Media and Conflict in Sri Lanka

Paper by Mr. Sanjana Hattotuwa1 for Consultative Workshop on Managing Ethnic

and Religious Conflict in Southern Asia: Role of Education and the Media

Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

9-11 May 2003

Introduction

Fourteen months into a ceasefire agreement, decades of ossified media culture show signs of a
gradual change. Much attention has recently focused on the media and its part in the ethno-
political conflict of Sri Lanka. However, articles in the press examining the complex interactions
between the media and the conflict have been reactionary, cautioning the public against tenets of
‘peace journalism’, or have too easily come to the conclusion that media in Sri Lanka is
unproblematic and objective in its reporting. On the other hand, debate on the underpinnings of
media freedom in Sri Lanka, coupled with an examination of its biases, ethno-centricity and
market driven agendas has been sparse. Ergo, the role of the media as an essential and pivotal
institution of democratic governance, and an examination on how it can best aid conflict
transformation and help support and critically analyse the emergence of a post-conflict situation is
of pivotal importance to the evolving context in Sri Lanka.

Overview of media in Sri Lanka

The media in Sri Lanka can be broadly placed into two categories – those which are owned and
controlled by the State and those which are privately owned and controlled. The State owns the
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd. (Lake House) which has the broadest outreach in terms of
distribution networks, and which also benefits from extensive State advertising. Radio and
television were a government monopoly until the mid-1980s. Since then, several privately-owned
television/radio stations have been established. The state continues to control the Sri Lanka
Broadcasting Corporation (radio), the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (television) and ITN
radio and television network. The transmission capacities of the private stations are much more
limited than that of the state-owned radio and television. Thus, State radio and television remain
the electronic media that reach the largest number of consumers, especially in the far-flung areas
of the island. In the north and east, in areas under the control of the LTTE, the Voice of Tigers,
the radio broadcast of the LTTE, can be heard within a limited radius.

There are 7 large private establishments that print a number of daily newspapers in national
languages, as well as some more private establishments that publish several weekend

1
The author is a Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). He gratefully acknowledges the input by
Mr. Sunanda Deshapriya and Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, without whose assistance, this paper would not have been
possible.
1
newspapers. There are 3 large privately-owned establishments broadcasting on radio and
television - and several other private radio stations.

There are several journalists' organizations that work for the promotion of their profession. Among
them are the Free Media Movement, Working Journalists' Association and the Photo-Journalists
Association. There is also the Editors' Guild of Sri Lanka, and a Foreign Correspondents'
Association. There are number of trade unions of media workers and the Federation of Media
Employees Trade Union (FMETU), which unites all of them. The Free Media Movement (FMM)
which is a grouping of independent journalists and persons working in different fields in the media
is the most active organization in Sri Lanka that advocates and lobbies for the freedom of
expression and information.

Problems of media in Sri Lanka

Compounded by protracted ethno-political conflict, exacerbated by ineffective media reforms and

coupled with the imperatives of market economics, the mainstream media in Sri Lanka continues
to be burdened with a number of problems. Many newspapers, for instance, perceive ethnicity as
immutable and innate, and, on account of a conscious decision or distinct lack of willingness, do
not demystify stereotypes and buttress institutions and practices that can ameliorate ethno-
political conflict. In short, the media in Sri Lanka exacerbates existing communal and ethnic
tensions by continuously playing on the nationalist and religious emotions of the people.

While it is natural that any media has to keep its language readership in mind, it is also the case
that impartiality and accuracy suffer as a result of this inherent requirement. In an ethnically
polarised society, ethnic bias in mainstream news media takes many forms and is also reflected
in the ownership of media houses. On the one hand, the ethnic ownership of media annuls efforts
by reporters to examine the realities of other ethnic groups. On the other hand, sustained
exposure to the world view of ethno-centric editorial policies and ethnic ownership enervates new
and vibrant journalism that seeks to question and critique the dominant paradigm. This complex
dialectic is evident in almost all the mainstream media in Sri Lanka, and is a vicious cycle that
must be broken for any real media reform.

