The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality

Author(s): David J. Kalupahana

Source: Philosophy East and West , Apr., 1974, Vol. 24, No. 2, Time and Temporality
(Apr., 1974), pp. 181-191
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1398021

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David J. Kalupahana The Buddhist conception of time
and temporality

During the early period of Indian thought, time (kdla) baffled the Indian
thinkers to such an extent that they came to look upon it not only as the
cause of the universe but also as an all-pervading principle which governs
everything in it.1 But as speculation advanced, time came to be considered
one of the causes which determines the course of natural phenomena. Thus,
a later Jaina scholiast, Silanka, attempting to explain the nonabsolutism in
Jaina thought, maintained that time can be recognized as one of the causal
factors in the evolution of nature, because it is found that certain events like
the flowering of trees, etc., occur at certain times only, not all the time.2
In the thought of the Upanisads, with its emphasis on permanence and
eternity and the resulting denial of change and causation as being illusory,
the problem of causation received scant attention. But in early Buddhism,
where there is a denial of permanence, the conceptions of change and
causality, and, hence, of time, occupied prominent places.
Causality (Pali, Paticcasamuppada; Skt., pratltyasamutpada) is the central
philosophy of early Buddhism. With the insight he gained as he sat con-
templating under the bodhi tree on the bank of the river Neranijara, the
Buddha realized that everything in this world of experience is causally
produced. It was this insight that enabled him to eliminate all the doubts
(kafikhd) he had entertained regarding the nature of existence.3 Thus, in
early Buddhism, the recognition of the fact that everything is impermanent
(anicca), conditioned (saiikhata), and causally produced (paticcasamup-
panna), along with the denial of anything permanent (nicca) or eternal (dhuva,
sassata) led to fruitful speculation regarding time. But it must be emphasized
that during this early period of Buddhist thought whatever reflections there
were on the problem of time were invariably connected with speculation
on the nature of things which are temporal (kalika).
Let us begin with the Buddha's conception of the universe. Unlike his
later Mahayana disciples who maintained that there is no beginning (ana-
varagra) of the world process (samsara),4 the Buddha insisted that the
beginning is totally inconceivable (anamatagga).6 Although the beginning is
inconceivable, yet it is possible to see periods of evolution (vivatta) and
dissolution (samvatta) following one another.6 These periods are reckoned
in terms of aeons (kappa), each of which is said to be of such immense
duration that it can only be illustrated by means of similes, and these became
very popular in Indian thought later on. One such simile is as follows: "If
there were to be a great mountain, one league in width, one league in length
and one league in height, a solid mass without chasms or clefts, and a man
at the end of every hundred years, were to strike it once each time with a
silken cloth, that mountain will sooner be done away with than would an

David J. Kalupahana is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii.

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182 Kalupahana

aeon."7 This passage, while emphasizing the immensity of time, also shows
that we can observe events only and use processes based on these events to
measure time.8 Thus we derive time from events which are in time (kalika),
but not vice versa.9

