Failure of elections

Typoco vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136191, 29 November 1999

DOCTRINE: The instant petition must fail because the allegations therein did not justify a
declaration of failure of election. There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may
be declared, namely:
a. the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
b. the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
c. after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

Remedy: The relief relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on account of
the falsified election returns, which is properly the subject of an election contest.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for the position of Governor in
Camarines Norte during the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 22, 1998, petitioner, together with
Winifredo Oco, a candidate for the position of Congressman, filed a Joint Appeal before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) docketed as SPC-No. 98-133, questioning the ruling of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Camarines Norte which included in the canvass of votes
the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. On June 4, 1998, the
COMELEC (Second Division) issued an Order dismissing the Joint Appeal. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration reiterating his motion to admit evidence to prove that a substantial
number of election returns were manufactured as they were prepared by one person. In the
meantime, on June 10, 1998, petitioner and Oco filed with the Comelec En Banc a separate
petition for Annulment of Election or Election Results and/or Declaration of Failure of Elections in
several precincts, docketed as SPA No, 98-413, alleging that massive fraud and irregularities
attended the preparation of the election returns. On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in SPC No. 98133 on the
ground that an election protest is the proper remedy. Petitioner then filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the Order and the Resolution issued by the
COMELEC (Second Division) and the COMELEC En Banc in SPC No. 98133. The Supreme
Court dismissed the petition and petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration. On October
12, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a resolution in SPA 98413, dismissing petitioner's
petition ruling that the grounds cited by petitioners do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE: WON the allegations justify a declaration of failure of election. (NO)

HELD: The instant petition must fail because the allegations therein did not justify a declaration
of failure of election. There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be
declared, namely:
d. the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
e. the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
 f. after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

In all instances there must have been failure to elect. None of these circumstances is present in
the case at bar. While fraud was allegedly committed in the preparation of election returns, the
fact is that the casting and counting of votes proceeded up to the proclamation of the winning
candidate, thus precluding the declaration of a failure of election. Petitioner's relief was for
COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on account of the falsified returns, which is
properly the subject of an election contest. The Supreme Court, therefore, ordered the dismissal
of the petition.
 Basher vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139028, 12 April 2000

DOCTRINE:

An election must be held at the place, date and time prescribed by law. Likewise, its suspension
or postponement must comply with legal requirements. Otherwise, it is irregular and void.

FACTS:

Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private Respondent Abulkair Ampatua were both
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur
during the May 12, 1997 barangay election. Private respondent was proclaimed winner. Petitioner
then filed a Petition before the Comelec praying that the election be declared a failure alleging
that no election was conducted in the place and at the time prescribed by law. Petitioner alleged
that the election of officials for said barangay was held at the residence of former Mayor Alang
Sagusara Pukunun, instead of the officially designated polling precinct at Cagayan Elementary
School. Petitioner also claimed that no announcement to hold the election at the former mayor's
house that night was ever made. The Comelec ruled against a failure of election holding that the
"election was conducted on the scheduled date, the precinct functioned, actual voting took place,
and it resulted not in a failure to elect." Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "election" held on the date, at the time and in the place other than those
officially designated by the law and by the COMELEC was valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Citing Mitmug v. Comelec, the Comelec points out that
a failure of election requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely (1) no voting took place
in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election
resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the
election. It ruled that these requirements were not met. We do not agree. The peculiar set of facts
in the present case show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral
exercise. Otherwise stated, the disputed 'election' was illegal, irregular and void. The "election"
supposedly held for officials of Barangay Maidan cannot be clothed with any form of validity. It
was clearly unauthorized and invalid. It had no legal leg to stand on. Not only did the
suspension/postponement not comply with the procedure laid down by law and the Comelec
Rules, neither was there sufficient notice of the time and date when and the place where it would
actually be conducted. It was thus as if no election was held at all. Hence, its results could not
determine the winning punong barangay.
 Benito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134913, 19 January 2001

Doctrine: Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-
à-vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there
can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled
and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After
all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered
voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be
elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus,
even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected.

Facts: Petitioner BENITO and private respondent PAGAYAWAN were two (2) of eight (8)
candidates for the position of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the
May 11, 1998 elections.

On the day of election, 30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots
into the air. As a result, the votes in these three precincts were excluded upon objection
by petitioner’s counsel.

Private respondent Pagayawan won over petitioner by 48 votes. Considering that private
respondent would still lead petitioner by 7 votes even if all of the 3 excluded precincts
were counted in the latter's favor, private respondent was proclaimed mayor.

Benito filed a petition to declare failure of elections in three precincts. He also filed a
separate petition to annul the proclamation of private respondent.

The COMELEC issued a resolution ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers to

reconvene and count the remaining uncounted votes for the three precincts. The
Commission affirmed the proclamation of private respondent as mayor considering that
the remaining uncounted votes will no longer affect the lead of the winning candidate.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in not holding a special election in the precincts on ground
of failure of election or of a suspended election before the closing of the voting on election
day on ground of threats, violence and terrorism?

Ruling: The SC held in the negative.

It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a
failure of election, or to call a special election. In relation thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides:

SEC. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,

fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
 transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension
of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the
basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.

In Hassan v. Commission on Elections the two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a
failure of election may be declared:
(1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or
terrorism; and
(2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election.

The cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of
the election.

It is indeed odd that petitioner singles out only 3 precincts as the subjects of his petition
when there were 2 other precincts in the same school. It was only in his reply with
memorandum did he signify his lack of objection to a declaration of failure of election in
precincts. Likewise, he never objected to the inclusion of the 2 other precincts during the
canvassing and counting of votes.

Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the
number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be
failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and
cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all,
there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters
must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by
a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if
less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same
must still be respected.

A final observation: petitioner should not ask us to declare a failure of elections in the
questioned precincts simply because public respondent COMELEC declared a failure in
other precincts in Lanao del Sur.
 Soliva vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723, 20 April 2001

DOCTRINE:

Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition for the declaration of a failure of
election, two conditions must first concur: (1) that no voting has taken place on the date
fixed by law or even if there was, the election results in a failure to elect, and (2) the votes
not cast would affect the result of the election.

FACTS:

Petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in Remedios T. Romualdez
(RTR) during the local elections of May 11, 1998. Petitioners belonged to the Lakas-
NUCD party while private respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang
Pilipino (LAMMP) banner.

On May 12, 1998, all the petitioners were proclaimed as the winning candidates. Six days
after, or on May 18, 1998, respondent Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of
election due to alleged "massive fraud, terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the
ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes by respondent Soliva, his wife and men from several
precincts to the supposed canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in the precincts
or polling places upon instructions of respondent Soliva and other anomalies or
irregularities, not to mention the alleged attempt of one of Soliva's men to assassinate Mr.
Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote in Precinct 17-A in San Antonio, RTR in the
early morning of May 11, 1998."

The Chairman of the MBC maintained that a public counting was had in all the thirty-three
(33) precincts although the venue of the counting was transferred to the multi-purpose
gymnasium of the municipality.

The COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution and declared a failure of election.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of elections in the entire municipality of RTR.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections, it was held
that before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition for the declaration of a failure of
election, two conditions must first concur: (1) that no voting has taken place on the
date fixed by law or even if there was, the election results in a failure to elect, and (2)
the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates three instances when the
COMELEC may declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special election.
First, when the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Second, when the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting. And third, after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect.

The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of
election in the municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the
election returns was clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and harassment.

It is not controverted by the petitioners that the counting of the votes was transferred from
the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium without the knowledge and permission
of herein private respondents or their representatives and that the counting of the votes and
the canvassing of the election returns were done without the latter's presence. The
Commission's authority was never sought to effect the transfer of venue.

Also, petitioners were irregularly proclaimed winners on May 12, 1998 as shown in the
Certificate of Proclamation which was signed by the members of the MBC on the same
day. The Minutes of Canvass reveal that the MBC finished reading the election returns
only on May 13, 1998 at eight o'clock in the evening after which their proceedings were
terminated on May 14, 1998.

Pasandalan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150312, 18 July 2002

DOCTRINE: As can be gleaned from Sec. 6 fo R.A. No. 7166, there are three instances justify a
declaration of failure of election. These are:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
 (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.

What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect. “Failure to elect” means
nobody emerged as a winner.

FACTS:

Pasandalan and Asum were candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Lumbayanague, Lanao
del Sur. Pasandalan filed a petition seeking to nulliofy the election results in certain barangays in
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner alleged that Cafgu’s stationed near Sultan Gunting Elementary School indiscriminately
fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the polling center without casting their
votes. Taking advantage of the confusion, supporters of Asum allegedly took the official ballots,
filled them up with the name of Asum and placed them inside the ballot boxes.

On the other precincts, the petition claims that that Asum’s supporters, taking advantage of the
fistfight between Asum’s nephew and the supporters of candidate Norania Salo, grabbed the
official ballots and filled them up with the name of Asum.

Pasandalan contends that a technical examination of several official ballots from the contested
precincts would show that only a few persons wrote the entries.

COMELEC denied the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition for declaration of elections is correctly dismissed by the
COMELEC. - YES

2. Whether the COMELEC is required to conduct a technical examination before ruling

on the subject petition. - NO

RULING:

1. First issue

YES. As can be gleaned from Sec. 6 fo R.A. No. 7166, there are three instances justify a
declaration of failure of election. These are:

(d) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
 (e) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or

(f) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.

What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect. “Failure to elect” means
nobody emerged as a winner.

In the present case, the allegations of Pasandalana do not fall under any of the instances that
would justify the declaration of failure of election. The election was held in the 16 protested
precincts as scheduled. At no point was the election in any of the precincts suspended. Nor was
there a failure to elect because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes during the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. The
alleged terrorism was not of such scale and prevalence to prevent the holding of the election or
to cause its suspension. In fact, the casting and counting of votes, the preparation, transmission
and canvassing of election returns and the proclamation of the winning candidate took place in
due course.

To warrant a declaration of failure of election on the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or
suspend the holding of an election, or mar fatally the preparation, transmission, custody and
canvass of the election returns.12 The conditions for the declaration of failure of election are
stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.

The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting, and other electoral anomalies
should be resolved in a proper election protest14 in the absence of any of the three instances
justifying a declaration of failure of election. In an election protest, the election is not set aside,
and there is only a revision or recount of the ballots cast to determine the real winner.

Moreover, the court emphasized that the party who seeks the nullification of an election has the
burden of proving entitlement to this remedy. It is not enough that a verified petition is filed. The
allegations in the petition must make out a prima facie case for the declaration of failure of
election, and convincing evidence must substantiate the allegations. In the present case.
Pasandalan failed to satisfy this. Burden as his allegations do not constitute sufficient grounds for
the nullification of the election. . Pasandalan even failed to substantiate his allegations of terrorism
and irregularities. His evidence consisted only of affidavits. Mere affidavits are insufficient,18 more
so in this case since the affidavits were all executed by Pasandalan’s own poll watchers. Factual
findings of the Comelec are binding on this Court.

Finally, the SC ruled that the fact that an election is actually held prevents as a rule a declaration
of failure of election. It is only when the election is attended by patent and massive irregularities
and illegalities that this Court will annul the election. Basher is an example of such a case.

2. Second issue

NO. The Comelec is not mandated to conduct a technical examination before it dismisses a
petition for nullification of election when the petition is, on its face, without merit.
Petitioner based his claim on the case of Typoco, Jr. vs. COMELEC. However the said case is
not all fours with the present case. Typoco. In this case, Pasandalan failed to attach independent
and objective evidence other than the self-serving affidavits of his own poll watchers.

Clearly, the fact that a verified petition is filed with the Comelec does not necessarily mean that a
technical examination or a hearing on the case should be conducted first before the Comelec can
act on the petition. There is no grave abuse of discretion if the Comelec dismisses the petition
even without a technical examination or hearing if the petition fails to show on its face the
existence of any of the three instances required by law to declare a failure of election. The
Comelec in this case correctly dismissed the petition.
 Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 148575-76, 10 December 2003

Tan vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148575-76, December 10, 2003

Doctrine:

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays down three instances where a failure of
election maybe declared, namely;

(1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(2) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or

(3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases.

In all instances there must have been a failure to elect. This is obvious in the first
two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was
suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns, which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect, must as
aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that “nobody emerged as a winner.”

Facts:

Petitioners Tan, Sahidulla and Burahan filed petitions for declaration of failure of election
in all precincts in the Municipality of Luuk, Sulu, and the Municipalities of Parang and Indanan,
Sulu, for the alleged fraud and irregularities. Subsequently, they amended their petitions
impleading private respondents who were the winning candidates.

Issue:

1. Whether COMELEC is vested with jurisdiction to take cognizance of and resolve the amended
petitions before it.

2. Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Orders.

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays down three instances where a failure of
election maybe declared, namely;
 (1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(2) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or

(3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases.

In all instances there must have been a failure to elect. This is obvious in the first
two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was
suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns, which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect, must as
aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that “nobody emerged as a winner.”

Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections, two conditions must concur, namely

(1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and

(2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.

Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

In these cases, elections were held in the questioned municipalities. The alleged
fraud and irregularities, granting arguendo that they indeed marred the elections, did not
prevent or suspend the holding of the elections in the aforementioned municipalities
including the preparation and transmission of the election returns. Indeed, these returns
were duly canvassed by the respective municipal boards of canvassers which prepared
the corresponding certificates of canvass which were in turn canvassed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sulu which, after such canvass, proclaimed the petitioners herein
as the winning candidates in the May 14, 2001 elections. In fine, elections had been
conducted and winners had been already proclaimed.

The proclamation of Jikiri, Anni, Daud, Omar, Ahmad, Burahan, Salim, Hayudini,
Tingkahan and Nahudan (Respondents) enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity.
To destroy the presumption, petitioners must convincingly show that respondents’ victory
was procured through extra-legal means.

2. COMELEC is duty-bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other

analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of
elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, COMELEC, in the case
of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct a
technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and
fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and
clean. However, the exercise of this authority presupposes that the petition has properly been
acted upon on account of the existence of any of the grounds provided under Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Where elections had been held and winners had been duly
proclaimed, the proper recourse of the petitioners should have been to file regular election protest
cases to ventilate the veracity of the alleged election fraud and irregularities of the election in the
subject precincts with the consequent determination and declaration of the real winners in the
elections. The recall by COMELEC of its June 20, 2001 Order is justified by case law. Thus, the
COMELEC may suspend or annul a proclamation only in three instances, including pre-
proclamation controversies, but not in a petition for a declaration of failure of an election.
 Batabor vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160428, 21 July 2004

DOCTRINE: There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority
has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be
accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that
a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning
candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes.

In Benito vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court said that there is failure of elections only
when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained.

FACTS: Hadji Rasul Batabor, the incumbent Punong Barangay, and Mocasim Abangon
Batondiang ran as opposing candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay
Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.

The result of the election shows that Batondiang won as Punong Barangay, garnering
123 votes, as against petitioners 94 votes, or a difference of 29 votes. Batondiang was
subsequently proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay.

Bewailing the outcome of the election, Batabor filed with the COMELEC a petition to
declare a failure of election. The petition alleges that during the election, the voting started
at around 8:30 oclock in the morning. It was temporarily suspended during the lunch break
but after lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) suddenly tore
all the unused official ballots. Thus, the voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked
the ballot boxes. At that time, Batabor was not present.

Despite the note of Election Officer Taha Casidar directing the BEI to resume the voting,
the latter did not allow the remaining voters to vote. Thus, petitioners relatives and
followers, numbering more than 100, were not able to cast their votes.

In his comment, Batondiang averred that petitioners allegations are not supported by
substantial evidence. It was petitioner who padlocked the ballot boxes as shown by the
affidavit of Comini Manalastas. During the counting of votes, petitioners wife, daughter
and son actually witnessed the same. Besides, Batabor’s allegations can be properly
ventilated in an election protest because the issues raised are not grounds for declaration
of a failure of election.

On October 9, 2003, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution denying the
petition. Petitioner contends in his petition for certiorari before the SC that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
his petition.

ISSUE: Whether there was a failure of election [NO]

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The power to declare a failure of
election is vested exclusively upon the COMELEC.
Under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, these two (2) conditions must exist
before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has been held in any
precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the
votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause
of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

While the alleged 100 votes of petitioners relatives and supporters, if cast during the
election, are sufficient to affect its result, however, he failed to prove that the voting did
not take place in precincts 3A, 4A and 5A. As found by the COMELEC, the Statement of
Votes and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that out of the 316 registered voters
in the questioned precincts, at least 220 actually voted. This simply shows that there was
no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover, petitioners allegation that the
voting was not resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his relatives and followers
to vote, is better ventilated in an election contest.

We cannot also help but notice that the instant petition seeks to declare a failure of
elections and to annul solely the proclamation of respondent Batondiang, the elected
punong barangay. The prayer for annulment of proclamation does not extend to all the
elected and proclaimed candidates in Barangay Maidan. The Commission may not, on
the ground of failure of elections, annul the proclamation of one candidate only, and
thereafter call a special election therefor, because failure of elections necessarily affects
all the elective positions in the place where there has been a failure of elections. To hold
otherwise will be discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws.

There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority
of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes.

We reiterate our ruling in Benito vs. COMELEC that there is failure of elections only when
the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. In the case at bar,
this incident is not present.
 Galo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164225, 19 April 2006

DOCTRINE: The established rule is that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the tribunal
are determined by the law and the allegations in the petition regardless of whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.

FACTS: Petitioner Galo and private respondent Dagalangit were among the five candidates for
mayor in the Municipality of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur in the May 10, 2004 national and
local elections.

There was a failure of election in Lumba-Bayabao due to serious disagreements among the
various local candidates involving the clustering of precincts, the distribution of election
paraphernalia, and the appointment of the members of the various Boards of Election Inspectors.
The Comelec scheduled and held a special election on May 12, 2004.

Petitioner Galo filed with the COMELEC En Banc a petition to declare a failure of election and to
annul the results of the special election involving six precincts. Galo's petition is based on his
claim that there were "serious and massive irregularities committed by the supporters of
Dagalangit, in conspiracy with members of the Board of Election Inspectors." All the election
returns accomplished based on the fake ballots do not reflect the true will of the electorate and
that the said irregularities justify the annulment of the election held.

The Comelec en banc issued a TRO directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba-
Bayabao to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidates, until further orders. The
Comelec en banc held that pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, the alleged use of fake ballots
in the questioned precincts is not one of the grounds for nullifying the election results. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba-Bayabao completed its canvass proceedings and
proclaimed respondent Dagalangit as the winning candidate for mayor of that municipality.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction

RULING: The petition is dismissed.

We cannot sustain the petitioner's contention that the Comelec en banc gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing his petition for a declaration of a failure of elections and for the annulment
of the election results.

There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (1) the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2) the election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of any of such
causes; or (3) after the voting and during the preparation, transmission, custody or canvass of the
election returns, the election results in a failure to elect on account of any of said aforementioned
causes. In all instances, there must have been a failure to elect.
The established rule is that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the tribunal are
determined by the law and the allegations in the petition regardless of whether or not the petitioner
is entitled to the relief sought.

Before the Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in a failure to elect; and,
second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In the case at bar, both conditions
are not present.

Petitioner himself admits in his petition that during the special election, voting took place in the
questioned precincts. He also failed to show that the votes cast would affect the results of the
election.

The Comelec did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Mutilan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171248, 2 April 2007

FACTS: Dr. Mahid M. Mutilan (petitioner) and Zaldy Uy Ampatuan (private respondent) were
candidates for Governor during the election of regional officials held on 8 August 2005 in the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. On 11 August 2005, private respondent Ampatuan was
proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the ARMM. Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or
Petition to Annul the Elections, on the ground that no actual election was conducted in the
precincts in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. Petitioner alleged that the voters did not
actually vote and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters in the four provinces.
Petitioner also contested the results in the municipalities of Butig, Sultan Gumander, Calanogas,
Tagoloan, Kapai, Masiu, and Maguing in Lanao del Sur where alleged massive substitute voting
allegedly took place. COMELEC Second Division: Dismissed the petition. The COMELEC Second
Division stated that during the initial hearing of the case, petitioner’s counsel admitted that the
petition was not an election protest but one for annulment of elections. Mutilan’s counsel prayed
that the case be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC Second Division ruled that
jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is vested in the COMELEC En Banc.
However, the elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or
by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.

COMELEC En Banc in its Order dated 28 December 2005, denied the motion for reconsideration
for petitioner’s failure to verify it in accordance with Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the 21 November 2005 Order of the COMELEC
Second Division had become final and executory on 8 December 2005.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the COMELEC Second Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition to annul
elections and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc

2. W/N there are valid grounds to Annul the Elections in question

HELD: Petition is partly meritorious.

ISSUE 1: The COMELEC Second Division is Not Prohibited from Elevating the Petition to the
COMELEC En Banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Commission
on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. xxx

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), jurisdiction over postponements, failure of
elections and special elections vests in the COMELEC En Banc because a petition to declare a
failure of elections is neither a pre-proclamation controversy nor an election case. Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division has no jurisdiction over the petition to annul the elections. The
COMELEC Second Division ruled that automatic elevation of the case to the En Banc is not
sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC Second
Division should have elevated the petition to the COMELEC En Banc instead of dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court agreed with Mutilan. While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed
with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is
not prohibited. Section 4, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: Means to Effect
Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect its
powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed
in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules,
any suitable process or proceeding may be adopted. Hence, there is nothing in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure to prevent the COMELEC Second Division from referring the petition to annul
the elections to the COMELEC En Banc instead of dismissing it as it had done.

ISSUE 2: In his Petition to Annul the Elections, Mutilan alleged that: no actual election was
conducted in the contested areas. The voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up
by non-registered voters. Massive disenfranchisement and substitute voting. Petitioner argued
that the irregularities warrant the annulment and setting aside of the elections in the contested
areas.

There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or

c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact,
Ampatuan was proclaimed the winner. The other allegations of petitioner, particularly the transfer
of venue of the canvass without previous notice to the candidates, the proclamation of private
respondent without canvassing the results of the "farcical election" in Tawi-Tawi, the erasures in
the certificate of canvass, the lack of initials by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, the use of
different inks and handwritings, and the act of the Provincial Board of Canvassers in simply noting
his objections to the canvass of the returns, are not grounds that would warrant the annulment of
the elections.

In Pasandalan v COMELEC, the Court explained: To warrant a declaration of failure of election

on the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or suspend the holding of an election, or mar fatally
the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. The conditions for the
declaration of failure of election are stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for losers will
always cry fraud and terrorism. The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of elections
is an extraordinary remedy. The party who seeks the nullification of an election has the burden of
proving entitlement to this remedy.

XXX

Also, last note on the failure to verify: Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
requires that the motion for reconsideration be verified. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that there
was no valid motion for reconsideration because petitioner failed to comply. There was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC En Banc in denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The Motion to Admit Verified Copies of Motion for Reconsideration was filed only
after the denial by the COMELEC En Banc of the original and unverified motion for reconsideration
 Presbitero vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178884, 30 June 2008
DOCTRINE: A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances (Section 6, OEC)

1. the election has not been held;

2. the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and
3. the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the
consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner.

Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes.

Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established, namely: (1) no voting has taken
place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the result
of the election.

FACTS: The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). in 16 inclusion/exclusion cases, ordered the
municipal election officer (EO) of Valladolid to include the names of 946 individuals in the list of
qualified voters of the said municipality for the May 14, 2007 elections.

These 946 then moved before the MCTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) from canvassing the election
returns and from proclaiming the winning candidates for the local positions in the municipality,
which was granted.

Nonetheless, contending that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over it, the MBOC continued with
the canvassing and subsequently proclaimed all the winning candidates for the municipal
offices, including four of the herein petitioners.

Thus, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a petition for the declaration of failure of election
and the holding of a special election. Such was denied by the COMELEC and the COMELEC
En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether there was failure of elections

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the negative. The Court held that a failure of election may
be declared only in the three instances:

1. the election has not been held;

2. the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and
3. the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the
consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner.
In the present case however, the Court found that petitioners have not adduced any ground
which will warrant a declaration of failure of election. Absent any proof that the voting did not
take place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and 2,000 more supporters of
the petitioners cannot even be considered as a basis for the declaration of a failure of election.

The Court also noted that there is failure of election only when the will of the electorate has
been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must
as far as possible be respected".

Sahali vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796, 15 January 2013

Reyes, J:

FACTS:

During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and private respondent Rashidin
H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in
the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman)
ran for the position of Vice-Governor.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as
the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively.

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba
contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts that functioned in the province
of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by
comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those
appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the
COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for
Reconsideration.

The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the said
motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby.

Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when the COMELEC granted the
motion for technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the
opportunity to oppose the said motion.
RULING:

No, Sadikul and Ruby were not denied due process when the COMELEC granted the
motion for technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the
opportunity to oppose the said motion.

The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical examination of election
paraphernalia does not mean that the COMELEC division is barred from issuing an order
for the conduct thereof. The power of the COMELEC division to order the technical
examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its “exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial and city officials.”

Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election
protests carries with it the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the
effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive
original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election
protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election
paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and
irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.

Abayon vs. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, 3 May 2016

FACTS
In the May 13, 2013 elections, out of the 332 clustered precincts in the First District of N.S, Abayon
garnered the majority vote. On May 17, 2013, Abayon was duly proclaimed as a member of the
HoR.

On May 31, 2013, Daza filed his Election Protest challenging the election results in 25 precincts
in the Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares, San Isidro and Victoria. He alleged that
there was massive fraud, vote-buying and that terrorism was committed by Abayon and his
supporters.

On Aug 1, 2013, Abayon filed his verified answer with a counter- protest, where he challenged
the results in ALL precincts.

On Feb 27, HRET conducted revision proceedings in the 25 precincts protested by Daza. Abayon
was still the winner here. Thereafter, Daza moved for the withdrawal of his cause of action for the
recount and revision but maintained his prayer for the annulment of election results on the ground
of terrorism.

HRET granted Daza’s motion. HRET annulled the election results in 5 precincts because of the
commission of massive terrorism. When HRET deducted the votes from the precincts, Daza was
the winner.
This decision was supported by testimonial and documentary evidence presented by Daza, which
the HRET found as convincing. HRET disregarded the certifications issued by the Provincial
Election Supervisor Atty. Gulay Jr. and P/Ssupt. Lenaming, indicating that there was no failure of
elections and that the conduct was generally peaceful despite the occurrence of two incidents,
because they were not presented to testify.

HRET concluded that since the terrorism affected more than 50% of the votes cast in the precincts
and it was impossible to distinguish from the good votes from the bad, the annulment was
warranted.

Abayon argued that HRET had no jurisdiction to nullify the election results since it was akin to a
declaration of failure of elections, it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7166. Even if HRET had jurisdiction, there was no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that terrorism affected more than 50% of the votes, and that it was
impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad. He relies on the certifications of COMELEC
and PNP.

ISSUES
1. Whether HRET had jurisdiction over the annulment of elections (YES)
2. Whether HRET had grounds to annul the elections (NO)

RULING
1. YES. The power to annul elections is Constitutionally granted to the HRET by virtue of
Sec 17, Article VI.

An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is a contest between
the winning candidate and the defeated candidate, based on frauds or irregularities.

The power of HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare
failure of elections. The power granted by the Constitution necessarily includes those which raise
the issue of fraud and terrorism to warrant the annulment.

First, the power granted to COMELEC is under its administrative function. While the power of the
HRET is an incident of its judicial function. Second, HRET only annuls election results connected
with the election contest brought to it, while the COMELEC declares the failure of the ENTIRE
election. Therefore, there was no overlap of jurisdiction, and HRET has jurisdiction.

2. NO. Annulment of elections is only warranted in exceptional circumstances. This case

does not warrant the annulment.

There are two (2) indispensable requisites that must concur in order to justify the drastic action of
nullifying the election:
 (1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on
the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality,
more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein; and
(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful
ballots.

None of the ballots of the witnesses of the respondent were subjected to terroristic acts. No
evidence was presented which directly points to the petitioner as the one perpetrating the
commission of the terroristic acts.

There was also no report from the PNP to the COMELEC of the commission of massive terrorism,
as provided for in Comelec resolution 9583. The other witnesses only testified that there was
violence committed by the NDF-EV but not the fact that they voted for Abayon because of fear.

The certification of the COMELEC and PNP should be given weight against the unsubstantiated
claims of Daza since the presumption is that it was issued in the regular performance of their
duties.

Therefore, the decision of the HRET to annul the election was clearly unsupported by clear and
convincing evidence.

Pre-proclamation cases
Mentang vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 110347, 4 February 1994

DOCTRINE: The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-
proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed. This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the
proclamation is valid. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation
at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration of nullity.

FACTS: The ARMM regular elections were scheduled for, and held on, 25 March 1993. Among
the contenders for one of the elective positions in the Regional Legislative Assembly was
petitioner Datu Pike Mentang and private respondent Datu Ali Bernan. After the elections and the
canvassing of the election returns by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Maguindanao, the
petitioner and the private respondent were locked for the third slot in the Regional Assembly of
the Second District of Maguindanao.

In the evening of 25 March 1993, the Provincial Board of Canvassers ("PBC") initiated the
canvassing of the election returns. On 28, March 1993, the final tabulation of the votes for all the
candidates in the first and second districts of Maguindanao was concluded. On an even date, the
PBC certified that the petitioner was the third and last winning candidate for Regional
Assemblyman in the Second District of Maguindanao with 55,212 votes as against private
respondent's 52,808 votes. The petitioner was then proclaimed among the duly elected members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly. On 31 March 1993, he took his oath of office.
The private respondent went to the Office of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the purpose
of showing his personal tally sheets which revealed that he should be credited with 57,248 votes
and not just 52,808 votes. The private respondent sent two FAX message to COMELEC
Chairman Christian Monsod and to Commissioner Maambong, who was specifically in-charge of
the elections in Maguindanao, to the effect that he was going to file a "Petition for Correction of
Error and To Set Aside the Proclamation" of the petitioner on the ground that the Statement of
Votes by Precinct indicated that he garnered more votes than petitioner's 55,212 votes. The
private respondent contended that he garnered a total of 57,248 while the petitioner was correctly
credited with 55,212 votes, based on the statement of votes by precinct per municipality. Asserting
that there was just a clear mathematical mistake in the computation of his votes by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers, the private respondent asked the COMELEC, in fine, to annul the
proclamation of the petitioner and to have him (the private respondent) proclaimed instead as
being among the three winning candidates for Assemblymen in the 25th March 1993 elections.

COMELEC, following an en banc hearing, rendered that: the Commission holds that the petition
to annual proclamation on the ground of mistake in the addition of votes was filed on time.
Accordingly, the Commission has jurisdiction over the same in the exercise of its broad
administrative powers over the conduct of elections.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that it has
lawful jurisdiction to decide the "petition to correct manifest error and annul the proclamation of
(petitioner) and/or suspend the effects of such proclamation."

HELD: The Court held in the negative.

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed. This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is valid.
Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make
such declaration of nullity.

Both respondent and his counsel are saying that the Commission has no jurisdiction because the
petition to correct manifest errors has been filed out of time. This position is not particularly
abhorrent, given the Comelec rules relied upon, but they should be reminded that like court
actions, election matters should not be treated as "games of technicalities in which one more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle act of movements and position, entraps and destroys
the other or like a duel (to be) won by a rapier's thrust." . . .

Given the manifest injustice to the petitioner if his allegation of mistake in addition is indeed true,
the Commission even considered the exercise of its power to suspend its rules under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 4 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure in much the same way that
the Supreme Court can suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation
whenever the purposes of justice require it. Under this authority, the Commission is similarly
enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right
of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate
in the choice of their elective officials. . . . Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain
by all means within its command who are the real candidates elected by the electorate.

Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It
is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we
continue to hold sacred.

Sison vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, 3 March 1999

DOCTRINE:

- Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three
(3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely:
- (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
- (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or
- (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.

FACTS: While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner filed a petition seeking
to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and declare a failure of
elections. Petitioner claimst hat there has been massive and orchestrated fraud after the voting
and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof.

While the petition was pending, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of
the elections in Quezon City, hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied due process by the COMELEC.

RULING:

Matalam v. Commission on Elections we have already declared that a pre-proclamation

controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure
of elections, founded as they are on different grounds.

We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found nothing
therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all
that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect
stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the
failure to elect came about.

With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-proclamation
controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive. The reason underlying the
delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the policy of the election law pre-
proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the
canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.

With the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, the question of whether
the petition raised issues proper for a pre proclamation controversy is already of no consequence
since the well entrenched rule in such situation is that a pre-proclamation case before the
COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies being a regular election protest or
a petition for quo warranto.

Due Process:

First, we note that his citation of Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his right
to present evidence is misplaced. The phrase "after due notice" refers only to a situation where
the COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to either partially or totally suspend or annul the
proclamation of any candidate-elect

Second, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to
satisfy the demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166,
particularly Section 18 thereof, all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-
proclamation controversies "on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board
of canvassers." This is but in keeping with the policy of the law that cases of this nature should
be summarily decided and the will of the electorate as reflected on the election returns be
determined as speedily as possible.
 Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, 26 January 2000
Doctrine:
The Comelec has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception
to the general rule, Sec. 15 of RA 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint
of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
before it. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of
Sec. 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the
process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.

In the present case, the Court held that Comelec has jurisdiction over the aforementioned
petitions filed by Oreta. These petitions essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in said
certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several election returns in the canvassing.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is vested in the Comelec en banc.

Facts:
Petitioner Sandoval and private respondent Oreta were candidates for the congressional seat for
the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed
Sandoval the duly elected congressman. Sandoval took his oath of office on the same day. Oreta
filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He
alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and
proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the
canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non
inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of
the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of
petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.

Issues:
1. W/N the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of the petitions filed by Oreta, both
alleging the existence of manifest error in the certificate of canvass and seeking to reconvene
said board of canvassers to allow it to correct the alleged error (YES)
2. W/N the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid (NO)

Ruling:
1. The Court held in the affirmative.

As a general rule, candidates and registered political parties involved in an election are allowed
to file pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
returns.

The Comelec has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception
to the general rule, Sec. 15 of RA 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint
of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
before it. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election,
which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an
exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15 allows the filing of petitions for
correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for
president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason
that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the
proclamation of the winner in the election.

Applying the foregoing rule, the Court held that Comelec has jurisdiction over the aforementioned
petitions filed by Oreta. These petitions essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in said
certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several election returns in the canvassing.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is vested in the Comelec en banc.
Sec. 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu proprio, or upon verified
petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of
the board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en
banc. Sec. 5, however, of the same rule states that a petition for correction of manifest error may
be filed directly with the Commission en banc provided that such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the
winning candidate had already been made.

2. The Court held in the negative.

Although the Comelec is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of the petitions
filed by Oreta, the Court held that the exercise of its jurisdiction is tainted with illegality. Procedural
due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires
that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and
that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.

The fact showed that the Comelec set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of
prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's
allegations. Therefore, the Comelec order was annulled and remanded the case to the Comelec
for proper hearing.
 Velayo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135613, 9 March 2000

Facts:

Arthur Velayo and PR Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for Mayor of Gapan Nueva
Ecija. PR orally sought the exclusion of Election Return on 3 precincts on the ground that it is
incomplete and contains material defects. PR filed 3 more cases before the Comelec without
giving notice of appeal to Velayo. All his petitions were denied by Comelec En Banc. PR filed a
MR contending that the order of dismissal is contrary to law and the evidence. Again, Velayo
was bit given a copy of the motion. Comelec En Banc ruled in favor of respondent and annulled
the proclamation of petitioner. The Solicitor General agreed with Velayo and opined that the
Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it issued the impugned resolution.
Velayo claimed that he was denied due process because he was not furnished any notice of the
pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that petitioner received
from the Comelec was its en banc resolution annulling his proclamation.

Issue:

Whether Velayo is a real party in interest since he was proclaimed the Mayor?

Ruling: YES

The proclaimed mayor and the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers were not
impleaded in the pre-proclamation cases brought before the Comelec. The non-inclusion of the
proclaimed winner as respondent in a pre-proclamation controversy and his lack of notice of the
proceedings in the Comelec which resulted in the cancellation of his proclamation constitute
clear denial of the process.

Angelia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135468, 31 May 2000

DOCTRINE: There is manifest error when on the face of an election return, a candidate was
credited with more (or less) than what is shown in the tally.

FACTS: Petitioner Dioscoro O. Angelia and private respondent Florentino R. Tan were
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog. Private respondent,
who received a total of 7,761 votes — four votes less than those obtained by petitioner — ranked
ninth among the candidates. On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto
with theRegional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte against petitioner, alleging that in Precinct Nos. 84-
A/84-A-1, he was credited with only 82 votes, when he actually obtained 92, while in Precinct No.
23-A,petitioner was credited with 18 votes, when he actually garnered only 13 votes. According
to pri-vate respondent, he actually received a total of 7,771 votes, while petitioner actually
garnered 7,760 votes.

On June 12, 1998 petitioner took his oath and assumed office as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
On June 23, 1998, private respondent filed a motion to withdraw his petition. Subsequently, he
filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of petitioner with the COMELEC. He attached to the
petition a copy of Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, which he claims
showed a tally of 92 votes for him but indicated a corresponding total in words and figures
of only 82 votes.

He also submitted a copy of Election Return No. 3700023, which allegedly showed a tally of
only 13 votes for petitioner but indicated a corresponding total in words and figures of 18
votes. In the resolution, dated August 18, 1998, the COMELEC annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Accordingly, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on September 1, 1998 and, after
making the necessary corrections in the election returns, proclaimed the private respondent a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
he was not given due notice and hearing.

Then, without waiting for the resolution of his motion, he filed the instant petition for certiorari,
alleging, as the sole assignment of error, the following: COMELEC gravely erred and vio-lated
petition’s constitutional right to due process when it passed the August 18, 1998 resolution,
annulling his proclamation and reconvening the Municipal Board of Canvassers without prior
notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied procedural due process.

RULING: The court held that it appears that the Municipal Board of Canvassers and the
COMELEC did not comply with the procedure that should have been followed in the instant case.
In Castro-mayor v. COMELEC, the returns from a precinct were overlooked by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers in computing the total number of votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan, for which reason the COMELEC directed the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections.

The case involves a manifest error. There is manifest error when on the face of an election
return, a candidate was credited with more (or less) than what is shown in the tally.

The SC held that although the COMELEC erred in annulling the proclamation of petitioner without
notice and hearing, the expedient course of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules
Of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass and proclaim the
winning candidate or candidates on the basis thereof.

This case likewise involves manifest errors. Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-
A/84-A-1 is claimed to show 92 votes in fa-vor of private respondent but indicate a total in words
and figures of only 82 votes.

On the other hand, Election Return No. 3700023 allegedly shows 13 votes for petitioner but
indicates in words and figures 18 votes. These discrepancies can be easily resolved without
opening the bal-lot boxes and recounting the ballots. COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 provides
that "in case there exist discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in taras/tally as against the
votes obtained in words/figures in the same returns/certificates, the votes in taras/tally shall
prevail."
 Sema vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134163-64, 13 December 2000
DOCTRINE

FACTS
Muslimin Sema and Rodel Maara were two (2) of the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of Cotabato City
during the May 11, 1998 elections.

During the canvassing of the election returns from the three hundred sixty-two (362) precincts of Cotabato
City by the City Board of Canvassers (CBC), numerous petitions for exclusion of election returns were filed.
For his part, Sema objected to thirty (30) election returns. She then filed a petition for exclusion of such
returns with the CBC on the ground that the same contained material defects, were allegedly tampered with
or falsified, prepared under duress, threat, coercion, and intimidation, or substituted with fraudulent ones.
If the 30 election returns were to be excluded, Sema and Maara would obtain 13,338 and 12,484 votes,
respectively. Including the 30 election returns, the votes of Sema and Maara would be 13,713 and 15,442,
respectively.

CBC issued an order dismissing one hundred-sixteen (116) petitions for exclusion of election returns
including the petitions for exclusion filed by Sema with respect to thirteen (13) of the thirty (30) contested
returns he filed. chanrobles virt

CBC issued another order dated May 29, 1998, this time granting Semas petition for exclusion of the thirty
(30) election returns. A copy of this order was actually served upon Maara in the morning of May 31, 1998.
On May 30, 1998, counsel for Maara, already aware of the existence of the May 29, 1998 order, questioned
the illegal proceedings of the CBC saying that it had previously ruled upon the inclusion of twenty-eight (28)
of said thirty (30) contested returns. In addition, Maara questioned the composition of the CBC, the legality
of its proceedings and the capacity of the board to act fairly and judiciously and did not rule on his objection.

Sema and the other winning candidates for the City of Cotabato were proclaimed by the CBC. Notably, said
proclamation was based on the canvass of only three hundred thirty-two (332) election returns, thirty (30)
returns having been excluded from the total of three hundred sixty-two (362) returns pursuant to the CBCs
Order of May 29, 1998.

Maara filed his appeal with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), questioning the exclusion of the
thirty (30) election returns in the canvass and the proceeding of the CBC in promulgating the May 29, 1998
order which he claimed to be illegal.

On June 9, 1998, Maara filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Sema, then
the COMELEC proclamation for the position of City Mayor of Sema was suspended. Muslimin Sema is
directed to cease and desist from taking his oath of office as City Mayor and/or from discharging the
functions of said office. But, despite the COMELEC’s order Sema still assumed the office and petition for
certiorari and prohibition before this Court to annul the order of the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction directing the
COMELEC to desist from enforcing the questioned order. The court issued a resolution directing the parties
to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the order of the COMELEC.
ISSUE

WON the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998 granting Semas 28 petitions for exclusion
of the 30 contested election returns is null and void for having been issued after its earlier ruling embodied
in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the exclusion of the same returns had already become final.