Newspaper establishments owned by Sinhalese show a majoritarian bias regardless of their

language medium. Three such establishments publish newspapers in English, and all of them
have a pro-Sinhala bias in varying degrees. Although English literacy is around 7% in Sri Lanka,
and a sizeable amount of Tamils are included in this percentage, no effort is made to examine the
news from the perspective of the Tamils or any other minority community. Furthermore, none of
these Sinhala owned private mainstream media establishments publish newspapers in Tamil.
That said, there are newspapers like the Daily Mirror and Lankadeepa, which feature regular
columnists who write about inter-ethnic perspectives.

The same, unfortunately, is true for media establishments with Tamil ownership. None of them
publish any newspapers in Sinhala, although one of them used to publish a weekend newspaper
in English with a definite pro-Tamil bias. It can be argued that Tamil viewpoints in the media are
defined by a reactive articulation against Sinhala hegemony. In recent times, the Tamil speaking
Muslim community has complained that the mainstream Tamil media ignores their concerns, and
as a result it is not impossible to imagine the emergence of a Tamil language newspaper with
2
Muslim ownership. There are already reports of the emergence of Muslim newspapers, albeit with
extremely limited circulation in the East, which appeal to the radical sections of the Muslim
community.

The State owned Lake House publishes newspapers in all three languages. State owned
mainstream media in Sri Lanka supinely accept the dominant political paradigm – when the state
is at war, conflict sensitive journalism and independence usually succumb to the enfilade of
propaganda. When the state is at peace, the State media blindly and uncritically endorse the
peace initiatives of the incumbent government. Also not to be forgotten is ‘Dedunna’, the Sinhala
newspaper published by the LTTE. It has become the Tamil voice in Sinhala, reporting on Tamil
grievances during the on-going peace process.

Along with a state-centric bias, the mainstream media in Sri Lanka largely ignored issues related
to development and gender equality. Human Rights is newsworthy because it is a tool of partisan
mud-slinging, no real examination of the need for human rights in a peace process, or
examination on the qualitative aspects of human rights in a peace process are to be found in the
2
mainstream press. This is brought out in a study of issues report in the mainstream media :

Sinhala Tamil English

Type of Report
Newspapers Newspapers Newspapers
Actual Combat 78 52 36
Arrests (War
33 09 05
related)
Civilian Issues 18 18 11
Refugee Issues 12 10 15
Peace Talks 14 07 00
Human Rights 03 16 04
Development
04 18 02
Related
Other 86 17 02

As one can see from above, coverage of the war to the exclusion of related civilian issues was
the norm in the English and Sinhala media. Issues of this nature are the domain of the
‘alternative’ media in Sri Lanka. In terms of a language difference however, as can be seen
clearly above, that the overwhelming majority of development related and news related to human
rights is covered in the Tamil media exposes the deep schism between the foci of Sinhala and
Tamil mainstream media.

Furthermore, after the General Elections in 2001, it can argued that the same political party which
curries favour with the private media is, by virtue of being in power, in control of State media as
well. Thus, the opposition constantly alleges that they do not receive equal coverage.

What may not be immediately evident from the above is the peculiar relationship between the
market and Sinhala-Buddhist ideology in Sri Lanka, with regard to media institutions. For
instance, the pro-Sinhala Buddhist ideology of the Upali Group of Newspapers is not solely based

2
Media Monitor, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Vol. 1, Issue 1, June 1997.
3
on market share. Although the market share of the Upali Group of Newspapers is much smaller
than the Wijeya Group, which is the market leader, the former makes little effort to break out of a
framework defined by its acceptance of the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony.

3
As Media Monitor points out, when reporting on conflict, there are even occasions when the
same writer provides divergent accounts of the same incident on the same day to the English and
Sinhala publications of the same organisation!

