) Pa Λ Ma 3, Com.
6) Pa 5, Simp.
7) Ma 5, Simp.
8) Va 4, 6, M.P.
9) Ma Λ Va 7, 8, Conj.
10) ∴ (∃x)(Mx Λ Vx) 9, UG

Let us examine why the restriction of EI must be honoured. Consider a fallacious argument.
1) Some animals are herbivorous.
2) Some animals are men.
∴Some men are herbivorous.

When symbolized the argument becomes:

 14

1) (∃x){Ax Λ Hx}
2) (∃x){Ax Λ Mx} / ∴ (∃x)(Mx Λ Hx)
3) Aa Λ Ha 1, E.I.
4) Aa Λ Ma 2, E.I. (Error)

4th Step is erroneous. The second premise tells us that there is at least one thing that is both an
animal and herbivorous. It does not permit us to conclude it should also be regarded as man.
Therefore a second use of EI leads to error.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

Employ proper method to remove the quantifiers in the following statements.

1. (x) (Hx => Mx)

----------------------
------------------------

2. (x) (Ax => ¬ Lx)

-------------------------
-------------------------

2.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have presented a new set of rules called quantification rules which supplement the
existing rules. UI, UG, EI and EG are these rules. We learnt the art of testing arguments which
consist of singular and general propositions and also the art of translating general statements to
truth- functionally compound statements. Rules of quantifier equivalence are also discussed.
These rules will allow us to replace a quantified expression by its equivalent expression
whenever there is need. Application of Rules of Instantiation and Generalization were discussed.
Contradiction and conversion were presented in terms of the theory of quantification. Syllogism
is another type of argument tested within the frame-work of this theory.
2.9 KEY WORDS

Quantified statement: A statement which does it refer to a particular person or a object. It refers
to the quantity or magnitude of subject term.

Scope of a quantifier: The extent of the interpretive power of a quantifier.

Rules of Quantifier Equivalence: It is between A, E, I, O, which follow from the Square of

opposition, but phrased as quantified expressions and their negations in predicate logic.

Bound variable: If the variable is either part of the quantifier or lies within the scope of a
quantifier, then it is called bound variable.
 15

Free variable: Any variable is free if and only if the variable is not bound.

2.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________ Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of Madras,
1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd. 2007.
Copi, M. Irving. Symbolic Logic. Fourth edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________ Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co.,
1968.
_____________ and James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York: The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
_____________ and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Tenth Edition. New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2001.
___________________________ Introduction to Logic. Eleventh Edition. New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2004.
 1

UNIT 3 PROOFS OF VALIDITY

Contents
3.0. Objectives
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Quantification and Equivalence
3.3. Rules of Quantification and Non-syllogism
3.4. Exercises
3.5. Multiply General Propositions
3.6. The Strengthened Rule of C. P. and Quantification
3.7. Let Us Sum Up
3.8. Key Words
3.9. Further Readings and References
3.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this unit is to give a perspective of the technique of proving validity.
Evidently, this is in continuation of what we learnt in the previous unit. In order to reinforce
what we have already learnt, arguments in verbal form are considered in detail in this unit in
addition to symbolic expressions. Application of the technique of proving validity to arguments
in verbal form is the second objective of this unit. At the end of this unit we should be able to
apply the technique of proving validity to arguments in natural language. Secondly, we must
learn to compare and evaluate different methods of proof of validity in terms of merits and
demerits

3.1 INTRODUCTION

There are several ways of testing arguments. Every method is unique in the sense that it has its
own advantages and disadvantages. Disadvantage means only limitation. Simplicity, economy,
etc. are only matter of degree. Even when we consider complex methods, they have certain
advantages. One such advantage is the development of insight into the inner structure of
statements which are often hidden. Second most important advantage is that our ability to reason
is sharpened. In philosophical discourse these two factors play decisive role. Therefore it is
imperative that we explore all possible and plausible avenues to test the validity of arguments.
Against this background, we must understand that the proliferation of plurality of methods of
testing is imperative.

One such method is natural deduction method. Natural deduction method is also known as
derivation by substitution or formal proof of validity. Formal proof of validity is relevant while
proving the validity of a given argument. This is also an example for direct proof wherein we
derive a given conclusion from a set of premises by using such accepted rules, such as Rules of
Inference and Equivalence or Replacement. Arguments expressed in natural language can be
subjected to the formal proof of validity when translated to symbolic language. In this context
we should consider what is known as decision procedure. Decision procedure means the way of
testing an expression in order to know whether it is a tautology or not. We say that an expression
 2

is a tautology when it is true in all instances. If an expression is false in all instances, then it is
said to be a contradiction. Lastly, if an expression is true in some instances and false in one or
more than one instance, then it is said to be contingent. An expression is nothing but an argument
or argument form expressed in the form of a single statement which is necessarily a compound
statement. Consider this argument and corresponding expression to understand what we mean by
an expression and also what tautology, contradiction and contingent mean in terms of truth-
value.
p => q

p/∴q

The argument is in accepted form. This is translated to the form of an expression in this manner.

{(p => q) Λ p} => q

Now we will construct truth-table for the aforementioned expression in the following manner.

p ¬p q ¬q {(p => q) Λ p} => q

1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1

0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1

0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0

How do we know that this expression is tautological? This is true in all instances. The truth-
value in the main column is the standard of determination. Consider this argument.

p => q

∴pΛ ¬q

When we put it in the form of an expression, it becomes

{(p => q) Λ (p Λ ¬ q)}

We can construct truth-table using the same method (which is left as an exercise for the student)
to find out that this expression is a contradiction. Likewise, the argument
p => q

¬p

∴¬q
 3

becomes {(p => q) Λ (¬ p Λ ¬ q)} in the form of an expression and the construction of truth-
table shows that it is contingent because it is true in some instances only.

Why do we need an alternate method? We already know that if there are two variables, we will
have four rows according to the formula 2n where n is the number of variables. Suppose that
there are six variables. Then the number of rows is 26 = 64. Evidently, construction of truth-table
in this case is cumbersome. Naturally, we do not attempt to prove that the given expression is
tautological using truth-table method. Therefore we search for alternate methods which are
shorter. Only trial-and-error method helps us to know which is shorter and which is not. Rules of
quantification help in discovering one such short method.

One important aspect to be remembered is that all valid arguments are tautological. Therefore
when such an argument is put in the form of an expression, it must be true in all instances.

3.2 QUANTIFICATION AND EQUIVALENCE RELATION

In the previous unit we examined conversion. The same discussion is now extended to cover
another important relation. Obversion is the one to be examined now.

1. All players are well-paid.

∴ No players are nonwell-paid.

As usual, transform this argument to symbolic form.

1. (x) {Px => Wx}

2. ∴ (x) {Px => ¬ (¬ Wx)}

The negation within parentheses symbolizes the complement of predicate whereas the negation
which precedes the parentheses symbolizes the quality of the conclusion. Now apply UI to the
symbolic form.

3. Pa => Wa 1, UI

4. Pa => ¬ (¬ Wa) 3, DN

4 corresponds to the conclusion of 1. Applying UG we get

5. ∴ (x) {Px => ¬ (¬ Wx)}

Let us recall the method of obtaining contraposition. In the case of ‘A’ we convert obversion. In
the language of modern logic it means that we have to commute double negation because double
negation is another word for obversion. Now Commute 4.

6. (¬ Wa) => ¬ (Pa) 4, Com.

 4

6 is partial contrapositive of 1. In natural language 6 means ‘No nonwell-paid persons are

players’. Next steps is self-explanatory.

7. (¬ Wa) => (¬ Pa)

7 is full contrapositive of 1 in virtue of the law of contradiction, the only survivor among
opposition relations. If an element does not belong to a set, it ought to belong to its complement.
In natural language it becomes ‘All nonwell-paid persons are nonplayers’. The process of
obtaining the conclusion stops at this point since ‘A’ does not have conversion by limitation.
Using the same technique, obversion and other relations for the remaining propositions can be
determined by the student. It must be remembered that according to the stipulations laid down by
modern logic, inversion, whether partial or full, is invalid since it is always particular whereas
the premises (A or E) are universal.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Explain formal proof method.

------------------------

------------------------

2. Examine the following arguments with the help of quantification rules.

a) Some women are not sages.

