TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING

NON-ALIGNMENT

K.P. MISRA*

More than three decades have passed since the non-aligned movement
became a distinct international orientation evolved and shaped by the
foreign policy practices of essentially the new states of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. In the process, there has emerged a certain theoretical
framework the components of which are not adequately understood and
appreciated at least in some sections of scholarly and diplomatic opinion.
This article is an attempt to offer some clarifications in this regard.
’

We may begin with the consideration whether non alignment is a negative

policy. This point has been raised in two respects-substantive and termi-
nological.
Substantively, it is argued that non-alignment was, to begin with, a
reaction to the Cold War, which was characterized by aggressive bloc-
building by the two Super Powers. Thus dissociation from bloc politics or
military alliances became a focal point of non-alignment. And now, since
the character of international relations has changed, so goes the argument
further, the rationale or the relevance of non-alignment has also disappea-
red. At any rate it is now considerably circumscribed. This point, repea-
tedly made since the beginning of detente, is based on insufficient know-
ledge and understanding of the motivations and inspirations of non-align-
ment.
Non-alignment was chosen to be an instrument or a means of foreign
policy by its founders like India in order to give fuller meaning and con-
tent to their newly achieved political independence. They were not content
with just formal transfer of political power: they wanted to go beyond and
shape their destiny autonomously and in a manner which protected and
promoted their national interests, which lay essentially in accelerated
socio-economic development of their weak and backward societies. Inter-
national peace was a prerequisite for the achievement of this objective,
and the Cold War, bloc politics, and power politics needed to be

*Dr Misra is Dean and Professor of International Politics at the School.

24

opposed. Soon after the dawn of India’s independence, Jawaharlal

Nehru declared in the course of a reference to foreign policy that &dquo;our
policy is not a negative policy&dquo; and that &dquo;ultimately foreign policy is the
outcome of economic policy&dquo;.1
For about a decade and a half from the beginning of the historic process
of decolonization in the period following the Second World War this point
was made on numerous occasions by the leaders of the non-aligned move-
ment. It was given formal and organized expression by the Cairo Prepa-
ratory Conference held in June 1961 to discuss the holding of the first ever
summit conference of non-aligned countries. After considerable discussion,
the criteria of non-alignment were laid down. They were five in number. It
is instructive that the criteria gave top position to &dquo;an independent policy
based on peaceful co-existence and non-alignment&dquo;. Next in importance was
support for &dquo;movements for national independence&dquo;. The last three points
no doubt dealt with prohibitions but were in fact facets of just one point.

These points enjoined the non-aligned countries not to become members of

multilateral military alliances, not to concede military bases, and not to
become members of bilateral or regional defence arrangements
made &dquo;in the context of Great Power conflicts&dquo;.2 Thus these prohibitions
were not absolute: military alliances and foreign military bases should be
avoided only if they aggravated tension in international relations and
opened up possibilities of conflict or war. Here again a partially negative
orientation was to achieve the positive result of peace and development.
Almost a decade later, in September 1970, the Third Conference of
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka urged
its participants to rededicate themselves to the following basic aims of
non-alignment:

...the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening

the role of non-aligned countries within the United Nations so that it
will be a more effective obstacle against all forms of aggressive action
and the threat or use of force against the freedom, independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of any country, the fight against
colonialism and racialism which are a negation of human equality and
dignity; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the ending

J1awaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-

April 1961 (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broad-
casting, Publications Division, 1961), pp. 32 and 24. More such quotations can
easily be gathered from the speeches of Nehru and other pioneers of the non-aligned
movement.
For the text of the criteria,
2 see G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment
(London, 1966), pp. 285-6.
 25

of the arms race followed by universal disarmament; opposition

to Great-Power military bases and foreign troops on the soil
of other nations in the context of Great-Power conflicts and
colonial and racist suppression; the universality, and the streng-
thening of the efficacy of the United Nations; and the struggle for
economic and mutual co-operation on a basis of equality and mutual
benefit.3