Electronic media in Sri Lanka closely mirrors the problems of print media. As a concise example,
the Centre for Policy Alternatives and INFORM, a local NGO, monitored the electronic media
coverage of the General Election in 2000 with the assistance of ARTICLE 19, an international
organization working to combat censorship by promoting freedom of expression and access to
official information. This was the first ever such monitoring exercise covering all the electronic
4
media (radio and television, private and state) during a general election in Sri Lanka.

th
It was reported on 10 September 2000 in the private print media that the Criminal Investigations
Department of the Police (CID) had detected a large number of security stickers at a private
press outlet. The stickers, which had been ordered by the Commissioner of Elections, Mr.
Dayananda Dissanayake, were intended for poll cards as an anti-rigging measure for the
forthcoming General Elections. The electronic media gave wide publicity to the issue from the
afternoon of 18th September 2000. CPA and INFORM monitored both the private and public
th
broadcast media coverage of the issue until 20 September 2000.

The following table shows the electronic media coverage of this issue:

Category Total Time (Mins) For E.C %* Against E.C %*

All Government
170.6 23.64% 70.49%
Channels
All Private Channels 68.46 64.4% 17.25%
*Neutral news reports are not included in the percentages. Rupavahini, ITN, MTV and TNL channels
were monitored as part of this exercise.

Two facts stood out in the coverage of this incident by electronic media owned by the State:

1. The views of the governing People Alliance (PA) politicians dominated the programmes
and there was no significant time allocated to coverage of the views of the Opposition. In
particular, the participants in discussions and special programmes were limited to PA
politicians and campaigners for the PA.
2. The Election Commissioner's views were given limited coverage in terms of time
allocation and prominence.

The private media was no better. As the report states:

There was a clear difference in the way in which the Election Commissioner’s issue was
reported in the channels owned by the two groups monitored (MTV and TNL). While the
MTV channels attempted to be “balanced” by presenting both government and

3
Media Monitor, ibid.

4
 opposition party perspectives, TNL (Sinhala and English news) had little representation
of government views. Although Sirasa (MTV) Sinhala news did spend 60.6% of the time
spent on reporting the issue in favor of the Commissioner, it also spent 33.75% of the
time in items reflecting negatively on the Commissioner. On the other hand, TNL Sinhala
news spent 73% of the time spent on the issue in favour of the Commissioner, and the
government perspective was not represented at all. In addition, where the TNL news
defended the Election Commissioner’s actions, it did so mostly by attacking the ruling
party rather than by promoting the ideals of democracy and the independence of the
Election Commissioner.

Partisan reporting and the lack of journalism that is accurate and fair, and one which places the
issue in context is, as evident from above, a problem common to both electronic and print media.
The link also has to be made between partisan reporting and conflict. Partisan reporting in
Sri Lanka is inextricably linked to political violence, which in turns often exacerbates ethnic
conflict since issues like ethnicity, nationalism and communalism are often used for political
mileage. Hence, what may not be immediately evident from the above is that partisan reporting is
often symptomatic of other inherent biases and a lack of professionalism, which often serves to
heighten ethnic tension and conflict.

5
As the Media Monitor again points out:

1. Sri Lankan Newspapers of the 3 language media cater to sets of individuals who inhabit
different worlds and espouse different worldviews. Though the island is small, yet the gulf
that separates these language groups appears to be ever-widening, particularly between
the Tamil readership and the rest.
2. An analysis of the reportage of the North-East war demonstrates that these differences
are not accidental or innocent, but rather, a reflection of deep ideological divergences
that need to be brought to the surface and addressed directly for any lasting solution to
the ethnic crisis to be meaningful and just.

News Coverage in Sri Lanka: A Case Study

th
On 9 October 2002, a clash took place between a few hundred people and the Special Task
Force (STF) Army Camp in the East of Sri Lanka, in a place called Kanjirankuda. Some persons
among the group attacked the camp with stones and tried to enter and destroy the camp
premises. They wanted the camp to be removed. On this particular day, according to LTTE
sources, two of their members had been assaulted by STF personnel, a charge which the STF
denied. The LTTE undoubtedly helped mobilise the mob against the STF camp. Unable to stop
the agitated mob from entering the camp after using tear gas and rubber bullets, STF personnel
opened fire using live ammunition, killing seven people and injuring 14 others.

A look at the way in which the mainstream media in Colombo reported this incident a day after is
revealing.