The processes of evolution and dissolution are said to take place in accor-
dance with the causal principle which is stated as: "When this exists, that
exists or comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this does not
exist, that does not exist or come to be; on the cessation of this, that
ceases."'? Since it has been pointed out that "there is a profound connection
between the reality of time and the existence of an incalculable element in the
universe," 1 let us pause to consider the nature of the causal principle stated
in the preceding formula. This causal principle was presented by the Buddha
in the background of several theories, one of which was popular in the early
Upanisadic tradition. In the early Buddhist texts, this is referred to as the
theory of self-causation (sayamkata-[vada])12 and was based on the belief
in a self (attan) considered to be the essence of everything (sabbam).
Thus, "everything exists" (Pali, sabbam atthi; Skt. sarvam asti)13 means
that this essence of everything exists. This leads to the view that the conse-
quence preexists in the cause, the future in the present. Such a strictly
determined causal principle would also mean that we can, by examining the
present, predict with absolute certainty what will happen in the future, for
the future is merely the hidden present. For this reason temporality becomes
a mere illusion.
The Buddha's theory of causality differs from this in that it is not a form
of strict determinism of this sort. The very use of the term 'when' (and this
idea is expressed by the use of the locative absolute construction in Pali),
which in this context is equivalent to the conditional particle 'if', should be
sufficient to show that the future events cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty. For this reason, we find that none of the extrasensory perceptions
recognized in early Buddhism refer to the future. As is well known, omni-
science (sabbaniinut), as later understood, was not claimed by the Buddha.
We come across only two instances when the Buddha made any kind of
prediction into the future with much certainty. One is the prediction that
a 'stream entrant' (sotdpanna) is certain (niyata) to attain enlightenment
(sambodhipardyana),14 and the other is that a person who has eliminated
craving and thus attained enlightenment will not be reborn (khina jati,
naparanz itthattdya).15 Both these could be considered knowledge based on
inductive inference (anvaye iiana).16 Depending on such inductive inferences
the Buddha recognized the future validity of the causal principle. This
prompted him to make such declarations as: "Whether the Tathagatas were
to arise in this world or were not to arise, this causal status, this causal
pattern, this conditionality remains."17 If this causal pattern is said to exist

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183

always in this world, and if "perceiving the dhamma means perceiving

causality (paticcasamuppada),"18 then it is possible to say that his teachings
will be valid at all times. It is only in this sense that the teaching (dhamma)
was described as being timeless (akalika).19 On the basis of this theory of
causality, it is possible to define the three periods of time, past, present, and
future, in the following manner: the past is the determined (=bhuta); the
present is the moment of becoming (=bhava); and the future is the as yet
undetermined (=bhavya) .20
Thus, using the terminology of Whitrow on the problem of time, it is
possible to say that according to Buddhism, "the future is hidden from
us-not in the present, but in the future."21 Time is the mediator between
the past and the present. Hence for that which is born (jatassa), death is
a matter of time. This may be the idea behind the use of the phrases kdlam
karoti22 (literally, "he does his time," "is fulfilling his time"), which means
dying, and kalam kaikhati23 (literally, "awaiting time"), that is, awaiting
death. For this reason, time assumes the position of Mara, the personification
of death. The famous quatrain in the Jataka runs:

Time consumes all beings

including oneself;
the being who consumes time,
cooks the cooker of beings.24

Although time is supposed to overwhelm ordinary human beings, yet the one
who has attained enlightenment is able to bring time under his control. Just
as he overwhelms Mara, the evil one, even so does he overcome time. He is
said to overcome time, not because he attains to a state of permanent existence
(as it was advocated in Mahayana),25 but because of two important reasons.
First, with the complete eradication of craving and attachment, he no longer
has any longing for existence or anything associated with it. Hence, dying or
'fulfilling time' (kalakiriya) never worries him, as it does the ordinary man.
Secondly, he has put an end to continued becoming (bhava). Thus, im-
mortality (Pali, amata; Skt. amrta) in early Buddhism becomes a synonym
of no-rebirth (a-punabbhava).26 He who has overcome the process of becom-
ing also overcomes time, because there is no time apart from the process of
becoming. As pointed out by Whitrow, ". .. the idea that time is ultimate
and irreducible does not commit us to the unnecessary hypothesis that it is
absolute, for moments do not exist in their own right but are mere classes
of co-existent events."27

It was mentioned that during the pre-Buddhist period there was a theory
which upheld that "everything exists." The foundation of this theory seems
to be the view that an event can never cease to be an event.28 Because of the
popularity this theory enjoyed during this period, the Buddha seems to have

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 184 Kalupahana

taken much trouble to refute it. In addition to the argument from experience
that he adduced to refute this theory, the Buddha also pointed out that it was
the result of a linguistic fallacy.29 His criticism runs thus:

Monks, there are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or

terms which are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are distinct at present
and will be distinct in the future and which are not ignored by the recluses
and brahmans who are wise. Which three? Whatever form (rupa) there
has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called,
reckoned or termed "has been" (ahosi); it is not reckoned as "it exists"
(atthi) nor as "it will be" (bhavissati). (The same is said about the other
four aggregates-sensation, perception, dispositions and consciousness.) . . .
Whatever form is not arisen, not come to be, is called, reckoned or termed
"it will be" (bhavissati) and is not reckoned as "it exists" or as "it has been."
. .. Whatever form has become and has manifested itself is called, reckoned
or termed as "it exists" (atthi) and is not reckoned as "it has been" or as
"it will be."30

It is very clear from this passage that the theory according to which the past
and the future exist in the present or even the view that a thing exists during
the past, the present, and the future are the results of unwarranted interpreta-
tion of linguistic usage. Here the temporal copulas "was," "is now," or "will
be" in propositions which assert temporal relations between events are being
confused with the timeless copulas of logic.
One of the arguments against the reality of time seems to be based on the
view that it is not an object of the five types of sense experience. Hence it is
nothing but a mysterious illusion of the intellect.31 For early Buddhism, which
not only recognized six senses but also held that the sixth sense (that is, the
mind) could be developed to perceive, with the help of memory, a long
period of one's past history, time was an important ingredient of experience.32
As if rejecting the theory of atomic moments of time, which is recognized to
be a logical abstraction,33 the Buddha is represented as saying: "This physical
body made up of the four primary existents is seen to exist for one, two, three,
four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, hundred or more years. That which
is called the mind, thought or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases
as another whether by night or by day."34 This is a clear recognition of the
two types of experience that we have. One is the experience of things which
endure for some finite segment of time, and the other is the experience of
momentary things. The latter experience is illustrated by the simile of the
flowing river. According to the description in the early Buddhist texts, "there
is no moment, no inkling, no particle of time that the river stops flowing."35
These two types of experience of time can be compared to the experiences
one has of the movement of the two hands of the clock, the hour hand and
the second hand.36 It is important to note that early Buddhism never reduced
the experience of the former to the experience of the latter, although logical
abstraction can always lead to such a hypothesis. In fact, a reduction of every

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185

form of experience into further indivisible moments (Pali, khana; Skt. ksana)
was carried out during the period of scholasticism, and such a theory is
conspicuous by its absence in the early discourses. Therefore, during the early
period, although there were statements which could be interpreted to mean
a theory of momentariness, the most dominant view was the one which
recognized a finite segment of time as constituting our immediate experience.
The recognition of this finite segment of time means that according to early
Buddhism there is a duration of temporal experience with a certain unification
of perspective. For this reason, unlike in the cases where a theory of moments
dominated,37 early Buddhism considered both time and causation as parts of
our experience, not as mere inferences based primarily on the succession of
momentary ideas. Thus, it is possible to maintain that early Buddhism
presents us with an empiricist analysis of time.
With regard to the problem of time, early Buddhism seems to have followed
the middle path, so famous in the history of Buddhist thought. It appears as
if it considered absolute time as an extreme and an unnecessary hypothesis.
The other extreme is the consideration of time as a mysterious illusion of the
intellect. Avoiding both these extremes, the Buddha seems to have considered
time as an essential feature of the universe and the experience of it.
With the development of scholasticism after the passing away of the Buddha,
this empiricist philosophy of time and temporality changed completely. Un-
bridled speculation during the period of the Abhidharma led to the develop-
ment of many theories which are more metaphysical than empirical.
In his desire to eliminate the pre-Buddhist conception of an eternal and
immutable self (attan), the Buddha adopted the analytical method (vibhaj-
javada) of reducing things to their components. Thus the human personality
was analyzed sometimes into five aggregates (Pali, khandha; Skt. skandha)
and at other times into six elements (dhatu). Yet all these aggregates, as
well as the elements, were the contents of experience, not of pure logical
analysis. But with the development of scholasticism, this analytical approach
was carried to its logical conclusion, and the result was the emergence not
only of a theory of atoms (paramdnu) but also a theory of moments (khana),
spatial analysis giving rise to temporal atomicity.38 The development of these
two theories occasioned several other doctrines which are not compatible with
the basic teachings of the Buddha.
One of the immediate results of the analysis of time into atomic units or
chronons was the view that time is fleeting or flowing from the future into
the present and from the present into the past. Thus, in the commentarial
literature, we come across expressions such as gacchante gacchante kale
meaning "as time passed by" or "with the passage of time."39
All these developments were summarized by Buddhaghosa in the Atthasd-
lini, his commentary on the Dhammasangani, where he refers to the three