It is true that at no time during the last three decades has a cohesive
and well-integrated theoretical framework of non-alignment been evolved.
It is also true that this has led to varying interpretations of non-alignment
and hence to confusion. However, considering the above evidence and the
major thrust of non-alignment as has emerged during the 1970s, it would
be unfair to characterize non-alignment either as a negative concept
or as a concept designed to be relevant only in the context of the Cold
War. Even during the Cold War there was an organic link between it and
peace and development. In the 1980s, following the partial replacement
of the Cold War by détente, the non-aligned movement has addressed
itself to a host of issues and problems affecting the socio-economic deve-
lopment of the new nations. Consequently its efforts are now more com-
prehensive, and its approach deeper and more sharply in focus. It is,
therefore, suggested that negativism or prohibitionism, which is apparent
in the term &dquo;non-alignment&dquo;, should not be given a superficial treatment.
The basic substantive thrust of non-alignment is distinctly and unambigu-
ously positive and developmental, and this can be lost sight of only at the
risk of objective understanding.
It may also be added that since the infancy of non-alignment (1947-54)
synchronized with a time of great tensions, with a time when the Cold
War between the two Super Powers was at its intensest, it was logical that
the movement should give high priority to this item on its agenda of
work. It is, however, a fact that the Cold War was not the sole reference
point of non-alignment. Nor was it even a critical one. The Cold War
arose from, and was kept up by, a wider complex of national and inter-
national factors in the post-war period. This can be substantiated by the
fact that the genesis of non-alignment preceded the Cold War.4

Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1978 (Belgrade, 1978),

3
p.45.
A former Foreign Secretary has pointed out: "The principle of non-alignment...
4
was accepted by the Congress at the Haripura session (1939)." In support he quotes
a resolution passed there. It said: "India was resolved to maintain friendly and co-
operative relations with all nations and avoid entanglement in military and similar
alliances which tend to divide up the world into rival groups and thus endanger world
peace." See Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta, 1977), p. 22.
26

Terminologically, since the term &dquo;non-alignment&dquo; owes its origin to

India, it is relevant to consider the ways of thinking of the Indian people.
Even a cursory look at the philosophical and civilizational tradition
indicates that the Indians have been fond of noun with negative.5 It is
through negative terms that they have expressed positive and affirmative
ideas of profound. significance in their social evolution. The point can be
illustrated by giving some examples. Instead of saying &dquo;victory and defeat&dquo;,
what is said is &dquo;victory and non-victory&dquo; (jayaajayau). Instead of &dquo;many&dquo;
there is &dquo;non-one&dquo; (aneka). At the more popular level we are familiar
with non-violence (ahiinsaa) as against peace, non-idleness (apramaada) as
against exertion, and non-grudge (avaira) as against tolerance. These
examples can be multiplied, particularly from the literature on Buddhism
and Jainism. What is evident is that these negative words have positive
meanings of great significance. &dquo;To other nations&dquo;, as Nakamura rightly
points out, &dquo;showing the moral precepts in the negative form seemed some-
what powerless and unsatisfactory, but to the Indians, who lay stress on the
negative phase and pursue the non-determinant, the negative form of
expression has more positive and powerful meanings
It would lead to better understanding if it is remembered that Mahatma
Gandhi was influenced by this philosophical current and in turn influenced
India’s freedom struggle, whose principal spokesman in the realm of foreign
policy and international relations was Jawaharlal Nehru. It is Nehru, more
than any other leader, who articulated the country’s foreign policy, the
main instrument of which was non-alignment. Hence terminological
negativism needs deeper understanding of the cultural psyche of those
who coined the term &dquo;non-alignment&dquo;.
In sum, neither from the substantive point of view, which is very important,
nor from the terminological point of view is non-alignment a negative concept.
Its essential thrust is positive in favour of national reconstruction aided
and supported by appropriate international transformation.

