[ G.R. No.

193652, August 05, 2014 ]

INFANT JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, ATTY. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B.
CABRERA, CELIA C. YANGCO, AND OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set aside
the August 17, 20103 and September 6, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioneras
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain
parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the
respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino
Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latteras child
without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon
Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in ParaAaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City.6 Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On
August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing about the
birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelinoas family that she
and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial
embarrassment. Marcelinoas family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with
Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. 9

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a
certificate10 declaring Baby Julian as aLegally Available for Adoption.a A local matching
conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was amatcheda
with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay
Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julianas adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together.12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a
Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate
declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009,
or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated
her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said
Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service,
DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelinoas brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin
informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory
at the University of the Philippines.14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel Constantino stating that it
would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel
Constantino that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the
child for adoption and the childas subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were
proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant
Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority
over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as
the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant
Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

In her petition, Christina accused respondents of ablackmailinga her into surrendering custody
of her child to the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for
adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for
adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond
the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child
and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition, the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding
Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July 28,
2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing
scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were also required to file their verified written
return to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the
service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying that
the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating to a biological
parentas custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the
child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give
respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance
as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their
memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the appearance of
the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments raised during
the said hearing.

Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the
issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
 2. Whether or not this petition is the proper remedy based on the facts of the case and
prayer in the petition; and

3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be
given to his biological mother.

The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on
these three main issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for the
resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00
a.m.21

In the same order, Judge Sale also acknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought
before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of
the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that
Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code
and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by
another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a
principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that since the RTC
assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-
bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, denied Christinaas motion for
reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong remedy
and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation
to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court
(1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No.
9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated by
the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the
aenforced separationa between her and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and
security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could
be reunited with her son.28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for
a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor
child. This Court will not belabor to discuss Christinaas arguments relating to the supposed
unconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to repeal, alter and
modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the
provisions of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being
violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officersa enforcement of an illegal Deed of
Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims that she had been
ablackmaileda through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moonas
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the aforced separationa of the said
infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers
acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julianas custody. 30

The Court rejects petitioneras contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. a The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31 this Court held:

[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of aextralegal killingsa and
aenforced disappearances,a its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. aExtralegal killingsa are akillings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.a On the other hand, aenforced
disappearancesa are aattended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case
of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
to threats thereof. As to what constitutes aenforced disappearance,a the Court in Navia v.
Pardico33 enumerated the elements constituting aenforced disappearancesa as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
(b) or a political organization;

that it be followed by the State or political organizationas refusal to acknowledge or give

that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
(d) law for a prolonged period of time.

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her aenforced
separationa from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an aenforced disappearancea
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julianas whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWDas May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. 36 There is therefore,
no aenforced disappearancea as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christinaas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. 37

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED
without prejudice to petitioneras right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law
and related rules.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.