NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

EVOLUTION OF
WARFARE

May 2006

NAVAL SERVICE TRAINING COMMAND

SF 050607
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Record of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Letter of Promulgation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Definition of Measurement Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Professional Core Competency Objectives . . . . . . . . . . v

Course Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

List of Lesson Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Topic Area Outlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Instructional Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

“Military History: Is it Still Practicable?”. . . . . . . . xx

by Jay Luvaas
(At the time of this writing, also available at:
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/luvaas.htm.)

“Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military Art” . . . . xxxvi

“How to Get the Most Out of a Seminar Format” . . . . . . . xlix

by Dr. Bradley J. Meyer

Lesson Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-143

Instructor Resource Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix A

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE NO. DATE OF CHANGE DATE ENTERED BY WHOM

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

Evolution of Warfare is a survey of the operational art of

warfare from the beginning of recorded history to the present.
This curriculum guide provides an introduction, suggested
lessons, and reference material for a single semester course in
Evolution of Warfare.

The guide is a generic solution to a multi-faceted problem and

should be viewed and used as a tool in the preparation of more
detailed and personalized lesson plans. It is in no way intended
to limit the individual instructor's creativity or academic
freedom. It is expected that Marine Officer Instructors will
tailor their respective course syllabus and individual lesson
plans to their own strengths as instructors, the unique needs of
their students, and available classroom resources. However,
instruction should encompass the maximum breadth of the course
feasible while ensuring that each of the professional core
competencies is mastered.

Instructors should promote critical thinking skills throughout

this course of instruction and provide opportunities for
students to demonstrate progression in both the cognitive and
affective domains. Although this course focuses primarily on
the cognitive and offers many opportunities for analysis,
synthesis and evaluation, this curriculum can also be
instructive in the affective domain as students practice
valuing, organizing and internalizing aspects of the military’s
culture and methods. Instructors are encouraged to use their
own past experiences to illustrate and enrich their classroom
instruction.

This course is approved for implementation upon receipt. The

NROTC curriculum for Evolution of Warfare, CNET P1550/7 (3/94),
is hereby cancelled and superseded by this curriculum guide.

22 May 2006
Date

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

DEFINITION OF MEASUREMENT TERMS

I. Know - Recall facts, bring to mind and recognize appropriate

material.

Examples: Know the objectives of damage control aboard

ship.

Know the safety procedures used to provide the

fullest measure of safe small boat operations.

II. Comprehend - Interpret principles and concepts and relate

them to new situations.

Examples: Comprehend the mission of the U.S. Navy and the

U.S. Marine Corps.

Comprehend the concept of internal forces

(e.g., stress, strain, shear, etc.).

III. Apply - Utilize knowledge and comprehension of specific

facts in new relationships with other facts, theories, and
principles.

Examples: Apply correct plotting procedures when

navigating in piloting waters.

Apply correct procedures to determine times of

sunrise and sunset.

IV. Demonstrate - Show evidence of ability in performing a task.

Examples: Demonstrate third-class swimming skills and

fundamental water survival skills.

Demonstrate the correct procedures used in

radio-telephone communications.

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

PROFESSIONAL CORE COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES

The professional competency objectives for this course are from

the Professional Core Competency Manual for Officer Accession
Programs promulgated in April 2001.

Comprehend the evolution of the means and methods of warfare,

particularly land warfare, including the following typical areas:

1. Know the preeminent leaders and military organizations of

history and the reasons for their success.

2. Know the interrelationship between technological progress and

military change in rendering obsolete previous successful
strategies, policies, doctrines, and tactics.

3. Comprehend the evolution of the influence of economic,

psychological, moral, political, and technological factors.

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COURSE OVERVIEW

I. OVERVIEW. The purpose of the Evolution of Warfare course is

to provide the Marine Option midshipmen with a very basic
understanding of the art and concepts of warfare from the
beginning of recorded history to the present day. Emphasis
should be placed upon educational value, vice training. The
intent of the curriculum is to familiarize the students
(future Marine officers) with an understanding of the
threads of continuity and the interrelations of political,
strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels of
war from the past, while bringing into focus the application
of these same principles and concepts to the battlefields of
today and the future.

II. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES. Throughout this course, military

history is used as a means by which the future officer may
challenge and question the decisions of the past. While the
violence and uncertainty of the battlefield cannot be
recreated, an appreciation for the complexities and dynamics
posed by the art and science of warfare can be realized.
Therefore, we must take the opportunities to learn lessons
presented by the past, while acquiring knowledge of the
present and future, in order to better anticipate future
conflicts.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. The curriculum guide is divided into 12 chronological

topic areas, with 33 lesson outlines (each designed for
approximately one hour of classroom time). This
material provides a “skeletal” framework of content,
references, readings, broad learning objectives, and
key points or highlights geared toward a single
semester (one term) course. This allows the instructor
to fill in the “muscle” of the course outline and
provide whatever perspectives deemed necessary to
assist the student in gaining insights into the
relationship between politics and war and/or between
societal values and their respective military forces.

B. The primary element in a successful education is the

student. Every effort should be made to encourage

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 active participation. It is the job of the Marine
Officer Instructor to ensure each student meets the
professional core competency objectives of the course.
Any method employed to make the material more alive, to
encourage problem solving, and to make this survey of
military history more relevant and useful is highly
encouraged.

C. Every instructor will approach the task of teaching the

professional competency objectives in a manner best
suited to his or her strengths, weaknesses, and
experiences. For those who are beginning in earnest
their professional historical studies, “Military
History: Is it Still Practicable?” by Jay Luvaas,
“Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military Art”
(USMA), and “How to Get the Most out of a Seminar
Format,” by Dr. Bradley J. Meyer, are provided as part
of this overview. It is hoped that the ideas and
framework provided in these articles will be of help to
both the avid military historian and those with less
knowledgeable backgrounds.

IV. COMMON THREADS/THEMES. The study of warfare and weapons can

be presented in a number of ways. MCDP 1, Warfighting, and
MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, review and consider the levels of war
from the political/strategic through tactical levels of
warfare and provide one framework. This framework is by no
means the only method for studying warfare at the
introductory level, but it is a good starting point. The
examination of leadership and its effect on combat
effectiveness could present some interesting challenges.
The framework used to add focus to these diverse areas of
concern can be developed using the course’s professional
competency objectives and more specific learning objectives
designed by the instructor for the lessons. This design
assumes instructor preparation and knowledge of the subject
matter and, in most cases, demands that the student prepare
and actively participate.

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LIST OF LESSON TOPICS

Lesson
Number Title Page

THE NATURE OF WAR

1 Introduction....................................... 1
2 Man and War........................................ 4

CLASSICAL WARFARE

3 Development of Warfare in Ancient Times............ 8

4 Alexander and the Macedonian System................15
5 Roman Modifications, Hannibal, and
the Punic Wars.....................................19
6 Pax Romana.........................................25

BYZANTINE AND FEUDAL WARFARE

7 The Byzantine Empire...............................29

8 Feudal Warfare and the Renaissance of the
Military Art....................... ...............33

THE AGE OF TRANSITION

9 The Spanish Square and the Great Armada............39

10 The 17th Century and Military Innovations..........44
11 Limited Warfare in the Age of Monarchs.............50

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

12 The American Revolution............................55

13 The French Revolution..............................59
14 Napoleon...........................................63
15 Clausewitz/Jomini..................................67
16 Industrial Revolution and Warfare..................72
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

17 The American Civil War.............................76

PAX BRITANNICA AND THE PRUSSIAN INFLUENCE

18 Pax Britannica and Colonialism.....................83

19 The Prussian Influence.............................87

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LIST OF LESSON TOPICS (CON’T)

Lesson
Number Title Page

WORLD WAR I

20 World War I........................................91

INTERWAR YEARS

21 The Rise of Communism..............................98

22 Interwar Years...................................101
23 Technological Advances...........................105
24 Japanese Ascendancy in the Pacific................108
25 The Rise of Nazism and War in Europe..............111

WORLD WAR II

26 World War II in Europe and the Atlantic...........116

27 Post-World War II Military Development............123

POST WORLD WAR II

28 The Korean Conflict...............................126

29 Wars of National Liberation.......................129
30 Vietnam...........................................132
31 Conflicts in the Middle East......................135

WAR TODAY

32 Terrorism.........................................139
33 The Gulf War (Desert Storm).......................141

As noted previously, sample “slides” are available at

https://www.cnet.navy.mil/cnet/nrotc/cig.html and from the Course
Coordinator. Also available from the Course Coordinator are
additional lessons for each of the twelve topic areas. These
lessons were deleted from the previous edition of this guide in
an effort to reduce the size of the document, which was
originally designed to support a two-term course. However, some
instructors may still find them of value as a reference or to add
depth and focus to an area of limited coverage. They may be
especially useful for the instructor planning a lecture format.