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186 Kalupahana

varieties of the present (paccuppanna).4 The first is the protensive present

(addha paccuppanna) or the finite segment of time constituting our immediate
experience. This is said to be the kind of present recognized in the discourses
(sutta). The second is the flowing or the continuing present (santati paccup-
panna), which was then accepted in the commentarial tradition (at!hakatha).
The third is the momentary present (khana paccuppanna), which is not
identified with any tradition. Yet it was the conception mentioned last which
dominated the scholastic tradition.
Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Vibhaiga, the second book of the
Abhidhamma Pitaka, in introducing the theory of moments, says that it is a
doctrine peculiar to the Abhidhamma and not to the Suttanta. According to
this, ripa (matter or form) is classified as past, future, or present (atitanaga-
tapaccuppanna) in the Suttanta and this division is made on the basis of
becoming (bhavena paricchinna). In the Abhidhamma, however, the division
is made on the basis of moments (khanena paricchinna).41
These are different versions of the theory of moments. The Sarvastivadins
recognized four moments, the nascent (jati), the static (sthiti), the decaying
(jara), and the cessant (mnSa).42 Post-Buddhaghosan Theravada recognized
three: the nascent (uppada), the static (thiti), and the cessant (bhaniga).43
The Sautrantikas differed from all of them in accepting two moments only,
the nascent (utpada) and cessant (vyaya), and rejecting the static moment
(sthiti-ksana) .44
The difficulties posed by the analysis of time into atomic units are in-
numerable. Although a moment was considered to be the unanalyzable unit
of time, it was found that a distinction had to be made between a moment of
thought and a moment of matter, because, as pointed out earlier, thought
changes more rapidly than physical bodies.45 Therefore, in the Theravada
Abhidhamma it is said that during the lifetime of a single moment of matter
sixteen moments of thought arise and pass away.46
The most difficult problem created by the theory of moments concerned the
experienced continuity of temporal events. A moment was considered to be
durationless, comparable to the dimensionless point of space, and hence, past,
present, and future moments are utterly distinct from each other. They are
discrete. To explain the problem of continuity arising as a result of the
analysis of time into momentary and discrete units, the Buddhist schools
offered various solutions. The most widely known and the most severely
criticized of these different solutions was that proffered by the Sarvastivadins
who insisted that underlying the succession of momentary events is the sub-
stance or 'own-nature' (dravya, svabhava) which remains unchanged.47 Thus,
a thing (dharma) has two aspects: the characteristic (laksana) which is
temporal (kalika, ksanika) and the substance (dravya) which is eternal or