Therefore some non sages are not non women.

b) Some scientists are mathematicians.

Therefore some mathematicians are not nonscientists.

------------------------

------------------------

3.3 RULES OF QUANTIFICATION AND NONSYLLOGISM

All arguments need not be syllogistic though they consist of two premises and a conclusion.
Relational argument is one such example.
1. Bangalore is to the west of Chennai.
Mangalore is to the west of Bangalore.
 5

∴Mangalore is to the west of Chennai.

Aristotelian system does not regard this class of arguments as syllogistic though this can be
shown to be valid if the structure of propositions are modified, but it results in the distortion of
the meaning of statements. If we try to retain the meaning, then it becomes impossible to
demonstrate the validity or invalidity, as the case may be, of such argument.

Apart from relational arguments, there is another class of arguments which consists of more than
three terms and propositions. Consider this argument.
1 2 3
Men are both stupid and dishonest.
4
Some men are irritable.
∴ Some dishonest persons are irritable.
Terms are numbered. So there is no confusion regarding the nonsyllogistic nature of arguments.
However, the statements are misleading. If we regard a conjunctive proposition as one
proposition, then in this argument there are three propositions. If we give priority to simple
propositions then the first premise has two simple propositions. Then we will have four
propositions. Therefore this type of argument is classified as nonsyllogistic. To test this kind of
argument we do not require any additional rule. Proper symbolization of this class of argument is
important. The symbolization is as follows:
1. (x) [Mx => (Sx Λ Dx)]
2. (∃x) [Mx Λ Ix] / ∴ (∃x) (Ix Λ Sx)
3. [Ma Λ Ia] 2, E. I.
4. Ma => (Sa Λ Da) 1, U. I.
5. Ma 3, Simp.
6. (Sa Λ Da) 4, 5, M. P.
7. Sa 6, Simp.
8. Ia 3, Simp.
9. Ia Λ Sa 8, 7, Conj.
10. (∃x) (Ix Λ Sx) 9, E.G.

The status of (1) calls for our attention. Had the first premise been regarded as a conjunctive
proposition, then (1) ought to have been symbolized as

11. Sm Λ Dm

It is a well known fact that conjunction does not have any equivalent form. Therefore (1) is not
equivalent to (11), which means that we have arrived at a proposition very different from the first
premise.

Consider another statement, which has a very different structure.

Americans and Germans are pioneers in science.

This statement actually means that a pioneer in science may be an American or a German.
Surely, it does not mean that a pioneer in science is both an American and a German. Hence
 6

when this innocuous statement is translated into logical language, it becomes a disjunctive
proposition with exclusive ‘Or’. Nor is it a conjunctive proposition of the form

Americans are pioneers in science and Germans are pioneers in science.

This is so because a conjunctive proposition of this form means the same as saying that a pioneer
in science is both an American and a German, which is absurd. Consider this argument:

Americans and Germans are scientists.

Some white men are Americans.
Therefore, some white men are scientists.

This argument is symbolized as follows:

1. (x) [(Ax v Gx) => Sx]

2. (∃x) [Wx Λ Ax] / ∴ (∃x)[Wx Λ Sx]
3. Wa Λ Aa 2, E.I.
4. Aa 3, Simp.
5. (Aa v Ga) 4, Add.
6. (Aa v Ga) => Sa 1, U.I.
7. Sa 6, 5, M.P.
8. Wa 3, Simp.
9. Wa Λ Sa 8, 7, Conj.
10 (∃x)[Wx Λ Sx] 9, E.G.

In one particular sense, nonsyllogistic arguments are more significant than traditional syllogism
for the simple reason that in any debate, whether based in science or politics syllogism is seldom
used. Application of nonsyllogistic arguments is widespread and more useful. Therefore there is
greater need to become familiar with nonsyllogistic arguments.

3.4 EXERCISES

I. Construct formal proofs of validity.

1. (x)[ Qx => Rx]

(∃x) ( Qx )
∴ (∃x) Rx

2. (x)[Sx => (Tx =>Ux)]

 7

(x)[Ux => (Vx Λ Wx)]

∴ (x) [Sx => (Tx => (Vx Λ Wx)]

3. (x)[Dx => ¬ Ex]

(x)[Fx => Ex]
∴ (x) [Fx => ¬ Dx]

4. (∃x) [Jx Λ Kx]

(x) [Jx => Lx]
∴ (∃x) [Lx Λ Kx]
5. (x) [(Ix => Ax)]
(∃x) [(Px Λ Ix)]
∴ (∃x) [(Px Λ Ax)]

6. (x) [(Mx => Nx)]

(∃x) [(Mx Λ Ox)]
∴ (∃x)[ (Nx Λ Ox)]

7. (x) [(Dx => Cx)]

(∃x)[(Ax Λ Dx)]
∴ (∃x)[(Ax Λ Cx)]

8. (∀x) [(Px => Qx)]

(∃x) [(Rx Λ Px)]
∴ (∃x) [(Rx Λ Qx)]

9. (∀x) [( Tx => Ux)]

¬ Ut
∴ ¬ Tt

10. (∀x) [(Dx => Cx)]

(∀x) [(Ex => ¬ Cx)]
∴ (∀x) [(Dx => ¬ Ex)]

11. (∃x) [(Hx => Ix) Λ (Jx => Kx)]

(∀x) [(Ix Λ Kx) => Lx]
¬ Lx
∴ (∃x) (¬ Hx v ¬ Jx)

12. (∀x) (¬ Qx => ¬ Px)

(∃x) (Px Λ Rx)
∴ (∃x) (Qx Λ Rx)

13. (∀x) (¬ Px => ¬ Qx)

 8

¬ Px
∴ ¬ Qx

14. (∀x) (¬ Ax => ¬ Bx)

(∀x) (Ex => ¬ Ax)
∴ (∀x) (¬ Ex => ¬ Bx)

15. (∃x) [(¬ Ax => ¬ Bx) Λ ( ¬ Kx => ¬ Jx)]

(∀x) [¬ Lx => ¬ (Kx Λ Ax)]
¬ Lx
∴ (∃x) (¬ Bx v ¬ Jx)

16. (∀x) [(Qx => Px)]

(∃x) [(¬ Px Λ ¬ Rx)]
∴ (∃x) [(¬ Qx Λ ¬ Rx)]

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

Apply quantification rules to test the validity of the following syllogistic arguments which were
explained in the previous unit.

1. All fish swim.

No swimming creatures are mammals.

Therefore no mammals are fish.

2. Some historians are Marxists.

All historians are women.

Therefore some women are Marxists.

--------------------------

--------------------------

3. No birds are harmful.

All cheats are harmful.
 9

Therefore no birds are cheats.

3.5 MULTIPLY GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

There are two types of general proposition; singly general and multiply general. If a general
proposition has only one quantifier, then it is called singly general. Up till now, we considered
only propositions of former kind. If a general proposition consists of two or more than two
quantifiers, then such a proposition is called multiply general propositions. Consider, for
example, this proposition:

“If all Indians play cricket, then there are at least some Asians who play cricket.”

Its symbolization is as follows:

1) All Indians play cricket: (x){Ix => Px}
2) There are at least some Asians who play cricket: (∃x){Ax Λ Px}

Now the symbolization of the whole sentence is as follows:

(x)[{Ix => Px}] => (∃x){Ax Λ Px}

Depending upon the complexity of the given statement quantifiers may occur any number of
times.
3.6 THE STRENGTHENED RULE OF C.P. AND QUANTIFICATION
In an earlier unit, we learnt that assumption is different from C. P. and that assumption does not
include the conclusion. It depends solely on the premise. A few examples will illustrate how an
argument can be tested using these techniques.

1. 1) (x)[Cx => Dx]

2) (x)[Ex => ¬ Dx]
(x)[Ex => ¬ Cx]

The argument is written in standard form;

1) (x)[Cx => Dx]

2) (x)[Ex => ¬ Dx] / (x)[Ex => ¬ Dx]
3) Cy
4) Cy => Dy 1, U.I.
5) Ey => ¬ Dy 2, U.I.
6) Dy 4, 3, M.P.
7) ¬Ey 5, 6, M.T.

8) Dy => ¬ Ey 6, 7, C.P.
 10

9) (x)[Ex => ¬ x] 9, U.G.