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

TOPIC AREA OUTLINES

Throughout this curriculum guide, 12 chronological topic areas

are used to provide continuity between the volumes. The
following outlines provide a general framework that instructors
can use to develop their own personalized curriculum.

1. The Nature of War

This topic will set the tone for the remainder of the course.
The student should be introduced to the concepts contained in
MCDP 1, Warfighting, particularly those found in Chapters 1 and
2. This will give the student a sound theoretical foundation and
a point of reference for the remainder of the course.
Additionally, the handouts “Military History: Is it Still
Practicable?” and “Fundamental Concepts: History of the
Military Art” should be used to examine the usefulness of history
and to provide a sound foundation of military operational
language.

2. Classical Warfare: Macedonians and Romans

The era of the ancient Greeks and Romans presents the first well-
documented period of military history in the western world. The
impacts of political and economic institutions on warfare are
introduced. The development of the phalanx (Greek), articulated
phalanx (Macedonian) and legion (Roman) as weapon systems, as well
as tactical organizations, can be studied. Great Captains, such
as Alexander, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar, are also examined.

3. Byzantine and Feudal Warfare (Mongol Warfare)

The collapse of the Roman Empire in the West presents a whole new
set of political, economic and social realities -- the result of
which is the establishment of the feudal system relying on heavy
cavalry for military effectiveness. The Battle of Hastings is
studied as an example of the enduring value of combined arms
despite prevailing conventional wisdom. The Byzantines, on the
other hand, continue the Roman tradition of scientific warfare,
albeit adapted to new conditions. Their system of staffing and
education is in many ways a precursor of the German General Staff
system. The Byzantine cataphract was the mounted successor of
the Roman legionary. The campaigns of Belisarius and Narses are

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of particular interest for their applications of speed, deception
and combined arms.

Of all the military systems of the ancient world, the Mongols

have the most to offer modern students. The Khwarezemian
Campaign of Genghis Khan (1219-1220) and Subotai’s invasion of
Europe (1237-1241) are used to vividly illustrate the operational
concepts contained in MCDP 1-2. As these campaigns demonstrate,
the Mongols were the supreme practitioners of maneuver warfare
prior to the age of gunpowder.

4. The Age of Transition (15th and 17th Centuries)

The breakdown of the old feudal order and the emergence of the
modern world had far reaching effects on warfare. Technology
began to have a significant and rapidly evolving impact on
weapons, tactics and organizations. The solutions to the
problems posed by this evolving technology used by Gonzalvo de
Cordoba, Maurice of Nassau, and Gustavus Adolphus are worth
serious attention. The pace of change and the suddenly increased
lethality of weapons during this period are precursors to modern
times. The emergence of the strong, centralized, dynastic state
results in the bureaucratization of warfare. The expense and
lethality of late 17th to early 18th century battles lead to a
highly stylized, even ritualistic, approach to warfare with
emphasis on maneuver, fortification and siege operations.
Mercantilist economic philosophy is a critical component of this
period. Commanders, such as Marlborough and Frederick the Great,
who attempted to transcend the bonds of their time, are examined.
The French and Indian War of 1754-1763 (Seven Years’ War in
Europe) is in many ways the First World War, and its impact is
studied. The reintroduction of light troops and the theories of
Marshal de Saxe are also important elements of this topic.

5. The Revolutionary Period

While not all that remarkable from a purely military standpoint,

the contrasting approaches of Washington and Greene are an
interesting case study. From the political/social standpoint,
the American Revolution paves the way for the emergence of
nationalism as the most important force in world affairs.

Frenchmen are no longer subjects of a king, but citizens of a

modern nation-state with the right and the responsibility to bear
arms in defense of the state. This revolutionary concept makes
available hitherto unimagined manpower for military purposes.
The military currents of the latter portion of the age of

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maneuver (e.g., light troops, skirmisher tactics, divisional
organization and the artillery reforms of Gribeauval) also come
together to change the face of the battlefield. One of the
greatest of the military captains, Napoleon, capitalized on all
that preceded him during the revolutionary period and forged one
of the finest, most cohesive, and most responsive military
instruments in history. The Grand Army, under his leadership,
practiced maneuver warfare in a manner clearly reminiscent of the
Mongols. The Italian Campaigns (1796-97 and 1800), Ulm-
Austerlitz and Jean-Auerstadt all provide abundant material to
illustrate concepts found in MCDP 1-1. Wellington’s counter to
Napoleonic methods and Napoleonic interpreters, Jomini and
Clausewitz, are introduced to round out this topic.