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187

timeless. The term sarvastivada means the "theory that everything exists"
(sarvam asti). This everything (sarvam) was the substance of everything
which, they held, exists during the three periods, past, present and future.
This theory was examined by the Theravadins in their Kathavatthu where
they make the Sarvastivadins admit that not only everything past, present,
and future exists, but that past, present, and future themselves exist, that is,
they are independently real.48 While the basic theory of the Sarvastivadins
was not much different from the Upanisadic theory of "everything exists"
referred to and criticized by the Buddha, there is also a significant difference.
Unlike the thought of the Upanisads which is idealistic, the Sarvastivada
represented a school of realism and therefore, as pointed out by the Thera-
vadins, they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of
time. It is interesting to note that in support of their rejection of this theory
of "everything exists" (sarvam asti), the Theravadins are represented as
quoting a discourse from the Buddha on the nature of linguistic conventions
referred to earlier.49
The school of Buddhism known as the Sautrantika rejected the Sarvastivada
conception of substance (svabhava) as being no different from the theory of
self (atman).60 But the rejection of this underlying substance compelled them
to the view that there is no duration whatsoever and that what appears as
duration is a series of fleeting moments, like the cinematograph. This con-
tinuum of durationless instants, no doubt, is the result of logical abstraction,
a theoretical construction based on the empirical data of consciousness. Unlike
the Theravadins who recognized two different types of moments, that is, a
moment of thought and a moment of matter, the Sautrantikas made no such
distinctions. The most important consequence of this conception of time was
the theory that there are no instantaneous connections between external
events and the observer.51 Hence there is no direct perception of an object;
there is inferential knowledge (anumana) only. Thus the Sautrantikas were
popularly known for their doctrine of "representationism," that is, the infer-
ability of the external object (bahydrtMhnumeyavdda).52
In the Mfilamadhyamakakaarik, Nagarjuna devotes one chapter to the
examination of the problem of time.53 It is indeed a very short but extremely
important chapter. There is no doubt that it was the Sarvastivada conception
of time which drew the criticism from Nagarjuna. The theory, as explained
by Candrakirti, recognized the existence of the substance of things during
the three periods. It was argued by the realist that since substance exists,
time with which it is associated also exists.54 It is this independent reality of
time which Nag5rjuna takes up for criticism. His criticism was based on the
fact that a thing (bhava) or its substance (bhavasvabhdva) and time (kala)
are relative to or dependent upon one another. Early Buddhism, as pointed

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 188 Kalupahana

out earlier, would have stopped at this point, but Nagarjuna did not. He
employed his dialectic to demonstrate the unreality or nonexistence of time.65
Nagarjuna's argument was based on the assumption that two things cannot
be related unless they are coexistent. Hence, if present and future are held
to be contingently related to the past, then both present and future should
be in the past. Otherwise they cannot be contingently related. On the other
hand, present and future could not exist without being contingent on the past.
Hence, according to Nagarjuna, there is no justification for the recognition
of a present and a future time.56 The selfsame argument was used to refute
the reality of the past. Past, present, and future, which were comparable to
such concepts as above, below and middle (uttamadhamamadhyama), or
arising, enduring, and passing away (utpadasthitibhanga), etc., could not thus
withstand the onslaught of Nagarjuna's dialectic.
The opponents argued that time exists because it has dimension and is
measured in terms of moments, days, fortnights, months, and years.57 Nagar-
juna pointed out that it is not possible to measure time. He maintained that
nonenduring or nonstatic time cannot be measured, because it cannot be
manipulated, and that an enduring or static time, although manipulatable, does
not exist.58 By way of conclusion, Nagarjuna points out that if time exists
depending on existential structure, then it cannot be obtained without such
structure. But no existential structure is to be found, for he has already
refuted such a structure.59 Hence, according to him, time does not exist.
Nagarjuna claimed that his exposition of the doctrine is based on the
recognition of the two truths, the conventional (samnvrti-satya) and the ulti-
mate truth (paramartha-satya) .6 According to Candrakirti, the ultimate truth
is the independent (aparapratyaya), peaceful (Sdnta), without conceptual pro-
liferation (prapancatita), nonconceptual (nirvikalpa), and without plurality
(anekartha).6l Hence, Nagarjuna's, no doubt, was a transcendentalist criticism
of phenomenal reality. This would become clear from a comparison of the
standpoints adopted by the two schools, early Buddhism and Madhyamika.
When early Buddhism maintained that things are relatively real, Nagarjuna
insisted that things are unreal because they are relative, the real being the
transcendental.
Summing up the whole discussion, I may say that (1) early Buddhism
presented an empiricist and relativistic conception of time; (2) the Abhid-
harma scholasticism produced an absolutistic conception mainly because of its
speculative approach, and (3) the Madhyamikas, as a result of their tran-
scendentalism, denied the reality of time.