From (1) two aspects become clear. The limit of assumption ends, when CP is used. So it does
not depend upon the assumption. Second, since we are making an assumption, in place of ‘x’
only ’y’; an arbitrary chosen symbol can be used. This explanation holds good whenever the
strengthened rule of CP is used.

2. 1) (x)[Nx => Ox]

2) (x)[Px => ¬ Ox] / (x) (Nx Λ ¬Px) => Ox
3) Ny
4) Ny => Oy 1, U.I.
5) Py => ¬ Oy 2, U.I.
6) Oy 4, 3, M.P.
7) ¬ Py 5, 6, M.T.
8) Ny Λ ¬ Py 3, 8, Conj.

9) (Ny Λ ¬ Px) => Oy 8, 6, C.P.

10) (x) (Nx Λ ¬ Px) => Ox U.G.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

Using the method of derivation by substitution prove the following arguments.

1 (∃x) [(¬ Hx => Ix) Λ (Mx => Rx)]

(∀x) [(Ix Λ Rx) => Lx]
¬ Lx / ∴ (∃x) ¬ (¬ Hx Λ ¬ Mx)
--------------------
---------------------
2 (∃x) [(¬ Ax => Bx) Λ (Cx => Dx)]
(∀x) [(Bx Λ Dx) => ¬Lx]
Lx / ∴ (∃x) ¬ (¬Ax Λ Cx)
--------------------
---------------------
 11

3.7 LET US SUM UP

The most important vehicle for a formal system is its component for ‘derivation’ or ‘proof’. The
derivation procedure that looked into this unit is called formal derivation because it relies on the
valid argument forms, and not on the invalid arguments. On the whole, function of formal
derivation is to infer the logical consequences from the premises. It uses the valid argument
forms as the logical rules to determine which consequences can be correctly or validly drawn
from the premises. The logical rules, being valid argument forms themselves, have a special
quality. They are all truth-preserving.

3.8 KEY WORDS

Formal derivation: Deductive proof procedures that establish the validity of an argument by
inferring the logical consequences from given premises by valid argument forms.

Nonsyllogism: It is a kind of mediate inference which consists of propositions with complex

structure.
3.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES
Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission
Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________ Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of Madras,
1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. Second Edition. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India Pvt., Ltd., 2007.
Copi, M. Irving. Symbolic Logic. Fourth Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________ Introduction to Logic. Third Edition. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co.,
1968.
_____________ and James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. Second Edition. New York: The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
_____________ and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Tenth Edition. New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2001.
___________________________ Introduction to Logic. Eleventh Edition, New Delhi: Pearson
Education, 2004.
 1

UNIT 4 PROVING INVALIDITY

Contents
4.0 Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Methods of Proving Invalidity - 1
4.3 Methods of proving Invalidity - 2
4.4 Exercises
4.5 Let Us Sum Up
4.6 Key Words
4.7 Further Readings and References
4.0 OBJECTIVES
In our study of logic this is the second unit dealing with the role played by the technique of
proving the invalidity of arguments. Therefore the objective of this unit is a repetition of the
earlier unit on proving invalidity. However, there is no harm in reiterating our earlier goal.
Proving invalidity is significant not in negative sense, but in positive sense. The singular
objective of this unit is very clear. If we know what is wrong, we will know what is right in the
right sense of the word and we will avoid consciously the pitfalls of illogical ways of arguing.
Otherwise, we may walk into the trap of fallacies. Thus by the end of this unit one should be in a
position to establish the invalidity of seemingly valid arguments and also to identify the
difference between proving tautology and proving invalidity

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Building up of a consistent proof system is an efficient mode to show that an argument is valid.
Suppose that an argument happens to be invalid. Then it is not possible to construct proof of its
validity using any rule applied so far. The reason is simple. There are rules to govern the right
path, but there are no rules to govern the wrong paths. This maxim holds good in all walks of
life. Surely, logic is no exception. Therefore when compared with the technique of proving
validity, the technique of determining or proving invalidity turns out to be somewhat indirect.
The difference is more pronounced when we compare this method with the methods of proving
validity or tautology. We became familiar with one aspect of proving invalidity when in the
previous unit we established the invalidity of arguments consisting of truth-functionally
compound statements. We accomplished this task by assigning the truth-values to those simple
statements, which constitute the structure of respective truth-functionally compound
propositions, in such a way as to make their premises true and their conclusions false. We use
exactly the same method to prove the invalidity of arguments involving quantifiers with an
additional assumption which becomes clear shortly.

4.2 METHOD OF PROVING INVALIDITY -1

 2

Before we embark upon our task we have to be sure of the worthiness of our starting point and
also very clear about what that starting point amounts to. Otherwise, we may go astray. The
foundation of quantification logic is characterized by the assumption that we are dealing with
nonempty sets. This turns out to be the model for which the arguments which we are testing must
conform. In other words, the presupposition means that there is at least one individual. Again, it
must be pointed out, and there is a good deal of value in repeating what was pointed out earlier,
that there is a difference between saying at least one and saying there is only one…. ‘At least
one’ surely does not exclude (it does not mean that it includes) the possibility of two or more
than two members whereas the latter prohibits. Our study of the technique of proving invalidity
is based upon the assumption that there are two or more than two members in the universe of
discourse though we begin with the assumption that there is exactly one member.

So far, we were concerned with the assumption which we have made. Now we should turn to the
basic logical principle which has to be followed. In the previous unit on proving invalidity we
dealt with truth-functionally compound propositions which constituted the arguments.
Quantification logic deals with arguments consisting of general and singular statements to which
familiar Rules cannot be applied directly. Hence there is need to try a different method. The
logical principle involved here is that there is equivalence between general propositions which
are non-compound and truth-functional singular propositions. These singular propositions can be
said to be the units or constituents of non-compound general propositions. The equivalence
between these kinds can be established very easily when we use the principles of truth-functional
logic. There is a certain method of establishing the same. Suppose that there is only one member,
viz., ‘a’ or two members, a and b in the nonempty universe of discourse. Then we do not have
any reason to apply the rule UI. Therefore this technique is independent of the rules of
quantification. This is an important aspect to remember. In such a case we get the following
result.

1 (x) (Φx) ≡ Φa
2 (∃x) (Φx) ≡ Φa

It is obvious that in a nonempty universe of discourse with exactly one member, the proposition
with universal quantifier is logically equivalent to proposition with existential quantifier.
Therefore the following equation holds good.

3 (x) (Φx) ≡ Φ a ≡ (∃x) (Φx)

However, the result alters when we consider two members, say a and b. Then proposition with
universal quantifier takes this form.

4. (x) (Φx) ≡ [Φa Λ Φb]

5. (∃x) (Φx) ≡ [Φa v Φb]

It is not possible to say that 1 ≡ 2 without further evidence. 4 is true only when Φ a is true and
also Φ b is true. However, for 5 to be true it is sufficient if at least one of the two components on
 3

R.H. S. is true. We shall generalize our conclusion. If there are ‘n’ members, then the respective
equations become

6. (x) (Φx) ≡ [Φa Λ Φb Λ Φc Λ….. Φn]

7. (∃x) (Φx) ≡ [Φa v Φb v Φc…. Φn]

It is obvious that every equation is a biconditional proposition. Therefore both sides of the
equation must have the same truth-value. Since we are dealing with non-empty universe of
discourse, 0 cannot be the value assigned to any side. From this stage onwards we restrict
ourselves to the method of assigning truth-values.

Now our task is very much simplified. An argument involving quantifiers must possess such a
structure that after assigning 0 to the conclusion it must be possible to assign 1 to every premise.
We must remember that the conjunction of an indefinite number of true premises with just one
false premise produces a false conjunction. Therefore in an invalid argument it is imperative that
all premises are true while the conclusion is false. This is the first step in testing the invalidity of
arguments. In the next step we prove the invalidity of a given argument by displaying or
describing a model in which the given argument is logically equivalent to an invalid truth-
functional argument. This is achieved by translating the given argument involving quantifiers to
a logically equivalent argument involving only singular propositions and truth-functional
compounds of them, and then using the method of assigning truth-values to prove that the
argument is invalid. This is the actual method of proving the invalidity of arguments. We shall
examine a few arguments to become familiar with this technique. Consider this argument:

1.
All sharks are dangerous.
All lions are dangerous.
Therefore all sharks are lions.

We symbolize this argument as follows.

