Landmark Judgements
Landmark Judgements
This case arose when the Madras government banned Romesh Thappar's journal
"Cross Roads" citing "public order." Thappar challenged this as a violation of his
freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling,
broadly interpreted freedom of speech as vital for democracy and narrowly defined
"public order" as distinct from threats to state security. It struck down the Madras law,
initially strengthening free speech. However, ironically, this case became a catalyst for
the First Amendment to the Constitution, which added "public order" as a legitimate
ground to restrict freedom of speech, effectively altering the Court's initial narrow
interpretation of that term and broadening the scope for restricting expression.
This case centered around the detention of communist leader A.K. Gopalan under the
Preventive Detention Act of 1950. Gopalan challenged his detention, arguing it
violated his fundamental rights, particularly Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal
Liberty), as well as Articles 19 and 22. The Supreme Court, in a significant but later
criticized judgment, narrowly interpreted Article 21, focusing on the phrase
"procedure established by law." It held that as long as the detention followed the
procedure prescribed by law (in this case, the Preventive Detention Act), it was
constitutionally valid, even if that law might be considered unjust or unreasonable.
The Court rejected the concept of "due process" and ruled that Article 21 only
protected against executive action, not legislative action, effectively separating it
from other fundamental rights like those under Article 19. The majority upheld the
validity of the Preventive Detention Act and Gopalan's detention, marking a restrictive
initial interpretation of Article 21 and validating preventive detention as a state tool, a
decision that would be significantly revisited and broadened in later years by the
Supreme Court.
This case revolved around the Madras government's policy of caste-based reservation
of seats in state-run medical and engineering colleges, challenged by Champakam
Dorairajan as discriminatory. She argued the Communal Government Order (GO)
violated Articles 15(1) and 29(2) by denying her admission based on caste. The State
defended the GO as a measure for social justice. The Supreme Court sided with
Dorairajan, declaring the Communal GO unconstitutional as it violated Article 29(2),
which guarantees non-discrimination in admissions based on caste, and Article 15(1).
The Court held that fundamental rights prevail over Directive Principles of State Policy
in case of conflict. This landmark judgment, striking down caste-based quotas in
education, became a major impetus for the First Amendment to the Indian
Constitution, which subsequently inserted Article 15(4) to enable the state to make
special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward
classes, effectively paving the way for constitutionally valid reservations.
This case was a pivotal case concerning Parliament's power to amend Fundamental
Rights. It arose immediately after the First Amendment to the Constitution, which
itself was a response to earlier Supreme Court judgments. The central question was
whether Parliament, using its power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution,
could amend Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III. The Supreme Court
unanimously held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights. The Court
reasoned that Article 368 provided a distinct power to amend the Constitution,
separate from ordinary law-making power. Furthermore, it interpreted "law" in Article
13(2) (which prohibits laws that abridge Fundamental Rights) to mean ordinary
legislative law, not constitutional amendments. Therefore, amendments made under
Article 368 were not subject to the limitations of Article 13(2). This ruling effectively
upheld the Parliament's power to amend any part of the Constitution, including
Fundamental Rights, and set the stage for further constitutional amendments,
although this interpretation would later be challenged and modified in subsequent
landmark cases.
This case is a highly sensational and legally significant case involving Naval
Commander Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati who was tried for the murder of Prem Ahuja,
his wife Sylvia Nanavati's lover. Nanavati shot Ahuja after finding them together,
pleading not guilty based on "grave and sudden provocation" under Section 300 of the
Indian Penal Code. The case became a media frenzy, captivating the nation with its
themes of love, betrayal, and honour. In a jury trial, the jury initially found Nanavati
not guilty of murder, but the Sessions Judge disagreed, referring the case to the High
Court. The Bombay High Court controversially overturned the jury's verdict, finding
Nanavati guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, a decision upheld by
the Supreme Court. The case is landmark because it was one of the last jury trials in
India, and its dramatic nature exposed flaws in the jury system, ultimately
contributing to its abolishment. Furthermore, it significantly shaped the understanding
and application of the "grave and sudden provocation" defence in Indian law and
remains a subject of public and legal fascination even today.
This case arose from an agreement between India and Pakistan to divide the Berubari
Union, a territory within West Bengal. The President sought the Supreme Court's
advisory opinion under Article 143 on whether a law was needed to implement this
transfer of territory to Pakistan, and if so, what kind. The Supreme Court advised that
while Parliament could adjust boundaries under Article 3, this power pertained to
internal readjustments of states within India and did not extend to ceding Indian
territory to a foreign country. To cede territory, the Court ruled, a constitutional
amendment under Article 368 was necessary. This landmark opinion clarified that the
Parliament's power to alter state boundaries domestically was distinct from the act of
transferring Indian territory internationally, emphasizing that ceding territory required
a formal constitutional amendment to give effect to such international agreements.
Consequently, the 9th Constitutional Amendment Act was enacted to facilitate the
transfer of the Berubari Union to Pakistan.