RULING

Ampatuan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149803, 31 January 2002

DOCTRINE:
● The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its
authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In the case at bar, we cannot assume that
petitioners' proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because
the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for
annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections.

● The validity of a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate
has assumed office.

FACTS: Datu Andal Ampatuan (Ampatuan) et. al. and Datu Zacaria Candao (Candao) et. al. were
candidates for the provincial elective positions in the province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001
election. Ampatuan and Candao vied for the gubernatorial position. When Ampatuan et. al. emerged as the
winning candidates, Candao et. al. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of election returns
and/or declaration of failure of elections in several municipalities in Maguindanao for massive fraud and
terrorism. The COMELEC initially suspended proclamation but eventually lifted the same. Ampatuan et. al.
were then proclaimed winners and assumed their offices. In the meantime, the COMELEC ordered the
random technical examination of several precincts and issued an order outlining the procedure therefor.
Ampatuan et. al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify and set aside the orders of COMELEC,
claiming that by virtue of their proclamation the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition
for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.

ISSUE/S: Was the COMELEC divested of its jurisdiction to hear and decide Candao’s petition for declaration
of failure of elections after Ampatuan had been proclaimed?

RULING: NO. The Court explained that the fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not
deprive the COMELEC of its authority to annul an cavass and illegal proclamation. In this case, the
COMELEC cannot assume that Amaptuan’s proclamation and assumption into office on 30 June 2001 was
legal because of the conduct by which the election was held was put in issue by Candao in their petition for
annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections.

The alleged massive fraud and terrorism that attended the 14 May 2001 election in the affected
municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant dismissal of said petition by the COMELEC on the
simple pretext that Ampatuan et. al. had been proclaimed winners. The COMELEC has the authority to annul
election results and/or declare a failure of elections under Sec 6 of the OEC. Further, the COMELEC is duty-
bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of Candao’s allegation of massive fraud and terrorism.

Ampatuan’s petition was dismissed. The Court ordered COMELEC to proceed with the hearing of the
consolidated petitions and the technical examination.

Alauya vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 152151-52, 22 January 2003

DOCTRINE
INSTANT PETITION IS ONE FOR DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTION AND NOT A
PREPROCLAMATION CASE. — Alauya erroneously considers SPA Nos. 01-454 and 01-455 as
pre-proclamation controversies. These petitions were filed under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code for a declaration of failure of election. The petitions clearly state their nature, as
they are denominated "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF
ELECTIONS OR TO ANNUL THE RESULTS OF ELECTIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
SULTAN GUMANDER, MADAMBA, BACOLOD KALAWI AND BAYANG, ALL IN THE 2ND
DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR, AUTONOMOUS REGION OF MUSLIM
MINDANAO" on account of the "widespread, massive and rampant substitute voting and other
electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities which prevented duly registered voters from actually
voting in the regional elections." Dagloc v. Commission on Elections reiterates the well-settled
rule that an action for declaration of failure of election cannot be confused with a pre-proclamation
controversy, thus: "In Matalam vs. COMELEC, it was held that an action for a
declaration of the failure of election is not in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. The
distinction between the two actions was discussed by the Court in Loong vs. COMELEC in this
wise: While, however, the COMELEC, is restricted in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination
of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for
declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus,
the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze
voters' signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean. Needless to say, a preproclamation controversy is not the same as
an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections." Hence, we find
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said
petitions.

FACTS
Regular elections for regional governor, regional vice-governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ("ARMM" for brevity) were
held on November 26, 2001. The first three (3) candidates for assemblyman of the ARMM
receiving the highest number of votes in each legislative district of the province were to be
proclaimed winners. The 2nd District of the province of Lanao del Sur is composed of 21
municipalities. There was a failure of election in the municipality of Lumbatan necessitating the
holding of special elections in Lumbatan on January 7, 2002. Nevertheless, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers proclaimed Alexander Menor ("Menor" for brevity), who garnered the highest
number of votes based on the results of the 20 other municipalities. Considering the number of
registered voters in Lumbatan, the special elections would not affect Menor's election as regional
assemblyman.
On December 21, 2001, private respondent Shalimar H. Tamano filed two (2) petitions to declare
a failure of election in the 5 municipalities of Madalum, Madamba, Sultan Gumander, Bacolod
Kalawi, and Bayang of the province of Lanao del Sur. Tamano claimed there was massive
substitute voting in these 5 municipalities. Tamano also claimed that in almost all of the precincts
in these 5 municipalities, either petitioner Saaduddin M. Alauya, Jr. ("Alauya" for brevity) or private
respondent Usman T. Sarangani ("Sarangani" for brevity) obtained 100% of the votes such that
their votes equalled the total number of registered voters. Tamano prayed for the suspension of
proclamation of the winning candidates.

The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded as scheduled on January 7, 2002. The Provincial
Board of Canvassers canvassed the election returns. The results of the canvass of Lumbatan and
of the other 20 municipalities showed Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate followed by
Sarangani in the No. 2 spot and Alauya in the No. 3 spot.

On January 7, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued the order directing "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers NOT to proclaim the alleged or supposed winners and to continue and complete the
canvass of election results in the Second District of Lanao del Sur."

ISSUE
Whether the suspension of proclamation is void because the results of the 5 municipalities do
not affect Alauya's election.

RULING
YES. The court issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC to cease and desist
from implementing the suspension of proclamation insofar as Alauya is concerned. This Court
has emphasized that public policy frowns on attempts to "grab-the-proclamation and prolong-the
protest." However, this policy has to be balanced against the clear and present dangers created
by a lengthy period of non-proclamation of winners, a period commonly fraught with tension and
danger for the public at large.

On the election concern of remaining 5 out of 21 municipalities, Court directed the COMELEC to
act with deliberate speed in resolving the petitions to annul the elections or declare a failure of
elections in the 5 municipalities. If the COMELEC does not declare a failure of election, the
proclamation of the winning candidates should be done with utmost dispatch based on the
canvassed election returns from the 21 municipalities of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur.

The election results in 16 out of 21 municipalities forwarded by Alauya showing that he is the No.
3 winning regional assemblyman are not controverted by Tamano or the Solicitor General acting
on behalf of the COMELEC. However, simply deducting the election results of the 5 municipalities
from the election results of the other 16 municipalities does not necessarily establish Alauya's
theory that the over-all election results will not change. In case the COMELEC declares a failure
of election in the 5 municipalities, special elections will have to be conducted. We cannot discount
the possibility that the results of the special elections may still change the standing of the
candidates. There is no allegation as to how many registered voters there are in the 5
municipalities. The number could not be determined from the figures submitted by Alauya as
some registered voters may have voted for three, two or only one candidate. There is no certainty
that the election results in the 5 municipalities, before or after the special elections, will not affect
the results in the 16 other municipalities absent any allegation on the total number of registered
voters in the contested municipalities.
 Navarro vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150799, 3 February 2003
DOCTRINE:

Non-compliance by a BOC of the prescribed canvassing procedure is not an "illegal proceeding"

under paragraph (a) of Section 243 of the OEC, given the summary nature of a pre-proclamation
controversy, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as
little as possible. The enumeration of pre-proclamation grounds under Section 243 of the OEC is
exclusive. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on
their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and
investigate the alleged election irregularities. The absence of the required number of padlocks on
ballot boxes containing the election returns prior to actual canvassing is not a ground for exclusion
of election returns.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the COMELEC en banc
resolution denying petitioner’s petition for exclusion of election returns. Both Amelita Navarro
(petitioner) and Jose Miranda (private respondent) were mayoralty candidates of Santiago City,
Isabela during the 2001 elections. The City Board of Canvassers (BOC) convened and started
canvassing the election returns when the lawyer of Navarro objected to conduct of canvass citing
irregularities in the sealing of the envelope of the election returns and the absence of the padlocks
in the ballot boxes. Navarro through counsel filed a petition before the BOC to exclude nine (9)
ballot boxes due to the alleged irregularities in the sealing and securing the ballot boxes. The
BOC denied the petition and so Navarro filed an appeal before the COMELEC. Pending appeal,
the BOC suspended the proclamation of Miranda. COMELEC through its resolution denied the
appeal and ordered the BOC to complete the canvass of the ERs as well as proclaim the winners
of the elections. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a pre-proclamation controversy that warrants the suspension of the
proclamation of winners.

RULING:

NO. Non-compliance by a BOC of the prescribed canvassing procedure is not an “illegal

proceeding” under paragraph (a) of Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, given the
summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy, consistent with the law’s desire that the
canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.

A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face

and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate
the alleged election irregularities.

“Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. — (i) The board of
canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission
after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any
proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not
adversely affect the results of the election.”
As correctly ruled by the COMELEC, petitioner’s reliance on said Section is misplaced. The
Section applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy, not where,
as in the present petition, it raises or deals with no such controversy.

Aggabao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005

DOCTRINE:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

FACTS: Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent Anthony Miranda were rival
congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of
Cordon and San Agustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on
grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under duress; differed from other authentic copies
and contained manifest errors.

Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for a pre-
proclamation controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of
Representatives.

On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from
canvass the contested COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th copies of the COCVs.5 Based
on the results, Miranda garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Congressman.

On appeal with the COMELEC, petitioner asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when
it heard Miranda’s Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had jurisdiction over the
petition, it still erred in excluding the contested COCVs as they appeared regular and properly
authenticated.

On June 6, 2004, private respondent filed a Very Urgent Motion for Proclamation which was
opposed by petitioner who contended that the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC
Second Division is a bar to Miranda’s proclamation.

On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 7233 likewise directing the
proclamation of the remaining winning candidates in Isabela.

On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the 4th
District of Isabela.

On August 27, 2004, the petitioner filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Resolution;
Manifestation that the COMELEC Second Division Issued a Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of
the Petitioner; and Reply to the Comment. He manifested that on August 16, 2004, the
COMELEC Second Division gave due course to his pending appeal. At the same time, he
bewailed the failure of the COMELEC Second Division to annul the proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether the SC can take cognizance of this petition (No)

RULING: Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the
essential requisites, to wit:
(a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
(b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral
Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on
Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to
the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the
COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation
controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office
on June 14, 2004. As such, petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest
before the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.

The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of
its jurisdiction. Thus:

(I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.24

In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the
COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioner’s remedy was an electoral protest before
the HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

Jurisprudence mentioned in the case:

In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections we ruled that, upon proclamation of the winning
candidate and despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to hear
the protest. Thus:

The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral
protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal.l^vvphi1.net
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which has been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Baddiri vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165677, 8 June 2005

EDILWASIF T. BADDIRI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALKADAR T.

LOONG, NIJAR I. HASSAN AND THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SULU,
respondents.

G.R. No. 165677. June 8, 2005.

DOCTRINE: The Board of Canvassers may correct manifest errors committed under the
circumstances enumerated under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure before
proclamation of the winning candidate:

Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of

Canvassers. — (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors
were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass,
during the canvassing as where . . . (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of
the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, . . . the
board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate , political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
committed.

FACTS: Petitioner Baddiri, private respondents Alkhadar T. Loong and Nijar Hassan were
candidates for Board Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the Province of Sulu
in the May 10, 2004 elections.

On May 17, 2004, during the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu,
respondent Loong became aware of a manifest error of 2,000 excess votes in favor of petitioner
Baddiri in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes for Local Positions for the Municipality of Patikul,
Province of Sulu after tallying petitioner's votes based on the Statement of Votes. Baddiri was
credited with 4,873 instead of 2,873 votes in said Certificate of Canvass.
To support Loong's stand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu, executed an
Affidavit on May 17, 2004, which stated that the Board committed an honest ERROR in the total
votes garnered by candidate Baddiri for member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu and that
Badiri only garnered 2,783 votes.

Consequently, Loong filed a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error with the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu – which the Board GRANTED. On the basis of the corrected Certificate of
Canvass from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, respondent Loong placed third with 20,660 votes;
Nijar Hassan placed fourth with 20,558 votes; while petitioner Baddiri placed sixth with 19,578
votes and would not make it to the four-member Board of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First
District of the Province of Sulu.

Petitioner filed an Appeal with the COMELEC, First Division, which was dismissed for lack of
merit. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, however, this was also denied by
the COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there was manifest error in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the
Municipality of Patikul, Sulu. (YES)

(2) Whether or not the Provincial Board of Canvasser of Sulu had jurisdiction over the petition for
correction. (YES)

RULING:

(1) The COMELEC, First Division, held that it is clear that the manifest error committed in this
case falls under subparagraph 5, Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669 – “5. There was
a mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate.” It found that there was manifest error
in the addition of votes for Baddiri resulting in the addition of 2000 votes in his favor. The
Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, reflected 4,873 votes in
favor of petitioner, but the supporting Statement of Votes by Precincts showed that the correct
total votes garnered by him is only 2,873, as admitted by the members of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of the said municipality.

The factual finding of the COMELEC, which is supported by substantial evidence, is binding on
the Court. Hence, petitioner's contention that there were no manifest errors in the said Certificate
of Canvass is without merit.

(2) Petitioner, citing Section 31 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669, contends that if there was a
manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul
which prepared the document is the appropriate canvassing body that had jurisdiction to correct
the error and not the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu.

The provision of law cited by petitioner is not in point because it refers to "Pre-
proclamation cases not allowed in the election for President, Vice- President, Senator,
Member of the House of Representatives and Party-List."

The pertinent rule on the matter is Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, in
which case, the Board of Canvassers may correct manifest errors committed under the
circumstances enumerated therein before proclamation of the winning candidate. In this
case, therefore, either the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu or the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Sulu has jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Loong's Petition For
Correction of Manifest Error. Since the canvassing proceedings for the subject position were
already before respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu and the petition for correction
was filed before it, respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers correctly took cognizance of
the petition.

Lucman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166229, 29 June 2005

DOCTRINE: SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The
following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

FACTS: Petitioner Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private respondent Mosama M. Pandi were
mayoralty candidates in Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, during the May 10, 2004 elections.

During the canvassing of votes, private respondent Mosama Pandi objected to the inclusion of
ten election returns, although only six of these are subjects of the present controversy, to wit:

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSER’S RULING: It overruled private respondent’s objections

on the disputed returns, and proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate, as shown in the
Certificate of Canvass Of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal
Offices, signed on May 19, 2004.Petitioner won over private respondent by a margin of 16 votes.

Private respondent Pandi filed with COMELEC an appeal from the ruling of the Board and alleged
the following:
- That massive fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the elections, e.g., force, threat and
intimidation were employed on the voters, double voting, substitution of voters, snatching
of ballots, padding of ballots and existence of flying voters
- That he contested election returns should have been excluded from the canvass, and that
the Board was precipitate in proclaiming petitioner as the winning candidate, as private
respondent has manifested on record that he is intending to appeal the Board's ruling
- That although the exclusion of the contested returns is a ground for election protest, the
COMELEC may go beyond the face of the returns to determine whether the elections in
the precincts involved are a sham.

In addition, private respondent Pandi filed a motion to annul proclamation and/or to suspend the
effects of proclamation pendente lite.

In his Comment and/or Answer to the appeal, petitioner Lucman argued the following:
- That the grounds relied upon by private respondent are not proper in a pre-proclamation
controversy but in an election protest
 - That her proclamation is valid
- That the petition is defective for failure to include indispensable parties
- That private respondent failed to inform the Board that he is appealing its ruling, as
required by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166, or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1991.

COMELEC 1ST DIVISION’S ORDER: In its September 30, 2004 Order, it ordered the document
examiners of the Commission on Elections to conduct an examination of the List of Voters with
Voting Record of the precincts involved in this case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the
contested precincts in the Municipalityof Poonabayabao to determine whether or not actual voting
by the duly registered voters of said precincts were conducted during the elections of May 10,
2004.

Further, it ANULLED the proclamation of BAIRAMSALAM LAUT LUCMAN as duly elected mayor
ofPoonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, it is hereby ordered that the Vice-Mayor of said Municipality
assumed (sic)the position pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code, until the final
resolution of this petition. Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano dissented to the majority opinion
on the ground that the petition involves issues proper to an election protest and not a pre-
proclamation controversy.

Petitioner Lucman moved to reconsider the assailed Order, and in an Order dated October 13,
2004, Commissioner Borra ordered and certified the motion for reconsideration to the
Commission en banc. o Thereafter, the Commission en banc, in an Order dated October 14,
2004, issued a temporary restraining order and a status quo ante order, directing the parties to
maintain the status prevailing before the issuance of the September 30, 2004 Resolution.

COMELEC EN BANC’S RESOLUTION: It DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit andAFFIRMED the COMELEC 1st Division’s order.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal from the Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC (First Division)
interjected by private respondent makes a case for a pre-proclamation controversy? – YES.

RULING: Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as
"any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns."

Under Section 243 of the same Code, the issues that may be raised in a pre- proclamation
controversy, are as follows:

SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election
returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under
duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic;
and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
In the present case, the objections initially raised by private respondent before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e., the
election returns is obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains
alterations. o Obviously, the foregoing allegations pertain not only to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, but to the conduct
of the elections as well. Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed
against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular
election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. As a rule, the COMELEC is limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. o It is beyond the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to go beyond the face of the returns or investigate election irregularities.

The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature. Reception of evidence

aliunde, such as the List of Voters with Voting Record and the VRRs, is proscribed. Issues such
as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the resolution of which would compel or
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie
regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. o Such issues should be
posed and resolved in a regular election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal and
factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.

Hence, as correctly argued by petitioner, private respondent's cause of action before the
COMELEC is proper for an election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy, and the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent's
petition/appeal. Consequently, all subsequent actions by the COMELEC in relation to private
respondent's appeal are null and void, and correctable by the present special civil action for
certiorari.

The proclamation of petitioner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers is maintained and petitioner
should be allowed to assume her office as mayor of Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

Sinsuat vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 169106, 23 June 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Datu Israel C. Sinsuat (Israel) was a mayoralty candidate in the May 2004 Local
Elections in South Upi, Maguindanao, while petitioner Datu Jaberael R. Sinsuat (Jaberael), a vice
mayoralty candidate. Before the elections, Israel filed a complaint docketed as SPA No. 04-202
for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy for mayor of Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. (Gunsi). Upon
canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed as winners, on different
dates, three candidates for mayor, two candidates for vice-mayor and different sets of members
of the Sangguniang Bayan. The COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 04-202, disqualified
Gunsi to run for mayor for not being a registered resident of South Upi.

Petitioners filed the following: (1) Motion to suspend implementation of order promulgated on July
26, 2005; (2) Very urgent motion to suspend reconvening of the SBOC; and (3) Very urgent motion
to recall notice to reconvene issued by the SBOC. On August 2, 2005, the COMELEC suspended
the reconvening of the SBOC and required the other parties to comment.
In its assailed order dated August 16, 2005, the COMELEC denied the cited motions holding that
they were actually motions for reconsideration of an en banc resolution which is not allowed in
special cases under Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. It added that
the SBOC had already considered the contested ballots from Precincts Nos. 15A and 17A as
valid, and counted them in favor of Campong. It ratiocinated that the case before it was not an
election protest where election documents may be examined and evidence aliunde may be
presented to prove that the contested ballots were written by two persons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Israel should be proclaimed as mayor.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains
the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.
This rule admits an exception. But this exception is predicated on the concurrence of two
requisites, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2)
the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. The facts warranting the exception do not obtain in this case.

The complaint for disqualification of Gunsi was filed before the elections but the COMELEC en
banc disqualified him subsequent to the election. Thus, when the electorate voted Gunsi for mayor
on May 10, 2004, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the
electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Gunsi's disqualification.
The Court cannot adhere to petitioner Israel's contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi are
stray votes. The subsequent finding of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi is ineligible cannot
retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. At the time, he was not
notoriously known by the public to be ineligible to run for mayor. Considering Gunsi failed to qualify
as mayor of South Upi, the proclaimed vice-mayor shall then succeed him as mayor. The petition
is DISMISSED.

Muñoz vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170678, 17 July 2006

Doctrine: If the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter
precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of
election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election”.

In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762 votes over the private respondent
based on the canvass of the uncontested ERs whereas the total number of votes in the
26 contested ERs is 5,178, which is higher than the 762-lead of the petitioner over the
private respondent. Clearly, the results of the election would be adversely affected by the
uncanvassed returns.

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of Camalig, Albay in
the May 10, 2004 election.
Private respondent objected to the inclusion of the 26 election returns from various
precincts based on certain irregularities. The Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled to
include the objected ERs in the canvass. The ruling was appealed. Pending appeal,
Petitioner Muñoz was proclaimed as mayor.

Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the
petitioner for being premature and illegal. The COMELEC granted the annulment of the
proclamation.

Hence, petitioner files the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC correctly annulled the proclamation of the
petitioner?

Ruling: The SC held in the affirmative.

Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. At the
time the proclamation was made, the COMELEC First Division had not yet resolved the
appeal. The MBC should not have proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate
absent the authorization from the COMELEC. Any proclamation made under such
circumstances is void ab initio.

The Court do not agree with petitioner's contention that the proclamation was valid as the
contested ERs will not affect the results of the election.

"Results of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in
a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest
rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where
there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the
election”. (Lucero v COMELEC)

Although the Lucero case involves a failure of election, the definition of "results of
election" applies to the disposition of contested election returns under Section 20(i) of
R.A. No. 7166. In both situations, if the total number of votes in the precinct where there
is a failure of election or in case of the contested ERs, is less than the lead of a candidate
over his closest rival, the results of the election would not be adversely affected. Hence,
a proclamation may be made because the winning candidate can be ascertained.
Otherwise, a special election must be held or an authorization of the COMELEC is
necessary after ruling on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party in order
to determine the will of the electorate. Proclamation made in violation of the rules is void
ab initio as it would be based on an incomplete canvass of votes. It is well settled that an
incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board
of canvassers considers all returns and omits none.

In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762 votes over the private respondent
based on the canvass of the uncontested ERs whereas the total number of votes in the
26 contested ERs is 5,178, which is higher than the 762-lead of the petitioner over the
private respondent. Clearly, the results of the election would be adversely affected by the
uncanvassed returns.

Fernandez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171821, 9 October 2006

DOCTRINE:

- Compliance with the period set for objections on exclusion and inclusion of
election returns is mandatory.

- The irregularity in the preparation of the election returns should be brought before the
city/municipal Boards, at the time the said returns were being canvassed by the said
boards. This is required under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166

FACTS:

Petitioner Fernandez and private respondent Lazaro ran for governor of Laguna. During the
canvassing of the certificates of canvass, Fernandez moved to suspend the proceedings aiming
tampering of election returns for San Pablo City and Biñan, Laguna, which allegedly increased
Lazaro’s votes. It was denied by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) and proclaimed
Lazaro as governor. The First Division suspended Lazaro's proclamation and directed the
Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to examine whether the photocopied election
returns submitted by petitioner were prepared in sets or groups by only one person. More than a
month after, however, the First Division again directed the ERSD to cause the examination of the
election returns from the disputed cities and municipalities. It also ordered the concerned Boards
of Canvassers to deliver copies of the election returns used in the canvassing.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for deliberately failing to mention the
outcome of the examination of the election returns as ordered by the First Division.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. No grave abuse of discretion attended public
respondent's decision to affirm the actions taken by the PBOC and the First Division because it
only applied Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166 mandating that matters raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code on the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought
in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.
In the instant case, it was incumbent for Fernandez to raise his oral objections to the chairman of
the city and municipal board of canvassers of San Pablo and Biñan, respectively, at the time the
questioned returns or certificates of canvass is presented for inclusion in the canvass. However,
he questioned the election returns for San Pablo City and Biñan on the ground of fraud only before
the provincial, and not before the appropriate city and municipal, boards of canvassers. In fact,
he belatedly questioned the election returns for Calamba City and four other municipalities, to wit:
Cabuyao, San Pedro, Sta. Rosa and Nagcarlan, in his petition with the First Division when he
attached the contested election returns in his memorandum.

Fernandez cannot justify raising belatedly the issue of tampering before the PBOC as this would
run counter to the mandatory rule requiring protestants to present objections to the inclusion or
exclusion of election returns at the time the questioned returns are presented for inclusion in the
canvass. Section 20 of R.A. 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 requires that an
oral objection to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns in the canvassing shall be submitted
to the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for
inclusion in the canvass. It is not denied by Fernandez that the objections interposed were made
after the election returns in certain precincts were included in the canvass. Such belated
objections are fatal to Fernandez’s cause. Compliance with the period set for objections on
exclusion and inclusion of election returns is mandatory.

The irregularity in the preparation of the election returns should have been brought before the
Boards of Canvassers of San Pablo City and Biñan, respectively, at the time the said returns were
being canvassed by the said boards. This is required under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166,
to wit:

Section 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. — Questions affecting the

composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission. However, matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first
instance before the board of canvassers only.

Marabur vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 169513, 26 February 2007

DOCTRINE: Paragraph (i) of Section 20, RA 7166 provides that any proclamation made in
violation of the prohibition against proclamation without the COMELEC authorization shall be void
ab initio.

FACTS:
Petitioner and Omar "Bornok" Mahamad, Jr. (respondent) were among the candidates for
councilors of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC, praying that the proceedings of the CBC be
declared illegal and void. The petition alleged the canvass of all but one of the 190 precincts of
Marawi City, particularly Precinct No. 108-A, showed respondent to be ahead of petitioner, with
10,070 votes as against 10,020 votes for petitioner. However, the election return from Precinct
No. 108-A was allegedly missing, prompting the CBC to defer the canvass. However, at around
8:00 p.m. of 20 May 2004, the missing election return allegedly reappeared. The election return
showed signs of tampering atop the thumb marks and signatures of the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors, and affixed at the end of the taras corresponding to petitioner’s name were
additional taras. Alterations in the number of votes for petitioner in words and figures allegedly
made it appear that petitioner had 150 votes instead of only 50 votes. Respondent claims that it
is possible for him to garner 150 because based on the contested election return only 132 voters
actually voted in Precinct No. 108-A. The petition also alleged that the CBC disregarded
respondent’s objections and denied him of any chance to appeal its inclusion of the contested
election return.
Meanwhile, petitioner took his Oath of Office as councilor of Marawi City on 4 June 2004.
COMELEC Second Division found the CBC violated the prohibition in Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166
in proclaiming any candidate as winner without authorization from the COPMELEC after the
COMELEC has ruled on the objections of the losing party. Hence, it declared null and void the
proclamation of petitioner. MR was also denied.
COMELEC En Banc also denied petitioner’s MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in annulling the proclamation of petitioner as the 10th ranking and winning candidate for councilor
of Marawi City.

RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that CBC contravened paragraphs (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Sec. 20 of RA 7166.
First, the CBC ignored respondent’s manifestation to appeal. Under paragraph (e), the CBC
should have entered respondent’s intent to appeal in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the
contested election return, and proceeded to consider the other returns. There is no showing that
the CBC observed this procedure. Second, the CBC did not suspend the canvass, and instead
proclaimed petitioner as one of the winning candidates for councilor. The CBC, in violation of
paragraph (f), did not give respondent 48 hours to file his notice of appeal forcing respondent to
appeal directly to the COMELEC. Consequently, the CBC did not elevate any record or evidence
to the COMELEC as required in paragraph (g). Finally, disregarding paragraph (i), the CBC
proclaimed petitioner without any COMELEC authorization after the COMELEC has ruled on
respondent’s objections.
Paragraph (i) of Section 20, RA 7166 provides that any proclamation made in violation of the
prohibition against proclamation without the COMELEC authorization shall be void ab initio.
Accordingly, petitioner’s proclamation as the 10th ranking and winning candidate for councilor is
void. Where a proclamation is void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the assumption
of office of the proclaimed candidate cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such
nullity and to annul the proclamation. The nullity of the proclamation is one of the exceptions to
the rule that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC
is no longer viable. This resolves petitioner’s argument that respondent’s cause of action is proper
in an election contest, and not in a pre-proclamation controversy.
In view of the CBC’s violation of paragraph (i), among others, we find that the COMELEC properly
annulled petitioner’s proclamation and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or
administrative body, in this case the COMELEC, must have issued the assailed decision, order,
or resolution in a capricious and despotic manner. Clearly, such is not the situation in the instant
case.

NOTES:
Section 20, RA 7166
Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. –
(a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or
exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under
Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall
submit their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the
questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be
recorded in the minutes of the canvass.
(b) Upon receipt of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall automatically defer
the canvass of the contested returns and shall proceed to canvass the returns which are
not contested by any party.
(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter his objection
in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the Commission. Within twenty-four
(24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party shall
submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be attached to the form for
written objections. Within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of
the objection, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection in the
form also to be prescribed by the Commission, attaching thereto supporting evidence, if
any. The board shall not entertain any objection or opposition unless reduced to writing in
the prescribed forms.
The evidence attached to the objection or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall be
immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman affixing
his signature at the back of each every page thereof.
(d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall take up the contested returns, consider
the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily and immediately rule
thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed form and authenticate the same
by the signatures of its members.
(e) Any party adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately inform the
board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall enter said information in the
minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns and proceed to consider the other returns.
(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested return ruled
upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hours, therefrom,
any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board a written and verified
 notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter an appeal
may be taken to the Commission.
(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate
report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence
submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.
(h) On the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board, the Commission
shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said records and
evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the board, without
the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily
dismissed.
The decision of the Commission shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from
receipt thereof by the losing party.
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized
by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objection brought to it on appeal by the losing
party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested
returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
 Arbonida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167137, 14 March 2007

Doctrine:

Under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, a pre-proclamation controversy

refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns.

Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

Facts:

Petitioner Arbonida and respondent Caingal were candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tanza Cavite. Arbonida was declared as the eighth winning candidate with 14,620 votes as
against Caringal who garnered 14,552 votes. Caringal filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking
to annul Arbonida's proclamation on the ground of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes by
Precinct (SOVP). Caringal alleged that the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) committed
mistakes in the copying of figures from the election returns to the SOVPs. Arbonida moved to
dismiss the petition since dagdag-bawas did not constitute manifest error but rather a ground for
an election protest. He also claimed that a pre-proclamation controversy was no longer viable
after the proclamation of the winning candidate.

COMELEC found that there existed discrepancies in the number of votes sufficient to have
an effect on the last place for municipal councilor being contested. COMELEC First Division
annulled the proclamation of Arbonida and instead proclaimed Caringal as the duly elected eighth
municipal councilor of Tanza, Cavite.

Issue:

Whether the petition filed by Caringal is a proper subject of a pre-proclamation

controversy.

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction over Caingal’s petition for the correction of the
entries.

Ruling:

Under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, a pre-proclamation controversy refers
to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns.

In this case, the petition filed by Caringal before the COMELEC involves a pre-
proclamation controversy and not an election contest. Although the petition alleged fraud, the
remedy sought was merely for correction of erroneous entries in the statements of votes which
were based on the election returns.

In Milla v, Balmores-Laxa, the Supreme Court held that the statement of votes forms the
basis of the certificate of canvass and of the proclamation. Any error in the statement ultimately
affects the validity of the proclamation. If a candidate's proclamation is based on a statement of
votes which contains erroneous entries, it is a nullity. As the COMELEC correctly stated, where a
proclamation is null and void, it is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to annul the proclamation.
Moreover, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that the COMELEC has the power to suspend
its own rules so as not to defeat the will of the electorate. In Milla, the Supreme Court allowed the
filing of a petition one month after the proclamation of the petitioner therein on the ground that an
invalid proclamation is no proclamation.

COMELEC correctly assumed jurisdiction over Caringal’s petition for the correction of the
entries, and declaring the nullity of Arbonida’s proclamation. Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

The Constitution clearly mandates that pre-proclamation controversies must be first heard
and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the en banc if a motion for
reconsideration were filed.
 Cumigad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167314, 20 March 2007

DOCTRINE: Sec. 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules. Pre-proclamation Controversies

Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. — (a) The following pre- proclamation
controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:

(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of
the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the figures into
the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from
non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation
of the winning candidates had already been made.

FACTS: Petitioner Luisito O. Cumigad ran for a seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of Gamu,
Isabela during the 10 May 2004 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Gamu,
Isabela (MBOC) completed the canvassing of votes on 12 May 2004 and proclaimed
petitioner as having received 3,539 votes, placing him in sixth place among the eight
winning candidates.

Then, the MBOC filed a Memorandum before the COMELEC alleging "manifest error" in
the proclamation of the winners and requesting authority to reopen the canvassed
election returns. The MBOC claimed that upon comparison of its tally with those of the
National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and the Parish Pastoral Council for
Responsible Voting (PPCRV), it found "variance [in] the result" and errors "which in a way
would [a]ffect the winning and [losing] candidates."

Before filing the MBOC memorandum, Angangan (Angangan), one of the losing
candidates, was given a Certification stating that Angangan ranked seventh among the
candidates for municipal councilor according to the PPCRV count, contrary to the result
x x x as proclaimed by the MBOC.

On 25 June 2004, petitioner filed his Memorandum before the COMELEC, arguing that
no manifest error can be said to exist when the tally made by the MBOC differs from that
of the NAMFREL, the PPCRV, or of other candidates. He also argued that any reopening
of the ballot boxes and recount of votes in the election returns would therefore be illegal.
Upon a review of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes, the MBOC was convinced that it
committed manifest errors. The MBOC clarified that it did not intend to open the ballot
boxes and recount the votes cast for the candidates, but only to reconvene and correct
manifest errors committed during the canvassing.

The COMELEC En Banc found that the MBOC committed manifest errors in the transfer
of entries from the election returns to the Statement of Votes. Clearly, there are manifest
errors committed which affected the outcome or result of the elections considering that in
the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation, it is stated that petitioner ranked
number six (6) with 3,539 votes but with the implementation of the correction, he only
ranked number nine (9) with 3,389 votes.

Finally, the proclamation of petitioner cannot be considered valid because it was based
on faulty tabulation.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the MBOC to reconvene and make corrections to the
Statement of Votes [NO]

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in in ordering the MBOC to reconvene and make corrections to the
Statement of Votes.

The COMELEC correctly treated the memorandum as a petition for correction of manifest
errors under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules. Section 4 classifies
"correction of manifest errors" as an issue that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. Section 5 provides scenarios where manifest errors may be said to exist:

Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the

Commission. — (a) The following pre- proclamation controversies may be filed directly
with the Commission:

(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of
the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the figures into
the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from
non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation
of the winning candidates had already been made.

In a long line of election cases, we have consistently held that election laws should
be construed liberally to give effect to the popular will, without resort to
technicalities. The court frowns upon any interpretation of election laws that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an election but also
the correct ascertainment of the results. It does not escape our attention that petitioner
raised purely technical objections, but he did not dispute the findings of the COMELEC
on the errors in the Statement of Votes.

There is no controversy that discrepancies exist in the statement of votes and that
reflected in the questioned election returns. Considering that any error in the statement
of votes would affect the proclamation made on the basis thereof, the resolution of the
COMELEC directing the MBOC to reconvene to rectify the errors it committed in tallying
the votes for the vice-mayoralty race in Alicia, Isabela should be upheld. Indeed, "above
and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount.
It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the
democracy we continue to hold sacred.
 Jainal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174551, 7 March 2007

Doctrine: The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no
longer viable after a proclamation has been made.

However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when the proclamation is null and void. The
proclamation of petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons:
(1) it was based on a canvass that should have been suspended with respect to the contested
election returns;
(2) it was done without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in view of the unresolved
objections of Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass; and
(3) it was predicated on a canvass that included unsigned election returns involving such number
of votes as will affect the outcome of the election. In this regard, it has long been recognized that
among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a proclamation or suspend the effects
of one.

The absence of the required signatures and thumbmarks rendered the election returns concerned
materially defective. The crucial circumstance also served as a proper subject of a pre-
proclamation controversy, particularly falling under paragraph (b) of Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which the COMELEC resolved in the assailed issuances.

Facts: Petitioner Mayor Jainal and private respondent Talib were duly certified candidates for
Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. During the canvassing, Talib objected to
the inclusion of certain returns. Petitioner Jainal was proclaimed by the MBC as the winning
candidate.

Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC, for the annulment of election returns
pertaining to 21 precincts. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the
precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election
returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers.

The COMELEC 2nd Division annulled in part the election returns in certain precints and likewise
annulled the proclamation of Respondent Jainal.

Talib filed the instant position, including Vice Mayor Ahajan as private respondent, who will fill up
the vacancy created by the annulment.

Vice Mayor Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as acting mayor pursuant to the COMELEC
resolutions.

On October 5, 2006, the COMELEC issued an order directing the Vice Mayor to cease and desist
from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC rightfully issued the Order directing the Vice Mayor Ahajan to
cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

Ruling: The SC held in the negative.

Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns.

The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no longer
viable after a proclamation has been made.

However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when the proclamation is null and void. The
proclamation of petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons:
(1) it was based on a canvass that should have been suspended with respect to the contested
election returns;
(2) it was done without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in view of the unresolved
objections of Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass; and
(3) it was predicated on a canvass that included unsigned election returns involving such number
of votes as will affect the outcome of the election. In this regard, it has long been recognized that
among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a proclamation or suspend the effects
of one.

The absence of the required signatures and thumbmarks rendered the election returns concerned
materially defective. The crucial circumstance also served as a proper subject of a pre-
proclamation controversy, particularly falling under paragraph (b) of Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which the COMELEC resolved in the assailed issuances.

Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. Clearly, the effects of
the two resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final
and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus,
in granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist
from assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a
usurpation of this Court's prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs
sought in the present petition.

The 5 October 2006 order of the COMELEC En banc is null and void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction and in usurpation of this Court's prerogative and
jurisdiction.

With the nullification of petitioner's proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu
is vacant.

If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor
or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner's proclamation is in the nature of a
permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the functions
of his office." Ahajan's assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the
result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC.
 Ewoc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171882, 3 April 2007

FACTS

Petitioners and private respondents were candidates for mayor, vice-mayor and Sangguniang
Bayan members in the municipality of Tanudan, Kalinga in the May 10, 2004 elections. Three pre-
proclamation cases,4 namely SPC Nos. 04-185, 04-186, and 04-226, were filed, impugning the
rulings of the old Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) for excluding the election returns from
Precincts Nos. 26A, 27A/28A, 39A and 40A/41A on the alleged grounds that the same were
tampered, falsified, padded and were not prepared by the duly authorized or appointed members
of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI).

These three cases were then consolidated after which the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Joint Order,5 reconstituting a new MBOC and directed the latter to examine and determine the
integrity of the contested ballot boxes from the said precincts. After reconvening and opening the
ballot boxes of the said precincts, the new MBOC issued its ruling 6 excluding the election returns
from the said precincts, and proclaiming private respondents as the winning candidates for the
contested positions of mayor, vice-mayor and Sangguniang Bayan members, respectively.

On September 15, 2004, petitioners filed the Petition to Annul Proclamation or To Suspend the
Effects Thereof and To Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the New Municipal Board of
Canvassers,7 in the case entitled “Cornelio Ewoc, et al. v. New Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Tanudan, Kalinga, et al.,” docketed as SPC No. 04-301. In the said petition, petitioners assailed
the ruling of the new MBOC for lack of evidence to support its conclusion that the integrity of the
ballot boxes for the abovesaid precincts and their contents were violated.

ISSUE

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CONJECTURED AND
UNSUBSTANTIATED 9 SEPTEMBER 2004 RULING OF THE NEW MBOC WHICH ADOPTED
A CANVASSING PROCESS CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.

HELD

It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of Canvassers is without

jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the election return. The rationale is that a
full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election
documents would run counter to the summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. However,
this rule is not without any exception. In Lee v. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 363 (2003),
we held as follows: . . . [this rule] presupposes that the returns “appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face.” Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the
return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the
doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis
for the exclusion of the questioned election return.
 Tamayo-Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 175121, 8 June 2007
DOCTRINE: A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition or political parties before the board or directly with the
COMELEC, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code, in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns. It is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and the
COMELEC, as a general rule, need not go beyond the face of the returns and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate the alleged election irregularities

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Taytay, Rizal. After the counting of votes and the canvassing of election returns, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed, on May 15, 2004, private respondent as the duly
elected with a lead of 1,568 votes.

Dissatisfied, petitioner caused the compilation of all copies of the election returns and the
statement of votes by precinct and discovered discrepancies thereon. Then, almost four (4)
months after the proclamation of private respondent, or on September 6, 2004, petitioner filed her
petition for correction of manifest errors in the election returns and the statement of votes and for
nullification of the proclamation of private respondent as Vice- Mayor alleging that she would have
won over private respondent by a plurality of 172 votes.

The COMELEC First Division dismissed said petition on the ground that the correction in the
tabulation would be futile as it would not affect the results of the election since only 5 out ten
irregularities cited by petitioner as grounds for correction were proper for action pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated October 16, 2006, affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC En Banc erred in affirming the ruling of the COMELEC First Division

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the negative.

The Court held that COMELEC En Banc did not gravely abuse its discretion when it considered
only five out of the ten irregularities pointed out by petitioner as matters proper for correction of
manifest errors.

The Court emphasized that for errors to be manifest, they must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected, and objections thereto must
have been made before the Board of Canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.
It should be remembered that petitioner filed her petition for correction of manifest errors and
nullification of proclamation directly with the COMELEC. According to Section 5, Rule 27 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, there are only two (2) instances where a pre-proclamation
controversy may be filed directly with the COMELEC:

1. illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and

2. correction of manifest errors.