(x) (Sx => Dx)

(x) (Lx => Dx)

∴ (x) (Sx =>Lx)

In the case of a model containing exactly one individual, say, (a) the given argument is logically
equivalent to:

(Sa => Da)

(La => Da)
∴ (Sa => La)
 4

Assign truth-values to the propositions beginning with the conclusion according to the norm.
While assigning the 0 value to the conclusion we must remember that it should be assigned to the
sentential connective.

(Sa => Da)

1 1 1

(La => Da)

0 1

∴ (Sa => La)

1 0 0

Since the premises are true when the conclusion is false, the argument is invalid. In the second
premise there is no reason to assign the value to the consequent since the premise is known to be
true beforehand.

Now suppose that there are two members, say a and b, in the universe of discourse. Then the
argument takes this form.

(Sa => Da) Λ (Sb => Db)

(La => Da) Λ (Lb => Db)

∴ (Sa => La) Λ (Sa => La)

Now assign the truth-values as we did in the previous case.

(Sa => Da) Λ (Sb => Db)

1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(La => Da) Λ (Lb => Db)
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
∴ (Sa => La) Λ (Sb => Lb)
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
The argument turns out to be invalid according to this fixation of values. The student is advised
to obtain the result when the second component of the conclusion takes 0.

One more example is considered.

2.

All snakes are animals.

All elephants are animals.

Therefore all snakes are elephants.
 5

We symbolize the argument as follows.

(Sa => Aa)
(Ea => Aa)

∴ (Sa => Ea)

When the truth-value is assigned to the logically equivalent form of this argument with exactly
one member, the result is as follows.

(Sa => Ua)

1 1 1
(Ea => Ua)
0 1 1
∴ (Sa => Ea)

1 0 0

There is no need to consider a non-empty universe of discourse with two members. The method
of testing is the same as the one for the first example.

Consider an example where two premises are universal and conclusion is particular.

3.

All flowers are attractive.

All attractive things are temporary.

Therefore some flowers are temporary.

Assuming that in non-empty universe of discourse there is only one member, we shall assign the
truth-values. Let us assign 0 to Fa.

(Fa => Aa)

0 1 0
(Aa => Ta)
0 1
∴ (Fa Λ Ta)
0 0

With this set of values the argument turns out to be invalid no matter what value is assigned to
Ta in the conclusion and in the premise. Of course, if Aa takes 1, then Ta must take 1. We must
remember that nowhere did we use any rule of quantification.
 6

Let us consider a non-empty universe of discourse consisting of three individuals. This is being
discussed only with the intention of reinforcing what we have learnt so far. Once we arrive at
desired result, it is possible to safely assume that the result holds good for n number of members.

Suppose that there are only three men in the model of men, viz. a, b and c. In such a case the
proposition ‘A’ can be represented in the following manner.

1. (x) (Φx) ≡ (Φa Λ Φb Λ Φc)

The LHS is true if and only if Φa is true, Φb is true and Φc is true. If any one of them is
false, then the LHS is false. Similarly, the proposition ‘E’ becomes

2. (x) (¬ Φx) ≡ (¬ Φa Λ ¬ Φb Λ ¬ Φc)

If a, b and c are the only men in the model of men, then as in the previous case, in the present
case also the LHS is true. This is because a conjunction is true (RHS) if and only if everyone of
the three components is true. If any one of them is false then LHS also is false.

While the propositions with universal quantifiers are translated to the conjunction mode, those
with existential quantifiers are translated to the disjunction mode. If we persist with the same
model, then

3. (∃x) (Φx) ≡ (Φa v Φb v Φc)

4. (∃x) (¬ Φx) ≡ (¬ Φa v ¬ Φb v ¬ Φc)

These four equations are in the form of bicondtional proposition and a biconditional proposition
is true only when both sides of the equation have the same truth-value. From these four
equations, it is clear that the truth-status of propositions with quantifiers is determined by the
truth-conditions of corresponding compound proposition. This relation is in perfect consonance
with the definition of universal and existential quantifiers. We always assume that the
propositions are true as long as we are dealing with the set of premises. Therefore both sides of
the equations representing the premises must necessarily be true.

On logical grounds, there is a qualitative difference between a model containing only one
individual and another model containing two or more than two individuals. For the sake of
convenience let us call the first model monadic and the second one polyadic or n-adic model for
n number of members. For example, if there are two individuals, then the model is dyadic and if
there are three members, then triadic and so on. There is a qualitative difference because in a
monadic model an invalid argument may correspond to a valid truth-functional argument
whereas the very same argument in any other model may correspond to an invalid truth-
functional argument. Let us consider an argument which is invalid from traditional angle.

4.
All politicians are lawyers.
 7

All judges are lawyers.

∴ All judges are politicians.

1. p1: (x) {Px => Lx}

2. p2: (x) {Jx => Lx}
∴ (x) {Jx => Px}

Since there is only member, this argument is logically equivalent to

3. p1: {Pa => La}

4. p2: {Ja => La}
∴ Ja => Pa

In a monadic model (x) (Φx) ≡ Φa ≡ (∃x) (Φx)

∴The argument is logically equivalent to

5. Pa Λ La
6. Ja Λ La
∴ Ja Λ Pa

If we assign the value 0 to any one of the components of the conclusion, then not only the
conclusion is false but also one of the premises becomes false. However, according to definition,
the premises must be true. It is logically impossible to derive a false conclusion from true
premises. Therefore the argument is valid. However, the same argument is invalid in a dyadic
model.
We shall symbolize the previous argument.
1. p1: (x) {Px => Lx}
2. p2: (x) {Jx => Lx}
∴(x) {Jx => Px}

Since we are considering a dyadic model the symbolic presentation is logically equivalent to
3. (Pa => La) Λ (Pb => Lb)
4. (Ja => La) Λ (Jb => Lb)
∴ (Ja => Pa) Λ (Jb => Pb)

Assign 0 to Pa and 1 to the rest. The result can be computed as follows:

5. (Pa => La) Λ (Pb => Lb)

0 1 1 1 1 1 1
6. (Ja => La) Λ (Jb => Lb)
11 1 1 1 1 1
∴ (Ja => Pa) Λ (Jb => Pb)
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
The conjunction of the truth-values in 5 and 6 yields true premises whereas the conclusion is
false. Hence the argument is invalid. This result can be generalized to include other polyadic
 8

models with 3 or more than 3 members. Whatever holds good to a dyadic model in this case also
holds good to any other polyadic model. In order to become familiar with this method let us
work with some more problems.

5. (x) (Dx => ¬ Ex)

(x) (Ex => Fx)
∴ (x) (Fx => ¬ Dx)

Let us restrict this argument to a dyadic model. If this argument is invalid in this model, then it is
invalid in all other polyadic models. The logically equivalent form of 3 is as follows.

1. (Da => ¬ Ea) Λ (Db => ¬ Eb)

2. (Ea => Fa) Λ (Eb => Fb)
∴(Fa => ¬ Da) Λ (Fb => ¬ Db)

Assign 0 to ¬ Da. Accordance to the law of contradiction Da = 1. Similarly, ¬ Db is assigned 0.

Therefore Db = 1. Assign 1 to ¬ Ea. Ea takes 0. Assign 1 to ¬ Eb. Eb takes 0. Assign 1 to Fa and
Fb. The result can be computed as follows.

3. (Da => ¬ Ea) Λ (Db => ¬ Eb)

1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4. (Ea => Fa) Λ (Eb => Fb)
0 1 1 1 0 1 1
∴ (Fa => ¬ Da) Λ (Fb => ¬ Db)
1 0 0 0 1 0 0

In this argument also the conjunction of the truth-values in 5 and 6 yields true premises whereas
the conclusion is false. Hence the argument is invalid. This result can be generalized to include
other polyadic models with 3 or more than 3 members. Whatever holds good to a dyadic model
in this case also holds good to any other polyadic model.