This case dramatically challenged the precedent set in Shankari Prasad, questioning
Parliament's power to amend Fundamental Rights. The Golaknath family challenged
the 17th Amendment, which impacted their land holdings, arguing that Parliament
could not amend or abridge Fundamental Rights. In a 6:5 majority, the Supreme Court
overruled Shankari Prasad, holding that Parliament had no power to amend
Fundamental Rights. The Court reasoned that Fundamental Rights were
"transcendental" and beyond the reach of Article 368's amending power, and that
"law" in Article 13(2) included constitutional amendments, thus prohibiting any
amendment that abridged Fundamental Rights. To avoid retrospective chaos, the
Court applied the Doctrine of Prospective Overruling, meaning the ruling applied only
to future amendments, not past ones. Golaknath was a landmark victory for
proponents of inviolable Fundamental Rights, temporarily restricting Parliament's
amending power and setting the stage for further constitutional battles, most notably
the Kesavananda Bharati case, which would ultimately modify the Golaknath position.
This case is arguably the most significant constitutional case in India. It arose in
response to Parliament's attempts to circumvent the Golaknath ruling and assert its
power to amend Fundamental Rights. The central issue was the extent of Parliament's
amending power under Article 368: could it amend the Constitution so extensively as
to alter its fundamental features, including Fundamental Rights? In a landmark and
complex judgment, a 13-judge bench overruled the Golaknath case, affirming
Parliament's power to amend Fundamental Rights. However, crucially, the Court
introduced the "basic structure doctrine." This doctrine held that while Parliament is
powerful and can amend the Constitution, this power is limited; it cannot alter the
"basic structure" or essential features of the Constitution. While the "basic structure"
was not exhaustively defined, it was understood to include features like democracy,
secularism, federalism, and judicial review. Kesavananda Bharati struck a balance,
recognizing Parliament's amending power while safeguarding the core principles of
the Indian Constitution, profoundly shaping constitutional law and jurisprudence in
India.
Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain (1975)
This case arose from a challenge to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 1971 election
victory. Raj Narain, who had contested against her, alleged electoral malpractices. The
Allahabad High Court controversially upheld these allegations, invalidating her
election and barring her from holding office. Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court,
and while the appeal was pending, she declared a national emergency. Parliament
then passed the 39th Amendment, attempting to place the Prime Minister's election
beyond judicial scrutiny. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, despite initial stays, upheld
the Allahabad High Court's judgment, though on different grounds related to changes
in election law brought about by the 39th amendment. This case is significant for its
backdrop during the Emergency, its highlighting of the tension between the judiciary
and executive, and its role in the context of eroding democratic norms of that period,
while also showcasing the judiciary's eventual stance on upholding electoral integrity
even against the Prime Minister.
The ADM Jabalpur case is infamously known as the "Habeas Corpus case" and is a
dark chapter in Indian legal history. It occurred during the National Emergency
declared by Indira Gandhi. The question before the Supreme Court was whether
citizens could approach High Courts for habeas corpus petitions (seeking release from
unlawful detention) to enforce their fundamental rights to life and personal liberty
(Article 21) when those rights were suspended during the Emergency. In a deeply
controversial 4:1 majority judgment, the Supreme Court ruled against the citizens,
holding that during the Emergency, Article 21 remained suspended, and therefore, no
person could move any court to enforce their fundamental rights, including habeas
corpus. Justice H.R. Khanna was the lone dissenting voice, upholding the importance
of habeas corpus even during emergencies. The ADM Jabalpur case is widely criticized
for its abject surrender of judicial independence and for enabling state-sponsored
human rights abuses during the Emergency, becoming a stark reminder of the
judiciary's potential failure to protect fundamental liberties in times of crisis.
This case addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty in India. Bachan Singh
challenged the death sentence awarded to him, arguing it violated Article 21. The
Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of the death penalty,
significantly narrowed its application by establishing the "rarest of rare cases"
doctrine. The Court ruled that the death penalty should only be imposed in the "rarest
of rare cases" when the crime is exceptionally heinous and barbaric, and when there
is no possibility of reformation of the offender. The Court also emphasized balancing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when deciding on the death penalty,
leaning towards life imprisonment unless there were compelling reasons for capital
punishment. Bachan Singh's case thus legitimized the death penalty in India, but
simultaneously erected high judicial barriers for its imposition, making it an exception
rather than the rule and focusing on the "rarest of rare" standard.
This case further solidified the "basic structure doctrine" established in Kesavananda
Bharati. Minerva Mills challenged the 42nd Amendment, particularly clauses that
sought to give Directive Principles of State Policy precedence over Fundamental Rights
and to exclude judicial review from constitutional amendments. The Supreme Court
struck down these clauses, declaring them violative of the basic structure. The Court
held that the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, and
judicial review itself, were essential features of the Constitution's basic structure and
could not be removed by amendment. Minerva Mills reinforced the limitations on
Parliament's amending power, reaffirming the judiciary's role as the guardian of the
Constitution and its basic framework, and emphasizing the harmonious and balanced
relationship between different parts of the Constitution.