6. American Civil War

Not only is the Civil War considered the first modern war in
history, it affects American military thought and practice up to
this very day. The impact of technology on tactics is never more
clearly illustrated than when Napoleonic tactics run headlong
into rifled weapons in the early years of the war. While the
tendency to attack in massed formations was never entirely
overcome, the last year of the war saw considerable modifications
in tactical practice. On the operational and strategic levels,
Grant, as the first great modern commander, and Lee, as the great
Napoleonic general, are juxtaposed very successfully.

7. Pax Britannica and the Prussian Influence

As England’s colonization program expanded and industrialization

spread throughout Europe, North America, and Japan, the military
potential of the nation-state increased exponentially. While the
Prussian-German General Staff had its roots in the Napoleonic
Age, it came into its own during the late 19th century, providing
a means to harness this greatly expended military power. Its
evolution and the spread of the general staff idea was one of the
key military developments leading to the 20th century.

8. World War I

The fully mobilized military power of technologically advanced,

industrialized nation-states is seen on the battlefield for the
first time. Stalemate ensues on both Eastern and Western Fronts.
The various approaches to breaking this stalemate are examined in
depth. The Allies largely relied on material-technological
solutions (i.e., more and heavier artillery fire, tanks, etc.),
while the Germans took a doctrinal-tactical approach. Gallipoli

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is looked at as one of the Allies’ few strategic initiatives away
from the Western Front. The reasons for its failure in execution
should be looked at closely. Be careful not to duplicate
Amphibious Warfare instruction.

9. Interwar Years

The 1920’s and 1930’s were a period of reaction against the

horrors of total war. The various attempts to limit war are
examined. Against this political/economic/social background, the
theories of strategic airpower, naval airpower, mechanization of
warfare, and amphibious warfare are studied. The developments in
strategic airpower and mechanization were aimed at returning
decision at a reasonable cost to the industrialized battlefield.
Naval airpower and the development of amphibious warfare,
particularly in the United States, were studied to ensure the
viability of sea power in the modern world. The conduct of World
War II is a direct outgrowth of the developments in these areas.

10. World War II

This topic is a broad and complex period to be totally analyzed.

An examination of the Blitzkrieg as unleashed by the Germans
against the Allies in 1940 (with its lessons in leadership,
command and control, and combined arms) is conducted. Secondly,
the Allied strategic bombing campaign against Germany is studied,
with objective analysis of its strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, a Pacific war overview with its interplay between
carrier task force and amphibious operations will drive home the
desired concepts.

11. Post World War II

Strategic nuclear strategy, limited war, counterinsurgency/

revolutionary warfare, terrorism, continued technological
progress, and the enduring value of maritime power are all
subjects that are included in this topic. Korea, Vietnam, the
Arab-Israeli Wars, the wars of decolonization, and the Gulf War
provide fertile ground for appropriate case studies.

12. War Today

Drawing upon a semester/year’s worth of experience, students

should be prepared to draw logical and supportable conclusions
regarding the shape of future warfare.

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS

1. Although this material may be presented in a myriad of

conventional means (chalkboard/whiteboard, overhead
projector, easel, etc.) and you should select the format
with which you are most comfortable, most classrooms are now
equipped to display lessons electronically. Students, too,
have grown more sophisticated and most will be expecting
lectures to be augmented by some type of presentation
software (Microsoft PowerPoint, et al). These digital
presentations will likely be included as part of your
turnover at your NROTC unit; however, sample “slides” are
available online at:
https://www.cnet.navy.mil/cnet/nrotc/cig.html, as well as
from the current Course Coordinator.

2. The World Wide Web offers easy access to a tremendous amount

of information. With powerful search engines (Google, et
al), you are rarely more than a few mouse clicks away from
additional information, video clips, graphics, maps, etc.
There are far too many websites to list here, and the fluid
nature of online information would limit the value of such a
list. History-specific sites, such as The History Channel
website (www.historychannel.com), often offer useful
material and/or suggestions on where to point your browser
to find an answer.