6.
1 (∃x) (Jx Λ Kx)
2 (∃x) (Kx Λ Lx)
∴(∃x) (Lx Λ Jx)
We shall consider this argument also in a dyadic model. This is logically equivalent to
3 (Ja Λ Ka) v (Jb Λ Kb)
4 (Ka Λ La) v (Kb Λ Lb)
∴(La Λ Ja) v (Lb Λ Jb)
There is a difference between this argument and the previous arguments. In this argument the
premises and conclusion are disjunctive unlike the previous arguments which have conjunctive
statements. The difference is due to quantifiers. In case of universal quantifiers conjunction is the
connective whereas in case of existential quantifiers disjunction is the connective.
Assign the truth-values as follows; 0 to La and Jb and 1 to the rest. The result is computed as
follows.
5 (Ja Λ Ka) v (Jb Λ Kb)
 9

1 1 1 1 0 0 1

6 (Ka Λ La) v (Kb Λ Lb)

1 0 0 1 1 1 1
∴ (La Λ Ja) v (Lb Λ Jb)

0 0 1 0 1 0 0
In this argument also the conjunction of the truth-values in 5 and 6 yields true premises whereas
the conclusion is false. Hence the argument is invalid. This result can be generalized to include
other polyadic models with 3 or more than 3 members. Whatever holds good to a dyadic model
in this case also holds good to any other polyadic model.

4.3 METHOD OF PROVING INVALIDITY -2

We shall examine those immediate inferences which are regarded as valid by traditional logic,
but invalid according to modern logic. Let us begin with conversion per limitation for a dyadic
model.

7.

All women are pious.

Therefore some pious persons are women.

Symbolize the argument and assign truth-values:

(Wa => Pa) Λ (Wb => Pb)

1 1 1 1 0 1 1

∴ (Pa Λ Wa) Λ (Pb => Wb)

1 1 1 0 1 0 0

Consider O proposition.

8.
Some soldiers are not graduates.
Therefore some graduates are not soldiers.

Again, we consider this argument for a dyadic model. Then the rest follows.

(Sa Λ ¬ Ga) Λ (Sb Λ ¬ Gb)

1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 10

∴ (Ga Λ ¬ Sa) Λ (Gb Λ ¬ Sb)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Consider opposition of relations. Let us begin with superaltern.

9.

All graduates are university educated.

Therefore some graduates are university educated.

we shall examine this argument for a dyadic model following the familiar norms.

(Ga => Ua) Λ (Gb => Ub)

0 1 1 1 1 1 1
∴ (Ga Λ Ua) Λ (Gb Λ Ub)
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
The argument is invalid for a dyadic model. Therefore it is invalid for polyadic model.
There is no need to work out the status of subaltern relation. It is sufficient if the statements of 9
are reversed. This is left as an exercise for the student.

Contrary is the relation to be considered now.

10.
All swimmers are medalists.
∴No swimmers are medalists.

Symbolize the statements and assign the truth-values as usual.

Sa => Ma
1 1 1
∴ Sa => ¬ Ma
1 0 0
Subcontrary relation is left out for the student as an exercise.

This method of proving invalidity in this manner is, perhaps, decisive since the invalidity of
those arguments, which are held by traditional logic as valid, becomes clear from the last two
examples.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for you answers.

1 Give examples to prove that subcontrary and subaltern relations are invalid.

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 11

2 Distinguish between monadic and dyadic models.

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---------------------------------

4.4 EXERCISES

Using the method of assigning truth-values prove that the following arguments are invalid.

1.

(x) {Ax => (Bx ∨ Cx)}

(x) {Dx => (Ex ∨ Fx)}
(x) {¬ Bx => (Fx ∨ Gx)}
(∃x) {(Fx => Dx) Λ (¬ Ex => ¬ Dx)}
¬ Gx
__________________

∴ (x){Ax => (Dx ∨ Fx)}

2.
{Aa => (Ba ∨ Ca)}
{Da => (Ea ∨ Fa)}
{Ba => (Fa ∨ Ga)}
{(Fa => Da) Λ (¬ Ea => ¬ Da)}
¬ Ga
__________________

∴ {Aa => (Da ∨ Fa)}

3.

Aa => (Ba ∨ Ca)

Da => (Ea∨ Fa)
¬ Ba => (Fa ∨ Ga)
(Fa => Da) Λ (¬ Ea => Da)
¬ Ga
_______________________

∴Aa => (Da ∨ Fa)

_______________________
 12

4.
(x){Px => (Qx ∨ Rx)}
(x){Sx => (Tx ∨ Ux)}
(x) {¬ Qx => (Ux ∨ Vx)}
(∃x){[(Ux => Sx) Λ (¬ Tx => ¬ Sx)}
¬ Vx
__________________

∴ (x) {Px => (Sx ∨ Ux)}

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Using the technique of proving invalidity show that the following arguments are invalid:

a) Ix ∨ (Kx Λ Jx)
¬ (Ix ∨ Jx) ∨ (Lx ≡ ¬ Mx)
¬ (Lx => ¬ Mx) ∨ (¬ Nx Λ Mx)
(Nx => Ox) Λ (Ox => Mx)
¬ (¬ Jx ∨ Kx) ∨ Ox /∴Oa

b)

(Bx Λ Cx) ∨ Ax
(Ax ∨ Cx) => (Lx ≡ ¬ Mx)
(Lx ⊃ ¬ Mx) => (¬ Nx Λ Mx)
(Nx => Zx) Λ (Zx ⊃ Mx)
(¬ Cx ∨ Bx) => Ox /∴Za ∨ Kx

4.5 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have learnt about the significance of proving invalidity. The method followed is
assigning of truth-values to the statements. We have also learnt that the conclusion must be
always assigned the value 0 while all premises must invariably take the value1. Some inferences
held as valid in traditional logic are shown conclusively to be invalid with the help of this
method. The importance of nonempty universe of discourse is demonstrated.

4.6 KEY WORDS

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Nonempty universe of discourse or model: A universe of discourse with at least one member.

Monadic model: A model with exactly one member.

Polyadic or n-adic model: A model with an indefinite number of (n) members.

4.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________ Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of Madras,
1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi. Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Prentice-
Hall of India, 2007.
Copi, M. Irving. Symbolic Logic. 4th Ed. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________ Introduction to Logic. 11th Ed. New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2004.
Copi, M. Irving and James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. 2nd Ed. New York: The Macmillian
Co., 1972.
Copi, M. and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. 10th Ed. New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2001.
 1

UNIT 5 APPLICATIONS OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC

Contents
5.0.Objectives
5.1.Introduction
5.2.Application of Symbolic Logic with Digital World
5.3.Boolean Algebra
5.4.Logic Gates
5.5.Role of symbolic logic in Multi – Value logic
5.6.Application of Fuzzy Logic.
5.7.Let Us Sum Up
5.8.Key Words
5.9.Further Readings and References

5.0. OBJECTIVES

This unit is to limelight the application of Symbolic Logic in the Modern Era. The
instrumental value of logic is well known in many disciplines, such as Philosophy,
Mathematics, and Computer Science. Mathematics teaches logic almost as an extension
of algebra or calculus with lemmas and proofs. And also, Computer science teaches it
with more emphasis on its applicability for enriching programming power or for building
‘thinking machines’. But Philosophy, of which logic has always been a fundamental part,
approaches logic somewhat differently. For then its key concerns are different kinds. We
present a range of binary systems suitable for representing information in digital
components. The binary number system is explained and binary codes are illustrated to
show the representation of decimal and alphanumeric information. We introduce the
concepts of Boolean algebra from a fundamental point of view, co-relating with
Symbolic Logic. The correlation between a Boolean expressions and its equivalent
interconnection of gates is emphasized. At present, in the field of communication,
entertainment, medical electronics, and digital electronics has taken giant strides. Here
fundamental ideas about implementing a logic circuit for a logic expression or writing a
logic expression for a given logic circuit are discussed.

All possible logic operations for two variables are investigated and from that, the most
useful logic gates are derived. The characteristics of digital gates available in integrated
circuit form are presented. This unit supplies the diagram and tabulation methods for
simplifying Boolean functions. The diagram is used to simplify digital circuits
constructed with AND, OR, NAND, NOR, and wired-logic gates. The chief endeavor of
this chapter is to utter that the Digital logic is not based on numbers but they are based on
the sentences. More specifically, it is based on the connectivity of the propositions.
Primary purpose of this unit is to facilitate education in the increasingly important areas

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of multi-value logic suitable for representing information in Fuzzy logic. The role of
symbolic logic is decorated in the multi-value logic. Truth status of propositions is
challenging and is not restricting the future events. The fundamental of fuzzy
propositions is also discussed in this chapter.