II

The second point is that non-alignment is not neutrality. Not only is this
aspect more complicated than the one which we have discussed in the

The reasons for this are explained by a Japanese scholar. He says: "The Indians
5
become to aim at the non-determinant at last, as the result of their way of thinking by
which the universal is aimed at. To say in general, the universal is less limited than
the individual, so that on the last point of aiming at the universal they come to think
the non-alignment. Thus the negative character of Indian culture comes into exi-
stence." See H. Nakamura, The Ways of Thinking of Asian Peoples (Tokyo, 1960),
p. 23.
Ibid.
6
 27

preceding section, but it has also attracted wider attention in diplomatic

pronouncements and scholarly writings.7 During the early post-war years
most Western scholars and statesmen obstinately refused to accept and use
the term ’,’non-alignment&dquo;. For some time the term &dquo;neutrality&dquo; was used;
thereafter &dquo;neutralism&dquo; became attractive. One can come across these
terms even in the current literature on non-alignment.
Sometimes a scenario of bipolarity is sought to be established between
non-alignment and neutrality, one section suggesting that the two
concepts have nothing in common and the other insisting that the two are
identical or at any rate similar in their essentials. It seems that both views
represent misleading oversimplifications. An objective study would reveal
that the truth lies somewhere in between. -

Neutrality should be studied in two fragments, and the second fragment

should be further stratified into two sub-fragments.
The first fragment consists in neutrality as an integral part of the
international law of warfare, the legal basis of which is mostly to be found
in the Hague Conventions of 1907. The conventions vest certain rights in
neutral states and make certain duties obligatory for them. Under them,
a neutral state is obliged to abstain from participation in an armed conflict

and also from assistance to any of the parties to such a conflict. Participants
in a conflict are on their part required to respect the territory of neutral
countries, which includes abstention from use of such territory for move-
ment of troops and munitions of war.8 This is what is called the classical
notion of neutrality, which is simple and limited in scope in terms of the
area and the time (or period) of its operation. It is evident that this
fragment of , neutrality is a different concept and has little in common
with non-alignment.
The second fragment involves consideration of the status and policies of
the four neutral European countries-Switzerland, Austria, and Finland
on the one hand and Sweden on the other. Some of these countries have
maintained their status as neutral states during times of war in the past
and are now conducting their foreign policies so as to be able to stay
neutral in the event of a war breaking out in future also. Thus, with an
eye on future developments, they stay out of military alliances during peace-
time. Their policies have two obvious implications: like non-alignment,
neutrals dissociate themselves from bloc politics; and their status is a
peace-time phenomenon also.
For a representative listing of these writings, see K.P. Misra, "The Concept of
7
Non-Alignment: Its Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P. Misra, ed., Studies
in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1969), p. 90. Also see Peter Lyon, Neutralism
(Leicester, 1963).
It is, of course, important to see how far the Hague Conventions have become
8
d ated, but this is outside the scope of this study.
28