1. Atharvaveda Sanhita, ed. R. Roth and W. D. Whitney (Berlin: F. Diimmler, 1924),

19.54; Maitri Upanisad 6.14 (see The Principal Upanisads, ed. and trans. S. Radhakrish-
nan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953)).

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189

2. Sitrakrtdniga with the commentary of Silinika, ed. A. S. Suri and C. Ganindra

(Bhavanagara, Bombay, Vijayadeva Sura, 1950-1953), i.31-2, "Tatha kalo 'pi karta,
yato bakulacampaka,okapunnaganagasahakaradinam vi?iSta eva kale puspaphaladyudbhavo
na sarvadeti."
3. Udana, ed. P. Steinthal (London: PTS, 1948, reprint), p. 1: "Yada have patubha-
vanti dhamma/atapino jhayato brShmaniassa/ath'assa kafikha vapayanti sabba/yato pa-
janati sahetudhammamr."/
4. Malamadhyamakakdrikas (hereafter cited as MK) des Nagarjuna, avec la Prasan-
napada commentaire de Candrakirti (hereafter cited as MKV), publiC par Louis de la
Vallee Poussin (St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences of USSR, 1903-1913), xi. 1.
5. Samyutta Nikaya (hereafter cited as S), ed. Leon Feer (London: PTS, 1884-
1904), i.178 ff.; Saratthappakasini, ed. F. L. Woodward (London: PTS, 1929-1937),
ii.156, anamattaggo aviditaggo.
6. Digha Nikaya (hereafter cited as D) ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter
(London: PTS, 1890-1911), iii.84-5; Taisho Shinshu Daizoky5 (hereafter cited as
Taisho), ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (Tokyo, The Taisho Shinshu Daiz6ky6
Kanko Kai, 1962, reprint), i.37b-c.
7. S ii.181-4; Taisho ii242a-243b.
8. Whitrow, G. J., The Natural Philosophy of Time (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons,
1961), p. 34.
9. Cp. J. Alexander Gunn, The Problem of Time (London, 1929), p. 323 (quoted by
Whitrow, op. cit. p. 36).
10. Udana, p. 1; Majjhima Nikaya (hereafter cited as M), ed. V. Trenckner and R.
Chalmers (London: PTS, 1948-1951), i.262-4; S ii28, 70, 96; MKV 9; Taisho i.562c;
ii.10a, 67a, 713c-714a.
11. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 295.
12. S ii.18; Taish6 i.76a; ii.81a, 86a-c.
13. S ii.17; Taisho ii. 85c.
14. D i.156; Taislh i.616c.
15. M i.184; Taisho i.658a. In fact, on one occasion it was anticipated that an outsider
might point out that the Buddha has knowledge with regard to the past but not with
regard to the future. The Buddha's reply was that, with regard to the past, his knowledge
follows in the wake of memory (satanusari) and that, with regard to the future, the
knowledge is that gained with enlightenment (bodhiiasa), namely, the knowledge that
there is no more future rebirth. See D iii.134; Taisho i.75.
16. S ii.58; cp. Taisho ii.99c-100a.
17. S ii25; Taisho ii.84b; MKV 40.
18. M i.190-1; Taisho i.467a, "Yo paticcasamuppadam passati so dhammam passati."
19. Anguttara Nikaya (abbr. A), ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy (London: PTS, 1885-
1900), iii.212, etc.; Taisho i.616c.
20. Cp., op. cit., p. 295.
21. The Natural Philosophy of Time, p. 259.
22. Vinaya Pitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg (London: PTS, 1879-1883), iii.80.
23. S i.187; Sutta Nipata, ed. D. Anderson and H. Smith (London: PTS, 1948), 516.
24. Jataka, ed. V. Fausboll (London, 1895-1907), ii260.
25. Kilo ghasati bhfitani sabban'eva sahattana,
yo ca kalaghaso bhiito so bhutapacanim paci.
Cp. Maitri Upanisad, 6.15. See also Theragathd, ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel (Lon-
don: PTS 1883), 661; MKV 386.
Speaking of the Tathagata, the Saddharmaputndartka-sitra (ed. H. Kern and B.
Nanjio (St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1912, p. 271)) says that he
remains for ever (sada sthitah).
26. S 1.174; Taisho ii27b.