5.1. INTRODUCTION
In the history of western logic, Symbolic logic is relatively recent development. It is the
study of human thoughts through symbols. It is learning towards mathematics and
symbolization. It would be a well high hopeless task to discuss modern considerations of
logic by the use of only ordinary language. A symbolic language has become necessary
in order to achieve the required exact scientific treatment of the subject. Because of the
presence of such symbolism, the resulting treatment is known as symbolic logic.

5.2. APPLICATION OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC WITH DIGITAL LOGIC

The word ‘digit’ is resultant from the Latin term “digitus” which means finger or toe. The
fact that this system has ten digits is commonly attributed to the ten fingers of a human
being. The most commonly used number system is the decimal number system; it is
composed of digits ‘0’ to ‘9’. Digital logic is concerned with the interconnection among
digital components and modulus. Digital computer has made possible many scientific
industrial and commercial advances that would not be attainable otherwise. Our space
program would have been unfeasible without real-time, continuous computer monitoring
and many business enterprises functions efficiently only with the aid of automatic data
processing. Computers are used in scientific calculations, commercial and business data
processing, air traffic control, space guidance, the educational field, and many other
areas. A digital computer is a programmable machine that processes binary data which is
represented by binary number system. The simplest number system employing positional
notation is the binary system. A binary number system uses only two symbols or digits
namely 0 and 1.They are the binary number system which has a base or radix of 2. A
binary digit 0 and 1 are called “bits”. 4-bit binary word is called “nibble”, and 8- bit
binary word is called “byte”.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. What do you mean by “digitus”? Explain.

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2. Explain the application of Symbolic Logic in the digital world.

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5.3. BOOLEAN ALGEBRA

George Boole urbanized Boolean algebra in 1847 and used it to crack in Mathematical
logic or Symbolic logic. In 1938 Claude Shannon introduced a two-valued Boolean
algebra called “Switching Algebra”, in which he demonstrated that the properties of bi-
table electrical circuits can be represented by this algebra. Claude Shannon previously
applied Boolean algebra to design of switching network in 1939. The values used in
Boolean algebra are representing the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’. They have no numeric values.
A binary ‘1’ will represent a High level, and a binary ‘0’ will represent a Low level in
Boolean Equations.

Basic Operation: Boolean algebra has only three operators AND (•), OR (+) and NOT
(‘) or Complement or Inverse.

AND Operator: The logical operation of AND can be articulated with symbols as
follows. Let one input variable is A, the other input variable is B and the output variable
is C. Subsequently the Boolean expression of this basic operator function is C= A Λ B
(or) C= AB. The table for the Boolean expression C= A Λ B, is as follows.

A B AΛB C

0 0 0Λ0 0

0 1 0Λ1 0

1 0 1Λ0 0

1 1 1Λ1 1
OR Operator: The logical operation of OR can be articulated with symbols as follows.
Let one input variable is A, the other input variable is B and the output variable is C. In
that case the Boolean expression of this basic operator function is C= A+B. The table for
the Boolean expression C= A+B, is as follows.

A B A+B C

0 0 0+0 0

0 1 0+1 1

1 0 1+0 1

3
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1 1 1+1 1

NOT Operator: The Complement of ‘0’ is ‘1’ and the Complement of ‘1’ is ‘0’.
Symbolically, we write 0’ = 1 and 1’ = 0. The logical operation of an inverter (NOT) can
be expressed with symbols as follows: If the input variable is ‘A’ and the output variable
is called X, then X = ⎯A. This expression states that the output is the complement of
input, so if A=0 then X=1 and A=1 then X=0. The table for the Boolean expression A=
X, is as follows.

A X

0 1

1 0

5.4 LOGIC GATES

A logic gate is an electronic circuit, which takes numerous inputs and produces a single
output. Logic gates form the fundamental building blocks for all the digital circuits. AND
gate, OR gate and NOT gate are called “basic gates”. NAND gate and NOR gate are
called “Universal Gates”. All the gates are obtainable in Integrated Circuit (IC) form. The
different IC families differ in their speed, power dissipation, propagation delay, etc.
There are eight functions to be considered as candidates for logic gates: AND, OR,
NAND, NOR, XOR, XNOR, INVERTER, BUFFER. The graphic symbols and truth
tables of the eight gates are show in below.

Name Graphic Algebraic Truth

Symbol Function Table
x y f
AND x f=xy 0 0 0
Λ 0 1 0
y 1 0 0
1 1 1
x y F
OR x f = x+y 0 0 0
+ 0 1 1
y 1 0 1
1 1 1

x F

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 5

INVERTER x f = x’ 0 1
1 0

x F
BUFFER x f=x 0 0
1 1

x x y F
NAND Λ f = (xy)’ 0 0 1
y 0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
x y F
NOR x f = (x+y)’ 0 0 1
+ 0 1 0
y 1 0 0
1 1 0

x y F
XOR x f = x ⊕y 0 0 0
⊕ 0 1 1
y 1 0 1
1 1 0
x y F
XNOR x f=xΘy 0 0 1
Θ 0 1 0
y 1 0 0
1 1 1

Each gate has one or two inputs nominated by x, y, etc and the out put is designated by
‘f’.

Modern Classification of Propositions and Digital Logic Gates: Modern logicians

categorize propositions into three types. They are Simple, Compound and General.
Compound proposition is classify further into:

1. Conjunctive
2. Implicative (Conditional)
3. Disjunctive
(a) Inclusive, (b) Exclusive
4. Equivalence (Bi- Conditional)
5. Negation

Conjunctive: A conjunctive proposition is a compound proposition containing two or

more simple propositions, conjoined by the word ‘and’. Two or more propositions so

5
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conjoined are called conjuncts. ‘Sankara is philosopher and Ramanuja is a philosopher’ is

one such conjunctive proposition. The symbol ‘ * ‘ or ‘Λ ’ (dot) is used to represent
the function of conjunctive proposition. If we substitute the variable ‘p’ for ‘Sankara is
philosopher’ and ‘q’ for Ramanuja is a philosopher’ then the two conjuncts are
symbolized as ( p Λ q ). The truth value and truth functions of these conjuncts will be as
such:

p Λ q
T 1 T
T 0 F
F 0 T
F 0 F ____ Equi - 1

Among the Logic gates, AND gate is one of the basic gates; its truth table is stated below
and let the equitation be “2”. The evaluation of this equation says that output ‘f’ of an
AND gate is High (1) only both inputs are High (1)

p Λ q
0 0 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
1 1 1 ____ Equi – 2

This gate is compared with the equitation “1”, Conjunctive proposition of the compound
proposition in Symbolic Logic which states that when the antecedent and consequent of
the proposition is True the validity of the whole proposition will be true, if not it is
invalid. This equitation (1) is rewritten without affecting the truth values and truth-
functions for our better understanding and is stated as equitation“3”.

p Λ q
F 0 F
F 0 T
T 0 F
T 1 T ____ Equi - 3

Let F=0, and T=1, substitute in Equitation “3”

p Λ q
0 0 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
1 1 1____ Equi -4
⇒ Equi -4 = Equi – 2
⇒ [Equi -4 = Equi – 3] = Equi – 1
⇒ Equi -4 = Equi – 1
⇒∴ Equi – 1= Equi – 2

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Equitation “1” interprets the basic truth table of a conjunctive proposition of a compound
proposition containing two or more simple proposition, conjoined by the word ‘and’.
The Equitation “2” just reveals us that output of an AND gate is High (1) only when both
inputs are High (1). The above truth table specifies the out put values of every possible
combination of values of the variables in the expression. In this way other gates can be
proved.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. Define Logic Gate.

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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Write a short note on Boolean operators.

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5.5 ROLE OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC IN MULTI – VALUE LOGIC

In 1936 K.Michalski discovered that three-valued logics had actually been anticipated as
early as the 14th century by the medieval schoolman, William of Occam. The possibility
of a three-valued logic has also been considered by the Philosophers Hegel and, in 1896,
Hugh MacColl. It will be recalled that new geometries primary came about through the
refutation of Euclid’s parallel postulate, and that new algebras first came about through
the rejection of the commutative law of multiplication. Similarly, the new so-called
“many-valued logics” first came about by denying Aristotle’s law of excluded middle.