In spite of this common denominator the European neutrals may be

divided into two categories. Switzerland, Austria, and Finland form the
first category; the basis of their neutral status is legal. Sweden belongs
to the second category; its neutrality is basically political. The neutrality
of Switzerland has been a part of the national tradition of that country for
hundreds of years. It first gained international recognition at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 and was rearmed by the Treaty of Peace of Versailles
in 1919. As a consequence of these legal developments and from continuous
practice, Switzerland accepts the duty to observe the legal rules of neutra-
lity in all wars between other states. Even during peace-time it may not
accept obligations which might land it in a war. In return, the other
Powers guarantees the integrity of its territory.
As for Austria, its neutrality came much later. It was in 1955 that
the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States signed a treaty to that effect. Highlighting its
implications, the Austrian Foreign Minister said: &dquo;This instrument will
constitute the starting-point of a new and happy era of Austrian history,
which in future will unfold under the aegis of a policy of neutrality and
independence against all states A few days later the Austrian National
Council adopted a motion on neutrality which, among other things, said
that &dquo;Austria of her own free will hereby declares her permanent neutrality&dquo;.
Two major implications of this were that Austria would refrain from
joining any military alliance and also disallow foreign military bases upon
its territory, Interestingly the Austrians stress that their neutrality is a
self-chosen policy. However, as we know, this policy has been affirmed by
the Austrian State Treaty in a manner that gives the Great Powers reason
to expect Austria to continue to adhere to a policy of neutrality. Neverthe-
less what is important to note is that by &dquo;accepting a neutral Austria, the
big powers agreed on establishing a neutral belt or ’locking device’ lying
across the centre of Europe and ranging over 800 km from Vienna to
Geneva&dquo;.11
The status of Finland and Sweden merits mention in as much as the
countries in the Nordic region as a whole have a tendency to keep out of
the power politics of the Great Powers. Broadly, this gives them a sort of
neutralist orientation in their foreign policies. Thus Norway and Denmark,
even when they became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

For details, see Alfred Verdress, The Permanent Neutrality of the Republic of
9
Austria (Wien, 1967), p. 7.
10 these two principles
Interestingly were incorporated six years later in the decla-

ration made by the Cairo Preparatory Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries.

Daniel Frei, "Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Convergencies and Contrasts"
11
(an unpublished paper submitted to the Eleventh World Congress of International
olitical Science Association, 1979), p. 5.
 29

tion (NATO), insisted on retaining a certain degree of neutrality: both

refused to the stationing of the troops and nuclear weapons of other
countries on their soil. Of course this does not give them a neutral
status.
Finland’s neutrality, like the neutrality of the other countries of Western
Europe, is conditioned by its geographical location. The country is very
close geographically to the Soviet Union. Its neutrality is based on two
premises: (i) It could ignore the vital security interests of the Soviet
Union only at its peril; and (ii) it could not seek security or protection
from others. In 1948, therefore, following its defeat at the hands of the
Soviet Union in the Second World War, it concluded a Treaty of Friend-
ship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Under
this arrangement, it undertook not to permit its territorry to be used as a
base for aggression, or as a route of aggression, against the Soviet Union.
In return, the Soviet Union recognized its desire to stay outside the conflict
of interests between the Big Powers. This reciprocal arrangement is the
essence of Finnish neutrality. It would thus seem that this neutrality has
a legal basis in a bilateral treaty; it cannot, therefore, be altered without

doing violence to treaty provisions. The Finns deny that their neutral
status is something &dquo;imposed upon&dquo; them though this contention appears
to be controversial.12
And then there is the neutral status of Sweden, which has managed to
keep out of the two world wars and to protect its independence and secu-
rity in the face of the East-West conflict. Its neutrality is the centre-piece
of its foreign policy. Indicating the essential dimensions of his country’s
neutrality, a distinguished Swedish diplomat once referred to two obliga-
tions :

The first is that no commitments must be made in peace-time that

prevent us from fulfilling the obligations of a neutral Power under inter-
national law in a war between other states.
The second is that in peace-time we must pursue a policy that inspires
and sustains the confidence of the rest of the world in our determination
and ability to remain a neutral and independent state in war-time.13

These points make it clear that the main aim of Sweden’s foreign policy is
The Finnish view has been articulated by its President, who has said: "I have
12
heard it said that neutrality has been imposed upon us. This is not so. It is a way of
solving a problem of security that has its roots in our history, and it reflects, I
believe, a realistic appraisal of our national interests and possibilities and a true
understanding of our position in the world today.’ See Urho Kekkonen, Neutrality:
The Finnish Position (London, 1973), p. 87.
Sverker Astrom, Sweden’s Policy of Neutrality (Stockholm, 1977), p. 9.
13
30

to maintain a posture in peace-time which would enable it to remain out of

armed conflicts in the future. This neutral status is not founded upon any
law, municipal or international.
Lastly, a point of academic interest is the implication of Article 2(5) of
the Charter of the United Nations for the status of neutrality. At least in
the early years of the post-war period it used to be argued that to keep
neutral/non-aligned was inconsistent with this provision, which lays
down, inter alia, as follows:

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is takiilg
preventive or enforcement action. 14
And then there are the provisions contained in Chapter VII (Articles 39-51)
of the Charter relating to action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
It may be argued that a couple of factors have weakened the validity of
the view that neutrality/non-alignment is not permissible under the Charter.
First, Article 27(3) of the Charter provides that the decisions of the
Security Council require a majority of votes, including the concurring votes
of all the permanent members, for collective action against a permanent
member. This provision leaves Member states free to exercise their discre-
tion in a case where a permanent member is involved. Such a situation
clearly permits a state to remain neutral or non-aligned in case of conflict.
Further, in order to make the system of collective security effective, it is
necessary that an agreement or agreements specifying the required details of
the operational aspect should be made in terms of Article 43 of the
Charter. As is well known, no such agreement has been concluded, and in
the absence of such an agreement Member states are free to chart out a
course of action of their own. Here again the option to remain non-aligned
in a conflict is available. As Hans Morgenthau puts it, the United Nations
&dquo;did not kill neutrality, but rather sentenced it to die, staying indefinitely
the execution of the sentence&dquo;.15
The foregoing description and discussion indicate that although the four
European neutrals may have acquired guest status in non-aligned gatherings,
neutrality and non-alignment are in essence two different cups of tea. In
summary:
(1) In formalistic terms the neutrality of three of the fqur countries is

Article 2(5) of the UN Charter.

14
15
Hans J. Morgenthau, "Neutrality and Neutralism", in his Dilemmas of Politics
(Chicago, Ill., 1958), p. 192.
 31

founded on either municipal or international law. This legal status cannot

be transformed without violating the legal provisions relevant to them.
Non-alignment on the other hand is based on political considerations and
can be changed without recourse to legalities.

(2) The main concern of all the four European neutrals is war, i.e. to
stay neutral in that eventuality. Their peace-time neutrality is really a
prerequisite to their main war-time objective. Non-alignment, as is
obvious, is basically and almost entirely a peace-time policy.
(3) In case of war, the response of the neutrals would obviously be to
insist on the retention of their legal status. As against this, the non-aligned
may find it necessary to take sides on the basis of right and wrong.
Unlike neutrals, the non-aligned have no prior commitment to behave in
a particular way; their policy is open and is determined on the merits of
each case as they see it.
(4) European neutrality is mainly passive in character, with several
don’ts (prohibitions) and very few dos. Non-alignment is on the contrary
an active policy which seeks to take a variety of initiatives to transform the
international system in a manner which serves the national interest. The
very active and increasingly important and multi-faceted role that the
leaders of the non-aligned movement have been playing substantiates this
point.
(5) A related point is about the objectives of neutrality and of non-
alignment. The endeavour of the neutrals is to retain their status in case
of war. Thus seen, their objective is limited. The objective of non-align-
ment is to reverse the course of the history of the preceding centuries marked
by colonialism and imperialism. Indeed it is much wider: it is to establish
an international order based on justice, whether in the field of the economy
or information or science and technology. Unlike neutrals, the non-aligned
are by and large poor and developing countries which had long been victims
of exploitation and injustice. Their teeming millions require urgent attention
and action for bettering their lot, a situation which is conspicuous by its
absence in Europe.16
(6) Whatever the relevance of the provisions of the UN Charter for
neutrality, they do not inhibit the non-aligned movement in any way.
III

The similarity or otherwise of non-alignment to the Monroe Doctrine

(sometimes characterized as neutrality or isolationism) also merits attention.