4
For full report please visit www.cpalanka.org/media or email author
5
Media Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 1, June 1997
5
 6
English News Papers
• Four killed as mob attacked STF camp – Premier orders full probe (Daily Mirror,
Wijeya Group)
• LTTE storms Akkareipattu STF Camp (The Island, Upali Group)

Sinhala Newspapers
• Gun fire at a group who tried to storm in to a STF camp – 6 dead. 5 STF injured as
well (Daily Lankadeepa, Front Page 3 column, Wijeya Group)
• Four tigers dead after clash in Ampara – PM orders commander to investigate
(Divaina, Front Page 3 column, Upali Group)
• Group which attacked STF Camp shot at. Six dead. 27 injured. PM Orders a probe
(Lakbima, Front Page 2 column, Sumathi Group)
• Military leaders dispatched to investigate Akkareipattu incident where two persons
have died. (Dinamina, Front Page 3 column, Lake House)

7
Tamil Newspapers
• Four dead as STF fires into a hartal. 14 injured. Potuvil LTTE leader accuses STF
(Virakeseri)
• Seven people dead, 15 injured due to STF firing in Thitukkovil – Ranil orders probe
(Thinakkural)
• Seven dead, 16 injured due to STF firing into a peoples rally in East (Suder Oli)
• Hartal in Kalmunei, tires in Akkareipattu burned to protest STF action – PM orders
8
immediate inquiry (Thinakaran, State Owned)

Other than the immediately evident differences in the headlines, one can also see that not even a
single Tamil language newspaper used the word ‘stormed’ or equivalent. The Tamil media has
the STF firing into a hartal or peoples protest, and gave more prominence to the LTTE version of
events. On the other hand, news reports of privately owned English newspapers had the STF
firing into a mob led by the LTTE. Here too, while the Island directly attributes the mob attack to
the LTTE, the Daily Mirror does not.

The Sinhala newspapers were milder in their headlines, but reflected the bias in the English
newspapers. The Sinhala daily (Divaina) of the Upali Group did not mirror the headlines of its
English counterpart (The Island). However, the weekend Divaina, under a different Editor, took a
Sinhala nationalist line on the Akkareipattu incident. This anomaly between the daily Divaina and
weekend Divaina is also reflected in differences of reporting and bias between the Daily Mirror
and the Sunday Times of the Wijeya Group.

On the whole, while State owned newsprint tried to water down the incident and tried to show that
the situation was under control, the private owned media took to the other end of the spectrum
and reported the incident in with inflammatory headlines and reporting.

6
The Kanchamkuda incident is not reported as headlines news in the Ceylon Daily News (State owned)
7
There are three Tamil dailies in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. One of them is the provincial edition of the
Thinakkural, which has its head office in Colombo. Another is Uthayan, which is the sister paper of Suder Oli, published in
Colombo. The third is Valampuri, a small newspaper based in Jaffna. There are no other provincial newspapers in Sri
Lanka.
8
There is one other Tamil daily, Thinakkathir, operating from Batticaloa in the Eastern Province, which by this time had
ceased to exist due to political violence against it by the LTTE, though it was not in fact a newspaper that was anti-LTTE.
6
Four weeklies supporting the JVP and the SLFP axis all portrayed a doomsday scenario during
this incident and did not report the Tamil perspective at all.

9
Media and Conflict Resolution

Where undemocratic politicians inspire, provoke and underwrite national fears and prejudices,
and where journalists do not benefit from a tradition of independence, but satisfy demands of
leaders for support for the 'national interest', media soon becomes a vehicle for propaganda. This
is often the case in Sri Lanka, where the constant quest of media is an elusive search for
'objectivity'. In this quest, propaganda becomes truth, and the search itself becomes rooted in
vested interests that often veil and distort reality.