3. The history department and library at your local

college/university is another ready source of instructional
aids. It is highly recommended that you seek out these
local contacts and explore what they may have to offer to
contribute to your instruction.

4. A wide variety of Department of Defense (DOD) materials is

available through the Defense Automated Visual Information
System/Defense Instructional Technology Information System
(DAVIS/DITIS) website at: http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil.
This site contains listings and descriptions of thousands of
audiovisual productions/videotapes and interactive
multimedia instructional products used by DOD. The NETPDTC
Norfolk Regional Electronic Media Center may also be able to
provide desired multimedia resources by contacting Mr. Ron
Burk at ron.burk@navy.mil or (850) 452-1001, ext. 2020.

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5. NOTES OF CAUTION:

a. When purchasing videos from commercial vendors, you

must keep in mind that many vendors have a license from
the copyright owner to rent or sell the film for home
viewing only. Public viewing, including classroom,
would be a separate license. Therefore, you must make
it clear to the vendor that you intend to use the video
for educational purposes/classroom use and ensure the
vendor has the authority to sell copyrighted materials
for this purpose. It is imperative that there be a
written purchase document that indicates to the vendor
the intended use of the video, the intended frequency
of use, the number of students at a typical viewing,
and if the product will be shown only in specific
segments, so there will be no doubt in the vendor's
mind how the product will be used.

b. Instructors should be aware that commercial videos

provided by NSTC or purchased by the unit are for use
in an academic setting only. They are not to be
reproduced, sold, copied, or shown in their entirety.
Academic privileges allow instructors to utilize
portions of videos, books, articles available to the
public, and other media in academia to teach and
educate. Using or distributing these videos in any
fashion other than outlined here may constitute
copyright infringements. Many short video clips from
commercial movies supply the instructor with
contemporary, intriguing materials that provide
examples of the issues they are trying to teach, but
these segments should be used appropriately. Seek
official legal advice for any use not mentioned in this
guide. Additional guidance may be found in SECNAVINST
5870.4 (Series).

c. All personnel must exercise caution in using material

downloaded from the Internet. Access to works on the
Internet does not automatically mean that these can be
reproduced and reused without permission or royalty
payment. Before using any materials downloaded from the
Internet for use in training, you must determine what,
if any, copyright restrictions might apply. A good rule
of thumb would be to presume that any information on
the Internet is copyrighted and that you should not use
it without obtaining permission from the copyright

xv
holder. SECNAVINST 5870.4 (Series) provides specific
guidelines that should be addressed in the copyright
permission request letter.

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Texts (1 per student, 1 per instructor)

Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps.

Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997. (Hard
copy not provided by NSTC; document available online at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1.pdf.)

Jones, Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. Chicago,

IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001. (ISBN 0-252-06966-8)

Preston, Richard A., Alex Roland and Sydney F. Wise. Men in

Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with
Western Society, 5th ed. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College
Publishers, 1991. (ISBN 0-03-033428-4)

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press, 1977. (Paperback, ISBN 0-253-
28029-X)

2. Student References (3-5 texts per unit for students, 1 per

instructor)

Keegan, John. The Face of Battle. New York, NY: Random House,
Vintage Books, 1977. (ISBN 0-394-72403-8)

3. Instructor References

Dupuy, Ernest R. and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia of

Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present, 4th ed.
New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1993. (ISBN 0-
06-270056-1)

Dupuy, Trevor N., Col, USA (Ret.). The Evolution of Weapons and
Warfare. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1984.

Hagan, Kenneth J., ed. In Peace and War. Westport, CT:

Greenwood, 1984. (2nd edition paperback, ISBN 0-313-24581-9)

Hammond Historical Atlas of the World. Maplewood, NJ: Hammond,

Inc., 1997. (Referenced in only one lesson but should be
helpful throughout the course.)

xvii
Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. (ISBN 0-8018-6445-3)

4. Optional references are listed throughout the lesson guides.

These references are not available from NSTC but may found
in your university’s library system or through the
interlibrary loan system. (NOTE: Universities will usually
place books on hold for instructors during the academic
semester.) These optional materials include:

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1976.

Edson, J. J., Col, USMC (Ret.). “A Perspective on Desert Storm.”

Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75, No. 6, June 1992.