This case was a sequel to the Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills cases, focusing
on the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and the Basic Structure doctrine's
application to laws placed within it. The Court addressed the validity of constitutional
amendments that had placed numerous laws within the Ninth Schedule to shield them
from judicial review. Waman Rao established a "cut-off date" of April 24, 1973 (date of
the Kesavananda Bharati judgment). It held that amendments made before this date,
adding laws to the Ninth Schedule, were valid and immune from challenge even if
they violated Fundamental Rights. However, amendments made after April 24, 1973,
placing laws in the Ninth Schedule, would be subject to the Basic Structure doctrine
and could be struck down if they violated it. Waman Rao thus gave limited
retrospective effect to the Basic Structure doctrine regarding the Ninth Schedule,
creating a temporal division for the application of this crucial constitutional principle.
The "First Judges Case", centered on the interpretation of "consultation" with the Chief
Justice of India (CJI) in the appointment of judges to the High Courts and Supreme
Court, as outlined in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, in a controversial judgment, held that "consultation" did not mean
"concurrence." It established that the executive (the President, acting on the advice of
the government) had primacy in judicial appointments and that the CJI's opinion was
merely one of several inputs to be considered, not binding. The Court reasoned that
the ultimate power of appointment rested with the executive in a democratic system.
The First Judges Case thus significantly reduced the CJI's role in judicial appointments
and tilted the balance of power towards the executive, a position that would be
fundamentally reversed in the later "Second Judges Case" which established the
Collegium system and judicial primacy in appointments.
The Shah Bano case involved Shah Bano, a divorced Muslim woman who sought
maintenance from her ex-husband, Mohammed Ahmed Khan, under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which applies to all citizens regardless of religion. The
Supreme Court ruled in Shah Bano's favour, holding that Section 125 did apply to
Muslim women and that Muslim personal law did not override the secular law in this
instance, emphasizing the need to provide maintenance to destitute divorced women.
This judgment sparked intense controversy and protests from conservative Muslim
groups who viewed it as an infringement on Muslim personal law. In response to this
backlash, the government of Rajiv Gandhi enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which effectively overturned the Supreme Court's
decision and restricted the right of divorced Muslim women to maintenance only
during the 'iddat' period, shifting the responsibility to family or Wakf boards. The Shah
Bano case became a highly politicized landmark, highlighting the tension between
secular law, religious personal laws, and women's rights in India, and remains a
significant point of debate on issues of minority rights and gender justice.
This case addressed the rampant practice of the Bihar government re-promulgating
ordinances, some for as long as 14 years, instead of enacting them into legislation
through the state legislature. The Supreme Court strongly condemned this practice,
declaring it unconstitutional and a "fraud on the Constitution" and a subversion of
democratic legislative processes. The Court held that the ordinance-making power is
meant for exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action, not as a substitute
for the legislature's law-making function. Repeated re-promulgation was deemed a
violation of the principle of separation of powers and undermined the democratic
process by bypassing legislative debate and scrutiny. The D.C. Wadhwa case thus
became a landmark judgment against the abuse of ordinance-making power and
reaffirmed the importance of legislative supremacy and democratic accountability.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (series of cases, often referred to as the Oleum Gas Leak
case) is a landmark set of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases initiated by
environmental activist M.C. Mehta, significantly shaping environmental jurisprudence
in India. These cases, starting in the mid-1980s, addressed various issues, including
industrial pollution, vehicular emissions, and the protection of the Taj Mahal from
pollution. Notably, in the Oleum Gas Leak case following a leak from Shriram Foods
and Fertilizers Ltd., the Supreme Court formulated the principle of "absolute liability"
for hazardous industries, holding them strictly liable for harm caused by their
operations, and that liability should be absolute and not subject to exceptions like in
strict liability. The M.C. Mehta cases are pivotal for establishing the proactive role of
the judiciary in environmental protection, expanding the scope of Article 21 to include
the right to a healthy environment, and developing key environmental law principles
in India through PIL.
This case, challenged the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule of the Indian
Constitution, also known as the anti-defection law, and the power granted to the
Speaker of the Legislature to decide on disqualification of Members of Parliament or
State Legislatures under this schedule. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Tenth Schedule, designed to curb political defections. However, it significantly
curtailed the Speaker's power by ruling that the Speaker's decision in disqualification
matters is subject to judicial review, thereby ensuring accountability and preventing
potential bias or arbitrariness in the Speaker's decisions. The Court clarified that while
the Speaker initially decides, this is a quasi-judicial function and not immune from
judicial scrutiny, reinforcing the principles of judicial review and checks and balances
within the Indian parliamentary system in the context of political defections.
This case, also known as the Mandal Commission case, was a landmark judgment
concerning reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs. The
Supreme Court largely upheld the Mandal Commission report's recommendation of
27% reservation for OBCs, but with crucial caveats. The Court mandated the exclusion
of the "creamy layer" (economically advanced sections within OBCs) from reservation
benefits to ensure that the most deserving sections benefited. Furthermore, it
imposed a 50% ceiling on total reservations (except in extraordinary circumstances),
and importantly, ruled that reservations should not apply to promotions. Indra
Sawhney thus legitimized OBC reservations in principle while also establishing crucial
limitations and safeguards to prevent its misuse and ensure a balance with the
principle of equality and meritocracy.