Furthermore, in instances of ethno-political conflict, the role of the media is inextricably entwined
with the particular dynamics of that conflict. The media can be a frightful weapon of violence
when it propagates messages of intolerance or disinformation that manipulate public sentiment.
Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda is one of the most appalling contemporary examples. Using a
blend of popular entertainment and proselytizing by announcers, the government-supported
broadcasts demonized one group of people and built resentment and fear among the other
group. One can also see this in the journalism in Sri Lanka, where there is a profusion of ethnic
stereotyping. Take the following for example:

th
• Attempt to steal chain of soldier: Muslim suspect in custody – Divaina, 9 September
2001
nd
• 230 LTTE cadres begin hunger strike in Kalutara Prison – Lankadeepa, 2 February
2002 (the article goes on to mention that these 230 ‘cadre’ are actually only suspected of
belonging to the LTTE)
• Muslim erects barbed-wire fence around plot of land given by English Governor –
st
Lankadeepa, 1 September 2001
th
• Tamil woman in custody for pick-pocketing Rs. 40,000 – Lankadeepa, 25 May, 2001

But there is another aspect to the media. It can be an instrument of conflict resolution, when the
information it presents is reliable, respects human rights, and represents diverse views. It's the
kind of media that upholds accountability and exposes malfeasance, one that enables a society
to make well-informed choices, which is the precursor of democratic governance. It is a media
that reduces conflict and fosters human security.

Such a media culture can be a vital tool in transcending conflict, working towards a just and
lasting peace by going beyond the problems of the present.

In general, the media can have four inputs on any peace process. First, they help in defining the
political atmosphere in which the peace process takes place. Second, the media has an active
influence on the strategy and behaviour of the stakeholders to the conflict. Third, the media

9
Also see The Varying Role of the News Media in Peace Processes: Theory and Research by Gadi Wolfsfeld from the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Paper given at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
at San Francisco, California (August, 2001).
7
has an important influence on the nature of debate about a peace process. Fourth, the media
can buttress or weaken public legitimacy of the stakeholders involved in the peace process.

An understanding of how each of these facets interweave to shape the peace process is of
pivotal importance for all news media personnel and institutions in Sri Lanka.

A peace process is usually long and complex, and the direction it takes is often open to
interpretation. Journalistic norms and routines, which dictate the selection of sources and
construction of story lines, can have a significant effect on which interpretation appears to make
the most sense. News reports provide citizens with important clues about the political climate
surrounding the peace process. Is the process moving forward or back? Does the overall level of
violence appear to be rising or declining? Is the LTTE keeping its side of the agreements? Are
events in the East undermining the peace process? How much of the public supports the
government initiatives for peace? Will there be snap elections? How will the constant bickering
between the President and the PM affect the peace process? What will the effect be of the LTTE
pulling out of negotiations? The answers to such questions – which are often provided by ongoing
news coverage – help determine whether the political atmosphere is conducive to making
10
peace.

We must also understand that peace and news make strange bedfellows. News covers
events, not processes. This presents the public with an extremely narrow and simplistic view of
what is happening and makes it difficult for the stakeholders to the conflict promote long-term
policies. The Sri Lankan peace process, like any other, will be marked by protracted negotiations
with occasional breakthroughs. Adopting a short-term perspective often leads to a sense of
impatience and frustration, and the media’s emphasis on the immediate makes it difficult for the
government, the LTTE and other stakeholders maintain support amongst their constituencies for
the peace process over a long period of time. The sum of all this is deeply ironic. While
negotiations are intrinsically considered major news, the protracted nature of negotiations will
entice media to flag and highlight the negative rather than the positive of these negotiations.

The search for drama within a peace process can also be detrimental to the process.
Headlines, as one has often seen over the past few weeks, which focus on threats, accusations
and sensational confrontations, generate anger on both sides, with the inevitable demand for
retaliation. Disagreements turn into crises, enemies become more frightening and opponents
more viscous. This dynamic also raises the level of rancour in the internal debate over the peace
process. Reportage on the flashpoints and incidents in the East rarely give voice to the moderate
forces in each community. By highlighting the most angry and violent forces, the media make it
almost impossible for leaders, moderates and civil society carry out a reasoned debate over the
issue. Over a period of time, this search for sensationalism over moderation, action over reason,
and radical voices instead of temperate ones, leads to an exacerbation of the conflict and even
the radicalisation of moderate voices.