Friedman, N. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis, MD:

Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Fuller, J.F.C. A Military History of The Western World, Volumes

I, II & III. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1954-7. (ISBN Vol
I: 0-306-80304-6, Vol II: 0-306080305-4, Vol III: 0-306-
80306-2) (Not referenced in a specific lesson but may be
helpful throughout the course. Obtain book from the
Amphibious Warfare course.)

Harding, David, ed. Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from

5000 B.C. to 2000 A.D. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press,
Inc., 1990. (Not referenced in a specific lesson but may be
helpful throughout the course.)

Keene, R. R. “Desert Storm Stirs Up.” Leatherneck Magazine, Vol.

LXXIV, No. 3, March 1991.

Knight, John E., Jr. “The Arabs and Israel in Perspective.”

Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2 & 6, 1974.

Mans, Rowland S. N. “Victory in Malaya.” Marine Corps Gazette,

Vol. 47, Nos. 1, 2 & 3, 1963.

National Security Council. “U.S. Objectives and Programs for

National Security” (NSC-68). (Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.)

Rejai, M., ed., and Peter Smith, trans. Mao Tse-tung on

Revolution and War. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1969, 1970.

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 (Paperback, Library of Congress No. 74-111194)

Montross, Lynn. War Through the Ages. New York, NY: Harper Row
Publishing, 1960. (NOTE: No longer being printed; but
previously used in the Evolution of Warfare course, so
copies may still be onhand at the unit.)

Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in

Perspective. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. (ISBN:
0891410414)

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavella to

the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press, 1986.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Art of Warfare in the Age of

Napoleon. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980.
(ISBN 0-253-31076-8)

Wilson, G. I., LtCol, USMC. “Maneuver Warfare and the

Operational Art.” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75, No. 6,
June 1991.

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 Military History: Is It Still Practicable?
by
Jay Luvaas

Originally published in the Army War College's Parameters, March 1982. Public Domain.

THERE was a day, before the advent of the A-bomb and its more destructive offspring, before
smart bombs and nerve gas, before computer technology and war games, when professional
soldiers regarded reading history as a useful pastime. Many who have scaled the peaks of the
military profession have testified to the utility of studying military history.

Most of these, however, seem to be commanding voices out of the past. MacArthur, steeped in
family tradition and familiar with many of the 4000 volumes inherited from his father, was never
at a loss for a historical example to underscore his point of view; Krueger, as a young officer,
translated books and articles from the German military literature; Eisenhower spent countless
hours listening to the erudite Fox Conner on what could be learned from military history;
Marshall and his contemporaries at the Army Staff College at Leavenworth reconstructed Civil
War campaigns from the after-action reports; Patton took the time in 1943 to read a book on the
Norman conquest of Sicily nearly nine centuries earlier and to ponder "the many points in
common with our operations";[1] and Eichelberger summoned from memory a passage he had
read ten years before in Grant's Memoirs (which ought to be required reading for all officers) and
thereby stiffened his resolve to press home the attack at Buna. These Army commanders were all
remarkably well versed in history.

So were many of their civilian superiors. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was an avid reader of
naval history, and Harry Truman frequently acknowledged the pertinent lessons that he had
gleaned from a lifetime of exposure to history:

Reading history, to me, was far more than a romantic adventure. It was solid instruction and
wise teaching which I somehow felt that I . . . needed . . . It seemed to me that if I could
understand the true facts about the . . . development of the United States Government and
could know the details of the lives of . . . its political leaders, I would be getting for myself a
valuable . . . education . . . I know of no surer way to get a solid foundation in political
science and public administration than to study the histories of past administrations of the
world's most successful system of government.[2]

Because the military is a "practical" profession geared much of the time to problem-solving,
soldiers--like engineers and scientists--tend to be pragmatic about what is meant by the word
"practicable." History is "practicable" if it yields lessons, especially exemplary lessons in tactics
and strategy that can be directly applied to some current situation. History is "useful" in
illustrating points of doctrine, in instilling in the young officer the proper military values or an
appreciation for our military heritage. The "practical" man often scans the past for some magical
formula that may ensure success in war, like Field Marshal von Schlieffen's theory of
envelopment, or Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's strategy of indirect approach.

xx
Such assumptions inevitably determine the way military history is taught. Because an important
duty of the officer in peacetime is to teach, and because in the Army teaching usually involves
explaining, it is often assumed that history, to be taught, must be explained. The emphasis
therefore is on organizing and presenting information in a lucid, often lavishly illustrated lecture,
in which tidy answers outrank nagging questions in the minds of everyone involved. The
inference on the part of most students, if not the instructor, is that a person who remembers the
lecture will somehow have learned history. It's a mistaken assumption we all make.