For a list of the objectives of the non-aligned movement, see Bojana Tadic,
16
"Non-Alignment and Neutrality in the Contemporary World", Review of International
Affairs (Belgrade), no. 653, 5 June 1977, pp. 11-12.
32

Though the Monroe Doctrine was formally enunciated in December 1823,

it was more or less a running theme of US foreign policy from the time of
the founding of the Republic to the Second World War. As we know, the
United States rose to the top position in the international system during
this period. Some people attribute this rise, at least partly, to the US
policy of neutrality. It is further suggested that the non-aligned countries
are attempting to follow the same policy in order to reap a similar harvest.
For a balanced understanding of the inspirations and objectives of the
Monroe Doctrine, it may be recalled that a concert of European Powers,
known as the Holy Alliance, consisting of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and
England (which opted out subsequently), came into being in 1815. It was
a quadruple alliance but became a quintuple one when France joined it in
1818. This alliance was instrumental in suppressing revolutions in Spain,
Portugal, Naples, and Greece within years of its inception. The Monroe
Administration feared that it might intervene in Latin America also.
Latin America in this period was &dquo;an inert mass of Indian serfs,
Negro slaves, and mixed breeds&dquo; and was being ruled by Spanish
viceroys.17 When Napoleon invaded Spain, Spain’s control over its Latin
American provinces became loose; so much so that these formed provisional
Governments of their own during the second decade of the nineteenth
century. In order to achieve their objective of detaching themselves from
Spain, they sought recognition from America, which thought it to be in
its national interest to respond favourably. Thus Argentina was recognized
in 1819; Chile, Colombia, La Plata, Mexico, and Peru were recognized
in 1822.
In view of persistent rumours of a European intervention in the Latin
American situation, President James Monroe in his Annual Message to
Congress in 1823 declared:
... the American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered
as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.

He further announced:

...with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we

have not interfered [Florida?] and shall not interfere. But with the
Governments who have declared their independence...we could not
view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling
in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other

Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the
17
American Republic (New York, N.Y., 1958), vol. 1, p. 452
 33

light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the

United States. 18

In return he promised that the United States would not interfere in

the affairs of the European Powers.
With these facts in the background, let us ask ourselves what the purpose
of this &dquo;most honoured principle&dquo; of US foreign policy was.l9 Was it to
protect some principles? Or was it really to promote the national interests
of the United States? Were the principles mentioned just to serve as a
facade or a mask? Answers to these questions would throw light on the
common elements between non-alignment and neutrality or isolationism.
Several facts relating to the time when the Monroe Doctrine was enun-
ciated make it unambiguously clear that the real intention of the United
States was territorial expansion southwards. How in 1819 the then
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, obtained the signature of the
Spanish Minister in Washington to a very important treaty by which
Florida was given to the United States is well known. How anxious the
US Administration was to annex Cuba is evident from the following
accounts given by two distinguished American historians. One of them
wrote:

For fifteen years the statement at Washington had kept anxious eyes on
Cuba....Monroe and Adams were worrying lest France or England
should seize the Pearl of the Antilles; and if Adams did express the hope
that Cuba would stick to the Spanish tree until ripe for the United States
basket, it was because he feared lest some other naval Power might
shake the trunk.2o

The other historian sought to expose the motivations of US policy in this

period by focussing on the discussion between the British Foreign Secretary,
George Canning, and the US Secretary of State, Adams, a few months
before the Monroe Doctrine was announced:

Ever vigilant, Adams had other grounds for misgivings: Lurking in the
Canning scheme was the suggestion that neither the United States nor
Great Britain would seize any part of Spanish America. Such apledge
would tie the hands of the American people should they ever want, as they
ultimately did, Texas, California, and Cuba. Canning, who was particular-
J.D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, D.C.,
18
1896), vol. 2, p. 218.
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy; A History (New York, N.Y., 1959),
19
p. 74.
Morison and Commager,
20 n. 17, p. 459,
34

ly nervous about the fate of Cuba, appears to have had in mind erecting
a barrier against the southward surge of the Yankees.21

What is interesting is that the European Powers had no illusions about the B
real intentions and interests of the Americans.
During this very period the United States laid it down as a condition for
its recognition of Argentina that &dquo;no special privileges of indefinite dura-
tion should be granted [by Argentina] to Spain&dquo;.22 .