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Thiru Kadiah says that “even if we are ready to resist the easy explanation of cynicism of the part of those
who…profess commitment to peace and concede sincerity to them, (we are forced) to recognise also a tremendous
blindness on the part of the professors to what they are actually doing. It is a blindness that is based on a large capacity
for self-deception which is exactly what any movement out of the impasse of the ethnic conflict can do without”. An
excerpt from pg. 15 in The Media and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Thiru Kandiah, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic
Reconciliation, No. 19, 2001, Marga Institute
8
One must not forget the extent to which the media in Sri Lanka is the repository of public
prejudice, majoritarian interests and market capitalism. It is especially important to remember
that the greater the frequency and severity of crises which affect the peace process, the more
likely it is that the media will play a negative role. That both of these are usually facets of
mainstream media in any region with protracted ethno-political conflict.

Events that will shape and inform the dialogue and debate on the peace process in Sri Lanka will
increasingly stem from areas and peoples whose concerns and fears will have hitherto been
ignored in the mainstream media. The emergence of a radical Muslim and Tamil press is to be
taken as a result of this neglect. The inherent ethnocentrism of this radical media cannot be
expected to provide reasoned analysis, insightful and constructive criticism, or help diffuse ethno-
political tension.

It is here that consensus amongst political leaders can help the media. When there is a lack of
political consensus, as one finds in Sri Lanka, intra and inter-party power politics will inform and
shape reportage on the peace process. Within such a context, it is unfeasible to think that the
media will try to report the conflict with any degree of accuracy since media personnel and
institutions close to centres of political power will rarely transcend partisan agendas. This is not to
say that the media is merely an external tool, which is supine to the whims of all parties to the
conflict to propagate partisan agendas. As Thiru Kandiah has noted “the media are central
instrumentalities of the conflict, not just passive tools or containers or vehicles of the operative
11
substantive factors and positions, the shape of which has already been determined elsewhere.”

Journalists must recognise that virtually every technical and editorial decision made by them in
presenting conflict has potential consequences for the conflict itself. All these forms of reporting
generally adhere to the first principle of mediation, which is to give all stakeholders an opportunity
to present their views. In the process of giving each side a hearing, several important steps
toward conflict resolution can occur: the parties may be educated about each other's point of
view; stereotypes are challenged; and initial perceptions can be re-evaluated and clarified.

Of equal importance to the emerging context in Sri Lanka is the ability of reporters to ask
questions that lead the conflicting parties to identify and discuss the deeper interests and needs
that underlie their public positions. Reporters and commentators must put the conflict in historical
and social perspective, deepening everyone's understanding of it. Good reporting and news
analysis should look beyond stated positions toward the interests and needs of the parties. This
exploration of the interests of stakeholders by the media helps disputants and the public identify
the shared problems that are causing the conflict.

11
The Media and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, Thiru Kandiah, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No.
19, 2001, Marga Institute
9
 Presidential Election 1999: Monitoring the Mainstream Media12
th
On 20 October 1999, over a year before she completed her first term as Executive President,
H.E. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga announced her decision to hold a Presidential
Election to obtain a mandate for a second term. The date of election was announced by the
st
Commissioner of Elections to be the 21 of December, 1999.

Conclusions of Media Monitoring

Government newspapers were blatantly partial towards the ruling PA candidate, with the
reportage and analysis maintaining a media style that was crude and lacking in finesse. When
on looks at election reportage, one could discern the fact that they attempted to appeal to
people’s emotions rather than base their articles on a critical and logical foundation. Elections in
this country, Presidential, Parliamentary or Provincial, are basically very charged and often
violent. The newspapers fed on and thrived on this atmosphere.

It is possible to say that most newspapers assisted the politicians in their attempt to use the
North-East conflict as a political tool… Most papers were seen to cater to politicians, rather than
the people, intentionally or unintentionally. Another interpretation is that the media merely
operated within the framework of the existing media culture.

Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Sri Lanka

Within the context of the present ceasefire in Sri Lanka, it is certainly the role of journalists to act
as watchdogs to violations of the ceasefire agreement and other developments in the North-East,
and report it to the public once their factual accuracy has been suitably determined. Conflict
sensitive journalism should not be misconstrued as an attempt to mystify the truth, or to hide it.
Conflict sensitive journalism at the end of the day, is nothing more than the practice of good
journalism – journalism that critically examines and also looks beyond the problems of any given
context. In Sri Lanka, conflict sensitive journalism would examine the shortcomings of the
ceasefire agreement, explore how society and polity could address these lacunae, critically
analyse the dissipation or build-up of tensions in the North-East between ethnic groups, the Army
and the LTTE and other armed factions, and explore options to bring an end to armed hostilities.
A conflict sensitive journalist would ensure that every story of a ceasefire violation would examine
not only the violation itself, but also its underlying causes, and explore how violations of a similar
nature can be avoided in future. Conflict sensitive journalism extrapolates from incidents in the
present, lessons for the future. It engages with actors and stakeholders, examines their concerns,
and formulates strategies to buttress developments on the ground for an end to armed conflict.

Peace Journalism seems to attract derision from many quarters, but is also somewhat of a
misnomer. It seems to suggest that there is a separate category of journalism that one can
adhere to if one is to be sensitive to conflict. This is untrue.

In June 2002, the Centre for Policy Alternatives and International Media Support (Denmark),
conducted several workshops and seminars on conflict sensitive journalism for print, television

10
and radio media in Sri Lanka. In covering these workshops, some columnists maintained that
‘peace journalism’ was a false construct, and that no serious journalist would be against peace.

However, peace journalism is nothing more than the practice of a journalism that adheres rigidly
to a set of ethics and principles that are predicated on professionalism and a commitment to the
truth. Truth however has many facets, and any one of them alone is a lie. This is an adage that
journalists must always remember. Good journalists must not suspend judgement on everything
in their quest for objectivity. Certain facts must be stated, and obvious conclusions must be
drawn. However, journalists must strive to present facts mindful of a larger context, where single
incidents are part of a larger whole, where individuals and groups are part of a complex matrix
that is in constant flux.

Capacity Building for Media

Ideally, the news media should serve as a forum in which proponents and opponents are
encouraged to express their views in an open and reasoned fashion. While such an ideal is rarely
achieved, it is important nevertheless to identify those structures and processes that prevent
constructive criticism and healthy debate on the peace process.

By examining the ideologies of key protagonists and spoilers, the media can often flag aspects of
the peace process that are important and cannot be ignored. Assigning a reporter for instance, to
spend some time with the LTTE or amongst the Muslims and Sinhalese in the East could make
them develop new sources close to the ground, identify moderate voices, examine the internal
dynamics of emergent socio-political realities, provide perspectives which are not ethnocentric in
form or content and examine political arguments that go beyond specific incidents into the deeper
roots of the conflict.

Greater research must also be done on whether there is a potential conflict between the Freedom
of Expression, Speech and Information and the protection and advancement of the peace
process. How critical should one be of the process? Can one be first with the news and also be
impartial, accurate and reliable? How can the media maintain the balance between transparency
of the peace process and the need for confidentiality? Can the media meet the imperatives of
market forces, sensationalism and commercialisation, and at the same time create a forum for
serious and responsible public debate?

There are no concrete answers to these questions, and the media in Sri Lanka, as media
anywhere else, will always be characterised by a combination of all these factors. In all this, what
must not be forgotten is that the media is a very important actor in the peace process. The media
is a pivotal catalyst in the success of the peace process, within an enabling political atmosphere.
Animating its involvement should be a realisation that citizens depend on the media for
information on the peace process. The relationship between the stakeholders to the conflict, the
political framework of the peace process, media reporting and the public is a symbiotic one –
each moulding the other, in a continuum that contains within it the key to conflict transformation
13
as well as the seeds of conflict formation.

12
Excerpt from Media Monitor, Vo. 2 Issue 1, Centre for Policy Alternatives, March 2000
13
Also see The Role of Regional and International Media in Peace Building, report on workshop held by the Centre for
Conflict Resolution (CECORE), 27th June – 1st July 2000, Entebbe, Uganda.
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The future of the media in Sri Lanka

The problem facing journalists in Sri Lanka is how to protect their ‘independence’ when the world
around them asks them to follow strategies and ethics which bind them to a certain ideology and
path. No path or method is value neutral. And yet, the imperatives of journalism – accuracy,
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fairness, impartiality and reliability – bolstered by the freedom of expression, speech and
information and open government provide the backbone of democratic pluralism. However, the
multiplicity of voices in the media should not become a cacophony of half-truths, and must avoid
the ills of rabid ethnocentrism and tabloid sensationalism.