This case was a significant judgment concerning the right to education. Mohini Jain
challenged the exorbitant fees charged by private unaided medical colleges in
Karnataka, arguing it violated the right to education. The Supreme Court, in a
landmark ruling, declared that the right to education is a fundamental right under
Article 21 (Right to Life), holding that this right is not merely to literacy but to quality
education for all citizens. The Court further stated that the State has an obligation to
provide education and cannot allow commercialization to completely deny access to
education for those who cannot afford high fees. While it acknowledged the role of
private institutions, it emphasized the need for regulation of fees to ensure education
remains accessible, thereby expanding the understanding of Article 21 and paving the
way for further legal and policy developments in the realm of the right to education in
India.
This case further elaborated on the right to education established in Mohini Jain, but
with significant modifications. While affirming that the right to education is a
fundamental right under Article 21, the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan clarified its
scope, limiting it to elementary education for children up to the age of 14 years. The
Court held that the right to higher and professional education, while desirable and a
State objective under Directive Principles, was not a fundamental right in the same
vein. Furthermore, the judgment addressed the issue of capitation fees in private
educational institutions, ruling against their unchecked levy and advocating for a
regulated fee structure to ensure accessibility and prevent commercialization of
education, thus refining and partially limiting the broad scope of the right to education
as initially envisioned in Mohini Jain.
This case, often called the Second Judges Case, fundamentally altered the process of
judicial appointments to the higher judiciary in India. The Supreme Court addressed
the interpretation of Article 124(2) and Article 217(1) concerning consultation with the
Chief Justice of India (CJI) in judicial appointments. Overruling previous interpretations,
the Court declared that "consultation" actually meant "concurrence" – giving primacy
to the CJI's opinion in appointments. Furthermore, it established the Collegium system,
a body of senior judges including the CJI, whose collective recommendation would be
binding on the President in judicial appointments. This landmark judgment
significantly shifted the power of judicial appointments from the executive to the
judiciary itself, aiming to ensure judicial independence and merit-based appointments
by vesting significant influence in the hands of senior judges.
S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994)
This case is a landmark judgment that significantly curtailed the arbitrary use of
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, concerning President's Rule in states. The case
arose from the dismissal of several state governments under Article 356. The
Supreme Court, in a crucial ruling, upheld the validity of Article 356 but imposed
significant limitations on its application to prevent its misuse for political purposes.
The Court mandated that the proclamation of President's Rule is subject to judicial
review, and the Court could examine if there was "material" to justify its imposition. It
emphasized that President's Rule should be a last resort, only when there is a
demonstrable breakdown of constitutional machinery in a state, and crucially, that the
floor of the Legislative Assembly is the proper forum to test majority, not the
Governor's subjective assessment. The Bommai case thus became a vital safeguard
against the arbitrary dismissal of state governments, strengthening federalism and
making the invocation of Article 356 far more judicially accountable.
This case addressed the issue of religious conversion to evade existing marriage laws,
specifically polygamy. Several Hindu women petitioned the court after their husbands
converted to Islam to remarry without dissolving their first Hindu marriage. The
Supreme Court ruled that a Hindu husband converting to Islam solely for the purpose
of contracting a second marriage is illegal and such a marriage is void, constituting
bigamy under Section 494 of the IPC. The Court held that the first marriage under
Hindu law remains valid, and conversion cannot be used as a tool to circumvent
existing marital obligations. Furthermore, the judgment strongly advocated for the
implementation of a Uniform Civil Code to avoid such conflicts arising from differing
personal laws and to ensure equality and justice for all citizens, irrespective of
religion, in matters of marriage and divorce.
This case is a landmark judgment that addressed the issue of sexual harassment at
the workplace in India in the absence of specific legislation. The case arose after the
gang rape of a social worker, Bhanwari Devi, in Rajasthan, highlighting the lack of
legal recourse for women facing sexual harassment at work. The Supreme Court,
recognizing the violation of fundamental rights to gender equality and dignity, took a
proactive stance and formulated the Vishaka Guidelines. These guidelines, based on
international conventions and constitutional principles, defined sexual harassment,
laid down preventive and redressal mechanisms for workplaces to implement, and
directed employers to ensure a safe working environment for women. The Vishaka
Guidelines became legally binding and filled the legislative vacuum, acting as law
until the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act was enacted in 2013, making the Vishaka case a pivotal moment in
recognizing and combating sexual harassment in India.
Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1997)
This case, also known as the Hawala case, arose from a Public Interest Litigation
seeking a court-monitored investigation into alleged illegal payments made to
politicians and bureaucrats by businessmen through Hawala transactions. The
Supreme Court, responding to allegations of laxity by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) and Enforcement Directorate (ED), issued a series of landmark
directions to ensure the independence and effectiveness of these agencies. The Court
mandated fixed tenures for key officials, insulating them from political interference,
and introduced the concept of "continuing mandamus" to actively monitor the
investigation. The Vineet Narain judgment is crucial for establishing principles of CBI
autonomy, judicial oversight of investigations into high-level corruption, and for
emphasizing the importance of probity in public life and accountability of investigative
agencies to the rule of law, setting a precedent for judicial intervention to ensure fair
and impartial investigations in corruption cases.
The "Third Judges Case" (1998), or Presidential Reference Case, was a crucial
clarification and expansion of the Collegium system for judicial appointments
established in the Second Judges Case. Following concerns and differing
interpretations about the Collegium's composition and functioning, the President
sought the Supreme Court's advisory opinion. The Supreme Court, in response,
reiterated the primacy of the judiciary in appointments but elaborated on the
Collegium. It expanded the Collegium to a five-judge body, including the Chief Justice
of India and the four seniormost Supreme Court judges. Furthermore, it clarified that
"consultation" with the CJI meant consultation with the Collegium, and that the
Collegium's recommendation, after consultation within its expanded body and with
consultees from the High Courts for High Court appointments, was binding on the
executive. The Third Judges Case thus solidified and refined the Collegium system,
further cementing judicial control over appointments to the higher judiciary in India
and addressing ambiguities left after the Second Judges Case.
The ADR case of 2002 was a landmark Public Interest Litigation that revolutionized
electoral transparency in India. The Association for Democratic Reforms sought to
mandate disclosure of crucial information about candidates contesting elections. The
Supreme Court, upholding the citizen's right to information and freedom of expression
(Article 19(1)(a)), directed the Election Commission of India to ensure that candidates,
along with their nomination papers, must disclose information regarding their criminal
records, assets, liabilities, and educational qualifications. This judgment empowered
voters by providing them with essential information to make informed choices,
significantly enhancing transparency and accountability in the electoral process and
marking a crucial step towards cleaner politics in India.
TMA Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002)
This case was a landmark judgment clarifying the rights of minority educational
institutions, particularly unaided private institutions, under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court, in a comprehensive ruling, affirmed the fundamental
right of minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions,
emphasizing their autonomy in this sphere. However, the Court also clarified that this
right was not absolute and was subject to reasonable regulations aimed at preventing
maladministration, ensuring excellence, and maintaining standards of education. The
judgment aimed to strike a balance between protecting minority rights and ensuring
broader societal interests in education, outlining aspects where regulations could be
imposed, such as in admission procedures to ensure fairness and prevent capitation
fees, while upholding the core administrative rights of these institutions.
This case centered on the question of whether ordinary citizens have the right to fly
the national flag as a fundamental right. Industrialist Naveen Jindal challenged
restrictions in the Flag Code of India that limited flag hoisting to only certain days and
individuals. The Supreme Court, upholding Jindal's argument, declared that flying the
national flag by citizens with respect and dignity is indeed a fundamental right under
Article 19(1)(a) - freedom of speech and expression. The Court reasoned that
expressing national pride and patriotism through the flag is a form of free expression.
This landmark judgment led to amendments in the Flag Code, allowing ordinary
citizens to fly the national flag respectfully on all days, significantly expanding the
scope of freedom of expression and national symbolism.
This case (in 1996, with subsequent orders in 2006) was a landmark Public Interest
Litigation focused on much-needed police reforms in India. Prakash Singh, a former
police officer, sought directions from the Supreme Court to implement
recommendations aimed at insulating the police from political interference and
enhancing their efficiency and accountability. In its 2006 judgment, the Supreme
Court issued a series of six binding directives to all states and union territories,
encompassing measures such as establishing State Security Commissions to insulate
police from undue political influence, ensuring merit-based appointments and fixed
tenures for key police officers like the DGP and SP, separating investigation from law
and order functions, setting up Police Establishment Boards for transfers and postings,
and establishing Police Complaints Authorities to address public grievances against
the police. The Prakash Singh case is crucial as it provided a concrete framework for
police reform at the national level, though its implementation across states has been
inconsistent, it remains a touchstone for advocating for police autonomy and
accountability in India.
M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India (2006)
This case further solidified the Basic Structure doctrine in relation to the Ninth
Schedule of the Constitution. The case examined the validity of numerous laws placed
in the Ninth Schedule after the Kesavananda Bharati judgment's cut-off date of April
24, 1973. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, overruled the implied
immunity previously accorded to Ninth Schedule laws. It held that while laws placed in
the Ninth Schedule before the cut-off date were protected, any law added to the Ninth
Schedule after April 24, 1973, would be subject to judicial review based on the Basic
Structure doctrine. This meant that even if a law were placed in the Ninth Schedule, it
could be struck down if it violated the Basic Structure of the Constitution, reinforcing
the supremacy of the Constitution and the enduring relevance of the Basic Structure
doctrine as a limitation on Parliament's power, even in the context of the Ninth
Schedule.