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 190 Kalupahana

27. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 313.

28. See J. M. E. McTaggart, Nature of Existence (Cambridge: At The University
Press, 1927), ii.10.
29. S ii.17; Taisho ii.85c.
30. Cp. C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (Cambridge: At The
University Press, 1938), ii.316, "When I utter the sentence 'It has rained', I do not
mean that, in some mysterious non-temporal sense of 'is', there is a rainy event, which
momentarily possessed the quality of presentness and has now lost it and acquired instead
some determinate form of the quality of pastness. What I mean is that raininess has been,
and no longer is being, manifested in my neighbourhood. When I utter the sentence 'It
will rain', I do not mean that, in some mysterious non-temporal sense of 'is', there is a
rainy event, which now possesses some determinate form of the quality of futurity and
will in course of time lose futurity and acquire instead the quality of presentness. What
I mean is that raininess will be, but is not now being, manifested in my neighbourhood."
31. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 313.
32. D iii.134; cp. Taisho i.75b-c.
33. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 312.
34. S ii.94-7; Taisho ii.81c-82a.
35. A iv.137; cp. Taisho i.682b.
36. C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 351.
37. As a result of the acceptance of the theory of moments, David Hume reduced caus-
ation to mere succession of ideas. His theory of moments is very clearly set out in A
Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888),
p. 39 f.
38. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 153.
39. Dhammapada-atthakatha (London: PTS 1906-1914), i.319.
40. Atthasalin, ed. E. Miiller (London: PTS, 1897), p. 421.
41. Sammohavinodani (hereafter cited as VbhA) ed. A. P. Buddhadatta (London: PTS,
1923), p. 7.
42. Abhidharmadlpa (hereafter cited as Ad), ed. P. S. Jaini (Patna, K. P. Jayaswal
Research Institute, 1959), p. 104.
43. VbhA 7.
44. Sphutarthabhidharmakofavyakhya of Ya?omitra (hereafter cited as Sakv), ed. U.
Wogihara (Tokyo: The Publication Association of Abhidharmakosavyakhya, 1932-1936),
p. 33.
45. VbhA 25, Ruipam garuparinamam dandhanirodham, arupam lahuparinamam khip-
panirodham.
46. Ibid. 25-26, Rupe dharente yeva solasa cittani uppajjitva nirujjhanti. Tarn pana
sattarasamena cittena saddhimr nirujjhati.
47. L'Abhidharmako.a de Vasubandhu, traduction et annotations par Louis de la Vallee
Poussin (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-1925), v.52 ff.; Taisho xxix.104c; Ad 259; Tattva-
samgraha, ed. E. Krishnamacharya (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1926), i.504.
48. Points of Controversy (translation of Kathavatthu), by S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys
Davids (London: PTS, 1915), p. 84 ff.
49. Ibid. p. 95 f.
50. Sakv p. 362.
51. Whitrow, op. cit., p. 179, where it is given as a theory formulated by Albert Ein-
stein.
52. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, ed. V. S. Abhyankar (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Re-
search Institute, 1924), p. 36.
53. Chap. xix, Kalapariks.
54. MKV 382
55. MK xix.3, tasmat kalo na vidyate.

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191

56. Ibid. xix.l.

57. MKV 385.
58. MK xix.5.
59. See MK chapters iv, v, vii, xv, and xviii.
60. Ibid. xxiv.8.
61. MKV 493.

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