In crisp logics, such as binary logic, variables are either true or false, black or white, 1 or
0. An extension to binary logic is multi-value logic, where variables may have many
crisp values. In 1921, in a short two-page paper, J.Lukasiewicz considered a three-valued
logic, or a logic in which proposition ‘p’ may possess any one of the three possible truth
values. Very shortly after and independent of Lukasiewicz’s work, E.L.Post considered
m-Valued logics, in which proposition ‘p’ may possess any one of ‘m’ possible truth
values, where ‘m’ is greater than 1. If ‘m’ exceeds 2, the logic is said to be many-valued.

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Bi-Value and Multi-Value Logic: We shall utilize the method of truth table, preliminary
with a Basic truth table for conjunction. We, first of all, replicate the truth table for
conjunction in the two-valued logic.

˄ T F
p
T T F

F F F
Figure-1

Down the left-hand column emerge the possible truth values for proposition ‘p’ and
across the top row show the possible truth values for the proposition ‘q’. Now, knowing
the truth value of ‘p’ and of ‘q’, one can find the truth value of ‘p ˄ q’. ‘p ˄ q’ is to be
true when and only when both ‘p’ and ‘q’ are true, a T appear in the top left box of the
table and F’s come out in all the other boxes. We now ensue to the three-valued logic
and again agree to take the conjunction ‘p ˄ q’ to be true when and only when both ‘p’
and ‘q’ are true. Denoting the three possible truth values of a proposition by T, ?, and F.
We start to build a truth table.

˄ T ? F
p
T T

F
Figure-2

By our array ‘p ˄ q’, the top left box in the above table must contain as T, and no other
box in the table is allowed to contain a T. Since there are eight remaining boxes and each
may be filled in either of two possible ways, namely, with either F or ?, in sum 28 =256
possible ways of filling the eight boxes. It follows that there are 256 different ways of
developing a truth table for conjunction in a three-valued logic. To illustrate two of the
possible 256 truth tables for conjunction in a three-valued logic.

˄ T ? F
p
T T ? F

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 9

? ? ? F

F F F F
Figure-3a

In paradox: Let a proposition be ‘s’ and the Negation of it is ‘not-s’, the proposition and
its negation are same.

∴ “s=not-s” ------- Equi.1

The truth function of this Equitation is:
⇒ t(s) =t(not-s) ------- Equi.2
In a Bivalent Logic
⇒ [t(s) =t(not-s)] =1------- Equi.3
⇒ t(not-s) =1─ t(s) -------- Equi.4
Substitute Equi.2 in Equi.4
⇒ t(s) =1─ t(s) -------- Equi.5
⇒If s= true, t(s) =1 then 1=0
Contradiction
⇒If s= false, t(s) =0 then 0=1

When we test the same Equitation in Multi-value logic from Equi.5

⇒ t(s) =1─ t(s) -------- Equi.5
⇒ t(s) + t(s) =1 -------- Equi.6
⇒ 2t(s) =1-------- Equi.7
⇒ t(s) =1/2-------- Equi.8
The degree of truth lies in ½ (Half-Truth)

∴An extension to binary logic is multi-value logic.

Multi-Value Logic: The fundamental assumption, upon which classical logic (or two-
valued logic) is based, that each proposition is either true or false – had been questioned
since Aristotle. It is understood that propositions truth status is problematic are not
restricted to future events. As an end result of the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty, for
example, it is acknowledged that truth values of certain propositions in quantum
mechanics are innately indetermined due to fundamental boundaries of measurements. In
order to treat with such propositions, we must relax the true/false dichotomy of classical
two-valued logic by allowing a third truth value, which may be called indetermined. The
classical two-valued logic can be extended into three-valued logic in different ways.
Several three-valued logics, each with its own rationale, are now well established. It is
frequent in these logics to designate the truth, falsity, and indeterminacy by 1, 0, and 1/2,
respectively.

Once the range of three-valued logics was acknowledged as meaningful and useful, it
became pleasing to explore generalization into n-valued logics for an arbitrary number of

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truth values (n ≥ 2). Several n-valued logics were, in fact, urbanized in the 1930s. For any
given ‘n’, the truth values in these generalized logics are usually labeled by rational
numbers in the unit interval [0,1]. These values are obtained by uniformly dividing the
interval between 0 and 1 exclusive. The set Tn of truth values of an n-valued logic is thus
defined as:
Tn = {0 = 0/n-1, 1/n-1, 2/n-1,…, n-2/n-1,n-1/n-1= 1}

These values can be interpreted as degrees of truth.

Fuzzy Logic: Fuzzy Sets as well as Fuzzy Logic is a factual magnum work. Fuzzy Logic
addresses practically every significant topic in the broad expanse of fuzzy set theory. To
us Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic is an astonishing achievement; it covers its immeasurable
territory with impeccable authority, deep insight and a meticulous concentration to detail.
To view Fuzzy Sets along with Fuzzy Logic in an appropriate perspective, it is
compulsory to clarify a point of semantics which relates to the meanings of fuzzy sets
and fuzzy logic. More exclusively, in a broad sense, fuzzy logic is a logical system
which is an extension and generalization of classical multi-valued logics. However in a
wider sense, fuzzy logic is almost identical with the theory of fuzzy sets.

Fuzzy Propositions: The primary disparity between classical proposition and fuzzy
propositions (Rule Base) is in the range of their truth values. At the same time as every
classical proposition is mandatory to be either true or false, the truth or falsity of fuzzy
proposition is a matter of degree. In this slice, we focus on simple fuzzy propositions,
which we categorize into the subsequent four types:

1. Unconditional and unqualified proposition.

2. Unconditional and qualified proposition.
3. Conditional and unqualified proposition.
4. Conditional and qualified proposition.

Classical Set: The most vital and most fundamental term to be found in modern
mathematics and logic is that of set, or class. Even though some modern studies make a
technical dissimilarity between set and class, we do not do so in this treatment; it is
recognized, however, that mathematicians are inclined to use the word set, whereas
logicians universally refer to a class. The theory of sets, we shall see, forms one of the
connecting links between mathematics on the one hand and logic on the other hand. We
shall think of a set as simply a collection of well defined objects. The objects which
make up a set will be called elements of the set or the items that are entered or considered
as in the set are called the elements or members of the set. The important set operations
can be defined as below:

• Complement of A is A’ = { x | x ∉A}
• Intersection of A and B, A ˄ B = { x | x ∈ A and x∈B}
• Union of A and B, A ∨ B = { x | x ∈ A or x∈B}

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The basic set operations, ‘intersection’, ‘union’ and ‘complement’, are illustrated using
Venn diagram.

A∩B AUB A’

The three set operations, intersection, union, and complement are equivalent to AND (˄),
OR (∨) and NOT (¬) of Basic truth tables based on the connectivity of the Proposition in
Symbolic logic.

Basic Operation on Fuzzy Sets: The classical set theory defines three key fundamental
operations on sets, namely, the complement, intersection and union operations. There is
a significant distinction between fuzzy set logic and crisp set logic. While classical set
membership ‘abruptly’ changes, it is not the case with fuzzy set. It is possible to redefine
the set operation, namely, union, intersection and complement, in terms of characteristic
functions, which will be useful when dealing the fuzzy set operations. The three set
operations, intersection, union and complement are as follows:

• Intersection μa(x) ˄ μb(y)

• Union μa(x) ∨ μb(y)
• Complement ¬μa(x)

The three set operations, intersection, union, and complement are corresponding to
AND (˄), OR (∨) and NOT (¬) of Basic truth tables based on the connectivity of the
Proposition in Symbolic logic.

• Intersection μa(x) ˄ μb(y) = μa(x) AND μb(y)= 0 AND 1= 0

• Union μa(x) ∨ μb(y) = μa(x) OR μb(y) = 0 OR1= 1
• Complement ⎯μa(x) = ¬μa(x) = ¬0 = 1.