These facts, together with the enormous growth by accretion that occur-
red in the size of the United States in the nineteenth century, make it
obvious that whatever high principles the US Administration spoke about
were really meant to quench its thirst for territorial expansion. It is this
which led two top US historians to remark that the policy of the Monroe
Administration was &dquo;frankly selfish&dquo;.23 To this may be added the omis-
sions and commissions of successive US Administrations in Latin America
for a century and a half since the famous doctrine was codified in US
foreign policy. It is a history of expansion, of exploitation, of dominance,
and of erection of dependency structures. It is only since the Second
World War that the countries of Latin America have made efforts to reverse
the historical process. Needless to add that the motivations of non-
alignment were, and continue to be, diametrically opposite to those of
US neutrality/isolationism. Hence those who see identity, or even simi-
larity, between the two base their conclusions on a wrong reading of the
history of the two concepts.
IV

The relationship between non-alignment and pov~rer politics and/or power

has also been a subject of discussion in some writings. If on the one hand
non-alignment has been branded a policy based on morality and idealism,
on the other it has been characterized as an exercise in power politics.
Much depends on the meaning that one attaches to the various terms
involved in this discussion.24
Some confusion (and perhaps also difference of opinion) has arisen

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York,

21
N.Y., 1958), p. 182. Emphasis added.
H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Chicago, Ill., 1947), p. 33.
22
Morison and Commager, n. 17, p. 454.
23
For an interesting discussion, see A.P. Rana, "The Nehru of India’s Foreign
24
Policy", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 22 (1966), pp. 101-39, and also the rele-
vant parts of his The Imperatives of Non-Alignment (Delhi, 1976). Rana’s views have
been justifiably questioned in the rejoinder by G.L. Jain, "Indian Non-Alignment and
Balance of Power", India Quarterly, vol. 22 (1966), pp. 177-9.
 35

because different meanings have been given to power politics by different

people. It is suggested that the terms should not be given a literal, neutral
meaning. Through modern history it has come to acquire certain broad
meanings; it has come to symbolize certain values in international relations.
Without going into the details, we may approvingly quote Schwarzenberger,
who says that power politics &dquo;signifies a type of relations between states
in which certain patterns of behaviour are predominant: armaments,
isolationism, power diplomacy, power economics, balance of power and
war&dquo;. Subsequently he says that &dquo;power politics may be defined as a
system of international relations in which groups consider tlzemselves to be
ultimate ends&dquo;.25
Now that we have taken note of these values and orientations of power
politics, let us see what non-alignment is meant to be. What is the
understanding of the non-aligned leaders about power politics? What
kind of politics do they propose to pursue? If we go for enlightenment to
Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the pioneers of non-alignment, he clearly stated
as early as 1946:

We propose, as farpossible, to keep away from the power politics of

as

groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world
wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.26

This oft-quoted policy declaration makes two points crystal clear. First,
Nehru’s understanding of the theory and practice of power politics was
identical with what we have indicated in the preceding paragraph. Next,
he did not want non-alignment to follow this variety of politics. He
rejected the dangerously pernicious view that one or more states should
consider themselves as ultimate ends, and declared: &dquo;We believe that
peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere
must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war.&dquo;27 Thus
he attempted to highlight a sort of organic link between the constituents
of the international community. As regards the main thrust of the non-
aligned movement, he rejected not only power politics but also the argu-
ment, advanced notably by Hans J. Morgenthau and others, that all politics
was a struggle for power. He held that power politics was just one kind