Thus, it was proper for the COMELEC to take cognizance of the petition, and in their respective
resolutions, both the COMELEC First Division and En Banc were correct in not considering the
five alleged irregularities since they were beyond the ambit of "manifest errors." Accordingly, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Cambe vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178456, 30 January 2008

DOCTRINE:

COMELEC En Banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance, whether original or
appellate, over election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and incidents thereof.
When such disputes are filed before or elevated to COMELEC, they should be heard and
adjudicated first at the division level. This is in accordance with Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution which provides that election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, should be heard and decided first at the division level.

FACTS:

Petitioner Randy C. Cambe contends that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the May 22, 2007 Ruling of public
respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Lasam, Cagayan, which granted
herein private respondent Dominador M. Go's petition to exclude from the canvass
Electon Return No. 9601666 (for clustered precinct numbers 66 and 68, Barangay
Nabannagan East),resulting in the proclamation on even date of Go as the duly elected
eighth (8th) Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Lasam, Cagayan.

Petitioner and Go were candidates during the May 14, 2007 elections for Sangguniang
Bayan members of the municipality of Lasam, Cagayan. Go orally moved for its exclusion
on the ground that said return was allegedly manufactured. He alleged that the integrity
of said return is questionable as the total number of votes cast for the vice-mayoralty
candidates exceeded the number of registered voters.

MBC proclaimed the winners for the position of mayor, vice-mayor, and 7 Sangguniang
Bayan Members, leaving the canvassing of the questioned return for the 8th slot pending.
MBC issued a ruling excluding Election Return No. 9601666 on the ground of "fraud,
material defect, tamper[ing], and statistical improbability. MBC proclaimed Go as the 8th
duly elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Lasam, Cagayan.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in excluding Election
Return No.9601666 in the canvas of votes which led to the proclamation of Go as the 8th
elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction in the first instance in this case.

RULING:

No, COMELEC En Banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance, whether original
or appellate, over election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and incidents thereof.
When such disputes are filed before or elevated to COMELEC, they should be heard and
adjudicated first at the division level. This is in accordance with Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution which provides that election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, should be heard and decided first at the division level.

Dimaporo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008

FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent Vicente Belmonte were both candidates for
Representative of the 1st Congressional District of Lanaodel Norte during the May 14, 2007
elections.

On May 22, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) completed the canvass of the
Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for the City of Iligan and four (4) of the municipalities, namely,
Linamon, Kolambugan, Tubod and Baroy. Upon adjournment on May 22, 2007, the said PBOC
issued a Certification showing respondent Belmonte in the lead, with 52,783 votes, followed by
candidate Badelles with 39,315 votes, and petitioner Dimaporo in third place with only 35,150
votes.

Sometime in the evening of May 19, 2007, the ballot boxes containing the COCs of Kauswagan,
Bacolod and Maigo were allegedly forcibly opened, their padlocks destroyed and the envelopes
containing the COCs and the Statement of Votes (SOV) opened and violated.

When the PBOC was about to resume the canvassing at around 9:00 a.m. the succeeding day,
the forced opening of the ballot boxes was discovered prompting the PBOC to suspend the
canvass.-the Commissioner-in-Charge of CARAGA Region, Nicodemo Ferrer, issued a
Resolution ordering that the canvassing of the ballots contained in the tampered ballot boxes of
Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod be suspended until after the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) submits its findings to the Commission.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8073 adopting in part the recommendation of Atty. Ausan
directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to "immediately reconvene solely for the purpose of
retrieving the three envelopes supposedly containing the COCs from the municipalities of
Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo"and to "open the same in the presence of all watchers, counsels,
and representatives of all contending parties and the accredited Citizens’ Arm of the Commission
and right there and then to direct the representatives of the dominant majority and minority parties
to present their respective copies of the COCs for comparison with the COCs intended for the
COMELEC and with the COCs inside the envelope just opened."

The COMELEC further resolved that when discrepancies show signs of tampering and falsifying,
the PBOC is to "immediately turnover to the NBI the copies of the COCs of said three (3)
municipalities intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for purposes of comparison
with those retrieved from the questioned ballot boxes."

However, no canvassing took place on May 30, 2007 in view of the human barricade of some 100
persons who effectively blocked the entrance to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan building. The new
PBOC convened and opened the ballot boxes for the towns of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod.

As the PBOC proceeded with the canvass, private respondent Belmonte objected to the inclusion
of the COCs of the concerned municipalities The PBOC denied Belmonte’s objections due to lack
of jurisdiction Belmonte filed his verified notice of appeal before the PBOC. Also, Belmonte filed
with the COMELEC his alternative petition to correct manifest errors.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted Belmonte’s petition. While conceding that it has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases against members of the house, it took
cognizance of the petition as one for the correction of manifest errors, hence, within its jurisdiction

Dimaporo filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the case.
Dimaporo claims that the subject matter involved does not pertain to manifest errors but to the
"preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation" of certificates of canvass, a matter
outside the realm of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when a congressional seat is involved. Dimaporo
was also granted a status quo ante order.

ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC erred in proclaiming Belmonte winner even though a Status Quo Ante
Order was granted

RULING
Comelec has duly proclaimed BELMONTE, thus if DIMAPORO wants to pursue a case, he must
file with the HRET.
Private respondent Belmonte filed his comment even before the issuance of the status quo ante
order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of
the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte-he had taken
his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.

IN LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE HAS ALREADY BEEN
TRANSFERRED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET).
WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A PROCLAMATION AND A DEFEATED CANDIDATE CLAIMS TO
BE THE WINNER, IT IS THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ALREADY THAT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.

The COMELEC was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmonte’s petition to correct manifest errors
then proclaiming him the winner.

ELECTION CASES ARE IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. THEY INVOLVE NOT ONLY THE
ADJUDICATION OF THE PRIVATE INTEREST OF RIVAL CANDIDATES BUT ALSO THE
PARAMOUNT NEED OF DISPELLING THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH BECLOUDS THE REAL
CHOICE OF THE ELECTORATE WITH RESPECT TO WHO SHALL DISCHARGE THE
PREROGATIVES OF THE OFFICES WITHIN THEIR GIFT.

It has always been the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed
as little as possible.

CONSIDERING THAT AT THE TIME OF PROCLAMATION, THERE HAD YET BEEN NO

STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER FROM THE COURT,
SUCH PROCLAMATION IS VALID AND, AS SUCH, IT HAS VESTED THE HRET WITH
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AS BELMONTE HAS, WITH THE TAKING OF HIS OATH,
ALREADY BECOME ONE OF THEIR OWN.

Hence, should Dimaporo wish to pursue further her claim to the congressional seat, the filing of
an election protest before the HRET would be the appropriate course of action.

Pimentel vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413, 13 March 2008

DOCTRINE: In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the exception applies only to Congress or
the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still
be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies.
FACTS: Two months after the May 14, 2007 national elections, 11 candidates for senatorial posts
were proclaimed and had taken their oaths except to the 12th and last post where Pimentel and
Zubiri were the contenders. A new board of canvassers (Special Provincial Board of Canvassers
for Maguindanao) was created because Pimentel through his counsel questioned some
irregularities as to the authenticity and due execution of Certificate of Canvass. During the
proceedings, they were not allowed to ask questions and present evidence to prove their claim.
Instead, their questions were noted in the minutes. Hence, Pimentel a petition for certiorari and
mandamus seeking the court to issue TRO as to enjoin comelec from canvassing; to annul such
proceedings because it is unconstitutional and illegal proceedings and; to allow them to raise their
objections and present evidence to prove their claims. All petitions were denied.

Eventually, Zubiri was proclaimed, had taken oath and assumed office. Pimentel protested. Zubiri
filed a motion to dismiss contending that Pimentel should have filed with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) for the annulment of his proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in

cases of Senators.

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court did not recognize the pre-proclamation case of
Pimentel, which could have prospered if he met the requirement of law, because SPBOC-
Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged
by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it.

In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the exception applies only to Congress or
the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still
be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies.

The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case. As provided in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, SET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a senator, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the SET’s own
jurisdiction begins. The word "sole" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution underscores
the exclusivity of the electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their
respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters which may be threshed out in an election contest.
It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it
does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
 Dormal vs. Biron, G.R. No. 181809, 17 February 2010
DOCTRINE:

- An act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias constitutes grave abuse of
discretion

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were vice mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo. During the canvassing of votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of 25
election returns as some of them had missing taras and certain discrepancies in the number of
votes on the returns vis a vis the certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI).

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) found that there was no tampering on the
number of taras for Doromal, thus Biron appealed to the COMELEC who partially granted such.
The case was brought to the COMELEC en banc who affirmed the previous COMELEC decision.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to compare the contested
returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that there was tampering or
falsification of the said returns.

RULING:

Thus, in Patoray v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that the certificate of votes is inadmissible
to prove tampering because it was signed only by the chairperson of the BEI, whereas Section
16 required that the same be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the BEI which issued
the Certificate.

In the instant case, the certificates of votes from Precinct Nos. 90A/90B 20 and 7A/7B 21
are defective, for they do not contain (1) the thumbmarks of the members of the BEI, (2) the total
number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the time of the issuance of the certificates.
Likewise, the certificate of votes from Precinct 208A is defective because it does not contain (1)
the names, signatures and thumbmarks of the members of the BEI, (2) the total number of voters
who voted in the precinct, and (3) the time of the issuance of the certificate. Aida Pineda, private
respondent's poll watcher in said precinct, claims that she prepared a certificate of votes reflective
of the true tally in the election return, but the members of the BEI refused to affix their signatures
thereto.

At any rate, we cannot admit the defective certificate because, by Pineda's own admission,
she was the one who prepared the entries in the said certificate and not the BEI as required by
Section 16 of RA 6646, thus raising grave doubts as to its accuracy.

The clear legislative intent was, thus, to impose the additional condition under Section 17
before the certificate of votes may be admitted in evidence to prove tampering.
 The rationale of the law is perceptible. By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly
authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the same, the law seeks to
safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to the watcher after
the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it is presented to the board of
canvassers to prove tampering. The legislature may have reasonably foreseen that the certificate
may be easily altered while in the hands of the watcher in order to orchestrate a sham pre-
proclamation controversy. To counterbalance this possibility, the law imposes the condition that
the certificate, aside from complying with Section 16, must be subsequently authenticated at the
time of its presentment to the board of canvassers in the event that it shall be used to prove
tampering.

In the instant case, the records indicate that Biron failed to comply with the requirements set by
Section 17 with respect to the certificates of votes from Precinct Nos. 208A, 90A/90B and 7A/7B
which he submitted in evidence before the MBC. This should have provided an added reason for
the COMELEC to refuse the admission of said certificates had the COMELEC carefully examined
the certificates of votes appearing in the records of this case.

On the Issue of the affidavits:

At the outset, we find that the COMELEC placed undue reliance on the affidavits of Biron's
poll watchers to establish the irregularities and fraud allegedly committed during the counting of
votes. These affidavits are evidently self-serving.

While these statements suggest that the watchers failed to assert their rights or to perform
their duties under the OEC, we fail to see how they established that the election returns were
tampered On the contrary, these affidavits reveal that the watchers failed to detect any anomaly
during the actual tallying of the votes at the precinct level because the missing taras were
discovered only later on when Copy 4 was shown to them.

In the discrepancies and in relation to sec. 236:

With the above finding that there are minor discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the
subject returns, specifically Copies 4 and 5, the proper procedure then is not to exclude the said
returns but to follow Section 236.

In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting
in the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The proper
procedure in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly
spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Election contests
Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001, 13 February 1996
Facts:
After Fidel Ramos was declared President, defeated candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago filed
an election protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). Subsequently, while the case is
pending, she ran for the office of Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as
Senator.

In her motion, Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of
the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed
completed. When the Court required her and Ramos to submit their respective memoranda on
the issue of whether the case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995, she
asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private
interests of the rival candidates, but more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and
for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with
public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine the bona fide winner.
She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the term of the contested
office has expired, thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under
the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova, be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest.

Issue: W/N the election protest has already been mooted (YES)

Ruling:
The Court held in the affirmative.

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three
of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May
1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed
in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming
the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or
at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue
the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal
of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the
results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-too crucial political stability of
the nation during this period of national recovery

It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election
protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest
implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and
substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3)
The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or
the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The
petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.

After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In
sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger
reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant. In sum, if an election
protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason,
if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

However, it was never the view of the majority of the Court that the protestant's filing of the
certificate of candidacy for a seat in the senate as the sole operative act why the present protest
has become moot and academic. Such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts performed
by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest. The Moraleja ruling
conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner therein had
accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In
short, Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the
Protestant accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be,
and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office whose
term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after winning
the said election, took her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.

Therefore, the Tribunal resolved to: (1) grant the Protestant's Motion to dispense with the revision
of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas; (2) dismiss
the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment
or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and (3) dismiss, as a consequence,
the Protestee's Counter-Protest.
 Roquero vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128165, 15 April 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division as Special Police
Captain.Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency
who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.

Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-
Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero.

The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden
Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case.The Prosecution presented
its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion of the cross-examination on the
prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or
before16 July 1999.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed
upon. Thereafter, when the case was called, only petitioner and his counsel appeared. The
prosecution repeatedly failed to appear.

Later, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private respondent
herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant
was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to the
unreasonable delay, petitioner filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative
case against him based on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered
its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed; that the unfounded charges in
the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and
speedy disposition of the case.

Later, the prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed of
which a copy was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel per registry return receipt.
However, petitioner has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer.

In its petition for certiorari, the CA denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning
that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Roquero
moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution promulgated.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion which he seasonably filed and order
of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda
Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the constitutional right of the
petitioner to a speedy disposition of cases?

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition.

Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service states
that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be considered
as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal offer almost five
(5) years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was presented with the
choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to dismiss owing to the
extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.

While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same however
should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and
in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of
the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:

[1] the length of delay;

[2] the reasons for the delay;
[3] the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
[4] the prejudice caused by the delay.

Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to a speedy disposition
of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5)
years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner
reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of
the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he
did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners
cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum
of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution
stage.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by
our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an
orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be
promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations
inutile. CA DECISION IS REVERSED.

Alberto vs. COMELEC, 132242, 27 July 1999

DOCTRINE:
1. It is doctrinal that election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
2. The possible delay and potential threat to the sanctity of the ballot which the grant of the
motion to photocopy the ballots might engender are indeed valid concerns, but as earlier
explained, such concerns of the trial judge are unfounded because sufficient safeguards
may be put in place to ensure that the proceedings shall be expeditious and the handling
of the ballots adequately guarded and supervised.

FACTS: Petitioner Roberto S. Alberto and private respondent Arnaldo A. Cando were candidates
for Punong Barangay during the May 12 1997 barangay elections. Cando won and was
proclaimed as the duly–elected Punong Barangay by the Board of Canvassers. Petitioner
timely filed a verified Petition of Protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) alleging that in all
the fourteen (14) precincts in their barangay, massive fraud and illegal electoral practices were
committed during the registration, the voting and the counting of the votes.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an “Ex–Parte Urgent Motion to Photocopy Ballots,” to which Cando did
not object to. However, when the first ballot box was opened revision of ballots, private
respondent judge orally denied the motion to photocopy the ballots and later issued an
Order which stated “the same is hereby denied considering the voluminous documents involved,
sanctity of ballots and it will unduly delay the proceedings of the court.”

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the COMELEC claiming
that said order of the trial court was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and in disregard of law and jurisprudence. The COMELEC denied the petition, holding
that the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
photocopy the ballots. However, COMELEC Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissented,
stating that the grounds relied upon by the respondent judge were insufficient to justify the denial
of the motion to photocopy the ballots. She reiterated the rule that laws and technical rules of
evidence should be liberally applied especially so in election cases where public interest is
involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying the motion to photocopy the
ballots on the ground that, among others, would unduly delay the proceedings.

RULING: YES, the respondent judge erred in denying the motion to photocopy the ballots on the
ground that, among others, would unduly delay the proceedings.

According to the COMELEC, since nowhere in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or in the
Omnibus Election Code and other related election laws is the right to photocopy ballots granted,
the respondent judge properly exercised her discretion in denying petitioner's motion. On the other
hand, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, while it may be true that there is no specific
COMELEC rule governing the photocopying of ballots, it has become a practice allowed by the
COMELEC itself in numerous election cases. The same is true in the proceedings of the House
of the Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Regional and Metropolitan Trial Courts.
Furthermore, photocopying the ballots is not entirely without legal basis as the Rules of Court
expressly allows it as a mode of discovery,

It is doctrinal that election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

The possible delay and potential threat to the sanctity of the ballot which the grant of the motion
to photocopy the ballots might engender are indeed valid concerns, but as earlier explained, such
concerns of the trial judge are unfounded because sufficient safeguards may be put in place to
ensure that the proceedings shall be expeditious and the handling of the ballots adequately
guarded and supervised.

There is no gainsaying the fact that trial courts and other bodies hearing election cases are
mandated by law to resolve such cases expeditiously and promptly. In San Juan v. Abordo, this
Court has had occasion to rule that “election contests should be rapidly and economically decided,
avoiding unnecessary delays. In this way, the uncertainty as to the result of the election is done
away with, the ardor of party contests is quenched, and political repose which is so necessary to
the progress of the country, is restored in the community.”

However, at the same time, courts should not lose sight of the contending parties’ right to avail of
every reasonable opportunity to support their claim to the office in question. It should be stressed
that the prompt resolution of election cases must not be accomplished at the expense of
determining the true choice of the electorate. Thus, the courts and other electoral bodies are
enjoined, not only to maintain their sense of urgency in resolving election cases, but also to
explore every reasonable and feasible means of ascertaining which candidate was duly elected
because, in the final analysis, it is the will of the people that is the ultimate concern.

Garcia vs. HRET, G.R. No. 134792, 12 August 1999

Facts:
Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd district of Manila. However, there has been a
petition for quo warranto filed before the HRET against Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioners
questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives claiming
that the latter was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon
the petitioner’s filing of their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php filing fee. However, HRET issued
a resolution dismissing the petition for failure to pay 5,000 php as deposit. The petitioners then filed the
cash deposit and filed for a motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached. However, it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
quo warranto of petitioners even after the payment of deposit fee

Ruling No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has a judgment call
and has the authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a
wellfounded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
In view of the delicate nature of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules
of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners are duty bound to
know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal
without being formally offered to do so. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities
precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation.

Olondriz vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135084, 25 August 1999

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, a recount of votes is in order where a
discrepancy exists between the votes written in words or in figures. The recount merely consists in the
mathematical counting of the votes received by each candidate and it does not involve any appreciation of
ballots or the determination of their validity as is required in an election contest. The reason for this
provision is to offer a prompt relief to a simple controversy and to restore public tranquility by dispelling all
doubts as to the true and correct number of the votes cast in a given polling place. That way, the chances
whereby a candidate may grab a proclamation to which he is not entitled to are minimized. The electorate
deserve to know who the true winner is. Public interest and the sovereign will of the people expressed in
their ballots must, at all times, be the paramount consideration in an election controversy.

FACTS: Manuel Olondriz Jr. (Olondriz) and Marites Fragata (Fragata) were contenders of the mayoralty in
Sorsogon in the 11 May 1998 elections. During the canvass of votes, a watcher for Fragata noted a
discrepancy between the words and the figures in the number of votes for Olondriz in the election return
from a certain precinct. On the face of the said return, the votes cast for Olondriz was sixty-six (66) written
in figures and fifty-six (56) in words. When the issue was raised to the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC), the MBC decided to credit Olondriz with the 66 votes written in figures. Onlondriz then garnered 2
votes higher than that of Fraganta’s (4,500 and 4,498 votes, respectively). The objection was ignored by the
MBC.

Fraganta filed a petition to suspend the proclamation on the ground that a discrepancy appears on the
election returns, and was denied. Fraganta filed an appeal with the MBC which was also denied. The MBC
issued a certificate of canvass of votes and proclaimed Olondriz the winner in the elections. Fraganta filed
with the COMELEC a petition to annul the certificate of canvass and Olondriz’s proclamation. The COMELEC
issued a resolution and declared the proclamation null and void. The MBC was ordered to reconvene, open
the ballot box in Precinct No. 22-A following Sec 236 of the OEC and include the tally to the result of all the
election returns previously canvassed. Olondriz filed for an MR.

ISSUE/S: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the opening of the ballot box to
recount the votes cast for mayor in Precinct No. 22-A?

RULING: NO. The Court held that COMELEC was correct in ordering the opening of the ballot box to recount
the votes cast for mayor in Precinct No 22-A. Under Sec 236 of the OEC, in case it appears to the board of
canvassers that there exists discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the election returns from a
polling place, or in the votes of an candidate in words and in figures in the same return, and in either case
the difference will affect the result of the election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of canvassers
or any candidate affected and after due notice to all candidates concerned, shall summarily determine
whether the integrity of the box had been preserved, and once the foregoing are satisfied, the Commission
shall order the opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the polling place to determine the true
result of the count of votes of such candidates.
In this case, it is clear that the recount of votes was necessary since a discrepancy between the votes for
mayor written in words and in figures was noted. The recount was for the purpose of ascertaining the true
result of the elections. It would be unjust for the people of Juban, Sorsogon if the Court rules otherwise.
The electorate deserve to know who the real winner is. Public interest and the sovereign will of the people
expressed in their ballots must, at all times, be the paramount consideration in an election controversy.

Antonio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135869, 22 September 1999

DOCTRINE

Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided
a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of
election related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-
day period for barangay election contests. In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has
consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests
heard by a regional trial court.

FACTS
The parties here are rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Bgy. Ilaya, Las Piñas, Manila.
After Antonio was proclaimed winner, Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest. The trial court ruled in
favor of the latter; and nine days from receipt of the decision, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Commission, however, dismissed the same on the ground that Antonio failed to perfect his
appeal within the prescribed time.

ISSUE
Whether the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the COMELEC in an
election protest involving a barangay position is 5 days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or 10
days as provided for in RA 6679 and the Omnibus Election Code.

RULING
It would be 5 days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

When the Court declared in the case of Flores v. COMELEC that decisions of the
Municipal/Metropolitan Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer
appealable to the RTC but to the COMELEC, the same includes the 10-day period of appeal. The
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform 5-day period for taking an appeal
consistent with the expeditious resolution of election related cases. It would then be absurd and
therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests.

Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided
a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of
election related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-
day period for barangay election contests. In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has
consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests
heard by a regional trial court. The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC that "the
procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay
election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure." More recently, in Calucag
vs. Commission on Elections, the Court en banc had occasion to state that: ". . .Therefore, the
COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal
must be filed within five days after the promulgation of the MTC's decision . . ." Significantly,
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that "[r]ules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

ADDITIONAL NOTE: The period for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions
of the law. By virtue of Section 9(d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides
that "an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission
for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period," the COMELEC is precisely given
the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.

Melendres vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129958, 25 November 1999

DOCTRINE:

The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of an election
protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule
should not be taken lightly nor should it be brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be
overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance
of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS:

Petitioner herein (Ruperto P. Concepcion) and private respondent (Miguel Melendres, Jr.) were
candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May
12, 1997 barangay elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed as the
duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent filed an election protest
against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of
the election in all forty-seven (47) precincts of said barangay.

After the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was
paid by the protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to
comply with this requirement.

Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be continued on the ground
that the filing of docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and not jurisdictional.
Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC to decide. The COMELEC overruled the assailed
Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court and that the Trial Court should cease and desist from further
acting on the Election case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not COMELEC acted with a grave abuse of discretion in its ruling.
2. Whether or not payment of filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional requirement.

RULING:
 1. NO. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The interpretation
of an administrative government agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Courts give weight to government agency
or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence, expertness,
experience and informed judgment.
2. NO. The payment of filing fee is an administrative procedural matter, proceeding as it does
from an administrative body. Sec. 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is explicit
and does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the
Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing fee. Contemporaneous construction is resorted
for certainty and predictability in laws especially those involving specific terms having
technical meanings.

Chu vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135423, 29 November 1999

DOCTRINE: Sec. 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy as follows:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus L. Chu and private respondent Salvadora O. Sanchez (Sanchez) were
candidates for municipal mayor of Uson, Masbate in the May 11, 1998 elections. While the
election returns were being canvassed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Uson, Masbate
(MBC), petitioner objected to the inclusion in the canvass of some of the election returns. 2
Petitioner alleged that Sanchez, with the aid of armed men, entered into the polling places
where the centralized counting was being conducted, and exerted undue influence and
intimidation upon the board of election inspectors (BEI) who were then counting the votes and
preparing the election returns.3 Thus, according to petitioner, the votes reflected in these
returns are no longer reflective of the will of the electorate and should not be included in the
canvass.4

Petitioner claims that he orally objected to the inclusion of seventy-four (74) election returns.
Yet, he was only able to file written objections within 24 hours from the time the oral objections
were made as required under section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code (the "Code")5 for thirty-
seven (37)6 election returns. Petitioner attributed this shortcoming to the MBC's refusal to give
him the prescribed form when it convened on the evening of May 11, 1998. It was only on May
12, 1998, at 5 p.m., after the MBC had already finished canvassing forty (40) election returns,
that the MBC furnished petitioner with a single copy of the required forms, which petitioner had
to photocopy in another municipality. 7

On May 15, 1998, the MBC rejected petitioner's objections, finding that the affidavits submitted
by petitioner were not sufficient to support his allegations that they were prepared under duress
and giving more weight to the affidavits executed by the BEI.8 Petitioner appealed to the
Comelec and on June 8, 1998, public respondent's Second Division denied petitioner's appeal
and directed the MBC to reconvene and include in the canvass the 37 election returns and,
thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.

Petitioner received the Comelec's order on June 17, 1998. The following day, on June 18, 1998,
upon the receipt of a telegram sent by the Comelec, the MBC proclaimed Sanchez as the
winning candidate. On June 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Second
Division's order, with an additional prayer for the annulment of the proclamation of Sanchez.
However, on September 1, 1998 the Comelec en banc denied petitioner's motion. Hence, this
special civil action.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the entry of Sanchez and her armed bodyguards in the polling places during the
counting of ballots and the preparation of the election returns, which allegedly caused the
intimidation and undue influence of the members of the BEI, resulting in the "sudden and radical
change" in the election returns can be the subject of a pre-proclamation controversy. (No)

RULING:
1. Sec. 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy as follows:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.

This would appear to fall under section 243 (c) of the Code, which provides that one of the
issues properly pertaining to a pre-proclamation controversy is that —

[t]he election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic.

However, petitioner does not claim that there are any defects or irregularities apparent from a
physical inspection of the election returns. Neither did the MBC nor the Comelec make any
finding that the returns contained any palpable errors or material defects. To prove the
intimidation which petitioner asserts was exerted upon the members of the BEI by Sanchez and
her supporters would require the reception of evidence aliunde in a full-blown proceeding,
wherein the parties are permitted to file pleadings and to introduce the testimonies of their
witnesses and other documentary evidence to substantiate their allegations before the proper
tribunal. Such election irregularities cannot be proven in a summary proceeding like a
pre-proclamation controversy, but rather should be properly raised in an election protest.

In the recent case of Salih vs. Comelec, we held that returns will not be excluded on the mere
allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear
regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration, or other similar vice. Thus, if
there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear as normal through the
falsification of the election returns, such grounds are properly cognizable in an election protest
and not in a pre-proclamation controversy.

And in Matalam vs. Comelec, the Court, in rejecting petitioner's claims that the election returns
were spurious, obviously manufactured and prepared under irregular circumstances, explained
that

[the] petition must fail because it effectively implores the Court to disregard the statutory norm
that pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in a summary proceeding. He [petitioner]
asks the Court to ignore the fact that the election returns appear regular on their face, and
instead to determine whether fraud or irregularities attended the election process. Because what
he is asking for necessarily postulates a full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous
examination of voluminous election documents, it is clearly anathema to a pre-proclamation
controversy which, by its very nature, is to be heard summarily and decided as promptly as
possible.

In light of our ruling that the electoral irregularities enumerated by petitioner are not proper
to a pre-proclamation controversy for so long as the election returns appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face.

Other notes:
The other issues raised by petitioner have necessarily become moot and academic.

The MBC, in rejecting petitioner's objections and proclaiming Sanchez, and the Comelec, in
upholding the MBC, are entitled to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions, which petitioner has failed to rebut.

Even assuming that petitioner had availed of the proper remedy, still the proclamation of
Sanchez by the MBC did not have to await the resolution of his motion for reconsideration by
the Comelec en banc since it was validly made upon the authority of the order issued by the
Comelec's Second Division, ordering the MBC to reconvene and include the 37 election returns
in the canvass and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate. In this respect, our ruling in
Casimiro vs. Comelec25 is squarely in point. We held in this case that the proclamation of the
winning candidate by the board of canvassers was authorized by the ruling of the Comelec's
Second Division ordering the board to "reconvene, complete the canvass if not yet completed,
and proclaim the winning candidates. . ." even though such proclamation was made before the
filing of the motion for reconsideration with the Comelec en banc.

We wish to stress that our ruling in this case merely sustains the Comelec's position that, in the
absence of "palpable errors and/or material defects [which] are clearly discernible on the faces
of these returns," the board of canvassers should include in the canvass the 37 election
returns26 and that, by ruling thus, we have no intention of passing upon the verity of petitioner's
imputations of electoral irregularities and acts of terrorism, which we reiterate is not in issue in a
pre-proclamation controversy, but should be resolved in a proper electoral protest

Mohammad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136384, 8 December 1999

HADJI HUSSEIN MOHAMMAD, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ABDULAJID ESTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 136384. December 8, 1999.

DOCTRINE: Where election was marred by fraud and irregularities, a revision and recount of
ballots would prove futile in determining the true will of electorate.

FACTS: Petitioner Hadji Hussein Mohammad and private respondent Abdulajid Estino were
among the candidates during the September 9, 1996 elections for the Regional Legislative
Assembly of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao ("ARMM") representing the Second
District of the Province of Sulu.

On September 10, 1996, petitioner Mohammad was proclaimed as the third winning
Assemblyman with a total of 31,031 votes. Private respondent Estino garnered a total of 29,941
votes, giving the petitioner Mohammad a winning margin of 1,090 votes. Since only three
positions of Assemblyman were open, private respondent Estino filed an election protest with the
COMELEC alleging rampant substitution of voters, miscounting and/or misreading of ballots by
the automated counting machine, and the inclusion in the counting of obviously marked ballots in
some precincts of the municipalities. Thereafter, petitioner Mohammad filed his answer with
counter-protest questioning the election results in some precincts of certain municipalities.

On September 11, 1997, respondent Comelec (Second Division) issued an Order directing the
Election Records and Statistics Department to undertake a technical examination of the
signatures and thumbprints of the voters in the Voter's Registration Records (VRR/CEF No. 1)
and the List of Voters with Voting Records or Computerized Voters List (CVL/CEF No. 2) involving
the protested and the counter-protested precincts. Thereafter, on the basis of the results of the
technical examination, the respondent Commission (Second Division), rendered judgment
annulling the election and proclamation of petitioner and directing him to vacate and relinquish
the position to private respondent. Petitioner Mohammad's Motion for Reconsideration was,
however, dismissed by the respondent Commission (En Banc).

ISSUE: Whether or not the technical examination of the fingerprints in the voting of records was
the proper method of resolving private respondent Abdulajid Estino’s election protest. (NO)

HELD: Petitioner Mohammad’s contention is untenable.

Firstly, petitioner is not really contesting the method of the COMELEC in conducting a technical
examination, but only the correctness thereof, petitioner theorizing double deductions in the
appreciation of the results. But petitioner is estopped from adopting inconsistent positions. He
cannot contest the method of dispute resolution, while at the same time affirm the validity thereof.
It is worthy to note that the petitioner is contesting only the correctness of the report and not the
method of dispute resolution. Then too, the Court has already sanctioned the method of technical
examination of the thumbprints of voters, over revision of ballots, where a recount or revision of
the ballots will not be reflective of the sovereign will due to the irregularities committed during the
elections.

Moreover, the election during which the petitioner and the private respondent were candidates
was marred by fraud and irregularities that a revision and recount of the ballots cast in the
elections would prove futile in determining the true will of the electorate. This is evident from the
result of the technical examination of the fingerprints.

Furthermore, since a revision and recount of the votes cast will unearth nothing except the
fraudulent and spurious result of the elections, the COMELEC was justified in ordering a technical
examination of the thumbprints of the voters based on the voters affidavits and the Computerized
Voters List. The COMELEC was well within its authority to order such approach considering the
circumstances obtaining in the election dispute.

Trinidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134657, 15 December 1999

DOCTRINE: “The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant must stand
or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of
the statutory period for filing of protest or counter protest."

A pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest errors must be filed not later
than five (5) days following the date of proclamation while an election protest must be filed within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. At this juncture, we have to point
out that the said Manifestation and Comments, whether it be considered a pre-proclamation
controversy or an election protest, was filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.

FACTS: Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both run for the
position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 18, 1998, private
respondent Claudio was proclaimed as the winning candidate. On May 23, 1998, petitioner filed
a petition for correction of manifest errors and annulment of proclamation with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Thereafter, private respondent Claudio filed his answer/memorandum
with counter-petition for correction claiming that some statements of votes contained errors, which
if corrected, would entitle him to an additional forty (40) votes but would result in petitioner's being
deducted thirteen (13) votes. Petitioner contested the filing of private respondent's
answer/memorandum with counter-petition in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18,
1998 alleging, inter alia, that the election returns from five precincts were not canvassed. The
COMELEC rendered its decision dismissing petitioner's petition for annulment of proclamation
and the supplemental petition for the correction of the Summary of the Statements of Votes.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for annulment of proclamation and
supplemental petition for the correction of the Summary of the Statements of Votes.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC's decision. According to the Court, the issue
on incomplete canvassing was raised for the first time in the Manifestation and Comments filed
by petitioner. The same was filed only on July 18, 1998, thirty-four (34) days after the case had
been submitted for resolution on June 14, 1998. Since the case was already deemed submitted
for resolution, the COMELEC can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. The
Court also emphasized that a pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest
errors must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation, while an election
protest must be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The
said Manifestation and Comments, whether it be considered a pre-proclamation controversy or
an election protest, was filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.

Columbres vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142038, 18 September 2000

DOCTRINE:

Any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed decision, order or ruling
of a COMELEC Division is also a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. were candidates
for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan during the May 11, 1998 elections. After
canvassing, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent with 4,248 votes
as against petitioner's 4,104 votes. Subsequently, petitioner filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner contested 42 precincts and prayed for the revision of ballots in the
said precincts. The trial court rendered its decision, declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor
of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with 4,037 votes against 3,302 votes of private respondent. Private
respondent appealed the decision to the respondent COMELEC. The Second Division
promulgated its Resolution reversing and setting aside the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court and, instead, affirmed the election and proclamation of private respondent. Private
respondent was declared to have won by sixty-nine (69) votes.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner claimed that
the Second Division erred in totally disregarding his other objections and therefore urged the
COMELEC en banc to review the findings of the Second Division. Respondent COMELEC en
banc issued its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirming the ruling
of the Second Division. In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent
COMELEC en banc ruled that the finding by its Second Division that the 111 questioned ballots
were written by the same person is a finding of fact that may not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. Protestant-appellee is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this
instance but the appreciation thereof by the Second Division. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC EN BANC gravely abused its discretion in declaring the division's
finding on the contested ballots not proper subject of a motion for reconsideration

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the COMELEC en banc for it
to physically re-examine the contested ballots and ascertain their validity. The Court ruled that
the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the COMELEC Second
Division's findings on the contested ballots are findings of facts that may not be the subject of a
motion for reconsideration. According to the Court, in order to determine the winning candidate,
the application of election law and jurisprudence in appreciating the contested ballots is essential.
Any question on the appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the declared winner and any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the assailed decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper subject of a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The Court further ruled that the COMELEC en
banc should have examined the questioned ballots and determined for itself their validity, i.e.,
whether they were marked ballots or not and to ascertain the real nature of the alleged markings
thereon.

Beso vs. Aballe, G.R. No. 134932, 18 February 2000

Doctrine: Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the Commission on Elections has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia,
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

The contested position in this case is that of a barangay captain. The Municipal Trial Court
of Calbayog City, a court of limited jurisdiction, had the exclusive original jurisdiction over
the election protest, and the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such
protest.

Facts: Petitioner Beso and private respondent Aballe were candidates for Barangay
Captain at Carayman, Calbayog City.

In the canvass of the returns of the four precincts, Aballe won the elections.

Beso filed a protest with the MTC. The MTC reversed the proclamation and declared
Beso as the duly elected Punong Barangay.

Aballe appealed in the RTC. Beso filed with the MTCC a motion for execution pending
appeal which was granted. Aballe filed with the RTC a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition against MTCC judge.

Issue: Whether the RTC has the jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction?

Ruling: The SC held in the negative and ruled that the COMELEC has the primary
jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari to annul the execution pending appeal granted by
the MTCC.

In Relampagos v Cumba, the SC held that that the COMELEC has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the election contest in question. In such cases the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of Section 50 reads:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
Commission on Elections has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia,
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

The contested position in this case is that of a barangay captain. The Municipal Trial Court
of Calbayog City, a court of limited jurisdiction, had the exclusive original jurisdiction over
the election protest, and the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such
protest.

It follows then that the RTC of Calbayog City is without Jurisdiction on the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Sebastian vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139573, 7 March 2000

DOCTRINE: A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns

on their face. The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and
investigate alleged election irregularities.

Where the resolution of the issues raised would require the COMELEC to "pierce the veil" of
election returns that appear prima facie regular, the remedy is a regular election protest, ". . .
wherein the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them in as much detail
as they may deem necessary or appropriate."

FACTS: Petitioners Sebastian and Romano were mayoralty and vice mayoralty candidates of the
Reporma Party in Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte. Private respondents Royo and Estela were
candidates from Lakas party.

On election day, as the Municipal Board of Canvassers was preparing to canvass the election
returns, petitioners sought the exclusion from the canvass of several election returns from certain
precincts in various barangays. Petitioners claimed that the election returns from these areas
were prepared under "extreme duress, threat, intimidation and political pressure and influence."

The COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal. Meanwhile, the Second Division ruled in favor
of petitioners and ordered the exclusion of 25 election returns from the canvass of votes. The
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of the Second Division.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it included the election
returns that were prepared under “extreme duress, threat, intimidation and political pressure and
influence”
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. For its part, the COMELEC pointed out that
it could not justifiably exclude from the canvass of votes, in a pre-proclamation controversy,
election returns that on their face appear regular. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the
examination of incomplete, falsified, or materially defective returns, which appear as such on their
face. Where the issues raised would require the COMELEC to look beyond the face of the return,
the proper remedy is a regular election protest.

A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their

face. The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate
alleged election irregularities. In Supreme Court’s view here is no exceptional circumstance
present in this controversy similar to that proved in the Antonio case, where the COMELEC as
well as the Court found "precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice to the Board,
and disregard of manifest irregularities in the face of the questioned returns" to justify the
summary annulment of the canvass and the annulment of petitioner Antonio's proclamation.

To require the COMELEC to examine the circumstances surrounding the preparation of election
returns would run counter to the rule that a pre- proclamation controversy should be summarily
decided.

Where the resolution of the issues raised would require the COMELEC to "pierce the veil" of
election returns that appear prima facie regular, the remedy is a regular election protest.
 Fermo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140179, 13 March 2000

DOCTRINE: "Shortness of term", alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must
be manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory
of the protestant has been clearly established.

FACTS:
Manuel Laxina, Sr. and Roque Fermo were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay,
Barangay Batasan Hills, District II, Quezon City, during the May 12, 1997 elections. Pursuant to
the canvassed results, Laxina garnered the most number of vote and was subsequently
proclaimed duly elected to the post.
However, Fermo filed an election protest questioning certain clustered and COA precincts on the
ground that the elections therein was attended by massive fraud and serious irregularities. Lazina
denied the allegations and moved for the dismissal of the case.
COMELEC dismissed the motion to dismiss and subsequently ruled that Fermo won the
contested post. Laxina filed a Notice of Appeal manifesting his intent to elevate the case to th e
Commission on Elections. Meawhile,Fermi filed a Motion for Execution pending Appeal on the
ground that that the term of the contested seat might have expired already long before the
appeal has been decided.
MTC granted the execution pending appeal, ruling that “the possibility that the term of the
contested seat of Barangay Captainship in Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City might have
expired long before the appeal has been decided, considering also that the term of the contested
office had past almost midway of the whole term.”
On appeal, the COMELEC reviersed the order of the MTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess
of jurisdiction in annulling the order of the MTC granting herein petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that there were no "good reasons" for the issuance therefor.

RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, A valid exercise of the discretion to
allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of
them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the
electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.)
the length of time that the election contest has been pending (emphasis supplied).7 In Lauban vs.
COMELEC8 , this Court ruled that "shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond
are not good reasons for execution of a judgment pending appeal . .
In the present case, the petitioner relies solely on one ground to support his petition i.e. "shortness
of term" With this, the SC ruled that the COMELEC committed no reversible error in reversing the
decision of MTC. "Shortness of term", alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It
must be manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the
victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
Moreover, the Court also found that RA 8524 has extended the term of office of barangay officials
to five (5) years, and this negates, or removes the factual basis for the finding of the MTC that the
term of the contested office "had past almost midway of the whole term."
The Court also did not agree with the arguments of the petitioner and held that the order of the
COMELEC annulling the grant of execution pending appeal would be inutile if it did not have the
effect of authorizing LAXINA to discharge the functions of Punong Barangay during the pendency
of the appeal. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of
FERMO, the decision of the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed
14 and the "status quo" or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy
15 was restored. Thus, the COMELEC correctly ordered FERMO to cease and desist from
performing the functions of Punong Barangay considering that LAXINA was the proclaimed
winner of the election prior to FERMO's filing of the election protest. The order for FERMO to
relinquish his post to LAXINA pending final resolution of the appeal is a logical and necessary
consequence of the denial of execution pending appeal.