5.6APPLICATION OF FUZZY LOGIC

Application of fuzzy logic includes decision-making, fuzzy-machines, fuzzy-genetic

algorithms, Neural networks, Medicine etc. Medicine is one field in which the
applicability of fuzzy set theory was recognized quite early, in the mid-1970s. Within
this field, it is the uncertainty found in the process of diagnosis of disease that has most
frequently been the focus of applications of fuzzy set theory.

Fuzzy Decision-Making: This is a common problem everybody faces in daily life and
therefore, it can be treated as one of the most fundamental activities. Decision-making is

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an area which studies about how decisions are actually made and how better they can be
made successfully.

Problem: A research institute wants to recruit a young, dynamic and talented scientific
officer to assist a team comprising three experts to work in the field of high voltage
engineering. There are four applications and the details are listed below:

NAME AGE QUALIFICATION SALARY DEMAND

a1 25 M.Tech Rs.12,500/-
a2 55 B.Tech Rs.25,000/-
a3 32 Ph.D Rs.17,000/-
a4 40 M.Tech Rs.21,000/-

The institute is in financial constraints. If the institute wishes to call only one person for
interview, develop a fuzzy decision-making algorithm and give the result for the present
problem.

Solution: In this problem, the institute is looking for young, dynamic (basically age
decides) and talented (better qualification) candidates. Therefore, it is appropriate to
consider age and qualification as goals, namely g1 and g2. The Institute has financial
impediments. Therefore, salary is the constraint c1. Thus the problem has two goals and
a single constraint. Let us build simple fuzzy sets for g1, g2 and c1 suitably. It may be
noted that an increase in age is less preferred. Similar is the case with salary too. As
qualification is higher, it is better. Hence the three fuzzy sets are sketched as shown in
the figures.

1
0.93
0.63 g1

0.30

25 32 40 60 x1 age
a1 a2 a3 a4

1.0

0.7
g2
0.3
B.Tech M.Tech Ph.D qualification x2
a2 a1, a4 a3

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It is important to note that qualification cannot be expressed numerically.

However, since a choice has to be made, this variable is assigned a suitable membership
grade.

1
0.95
0.6 c1
0.5
0.4

0
12.5 17 21 25 30 35 x3
a1 a3 a4 a2 Salary (x103)

From the above fuzzy sets, we can find

μ(g1/a1), μ(g1/a2), μ(g1/a3), μ(g1/a4),

μ(g2/a1), μ(g2/a2), μ(g2/a3), μ(g2/a4),
μ(c1/a1), μ(c1/a2), μ(c1/a3), μ(c1/a4),
μ(g1/ai) = [1/a1, 0.3/a2, 0.93/a3, 0.63/a4]
μ(g2/ai) = [0.7/a1, 0.3/a2, 1.0/a3, 0.7/a4]
μ(c1/ai) = [0.95/a1, 0.4/a2, 0.6/a3, 0.5/a4]
Using the equation D(ai)= Min {a1, a2, a3, a4} ie (i=total)
⇒ D(ai)= Min {0.7/a1, 0.3/a2, 0.6/a3, 0.5/a4}
Now, applying the equation D= Max {D(ai)}
We get Fuzzy decision, D= Max {D(ai)} = 0.7/a1
Thus, a1 is the suitable candidate to be called for interview.

Fuzzy-Machines: Fuzzy logic principles are extensively employed in various consumer

products and the sale of these products is increasingly going up in recent years. A typical
application is the use of fuzzy logic principle to automatic washing machines. While
many manufacturers provide with a variety of features, the underlying principle of fuzzy
logic-based washing is explained in this section. As long as the washing of clothes is
concerned, removal of dirt particles is the objective. Thus the input of the fuzzy control
system is the quantum of dirt and its rate of change. The weight of clothes is another
input. With these three inputs, the following are the outputs:

1. Quantity of washing powder

2. Water quantity
3. Water flow rate
4. Washing time
5. Rinsing time and
6. Spinning time

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Fuzzy-Genetic Algorithms: There are a number of ways in which Genetic Algorithms

and fuzzy logic can be integrated. The most common approach is to use a genetic
algorithm to optimize the performance of a fuzzy system. An alternative approach is to
use fuzzy logic techniques to improve the performance of the genetic algorithm. A fuzzy
genetic algorithm (FGA) is considered as a GA that uses fuzzy-based techniques or fuzzy
tools to improve the GA behavior by modeling different GA components. In a fuzzy-
controlled GA, the parameters of GA, namely, crossover probability Pc and mutation
probability Pm, are adjusted for improved performance. FGA employs a real coded
genetic algorithm with multiple crossover and mutation operators.

Other Application of Fuzzy Logic: Computational (Artificial) Intelligence

• Design requirements have increasingly become more qualitative and linguistic
• Artificial Intelligence (traditional) approaches are being adopted.
• New form of the design is increasingly dependant on approximate reasoning
• Approximate Reasoning and Intelligence leads to Computational Intelligence.
• Fuzzy Logic and Systems is a major component

Furby

Furby is the most famous and original interactive animatronic plush toy ever! It can be
trained to dance, sing and play games. Each Furby has its own name -- and [is] capable of
saying 800 different phrase combinations. It is far more than an electronic toy; Furby is a
friend.

My Real Baby

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MRB has its own set of emotions and drives, and an incredibly expressive, completely
animated, realistic face and voice. The child determines how she wants to play with her
doll, and the doll responds – naturally, emotionally, intelligently – just like a real baby.
The MY REAL BABY … has hundreds of facial expressions and literally billions of
different combinations of sounds and words ... MRB knows when she being hugged,
rocked, fed, burped, bounced and more. MRB uses a over 15 human-like emotions and
levels of emotional intensity.

AIBO

AIBO is not a toy. AIBO's a true companion with real emotions and instincts. With
loving attention it can develop into a mature and fun-loving friend. The more interaction
you have with AIBO, the faster it grows up. In short, AIBO is a friend for life. AIBO has
emotions and instincts programmed into its brain. AIBO acts to fulfill the desires created
by its instincts.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

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1) How many kinds of fuzzy proposition? Explain.

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2) Explain the Basic Operation on Fuzzy Sets.

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5.7 LET US SUM UP

In sum the intellectual capacity is to include an explicit cram on Multi-value logic. The
role of symbolic logic is decorated in the multi-value logic. In order to deal with such
propositions, we must relax the true/false dichotomy of classical two-valued logic by
allowing a third truth value, which may be called indeterminacy. The fundamental
difference between classical propositions and fuzzy propositions and the range of their
truth values are also discussed in this chapter. Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic is a true
magnum work. The fundamental distinction between classical proposition and fuzzy
propositions is in the range of their truth values. While each classical proposition is
required to be either true or false, the truth or falsity of fuzzy proposition is a matter of
degree. Assuming that truth and falsity are expressed by values 1and 0, respectively, the
degree of truth of each fuzzy proposition is expressed. In metro trains, fuzzy logic is
used to determine the proper start, stop, and cruising speed of the train; in washing
machines it determines the amount of water and the number of rinses; in cameras and
camcorders it adjusts the colour, contrast, brightness, focus, and son on; in vacuums it
determines the suction power based on the amount and size of particles; in automobiles
with automatic transmission it determine the proper gear; in intelligent vehicular systems
it finds the best route and automatically guides an automobile; and in communication
systems it processes signals, schedules and routes channels, and controls the system. In
financial engineering the performance of stocks is being predicted. As a result we
strongly conclude that the role of symbolic logic in the modern era is immensely
significant.

5.8 KEY WORDS

Logic Gate: A logic gate is an electronic circuit, which takes numerous inputs and
produces a single output.
Set: Set is a collection of well defined objects.

5.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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Balasubramanian, P. An Invitation to Symbolic Logic. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Mission

Vivekananda College, 1977.
________________. Symbolic Logic and Its Decision Procedures. Madras: University of
Madras, 1980.
Chhanda, Chakraborthi, Logic: Informal, Symbolic and Inductive. 2nd Ed. New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India, 2007.
Copi, M. Irving. Symbolic Logic. 4th Ed. New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1965.
_____________. Introduction to Logic. 11th Ed. New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2004.
Copi, M. Irving & James A. Gould. Readings on Logic. 2nd Ed. New York: The
Macmillian Co., 1972.
Copi, M. & Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. 10th Ed. New Delhi: Pearson Education,
2001.

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