To do this, there could be several practical steps media organisations can take:

• Promote ethnic and gender balance in the newsroom.

• Regular updating and internal review of editing and style handbooks.
• In-house workshops and training on conflict sensitive journalism. All journalists should
undergo specialised training in conflict transformation and peace building.
• Advocate the inclusion of a curriculum of peace-building and conflict transformation
processes for journalists in universities and schools of journalism.
• Greater co-operation between personnel in Colombo and grass-roots level
correspondents. Building the capacity of provincial and grass-roots level correspondents,
and increasing the interaction with journalists from Colombo is mutually beneficial. It
helps journalists from Colombo better understand local conditions and develop more
informed, diverse and reliable sources of information, and gives grass-roots level
journalists the experience and know-how with which to effectively report conflict.
• Recognition by media organisations of the need for voluntary self-regulation and
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maintenance of professional standards, codes of ethics and conduct.

Furthermore, the importance of legislation that facilitates the free flow of information cannot be
understated. Media reform has also to be looked at holistically. Inextricably entwined with the
impetus for media reform should also be the enabling framework of legislation regarding the right
to information, the right to speech and the freedom of expression. A piecemeal approach to
media reform, neglecting the wider canvas within which such reform takes place, is short-sighted
and will not lead to any real change.

There are of course no easy answers to address the problems facing the press in Sri Lanka. The
media in Sri Lanka, as media anywhere else, will always be characterised by a combination of all
the factors outlined in this article. It is up to progressive and proactive individuals, journalists and
civil society interventions to help the media develop a more positive, trans -ethnic and unifying
role than it has in the past.

14
See also Howard, ibid.
15
See also Journalism, Media and the Challenge of Human Rights Reporting, International Council on Human Rights
Policy, 2002
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 Excerpt from Freedom of Press 2003: A Global Survey of
Media Independence16

On Sri Lanka: “Although the constitution provides for freedom of expression, the government
has restricted this right in practice, particularly with regard to coverage of the civil war.
However, authorities lifted censorship of military-related news last year. The Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebel group tightly restricts the media in areas under its control. In a
major advance for press freedom, an act of parliament removed criminal defamation legislation
from the statute books in June. The government controls many of the largest media outlets,
and political coverage in the state-owned media favours the ruling party. While private
newspapers and broadcasters scrutinize government policies, journalists do practice some
self-censorship. Reporters, particularly those who cover human rights issues, corruption, or
police misconduct, continued to face some harassment, threats, and violent attacks at the
hands of the police, security forces, government supporters, and the LTTE during the year.”

The larger goal of peace talks and conflict transformation is to enhance the capacity of a society
to manage its own conflicts without resorting to armed violence. Peace talks and conflict
transformation processes however, do not take place in a normative void and usually take place
in a highly charged and unstable media environment, one in which information is scarce and
often suspect. Journalists in Sri Lanka have to realise the pivotal importance of the media in the
process of conflict transformation - media that continues to spew out half-truths, propaganda and
poor information, will negatively counter all other attempts at peace building.

Sri Lanka is at present undergoing significant changes in polity and society. To examine the
dynamics of this change requires a sensitivity to the historical moment, a commitment to reporting
the truth, and an imagination that refuses to be bogged down in the problems of the present. The
smorgasbord of issues that come in the wake of the CFA, are part of peace talks in the near
future, and indeed, are part of the greater process of conflict transformation requires journalists
who don't just report facts, who don't just inform the public, but go beyond facts and incidents to
critically and creatively explore avenues for conflict transformation. Conflict sells - but so should
peace, and it is up to journalists to ensure this.

- ENDS -

16
Published by Freedom House, 2003. Available online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/043003.htm
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