NOTES:
Execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases is governed by Section 2, Rule 39 6 of
the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. —
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the
case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be
filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order
after due hearing.
 Barroso vs. Ampig, G.R. No. 138218, 17 March 2000
Barroso v. Ampig

G.R. No. 138218. March 17, 2000

Doctrine:

Election Contest is not governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules of Civil
Procedure generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Election contests are
subject to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election contests
involving elective municipal officials before the Regional Trial Courts. Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not require that the petition contesting the election of
any municipal official be accompanied by a certification or any statement against forum
shopping.

Facts:

Petitioner Barroso and private respondent Escobillo were candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato. Barroso won the election. Escobillo protested the result,
filing pre-proclamation protest under Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code alleging massive
vote-buying, bribery, terrorism by petitioner and opening of ballot boxes outside the precincts in
at least 13 of the 63 precincts in the municipality, and another pre-proclamation case under 241
of the Omnibus Election Code against Barroso. In addition, Escobillo filed for the disqualification
of Barroso, alleging election offenses committed by the latter. Escobillo likewise filed 2 criminal
complaints against Barroso for illegal possession of firearm and violation of the gun ban and for
massive vote-buying. These protests were dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. Escobillo
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

Escobillo filed with the RTC a petition contesting Barroso’s election. Barroso moved to
dismiss Escobillo’s petition for lack of proper certification against forum shopping because of
Escobillo’s failure to disclose the two pre-proclamation protests under reconsideration by the
Comelec. RTC dismissed Barroso’s motion to dismiss.

Issue:

Whether RTC is not correct in dismissing Barroso’s motion to dismiss the petition of
Escobillo.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Election Contest is not governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules of Civil
Procedure generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. Election contests are subject to the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election contests involving elective
municipal officials before the Regional Trial Courts. Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure does not require that the petition contesting the election of any municipal
official be accompanied by a certification or any statement against forum shopping.
 The strict application of the non-forum shopping rule in the case at bar would not work to
the best interest of the parties and the electorate. An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil
action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether
the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the
winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern
involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the
court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real
candidate elected by the people. Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a
liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
 Miguel vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136966, 5 July 2000

Doctrine: When there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal,
examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order
the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.

Facts: Petitioner James Miguel was proclaimed as the Mayor-elect in the Municipality of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. His opponent, private respondent Eladio Lapuz, filed a verified Petition of Protest on
grounds of election fraud, anomalies, and irregularities before the RTC of Cabanatuan City.

After the petitioner filed his answer, the RTC scheduled a conference for the purpose, among
others, of discussing and resolving matters relating to the constitution of the Board of Revisors.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the said order, and prayed for the conduct of a preliminary hearing
on the merit to prove private respondent's allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities before
the opening of the ballot boxes and the recounting of ballots. Relying on the Narrative Report of
the acting election officer that the conduct of the election was "clean, honest and peaceful," the
court a quo granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration as well as it denied motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent relative thereto. When the private respondent raised
the said issue to the Comelec en banc, the latter set aside the said order of the trial court.

Issues: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the resolutions

Ruling: The petition is dismissed. The assailed resolutions of the Comelec en banc are hereby
affirmed there being no grave abuse of discretion in its issuance.

The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical
pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest
that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial
duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting
of ballots deposited therein.

The serious allegations embodied in the election protest mandates and necessitates the opening
of the subject ballot boxes to the end of resolving the issue of fraud and irregularities in the
election. The purpose of ordering the opening of the ballot boxes is to ascertain, with the least
amount of protracted delay, the veracity of the allegations of fraud and anomalies in the conduct
of the electoral exercise.

The lower court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the conduct of a
preliminary hearing to achieve the above mentioned purpose; the court a quo acted outside its
province and overshot the limits of its jurisdiction.

Petitioner's heavy reliance on the Narrative Report of Acting Election Officer Lourdes Barroga is
misplaced. The law does not require prima facie showing other than the allegations in the protest
of fraud or irregularities in order to authorize the opening of the ballot boxes. Applying this
principle, the stand taken by the lower court was extremely technical and highly impractical, apart
from tending to defeat one of the major objectives of the law.

In this specie of controversies involving the determination of the true will of the electorate, time
indeed is of paramount importance except for the genuine will of the majority. Courts and tribunals
should then endeavor to adopt only such means consistent with this general objective and be
constantly reminded to refrain from such a needless exercise "which has spawned the protracted
delay that the law and the principle underlying it precisely intend to forestall."

Banaga vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134696, 31 July 2000

Torres vs. HRET, G.R. No. 144491, 6 February 2001

Facts: Petitioner Jaime T. Torres and private respondent Ninfa S. Garin were among the candidates
for the said Congressional seat in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 17, 1998, upon canvassing the
votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo proclaimed the private respondent as the
winner, with Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty One (60,851) votes, over petitioner's Fifty Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Forty Seven (59,447) votes, or a margin of One Thousand Four Hundred
Four (1,404) votes.

Petitioner seasonably filed an election protest before the Tribunal questioning the results of the
elections in all the precincts of the seven (7) municipalities of the First Legislative District of Iloilo. He
claimed, in essence, that a number of votes cast in his favor were invalidated and not counted, while
a number of invalid votes were counted in private respondent's favor.

In her Answer with Counter Protest, private respondent denied the allegations in the protest. She
counter-protested the results of the elections in all the 158 precincts of Miag-ao and 126 precincts of
Tigbauan. She claimed that it was petitioner who had committed various election frauds, anomalies
and irregularities particularly in the precincts of Miag-ao and Tigbauan.

In the preliminary conference held on August 6, 1998, the parties agreed and stipulated, among other
things, that the issues involved are: (1) revision, recount and appreciation of ballots; and (2) election
irregularities, fraud, etc. as alleged in the counter-protest. The parties likewise designated their
respective pilot precincts in accordance with Rule 68 of the 1998 House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal Rules - 185 for the petitioner and 67 for the private respondent, 15 of which were commonly
protested or a total of 237 precincts. During revision, however, a total of 5 precincts were deducted
from the original lists of pilot precincts submitted by the parties. It turned out that there were only 232
ballot boxes belonging to the pilot precincts - 182 for the petitioner and 65 for the private respondent,
15 of which were commonly protested.

The Tribunal conducted full-blown hearings and admitted all documentary exhibits offered by both parties
for whatever evidentiary purpose they may serve. Thereafter, private respondent filed her Memorandum on
October 21, 1999, while petitioner filed his on October 25, 1999. Both were noted by the Tribunal in its
Resolution No. 99-248, dated November 18, 1999.

On April 17, 2000, a Resolution was issued by the Tribunal requiring the parties to show cause why the
protest and counter-protest, respectively should not be dismissed on account of the following findings of
the Tribunal:

"..., there is no doubt the official ballots cast in the 23 precincts of Miag-ao have been tampered with and
that the authentic ballots, now missing have been replaced by fake ones. Moreover, as observed by the
Protestee, the Tribunal has confirmed that the number of fake ballots in each of the 23 precincts more or
less correspond to the number of missing votes " for the Protestee as reflected in the election returns.

Consequently, the votes determined after the revision in said 23 precincts cannot be relied upon as they
do not reflect the true will of the electorate. Thus, in determining the number of votes for the Protestee in
the aforesaid 23 precincts, the 289 ballots for the Protestee during physical count were appreciated by the
Tribunal and it accordingly ruled on the admissibility or validity of the same. As regards the missing votes,
inasmuch as there is no basis to rule on their admissibility, the Tribunal had to rely on what was reflected
on the election returns, the same being the best evidence of the results of the election in the said precincts,
in the absence of the genuine ballots. Thus, the. missing votes were added back to Protestee's votes after
revision/appreciation.1âwphi1.nêt

The votes of the parties in the other protested and counter-protested pilot precincts were likewise
determined after a careful scrutiny of the ballots involved therein. The result shows that Protestant obtained
17,0043 votes, while Protestee garnered 22,309 votes in the pilot protested precincts. Adding these figures
to the votes in the contested non-pilot and uncontested precincts, the total votes in the First District of Iloilo
will be 59,428 for the Protestant and 60,803 for the Protestee or a margin of 1,375 votes."

On April 28, 2000, private respondent filed her "Compliance (With Show Cause Resolution) With Prayer for
Dismissal of the Case", while on May 2, 2000, petitioner filed his" Justifications/Reasons Why the Election
Protest Should Not Be Dismissed." Both pleadings were noted by the Tribunal in Resolution No. 00-59
dated May 11, 2000."

In its assailed decision, the Tribunal dismissed the election protest and counter-protest without further
proceedings.

ISSUE: WON PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RESORTING TO VOTES REFLECTED IN ELECTION
RETURNS AS THE VOTES TO BE CREDITED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN 23 PRECINCTS OF
MIAG-AO, ILOILO, INSTEAD OF THE PHYSICAL COUNT OF THE BALLOTS FOUND INSIDE THE
BALLOT BOXES DURING REVISION. (NO)

HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative.

In the instant case, the Tribunal reviewed and passed upon the validity or invalidity of ballots objected
to or claimed by the parties, exhaustively and judiciously, adhering to the "basic principle that the
cardinal objective of ballot appreciation is to discover and give effect to, rather than frustrate the
intention of the voters, thus, every ballot shall be presumed valid unless clear and good reasons justify
its rejection." Moreover, the specific objections were passed upon in accordance with the existing rules
and rulings in the appreciation of votes. We find no reason to disturb the Tribunal's appreciation of the
ballots contested as written by one person; written by two persons; and as marked ballots.

It is futile to insist that the physical count of ballots found inside the ballot boxes during revision must
prevail over the votes reflected in election returns in the revised protested precincts despite the
findings that the integrity of the ballot boxes was not preserved prior to revision. Further, this issue has
been squarely addressed in Lerias v. HRET in this wise: "In an election contest where what is involved
is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence
are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election
returns would be the best evidence.”

When authentic ballots have been replaced by fake ones, the physical count of votes in the precincts
as determined during the revision of the ballots cannot be considered the correct number of votes
cast. The election returns shall be basis of the votes.
 Alvarez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, 1 March 2001

DOCTRINE: Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution and Section 257, Omnibus Election Code
provides that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days
from the date of submission.

Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the Commission
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of submission for decision

FACTS: On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay.

He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585
votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities. the Metropolitan Trial
Court ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It
subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered 596
votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over
petitioner.

Petitioner brought before the Cost this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC when it did not preferentially dispose of the case. He points out that the
case was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the COMELEC En Banc
promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four months and four days after November 14,
1999.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did not preferentially
dispose of the case.

RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court first noted that it is aware of the laws which
provide that election contests should be decided within ninety days from the date of submission
for decision.

However, the Court took into consideration that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election
precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling,
authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before
it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunal's manpower and logistic
limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly
strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly
by reason of lack of material time.

The Court found that COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed and that because
of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the COMELEC is in
a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before
it. Thus, the Court found no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred
the factual findings of the COMELEC.

Villota vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 146724, 10 August 2001

DOCTRINE:

Section 3, Rule 22, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically mandates that the
notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision,
otherwise, the appeal is dismissible under Section 9, of the same rule.

Corollary thereto, pertinent portion of Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, provide: Section 3. Appeal Fees. — The appellant in election cases shall
pay an appeal fee as follows: (a) . . . (b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited
jurisdiction. . . P500.00. In every case, a legal research fee of P20.00 shall be paid by the
appellant in accordance with Section 4, Republic Act No. 3870, as amended. Section 4.
Where and When to pay. — The fees prescribed in Sections . . . 3 hereof shall be paid
to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within the period to file the
notice of appeal.

In Soller v. COMELEC, et al., reiterating the cases of Loyola v. COMELEC, et al., and
Miranda v. Castillo, et al., the Court stressed the caveat that errors in the payment of filing
fees in election cases is no longer excusable.

Thus, on the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of filing fees we opined that:
"the Court would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing
fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25,
1997.

The payment of the full amount of the appeal/docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal.

FACTS:

In the May 12, 1997 barangay elections, petitioner was proclaimed as the Punong
Barangay over his opponent, herein private respondent. Consequently, the latter filed an
election protest against the petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After
due hearing, the court rendered a decision declaring the private respondent as the duly
elected Punong Barangay.

On March 2, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously paid with the
cashier of the Metropolitan Trial Court the amount of P150.00 as appeal fee and another
P20.00 as legal research fee, or a total of P170.00.
On March 9, 2000, or nine (9) days after petitioner's receipt of the decision of the trial
court, he again paid with the Cash Division of the COMELEC the sum of P520.00 as
appeal fee and legal research fee.

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the
appeal fee within the reglementary period.

On June 13, 2000, the COMELEC ordered the dismissal of the appeal for failure of the
Commission to acquire appellate jurisdiction over the case. A motion for reconsideration
was denied by the COMELEC. Hence, the instant petition. The sole issue for resolution
here is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal and in denying his motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Court found that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
COMELEC in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period and in denying his motion for reconsideration. As early as March 25,
1997, it was emphasized in several decisions that the Court would no longer provide any
excuse for shortcomings in the payment of filing fees.

Thus, it was ruled that: "these cases now bar any claim of good faith, excusable
negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases
which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision." The instant petition was
dismissed by the Court for lack of merit.

Section 3, Rule 22, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically mandates that the
notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision,
otherwise, the appeal is dismissible under Section 9, of the same rule.

Corollary thereto, pertinent portion of Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, provide: Section 3. Appeal Fees. — The appellant in election cases shall
pay an appeal fee as follows: (a) . . . (b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited
jurisdiction. . . P500.00. In every case, a legal research fee of P20.00 shall be paid by the
appellant in accordance with Section 4, Republic Act No. 3870, as amended. Section 4.
Where and When to pay. — The fees prescribed in Sections . . . 3 hereof shall be paid
to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within the period to file the
notice of appeal.

In Soller v. COMELEC, et al., reiterating the cases of Loyola v. COMELEC, et al., and
Miranda v. Castillo, et al., the Court stressed the caveat that errors in the payment of filing
fees in election cases is no longer excusable.

Thus, on the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of filing fees we opined that:
"the Court would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing
fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25,
1997.

The payment of the full amount of the appeal/docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal.

Dumayas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952, 20 April 2001

FACTS
Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of mayor
in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing on 13 May 1998,
election returns for precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested
for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by
petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same-
that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws;
acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."

On the other hand, respondent Bernal, Jr. in vehemently denying the allegations of petitioner,
submitted joint affidavits of the members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors for precinct
nos. 61A, 62A and 63A/64A.

Nody Mahilum and PO3 Gilbert Sorongon also executed a joint affidavit denying the accusations
of Dumayas, Jr. and his watchers stating therein that they only entered their respective precinct-
polling place in order to exercise their right of suffrage and that the election in the three precincts
of Barangay Pantalan was orderly, peaceful, and honest which (sic) truly reflects the will of the
electorate.

In the afternoon of May 14, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection
to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the canvass. Petitioner filed a Notice
of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given due course by the COMELEC
Second Division3 which rendered a resolution dated August 4, 1998. On August 10, 1998, private
respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with
the COMELEC en banc.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and pursuant to the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, Election Officer Rolando Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC on
August 13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings and proclamation of winning
candidates for Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the position
of Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to present a copy of his motion for
reconsideration before the MBC
On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998 order, petitioner was proclaimed
winner of the election after excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three
contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second Division Resolution.

Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an action for
quo warranto against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as
Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent Bernal as one of the petitioners
together with Vice-Mayor Betita

On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion to expunge
respondent Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation
void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said
motions by the filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a formal
election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.

In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner’s motion to expunge and reversed and set aside the Resolution of COMELEC
Second Division. Thus the proclamation of Dumayas was annulled and COMELEC en banc
ordered the inclusion of the contested election returns. Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and
Japal Guiani, who have participated in the earlier deliberations and signed the August 24 ,1999
resolution have already retired at the time of its promulgation.

On March 13, 2000, respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the newly-constituted Municipal
Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles, thereby unseating
petitioner Dumayas.

ISSUES
1) Whether the resolution promulgated on March 2, 2000 is illegal as it was violative of article
IX (A) section 7 of the Constitution considering that only 4 commissioners voted to reverse
the resolution dated August 4, 1998 of the Second Division, as 2 commissioners have
already retired (NO)
2) Whether COMELEC erred in ordering the inclusion of the contested election returns in the
canvassing of ballots (NO)
3) Whether Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings
commenced before the regular court, deemed to have abandoned the motions he had
filed with the respondent Commission (NO)

RULING
 1. No, it does not violate Art IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution.

In Jamil v. Commission on Elections, we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had
earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically
be withdrawn or cancelled.
Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as
withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolution’s promulgation. The effect
of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only
the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy. However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the
result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the
decision a nullity.

In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at the time of the
resolution’s promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of Respondent. Noteworthy, these
remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the defect cited by petitioner
does not affect the substance or validity of respondent Commission’s disposition of the
controversy.

2. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC, or any other
administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding
on this Court.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required
to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where
a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce
the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a regular election
protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.

In the present case, petitioner barely alleged that the preparation of said returns was attended by
threats, duress, intimidation or coercion without offering any proof, other than the affidavits
mentioned above, that these had affected the regularity or genuineness of the contested returns.
Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are indeed spurious,
manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by petitioner would require the
reception of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy such as the one
initiated by petitioner. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegation that the returns are
manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear regular and without any physical
signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting
which was made to appear as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds
are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy.

3. No.
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier
filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation.

The general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of
canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what
was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made
without prejudice to the pre- proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the
proclamation was null and void.

Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to
consider as abandoned Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare
petitioner’s proclamation as void ab initio. Note that under the allegations cited above, the
determination of Betita’s right would ultimately hinge on the validity of petitioner’s proclamation in
the first place.

To repeat, the "quo warranto" petition brought by Vice-Mayor Betita is a petition to annul
petitioner’s proclamation over which COMELEC exercises original exclusive jurisdiction.
Consequently, it could not be deemed as a proper remedy in favor of respondent Bernal, Jr. even
if his name was included in the title of said petition.

O’Hara vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148941-42, 12 March 2002

DOCTRINE: In the absence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected,
the Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the
ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in order to validate the claim of its MBC.

If after the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error
or mathematical mistake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission should
have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificate of canvass. If the
records had borne out that the petitioner's proclamation was the result of a clerical error or simple
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the
electorate, there could have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a pre-
proclamation controversy not proper at this time.

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were candidates for the position of vice-governor,
province of Rizal during the May 14, 2001 elections. Upon conclusion of the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass coming from the thirteen municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected vice-governor with
216,798 votes over respondent Rodriguez’s 215,443 votes.

Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filed with the COMELEC en banc, a
petition to correct entries in the certificate of canvass of votes, entitled "In the Matter of Correction of
Entries In the Certificate of Canvass for the Position of Vice Governor in the Province of Rizal in the
Municipality of Binangonan." It was alleged that there were typographical errors in the number of votes
garnered by petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of 7,000 votes to petitioner.
That the error was due to the fact that the votes of 7,000 which is the sub-total of one hundred precincts
was brought forwarded thereby including the same in the total which is indicated in the last page of
the tabulation which is 28,754; hence the grand total, instead of 28,754 became 35,754."

The MBC of Binangonan submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal Accountant of
Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she committed the mathematical error.

Rodriguez filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the winning candidate for
vice-governor of the province of Rizal, and to correct an alleged manifest mathematical errors 5
Respondent Rodriguez asserted that after the mathematical error would have been corrected, she
would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against petitioner’s 209,798.

Petitioner filed his answer to the petition, arguing that there was no manifest error apparent in the
certificate of canvass which respondent Rodriguez and the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct, and
that respondent Rodriguez’s petition was filed out of time.

COMELEC annulled the proclamation of Respondent Teodoro O. O’Hara as elected Vice-Governor of

Rizal. To proclaim Jovita Rodriguez as the duly elected Vice-Governor of Rizal. The Court issued a
temporary restraining order directing respondents "to CEASE and DESIST from implementing
COMELEC Resolution.

Rodriguez filed a manifestation alleging that the temporary restraining order issued by this Court has
been rendered moot and academic since she had assumed the office of Vice-Governor of Rizal. Court
issued a resolution to the effect that "the temporary restraining order remains effective and is extended
to restrain the respondent from assuming the office of the vice-governor."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled the proclamation
of petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal.

HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. In any election contest, the ultimate issue is to determine the
electoral will. In other words, who among the candidates was the voters’ choice. Election means "the
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote," through the use of the ballot, and
the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate." An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. Specifically, the
term election, in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

The petition of the MBC of Binangonan, Rizal, before the COMELEC alleges in pertinent part:

● That after finalizing the Certificate of Canvass, same was reviewed by all of us and being
confident that it was prepared by an accountant whom the community regards as an honest
person, we, Chairman and Members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers signed the same
without noticing any mistake.
● That after the submission of the final copy to the Provincial Board of Canvassers and furnishing
copies to all concerned we were surprised when we heard over the radio about the complaint
of Mr. Jose Concepcion of NAMFREL, about the dagdag-bawas on the votes obtained by the
two (2) candidates for Vice Governor and we tried to review and check all the entries in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) and we did not notice any error; it was only in the Certificate of
Canvass wherein the number of votes of the two (2) candidates for vice-governor were
 erroneously typed, indicating 35,754 votes for Teodoro O’Hara instead of the actual total
28,754 and 18,871 for Jovita Rodriguez instead of the actual 18,870 votes.
● That the error was due to the fact that the votes of 7,000 which was the sub-total of one
hundred precincts was brought forwarded thereby including the same in the total which is
indicated in the last page of the tabulation which is 28,754; hence the grand total instead of
28,754 became 35,754.

It is apparent that the errors do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass that respondent
Rodriguez sought to be corrected. There is nothing on the certificate of canvass that shows the
addition of 7,000 votes in favor of petitioner. Likewise, the MBC of Binangonan failed to specify the
one hundred precincts whence the 7,000 votes came. Clearly then, the petition filed by the MBC of
Binangonan does not merely seek the correction of a manifest error but calls for the examination of
the election returns from the 100 precincts and the recount of the votes therefrom.

As previously stated, the MBC of Binangonan, Rizal explains the discrepancy or error as follows:

● That the error was due to the fact that the votes of 7,000 which is the sub-total of one hundred
precincts was brought forwarded (sic) thereby including the same in the total which is indicated
in the last page of the tabulation which is 28,754; hence the grand tabulation which is 28,754
became 35,754;

This was echoed by Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal and
tabulator who stated: That due to fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion, did not
notice that the sub-total of 7,000 from the preceding page was carried forward in the addition
of the votes of the last remaining precincts and reflected in the grand total 35,754 instead of
28,754 which is the actual count.

Clearly, the MBC of Binangonan and Evelyn Ramirez tried to explain the alleged error by referring
to a "preceding page" of a certain document which, however, was neither identified nor
presented in evidence. They also mentioned "100 remaining precincts" but neither the COMELEC
nor the MBC of Binangonan or PBC of Rizal or the respondents was able to identify the said precincts.
In fine, there is nothing on record to show where the "sub-total of 7,000 from the preceding page was
carried forward in the addition of the votes of the last remaining precincts" can be located. These
circumstances render their statement suspect.

Despite the confusing explanation of the MBC of Binangonan, the COMELEC relied heavily
thereon when it issued the assailed resolution. The correction of the certificate of canvass
necessitates the examination of several documents which the MBC of Binangonan and Evelyn
Ramirez mentioned in their petition and affidavit, respectively. Specifically, the correction of
the MBC of Binangonan’s mistake, if any, requires the examination of the election returns of
the alleged "100 precincts" and the supposed "preceding page." The COMELEC cannot simply
rely on the Statement of Votes per precinct submitted by respondents to determine the true mandate
of the electorate of Rizal considering that these Statements of Votes were prepared by the very same
members of the MBC of Binangonan, Rizal who claimed to have made a mistake due to "fatigue,
sleepless nights and physical exhaustion." Reliance on the Statement of Votes per precinct would
have been proper had the COMELEC determined if these individuals did not commit any other mistake
in the tabulation or preparation of the Statements of Votes.

Indeed, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest from the certificate of canvass
does not fall under the definition of "manifest error" which we laid down in the case of

A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, and is apparent
from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by
evidence, dehors the record be shown to have committed. To be manifest, the errors must appear on
the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of
their respective proceedings.

The alleged error which the MBC of Binangonan committed and which it attributes to physical
exhaustion and sleepless nights, is obviously not a plain error apparent from the Certificate of
Canvass. It would have been more prudent to order at least the examination of the election returns to
verify the existence of the alleged error instead of concluding outright that the Statements of Votes
submitted by respondents were accurate and correctly prepared. A more thorough study of the matter
would have been more appropriate under the circumstances specially considering that what is at stake
is the sanctity of the right of suffrage which we are bound to uphold.

Equally important to note is the fact that the COMELEC relied heavily on the self-serving affidavits of
the members of the MBC of Binangonan, Rizal, in order to justify its ruling, completely forgetting that
reliance thereon has long been frowned upon because:

As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the affidavits and supposed admissions of the members of
the MBC of Binangonan have no probative value and cannot, therefore, be the basis of the nullification
of his proclamation.

In this connection, it must be noted that in its petition, the MBC of Binangonan stated that Evelyn
Ramirez had her tabulation typed "by her typist purposely to finalize the subject Certificate of Canvass
for signatures of the chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers before submitting
the same to the provincial board of canvassers for canvassing and proclamation of the winners."
Otherwise stated, the MBC of Binangonan alleged that the Certificate of Canvass which the
COMELEC ordered corrected was prepared by another person who neither testified nor executed a
sworn statement. On this score, it is more justifiable to disregard the claims of the MBC and the affidavit
of Evelyn Ramirez.

Significantly, the "careful process" observed by the COMELEC in resolving the instant case consisted
of only two (2) hearings. Considering the factual issues involved, the COMELEC should have
conducted further investigation or at least a technical inspection or examination of election returns to
verify the existence of the alleged error before it gave credence to the statements of the MBC of
Binangonan and concluding outright that the Statement of Votes submitted by respondents were
accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of Votes because they were prepared
by the same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a mistake due to "fatigue, sleepless
nights and physical exhaustion." It would have been more prudent to make a determination whether
these same individuals committed any other mistake in the tabulation or statement of votes.

Even based on the statements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors
sought to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass. As above-stated, the
alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does not fall under the definition of
"manifest error" which was laid down in Trinidad v. COMELEC and Chavez v. COMELEC.

Considering, however, that petitioner had already been proclaimed as the Vice-Governor of Rizal,
respondents filed their petitions with the COMELEC. The applicable provision, therefore, is Section 5
of Rule 27 which states:

Sec. 5. Pre-Proclamation Controversies Which May be Filed Directly with the Commission. — (a) The
following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:

(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results
during the canvassing as where . . . (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the
statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or . . . and such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the
winning candidate had already been made.

If the Petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation and must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected thereby.

The above-quoted provision requires that the correction be one involving a manifest error such as "a
mistake in the copying of the figures into the Statement of Votes or into the Certificate of Canvass."
The provision, however, also requires that "such errors could not have been discovered during the
canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence."

The rationale for the provision is obvious. If the error sought to be corrected is truly a manifest error,
then the matter should have already been raised before the board of canvassers. The exception is if
the error is one that "could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of
due diligence." In the case at bar, the error allegedly committed by the MBC of Binangonan, which it
attempted to describe and rationalize in their affidavits, is one that should have been discovered even
with ordinary diligence. The truth of the matter, however, is that the error, even assuming it to be true,
is not manifest and was not apparent from the Certificate of Canvass and, therefore, cannot be
corrected simply by correction of alleged tabulation error.

Certainly, the present controversy does not merely involve a mistake in the addition of the votes
appearing on the Statement of Votes per precinct or an erroneous copying of figures in the Certificate
of Canvass.

The Court once more reiterates that the Constitution gives the Commission on Elections the broad
power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision
and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. The
Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the
people’s sacred right of suffrage.

In the absence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the
Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the
ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in order to validate the claim of its MBC.

If after the re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error
or mathematical mistake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission should
have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificate of canvass. If the
records had borne out that petitioner’s proclamation was the result of a clerical error or simple
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the
electorate, there could have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a pre-
proclamation controversy not proper at this time.
 Batoy vs. RTC, G.R. No. 126833, 17 February 2003
DOCTRINE:

- This Court held in Melo vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the requirement under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non Forum shopping is mandatory.

FACTS: The petitioner and private respondent (Sarmiento) were candidates for the position of
Barangay Chairman. The latter won as the chairman of their barangay leading to petitioner’s filing
of an election protest. She however, failed to append a certification of non-forum shopping as
mandated by the Supreme Court Admin. Circular No. 04-94.

Despite petitioner’s submission, the MCTC granted the motion to dismiss of private
respondent, leading her to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC. Said court dismissed the
petition, hence this case.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari.

RULING:

The RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed therewith by

Petitioner. This Court held in Melo vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , that the requirement under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non forum shopping is mandatory. The
subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party's failure to comply
therewith in the first instance.

In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the
submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling
reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. In this
case, however, the petitioner offered no valid justification for her failure to comply with the Circular.
Her only excuse is that she overlooked the deficiency of her election protest and discovered the
same after the private respondent had filed her motion to dismiss the election protest.

The RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for the added reason that it had no appellate
jurisdiction over said petition. Section 49 of Resolution No. 2824 of the COMELEC governing the
barangay elections on May 6, 1996, promulgated on February 6, 1996, provides that the
COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the MCTC or MTC on election protests

"SEC. 49. Finality of proclamation . — The proclamation of the winning candidates

shall be final. However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial
Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC) shall have original jurisdiction
over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. The Commission en
banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of the
(MeTC/MTC/MCTC) in accordance with the COMELEC rules of procedures…”

The resolution applies also to a final order of the MCTC dismissing an election protest. Petitioner
did not perfect her appeal from the MCTC to the COMELEC. Instead, the petitioner filed her
petition for certiorari with the RTC. The erroneous filing by the petitioner of her petition with the
RTC did not toll the running of the period for petitioner to perfect her appeal to the COMELEC.
 Navarosa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, 18 September 2003
Doctrine:
Under Rule 35, Sec. 9 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure: “Filing Fee. — No protest, counter-
protest, or protest-in-intervention shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in
the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00) for each interest. Each interest shall further pay
the legal research fee as required by law.” Further, an earlier ruling by the Comelec determined
that it would no longer tolerate "any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for
election cases filed.”

In the present case, however, it was held that it is highly unjust to the electorate of Libacao, Aklan,
after the trial court has completed revision of the contested ballots, to dismiss the election protest
and forever foreclose the determination of the true winner of the election for a mere P200
deficiency in the Comelec filing fee, especially as estoppel has already set against Navarosa.

Facts:
Petitioner Navarosa and respondent Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14
May 2001 elections. Thereafter, the Comelec Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao
proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor. Claiming that irregularities marred the
canvassing of ballots in several precincts, Esto filed an election protest in the RTC against
Navarosa. Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a
counter-protest in the same case.

Judgment was rendered in favor of Esto, declaring him winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
ordering Navarosa to pay him damages. While Navarosa appealed the ruling to the COMELEC,
Esto filed a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The same was granted subject to
the filing of P300,000 bond or stayed, as prayed by Navarosa, upon filing of P600,000 supersedes
bond. Esto then filed a petition for certiorari with the Comelec. Navarosa, in her memorandum,
raised for the first time the issue of RTC's failure to acquire jurisdiction over the election protest
for Esto's failure to pay the Comelec filing fee.

Issue:
W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the election protest filed by Esto (YES)

Ruling:
The Court held in the affirmative.

Navarosa contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because
of Esto's failure to pay the Comelec filing fee under Rule 35, Sec. 9 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Procedurally, Navarosa should not have raised this jurisdictional issue in this petition
which involves only the ancillary issue of whether to allow execution of the trial court's decision
pending appeal. Nevertheless, as the question of the trial court's jurisdiction also affects its
authority to issue ancillary orders, the Court has resolved to pass upon this issue. Section 9
provides:
 Filing Fee. — No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention shall be given due
course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00)
for each interest. Each interest shall further pay the legal research fee as required by law.

Esto must pay this filing fee before the trial court can exercise its jurisdiction over the election
protest. The Comelec filing fee, to distinguish from the other mandatory fees under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, is credited to the Court's General Fund. The Comelec Second
Division held that the P515 fees Esto paid already covered the P300 Comelec filing fee. However,
based on the trial court's Election Fees Form, of the total amount of P515 respondent Esto paid,
only P100 was indeed credited to the General Fund. Consequently, Esto only paid P100 of the
required P300 Comelec filing fee.

In an earlier ruling, the Court held that an election protest is not dismissible if the protestant,
relying on the trial court's assessment, pays only a portion of the Comelec filing fee. However, in
Miranda v. Castillo, the Court, reiterating Loyola v. Commission on Elections, held that it would
no longer tolerate "any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases
filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997." Still, in the present case,
it was held that it is highly unjust to the electorate of Libacao, Aklan, after the trial court has
completed revision of the contested ballots, to dismiss the election protest and forever foreclose
the determination of the true winner of the election for a mere P200 deficiency in the Comelec
filing fee.

Navarosa did not raise the issue of Esto's incomplete payment of the Comelec filing fee during
the full-blown trial of the election protest and, instead, actively participated in the proceedings.
Navarosa raised the issue of incomplete payment of the Comelec filing fee only in her
memorandum to Esto's petition before the Comelec Second Division. Although a party cannot
waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them at any stage of the proceedings, estoppel may bar
a party from raising such issues. Thus, estoppel has set in precluding Navarosa from questioning
the incomplete payment of the Comelec filing fee, and in effect assailing the exercise of jurisdiction
by the trial court over the election protest. Consequently, the law vests in the trial court jurisdiction
over election protests although the exercise of such jurisdiction requires the payment of docket
and filing fees by the party invoking the trial court's jurisdiction. Estoppel now prevents Navarosa
from questioning the trial court's exercise of such jurisdiction, which the law and not any act of the
parties has conferred on the trial court. Navarosa's conduct estops her from claiming, at such late
stage, that the trial court did not after all acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. The remedy
for Esto's incomplete payment is for him to pay the P200 deficiency in the Comelec filing fee.
 Lorenzo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158371, 11 December 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Sonia R. Lorenzo and respondent Nestor B. Magno were rival candidates for Mayor of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the local elections of May 14, 2001. A certain Carlos Montes, resident
of San Isidro, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition, docketed as SPA 01-153, for
the disqualification of respondent Magno as a candidate on the ground of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan of four counts of Direct Bribery. On May 7, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution disqualifying respondent Magno. This was affirmed on appeal by
the COMELEC En Banc on May 12, 2001.

The aforesaid Resolution was disseminated for implementation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Isidro. Hence, on May 18, 2001, petitioner Lorenzo was proclaimed as the
Mayor-elect of San Isidro.

Meanwhile, respondent Magno brought a petition for certiorari before this Court, assailing his
disqualification by the COMELEC, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. 147904. On
October 4, 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the two
challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7 and 12, 2001, and declaring that Magno
was under no disqualification to run for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001
elections. The relevant portion of the Decision reads:

[A]lthough [Magno’s] crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). [Magno]’s
disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification
anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC’s order for the canvass of votes defies the Supreme Court’s ruling in
G.R. No. 147904 that Magno should have filed an election protest

Ruling:

The Court held in the negative. Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Also settled
is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. In an election case, the Supreme Court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all
means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.

As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. This
rule, however, admits of exceptions: (1) where the board of canvassers was improperly
constituted; (2) where quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) where what was filed was
not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul the
proclamation; (4) where the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly
made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5)
where the proclamation was null and void.6

This case falls squarely within the fifth exception to the general rule, i.e. the proclamation of
Lorenzo as Mayor of San Isidro was null and void. As of May 18, 2001, the date on which
Lorenzo was proclaimed Mayor-elect of San Isidro, the question as regards Magno’s
qualifications for said post was still pending, and was raised as an issue before this Court in
certiorari proceedings in G.R. No. 147904. The question of Magno’s qualifications for the office
of Mayor was not resolved until October 4, 2002, when we expressly ruled that Magno was
qualified for said post.

Since the question of Magno’s eligibility for the position of Mayor was still pending, the canvass
which excluded Magno from the list of qualified candidates was an incomplete canvass, and
Lorenzo’s proclamation, on the basis thereof, was illegal. An incomplete canvass is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.

Dimaporo vs. HRET, G.R. No. 158359, 23 March 2004

DOCTRINE: The grant of a motion for technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of
the HRET. The Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. The
HRET may refuse the request for technical examination when the claims of the parties can be
resolved without the need for technical examination and when election documents pertaining to
the precincts in one municipality were gutted by fire.

FACTS: This is a petition filed by Congressman Abdullah D. Dimaporo, seeking to nullify the
Resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which denied his Motion for
Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration
Records and Voting Records, and denying the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Dimaporo was proclaimed the winning representative of the 2nd legislative district of Lanao del
Norte on July 20, 2001. Dimaporo winning only by 5,487 votes over Congressional candidate
Abdulla S. Mangotara, the latter filed a petition for protest, requesting for a technical examination
of the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the Voters Registration Records and the List of
Voters with Voting Records in the protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo
(SND).

Mangatoro purported that there was a massive substitution of voters, and electoral irregularities
that led to Dimaporo winning, and so he is the rightful representative of the 2nd District of Lanao
del Norte. Dimaporo countered this, by impugning the votes for Mangotara in all the precincts in
Lanao del Norte, except SND. He also filed for a technical examination claiming that there
was also massive substitute voting in these precincts, and that there were groups of
ballots written by only one person.

Before the revision proceedings, Mangotara filed for an Urgent Motion for Technical Examination,
for the precincts in SND. He claimed that the fire that occurred in the municipality made it
impossible to proceed with the revision in SND, so a technical examination is the only way to
determine if there really was a massive substitutive voting. In addition to that, the Sangguniang
Kabataan elections are forthcoming so there is an urgent need for the examination. Dimporo
opposed this but the HRET continued with the motion of Mangotara.
Unsatisfied, Dimaporo filed for a Motion for Technical Examination for: 198 revised pilot counter-
protested precincts, 47 pilot counter-protested precincts, and 36 precincts of the municipality of
Tangcal. To grant the motion, he mentioned that the 47 ballot boxes when opened were empty,
and for the 36 precincts the ballots were burned. This was denied by the tribunal reasoning that
it is impossible to examine the destroyed ballots, and for the other precincts a technical
examination would be unnecessary. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due process or the right to present
evidence to show the massive substitute voting committed in the counter-protested
precincts.
2. Whether or not the HRET deprived Dimaporo of equal protection in denying his Motion for
Technical Examination.

RULING:
1. No. The Court rules that the HRET may ascertain the validity of the allegations of
Dimaporo with no need for a technical examination.

The grant of a motion for technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the
HRET. The Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and
exclusive. The HRET may refuse the request for technical examination when the claims
of the parties can be resolved without the need for technical examination and when
election documents pertaining to the precincts in one municipality were gutted by fire

The ballots, election documents and other paraphernalia can still be admitted as evidence.
To add, Dimaporo offered evidence in the form of documents and testimonies, which
denies the allegation that the petitioner was denied his right to present his evidence. He
actually has already filed a formal offer of evidence to which Mangotara commented.

2. No. Dimaporo claims that he was denied equal protection when the HRET denied his
motion for technical examination, when it previously granted a similar motion of
Mangotara. He argued that there is no valid distinction between the precincts subject of
Mangotara’s motion and his own for in both instances, the ballots are no longer available
for revision. The court finds this argument untenable.

Equal protection simply means that all persons and things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. A substantial
distinction justifies a different treatment, as applies in the case at bar.

The election results in SND were the sole subjects of the protest with Mangotara, as
different from the motion of Dimaporo which put into issue all municipalities except SND.
In all other municipalities, the winning margin of Dimaporo over Mangotara is small, except
for SND in which Dimaporo won by 21,881 votes so the results in SND were what made
him win.

In addition to that, Mangotara filed his motion before the start of the revision proceedings
that the revision for SND is impossible due to the fire that occurred; while for Dimaporo he
filed already after the revision. It is impossible to examine the ballots in Tangcal for these
 were already destroyed by a fire, while in SND although the ballots were also destroyed
there are other election records which can still be used.

Lastly, the Court Agrees with HRET that the claims of Dimaporo can be resolved without
a technical examination.

Kare vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157526, 28 April 2004

FACTS:

Moll and Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Malinao Albay (May 14, 2001
Elections). Moll won and Ceriola was the 2nd placer (vote difference: 987). Kare was the elected
vice mayor of the said election.
• May 17 2001: Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of
Moll to Run for Any Elective Position on the ground that Moll had been sentenced to 6 mos of
arresto mayor to 1 year and 9 mos of prision correccional for Usurpation of Authority or Official
functions (RPC 177)
• Comelec 1st Div dismissed said petition
• On reconsideration, COMELEC En Banc issued Mar 19 2003 Resolution which affirmed
Moll’s disqualification (as recommended by the provincial election supervisor of Albay) and
proclaimed Ceriola as the mayor-elect. COMELEC ruled that:
o Moll had been disqualified from being a mayoral candidae in the 2001 local election and
that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was void ab initio. He was thus disqualified from
holding office
o TC’s final judgment disqualified Moll from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued
to disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, votes case in his favor were stray or invalid
votes, and Ceriola was adjudged the winner.
• Before Ceriola’s actual proclamation, Kare filed a petition before the SC for a Status Quo
order, which was granted.