The Naz Foundation case is a landmark legal battle for LGBTQ+ rights in India. The
NGO Naz Foundation challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code, which criminalized "carnal intercourse against the order of nature,"
arguing it violated fundamental rights. The Delhi High Court, in a historic 2009
judgment, ruled in favour of Naz Foundation, declaring Section 377 unconstitutional
insofar as it criminalized consensual homosexual acts between adults. The High Court
held that Section 377 violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution, relating to
equality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty. While this was a monumental
victory, the Supreme Court later overturned this ruling in 2013 in Suresh Kumar
Koushal v. Naz Foundation. However, the fight initiated by the Naz Foundation
continued, ultimately culminating in the Supreme Court's 2018 Navtej Singh Johar v.
Union of India judgment which finally decriminalized consensual homosexual acts,
building upon the foundation laid by the initial Naz Foundation case and its powerful
arguments for equality and dignity. Thus, the "Naz case" is often used to refer to the
entire legal struggle, and particularly the initial Delhi High Court victory that sparked
the movement towards decriminalization.
This case involved Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse who was in a persistent vegetative state
for 37 years after a brutal sexual assault. Pinki Virani, a journalist, filed a petition in
the Supreme Court seeking euthanasia for Aruna, arguing for her right to a dignified
death and against prolonged suffering. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging
Aruna's tragic situation and the ethical questions raised, ultimately rejected the plea
for active euthanasia. However, the Court legalized passive euthanasia in India under
strict guidelines, recognizing the right to withdraw medical support for patients in a
persistent vegetative state. The Court differentiated between active and passive
euthanasia, and while not allowing Aruna's plea directly, the case is significant for
initiating the legal framework for passive euthanasia in India, balancing the right to
life with the right to die with dignity in cases of irreversible suffering, while also
emphasizing the sanctity of life and the state's role in protecting it.
This case is a significant case concerning the right to information and its application to
elections. Building upon the ADR case which mandated disclosure of candidate's
criminal records, assets etc., PUCL further sought to enhance electoral transparency,
particularly regarding candidate and political party finances and expenditure. While
not as singularly famous as some other cases, PUCL's interventions, often working
alongside ADR, have been instrumental in pushing for greater transparency and
accountability in the Indian electoral process, advocating for the voter's right to know
and contributing to a series of judgments that have progressively strengthened
electoral democracy through enhanced information access. Specifically, PUCL has
often been involved in cases related to election expenditure monitoring and
disclosure, aiming to ensure free and fair elections by curbing the influence of money
and promoting transparency in political funding.
This case was a Public Interest Litigation seeking to reform the civil services in India,
aiming to enhance their efficiency, accountability, and insulation from political
interference. The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for reforms, issued a set of
directions to the central and state governments. These directions included
establishing fixed tenures for key civil service positions to ensure stability and
professional growth, creating Civil Services Boards to manage transfers and postings
based on merit and performance rather than political considerations, and ensuring
transparency and objective criteria in promotions and performance appraisals. The
T.S.R. Subramanian case aimed to bring about systemic improvements in civil service
governance, reduce political patronage, and promote a more professional and
accountable bureaucracy, although its full implementation has remained a challenge.
The case, often referred to as the NALSA judgment, is a watershed moment for
transgender rights in India. The Supreme Court, in this landmark decision, formally
recognized transgender people as a 'third gender'. Crucially, the Court affirmed that
transgender individuals are entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, including equality, dignity, and personal liberty. Furthermore, the Court
directed the central and state governments to take affirmative action to ensure the
social, economic, and educational inclusion of transgender people, including providing
reservations in jobs and education, and to combat stigma and discrimination against
the transgender community. The NALSA judgment was transformative in legally
recognizing transgender identity and laying the foundation for legal protections and
affirmative action measures to address the systemic discrimination faced by
transgender individuals in India.
This case struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, as
unconstitutional, marking a landmark victory for freedom of speech and expression in
India. Shreya Singhal challenged Section 66A, which criminalized the online posting of
"offensive" or "annoying" content, arguing it was vague and violated Article 19(1)(a).
The Supreme Court agreed, finding Section 66A to be overly broad and ambiguously
worded, leading to a "chilling effect" on legitimate online expression and not falling
within the 'reasonable restrictions' permitted under Article 19(2). The Court
emphasized the importance of free speech in the digital age and established crucial
principles for regulating online content, ensuring that restrictions are narrowly
tailored, clearly defined, and directly linked to permissible grounds under Article 19(2).
The Shayara Bano case is a watershed moment for Muslim women's rights in India,
famously known as the "Triple Talaq case." Shayara Bano challenged the practice of
instantaneous triple talaq (Talaq-e-Biddat), where a Muslim man could divorce his wife
irrevocably by saying "talaq" three times in one sitting. The Supreme Court, in a 3:2
majority judgment, declared Triple Talaq unconstitutional, holding it violated
fundamental rights, particularly Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (non-discrimination),
and Article 21 (dignity and life). The majority judges found Triple Talaq to be arbitrary,
discriminatory against women, and not an essential religious practice protected by
Article 25. While the minority dissented, the majority ruling effectively outlawed Triple
Talaq, providing significant relief and dignity to Muslim women and sparking further
debate about reforms in Muslim personal law and the potential for a Uniform Civil
Code in India.