Georg Schwarzenberger,
25 Power Politics (New York, N. Y., 1951), p. 13.
Emphasis added. Decades earlier Richard Cobden had described the balance of
power as a convenient excuse for aggrandizement. See his Political Writings
(London, 1867), vol. 1, p. 234.
Nehru, n. 1, p. 2. This has been approvingly cited by a leading scholar on
26
non-alignment. See Leo Mates, "Origins and Role of Non-Alignment", in Ljubivoje
Acimovic, ed., Non-Alignment in the World Today (Belgrade, 1969), p. 155,
Ibid.
27
36

of politics and that there were other varieties which were well worth
following for the sake of peace, justice, and development. His under-
standing was that &dquo;the problems of Asia...are essentially problems of
supplying what may be called the primary human necessities. They are
not problems which may be called problems of power politics.&dquo;28 In its
totality, then, non-alignment is an alternative to, or a substitute for,power
politics in international relations.
This inference or conclusion raises several questions. In rejecting
power politics, is non-alignment being oblivious of the importance of power
as well? Also, if it does not believe in power politics, what kind of
international politics does it attempt to follow and promote?
The policies of the non-aligned countries show that though they reject
power politics, they know that international relations are not an &dquo;exercise
in sainthood&dquo;. They are aware of the role of power. Hence one of the
basic motives of non-alignment is to increase their national power through
accelerated socio-economic development. For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru
attempted (with a degree of success) to enhance the power of India
through all manner of planned development, the objective being to create
social structures based on social justice. He did not try to augment the
war potential of the country in order to enable it to play the game of

power politics. His enthusiasm for enhancing the constructive and positive
power of India was so intense that he did not sufficiently prepare for a
possible war with China. It was one of his major failures as Prime
Minister. Nevertheless his basic approach made India a fairly well-deve-
loped country among the developing countries.
A general conclusion that can be arrived at in the light of this discus-
sion is that non-alignment is cognizant of power but rejects powerpolitics
with its attendant values.
A recent publication points to yet another wrong understanding of non-
alignment. The title of the book is The Non-Aligned Movement: The
Origins of a Third World Alliance.29 The subtitle of this study is clearly
objectionable because like &dquo;power politics&dquo;, &dquo;alliance&dquo; too has come to
acquire a distinct meaning in international relations. It would be inappro-
priate just to go by the literal meaning of the term. With the passage of
time and through persistent use many terms in international relations
acquire meanings which are different from, sometimes even opposite to,

Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years (Bombay, 1965), vol. 2, p. 483.
28
An Indian official categorically stated that non-alignment was a ’’protest against
power politics". See An Indian Official, "India as a World Power", Foreign Affairs
(New York, N.Y.), vol. 27 (1948-49), p. 55.
Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World
29
Alliance (Bombay, 1978).
 37

the literal or original ones. &dquo;Power politics&dquo; and &dquo;alliance&dquo; are such
terms.
About the meaning of &dquo;alliance&dquo;, one may refer to the writings of a
well-known American scholar, Arnold Wolfers, who observes: &dquo;In the
technical language of statesmen and scholars ’alliance’ signifies a pro-
mise of mutual military alliance between two or more sovereign states.&dquo;
By way of further clar ification, he says:

Although some propagandist advantages may be gained by applying the

term to loose agreements for cooperation, - - - this use obscures the peculi-
arly far-reaching commitmeret contained in military pacts by which a
nation formally promises to join another in fighting a common enemy. 30

This should make it clear even to a novice that non-alignment is not an

alliance. In fact the former is antithetical to the latter. Non-alignment
condemns and rejects alliances.

The foregoing analysis makes it clear that non-alignment is no negative

concept. It is neither neutrality noi power politics nor a kind of Nionroe
Doctrine nor an alliance. It is a movement which the Asians, Africans,
and Latin Americans espouse to transform the present international order
into an order based on justice to subserve their national objective of crea-
ting socio-economically strong and politically viable political systems within
their respective countries.

SEPTEMBER 1980

Arnold Wolfers, "Alliances", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences

30
(New York, N.Y., 1968), vol. 1, pp. 268-9. Emphasis added.