ISSUE
Should Moll be disqualified from running/holding the position of mayor? YES

RULING
Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor since his judgment of conviction
(the basis of his disqualification) has allegedly not attained finality. While he did not appeal the
said judgment (promulgated on May 11 1999) by filing a notice of appeal, he still filed an MR on
May 28 1999 within the reglementary period.

SC: The period for perfecting an appeal is interrupted when a MR of Motion for New Trial is filed
(Sec 6, Rule 122). Moll makes it appear that his filing of an MR should have stayed the running
of the period for filing an appeal. However, what he did file was a Motion to Quash the Information;
and when it was denied, he filed an MR. Neither the Motion to Quash nor his MR was directed at
the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment.
Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the ROC in relation to the conviction.
Further, Moll admitted that no regular appeal was filed. He also filed the MTQ belatedly (filed it on
day of promulgation instead of any time before entering a plea).

Since no appeal of conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, judgment against him has become
final. COMELEC en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor under
Sec. 40 (a) LGC . Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 mos of arresto mayor to 1 year
and 9 mos of prison correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any
elective local position.

Moll argues that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence.

SC: As correctly contended by the OSG, Moll received a notice of his promulgation, in fact his
counsel was present on the day of his promulgation- to file a motion to quash. Because of his
unexplained absence, promulgation of judgment can be validly made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his last known address or thru counsel
as per Sec 6, Rule 120 of ROC.

Hofer vs. HRET, G.R. No. 158833, 12 May 2004

DOCTRINE: Procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an
expeditRule 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules lays down the period allotted to each party in the presentation of
his evidence, thus:

'RULE 59. Time Limit for Presentation of Evidence. — Each party is given a period of twenty (20) working
days, preferably successive, to complete the presentation of his evidence, including the formal offer
thereof. This period shall begin to run from the first date set for the presentation of the party's evidence,
either before the Tribunal or before a Hearing Commissioner. Once commenced, presentation of the
evidence-in-chief shall continue every working day until completed or until the period granted for such
purpose is exhausted. Upon motion based on meritorious grounds, the Tribunal may grant a ten-day
extension of the period herein fixed.

The hearing for any particular day or days may be postponed or cancelled upon the request of the party
presenting evidence, provided, however; that the delay caused by such postponement or cancellation shall
be charged to said party's period for presenting evidence.'

FACTS: Dulce Ann Hofer (Hofer) and Belma Cabilao (Cabilao) were congressional candidates in the lone
district of Zamboanga Sibugay during the 14 May 2001 elections. On 18 May 2001, Cabilao was proclaimed
the duly elected congressional representative. Hofer claimed that massive vote buying, tampering of
election returns and other irregularities were committed in 671 precincts during the counting of votes and
canvassing of election returns and filed with the HRET an election protest. Subsequently, Cabilao filed a
motion to dismiss the protest for Hofer’s failure to prosecute for an unreasonable period of time. The HRET
granted the motion and dismissed Hofer’s protest. Hofer then filed for a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.

Hofer contended that HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her protest on mere
technicality, invoking that the laws governing election contests, especially the appreciation of ballots and
returns, must be liberally interpreted to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infirmities. The SolGen, in his comments, maintained that the HRET did
not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Hofer’s protest considering that she failed to prosecute it
within the period allowed by the rules.

ISSUE/S: Did the HRET act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Hofer’s protest on mere
technicalities, hence, depriving her of her right to due process?

RULING: NO. The Court explained that the election protest filed by Hofer is a serious charge which, if true,
could unseat the protestee as the Representative of her district. Thus, the observance of the HRET Rules in
conjunction with the Rules of Court must be taken seriously.

Under Rule 59 of 1998 HRET Rules, each party is given a limited period of twenty (20) days in the
presentation of his/her evidence, including the formal offer. This requirement in the presentation of
evidence is prompted by the nature of election contest, which should be decided as soon as practicable.
The 20-day period given to each parties may be extended by the Tribunal upon meritorious grounds and on
motion of the party concerned. This time limit prescribed by the Rules in the presentation of evidence
contemplates not only actual period spent in presenting before the Tribunal, but also the period used in the
taking of deposition of the witnesses under Rule 61 of the 1998 HRET Rules.

Unfortunately, Hofer failed to comply with such rule. Despite the lapse of six (6) months from the date of
initial hearing, she also failed to present her evidence. Such inaction shows her lack of interest to prosecute
her case.

Zamora vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158610, 12 November 2004

DOCTRINE
The mere filing of the notice of appeal is not enough. It should be accompanied by the payment
of the correct amount of appeal fee. Following the Loyola Doctrine, the Court would no longer
tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after
the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997." Applying in the case, Zamoras is not
only chargeable with the incomplete payment of the appeal fees but he also failed to remit the
required filing fees for his motion for reconsideration. The payment of the filing fee is a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance is a valid basis for the dismissal of the case. The
subsequent full payment of the filing fee after the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure
the jurisdictional defect. Such procedural lapse by Zamoras clearly warrants the outright dismissal
of his appeal. This left the COMELEC with no choice except to declare the Orders final and
executory.

FACTS
Zamoras and private respondent Bartolome Bastasa ("Bastasa") were candidates for punong
barangay of Barangay Galas, Dipolog City in the elections held on 15 July 2002. The Barangay
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bastasa as the duly elected punong barangay. Zamoras filed
an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC). Petition was denied by MTCC.
Aggrieved, Zamoras filed a notice of appeal with the MTCC. In a notice dated 17 January 2003,
the COMELEC's Judicial Records Division directed Zamora to remit P2,600 representing the
deficiency in the payment of the required filing fees within three days from receipt of the notice.
Zamoras allegedly received the notice on 28 January 2003 and remitted the deficiency by postal
money order on the same day.

On 10 March 2003, the COMELEC issued an Order dismissing Zamoras' appeal for failure to
perfect his appeal within the 5-day reglementary period pursuant to Sections 3 and 9(d), Rule 22
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Order contained a footnote that "[p]rotestant-appellant
received the November 4, 2002 Decision on November 29, 2002. He filed his appeal on December
9, 2002 or ten (10) days from receipt of the decision sought to be appealed."

Zamoras filed a motion for reconsideration by registered mail on 21 March 2003. In its Order
dated 4 April 2003, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration "for failure of the movant
to pay the necessary motion fees under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure."
Zamoras argues that the COMELEC dismissed his appeal on the mistaken belief that he filed his
appeal on 9 December 2002 or ten (10) days from his receipt on 29 November 2002 of the
decision. Zamoras claims that he filed his appeal on 2 December 2002, which is three (3) days
from 29 November 2002.

ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing Zamoras' appeal and in denying his motion for reconsideration.

RULING
No. While the notice of appeal filed by the Zamoras on 2 December 2003 is within the 5-day
reglementary period, Zamoras however paid only P600 as appeal fee which is deficient by
P2,600. COMELEC's Resolution No. 02-0130, issued on 18 September 2002, prescribes P3,000
as appeal fee plus P50 for legal research fee and P150 for bailiff's fee.

After the Judicial Records Division informed Zamoras of the deficiency, he paid the total amount
of P2,600 only on 28 January 2003, or almost two (2) months beyond the 5-day reglementary
period to appeal. Zamoras had only five days from receipt of the decision of the MTCC or until 4
December 2002 to perfect his appeal. While he may have timely filed his notice of appeal on 2
December 2004, he only paid P600 as appeal fee. He paid the deficiency of P2,600 representing
the appeal and legal research fees only on 28 January 2003.

The subsequent payment of the filing fee on 28 January 2003 did not relieve Zamoras of his
mistake. A case is not deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of the filing fee.
Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing
of the notice of appeal. The subsequent full payment of the filing fee on 28 January 2003 did not
cure the jurisdictional defect. The date of payment on 28 January 2003 is the actual date of filing
the appeal which is almost two (2) months after Zamoras received the MTCC Decision on 29
November 2002. This is way beyond the 5-day reglementary period to file an appeal.

The fact that the Judicial Records Division gave Zamoras three (3) days to complete payment of
the filing fee in a notice dated 17 January 2003 is of no moment. At the time of the notice's
issuance on 17 January 2003, the 5-day reglementary period to file an appeal had long lapsed
since 5 December 2002. The Judicial Records Division had no authority to extend the 5-day
reglementary period or revive the lapsed reglementary period by issuing the notice on 17 January
2003. Zamoras cannot rely on such notice as basis for arguing that he filed his appeal on time.
The Court stressed in Loyola v. COMELEC, promulgated on 25 March 1997, that there is no
longer any excuse for shortcomings in the payment of filing fees. The Court ruled that the case
bars "any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount
of filing fees in election cases which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision." The
court further reiterated the Loyola Doctrine which state that error in the payment of filing fees in
election cases is no longer excusable. The Court declared that "it would no longer tolerate any
mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the
promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997."

Balajonda vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, 28 February 2005

DOCTRINE:

While present election laws are silent on the remedy of execution pending appeal in election
contests, there is no case law holding that such remedy is exclusive to election contests involving
elective barangay and municipal officials. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allowing
execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies in a suppletory manner to election
cases, including those involving city and provincial officials.

FACTS:

On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay
Chairman, having won the office in the barangay elections held the previous day. Her margin of
victory over private respondent Maricel Francisco was 420 votes. Francisco duly filed a petition
for election protest, within ten days from the date of proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC).

In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Francisco’s petition stated no cause of action and
that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were "baseless, conjectural, flimsy,
frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latter’s wild imagination." After the issues were
joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69) ballot boxes, and eventually,
the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts were revised. After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with
its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by 418 votes.

Francisco appealed the MeTC Decision to the COMELEC, thereby reversing the MeTC, finding
that Francisco won over Balajonda by 111 votes. Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration; in the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for, praying for a writ of execution in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Court [Sec. 2(a), Rule 39], which allows discretionary
execution of judgment upon good reasons to be stated in the order.

Balajonda duly opposed the Motion for Execution, arguing that under Sec. 2(a), Rule 39, only the
judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of discretionary execution pending
appeal. However the COMELEC, in its Order, granted the motion and directed the issuance of a
Writ of Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as
Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending
appeal based on the following grounds:

1) that the COMELEC may order the immediate execution only of the decision of the trial
court but not its own decision;
2) that the order of execution which the COMELEC issued is not founded on good reasons
as it is a mere pro forma reproduction of the reasons enumerated in Ramas v. COMELEC;
and
3) the COMELEC exhibited manifest partiality and bias in favor of Francisco when it
transgressed its own rule.

RULING:

The Court, in Batul v. Bayron, affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC directing the immediate
execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to
the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute
the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of
Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that, “absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or
in a suppletory character and effect.” Batul also clearly shows that the judgments which may be
executed pending appeal need not be only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC
as well.

Anent the second ground, the Court finds that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that, “In the instant case, the protestant cited the good reasons enunciated in
Ramas v. Comelec, that is, (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the
shortness of the remaining period, and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been
pending.”

After evaluating the case, the Court ruled that the reasons cited are indeed obtaining. Public
interest is best served if the herein Protestant who actually received the highest number of votes
should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that the remaining period or the unexpired
term is too short that to further prolong the tenure of the protestee is a virtual denial of the right of
the protestant, the duly elected barangay captain, to assume office. Considering that there are
good reasons for the issuance of an Order of Execution, i.e. dictates of public policy and the
shortness of the remaining period, the Court has granted the Motion, dismissing the Petition for
failure of petitioner Balajonda to show that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Poe vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, 29 March 2005

DOCTRINE: Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that
movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of
the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to
an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public
officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently
rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant
dies during the pendency of the protest.
FACTS: Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a
near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected
President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for
the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ).1 She took her Oath of Office
before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an
election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed
her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties exchanged
lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of
God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. The medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of
Death of the Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral
infarction.

However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a
fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena.
Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an
outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for
all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be fully exercised to make
manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation. All these, despite
the fact that the submissions by the parties on their respective sides in the protest and the
counter-protest are thus far, far from completed.

Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the
Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to
INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs.
Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification therein.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and
in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount
interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her
late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the 2004 elections.

In support of her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections, and Lomugdang v.
Javier, to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the
dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest.
She stresses nevertheless that even if the instant protest case succeeds, she is cognizant that
as a mere substitute she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her
utmost concern is not personal but one that involves the public’s interest. She prays, however,
that if subsequently determined that the protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the
highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in office,
and thus prevented from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives
reserved only to the duly-elected president or her legitimate successor.

ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case? (No)
RULING: The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the
PET Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation
of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By
this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner
had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd
highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it
does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions
of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution
by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor
seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election
contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and
not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected
substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
during the pendency of the protest.

In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but
denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly,
in the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim of the
surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even
in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals,12 involving substitution by the widow of a
deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied
substitution by the wife or heirs.

This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have
held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal
and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and
exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust
the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.13 Hence, we have allowed
substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit.14 In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias15 and Lomugdang v.
Javier,16 we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in
interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume
office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august
office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that
protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit
of one’s right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.

Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an
election protest involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with public
interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. But herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in
mind that she desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that
she is "pursuing the process" to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the
Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the
electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a
person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court18 is the
applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such
intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose
by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit
from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the
highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsel’s manifestation that movant/intervenor
herself claims she has no interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot
succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties
such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or
to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the
action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable – and this is not the policy of the law.19 It is far more prudent to abide by the
existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.

Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no
justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and substitution.

WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN

ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.

Legarda vs. De Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, 31 March 2005

LOREN B. LEGARDA, protestant, vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO, protestee.

P.E.T. Case No. 003. March 31, 2005.

DOCTRINE: The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President
is expressly vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There
is no necessity, in the Tribunal’s view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within the
ambit of its constitutional function.

FACTS: In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
confirmed the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of protestee
Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal further ordered concerned officials to
undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the ballot boxes and election
documents subject of the protest. On February 4, 2005, protestee filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the said Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tribunal erred in its Resolution. (NO)

RULING: Protestee contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the
statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC). But it is not suggested by any of
the parties that questions on the validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are
outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the
duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification
of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and
COCs. There is no necessity, in the Tribunal’s view, to amend the PET Rules to perform
this function within the ambit of its constitutional function.

The Tribunal also note the apparent ambivalence of the protestee relative to the Tribunal's
jurisdiction over re-canvass of the election returns. He claims the Tribunal's authority to re-
canvass is "inexorably linked to [its] constitutional mandate as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the presidential and the vice-presidential elections." Contrarily, he states that the
Tribunal cannot recanvass and must resolve the protest through revision of ballots. If he
contends that the Tribunal has the authority to re-canvass, there is no reason why it cannot
perform this function now. The Tribunal agree that the ballots are the best and most
conclusive evidence in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes
of each candidate is involved. However, the Tribunal do not find any reason to resort to
revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant concedes the
correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both
protestant and protestee, and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the
correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of
transposition and addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new substantial arguments
to reverse the Tribunal’s ruling. The Tribunal hold that while Peña v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is still good law, it is
inapplicable in this case. The Tribunal dismissed the petition in Peña because it failed to specify
the contested precincts. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces,
municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein.
The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose
a challenge to protestee's title to his office. In the Tribunal’s view, the instant protest
consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in
due time.

Considering that the Tribunal finds the protest sufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal must
again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest
is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her
case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots,
nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors,
pursuant to the Tribunal's rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for ocular inspection and
inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of watchers. However, the Tribunal has already
ordered the protection and safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the
appropriate directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an imperative
need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard measures are already being
undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes.

Lucman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166229, 29 June 2005

DOCTRINE: SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The
following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

e. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

f. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
g. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
h. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

FACTS: Petitioner Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private respondent Mosama M. Pandi were
mayoralty candidates in Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, during the May 10, 2004 elections.

During the canvassing of votes, private respondent Mosama Pandi objected to the inclusion of
ten election returns, although only six of these are subjects of the present controversy, to wit:

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSER’S RULING: It overruled private respondent’s objections

on the disputed returns, and proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate, as shown in the
Certificate of Canvass Of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal
Offices, signed on May 19, 2004.Petitioner won over private respondent by a margin of 16 votes.

Private respondent Pandi filed with COMELEC an appeal from the ruling of the Board and alleged
the following:
- That massive fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the elections, e.g., force, threat and
intimidation were employed on the voters, double voting, substitution of voters, snatching
of ballots, padding of ballots and existence of flying voters
- That he contested election returns should have been excluded from the canvass, and that
the Board was precipitate in proclaiming petitioner as the winning candidate, as private
respondent has manifested on record that he is intending to appeal the Board's ruling
- That although the exclusion of the contested returns is a ground for election protest, the
COMELEC may go beyond the face of the returns to determine whether the elections in
the precincts involved are a sham.

In addition, private respondent Pandi filed a motion to annul proclamation and/or to suspend the
effects of proclamation pendente lite.

In his Comment and/or Answer to the appeal, petitioner Lucman argued the following:
- That the grounds relied upon by private respondent are not proper in a pre-proclamation
controversy but in an election protest
- That her proclamation is valid
- That the petition is defective for failure to include indispensable parties
- That private respondent failed to inform the Board that he is appealing its ruling, as
required by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166, or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1991.
COMELEC 1ST DIVISION’S ORDER: In its September 30, 2004 Order, it ordered the document
examiners of the Commission on Elections to conduct an examination of the List of Voters with
Voting Record of the precincts involved in this case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the
contested precincts in the Municipalityof Poonabayabao to determine whether or not actual voting
by the duly registered voters of said precincts were conducted during the elections of May 10,
2004.

Further, it ANULLED the proclamation of BAIRAMSALAM LAUT LUCMAN as duly elected mayor
ofPoonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, it is hereby ordered that the Vice-Mayor of said Municipality
assumed (sic)the position pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code, until the final
resolution of this petition. Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano dissented to the majority opinion
on the ground that the petition involves issues proper to an election protest and not a pre-
proclamation controversy.

Petitioner Lucman moved to reconsider the assailed Order, and in an Order dated October 13,
2004, Commissioner Borra ordered and certified the motion for reconsideration to the
Commission en banc. o Thereafter, the Commission en banc, in an Order dated October 14,
2004, issued a temporary restraining order and a status quo ante order, directing the parties to
maintain the status prevailing before the issuance of the September 30, 2004 Resolution.

COMELEC EN BANC’S RESOLUTION: It DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit andAFFIRMED the COMELEC 1st Division’s order.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal from the Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC (First Division)
interjected by private respondent makes a case for a pre-proclamation controversy? – YES.

RULING: Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as
"any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns."

Under Section 243 of the same Code, the issues that may be raised in a pre- proclamation
controversy, are as follows:

SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election
returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under
duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic;
and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

In the present case, the objections initially raised by private respondent before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e., the
election returns is obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains
alterations. o Obviously, the foregoing allegations pertain not only to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, but to the conduct
of the elections as well. Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed
against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular
election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. As a rule, the COMELEC is limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. o It is beyond the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to go beyond the face of the returns or investigate election irregularities.

The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature. Reception of evidence

aliunde, such as the List of Voters with Voting Record and the VRRs, is proscribed. Issues such
as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the resolution of which would compel or
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie
regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. o Such issues should be
posed and resolved in a regular election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal and
factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.

Hence, as correctly argued by petitioner, private respondent's cause of action before the
COMELEC is proper for an election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy, and the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent's
petition/appeal. Consequently, all subsequent actions by the COMELEC in relation to private
respondent's appeal are null and void, and correctable by the present special civil action for
certiorari.

The proclamation of petitioner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers is maintained and petitioner
should be allowed to assume her office as mayor of Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

Planas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167594, 10 March 2006

FACTS:

On January 5, 2004, Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the Third
Congressional District of Quezon City and on the same date, Cabochan filed her certificate of
candidacy for the same position. On January 12, 2004, Ramil T. Cortiguerra (Cortiguerra), a
registered voter of Quezon City, filed before the COMELEC National Capital Region (NCR) a
"Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional
Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan," which was docketed as Case No. SPA (NCR-RED) No. A04-
006, alleging that Cabochan's certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was
notarized by a Notary Public whose commission had already expired, in violation of Section 73 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 1 of COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 6453. On
January 15, 2004, Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr.
(Defensor) filed his substitution of Cabochan.

In the meantime, the national elections were held as scheduled on May 10, 2004. On May 15,
2004, Planas' counsel submitted to the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a copy of the above-
said May 14, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division on Cortiguerras's petition in SPA
No. 04-255 and moved that the votes in favor of Defensor be no longer read. His motion was,
however, denied on the ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central Office
disqualifying Defensor. Also on May 17, 2004, Defensor was proclaimed as the winning candidate
for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City.
By Order of May 22, 2004, the COMELEC First Division, acting on Cabochan's Motion for
Reconsideration of its May 14, 2004 Resolution, directed the elevation of the motion to the
COMELEC En Banc. On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged
Resolution reversing the May 14, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. Hence, the
present petition of Planas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Defensor’s proclamation was valid or legal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc,
et al. v. COMELEC, et al., x x x It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any
party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the
assumption that there has been a valid proclamation.

Whereas in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any
way affect the basic issues. In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who
garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his
proclamation was valid or legal. Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensors proclamation
the denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he
in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had
been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.
Benwaren vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 169393, 7 April 2006

Doctrine: The factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise
in their field are generally binding and conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave
abuse and none has been shown in this case.

The COMELEC ruled that based on Section 20 (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, earlier cited,
the proclamation of private respondent Crisologo was proper because the contested
returns would not adversely affect the results of the election.

Facts: Petitioner Benwaren and private respondent Crisologo were candidates for the
position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Tineg, Abra in the May 2004 elections.
The election returns from Precincts Nos. 8A and 16A were contested and became the
subject of pre-proclamation controversies before the COMELEC.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) excluded the election return of Precinct No.
16A of Tineg, Abra because of its irregularities and deferred the proclamation of the
winning candidate. The New MBC proclaimed private respondent Crisologo as mayor
based on the results of the remaining uncontested elections returns because the integrity
of the ballots in Precinct 16A have not been preserved and are no longer intact.
Petitioner filed a petition to annul the proclamation which was dismissed by the
COMELEC First Division and ruled that the proclamation was proper. It stated that if the
votes of Benwaren and Crisologo in Precinct No. 8A are added to their votes in the
uncontested precincts, Crisologo still emerges as the winner.

Petitioner contends that private respondent Crisologo’s proclamation is void, because it

was based on an incomplete canvass of votes. He claims that the New MBC hastily made
the proclamation despite the pending petition for exclusion of the election return of
Precinct No. 8A; hence, the votes contained in the election return of Precinct No. 8A and
the votes in Precinct No. 16A, which would materially affect the result of the election, were
not counted.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it illegally proclaimed private respondent Crisologo based on
incomplete canvass of votes?

Ruling: The SC held in the negative.

The factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field
are generally binding and conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave abuse and
none has been shown in this case.

The COMELEC ruled that based on Section 20 (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, earlier cited,
the proclamation of private respondent Crisologo was proper because the contested
returns would not adversely affect the results of the election. If the votes in Precinct No.
8A as reflected on the contested return are added to their votes in the uncontested
precincts, private respondent Crisologo still emerges the winner by a margin of six (6)
votes.

It bears noting that it was private respondent Crisologo, and not petitioner, who contested
the election return of Precinct No. 8A, so petitioner cannot claim to get more than what is
reflected in the election return of that precinct. The propriety of including or excluding the
said return, therefore, is thereby rendered moot and academic. Consequently, the
proclamation of respondent Crisologo has to be sustained.

In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc did not gravely abuse its discretion in
upholding the proclamation of private respondent.

Istarul vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170702, 16 June 2006

DOCTRINE: Execution pending appeal may be granted in election cases provided there
are good reasons therefore.
FACTS: Private respondent Maturan, petitioner Istarul, as well as Pacio, Atahal ran for the
position of mayor of the municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan. Maturan was eventually proclaimed
as the duly elected mayor. Private respondent Istarul and another losing candidate, Pacio,
separately filed election protests. The joint decision of the COMELEC annulled the proclamation
of Maturan and declared petitioner Istarul as the duly elected mayor.

Istarul filed his Notice of Appeal. Private respondent Maturan filed his Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal. Thereafter, Istarul filed his Opposition thereto. After the hearing, COMELEC
issued its Special Order granting Maturan’s Motion. He also issued a Writ of Execution on the
same day.

The Commission (First Division) issued a Temporary Restraining/Status Quo Ante Order. STcEIC

The COMELEC 1st Division issued a Resolution holding that there are no good reasons to
justify the issuance of the Special Order granting execution pending appeal. It further noted
in its Resolution, the Judge failed to state in the Joint Decision his explanation for crediting
certain ballots in favor of either of the parties, thus, violating the principle that a decision
should clearly show the basis for the judge's rulings. It then concluded that the decision is
seriously impaired and cannot be the source of a valid execution pending appeal.

Istarul was immediately ordered to cease and desist from performing his functions as mayor
of the municipality and Maturan was restored to his position as Mayor.

ISSUES:

Whether the COMELEC seriously erred in wantonly disregarding the jurisprudential rule on
execution pending appeal. (No)

Whether the COMELEC seriously erred in ignoring that rule that, as between two presumptive
winners, the proclamation made by the court prevails over that of the board of canvassers. (No)

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. E xecution pending appeal may be
granted in election cases provided there are good reasons therefore as held in a long line
of cases. Unfortunately, in this case, the COMELEC 1st Division and COMELEC En Banc
found the "good reasons" alleged by petitioner and relied on by the trial court to be
insufficient to justify the issuance of the special order granting execution pending appeal.
It is clear from the discussion in the petition that what are assigned as errors of the
COMELEC 1st Division and En Banc are merely alleged errors of judgment as they
question the wisdom and legal soundness of the COMELEC's resolutions and not the
jurisdiction of said body.

A perusal of the Joint Decision of the trial court, on its face, shows that the COMELEC's
observation that there was a total lack of explanation for the trial court's rulings for
crediting ballots or votes in favor of the candidates, is correct. Apparently, the supposed
victory of petitioner has not been clearly established. Hence, the COMELEC has a valid
basis for not considering the supposed will of the electorate as a "good reason" to allow
execution pending appeal. Having such a basis for its ruling, the COMELEC cannot be
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion. IHAcCS

SECOND ISSUE: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The COMELEC also did not
ignore the rule that, as between two presumptive winners, the proclamation made by the
trial court prevails over that of the board of canvassers. However, after finding that the trial
court's ruling regarding which candidate garnered the highest number of votes is unreliable,
the COMELEC applied the ruling in Camlian v. Comelec, where the Court agreed with
the COMELEC that:

. . . while it is true that when an election protest is filed the protestee is only considered a
presumptive winner until the protest is resolved, in the same way, when a protestant is adjudged
the winner by a court of law but the case is on appeal with the Commission, such appeal likewise
makes the protestant a presumptive winner and, unless meritorious grounds exist to execute
judgment pending appeal, it is illogical to replace a presumptive winner proclaimed by a
board of canvassers, by another presumptive winner so declared by a court. It needs no
explanation that when a protestant is installed as a winner pending appeal, that in itself is
already disruptive of the government service. How much more if the protestee wins the
appeal in which case he will have to be reinstalled again to the office which he was forced to
vacate?

Villamor vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 169865, 21 July 2006

DOCTRINE: The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except by analogy
or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient Section 256 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly state that no
motion for reconsideration should be entertained. Thus, there is no room to apply the rules of
ordinary civil procedure suppletorily. Nor can resort be made by the trial court to Section 5(g) of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to sustain its actions. The trial court did not conform to law and
justice when it granted the motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.
FACTS:
Petitioner Villamor was proclaimed as mayor of Carmen, Cebu by the MBC in the elections held
on May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao. Respondent filed a
petition to annul the proclamation alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its
proceedings.
Subsequently, he filed an election protest with the RTC. The trial court dismissed the election
protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one-day late. On a motion for reconsideration,
the RTC granted the same and found that the election protest was actually filed on time.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC, but the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. COMELEC En Bac denied the petitioner’s MR.
In the meantime, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the respondent’s petition to annul
the proclamation of petitioner.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court can act on a motion for reconsideration in an election protest.

RULING:
NO. Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the trial court cannot entertain a
motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal officers filed
by the aggrieved party. However, the latter may appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
COMELEC) within five days after the receipt of a copy of the decision. Likewise, Section 19, Rule
35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure implementing the abovementioned Section 256
provides:
Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the Court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall
become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent received a copy of the Order dismissing the election protest for lack of jurisdiction on
June 25, 2004. Thus, respondent had until June 30, 2004 within which to file an appeal with the
COMELEC but failed to do so. Instead, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which is a
prohibited pleading. As such, it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. However, as
ruled in the case of Veloria vs. COMELEC, since a "motion for reconsideration" is prohibited under
Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166143-47, 20 November 2006
Tan v. Comelec

G.R. Nos. 166143-47. November 20, 2006

Doctrine:

In a Section 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period did not start to run at
all, the filing of a Section 250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from proclamation
is not late. On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party seeking
annulment must file the petition before the expiration of the 10-day period.

There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of

pre-proclamation controversies and elections protests. Allowing the simultaneous
prosecution scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies
and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible in
each case and the objective each seeks to achieve.

Facts:

Petitioners Tan and Burahan filed 4 petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections,
alleging systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes, and machinations allegedly perpetrated by
private respondents Loong and Sahidulla and their supporters resulting in massive
disenfranchisement of voters.

Even before the filing of the 4 petitions, Tan had filed 4 other petitions, one before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Parang, Sulu for the exclusion of election returns from
several precincts, and the other three before the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to
exclude certificates of canvass from Luuk, Panamao, and Parang. All these petitions were
dismissed by the Boards concerned, prompting Tan to file an appeal with the COMELEC First
Division which issued an Order directing the concerned boards of canvassers to suspend their
proceedings and to refrain from proclaiming any winning candidate.

However, on the same day that the COMELEC First Division issued the said Order, private
respondent Loong was proclaimed the winning governor of Sulu and he assumed office. This
prompted petitioner Tan to file a Petition for Annulment of the Proclamation with the COMELEC
First Division. COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Loong.

COMELEC en banc dismissed all petitions to declare a failure of elections. Jikiri converted his
petition ad cautelam into a regular election protest he previously filed against Loong.

Issue:

Whether Jikiri was not able to file election protest against Loong on time.

Whether the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction to entertain simultaneously pre-
proclamation controversies and electoral protests.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

SECTION 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation. — The
filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate
shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto
proceedings.

The cited provision contemplates 2 points of reference: pre and post proclamation, under
which either of the petitions referred to therein is filed. Before the proclamation, what ought to be
filed is a petition to “suspend” or stop an impending proclamation. After the proclamation, an
adverse party should file a petition to “annul” or undo a proclamation made. Pre-proclamation
controversies partake of the nature of petitions to suspend. The purpose for allowing pre-
proclamation controversies, the filing of which is covered by the aforequoted Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is to nip in the bud the occurrence of what, in election practice, is referred
to as “grab the proclamation and prolong the protest” situation. A petition to suspend tolls the 10-
day period for filing an election protest from running, while a petition to annul interrupts the running
of the period. In other words, in a Section 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period did
not start to run at all, the filing of a Section 250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from
proclamation is not late. On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party seeking
annulment must file the petition before the expiration of the 10-day period.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the filing of the election protest ad cautelam on July
19, 2004 or fifty-six (56) days after the May 24, 2004 proclamation was contextually on time. This
is because the 10-day reglementary period to file such protest — which ordinarily would
have expired on June 3, 2004 — did not start to run at all.

There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of pre-

proclamation controversies and elections protests. Allowing the simultaneous prosecution
scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies and election protests
differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible in each case and the objective
each seeks to achieve. Moreover, the Court, under certain circumstances, even encourages the
reinforcement of a pre-proclamation suit with an election protest.
 Cerbo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168411, 15 February 2007

DOCTRINE: It is well settled that once a candidate is proclaimed as representative, the

opponent’s recourse is to file an election protest with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal which has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives,
and this holds true even if there is an allegation of nullity of proclamation.

FACTS: Petitioners Bienvenido A. Cerbo, Jr., Angelo O. Montilla, and Geronimo P.

Arzagon were candidates for representative, governor and vice-governor, respectively of
Sultan Kudarat in the May 10, 2004 elections.

Respondents Suharto T. Mangudadatu, Datu Pax S. Mangudadatu and Donato A. Ligo,

on the other hand, were petitioners’ respective opponents for the same positions.

During the provincial canvassing of the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (COCs) by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), petitioners objected to the inclusion of the COC
of the Municipality of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. The PBOC overruled the objection on
May 15, 2004.

The petitioners then filed with the PBOC a "Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors
and/or to Exclude Certificates of Canvass of the Municipalities of Palimbang and Lutayan,
Sultan Kudarat." In said petition, petitioners prayed that the proclamation of the
congressional and local positions be held in abeyance until such time that the manifest
errors were rectified. The PBOC verbally denied the petition and no appeal was taken
therefrom.

The PBOC thus proclaimed, also on May 16, 2004, respondents as winners of the
contested positions.

The petitioners filed with the COMELEC a "Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and
Annulment of Proclamation" alleging, inter alia, that the proclamation of respondents was
surreptitious, haphazard and illegal as the same was made despite the filing with the
PBOC of a notice of appeal and of a petition for correction of manifest errors.

The COMELEC First Division suspended the effects of the proclamation of respondents
after finding that the "documents submitted by petitioners, though convincing, cannot,
without an incisive look and investigation, warrant outright annulment of the Statement of
Votes or of the questioned Certificates of Canvass."
On the other hand, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioners’ petition for
correction of manifest errors. While the petitioners manifested their intent to appeal, no
appeal was actually made and perfected. Because of this failure to appeal, the ruling of
the board including the COC of Palimbang in the provincial canvass has become final.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it closed its eyes to the evidence on record and in faulting
petitioners for their alleged procedural lapses [NO]

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. With respect to petitioner Cerbo
who ran for the position of congressman, the COMELEC indeed had no jurisdiction over
his petition, his opponent respondent Suharto T. Mangudadatu having been proclaimed
as such. It is well settled that once a candidate is proclaimed as representative, the
opponent’s recourse is to file an election protest with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal which has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, and this holds true even if there is an allegation of nullity of
proclamation.

As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes
the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this rule
is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or
petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.

Under Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules, a petition for correction of manifest
errors filed directly with the COMELEC should thus pertain to errors that could not have
been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner
Arzagon, however, together with the other petitioners, initially filed a petition for correction
of manifest errors with the PBOC, evidently showing that the errors sought to be corrected
were discovered during the canvassing.

On his failure to appeal the PBOC’s dismissal of his petition for correction of manifest
errors, petitioner Arzagon claims that the PBOC did not indicate the reasons therefor,
hence, he was prevented from appealing the same.

Even if, however, this Court may, in the interest of justice, treat the petition for correction
of manifest errors filed with the COMELEC as an appeal from the PBOC’s verbal ruling
denying petitioners’ similar petition filed with the latter, its dismissal by the COMELEC is
in order.

Specifically with respect to the Palimbang COC, since its exclusion had earlier been
denied by the PBOC, and the denial was not appealed, it had become final. The
subsequent filing of a petition for correction of manifest errors in the Palimbang COC with
the PBOC appeared to be just an attempt to substitute the lost appeal, which is
impermissible.
 Delos Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170070, 28 February 2007

Doctrine: It is true that in election contests, where the correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate is at issue, the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence, unless the same
cannot be produced, in which case the election returns would be the best evidence. And when
the handwritings on the ballots are the subject matter of the election contest, the best evidence
would be the ballots themselves as the Comelec can examine or compare these handwritings
even without assistance from handwriting experts.

However, in election contests involving the issue of whether multiple ballots were written by one
person, it is not enough for the Comelec to merely rely on said ballots. Assisted voting authorized
under Section 196 of BP 881 is a reality which must be recognized and given effect.

Facts: In the July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections, Delos Reyes and Vasquez vied for the position
of Barangay Chairman of Barangay 414, Zone 42, District 4, Manila (Barangay 414). After the
canvass of votes, Vasquez was proclaimed duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay 414
with 181 votes as against Delos Reyes's 32 votes.

Delos Reyes filed with the MeTC a Petition for Recount of votes in all the precincts on the ground
that several votes in his favor were read and counted for Vasquez and that the latter employed
threat and intimidation against Delos Reyes's watchers in order to perpetrate election
irregularities.

Revision proceedings were conducted by a Committee. The Committee observed that two of the
three ballot boxes coming from the disputed precincts had padlocks to which none of the three
keys provided by the Comelec District Office of Manila fit. However, the Committee found nothing
more remarkable about the outward physical appearance of the ballot boxes and decided to
forcibly open the same. Inside were election paraphernalia in good condition, with Comelec paper
seals still intact.

However, Vasquez contested 106 ballots with votes cast for Delos Reyes while the latter
contested 67 ballots containing votes for Vasquez. Their objections were based on the grounds
that some ballots were marked while some contained votes written by only one person.

The MeTC issued a Decision, declaring Delos Reyes the winner. The MeTC based its Decision
on the result of the physical recount conducted by the Revision Committee where Delos Reyes
garnered 113 votes and Vasquez, 100 votes. It did not reject any of the contested ballots for it
found no evidence to invalidate them.

The Comelec Second Division, upon examination of all the contested ballots, reversed the
findings and conclusion of the MeTC. The results show protestee-appellant Vasquez the winner
over protestant-appellee Delos Reyes with a plurality of thirty (30) votes.

Issue:

1. Whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack and excess of its
jurisdiction in sweepingly invalidating forty-five (45) valid ballots cast by the innocent
voters for the petitioner
2. Whether the Comelec gravely erred in finding that the twenty-one (21) invalid ballots were
found to be valid for private respondent despite the very obvious markings of three
successive stars written after his name
Ruling: The petition is partly meritorious.

The will of the voters is embodied in the ballots. To ascertain and carry out such will, their ballots
must be read and appreciated according to the rule that every ballot is presumed valid unless
there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. On this matter, the findings of the Comelec,
which exercises original and appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective officials
in the regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay levels, are accorded great respect, if not
finality by the Court. The documents and evidence upon which the Comelec relies for its
resolution, and the manner it appreciates said documents and evidence in respect of their
sufficiency are ordinarily beyond our scrutiny for the latter is an independent Constitutional body
of a level higher than statutory administrative bodies.

Comelec's reliance on only one aspect of the handwritings on the ballots is tenuous. In Silverio v.
Clamor, the Court reversed the trial court which had invalidated certain ballots merely on a finding
that the writings thereon have the same general appearance and pictorial effect.

In the present case, the finding of the Comelec fell short of the foregoing standard. It saw no
differences in the handwritings on the 44 ballots yet it is silent on whether it discerned in the ballots
similarities and divergences in the class and individual characteristics of the handwritings as
would conclusively establish that these were made by the same hand. There was therefore an
incompleteness in Comelec's appreciation of the ballots that it acted prematurely when it declared
said ballots invalid.

In Torres v. HRET, the Court affirmed the procedure adopted by and the findings of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal on certain ballots which were disputed for having been
written by one person. In De Guzman v. Comelec, the Court overturned the Comelec which had
perfunctorily rejected seven ballots cast in favor of petitioner therein for having been written by
one person.

In the present case, Comelec's appreciation of the 44 contested ballots was deficient for it referred
exclusively to said ballots without consulting the Minutes of Voting or the Computerized Voter's
List to verify the presence of assisted voters in the contested precincts. Thus, Comelec acted with
grave abuse of discretion in overturning the presumption of validity of the 44 ballots and in
declaring them invalid based on an incomplete appreciation of said ballots.

The Court is barred from ruling on the validity of the 44 contested ballots and restoring them in
favor of Delos Reyes. Judicious resolution of this issue will entail scrutiny of the ballots and the
Minutes of the Voting, or if not available, the Computerized Voter's List, over which the Comelec
has primary jurisdiction. This matter should therefore be remanded to the Comelec for expeditious
and complete evaluation of the subject ballots and Minutes of the Voting or Computerized Voter's
List.

As to the ruling of the Comelec sustaining the validity of the 21 ballots known as Exhibits "C-3" to
"C-23" in favor of Vasquez, the Court affirms the same. It is axiomatic that a ballot should be
counted if it is marked afterwards by some person or persons other than the voter himself for such
unauthorized changes should not be permitted to destroy the will of said voter.
 Tugade vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171063, 2 March 2007

Facts:
Eduard V. Tugade and Florencio P. Agustin were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay of San Raymundo, Balungao, Pangasinan during the July 2002 synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan elections. The canvass shows that Tugade won over Agustin by just
1 vote. Hence, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tugade as winner. Agustin filed a protest
before the MTC of Balungao questioning the results of the votes cast and counted in Precinct No.
60-A/60-A-1. Tugade opposed saying that the conduct and final outcome of the election have
been regular, credible and in accordance with law. MTC, after the submission of the Revision
Committee report, declared Agustin as the winner with a lead of 4 votes. Tugade filed an appeal
notice while Agustin filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Motion denied.
COMELEC 2nd division declared that the election resulted into a tie and thereby reversed
and set aside the MTC decision. It likewise ordered the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
hold a special meeting for the drawing of lots to determine the winner of the election. Tugade filed
an MR which was denied. Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.