The case is a landmark judgment that unequivocally recognized the right to privacy as
a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. Arising from challenges to the
Aadhaar scheme, the Supreme Court overruled previous restrictive interpretations and
declared that privacy is intrinsic to Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) and
other fundamental rights. The Court emphasized that privacy is not an absolute right
but can be reasonably restricted, laying down a three-pronged test for any such
restrictions: legality, legitimate state aim, and proportionality. The Puttaswamy
judgment is transformative, establishing privacy as a core constitutional value, with
wide-ranging implications for individual liberties, data protection, and the relationship
between the individual and the state in India.
This case led to the decriminalization of adultery in India. Joseph Shine challenged
Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, the adultery law, arguing it was discriminatory
against women and violated fundamental rights. The Supreme Court unanimously
struck down Section 497 as unconstitutional, holding that it violated Articles 14, 15,
and 21 of the Constitution by discriminating against women, treating them as chattel
of their husbands, and denying them sexual autonomy and dignity. The Court
emphasized that a husband is not the master of his wife and adultery should be
treated as a civil wrong, not a criminal offense. The Joseph Shine judgment was a
significant step towards gender equality and recognized women's agency within
marriage, removing a law rooted in patriarchal notions of female ownership and
control.
The Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India (2018) case delivered a monumental victory
for LGBTQ+ rights in India by decriminalizing consensual homosexual conduct. Navtej
Singh Johar and other petitioners challenged Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code,
which criminalized "carnal intercourse against the order of nature," arguing it violated
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous and historic judgment, struck
down Section 377 insofar as it criminalized consensual homosexual acts between
adults. The Court emphatically held that Section 377 violated Articles 14 (equality), 15
(non-discrimination), 19 (freedom of expression), and 21 (privacy, dignity, and liberty)
of the Constitution. The judgment recognized the LGBTQ+ community's right to
equality, dignity, and sexual autonomy, affirming that sexual orientation is a natural
and immutable aspect of identity and that criminalizing consensual homosexual acts
was discriminatory and violated fundamental human rights, marking a transformative
moment for inclusivity and individual liberty in India.
M. Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2019)
The M. Siddiq case (2019), officially M. Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors., delivered
the Supreme Court's final verdict in the long-standing Ayodhya dispute concerning the
Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid site. In a unanimous judgment, the Court awarded the
disputed land to Hindus for the construction of a Ram Temple, based on archaeological
evidence supporting the pre-existence of a Hindu structure and faith-based claims,
while acknowledging that the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 was illegal.
Simultaneously, the Court ordered the allocation of an alternative five-acre plot of
land in Ayodhya to the Sunni Waqf Board for the construction of a mosque. The M.
Siddiq case effectively brought closure to a decades-old religious and political conflict,
seeking to balance historical claims, religious sentiments, and secular principles,
though the judgment itself remains a subject of diverse interpretations and opinions.
The Anuradha Bhasin case (2020), or Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, addressed
the legality of the internet shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir following the revocation
of Article 370. Anuradha Bhasin, editor of Kashmir Times, challenged the indefinite
internet blockade arguing it violated freedom of speech and expression, and freedom
of the press. The Supreme Court, in a significant judgment, affirmed that freedom of
speech and expression, and freedom of the press, extend to the internet and are
protected under Article 19(1)(a). The Court declared that indefinite internet
suspensions are illegal and that any restrictions on internet access must be
temporary, necessary, proportionate, and subject to judicial review. The ruling
mandated that restriction orders be publicly accessible and justified, establishing
important safeguards against arbitrary internet shutdowns and reinforcing internet
freedom as a fundamental right in India.
The Rambabu Singh Thakur v. Sunil Arora (2020) case addressed the critical issue of
increasing criminalization in Indian politics. The Supreme Court, responding to a
petition seeking stronger measures for voter awareness, directed the Election
Commission of India to ensure greater transparency regarding the criminal
antecedents of candidates contesting elections. Building upon previous judgments
mandating candidate disclosure in Form 26, the Court directed the Election
Commission to frame guidelines requiring political parties to publish the criminal
history of their candidates prominently in newspapers, television, websites, and social
media platforms. Furthermore, parties were mandated to explain the reasons for
choosing candidates with criminal backgrounds and why other individuals without
criminal records were not selected. The Rambabu Singh Thakur case aimed to
empower voters with comprehensive information and to hold political parties
accountable for candidate selection, furthering the fight against criminal elements in
the electoral process and promoting informed democratic choices.
Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India (2020)
This case challenged the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) 2018 circular that effectively
banned banks and financial institutions from providing services to cryptocurrency
exchanges and traders. The Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI),
representing cryptocurrency exchanges, argued that the RBI ban was unconstitutional
and violated fundamental rights. The Supreme Court struck down the RBI circular,
holding it to be disproportionate and violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution,
which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any occupation,
trade, or business. The Court reasoned that the RBI's blanket ban was not justified as
the harms caused by cryptocurrency trading were not proven to be severe enough to
warrant such a drastic restriction on economic activity and fundamental rights,
emphasizing the principle of proportionality in restricting fundamental freedoms even
in the context of economic regulation.
This case addressed the critical issue of witness protection in criminal trials,
particularly the extent to which witness protection measures can impact the rights of
the accused to a fair trial. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of witness
protection schemes to ensure witnesses can testify freely and fearlessly, but
cautioned that such measures should not automatically undermine the credibility of
protected witnesses in the eyes of the court. The Court clarified that witness
protection measures must be proportionate, justified by specific threats, and
implemented in a way that doesn't prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial,
including the right to cross-examine witnesses effectively. The Samiullah case thus
underscored the need to strike a delicate balance between ensuring witness safety
and upholding the fundamental principles of a fair and just criminal justice system,
providing guidance on the implementation and judicial scrutiny of witness protection
programs in India.
The case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India is a landmark legal battle in India
concerning the governance structure of Delhi, a Union Territory with a Legislative
Assembly. At its heart, the case is about the division of powers between the elected
Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD), represented by its
Council of Ministers and Chief Minister, and the Lieutenant Governor (LG), who is
appointed by the Central Government. The core dispute revolves around who has
ultimate executive control over the administration of Delhi, particularly concerning
"services," which broadly refers to bureaucracy and civil servants. Over years, the
case has seen multiple rounds in the Supreme Court, with fluctuating interpretations.
Initially, the Supreme Court in 2018 and 2019 rulings appeared to favour the GNCTD,
emphasizing that the LG is bound by the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers in
most matters, except in matters where the LG is required to act in their own discretion
or is entrusted with functions by law. However, disputes persisted, especially
regarding the control over "services." Finally, in a crucial judgment in 2023, a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clarified that while the GNCTD has
legislative and executive power over subjects in the State and Concurrent Lists
(excluding Entry 1, 2, and 18 of the State List and subjects ‘entrusted’ to the Union in
List II), "services" fall outside the purview of the GNCTD's executive control. This 2023
ruling essentially upheld the Union Government's legislative and executive
competence over "services" in Delhi, limiting the GNCTD's control in this crucial area.
The case underscores the unique constitutional position of Delhi and the ongoing
tension in balancing representative democracy in a Union Territory with the Central
Government's overarching interests in the national capital.
The ADR 2024 case (again, same petitioner as the 2002 ADR case), delivered a
resounding blow to the Electoral Bond scheme in India. ADR challenged the scheme's
validity, arguing it promoted opacity in political funding and violated the citizen's right
to information about political donors and parties. In a unanimous verdict, the Supreme
Court struck down the Electoral Bond scheme as unconstitutional, holding it violated
Article 19(1)(a) (Right to Information). The Court reasoned that the anonymity
provided by the bonds undermined transparency, hindered informed voting, and
facilitated potential quid pro quo corruption. The judgment mandated disclosure of
donors and recipients of all electoral bonds since the scheme's inception, requiring the
State Bank of India to provide this data to the Election Commission for public release,
marking a significant victory for electoral transparency and the right to know in
political funding.
Aligarh Muslim University & Ors. v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. (2024)
The Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment on the minority status of
Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). Overruling its previous decision in the Azeez Basha
case, the Court, in a 4:3 majority, laid down new parameters for determining whether
an educational institution qualifies as a 'minority institution' under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution. This article grants religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish
and administer educational institutions. The Court emphasized the need to trace the
origin and establishment of the institution, the purpose behind its establishment, its
implementation, and its administration. It clarified that minority status is not
surrendered simply because an institution was created by a statute or upon
incorporation. This judgment has significant implications for minority rights and
education in India, particularly for AMU, which can now rightfully claim its minority
status.
The case formally known as In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution, centered on the
constitutional validity of the Indian government's decision to abrogate Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution. Article 370 had granted special autonomous status to the
state of Jammu and Kashmir for decades. In August 2019, the Indian government
effectively revoked this article through Presidential Orders and subsequent
parliamentary actions, simultaneously bifurcating the state into two Union Territories.
This move was immediately challenged in the Supreme Court of India by various
petitioners who argued that the process and substance of the abrogation were
unconstitutional, violating the federal structure and the democratic rights of the
people of Jammu and Kashmir. The core legal questions revolved around whether the
government's method of abrogating Article 370, particularly through Presidential
Orders and without the explicit consent of the State's Constituent Assembly (which no
longer existed), was permissible under the Indian Constitution. After extensive
hearings, in December 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the government's decision,
ruling that the abrogation was constitutionally valid. The Court essentially affirmed the
government's actions and dismissed the petitions challenging the revocation of Article
370, bringing an end to the legal challenge and solidifying the altered status of Jammu
and Kashmir within the Indian Union.