Issue:
Whether the COMELEC erred in ordering the reconvention of the Board of Canvassers to
hold a special meeting for drawing of lots to determine the winning candidate by luck

Held:
No. COMELEC En Banc, in ordering the immediate implementation of the Resolution
issued by its Second Division for the drawing of lots of the herein parties, acted in accordance
with Section 240 of Batas Pambansa 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines which provides:

Sec. 240. Election resulting in tie. - Whenever it shall appear from the canvass that two or more
candidates have received an equal and highest number of votes, or in cases where two or more
candidates are to be elected for the same position and two or more candidates received the same
number of votes for the last place in the number to be elected, the board of canvassers, after
recording this fact in its minutes, shall by resolution, upon five days notice to all the tied
candidates, hold a special public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall proceed to the
drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as elected the candidates who
may be favored by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to assume office
in the same manner as if he had been elected by plurality of vote. The board of canvassers shall
forthwith make a certificate stating the name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and
his proclamation on the basis thereof.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to contest the
election.

Abubakar vs. HRET, G.R. No. 173310, 7 March 2007

DOCTRINE: In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of
votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves.
FACTS: In the May 10, 2004 elections, Abubakar and Jaafar were among the candidates for
Representative in the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province. On May 22, 2004, Abubakar was
proclaimed winner by a margin of 2,040 votes.

On June 1, 2004, Jaafar filed an election protest with the HRET impugning the election results in
ten municipalities alleging that that fraudulent and illegal acts were employed by Abubakar, his
supporters, the Board of Election Inspectors and some military personnel by preventing his
(Jaafar's) supporters from voting through the use of force, violence, intimidation, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation and other machinations.

Abubakar filed an Answer with Counter Protest denying Jaafar's allegations and alleged that
Jaafar committed illegal reading and counting of ballots; presence of multiple ballots prepared by
either one and the same person or individual ballots accomplished by two persons; illegal reading
and counting of fake, unauthorized or unofficial ballots containing the protestant's name;
misreading and/or misappreciation of ballots in protestant's favor; illegally considering the votes
cast for protestee as stray votes; and prevalent erroneous counting in the election returns of the
protestee's votes as votes for protestant.

November 15, 2004 to December 8, 2004, HRET, through its representatives, collected all ballot
boxes of the involved precincts in the protest and counter-protest, and some election documents
and paraphernalia from the municipalities of Tawi-Tawi Province. Upon their return to office,
HRET's representatives reported that the concerned election officers in the municipalities failed
to turn over the Election Day Computerized Voters Lists and Book of Voters and merely
surrendered the Book of Application Forms for Registration of Voters for the 2004 elections.

On May 31, 2006, Abubakar filed a Motion (1) to Conduct Technical Examination and (2) to
Photocopy Protestee's Ballots but such was denied. Abubakar's motion for reconsideration was
denied by HRET in Resolution No. 06-053 dated June 29, 2006

On June 30, 2006, HRET rendered its decision on the election protest declaring Jaafar as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province. Thus, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Decision which was subsequently denied by HRET.

In G.R. No. 173310, the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. 173310 is the interlocutory order
of HRET or Resolution No. 06-047 denying petitioner's motion to conduct a technical examination
and to photocopy his ballots, and Resolution No. 06-053, which denied his motion for
reconsideration.

In G.R. No. 173609 subject matter of G.R. No. 173609 is the Decision of HRET in the election
protest.

ISSUES:
1. G.R. No. 173310 - whether HRET erred in issuing interlocutory order of HRET or Resolution
No. 06-047 denying petitioner's motion to conduct a technical examination and to photocopy his
ballots

2. G.R. No. 173609 - whether HRET acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 30, 2006, which annulled petitioner's proclamation
and declared private respondent as the duly elected Representative of Tawi-Tawi Province.

RULING:
G.R. No. 173310 - The Court held in the negative. It must be pointed out that the 7,966 ballots
for petitioner were rejected since they were considered to be written by one person either because
the Minutes of Voting in the pertinent precincts did not indicate the existence of assisted-voting
or did not contain the names of the illiterate voters and their assistors in violation of the HRET
rules and guidelines.

Further, HRET rendered its decision on the election protest on June 30, 2006, and petitioner
received a copy of the decision onthe same date. Thus, when petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari on July 18, 2006 questioning the interlocutory orders of HRET issued in the main case,
that is, the election protest that had already been decided, the petition had become moot.

G.R. No. 173609 - the Court held in the negative. In its Resolution dated August 3, 2006, HRET
satisfactorily explained that it conducted its regular meeting on June 29, 2006 and deliberated
and voted on the challenged decision with six members present, and signed by five members.
The decision was, however, given for promulgation on June 30, 2006 because one member, who
was present during the meeting, left due to an emergency without having been able to affix his
signature on the decision. After the consent of said member to issue the decision even
without his signature was obtained on June 30, 2006, the decision was forthwith given to
the Secretary of the Tribunal for promulgation and release to the parties.

The Court agrees with the Tribunal that the duty of the Secretary of the Tribunal to indicate the
date of promulgation and thereafter serve copies thereof to the parties as mandated by Rule 72
of the HRET Rules is ministerial after the decision, signed by the members present, is delivered
and filed with the Secretary of the Tribunal so that copies thereof can be furnished to the parties
involved.

Second, petitioner erred when he contended that the testimonies of the nineteen Chairpersons of
the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) were wrongfully disregarded. As between the testimonies
of the BEI Chairpersons and HRET's actual findings per appreciation of the ballots and the
documents inside the ballot boxes, particularly the entries in the Minutes of Voting, HRET correctly
gave the latter greater weight. As stated by HRET, the presumption of regularity in the public
official's performance of his duty holds true only when it is not found to be inconsistent with the
facts.
Third, petitioner contends that invalidating 7,966 ballots in his favor, which were allegedly written-
by-one person, goes against the presumption of validity of votes and, in effect, 7,966 voters were
unable to vote. The Court did not give merit to this as HRET aptly stated that the general rule that
all ballots are presumed to be valid is applied when there is doubt in their appreciation, but not
when clear and sufficient reasons justify the nullification of the ballots. The 7,966 votes were
correctly invalidated as written by one person because aside from the observation that the ballots
bore similar/identical handwritings, the Minutes of Voting in numerous precincts had no entries as
to the names of the illiterate voters and their respective assistors, contrary to the aforecited rule
applied by HRET.

Fourth, petitioner contends that since there is unusual discrepancy of votes stated in the election
returns and physical count of ballots, the election returns and not the ballots should prevail.
Moreover, if more than 50% of the votes are rejected, then election returns, not the ballots should
be used to establish the votes of parties. The Court did not give merit to petitioner’s contention as
It ruled that HRET correctly considered the examination of ballots as the best evidence. In this
case, the ballots were available and their integrity was unquestioned. In an election contest where
what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves.

Rosal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253, 16 March 2007

DOCTRINE:

1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns
unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care which
precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution;

(2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is
on the protestant;

(3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such
substantial compliance with the requirements of thatmode as would provide assurance that the
ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of
achieving that end;

(4) it is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on
the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof
shifts to the protestee and

(5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court orComelec that the integrity of the ballots has
been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recountand not as reflected in the
election returns.

FACTS:

Petitioner Noel E. Rosal and private respondent Michael Victor C. Imperial were candidates for
mayor of Legaspi City in the May 10, 2004 elections. After the counting and canvassing of votes,
petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Legaspi City, having received 44,792 votes
over private respondents 33,747 and thereby winning by a margin of 11,045 votes.
On May 24, 2004, private respondent instituted a petition to annul the proclamation,[1] assailing
the canvass of election returns in the 520 precincts that had functioned during the election. On
July 6, 2004, the case was superseded by an election protest filed by private respondent with the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) contesting the results of the election in all 520 precincts on
the grounds of miscounting, misreading and misappreciation of votes, substitute voting,
disenfranchisement of voters, substitution and padding of votes, and other alleged irregularities.

After an initial hearing on private respondents' protest and petitioner's answer, the Second
Division issued on November 17, 2004 an order directing the collection of the ballot boxes from
the contested precincts and their delivery to the Comelec.

Revision of the contested ballots commenced in mid-January of 2005[3] and concluded on

February 2, 2005. The revision report indicated a reduction in petitioners vote count from 44,792
votes to 39,752 and an increase in that of private respondents from 22,474 to 39,184 votes.
Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for technical examination of contested ballots on the
ground that thousands of ballots revised by the revision committees were actually spurious ballots
that had been stuffed inside the ballot boxes sometime after the counting of votes but before the
revision proceedings. The Second Division denied the motion.

On March 17, 2005, the first hearing set for the presentation of his evidence, petitioner was
directed to pre-mark his exhibits and formalize his intention to have his witnesses subpoenaed.

n an order dated April 25, 2005,[4] the Second Division ruled that the testimonies of the proposed
witnesses were unnecessary inasmuch as the Comelec had the authority and wherewithal to
determine by itself the ballots authenticity and, for that reason, denied the motion and directed
petitioner to file forthwith his formal offer of evidence.

Asserting his right to present evidence in his defense, petitioner filed on May 6, 2005 a motion for
reconsideration of the April 25, 2005 order. In an order dated May 12, 2005, the Second Division
denied the motion.

On June 15, 2005, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari[7] under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (docketed as G.R. No. 1628253) assailing the April 25 and May 12, 2005 orders
of the Comelec's Second Division for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Meanwhile, the Second Division continued with the proceedings and, following the submission of
the parties memoranda, considered EPC No. 2004-61 submitted for resolution.

In a resolution dated January 23, 2006, the Second Division then composed of only two sitting
members, namely, Presiding Commissioner Mehol Sadain (now retired) and Commissioner
Florentino Tuason, Jr. declared private respondent Imperial the winning candidate for mayor of
Legaspi City and ordered petitioner Rosal to vacate said office and turn it over peacefully to private
respondent.

On January 30, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions
resolution. The motion was denied by the Comelec en banc in a resolution dated May 29, 2006.
In due time, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
Comelec en banc resolution. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172741 and consolidated with
G.R. No. 168253.
ISSUE:

Whether an interlocutory order rendered by a division of the Comelec, cannot be assailed by

means of a special civil action for certiorari, as only final orders of the Comelec en banc can be
brought to the Supreme Court by that mode.

RULING:

Yes, an interlocutory order rendered by a division of the Comelec, can be assailed by means of
a special civil action for certiorari. The Court cited Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Moreso, Kho tells us that an interlocutory order of a Comelec division should be challenged at the
first instance through a proper motion, such as a motion for reconsideration, filed with the division
that rendered the order. If that fails and no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy (such as
recourse to the Comelec en banc) is available, the party aggrieved by the interlocutory order may
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by means of a petition for certiorari on the ground that
the order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

As made abundantly clear by the foregoing provisions, the mode of preserving the ballots in this
jurisdiction is for these to be stored safely in sealed and padlocked ballot boxes which, once
closed, shall remain unopened unless otherwise ordered by the Comelec in cases allowed by law.

We summarize the foregoing doctrines: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count
as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been
preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change,
abstraction or substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is
enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that
mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight
deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; (4) it is only when the protestant has
shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the
burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee and (5) only if
it appears to the satisfaction of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election
returns.
 Mutilan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171248, 2 April 2007
Dimayuga vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174763, 24 April 2007
DOCTRINE: The Court declared that it has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning
the interlocutory orders of a division of the Commission on Elections, such as an order providing
for the denial of a party’s special and affirmative defenses. “The proper remedy,” according to the
Court, “is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its
merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative
defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the division upon
the merits.” Neither would it have certiorari jurisdiction even over final resolutions of division of
the Commission.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty post of the Municipality of San
Pascual, Batangas in the May 10, 2004 elections. Private respondent won with 9,005 votes as
against the petitioner's 7,775 votes or a difference of 1,230 votes in favor of the former.

Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, of Batangas City
based on the following grounds: a) misreading or miscounting of ballots; b) substitute voting; c)
disenfranchisement of voters when they failed to register; d) clustering of precincts; and e)
erasures in the Statement of Votes by Precinct. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring
petitioner the winner by 41 votes after invalidating a total of 1,192 ballots for private respondent.
Private respondent filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal. On the same date, petitioner filed
his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Trial court issued a Special Order granting execution
pending appeal, hence, a Writ of Execution was subsequently issued.

The private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the COMELEC, Second Division, assailing the
May 2, 2006 Special Order of the trial court. He alleged that: a) no good reason was cited to justify
the issuance of the Special Order and the Writ of Execution; b) the Writ of Execution did not
comply with the requirements of the Special Order since it was issued without the required bond
of P100,000; c) there is yet no final determination that a "majority" of the electorate of San
Pascual, Batangas really voted for petitioner; and d) and that there is no certainty that the
appealed decision of the trial court would be affirmed.

The COMELEC, Second Division, issued an Order granting private respondent's prayer for the
issuance of a TRO. On May 20, 2006, petitioner filed his motion to lift the temporary restraining
order. In his Manifestation and Motion filed on May 25, 2006, petitioner intimated his re-
assumption to the Office of the Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas on May 29, 2006 in view of the
expiration of the injunctive writ issued on May 5, 2006. On July 4, 2006, the COMELEC, Second
Division, issued a Resolution denying the petition, and
affirming the Special Order of the Trial Court. On July 5, 2006, private respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the above resolution, and the case was elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. On September 29, 2006, petitioner and his supporters occupied the Mayor's Office of the
municipality by forcibly opening the door and breaking its locks. This resulted to a complicated
situation wherein there were two persons, petitioner and private respondent, discharging the
duties, powers and functions of the Mayor.

The private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Resolution of the Issue as to Whether the
Special Order of Execution Pending Appeal Could be Executed Pending Resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Motion for Immediate Resolution of the Pending Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC en banc issued an Order granting the above Motion. In the meantime that the
Commission en banc is resolving the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and the case on the
merits, the Commission en banc hereby issues a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER directing both
parties to observe and maintain the status of the case prior to the promulgation of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in which case, private respondent Antonio A. Dimayuga is hereby
directed to cease and desist from performing the duties and functions of the Mayor of San
Pascual, Batangas and to peacefully vacate the said post in favor of petitioner Mario V.
Magsaysay.

The said status quo ante was ordered by this Commission en banc pending resolution of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration (of the adverse decision of the Second Division of this
Commission) based on serious allegations of errors apparently committed by the presiding judge
of the court a quo, citing the record of the case as prima facie evidence, in order to afford this
Commission en banc sufficient time to study the voluminous record of the case and render a just
judgment to both parties. However, the sixty-day period has proven to be insufficient for the
Commission en banc to complete its preparation of this resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration in view of the thorough review and analysis that it has had to conduct of each
and every one of the many ballots contested by the parties.

The Commission en banc finds the necessity of further extending the implementation of said order
of execution pending appeal issued by the court a quo, relying on Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and on the suspension of its rules of procedure "in the interest of
justice" as provided for in Section 4, Rule 1 of said Rules.

ISSUE: Whether t the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Status Quo Ante Order and/or Resolution.

RULING: The Court held in the negative. The petition should be dismissed for the following
reasons:
One, the assailed Order of the COMELEC en banc was issued pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that "a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling."

Thus, the above motion that was timely filed by private respondent, and which the COMELEC en
banc did not find to be pro forma, suspended the implementation of the Resolution issued by the
COMELEC, Second Division, on July 4, 2006. Given this, the COMELEC en banc did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and its issuance of the status quo ante order was proper under the
circumstances.

Two, the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC as prescribed in Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution refers to final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en
banc, in accordance with the pronouncement in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections. Hence,
the status quo ante order of the COMELEC en banc, being in the nature of an interlocutory order,
will not be reviewed herein by this Court.
 Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007
DOCTRINE:

- Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
- Where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections,
the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Unico were the candidates for the lone congressional district
of Camarines Norte. Petitioner alleges that during the canvassing of the election returns, her
counsel raised numerous errors and discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts
in a municipality.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) gave petitioner’s counsel an opportunity to

prove her allegations. But before she could do such, the MBC forwarded the results of its canvass
to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC). PBC denied the motion of petitioner to suspend the
proceedings as it ruled that pre-proclamation controversies were not allowed for the election of
House members. PBC had no authority to direct the MBC to reconvene and receive petitioner’s
objections and documents and re-canvass the election returns.

The PBC then proclaimed private respondent as representative-elect leading petitioner to

file with the COMELEC a petition. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit; the
decision was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc, hence this case.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is deprived of due process.

RULING:

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, 10 the Court held that:

. . . The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the
Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over
election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress). . . .
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of
the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and
taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress);
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's
Petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and
alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed
to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET
 San Juan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170908, 24 August 2007
Doctrine:
Election cases must be heard and decided first in division, and any motion for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The procedure for disposition of motions
for reconsideration in the Comelec is found in Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Facts:
Petitioner San Juan and private respondent Selpo were the candidates for Punong Barangay of
San Ramon, Tinambac, Camarines Sur during the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Based on the certificates of canvass of votes and proclamation
of winning candidates, the Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed San Juan the duly elected
Punong Barangay. Thereafter, on July 22, 2002, Selpo filed a petition before the MTC impugning
the correctness of the certificates of canvass and praying for a revision of the ballots cast in these
precincts.

The MTC, noting that Selpo and San Juan had both agreed to a recount, ordered a recount or
revision and directed the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac to deposit in court the ballot boxes.
Thereafter, the MTC proclaimed Selpo the duly elected Barangay Captain and declared the
proclamation of San Juan null and void. San Juan appealed to the Comelec but his appeal was
dismissed.

Issue:
W/N the Comelec First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or lack of jurisdiction in
denying San Juan's Motion for Reconsideration (NO)

Ruling:
The Court held in the negative.

Election cases must be heard and decided first in division, and any motion for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The procedure for disposition of motions
for reconsideration in the Comelec is found in Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

In the present case, San Juan's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time. His lead counsel
received a copy of the October 25, 2004 Resolution of the Comelec First Division on November
3, 2004, yet he filed his Motion for Reconsideration only on November 16, 2004. Under Sec. 2,
Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution,
order or ruling of a Division must be filed within five days from promulgation thereof. The Motion
for Reconsideration having been filed out of time, its dismissal by the Comelec First Division was
valid and proper, not a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the Court find no need, in this case,
to forward the matter to the Comelec en banc where the result will be the same.

Mañago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167224, 21 September 2007

Petitioner Nolito Mañago and private respondent Nicanor Bigay both ran for Punong Barangay
of Barangay Quinapaguian, Mercedes, Camarines Norte, during the Sangguniang Kabataan
and Barangay Elections held on July 15, 2002. The results showed Mañago won with 156 votes
over Bigay who garnered 155 votes. Mañago was proclaimed Punong Barangay. Bigay then
protested Mañago's proclamation in an election protest before the MTC where he prayed for a
judicial recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 71-A.

Issue:

Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in affirming that Bigay is the
duly elected Punong Barangay?

Ruling:

The Court held in the negative. Clearly, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in taking
cognizance of the election protest, considering the fact regarding estoppel on petitioner's part,
as well as the COMELEC's mandate to ascertain the true victor in election contests. An act of a
court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the
same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. There was no such abuse committed by the
COMELEC here.

Pagaduan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172278, 29 March 2008

DOCTRINES:
1. The settled principle is that “unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave
abuse of discretion, its decision will not be interfered with by this Court.”
2. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters
within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.

FACTS: Protestant [petitioner] and protestee [respondent Custodio] were candidates for
Municipal Mayor of Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Zaragoza
proclaimed Arturo Custodio as winner having obtained a total number of six thousand five hundred
ninety five (6,595) votes as against the six thousand one hundred forty (6,140) votes of Lydia
Pagaduan or with a margin of four hundred fifty five (455) votes.

On 21 May 2004, Pagaduan filed an election protest case before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 24. In her petition, Pagaduan contests the results of elections in the
following twenty-three (23) precincts: x x x alleging fraud, irregularities and misappreciation in the
counting of votes by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI's).

Protestee, in his Answer, denied the above allegations of the protestant and move for the
dismissal of the protest case. Pending decision by the court a quo, protestee died. Protestee's
counsel moved for the dismissal of the protest case claiming that the death of the protestee
renders this case moot and academic. This motion was denied by the court ruling that Teodorico
B. Cornes (Cornes for brevity), the vice-mayor elect, may intervene. Cornes filed his Answer in
Intervention. The court ordered the Revision of the ballots.
On 4 April 2005, the court a quo, rendered a decision declaring and proclaiming protestant Lydia
R. Pagaduan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. Unsatisfied, Cornes
appealed to this Commission. the First Division reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court and ruled in favor of protestee having obtained a total number six thousand four hundred
seventy three (6,473) votes as against the six thousand one hundred thirty two (6,132) votes of
protestant. Vice-Mayor Cornes, Jr., was therefore installed as mayor pursuant to Section 44 of
the Local Government Code.”

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration and the case was referred to the COMELEC En Banc.
The latter body then promulgated a Resolution denying petitionerÊs motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved by the foregoing Resolutions of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc, petitioner comes before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not it was proper for the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc to declare Vice-Mayor elect Teodorico B. Cornes, Jr. as Mayor.

RULING: Petitioner's assetations are unmeritorious. The settled principle is that “unless the
COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision will not be
interfered with by this Court.”

In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present satisfactory proof that the COMELEC First
Division or the COMELEC En Banc acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner
which would warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

First of all, it is inaccurate to say that the COMELEC did not take into consideration the finding of
the trial court that some of the ballot boxes had missing padlocks and/or broken or destroyed
seals. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within
an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. In this case, there is
no sufficient evidence to overturn said presumptions.

The COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc likewise cannot be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the Vice-Mayor elect, Teodorico B. Cornes, Jr.,
succeeded to the office of the Municipal Mayor upon the death of the duly elected mayor. The
COMELEC was merely applying the provisions of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to
wit:

“SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and
ViceMayor.·

a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vicemayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sang-gunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members
according to their ranking as defined herein.”

Mangudadatu vs. HRET, G.R. No. 179813, 18 December 2008

DOCTRINE
FACTS

Muslimin Sema and Rodel Mañara were two (2) of the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of
Cotabato City during the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order dismissing one hundred-sixteen (116) petitions for
exclusion of election returns including the petitions for exclusion filed by Sema with respect to
thirteen (13) of the thirty (30) contested returns he filed.

On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order dismissing fifty-five (55) petitions for exclusion
of election returns including Sema’s petitions for exclusion with respect to fifteen (15) of the
remaining seventeen (17) contested returns. In effect then, only two (2) election returns remained
contested.

CBC issued another order dated May 29, 1998, this time granting Sema’s petition for exclusion
of the thirty (30) election returns.

Upon the resumption of the canvassing in the evening of May 31, 1998, counsel for Mañara again
called the CBC’s attention to the fact that it had already ruled upon and dismissed the petition for
exclusion of Sema in its Orders dated May 22, and 23, 1998, and which orders had already
become final and executory because no appeal was taken therefrom. But the CBC ignored the
manifestation, explaining that the previous orders did not include Sema’s objections.
Consequently, Mañara’s counsel manifested his intent to appeal from the May 29, 1998 order of
the CBC.

COMELEC issued an order to the effects and consequences of the proclamation for the position
of City Mayor per Certificate of Canvas of Votes and Proclamation dated May 31, 1998 issued by
the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City is SUSPENDED.

ISSUE

WON the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998 granting Sema’s 28 petitions for
exclusion of the 30 contested election returns is null and void for having been issued after its
earlier ruling embodied in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the exclusion of the same
returns had already become final.

RULING

Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and void as it was based on an incomplete canvass.
An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. A proclamation
made where the contested returns set aside will affect the result of the election and the board of
canvassers proceeded to proclaim without the authority from the COMELEC is null and void.

Pecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182865, 24 December 2008

DOCTRINE: Decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial
evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given
similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when
attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term
of the contested elective office, of the case.

FACTS: Romulo Pecson (Pecson) and Lyndon Cunanan (Cunanan) were candidates for the
mayoralty position in the May 2007 elections. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate (a
total of 12,592 votes) garnering 61 votes higher than that of Pecson’s (12,531). Cunanan then
took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Subsequently, Pecson filed an
election protest with the RTC. The RTC decided in Pecson’s favor, ruling that Pecson received a
total of 14,987 votes as against Cunanan’s 13,758, a vote margin of 1,139.

Cunanan received a copy of the decision and filed an appeal the day after. Pecson, on the other
hand filed an urgent motion for immediate execution pending appeal, claiming that Sec 11 Rule
14 of the Ruled of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts allows this remedy. The RTC
granted Pecson’s motion for execution pending appeal. Cunanan moved to reconsider the order
arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there were good reasons to issue
a writ of execution pending appeal, and in entertaining the subsequent granting of the motion for
execution pending appeal. The COMELEC nullified the execution pending appeal.

Pecson filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and annul the COMELEC resolution which
nullified the grant of the RTC of the execution pending appeal of its decision in the election contest
between Pecson and Cunanan, who was the proclaimed winner in the 2007 mayoralty election in
Magalang, Pampanga.

ISSUE/S: Did the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it nullified the writ of execution
on the ground that the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of Pecson’s period to
appeal?

RULING: YES. The Court held that the COMELEC erred when it acted outside of the
contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order. Thus, the Commission nullified the said
order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction.

The Court cannot support COMELEC’s "balancing act" view that essentially posits that given the
pendency of the appeal and the lack of finality of a decision in the election protest, the unseating
of the protestee, and the need for continuity of public service, the balance should tilt in favor of
continuity or non-disruption of public service; hence, the execution pending appeal should be
denied. The Court agreed with Pecson’s argument that the COMELEC’s reasoning effectively
prevents a winner of an election protest from ever availing of an execution pending appeal as it
gives too much emphasis to the COMELEC’s authority to decide the election contest and the
losing party’s right to appeal.
Garcia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216691, 21 July 2015

DOCTRINE
Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for
purposes of transmitting the results to the next level of canvassing, and not for proclaiming the
winning candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been
lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it
appears that May 15, 2013 is the date the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members
of the MBOC claimed, the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified. And as justified
by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day after
the actual proclamation, because that was only when they were able to retrieve from the Regional
Election Director the username and password for generating the document.

FACTS
Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race
of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. The Office of the
Election Officer of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a certified copy of the printed Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of
proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed COCP reflected
the signatures and thumbprints of the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC).

On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. Anent the
timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013, the proclamation date
appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May 25, 2013, within which to
challenge the election results. He added that since May 25, 2013 falls on a Saturday, he filed his
protest on the immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27, 2013.

On the main, Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary period is from
the actual date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia
was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as
Garcia insists the proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing
on the printed COCP he received.

Respondent Comelec's Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that Garcia was proclaimed
on May 14, 2015 because the printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The
Comelec likewise alleged that Garcia failed to establish that Payumo had a representative present
at the exact moment Garcia was proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could
not have known that Garcia was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.

ISSUE
Whether Payumo's election protest was filed out of time.

RULING
Yes. The private parties herein advance two conflicting dates whence the reglementary period
should reckon. But between the two proposed reckoning dates, May 14, 2013, as claimed by
petitioner, appears to be the correct date of proclamation.

As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of the
mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed
COCP. What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Peñaflor (Peñaflor), vice-
chairperson of the MBOC, conveys an explanation for the discrepancy between the dates
appearing on the manual and printed COCPs — that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, Garcia was proclaimed the winner after 98.75% of votes were already canvassed;
that the proclamation was done in light of the fact that the number of voters in the unaccounted
clustered precinct could no longer affect the result of the recently concluded polls; that the
lowering of the threshold was approved by the Regional Election Director; and that the manual
COCP was prepared reflecting the result of the elections.

The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Peñaflor, is consistent with Comelec
Resolution No. 9700. Payumo's reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced.
To be sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary
only for purposes of transmitting the results to the next level of canvassing, and not for proclaiming
the winning candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have
been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling.
Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the date the printed COCP was generated, which,
as the members of the MBOC claimed, the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified.
And as justified by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013,
the day after the actual proclamation, because that was only when they were able to retrieve from
the Regional Election Director the username and password for generating the document.

Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013,
it is then plain to see that Payumo's election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the
10-day reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.

Additional Note:
The ruling in Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case. Payumo next seeks
refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed nullified the proclamation of therein
petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas even though private
respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than ten (10) days after
such fact.

To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that petitioner Federico therein could not
have validly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas, Batangas, and that as a
non-candidate in the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be declared and proclaimed the winner.
Thus, the nullity of the substitution consequently led to the nullity of the proclamation. Here lies
the difference.

More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two different
proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was surreptitiously made
were essential in Our ruling therein. This is in stark contrast with the case at bench where
there was only one proclamation, which was, by no means, clandestinely made. Here, there
is no dispute that there was only one mayoralty candidate proclaimed winner. Thus, the only
issues pertain to when such proclamation was done, and which document accurately reported
the same.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 218536, 26 January 2016

DOCTRINE:

There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where
power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice; or where
action is impelled by personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

FACTS:

During the 2013 barangay elections, Tolentino and respondent Henry Manalo both ran for
theposition of Barangay Captain in Barangay Calingcuan, Tarlac City. The election was held on
October 28, 2013. Manalo was proclaimed the winner after garnering 441 votes compared to
Tolentino's 440.Tolentino immediately filed an election protest before the MTCC. During the
revision of votes, the MTCC's initial tally was 439 votes for Tolentino and 442 votes for Manalo.
However, the MTCC invalidated six (6) of the ballots cast for Manalo and one (1) ballot cast for
Tolentino. Thus, Tolentino came out ahead. On November 26, 2014, the MTCC proclaimed
Tolentino as the winner with 438 votes compared to Manalo's 436. On the very same day, Manalo
filed a Notice of Appeal with the MTCC. Subsequently thereafter Tolentino filed a motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal. MTCC granted the motion of Tolentino and the appeal of
Manalo.

Manalo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari, with a corresponding application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) alleging that MTCC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in allowing Tolentino’s motion. COMELEC then issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) to prevent the implementation of the decision of MTCC pending determination of the
election protest. The 60-day TRO lapsed without any action from the COMELEC, prompting
Tolentino to seek the implementation of the MTCC’s judgment, however, MTCC said that the case
is no longer under its jurisdiction. Tolentino then filed a “Final Request” to COMELEC demanding
the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal. COMELEC denied his request and
advised him to await the resolution of the case. Tolentino then elevated the case to Supreme
Court alleging that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying his request.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the request of the petitioner.

RULING:

NO. After evaluating the facts, the Court fails to see any action on the part of the Commission that
constitutes grave abuse of discretion or absence of jurisdiction. The COMELEC is authorized to
enforce its directives and orders that, by law, enjoy precedence over that of the MTCC. Sec. 52
of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly states that in addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall: (f) Enforce and execute its decisions,
directives, orders and instructions which shall have precedence over those emanating from any
other authority, except the Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus proceedings. Thus,
Tolentino’s petition is derived of merit because COMELEC has acted within the scope of its
authority as provided for by the Omnibus Election Code in taking full cognizance of the election
protest case and not granting his request pending the resolution of such case.
 Rivera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210273, 19 April 2016

DOCTRINE: The Court ruled that: (1) Villanueva's act was contrary to Section 848 of R.A. No.
7941, which requires the submission, not later than 45 days before the election, of a list of not
less than five (5) nominees; and (2) Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, containing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7941 issued by the COMELEC, invalidly
expanded the exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 for the substitution of nominees.

FACTS: On December 20, 2013, Rivera and Luis filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 210273, seeking to nullify the assailed COMELEC resolutions. They claimed that they were
served a certified copy of NBOC Resolution No. 0011-13 only on November 21, 2013, after they
had requested the COMELEC for a copy thereof on November 14 2013.

Rivera and Luis argued that: (1) the registration of CIBAC with the SEC as CIBAC Foundation
was precisely intended to forestall questions raised in the past as to its qualification to
participate in the party-list election as a multi-sectoral party;19 (2) CIBAC National Council has
become "defunct", having been replaced by the BOT of CIBAC Foundation since its registration
with the SEC in 2003;20 (3) pursuant to Section 6(7) of R.A. No. 7941, CIBAC National Council
has lost its authority to represent CIBAC in the COMELEC;21 and (4) it was, in fact, the SEC-
registered CIBAC which had been participating in the 2004 and 2007 party-list elections, and
not the CIBAC National Council.22

To support their petition, Rivera and Luis invoke the consolidated cases of Lokin, Jr. v.
COMELEC, et al.23 (consolidated Lokin case), where the Court annulled the proclamation of
Gonzales, nominated by Villanueva's group as a CIBAC party-list representative in the 15th
Congress, and ordered the proclamation of Luis as its legitimate second nominee. They also
cited the case of Amoves v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al.,24 where the
Court declared that Villanueva, CIBAC National Council's President, was ineligible to hold office
as a member of the House of Representatives representing the CIBAC Party-list.

Thus, Rivera and Luis sought to nullify the following resolutions of the COMELEC en banc in
connection with the May 2013 elections:

NBOC Resolution No. 0011-1325 dated June 5, 2013, ordering the issuance of a Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation to the CIBAC Party-List, and recognizing its legitimate nominees as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
• Sherwin N. Tugna,
• Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales,
• Armi Jane R. Borje,
• Virginia S. Jose, and
• Stanley Clyde C. Flores
NBOC Resolution No. 0013-13,26 dated July 10, 2013, where the COMELEC considered as
moot the Manifestation and Motion for Proclamation as first nominee of CIBAC filed by Luis.

ISSUE: Whether the withdrawal by Villanueva, as CIBAC President, of the nomination of

Luis in favor of a new list of nominees was valid.

RULING: The Court ruled that: (1) Villanueva's act was contrary to Section 848 of R.A. No.
7941, which requires the submission, not later than 45 days before the election, of a list of not
less than five (5) nominees; and (2) Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, containing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7941 issued by the COMELEC, invalidly
expanded the exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 for the substitution of nominees.

Lastly, the petitioners invoke Amores,49 where it was declared that Villanueva was ineligible to
hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the youth sector of
CIBAC. The subject of the case was NBOC Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007, where the
COMELEC partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May 2007 elections, along with other
party-list organizations. The Court found that at the time of the filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, Villanueva was already 31 years old and beyond the age limit of 30
provided under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, and that his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six
months prior to the May 2007 elections, in violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 7941.

Nonetheless, the Court also clarified that NBOC Resolution No. 07-60 was not a proclamation of
Villanueva himself, but of CIBAC as one of the party-list winners, since Section 13 of R.A. No.
7941 separately provides that, "[p]arty-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or
coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list."

In a long line of cases50 and more recently in Reyes v. COMELEC, et al.,51 the Court has held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Since the nominees of CIBAC National Council have already assumed their seats in Congress,
the quo warranto petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED.

David vs. SET, G.R. No. 221538, 20 September 2016

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE
POE-LLAMANZARES, respondents.

G.R. No. 221538. September 20, 2016.

DOCTRINE: When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that
satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents
is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When
these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and
exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no
grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section
I of the Constitution.

FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological
parents are unknown.

On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. On October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A.
Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality.

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned
18 years old. The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card on December
13, 1986. On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport.
Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19,
2013, and March 18, 2014. Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic
passport on December 19, 2013.

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American
and Filipino national since birth. The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San
Juan, Manila. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband. For
some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States. Senator Poe was
naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was subsequently
given a United States passport.

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. After consulting her children, they all agreed to
return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces (upon the death of Senator Poe’s
adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr.). In early 2005, they notified their children's schools in Virginia,
United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following semester. She came
back on May 24, 2005. Her children also arrived in the first half of 2005. However, her husband
stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family
home there."

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
Identification Number. On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship
on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." The
Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006. In the
same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9225." Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the
Department of Justice or any other agency of Government."

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name
of Senator Poe and her children. It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Senator Poe became
a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009
using her United States Passport. She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010."

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010,
Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. Senator Poe executed an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States on July 12, 2011.

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. She won and was declared as
Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe
for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding
Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. David's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015.

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by David. On
December 9, 2015, David filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its
finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator
under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. (NO)

RULING: We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading
of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its
provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents
are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1 (2) explicitly makes
reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face
of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established personal circumstances of
private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on
a proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose
because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on burdening
private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months, the one
thing that she has never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore,
it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings
before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of having
been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class
citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and
defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.

Additionally, Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o
person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." At the
heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological
parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. Resolving
this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.

In this case, petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a
mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error. Petitioner invites this Court to establish a
jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the
Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require proof from private
respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy —
the identity of her biological parents — is simply not known.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the
action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy.
In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor
of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents
are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.

The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private
respondent.

Petitioner's refusal to account for the facts (Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn; She was found sometime in
September 1968; Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a
foundling; There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and, Private respondent's physical
features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos) demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As
against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that
at least one of private respondent's parents is a Filipino.

Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1 (2)'s reference
to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines
are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1 (2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both — not just one — of a foundling's biological parents are
not Filipino citizens.

Moreover, concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to
the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain
means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their
aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a
singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an
inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is. As it is settled that private respondent's being
a foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to
benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen,
re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the
United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.

Furthermore, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for
elective public office must comply with all of the requirements. Private respondent has complied
with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to
comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship. This was complemented by her execution of an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States before Vice-Consul Somer E.
Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011, which was; in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011 and the approval of this
certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also
complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
Republic Act No. 9225.

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act No.
9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to
postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect
citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as

articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to
erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an
irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

Marcos vs. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, 18 September 2018

FACTS: Protestee seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated April 10, 2018, which denied her
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Head Revisors to Apply the Correct Threshold Percentage
as Set by the Commission on Elections in the Revision, Recount and Re-Appreciation of the
Ballots, in Order to Expedite the Proceedings dated April 5, 2018 (Ex-Parte Motion). She likewise
prays for the immediate imposition of a twenty-five percent (25%) threshold by the Head Revisors
(HRs) in relation to the instant Protest. Protestee mainly bases her plea for reconsideration on
Minute Resolution No. 16-0600 4 dated September 6, 2016 issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc (Resolution No. 16-0600), a copy of which she furnished the
Tribunal for the first time as an annex to the Subject Motion.

In the Subject Motion, protestee seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated April 10, 2018, which
denied her Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Head Revisors to Apply the Correct Threshold
Percentage as Set by the Commission on Elections in the Revision, Recount and Re-Appreciation
of the Ballots, in Order to Expedite the Proceedings dated April 5, 2018 (Ex-Parte Motion). She
likewise prays for the immediate imposition of a twenty-five percent (25%) threshold by the Head
Revisors (HRs) in relation to the instant Protest. Protestee mainly bases her plea for
reconsideration on Minute Resolution No. 16-0600 4 dated September 6, 2016 issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc (Resolution No. 16-0600), a copy of which she
furnished the Tribunal for the first time as an annex to the Subject Motion.

OSG’s CONTENTION:
The OSG submits that the Tribunal correctly ruled that it has no basis to impose a twenty-five
percent (25%) threshold in determining whether a vote is valid or not. According to the OSG, the
power of the Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the president or vice president and to promulgate rules and regulations relative
to matters within its jurisdiction, including the determination of the threshold to be used in the
recount, is beyond dispute. The OSG further claims that the Tribunal need not use the threshold
applied in the RMA Guidelines and Report as the RMA is a completely different animal from an
election protest and that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over vice-presidential contests such
as this. Likewise, the fifty percent (50%) threshold imposed by the Tribunal is reasonable,
considering that the recount of ballots in election protests is done manually and the human eye is
indeed unable to distinguish a twenty-five percent (25%) threshold. Finally, the OSG opined that
the application of the fifty percent (50%) threshold will not disenfranchise voters who, for the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections (2016 elections), were consistently reminded by the
COMELEC to fully shade the oval space on the ballots.

ISSUE: WON the threshold issue is one of fact, specifically, of what was used to appreciate, count
votes, and proclaim winners in the 2016 elections — rather than which rule, as between those of
COMELEC and the Tribunal, must prevail.

HELD:
Despite COMELEC's and protestee's claim that the threshold was twenty-five percent (25%) in
lieu of the fifty percent (50%), a careful reading of their allegations and submissions do not clearly
establish that a twenty-five percent (25%) shading threshold had been set prior to the 2016
elections. Instead, what the official COMELEC Resolutions and other documentary submissions
show is that what was adopted was a range of twenty percent (20%) to twenty-five percent (25%)
shading threshold, as shown below:

First, no official document predating the 2016 elections was submitted to support the claim that
the machines were, in fact, calibrated in this manner of reading the votes on the ballots.
Second, similarly, as disclosed by Commissioner Guia in his letter dated September 6, 2016, the
public was not apprised of a twenty-five percent (25%) threshold as the voters were "told through
the voter information efforts of the Commission to shade the ballots fully." 53

The only thing clear from the foregoing is that the twenty-five percent (25%) threshold was initially
intended for the exclusive use of the RMA of the COMELEC. It appears from the COMELEC's
own submissions that, insofar as the voting instructions to the public and election protests within
its jurisdiction are concerned, such threshold was not being used, at least not prior to Resolution
No. 16-0600. COMELEC, in its Comment, admits that its intention was "to uphold the Intent Rule
as the governing rule in the appreciation of ballots." 54 Indeed, at the time Resolution No. 16-
0600 was issued, the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC did
not have guidelines on the proper threshold.

From the foregoing, for purposes of the 2016 elections, the fifty percent (50%) shading threshold
was no longer applied. It is likewise clear however that a new threshold had been applied. The
submissions of COMELEC and protestee show that, during the 2016 elections, instead of a single
numerical threshold, what was applied was a threshold that ranged from twenty percent (20%) to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the oval spaces in the ballots.

Third, officially, no threshold was thereafter adopted in place of the fifty percent (50%) threshold
for the 2016 elections prior to Resolution No. 16-0600, except only for the twenty percent (20%)
shading threshold adopted for the detainee voting in the 2016 elections under Resolution No.
10113 issued on May 3, 2016. 56

Finally, protestee likewise submitted an RMA Visual Guidelines presentation, 57 purportedly used
in the COMELEC's RMA, which states that a valid mark, to be considered a vote, is a mark whose
score is higher than the VCM's mark detection threshold of twenty percent (20%) to twenty-five
percent (25%), and an invalid mark is a mark whose score is lower than twenty percent (20%).

Applying the threshold in the revision process

The objectives of the revision proceedings, as stated in Rule 4 of the PET Revisor's Guide, 59
are the following:

a. To verify the physical count of the ballots;

b. To recount the votes of the parties;
c. To record the objections or claims of the parties with respect to ballots under revision; and
d. To mark the ballots objected to or claimed by the parties for purposes of identification, in
preparation for their examination by the Tribunal and for the reception of evidence in
support of the objections and claims of the parties, when necessary.

Thus, as stated earlier, other than the registration of claims and objections of the parties, the
purpose of the revision process is simply to recount the votes of the parties; and this is
implemented by mimicking (or verifying/confirming) how the VCMs read and counted the votes
during the elections.

Marcos vs. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, 17 November 2020

FACTS:
On November 9, 2020, protestant filed a "Strong Manifestation with Extremely Urgent Omnibus
Motion for the: I. Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen; II. Re-raffle of this Election
Protest; III. Resolution of all the Pending Incidents in the Above Entitled Case." He alleges that
since October 2019, the protest has "remained in limbo." Protestant claims the delay in the
resolution of this election protest, which hardly moved from the time Justice Leonen took over as
ponente and was marked by "one deferment after another through a series of resets and 'call-
against'" clearly showed Justice Leonen's bias and partiality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a delay in deciding the election protest filed by protestant. (NO)

RULING:

This Tribunal's actions on pending matters before it are not always publicized. There is no
requirement to keep the parties abreast with all its internal proceedings, especially on
administrative matters which do not directly concern them.

There is no rule requiring that an election protest should be decided within twenty (20) months or
twelve (12) months. The allegation of undue delay is severely unfounded. In their respective
Memoranda, the parties made serious factual allegations that warranted verification from the
Commission on Elections. They also raised constitutional issues which led this Tribunal to require
the Solicitor General's comment for a fair and full resolution of this protest.

Contrary to the protestant and the Solicitor General's actuations, the directives for the
Commission on Elections and the Solicitor General were not in response to opinion pieces, which
this Tribunal does not heed. In this Tribunal's August 28, 2018 Resolution, we denied protestant's
similar motion and ruled that "an opinion piece in a news website and an unauthenticated video
circulating on social media websites are not credible and admissible supporting evidence; they
are not even worthy of cognizance by the Court."

Marcos vs. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, 16 February 2021

Doctrine: "The power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves
the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the
law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step."

FACTS: The Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal resolves the June 29, 2016
Election Protest filed by protestant Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., who challenges the
election and proclamation of Maria Leonor "Leni Daang Matuwid" G. Robredo as vice president
in the 2016 national and local elections.

The Tribunal categorized his causes of action into: first, the annulment of protestee's proclamation;
second, a revision and recount of ballots in Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental; and third,
the annulment of elections in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Basilan.

Issue: Whether or not protestant has sufficiently shown reasonable recovery of votes after the
revision and appreciation of ballots from the three pilot provinces?
Ruling: The SC Held in the negative.

Suffrage is at the heart of every democracy. Election results must not be tainted with unnecessary
doubt by losing candidates who cannot accept defeat.

To reiterate, "the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves
the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the
law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step."

What this Tribunal faces today is not an extreme case of fraud that deserves further consideration.
Protestant failed to make out his case. There is no substantial recovery of votes in the pilot
provinces that he himself had designated. To entertain the third cause of action is to risk frustrating
the valid exercise of the nation's democratic will and subject it to the endless whims of a defeated
candidate.

Protestant still failed to substantiate his allegations of massive anomalies and irregularities in
protestee's favor. Instead, he chose to make sweeping allegations of wrongdoing and submitted
incomplete and incorrect data. His abject failure to support his claims leaves this Tribunal with no
other recourse but to dismiss his Protest.

WHEREFORE, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal DISMISSES the Election Protest filed by
protestant Marcos, Jr. for lack of merit. The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Robredo is likewise
DISMISSED.

Tolentino vs. SET, G.R. No. 248005, 11 May 2021

FACTS:
During the May 9, 2016 Elections, the COMELEC utilized election machines and equipment that
were procured by the COMELEC from Smartmatic-TIM under an Automated Election System
(AES) contracts, which were in the nature of a lease with option to purchase (OTP). The terms of
which expressly provide as follows:
"6.9 All Goods still in the possession of COMELEC as of 01 December 2016 because of any
election contest or audit requirement shall be considered sold to COMELEC pursuant to its option
to purchase under this Contract, and the COMELEC shall pay the corresponding price in
accordance with the Financial Proposal within ten (10) working days from receipt by COMELEC
of the invoice from the PROVIDER covering said Goods, without prejudice to COMELEC requiring
the protestant to shoulder such costs."
On June 20, 2016, petitioner filed an election protest against Senator Leila M. De Lima, pertaining
to the official results of the senatorial elections. Pursuant to Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts, the
SET Executive Committee required the COMELEC to provide the amount to be paid by petitioner
as retention costs of the VCMs and the CCS laptops pertaining to the latter's protest. The SET
acknowledged the above initial payment of P1,114,122.96 and required petitioner to deposit the
remaining balance in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-
Two and 40/100 Pesos (P2,201,662.40), representing the cost of retention by the COMELEC of
the 106 VCMs, otherwise, his election protest will be dismissed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Return of Payments asserting that the payments made by him in
the total amount of P3,315,785.36 should be returned because despite paying the purchase price
of these election machines and equipment, he never enjoyed ownership rights over the same. He
had no opportunity to possess them as these machines and equipment remained in the custody
of the COMELEC. He cannot even access them without permission from the COMELEC.
However, the COMELEC mainly asserted that the payments made by petitioner were for the
retention of the election paraphernalia in relation to his election protest and not for the payment
of the election paraphernalia itself.
ISSUE:
Whether the SET committed grave abuse of discretion as it failed to exercise its constitutional
mandate to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the Senate.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The SET has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue on the validity and constitutionality of Section
6.9 of the AES Contracts. The SET has no express, inherent or implied power to declare void or
unconstitutional Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts, which requires the protestant to shoulder the
retention costs. The authority of the SET is limited to matters affecting the validity of the
protestant's title. While it may be true that the SET has the power to control its proceedings, such
power cannot, by any means, be construed as including the power to interpret much less
invalidate a contract between third parties. Thus, any issue concerning the contract between the
COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM is beyond the jurisdiction and constitutional mandate of the SET.
Further, there can be no return of the deposits made by petitioner as the same was properly paid
by the COMELEC to Smartmatic--TIM. It is evidently clear that the COMELEC only retained the
possession and custody of the subject machines and equipment because of the pending election
protest of petitioner after the May 2016 elections. When petitioner manifested and moved for the
safeguarding and preservation of these election paraphernalia, he was fully apprised that he has
to shoulder the retention costs pursuant to Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts.

Comelec
Pangandaman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134340, 25 November 1999

DOCTRINE: Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power
to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite
initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this
constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the
COMELEC's powers in conducting elections.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed the case before the COMELEC praying that the Commission declare [a] failure of
elections in their respective municipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The petitions
were reinforced by reports received by the Commission from its field officers and deputies. The
petitioners alleged that in 11 muunicipalities, total and partial failure of elections took place due
to armed confrontation, violence, BEI’s are disqualified, and many more.
COMELEC then issued an Omnibus Order which orders the holding of special elections in 8
municipalities in Lanao Del Sur.
However, the petitioners assail the said order as COMELEC committee dgrave abuse of
discretion in ordering the holding of special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty
(30) days after the failure to elect, in certain municipalities, and by ordering only elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are not assigned to the
affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspector;.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to order the holding of special elections
more than 30 days after the failure to elect/
2. Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to order ordering only elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are not
assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspector.
RULING:
1. First issue
YES. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction;
for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite initiative,
referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the
COMELEC's powers in conducting elections.
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be later
than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The
second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. 10 Thus, the
holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the
postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date
of the election not held."
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the special
elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of elections was
determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus
Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding of
special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial failure of elections was
declared and, thus, these were "dates reasonably close" thereto, given the prevailing facts herein.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the
integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules
in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes.

2. Second issue
YES. The insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC violated Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of
the Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) who are not assigned to the affected areas as
members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis-à-vis the
underlying reason of the public respondent to have an effective and impartial military
presence "to avoid the risk of another failure of election."

NOTES:
Sec. 6. Failure of elections. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
 Diangka vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139545, 28 January 2000
Diangka v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 139545, January 28, 2000

Doctrine:

Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence
of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Facts:

Private respondent Balindog filed a special disqualification case against his rival
candidate, petitioner Diangka before the COMELEC. Balindog sought to disqualify Diangka from
continuing to run as candidate for mayor in the Municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, on the
ground that Diangka and her husband, then incumbent mayor of said municipality, committed acts
of terrorism in order to accord Balindog undue advantage at the polls. COMELEC 2nd division
issued a resolution disqualifying Diangka as candidate for Mayor in said municipality as the
alleged acts of terrorism and violation of election laws were sufficiently established by
documentary evidence. Diangka filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Comelec en banc
denied the motion and affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC 2nd division. Aggrieved, Diangka
filed a petition for certiorari questioning the two resolutions rendered by the COMELEC.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the

disqualification of Diangka.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by
gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated
attack on the validity of the same. COMELEC found evidence of her direct participation in the first
act of terrorism. She was on board the ambulance used to transport the ballots, ballot boxes and
other election paraphernalia intended for Precinct 2A at the Gadongan Elementary School.
Instead of proceeding directly to said place, the ambulance went to Barangay Bagoaingud where
the watchers of DIANGKA's rivals were forced off the ambulance at gunpoint by barangay
chairman Lombayan Dubar and their cohorts. DIANGKA could not feign ignorance as to what had
transpired as the COMELEC had found, based on her own admission and the testimonies of
witnesses, that DIANGKA was a passenger in the ambulance; that she had control over the driver
of the ambulance, who upon her request, dropped her off at her house; and that the ambulance
belongs to the municipality under the control of her mayor husband. Evidently, the application of
the rule on res inter alios acta is unavailing on account of these circumstances which show her
participation or at the very least her acquiescence to the incident.

SWS vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, 5 May 2001

DOCTRINE: Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

The prohibition of speech provided in Section 5.4 is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor
does this section pass the O’brient test for content related regulation because (1) it
suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc.; and
(2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because
the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics,
politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and
publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys.

Both are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act),
especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not
be published 7 days before the election.

SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at
the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well
as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election survey results
up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion
among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed
by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their
opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no
reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which
are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It
contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the
period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the
"evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is
minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the
national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not
prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger
to justify such restraint [YES]

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge
for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates.

By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, Section 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers.

Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by §5.4 cannot
be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The
prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and
is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before
a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.

As already stated, Section 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters,
the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to
the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts,
rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such
evils.

To summarize then, we hold that Section 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
 Pangkat Laguna vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, 4 February 2002

Doctrine: Factual findings of the Comelec based on its own assessments and duly supported by
evidence, are conclusive upon the Court, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity
of the same. The Comelec is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect
to the elections. The Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and
administration of election laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with
respect to the elections.

Facts: Respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by succession the
office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D. Lina, Jr. was appointed Secretary of
Interior and Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Respondent Lazaro filed
her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial position of Laguna.

Herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a
petition which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race. The
disqualification petition alleged in the main that respondent Lazaro committed acts violative of
Section 80 (Election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and
Section 261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner Pangkat Laguna specifically alleged that private respondent Lazaro, upon assuming —
by succession — the Office of the Governor, publicly declared her intention to run for governor in
the May 2001 elections. Respondent Lazaro ordered the purchase of 14, 513 items such as
trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts, serving no public purpose but to
promote her popularity as a candidate. Respondent directed the purchase and distribution of
1,760 medals and pins valued at P110,000.00 to various schools in Laguna, serving no
meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy. According to
petitioner, the abovementioned acts, in effect, constituted "premature campaigning" inasmuch as
the same were done prior to the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001.

Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent Lazaro violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus
Election Code, when the latter caused the bidding of seventy nine (79) public works projects.

The Comelec Second Division granted the petition to disqualify respondent as candidate for the
gubernatorial post of Laguna, prompting respondent Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration
before the Comelec en banc. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro
as the duly elected Governor of Laguna.

Issue: Whether the resolution of the Comelec en banc was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Ruling: The instant petition is denied. The resolution is affirmed.

As to the issue of "premature campaigning", this Court holds that respondent Lazaro was not
guilty of violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. It bears stressing
that the act of respondent Lazaro as Chief Executive of the Province of Laguna in ordering the
purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna,
in line with the local government unit's sports and education program, is to our mind not
constitutive of the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and
explicitly proscribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Upon a close perusal of the entirety of circumstances attendant in the instant case, this Court is
of the firm view that herein petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
questioned purchase and distribution of the aforesaid items were, in any significant way,
perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of respondent Lazaro or were, in any
manner, calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of respondent.
Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing proof that the purchase and
distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to influence and induce the
constituents of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Respondent's acts do not fall within, and are not contemplated by, the prohibition embodied in
Section 80 of the Code so as to effectively disqualify her from the elections and bar her from
holding office.

Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate petitioner's bare allegation that - in
furtherance of the public bidding conducted public funds were ever released, disbursed or
expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and the implementing rules.
Absent such clear and convincing proof, we find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings
and conclusions of respondent Comelec, the constitutional body tasked by no less than the
fundamental law to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections."

De Guzman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159713, 31 March 2004

Facts:

On May 19, 2001, petitioner Ariel G. De Guzman was proclaimed winner of the second of two
Provincial Board seats allocated for the First District of Pangasinan with 40,441 votes. Respondent
Nestor B. Pulido, a candidate for the same position, garnered 40,383 votes or 58 votes less than De
Guzman.

Pulido filed with the COMELEC an election protest against De Guzman, docketed as EPC No. 2001-
11. He alleged that: In the Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan, where the PROTESTEE
is the incumbent Mayor, more than one thousand (1,000) votes were padded in his favor. On the
other hand, more than one hundred (100) votes of the PROTESTANT were deliberately not read and
counted. The PROTESTEE obviously orchestrated the tempo in the canvassing of votes in the
Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan. He has the power and clout to do so being the
immediate past third termer Mayor of that town. It must be told with regrets that the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Mabini, Pangasinan, without justifiable reasons, deliberately suspended the
canvassing of votes for more than eight hours, from five o’clock in the afternoon of May 15, 2001 to
2:00 o’clock in the early morning of May 16, 2001, without proper notice to the watchers and to the
public. The idea behind the suspension of canvassing for more than eight hours was to give the
PROTESTEE enough time to know the results of the elections in the other municipalities and in case
he loses in the quick count, he would still have time to pad his votes. Indeed, when he knew he was
losing, the PROTESTEE padded more than one thousand votes to his name in order to win. Thus, a
recount of the votes cast in the various precincts in the Municipality of Mabini, Province of
Pangasinan, is necessary to ascertain the number of votes the PROTESTEE and the
PROTESTANT actually garnered.
The following day, Pulido amended his protest by also claiming that in the town of Mabini 500 ballots
cast in his favor were misappreciated in favor of De Guzman.

On June 18, 2001, De Guzman filed his Amended Answer with Counter Protest denying Pulido’s
allegations. As counter-protest, he alleged misappreciation of ballots cast in all the precincts in the
town of Anda. In addition, he alleged that:

13. In precinct 10A1 in Barangay Gais-Guipe, Dasol, Pangasinan, in CE Form No. 9 Sheet
No. 67180016, the PROTESTEE garnered seventy (70) votes; that apparently when the
result was transferred in CE Form No. 20-A, Sheet No. 2113885, the PROTESTEE was
credited with only seventeen (17) votes, thus depriving the PROTESTEE of fifty three (53)
votes. A photocopy from the copy for the Majority Party each of CE Form No. 9 Sheet
67180016 and CE Form No. 20-A, Sheet No. 2113885 are hereto attached as Annexes "A"
and "B" respectively, and made parts hereof; A recount of the votes in said precinct No.
10A1 of Barangay Gais-Guipe, Dasol, Pangasinan is therefore, necessary to ascertain the
correct numbers of votes of the PROTESTANT and PROTESTEE in said precinct;

14. In precinct No. 27A1 and 27A2, Barangay Bued, Alaminos, Pangasinan, it is made to
appear in CE Form 9, Sheet 67030051, that the PROTESTANT obtained twenty four (24)
votes when per the tally he received only nineteen (19) votes thereby adding five (5) votes
for the PROTESTANT which should be deducted from his total votes. A copy of CE Form 9,
Sheet 67030051 is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made a part hereto. A recount of the
votes in said precincts 27A1 and 27A2 is therefore, necessary to ascertain the correct
number of votes of the PROTESTANT and the PROTESTEE in said precincts;

15. In precinct No. 22A2 of Bamban, Infanta, Pangasinan, it is made to appear in CE Form
No. 9, Sheet No. 67190050, that the PROTESTEE obtained twenty eight (28) votes when
per tally he received thirty three (33) votes thus five (5) votes should be added to the total
votes of the PROTESTEE. A photocopy of CE Form No. 9, Sheet No. 67190050 is hereto
attached as Annex "D and made a part hereof;

16. In the Statement of Votes By Precinct, CE Form 20A, Sheet Nos. 2113889, 2113890 and
2113891 there is an error in the addition of the number of votes for the PROTESTEE, more
particularly in Sheet No. 2113891 where it is made to appear in the sub-total that the
PROTESTEE received three hundred forty two (342) votes instead of the correct one which
is three hundred eighty nine (389) thus from this erroneous addition he was deprived of 47
votes. This 47 votes should be added to the PROTESTEE’s total votes in Infanta,
Pangasinan. A copy each of the Statement of Votes By Precinct, CE Form No. 20-A, Sheet
Nos. 2113889, 2113890 and 2113891 are hereto attached as Annexes "E", "F" and "G"
respectively, and made parts hereof.

On July 31, 2001, the COMELEC First Division directed the parties to deposit money to defray the
expenses to be incurred in the revision of the ballots.

On September 10, 2001, the revision of the contested ballots commenced. Thereafter, both parties
presented their evidence. After both parties formally offered their respective evidence, the case was
submitted for decision.

Meanwhile, on March 20, 2002, the COMELEC en banc received three letter-petitions separately
filed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the towns of Infanta and Dasol and the Board of
Election Inspectors of Precincts 27A1 and 27A2 of Alaminos City. The letter-petitions, docketed as
SPC Nos. 02-001, 02-002 and 02-003, requested authority to correct mistakes or errors in tabulation
reflected in the Election Returns and Statement of Votes by Precinct which were also the subject of
De Guzman’s counter-protest.

On September 19, 2002, the COMELEC en banc jointly dismissed the letter-petitions in SPC Nos.
02-002 and 02-003 of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Infanta and the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precincts 27A1 and 27A2 of Alaminos City. The COMELEC en banc reasoned:

xxx [A]ll the matters raised in the letters-petitions are included in the issues to be resolved in EPC
No. 2001-11 pending before the First Division which was initiated more than 9 months before the
instant petitions. The election protest case is more extensive and appropriate in closely looking into
the parties’ allegations and supporting documents. Such proceedings are in fact consistent with Mr.
De Guzman’s call for a recount of votes in the subject clustered precincts, which we cannot
undertake in a petition for correction of mistake. Hence, the First Division is in a better position to
rule upon the issues and make the necessary conclusions especially on the allegations of fact that
we find insufficient herein.

Subsequently, on April 2, 2003, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution in EPC No. 2001-
11 annulling the proclamation of De Guzman. It declared Pulido as the duly elected Number 2
Provincial Board Member of the First District of Pangasinan having garnered a total of 40,336 votes
as against De Guzman who obtained 40,263 votes or a plurality of 73 votes.

Dissatisfied, De Guzman sought reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: WON THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED AND REFUSED TO CORRECT THE PLAIN AND
MANIFEST ERRORS OF TABULATION, DULY PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
CONFIRMED ON (SIC) PHYSICAL COUNT, AND, CONSEQUENTLY FAILED AND REFUSED TO
CORRECT THE WRONG BASE FIGURES USED IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE FINAL VOTES.

HELD:

The Court finds that the COMELEC en banc acted whimsically, capriciously and without any rational basis
in upholding the factual findings of the First Division which disregarded manifest errors in tabulation. It was
remiss in its duties to properly resolve the Motion for Reconsideration before it and it should have given a
close scrutiny of the evidence on hand. Its conclusion that only photocopies of the documents involved are
in evidence is contradicted by the records.

It is well to remember the basic principle that the cardinal objective of ballot appreciation is to discover and
give effect to, rather than frustrate the intention of the voters, thus, every ballot shall be presumed valid
unless clear and good reasons justify its rejection. Extreme caution should be observed before any ballot
is invalidated and doubts in the appreciation of ballots are resolved in favor of their validity. Thus, it is a
well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.

Upholding the sovereignty of the people is what democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people
expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do
everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always better than well said. Corollarily,
laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities.
 Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution which provided that “The Commission
may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits…”, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space.

FACTS: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa.

Then, COMELEC issued a resolution, wherein Section 32 provided “All propaganda materials
such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture,
image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing
rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to
have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.”

Thus, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law
Department. Petitioner asked to be exempted but the COMELEC denied such.

Petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is
allegedly an invalid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police
power?

RULING: The Court held in the negative.

Pursuant to Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution which provided that “The Commission may, during
the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits…”, the Court held that the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space. Thus, the resolution is valid.

The Court also found that the resolution intended to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations
of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered
by huge campaign "war chests."

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products,
he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products.
However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name
and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy.

By regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its
duty under the law. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it
required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards.
 Goh vs. Bayron, G.R. No. 212584, 25 November 2014
DOCTRINE:
COMELEC is mandated to shoulder all expenses relative to recall elections. The 2014 General
Appropriations Act provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct a recall election for 2014.

FACTS:
COMELEC issued Resolutions 9864 and 9882, the first raising an issue as to the funding of recall
elections in Puerto Princesa City for the position of City Mayor (a post currently held by Mayor
Bayron.), and the second suspending recall elections on the ground that the COMELEC does not
have appropriations to conduct said election. In essence, COMELEC is arguing that since there
is no specific line-item appropriation, the COMELEC cannot have funds to conduct the recall
election. Petitioner Goh assailed these provisions before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in saying that 2014 GAA does not
provide the line-item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate
of conducting recall elections.

RULING:
Yes, the COMELEC committed Grave Abuse of Discretion.

The SC, in ruling for Goh, said that the 2014 GAA provides the line-item appropriation to allow
the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. This is found
in the Programs category of its 2014 budget. Moreover, in the discharge of its functions, among
which is to conduct recall elections, the item named “Current Operating Expenditures” may be
used. More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has
“a line item for the” Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”.
Thus, there is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014. Moreover, should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed
insufficient, and then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line-
item appropriation from the COMELEC’s existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly
authorized in the 2014 GAA.

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166388, 23 January 2006

FACTS
The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of
Taguig were asked this question: "Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in
Republic Act No. 8487?"

On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), declared that the "No" votes won,
indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city. Alleging that fraud and
irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the
COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a
prayer for revision and recount of the ballots.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged
that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.

The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner's motion and dismissing
the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en
banc affirmed this Resolution.

Aggrieved, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and mandamus. On
January 26, 2004, we rendered a Decision reversing the COMELEC's Resolution. We held that
the controversy on the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite "is a matter that involves the enforcement
and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution authorizing it 'to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.'"

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, alleging that in rendering the said
Resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (NO)

RULING
No, the factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect,
but finality. This is so because "the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have
always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the
appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC
has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws." Its acts, therefore, enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166143-47, 20 November 2006

DOCTRINE: A petition to suspend tolls the 10-day period for filing an election protest from
running, while a petition to annul interrupts the running of the period. In other words, in a Section
248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period did not start to run at all, the filing of a Section
250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from proclamation is not late. On the other hand,
in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party seeking annulment must file the petition before the
expiration of the 10-day period. There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution
or adjudication of pre-proclamation controversies and election protests. Allowing the
simultaneous prosecution scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation
controversies and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence
admissible in each case and the objective each seeks to achieve.

FACTS: Petitioner Tan and Burahan were the gubernatorial and vice gubernatorial candidates,
respectively, of Sulu Province in the 2004 national and local elections. They filed with the
COMELEC 4 Petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk,
Tongkil, and Panamao. They alleged systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes and
machinations allegedly perpetrated by private respondents and supporters resulting in massive
disenfranchisement of voters. Even before filing the 4 aforesaid petitions, Abdusakur Tan had
filed 4 other petitions before the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the exclusion of election
returns from several precincts and the other three to exclude certificates of canvass. All were
dismissed by the Board.

Tan then filed an appeal with the COMELEC, COMELEC issued an Order directing the boards to
suspend the proceedings. On the same day of the Order, private respondent Benjamin Loong
was proclaimed the winning governor of Sulu and assumed office.
Petitioner Tan then filed a Petition for Annulment of the Proclamation. The petition was granted
and annulled the proclamation of respondent Loong as governor. Respondent Jikiri filed with
COMELEC a petition of protest ad cautelam praying for a recount / revision of the ballots cast and
the examination of election returns in the 4 municipalities. The COMELEC en Banc dismissed all
5 petitions.

This prompted Jikiri to convert his petition ad cautelam into a regular election protest which
COMELEC granted. COMELEC ruled that there was no failure of elections in the subject Sulu
Municipalities. It reasoned that it could only exercise the extraordinary remedy of failure of
elections in three instances mentioned in Carlos v. Angeles: 1) election is not held, 2) election is
suspended, or 3) the election results in a failure to elect. None of the grounds relied upon
petitioners fall under any of the three instances.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
consolidated petitions for the declaration of failure of elections despite the evident massive
disenfranchisement of the voters?

HELD: The court held in the negative. The argument of disenfranchisement of voters was only
raised during appeal and wasn’t raised in the court below. This is violative of fairness and due
process. In fact there never was any sudden change in the polling places that was unannounced.
The clustering of precincts in Sulu Province was an administrative matter that was already
covered in a COMELEC resolution released in April 2004. Furthermore, there was no failure of
elections. In Sec. 6 of the Synchronized Elections Law, the COMELEC can declare a failure of
elections in the following circumstances:
● the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
 ● the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or
● after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two
conditions must concur, namely: no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and the votes
not cast would have affected the result of the election.
● Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Petitioners never alleged that no voting was held nor was voting suspended in the subject
municipalities. Neither did petitioners allege that no one was elected.
● Petitioners only allege that there was a sham election and similar sham canvassing.
● To warrant a declaration of failure of election, the alleged irregularities must be proven to
have prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation
and transmission, custody, and canvass of the election returns.
These essential facts should have been clearly alleged by petitioners before the COMELEC en
banc, but they were not.

The Court agrees with the finding of the COMELEC en banc that the evidence relied upon by
petitioners to support their charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of elections in the
questioned municipalities consisted of:
● affidavits prepared and executed by their own representatives; and
● that the other pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners were not credible and
inadequate to substantiate petitioners' charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of
elections. Mere affidavits are insufficient, more so, when they were executed by
petitioners’ poll watchers.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain electoral protests filed beyond ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the results of an election. Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
SECTION 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. —
A sworn petition contesting the election of . . . any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed
with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.

Section 248 of the OEM provides: Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.
— The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings. Correlating the petitions mentioned in Section 248 with the 10-day period
set forth in the succeeding Section 250, a petition to suspend tolls the 10-day period for filing an
election protest from running, while a petition to annul interrupts the running of the period.

In other words, in a Section 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period did not start to run
at all, the filing of a Section 250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from proclamation is
not late.

On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party seeking annulment must file the
petition before the expiration of the 10-day period. In the case at bar, the petitioner filed against
petitioner Loong sought to suspend his then impending proclamation. Therefore, the filing of the
election protest ad cautelam on 56 days after the May 24, 2004 proclamation was contextually on
time. This is because the 10-day reglementary period to file such a protest – which ordinarily
would have expired on June 3, 2004 – did not start to run at all.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain simultaneously pre proclamation controversies and
electoral protests. Petitioner Loong holds that an election contest should be put on hold until pre-
proclamation controversies are concluded. For one, there is no law or rule prohibiting the
simultaneous prosecution or adjudication of pre-proclamation controversies and election protests.
Allowing the simultaneous prosecution scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-
proclamation controversies and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the
evidence admissible in each case and the objective each seeks to achieve.

Moreover, the Court, under certain circumstances, even encourages the reinforcement of a pre-
proclamation suit with an election protest. Simultaneous adjudications offer more practical
features than piecemeal adjudications in expediting the resolution of cases. We must stress the
importance of speedy disposition of election cases.
 Macacua vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 175390, 8 May 2007

DOCTRINE:

- The decision of the COMELEC en banc should not be taken as an abdication of its duty
to conduct elections, but a judgment call by the Commission based on lack of available
funds to hold another special election, the peculiar circumstances of this case, and the
fast approaching regular elections on May 14. 2007 that would render the result of another
special election moot.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Fermin) were candidates for Mayor in the municipality
of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed private
respondent as the mayor but the COMELEC annulled the proclamation due to the failure of
clustered polling to function in a barangay.

A special election was held proclaiming petitioner to be the winning candidate but the
private respondent challenged the proclamation due to procedural infirmities. The election was
nullified by the COMELEC who then scheduled another special election.Said new special election
rendered a vote count which tied the petitioner and respondent. A special public hearing was
called for to break the tie but despite the call, the SMBOC proclaimed private respondent as
Mayor.

Petitioner filed a motion to nullify the proclamation but the COMELEC denied such hence,
this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Public Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned Resolution disallowing
the holding of a third Special Election for lack of funds.

RULING:

the COMELEC en banc's decision not to hold a third special election in Barangay Guiawa for the
position of Mayor of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao cannot be characterized as capricious, whimsical
or arbitrary since it was based on the following considerations: (1) lack of available funds for
holding another special election in Barangay Guiawa; (2) the anomalies that transpired during the
regular and two special elections which all resulted in failure of election do not inspire assurance
that the will of the voters in the area will be upheld in another special election; and (3) the next
regular elections scheduled on May 14, 2007 is close-by.

In his separate concurring opinion, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. stated:

. . . [T]he Commission has already set into motion the mechanism for the conduct
of [the 2007] election as early as July 26, 2006. Preparations have already started
and conducting another special election in one precinct only might disrupt the
whole system and jeopardize our major electoral exercise come May 14, 2007. At
the time preparation alone for the conduct of the special election might
already coincide or so nearly approximate the May 14, 2007 election so that
 any result of the special election may already be mooted by the May 14, 2007
election.

The COMELEC en banc enunciated that it would be impractical in terms of time, effort and money
to declare the holding of a third special election in Barangay Guiawa, and it would be
disadvantageous to the government, specifically to the Commission.

The decision of the COMELEC en banc should not be taken as an abdication of its duty to
conduct elections, but a judgment call by the Commission based on lack of available funds
to hold another special election, the peculiar circumstances of this case, and the fast
approaching regular elections on May 14. 2007 that would render the result of another
special election moot.
 Manzala vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176211, 8 May 2007
Doctrine:
Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from
a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate court
can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.

Facts:
Petitioner Manzala and private respondent Monton were mayoralty candidates in the Municipality
of Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Monton as the duly elected Municipal Mayor. Thereafter,
Manzala filed an election protest with the RTC, seeking recount in the 10 precincts of Magdiwang
on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation of the Omnibus Election Code
and other pertinent COMELEC rules allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and
members of the Board of Election Inspectors during the election.

A revision of ballots was later conducted where protestant Manzala is proclaimed as the duly-
elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang. Manzala, then, moved for the execution of the decision
pending appeal which the trial court granted. However, the Former Second Division of the
COMELEC issued a Resolution which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declaring Monton as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon (NO)

Ruling:
The Court held in the negative.

Petitioner argues that the motion for reconsideration filed with the Former Second Division of the
COMELEC "has thrown the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a criminal
case," yet the COMELEC en banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots.

Sec. 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution provides the Comelec with quasi-judicial power to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. Sec. 3 states the administrative
power of the Comelec, either en banc or in two divisions, to promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Further, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution also mandates
the Comelec to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by
the Comelec en banc. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases
where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review
and the appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.

In the present case, the Comelec en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former
Second Division and affirmed the findings thereof with modification as to the number of votes
obtained by both parties after re-appreciation.

Other Notes:
Petitioner further contends that the trial court's "judicial appreciation of the contested ballots
[should be] honored, respected, and given the importance it deserves by [this] Court."

Sec. 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that from a judgment or final order or resolution of
the Comelec, the aggrieved party, herein petitioner, may file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Thus, in a special civil action of certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65, the only question that
may be raised and/or resolved is whether or not the Comelec had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such fact does not exist in the present case.
 Procedure and judicial review

ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, 28 January 2000

Facts :

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the
poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize
the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec
allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make an exit
survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and
Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed
that such project might be in conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this
Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the
Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or
the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue:

Whether the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in
conducting exit polls during the election

Ruling:

The two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent a limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome
of one can only be indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC concludes that
the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of
disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the
holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-
fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.

Soller vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, 5 September 2000

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition
with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an election protest
against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by
private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied.

Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private
respondent’s election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. Petitioner now
questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide the case.

RULING: The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have
the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies
in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election
protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and
not on the COMELEC en banc.

Carlos vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 142907, 29 November 2000

FACTS

Petitioner Carlos and respondent Serapio were candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila during May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was
declared as the duly elected mayor. The respondent, having the second highest number of votes,
filed with the RTC Valenzuela an election protest challenging the results. The trial court declared
that there was enough pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in Valenzuela. It
held that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had control over the election
paraphernalia and the basic services in the community such as the supply of electricity. Thus,
notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the
proclamation of protestee Carlos and declared protestant Serapio as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela City. With this, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Commission on Elections.
He also filed a petition before the Supreme Court. The respondent submitted that the Comelec
and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the respondent, having the second highest number of votes, can be declared as
the duly elected mayor WON the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as
the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by
petition for certiorari as a special civil action, the decision of the RTC in an election protest case
involving an elective municipal official considering that it has no appellate jurisdiction over such
decision.

RULING: An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power
of the people.The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes
cast in the election. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified,
the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be
declared elected. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of
the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In other words, a defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office. The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.

It is the Comelec sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. In a petition to annul an election, two conditions must be averred in order to support a
sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast
and (2) the goodvotes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two conditions
are established that the annulment of the election can be justified because the remaining votes
do not constitute a valid constituency. There are only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b)
the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. Thus, the trial court in its decision actually
pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and setting aside the results of the election.

Nonetheless, as herein-above stated, the trial court erred to the extent of ousting itself of
jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of election were not significant and even non-existent.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that
power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections.The result is
a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court can not declare a winner.

A permanent vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall
succeed as provided by law. Both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court
that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
 Partido ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164702, 15 March 2006

DOCTRINE: Be that as it may, we reiterate that the prevailing formula for the computation of
additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans, viz:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ——————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
||

FACTS: Several party-list participants sent queries to the COMELEC regarding the formula to be
adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the 10 May 2004 elections.
COMELEC responded by issuing a resolution, adopting the simplified formula of “one additional
seat per additional two percent (2%) of the total party-list votes”.

For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of votes, the
following formula was adopted:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ——————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of first the first party
party
And for the additional seats of other parties who reached the required two
percent mark, the following formula applies:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ——————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of first the first party
party
||
ISSUE/S: Could the COMELEC en banc, as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List
System, be compelled by the Honorable Court to mechanically apply the formula stated in its 25
June 2003 resolution reiterated in the 20 November 2003 resolution in the Ang Bagong Bayani
cases in the determination of qualified party-list organizations and in the proclamation?

RULING: NO. The Court reiterated that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional
seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans. The ruling in
the case of Ang Bagong Bayani is a pro hac vice, and cannot be relied upon as a precedent to
govern other cases. The COMELEC erred in applying the 20 November 2003 resolution and
abandoning the formula in Veterans.
 Juliano vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167033, 12 April 2006

DOCTRINES
● Unless COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision will
not be interfered with by the SC.
● The proper way for the COMELEC En Banc to act on a motion for reconsideration when
the first voting was equally divided is to rehear the matter, not merely to hold a
reconsultation amongst themselves. The Court notes, however, that the Order of the
Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was
a mere "re-consultation." A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing". A
consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation
means a second deliberation of persons on some subject. Rehearing is defined as a
"second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court's or administrative board's
attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. Thus, when the
COMELEC En Banc failed to hold a rehearing required by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS
The allegations of both parties establish that Cotabato City has a total of 577 clustered polling
precincts distributed among 37 barangays; that the first City Board of Canvassers chaired by Atty.
Martirizar convened and conducted its proceedings. That Petitioner filed an ex parte petition to
replace membership of the first City Board and was granted by the COMELEC. The second City
Board was chaired by Atty. Surmieda and conducted canvassing proceedings. Petitioner also
sought the transfer of the canvassing from the Session Hall to the 6 th ID Camp, Maguindanao.
That the second board also failed to finish canvassing and was replaced by a third board under
Atty. Bedol. This canvassing was interrupted by another petition from Petitioner for the transfer of
canvassing from Maguindanao to the COMELEC main office in Manila, which was granted. The
canvassing was done in the new venue and a notice was issued by the third board stating that
the resumption of canvassing in Manila will be on June 2, 2004. Despite the notice, the third board
resumed its canvassing on June 1, 2004 at the COMELEC Session Hall, ruling on all returns,
denying all petitions, canvassed election returns, then entered the votes and proclaimed the
winners. The third board then proclaimed Respondent as the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City.

Petitioner filed a consolidated petition to nullify canvass proceedings and proclamation by the
third board. The COMELEC 2 nd Division ruled against Petitioner’s contentions; hence, Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc and Commissioner Javier was
assigned as ponenta. COMELEC En Banc granted the reconsideration and the resolution of the
2nd Division was set aside. However, only three members of the En Banc voted in favor of such
resolution. Three members dissented and one member abstained. Therefore, upon failing to
obtain a majority vote, the COMELEC En Banc issued an order affirming the 2 nd Division. Hence,
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING
Yes. Considering that the Resolution of COMELEC 2 nd Division dated October 13, 2004 was
affirmed merely because the voting of the COMELEC En Banc on the Resolution dated February
10, 2005 penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier (which reversed and set aside the
Resolution dated October 13, 2004), was equally divided, this Court is compelled to look deeper
into this case.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the
Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that
the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was
conducted was a mere "re-consultation."

A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing". A consultation is a "deliberation of

persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation means a second deliberation of persons on
some subject. Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to
court's or administrative board's attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration.
A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to
be heard." But as held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals, A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.

Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of
presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments;
whereas, a re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand
only by the members of the tribunal, without the participation of the parties.

Additional Note: In Belac v. Comelec , when the voting of the Comelec En Banc ontherein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an
order setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
before voting anew on therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This should have been the
proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration when
the first voting was equally divided. Its own
Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En
Banc of the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the
rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Muñoz vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170678, 17 July 2006

DOCTRINE:

By ordering the re-canvass of all the election returns, the COMELEC En Banc in effect rendered
a decision on the merits of a case which was still pending before its First Division. This is in
violation of the rule that it does not have the authority to decide and hear election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, at the first instance. Election cases must first be heard and
decided by a DIvision of the COMELEC. COMELEC, sitting En Banc, does not have authority to
hear and decide the same at the first instance. COMELEC has no authority to decide cases: one
involving a pre-proclamation controversy on the preparation of election returns, and the other an
annulment of proclamation since proclamation was made by the BOC without COMELEC
authority – when the cases do not involve similar questions of law and fact.

FACTS:

In the evening of May 10, 2004 the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened and
canvassed the election returns of Albay in which the petitioner and the respondents were the
Candidates. On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent objected to the inclusion of the
26 Election Returns (ER) from various precincts based on the following grounds:

1. eight ERs lack inner seal;

2. seven ERs lack material data;
3. one ER lack signatures;
4. four ERs lack signatures and thumbmarks of the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors on the envelope containing them;
5. one ER lack the name and signature of the poll clerk on the second page thereof;
6. one ER lack the number of votes in words and figures; and
7. four ERs were allegedly prepared under intimidation.

The MBC denied it and still included the objected ERs. Private Respondent appealed to the
COMELEC. Despite the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner was proclaimed. On May 21, 2004,
private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the petitioner
for being premature and illegal; thereafter, the COMELEC rendered Resolution in SPC No. 04-
124 granting the petition to annul the proclamation for having been made in an irregular
proceeding and for being precipitate and premature. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

On December 15, 2005 COMELEC En Banc denied it where it affirmed the decision of the first
division. It also urges the Regional Director to constitute a New MBC and is directed to:

A. RECONVENE, and after due notice to all parties/candidates concerned,

B. RE-CANVASS all the election returns of Ca malig, Albay, and on the basis thereof,
C. PREPARE a new Certificate of Canvass, and forthwith
D. PROCLAIM the winning candidates for Mayoralty position.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On January 17, 2006, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and ordered the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the December 15, 2005 Resolution in SPC
No. 04-124.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it decided only the
Petition to Annul Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to consolidate private
respondent's appeal from the ruling of MBC since both cases were raffled to the same Division
and the issue in the latter case was not connected to, if not determinative of, the merits of the
former case.

RULING:

NO. The records are bereft of evidence that the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or
that the COMELEC First Division had granted the same. Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides that "when an action or proceeding involves a question of law and
fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be
consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number," however, this rule
is only permissive, not mandatory.
The Court has consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he
has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions
attached thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar
questions of law and fact. In the case at bar, the consolidation of SPC No. 04-087 with SPC No.
04-124 is inappropriate as they do not involve similar questions of law and fact.

SPC No. 04-087 assails the inclusion of the 26 ERs by the MBC on the ground that these were
incomplete, contained material defects and were prepared under intimidation, issues which are
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, SPC No. 04-124 is a petition for the annulment of
petitioner's proclamation for allegedly being prematurely done, in violation of Section 36(1) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6669 which instructs the board of canvassers "not proclaim any
candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the
objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party; any proclamation made in violation hereof
shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns/certificates will not affect the results of the
elections."

In fine, SPC No. 04-087 pertains to the preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation
controversy, while SPC No. 04-124 refers to the conduct of the MBC in proclaiming the petitioner
without authority of the COMELEC. In conclusion, Mere pendency of the two cases before the
same division of the COMELEC is not a ground for their outright consolidation. The discretion to
consolidate cases may be exercised only when the conditions are present. In any event, the
records are bereft of evidence that the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or that the
COMELEC had granted the same.

Panlilio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181478, 15 July 2009

DOCTRINE:
FACTS: The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province
of Pampanga during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On May 18, 2007, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest number of votes of Two Hundred Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Six (219,706) votes4 with a winning margin of One Thousand One
Hundred Forty-Seven (1,147) votes over the 218,559 votes of private respondent.

On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest5 against petitioner based on the
following grounds:

a). Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were deliberately misread
and/or mis-appreciated by the various chairmen of the different boards of election inspectors;

b). Thousands of votes of protestant such as "NANAY BABY", her registered nickname were
intentionally and/or erroneously not counted or tallied in the election returns as votes validly cast
for the protestant;

c). Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;
d). Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and erroneously mis-
appreciated or considered as marked and declared as null and void;

e). Ballots with blank spaces in the line for governor were just the same read and counted in
favor of protestee;

f). Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves and fake or unofficial ballots
wherein the name of protestee was written illegally, read and counted in favor of the latter;

g). Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots prepared by two (2)
persons were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of protestee;

h). Votes that are void because the ballots containing them were pasted with stickers or
because of pattern markings appearing in them or because of other fraud and election
anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted in favor of the protestee; and,

i). Votes reported in numerous election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of the
protestee, while votes in said election returns for the protestant were unlawfully decreased
("dagdag-bawas"), such that the protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those
actually cast in his favor, while the protestant appeared to have obtained less votes than the
actually cast in her (protestant’s) favor; and,

j). Moreover, buying of votes and other forms of vote-buying were resorted to by protestee in
order to pressure voters to vote for him or not to cast their votes for the protestant herein.6

On June 12, 2007, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest and counterclaims.

On February 6, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc issued the third assailed Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestee Eddie Panlilio’s Omnibus Motion dated August
7, 2007 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Order of the Commission
(Second Division) dated August 16, 2007 ordering the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of
Pampanga to defer the inventory, sealing and transmittal of the contested ballot boxes involved
in this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at such a disposition, the COMELEC En Banc ratiocinated that the assailed orders of
the COMELEC Second Division were interlocutory orders, which are not one of the orders
required by Section 5 (C) Rule 3 and Section 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to
be certified to the Commission en banc for resolution.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, on which the
omnibus motion was anchored, clearly mandates the Presiding Commissioner of the
Division of the COMELEC to certify the case to the COMELEC En Banc once a motion for
reconsideration is filed, regardless of whether the order or resolution sought to be
reconsidered is an interlocutory order or a final one.

RULING: The present controversy does not fall under any of the instances of which the
COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides:

SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. – The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of
the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an
action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.

This case is not among those specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in
which the COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is it one where a Division is not authorized to act
nor one where the members of the Second Division have unanimously voted to refer the issue
to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forum where
petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.

The July 23, 2007 Second Division Order was not a final disposition of the case. It was an
interlocutory order, which resolved an incidental matter and which did not put a complete end to
the controversy. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was
correctly resolved by the COMELEC Second Division, which issued the assailed order. Hence
the COMELEC En Banc cannot be faulted for issuing its February 6, 2008 Order denying
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to certify his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc
and to stay the order for the collection of ballot boxes.

Other notes:
This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC,7 where the Court has declared
that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division, which allegedly
was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, is provided in
Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently reads:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. –

(a) x x x.

(b) x x x.

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved
by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall
be resolved by the Division which issued the order.

In Repol, the Court held that since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory Order, the
same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the
COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the same case the Court added that:

Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs motions for
reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:
SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider
a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall
within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the import of this rule in this
wise:

Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely
disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in the case after its
issuance, that order is interlocutory.

Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration
of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.

It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final
character. Here, the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as
there was something more to be done, which was to decide the election protest. Being
interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC En
Banc.
Violago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194143, 4 October 2011

SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR., petitioner, vs. COMELEC IN ELECTIONS and JOAN V.

ALARILLA, respondents.

G.R. No. 194143. October 4, 2011.

DOCTRINE: The Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Comelec.

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Salvador Violago, Sr., and private respondent, Joan Alarilla, were
candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Private respondent Alarilla was proclaimed the winner.

On May 21, 2010, petitioner Violago, Sr., filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the
proclamation of private respondent Alarilla. In its assailed Order dated August 12, 2010, the
COMELEC Second Division dismissed petitioner's protest on the ground that the petitioner
Violago, Sr., belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.

On August 19, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc.
In its assailed Order dated September 21, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation
of Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the COMELEC Second Division committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the electoral protest of petitioner Violago, Sr. (YES)

(2) Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner Violago, Sr. (YES)

RULING:

(1) A perusal of the records of the instant case would show that petitioner was able to present a
copy of the Certification issued by the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan, attesting to the
fact that the Order sent by the COMELEC to petitioner's counsel informing the latter of the
scheduled hearing set on August 12, 2010 and directing him to file his Preliminary Conference
Brief was received only on August 16, 2010. Petitioner likewise submitted an advisory issued
by the Chief of the Operations Division of the TELECOM Office in Meycauayan that the telegraph
service in the said City, through which the COMELEC also supposedly sent petitioner a notice
through telegram, has been terminated and the office permanently closed and transferred
to Sta. Maria, Bulacan as of April 1, 2009. Respondent did not question the authenticity of
these documents.

On the basis of the abovementioned documents, the Court finds no justifiable reason why the
COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed petitioner's election protest. There is no indication
that the COMELEC Second Division made prior verification from the proper or concerned
COMELEC department or official of petitioner's allegation that he did not receive a copy of the
subject Order. In fact, it was only on the day following such dismissal that the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department, through the Second Division Clerk, sent a letter to the
Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan requesting for a certification as to the date of
receipt of the said Order stating therein that the "certification is urgently needed for the
proper and appropriate disposition" of petitioner's election protest. Fairness and prudence
dictate that the COMELEC Second Division should have first waited for the requested
certification before deciding whether or not to dismiss petitioner's protest on technical
grounds.

Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference Brief.
While it may be argued that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of the scheduled conference a
day prior to the date set through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the
fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly
prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the
outright dismissal of the protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication
of intent to violate the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is
justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner's protest.
(2) With respect to the COMELEC En Banc's denial of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, it
is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated
Election System, as well as Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly
require that a motion for reconsideration should be verified. However, the settled rule is that
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.

In past jurisprudence, the Court provided and reiterated that “The COMELEC may liberally
construe or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including
obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.”

Moreover, in the case of Pacanan v. Commission on Election, the Court clarified the mandated
liberal construction of elections laws, thus:

“...An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public
interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought
is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the
winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims
is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over
the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain,
by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation
of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Comelec. Thus, we have declared:

It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized
by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest,
unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not
only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice
of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for
an uncertain period one who's right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative
that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing
aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action.”

In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not
verified, the COMELEC En Banc should have considered the merits of the said motion in
light of petitioner's meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for
the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of one's claim or defense. It is the
denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. More particularly,
procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. As discussed above, the fact that
petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the preliminary
conference by means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to
dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable
notice and time to adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason
why petitioner was only able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference
itself. Petitioner's counsel may not likewise be blamed for failing to appear during the scheduled
conference because of prior commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent Motion to Reset
Preliminary Conference.

Hence, by denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, without taking into

consideration the violation of his right to procedural due process, the COMELEC En Banc
is also guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Cagas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, 24 January 2012

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista were candidate for Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. On may
14, 2010, canvassing of votes were cast in favor of the petitioner.

Alleging anomalies in the conduct of the election, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24,
2010. In his answer the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification
of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division issued the first order
denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The petitioner moved to reconsider on
the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to
the COMELEC en banc. the COMELEC First Division issued its second order, denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law.
Hence, petitioner commenced the present special civil action.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

HELD: No. Though Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution grants SC the power to review
any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC, this however is limited only to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

Basmala vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176724, 6 October 2012

FACTS:

The petitioner Kennedy B. Basmala (Basmala) and the private respondent Amenodin U.
Sumagayan (Sumagayan) were candidates for mayor in Taraka, Lanao del Sur during the May
10, 2004 National and Local Elections. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Sumagayan
emerged as the winner with 2,103 votes as opposed to Basmala's 1,866 votes. Contesting the
results in 21 out of the 43 precincts that functioned in Taraka, Basmala filed an election protest
docketed as Election Case No. 1415-04 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Lanao
del Sur, Branch 9.The trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner as the duly elected
municipal mayor of Taraka. The RTC arrived at this ruling by tallying the results in 38 precincts
after rejecting the results in the election returns of precincts 2-A, 19-A, 28-A, 30-A and 39-A.
Accordingly, the results were 1,831 votes for Basmala and 1,662 for Sumagayan.

Aggrieved, private respondent interposed an appeal with the COMELEC. On October 13, 2006,
the Commission's Second Division rendered the aforesaid assailed Resolution reversing and
setting aside the trial court's decision. It ruled that the RTC was in error when it merely relied on
the testimonies of Basmala's witnesses, who were his relatives and watchers, and discounted the
testimonies of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) chairpersons that the conduct of elections
in the contested precincts was generally orderly and peaceful. The COMELEC declared that the
evidence adduced was not sufficient to justify the invalidation of the election results in the 5
contested precincts. Further, the watchers of the candidates for the other positions in both the
national and local levels did not complain of any irregularity or fraud in the counting and
canvassing of votes. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that massive fraud attended
the elections in the said 5 precincts, the election returns therein should be upheld. Thus, after a
tabulation of the results in the COMELEC copy of the returns from the 43 precincts, the results
were 2,103 votes for Sumagayan and 1,866 for Basmala.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion tainted
the assailed COMELEC resolutions as to warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.

The COMELEC, in resolving the case, examined the records of the protest, the evidence
submitted by the parties, and the pertinent election documents. As it is the specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its findings of fact when supported
by substantial evidence are final, non-reviewable and binding upon the Court. Furthermore, the
appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the
COMELEC. Let it be reiterated that the Court is not a trier of facts and it will only step in if there
is a showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The petition for certiorari
is DISMISSED.

Sevilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203833, 19 March 2013

Doctrine: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting
business.

In the present case, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners
concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of
the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.

Facts: Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010. Sevilla was proclaimed as winner.
Private respondent So filed an election protest with the METC on the ground that Sevilla
committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. The
MeTC dismissed the election protest.

So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the MeTC for its non-
observance of the rule on appreciation of ballots. The COMELEC Second Division
granted So’s petition. The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec
Second Division’s ruling. Sevilla filed with this Court a petition for certiorari.

Respondent So contends that the petition was filed prematurely because the COMELEC
en banc Resolution was not a majority decision.

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari has been prematurely filed with the SC?

Ruling: The SC held in the affirmative and remanded the case to the COMELEC for
appropriate action.

Comelec en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required
by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each Commission shall decide by
a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution."

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of
the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business.

In the present case, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners
concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of
the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.

The COMELEC en banc’s Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.

Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion
of the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes,
however, that the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated
that what was conducted was a mere "re-consultation."

Re-consultation Re-hearing
 A consultation is a "deliberation of Rehearing is defined as a "second
persons on some subject;" hence, a re- consideration of cause for purpose of
consultation means a second calling to court’s or administrative
deliberation of persons on some subject. board’s attention any error, omission, or
oversight in first consideration. A retrial
of issues presumes notice to parties
entitled thereto and opportunity for them
to be heard."

A re-consultation involves a re- A rehearing clearly presupposes the

evaluation of the issues and arguments participation of the opposing parties
already on hand only by the members of for the purpose of presenting
the tribunal, without the participation additional evidence, if any, and further
of the parties. clarifying and amplifying their
arguments.

The Court find that a remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply
with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Villarosa vs. Festin, G.R. No. 212953, 5 August 2014

DOCTRINE: The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were
assigned to it before the substitution was made. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent
formation of the Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the Division's
composition of magistrates.

FACTS: Petitioner Villarosa and respondent Festin Festin were two of the four rival candidates
for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental. On May 15, 2013, Festin was proclaimed as the
winner.

Villarosa filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging
irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. In his answer, private respondent Festin
likewise impugned the election results in the precincts, particularly the number of votes credited
to petitioner.

With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical recount of
the ballots were conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro.

The RTC declared the proclamation of Festin void by deducting votes from Festin that were
allegedly pre-marked or tampered. Festin elevated the case to COMELEC via Petition for
Certiorari with a prayer for injunctive relief.
The COMELEC First Division, issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from implementing its Decision
during the pendency of the case. To Villarosa’s surprise, COMELEC granted Festin’s request for
a preliminary injuction, enjoining the RTC Decision’s execution pending appeal. What Villarosa
considered questionable was that the injunction was issued by a newly-constituted Special First
Division, which was allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC commissioners
who, at that time, were personally attending to the concerns of the overseas absentee voters
abroad.

ISSUE: Whether the orders of the Special First Division of COMELEC are valid, specifically the
granting of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuction.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under the 1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC en banc is strictly prohibited from entertaining
motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders unless unanimously referred to the en banc by
the members of the division that issued the same, whereas under COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, all motions for reconsideration filed with regard to decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings
of the COMELEC divisions are automatically referred to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, in view of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804's applicability in the instant petition, a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is available to petitioner herein.

With the availability of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at petitioner's disposal, his hasty
resort to certiorari to this Court cannot be justified. On this ground alone, the instant petition can
and should be dismissed outright.

Even delving into the merits of the case, it cannot be said that the issuance of the assailed Order
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion since public respondent's actions find sufficient
constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

Evidently, it is pursuant to this mandate that the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7808
on January 16, 2007. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the said Resolution, in part, provides:

Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division. —

(a) Temporary vacancy. — Whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously ill,

temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the junior
member of the other Division shall substitute such Commissioner, participating therein in an
acting capacity, in addition to his regular membership in his own Division.

xxx xxx xxx

Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division," as the
case may be, for purposes of the pertinent cases therein pending."

The above-quoted rule was amended by Resolution No. 9636 on February 13, 2013 to now read
as:

Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division. —

(a) Temporary vacancy. — Whenever a member of a Division is on Leave, seriously ill,

temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the
Chairman shall substitute him with another Commissioner, or the Chairman shall sit in place of
said member, and in that event he will preside.

HScDIC

xxx xxx xxx

Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division" as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent case therein pending.

With the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special
Divisions is not only sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution no
less.

No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special
First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Strictly speaking, the
COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the
vacancies in both of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates
that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via
substitution.

Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 211789-90, 17 March 2015

DOCTRINE: As a Rule 64 petition (viewed from a Rule 65 approach), the Court’s standard of
review is "grave abuse of discretion" or such "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." A lower court or tribunal’s
violation of the Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence or their use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint their action with grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of PHIC, issued an reassignment order directing
the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees. Thereafter, Aquino issued an Advisory
implementing the reassignment order.
With this, Avila filed before the COMELEC a complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado,
PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive VP and Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. Adre, Alonto and Macabato, along
with Romeo D. Albertoand Johnny Y. Sychua (PHIC Regional VPs) likewise filed before the
COMELEC a similar complaint for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h)
of BP 881 against Tito M. Mendiola, PHIC Senior VP for Operations Sector, and Ruben John A.
Basa, PHIC Group VP for Corporate Affairs.
Aquino, on the other hand, argues that the assignment order is beyond the purview of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737 as he issued it on January 8,2010, or prior to the start of the election period
that began on January 11, 2010.
COMELEC ordered the filing of an information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737
in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. It found a prima facie case against Aquino for violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 because while the reassignment order
was issued on January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the transfer ban, its implementation took
effect after the transfer ban had already set in. COMELEC affirmed in toto the said decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquino correctly availed the remedy under Rule 64 in assailing the decision of the
COMELEC.

RULING:
YES, As a Rule 64 petition (viewed from a Rule 65 approach), the Court’s standard of review is
"grave abuse of discretion" or such "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." A lower court or tribunal’s
violation of the Constitution, law or existing jurisprudence or their use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint their action with grave abuse of discretion.
In this petition, Aquino ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC as it found
prima facie case to indict him for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of
BP 881.
The SC emphasized it has no general powers of supervision over the COMELEC except those
which the Constitution specifically grants to the SC, i.e., to review its decisions, orders, and rulings
within the limited terms of a petition for certiorari.
Thus, in this Rule 64 petition, the scope of our review is limited to the question: whether the
COMELEC’s exercise of its powers as it issued the prima-facie-case-finding resolution and
Resolution No. 8737 was without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Aquino’s petition must prosper if the COMELEC, in appreciating and calibrating the evidence as
it arrived at the assailed resolutions, exceeded its authority or exercised its discretion in an
excessive, arbitrary, and gravely abusive manner. The grant of the petition based on these
asserted violations in effect recognizes that, in acting as it did, the COMELEC committed errors
of the level that effectively affected its jurisdiction.
Aquino’s petition must fail, however, if the COMELEC’s acts, even though viewed erroneous
under the terms of the asserted violations, were still well within the limits of its powers under the
Constitution and relevant statutes. The Court must, in such case, recognize the COMELEC’s
exercise of its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions to be proper and well within its
jurisdiction.
Viewed in this light, the court grants the petition and found that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion
 Querubin vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 218787, 8 December 2015
Querubin vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015

Doctrine:

The phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional commissions, the

COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not
all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise
of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the
provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority
to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of elective offices.

Facts:

COMELEC en banc released the bidding documents for the two-stage competitive bidding
for the lease of EMS and precint based OMR or Optical Scan System. Smartmatic JV submitted
bid for the project. Indra Sistemas, SA and MIRU Systems likewise signified their interest in the
project, but only Indra submitted its bid. Smartmatic JV informed the COMELEC Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) that one of its partners has a pending application with the SEC to amend its
AOI.

Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-end testing of their initial technical
proposals for the procurement project before BAC. BAC declared Smartmatic and Indra eligible
to participate in the 2nd stage of the bidding process. BAC then issued a Notice requiring them to
submit their Final Revised Technical Tenders and Price proposals. Smartmatic JV have tendered
a complete and responsive Overall Summary of the Financial Proposal. Indra was disqualified for
submitting a non-responsive bid.

After the conduct of post-qualification, BAC disqualified Smartmatic JV for failure to submit
valid AOI and the demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system shall be
capable of writing all data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least 2
data storage.

Smartmatic JV filed a protest with COMELEC en banc. COMELEC en banc declared that
Smartmatic JV’s OMR+ sufficiently satisfied the technical requirements. Petitioners now assail
the decision of the COMELEC en banc.

Issue:

Whether the judicial review under Rule 64 is applicable in assailing the COMELEC en
banc’s decision granting Smartmatic JV’s protest.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution states:

 Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members,
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

Though the provision appears unambiguous and unequivocal, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional commissions, the
COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-
encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the
provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the
sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of elective offices.

Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-
A, Section 7, should likewise be read in the same sense — that of excluding from its coverage
decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative
functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.
 Legaspi vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216572, 19 April 2016

DOCTRINE: Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules on Procedure provides:

Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is

equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied."

FACTS: Feliciano Legaspi sought for the disqualification of Alfredo Germar, Rogelio
Santos Jr. and Roberto Esquivel on the ground of rampant vote-buying during the days
leading to the elections. Germar emerged as the highest vote getter in the mayoralty
race. Santos, for his part, also appeared to have secured enough votes to be the second
councilor of the municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to become vice-mayor of
Norzagaray.

The COMELEC’s Special First Division has disqualified Germar and Santos. Motions for
Reconsideration were filed which resulted in a split vote. A rehearing was conducted
insofar as the electoral aspect of the case but the COMELEC en banc again failed to
come up with a majority consensus. The COMELEC en banc dismissed the
disqualification case based on Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedures, which states that ”When the Commission en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission.”

Unconvinced, the petitioner filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely erred in dismissing the disqualification case filed
against the respondents [NO]

RULING: The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of
the case when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing.

Section 7 of Article 1X-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other
constitutional commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a "majority vote of
all its members." When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELEC en
banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-
decision.
Verily, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot
decide or resolve by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be had after the
rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide on the part of the COMELEC en
banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the COMELEC en banc's, failure to
decide:

1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such action

or proceeding shall be dismissed;
2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The high court ruled that the failure of COMELEC en banc to reach majority votes on the
petition properly results in its dismissal as it further clarified that a motion for
reconsideration as a “mere continuation of an existing process” and does not change the
nature of the case filed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the COMELEC dismissing the disqualification
case filed against a mayor, a vice mayoral aspirant and a councilor in Norzagaray,
Bulacan. The high court through Associate Justice Jose Perez dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by defeated mayoral candidate Feliciano Legaspi against Alfredo German,
Rogelio Santos Jr. and Roberto Esquivel.
 Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, 5 July 2016

Doctrine: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all Commission on Elections' acts as Rule 65
applies for grave abuse of discretion resulting to ouster of jurisdiction.

Facts:

1. Respondents reiterate that the assailed notice and letter are not final orders by the
Comelec En Banc in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, thus, not subject to this
Court's review. Respondents contend that they merely implemented the law when they
issued the assailed notice and letter. These are reviewable not by this Court but by the
Comelec pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) of the Constitution on its power to decide
"all questions affecting elections." There are also remedies under Rule 34 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure on preliminary investigation for election offenses. Respondents submit
that petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Respondents submit that the tarpaulin is election propaganda that the Commission on
Elections may regulate. The tarpaulin falls under the definition of election propaganda
under Section 1.4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 for three reasons. First, it "contains
the names of the candidates and party-list groups who voted for or against the RH Law."
Second, "the check mark on 'Team Buhay' and the cross mark on 'Team Patay' clearly
suggests that those belonging to 'Team Buhay' should be voted while those under 'Team
Patay' should be rejected during the May 13, 2013 elections." Lastly, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin on the cathedral's facade to draw attention.
3. Respondents argue that size limitation applies to all persons and entities without
distinction. Respondents submit that when an election propaganda is posted by a
candidate or political party, it becomes a campaign material subject to the Comelec's
regulation under Section 9 of the Fair Elections Act. They argue that "the Fair Elections
Act regulates a variety of election-related activities that are not only engaged in by
candidates and political parties but also by other individuals and entities" in that Section 4
regulates publications, printing, and broadcast, while Section 5 regulates election surveys.
4. Respondents argue that the size limitation is a valid content neutral regulation on election
propaganda. As such, only a substantial governmental interest is required under the
intermediate test.

Issue: Whether the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents has merit
Ruling: The Motion for Reconsideration is denied with finality.

On respondents' argument on the prematurity of filing the case before this Court, we discussed
in our Decision that Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all Commission on Elections' acts as
Rule 65 applies for grave abuse of discretion resulting to ouster of jurisdiction. The five (5) cases
again cited by respondents are not precedents since these involve election protests or are
disqualification cases filed by losing candidates against winning candidates.

Petitioners are not candidates. They are asserting their right to freedom of expression.

The urgency posed by the circumstances during respondents' issuance of the assailed notice and
letter the then issue on the RH Law as well as the then upcoming elections also rendered
compliance with the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies as unreasonable.

All these circumstances surrounding this case led to this Court's pro hac vice ruling to allow due
course to the Petition.
This Court's Decision discussed that the tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that
"primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will
cause the election or non-election of a candidate." It is not election propaganda as its messages
are different from the usual declarative messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression
with political consequences, and this court's construction of the guarantee of freedom of
expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation
of the speaker's viewpoint or the content of one's speech."

We recognize that there can be a type of speech by private citizens amounting to election
paraphernalia that can be validly regulated. However, this is not the situation in this case. The
twin tarpaulins consist of a social advocacy, and the regulation, if applied in this case, fails the
reasonability test.

Lastly, the regulation is content-based. The Decision discussed that the form of expression is just
as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression, and size does
matter.

Labao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212615, 19 July 2016

DOCTRINE

The definition of ‘fugitive from justice’, thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

FACTS

Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. (Ludovico) filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking the disqualification of Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. (Labao, Jr.) as
candidate for Mayor of the Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz in the May 13, 2013 elections, on
the ground that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice. Ludovico essentially averred that there was
an outstanding warrant for Labao, Jr.'s arrest in connection with the filing of an Information for
Murder against him and four other persons, which stemmed from the assassination of Vice-Mayor
Abel P. Martinez;and that he had eluded arrest, thus, was at large.

Labao, Jr. denied the assertion that he was a fugitive from justice. He countered that there was
no charge against him when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC); and that he was only
implicated in the crime when one Roger D. Loredo filed his extrajudicial confession. Further,
Labao, Jr. asserted that he was confined at St. Paul’s Hospital in Iloilo City due to constant chest
pains occasioned by an enlarged heart; and that he learned from his staff that police authorities
had surrounded the hospital and they personally heard a police officer say “Shoot to kill si Labao.”
Instinctively, without any intent to elude arrest, but for the singular purpose of preserving his life,
he was forced to leave the hospital. Finally, Labao, Jr. puts emphasis on the fact that he had
already been proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz on May 14,
2013.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to disqualify
Labao, Jr.; and held that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice, i.e., that his acts subsequent to
the filing of the Information for murder and the issuance of a warrant of arrest indicate an
unmistakable intent to evade prosecution. Labao, Jr. sought for the reconsideration of said
resolution.

In the meantime, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capiz issued an order on November 4, 2013
temporarily suspending the proceedings in consideration of a July 15, 2013 DOJ Resolution
issued by Undersecretary Francisco F. Baraan III (Baraan Resolution) excluding Labao, Jr. from
the Information for murder of Vice-Mayor Martinez. On November 14, 2013, however, DOJ
Secretary Leila De Lima reversed the

Baraan Resolution, effectively reinstating Labao, Jr. as an accused in the criminal case filed
before the RTC. In yet another twist of events, on May 21, 2014, the RTC issued another order,
this time dismissing altogether the criminal complaint against Labao, Jr. on the ground of lack of
probable cause.

In a Resolution dated May 21, 2014, the same day as the issuance of the abovementioned RTC
order, the COMELEC En Banc denied Labao, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration, affirmed his
disqualification, and declared null and void his proclamation as mayor.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES

1. Was the petition against Labao, Jr. one for disqualification, or a preproclamation controversy?

2. Was Labao, Jr. a fugitive from justice at the time that he was a candidate for

Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz?

RULING

1. YES. The petition against Labao, Jr. was one for disqualification, and not a pre-proclamation
controversy.

The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) clearly defines the term “pre-proclamation controversy.”
Pertinently, Section 241 thereof provides as follows:

“Sec. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or

affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.”

From the foregoing provisions of the OEC, it is quite clear that the petition for disqualification filed
by Ludovico docketed as SPA Case No. 13-294 (DC) in no way qualifies as a pre-proclamation
controversy, having absolutely nothing to do with any matter or ground pertaining to or affecting
the proceedings of the board of canvassers or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns.
Thus, in this case, the petition filed against Labao, Jr. does not come within the scope of a pre-
proclamation controversy under the aforequoted OEC provision.

The grounds to file a petition for disqualification are provided for in Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code. In the case at bar, the petition for
disqualification against Labao, Jr. was based on Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code,
disqualifying “[f]ugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad” from running
for any elective local position.

2. NO. Labao, Jr. was not a fugitive from justice at the time that he was a candidate for Mayor of
Mamhusao, Capiz during the May 13, 2013 Elections.

Based on settled jurisprudence, the term “‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.”

In Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that: “The definition thus indicates that
the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction.
And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment
of conviction.”

The COMELEC anchored its finding that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice from the fact that
he was missed at the hospital when the warrant for his arrest was being served. No other
substantial evidence was presented to prove that Labao, Jr, tried to hide from the authorities or
that he left Mambusao, Capiz to avoid being arrested and prosecuted. On the part of Labao, Jr.,
he was able to show his presence in Mambusao, and his desire to participate in the proceedings
before the DOJ and the RTC. Moreover, there was no proof to show the efforts exerted by the
police to locate Labao, Jr. and that despite such efforts, the warrant of arrest against him could
not be served.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the pieces of evidence on record do not sufficiently
establish Labao, Jr.'s intention to evade being prosecuted for a criminal charge that will warrant
a sweeping conclusion that Labao, Jr., at the time, was evading prosecution so as to disqualify
him as a fugitive from justice from running for public office.
 Prohibitions and offenses
Pangkat Laguna vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, 4 February 2002
DOCTRINE: Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered `campaigning.'
Only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition and
enumeration.

FACTS: Respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by succession
the office of the Governor. Later, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial position
of Laguna.

Herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a
petition which sought to disqualify respondent as candidate in the gubernatorial race alleging

1. that respondent is guilty of premature campaigning as she kept buying items — such as
trophies, basketballs, volleyballs etc —for distribution — when such serves no public
purpose but to promote her popularity as a candidate." and
2. that respondent Lazaro violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused the bidding of
seventy nine (79) public works projects on 28 March 2001.

On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the duly
elected Governor of Laguna in the 14 May 2001
Elections. Thus, petitioner Pangkat Laguna filed a Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or to
Suspend Effect of Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646. This was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on 24 May 2001 through a resolution.

Thus, through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner now assails the
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated 24 May 2001, for having been "issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction."

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent committed premature campaigning violated (NO)

2. Whether respondent violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code providing for
the prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.

RULING: The Court held in the negative.

1. The Court found that the petitioner’s claim of "premature campaigning" against respondent was
without merit. The Supreme Court held that the act of respondent as Chief Executive of the
Province of Laguna in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent distribution
thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the local government unit's sports and education
program was not constitutive of the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity
contemplated and explicitly prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

The Supreme Court emphasized that not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be
considered `campaigning.' Only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be
covered by the definition and enumeration.

Thus, the Court upheld the CA’s ruling that respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of
the implementation of the questioned sports and education programs. The Court also ruled that
the petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the questioned purchase
and distribution of the aforesaid items were, in any significant way, perpetrated for the purpose of
promoting the candidacy of respondent Lazaro or were, in any manner, calculated to directly or
indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of respondent.

2. Likewise, the Court held that evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate
petitioner's bare allegation that — in furtherance of the public bidding conducted on 28 March
2001 — public funds were ever released, disbursed or expended during the 45-day prohibitive
period provided under the law. Absent such clear and convincing proof, the Court found no cogent
reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of respondent COMELEC.
 Baytan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, 4 February 2003

DOCTRINE:

Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State
to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. Section 267 of the
Election Code provides that "election offenses shall prescribe after five years from
the date of their commission."

In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997
when petitioners registered for a second time in a different precinct without
canceling their previous registration.

At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
offender.

Specifically, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint

even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. The
COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu
proprio under Sections 3, 4 and 5, Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

FACTS:

In June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections
when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio ("Ignacio" for
brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in
Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.

Petitioners registered in this precinct as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos.

41762473, 41762472 and 41762470.When petitioners returned home, they wondered
why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners
to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18.

They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay
28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew
on June 22, 1997 as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos. 42662969,
42662968 and 42662917.Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997
to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a
copy thereof to COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias. In this letter, petitioners requested
for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They also explained the reason
and circumstances of their second registration and expressed their intention to redress
the error.

On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of
petitioners’ Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Juanito V. Ravanzo ("Ravanzo" for brevity), for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter
to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department endorsed the
case to Ravanzo for resolution. On January 10, 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an
information for double registration against petitioners. In an en banc meeting held on
November 09, 2000, the COMELEC in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 affirmed the
recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC en
banc denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different
precincts without canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC
found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding of
probable cause.

The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct No. 83-A of
Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City.
However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents of No.
709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC noted
further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies.
Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to register.

However, Ignacio's affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct of
Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that petitioners registered in the
wrong barangay. Contrary to petitioners' sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of
petitioners, had another version. She claimed in her affidavit that on June 15, 1997,
Ignacio went to their house to inform them about the redefinition of their barangay's
territorial jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her sons to Barangay 18 to
register.
The COMELEC also pointed out that since "double registration" is malum prohibitum,
petitioners' claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did the
COMELEC consider petitioners' letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application to cancel
their previous registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after their
second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had
already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.

Moreover, petitioners' claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance
with the Election Code's requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters
of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation.

The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

Lanot vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, 16 November 2006

FACTS
On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot, et al,. filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68
and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and
Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an
election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign
period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored
by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the
publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters,
and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to
schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him.

The ruling of the regional director onMay 2004, recommends that the instant petition be granted,
pursuant to section 68 (a) and (e) of the omnibus election code, the respondent Vicente Eusebio
is disqualified to run for the position of mayor, Pasig city for violation of section 80 of the omnibus
election code.

In its 5 May 2004 resolution, the COMELEC First Division ordered the pertinent election officials
to delete and cancel Eusebio’s name from the certified list of Pasig City mayoral candidates, not
to count votes cast in Eusebio’s favor, and not to include votes cast in Eusebio’s favor in the
canvass of election returns. Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution on 9 May
2004. Hence, COMELEC Chairman Abalos issued a memorandum on 10 May 2004 which
enjoined the pertinent election officials from implementing the 5 May 2004 resolution. In a
Resolution dated 11 May 2004, theCOMELEC En Banc subsequently ratified and adopted
Chairman Abalos’ 10 May 2004 memorandum when it denied Lanot’s motion to suspend the
counting of votes and canvassing of election returns.
Lanot claims that Chairman Abalos whimsically grabbed the adjudicatory power of theCOMELEC
En Banc when he issued the 10 May 2004 memorandum. Lanot asserts that the last sentence in
the dispositive portion of the COMELEC First Division’s 5 May 2004 Resolution, "[t]his
Resolution is immediately executory unless restrained by the Commission En Banc,"
should have prevented Chairman Abalos from acting on his own.

ISSUE
Whether Eusebio violated Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code (NO)

RULING
There is no basis to disqualify Eusebio. Director Ladra recommended the disqualification of
Eusebio "for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code."The COMELEC First Division
approved Director Ladra's recommendation and disqualified Eusebio.

Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a "candidate" on 23 March 2004, even if constituting
election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are protected as part of freedom of expression
of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective public office. Acts committed by Eusebio
on or after 24 March 2004, or during the campaign period, are not covered by Section 80 which
punishes only acts outside the campaign period.

The 14 February 2004 and 17 March 2004 speeches happened before the date Eusebiois
deemed to have filed his certificate of candidacy on 23 March 2004 for purposes
other than the printing of ballots. Eusebio, not being a candidate then, is not liable for speeches
on 14 February 2004 and 17 March 2004 asking the people to vote for him.

They also presented Certification issued by Mr. Diego Cagahastian, News Editor
ofManila Bulletin dated 10 March 2004 and Mr. Isaac G. Belmonte, Editor-in-Chief
ofPhilippine Star dated March 2, 2004 to the effect that the articles in question came from the
camp of [Eusebio].

Eusebio is not liable for this publication which was made before he became a candidateon 23
March 2004.

Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only
on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by
Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436,
Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the
existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission
of the questioned acts.

By definition, the election offense in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be
committed during the campaign period. On the other hand, under Eusebio's
theory,unlawful acts applicable to a candidate cannot be committed outside of the campaign
period. The net result is to make the election offense in Section 80 physically impossible to commit
at any time. We shall leave this issue for some other case in the future since the present case
can be resolved without applying the proviso in Section 11 of RA 8436.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is
to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.

Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the applicable law prior to RA 8436,the
campaign period for local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the2004 local
elections, this puts the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. This also puts the last day
for the filing of certificate of candidacy, under the law prior to RA8436, on 23 March 2004. Eusebio
is deemed to have filed his certificate of candidacy on this date for purposes other than the printing
of ballots because this is the interpretation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
most favorable to one charged of its violation.

Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the
existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission
of the questioned acts.

COMELEC vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 171208, 7 September 2007

Doctrines: Congress has plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion jurisdictions of various
courts. It may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and
determined by a specific court. As applied to the current case, while BP 129 grants first level
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases with a penalty of less than a year but not
more than 6 years, the Omnibus Election Code clearly provides that any criminal action which
bears the same penalty save those arising from failure to vote or failure to register fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

FACTS: In 2005, the COMELEC, via its law department filed before the RTC of Caloocan an
information against respondent Genovia - docketed as Crim. Case No. C-73744, which alleged
that on the July 15, 2002 Baranggay and SK Elections, Genovia voted in substitution of another
– represented herself as Emely Genovia. She was charged with violation of Sec. 261(z)(3) of the
Omnibus Election Code that penalizes voting in substitution.

The RTC of Caloocan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing BP 129 Sec. 32(3)ii–
provided that jurisdiction of MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction for offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding (6) years. Under Sec. 264 of the Omnibus Election Code election
related offenses are punished with imprisonment of not less than one year, but not more than six
years

The COMELEC appealed via motion for reconsideration – argued that under Sec. 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction for any criminal action arising
from the Code except those relating to failure to register or failure to vote. The RTC denied motion
for reconsideration
The petitioners argue that under Sec. 268 of the Election Code, RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal offenses arising from the election code. Therefore, dismissal of the case
is improper.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the charge under Sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code?

HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. The BP 129 – Sec. 32 – which defines the jurisdiction
of first-level courts (MTC, MTC, MCT) does not cover criminal cases which, by direct provision of
law, fall within exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Therefore, because Sec. 268 of
the Omnibus Election Code clearly grants RTC exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
for any criminal proceedings arising from the code (except for offenses related to failure to vote
or failure to register) the RTC has jurisdiction over the current case.

"Any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or without the latter's knowledge
and/or consent." ii Sec. 32 – Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases – Except in cases falling within exclusive original
jurisdiction of RTC and Sandiganbayan, above courts shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine regardless of other imposable accessory penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, or value amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

SECTION 264. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall
not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification
to hold public once and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be
sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any
political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay one of not less than ten thousand pesos,
which shall be imposed upon such a party after criminal action has been instituted in which their
corresponding officials have been found guilty. SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. — The
regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.
From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 211789-90, 17 March 2015

DOCTRINE:

- Under Section 261 (h) of BP 881, a person commits the election offense of violation of the
election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any
official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior approval of
the COMELEC
- In Regalado Jr. vs. CA… In agreeing with the Solicitor General's position, this Court
declared that the terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever such that
"any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office
or agency, during the election period is covered by the prohibition."
 - Indeed, as used in Section 261 (h) of BP 881, the term whatever should be not be read
strictly in conjunction with only either the term transfer or the term detail ; nor should the
phrase transfer or detail whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the legal
prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules in reading provisions of law, the term —
whatever — as well as the phrase — transfer or detail whatever — should be understood
within the broader context of the purpose of BP 881.
- we reiterate our observation in Regalado that any personnel action, when caused or made
during the election period, can be used for electioneering or to harass subordinates with
different political Persuasions. This possibility — of being used for electioneering purposes
or to harass subordinates — created by any movement of personnel during the election
period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to prevent.

FACTS: Petitioner is President and CEO of PH Health Insurance Corp. (PHIC) who issued a
reassignment order of its employees. Due to this, a complaint was lodged against the petitioner
for violation of COMELEC resolution no. 8737 in relation to sec. 26(h) of BP 881.

The COMELEC declared that petitioner did violate said section when he directed the
transfer/reassignment of the PHIC officers and employees within the election period without prior
approval from the COMELEC.

Section 261 (h) considers an election offense for "any public official who
makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee
in the civil service . . . within the election period except upon prior approval of the
Commission

Petitioner sought a reconsideration but the COMELEC affirmed in toto the resolution,
hence this case.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737 that defined transfer, as
contemplated under Section 261 (h) of BP 881, to include all personnel action including
reassignment.

RULING:

Significantly, the terms make and cause indicate one and the same thing — the beginning, the
start of something, a precursor; it pertains to an act that brings about a desired result. If we read
these definitions within the context of Section 261 (h) of BP 881, the legal prohibition on transfer
or detail undoubtedly affects only those acts that go into the making or causing or to the
antecedent acts

When viewed in terms of how transfer or reassignments of government officers and employees
are usually carried into place, this act of making or causing often consists in the act of issuing the
transfer or reassignment order. To issue something means "to discharge, produce, send out,
publish, put into circulation, come out…

During this phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process, the official responsible for
issuing the order plays an active role at its center. The issuing of the order are his very acts. if the
orders are issued prior to the start of the election period, they are automatically rendered beyond
the coverage of the prohibition and the issuing official cannot be held liable for violation of Section
261 (h) of BP 881. Conversely, if the orders are issued during the election period and without
COMELEC approval, these are covered by the prohibition and renders the issuing official liable
for violation of Section 261 (h).

Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this
case based on the following facts:

First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and employees
before the election period.

Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHIC's intranet service, the reassignment order to all affected
PHIC officers and employees before the election period.

Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated clearly the affected
PHIC officers and employees as well as their respective places of reassignments, and was made
effective immediately or on the day of its issue, which was likewise before the election period.

Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of
the affected PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period.

Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of
the affected PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period.