It is also true that no other field of history is under as much pressure as military history to
provide "practical" answers to some current problem. If military history cannot provide such
answers, why study it? The specialist in Renaissance diplomacy is rarely solicited for his views
on foreign policy but, rather, is left alone to concentrate his thoughts on the cold war with the
Turks in the 15th century. Nor is the scholar who has spent a lifetime studying the ramifications
of the French Revolution apt to be consulted when news breaks of still another palace coup in
some Latin American banana republic. But let a historian or journalist prowl around in some
remote corner in the field of military history and often he will be expected, even tempted, to
function as a current-affairs military analyst.

Perhaps we think this way because, as a society, we are largely ignorant about both the facts and
the nature of history. In high school, European history no longer is required, having been
replaced by something called "Western Civilization." We know astonishingly little about the
history of other societies, and most of us, unfortunately, care even less. Students voting with
their feet in colleges and universities across the nation have caused enrollments in history
courses to plummet as they turn to "more practical" subjects such as economics, psychology,
biology, engineering, and business administration. In the Army's schools, history has become a
casualty of the Vietnam War, clearly the emphasis now is upon training. Even at the Military
Academy, the required course in the military art was severely curtailed several years ago and
only recently has been restored to its logical place in the curriculum. For that matter, how many
officers who have invested off-duty hours to work toward an advanced degree have taken it in
history? In the officer corps of today, the subject is rarely considered "practicable."

More to the point, is the Army as an institution as historical-minded as it was in the past? For
without even a rudimentary understanding of history and its processes, there is no way that the
past can be made to offer object lessons for the future. Professor Pieter Geyl, a distinguished
Dutch historian, reminds us that it is useless to talk about "the lessons of history" when the
historian "is after all only a man sitting at his desk."[3] The lessons that we would learn are his--
the fruits of his labors, the creation of his imagination, perhaps the idea that he is to sell to the
reader. For, as a German general asserted a hundred years ago, "it is well known that military
history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or
opinion."[4]

Common Fallacies

Perhaps the most frequent error in the abuse of history is to take historical examples out of
context. Once removed from its historical context, which is always unique, a battle or a
campaign ceases to offer meaningful lessons from history. According to Napoleon, "old

xxi
Frederick laughed in his sleeve at the parades of Potsdam when he perceived young officers,
French, English, and Austrian, so infatuated with the manoeuvre of the oblique order, which (in
itself) was fit for nothing but to gain a few adjutant-majors a reputation." Napoleon appreciated
that the secret of Frederick's successes was not the oblique order, but Frederick. "Genius acts
through inspiration," Napoleon concluded. "What is good in one case is bad in another."[5]

One of Frederick's own soldiers demonstrated that in another environment even Frederick's
maneuver's might fail. When Baron von Steuben, who had served in the Prussian Army
throughout the Seven Years' War, was trying to make soldiers out of Washington's shivering,
half-starved volunteers at Valley Forge, he knew better than to waste precious time teaching
those complex maneuvers he had mastered under Frederick. Instead he selected only those that
were essential to meet the unique conditions that prevailed in America, where volunteers had
only a few months instead of years to master the intricacies of Frederick's drill, and where
officers had to learn to lead by example instead of relying upon the severity of the Prussian
system. Soldiers, Frederick repeatedly had warned, "can be held in check only through fear" and
should therefore be made to "fear their officers more than all the dangers to which they are
exposed . . . Good will can never induce the common soldier to stand up to such dangers; he will
only do so through fear."[6] Whatever may have motivated Washington's amateur soldiers at
Valley Forge, most certainly it was not fear.

If there is a lesson here for us, it is simply that solutions to problems are not to be viewed as
interchangeable parts. Even the Germans in World War II apparently failed to heed this lesson in
drawing conclusions from their own war experiences. In addition to displaying a tendency to
generalize from personal or limited experience, they often indiscriminately applied the
experiences of one situation to entirely different circumstances. Thus the German Supreme
Command "applied the experiences acquired on the Western Front in 1940, unchanged, to the
war against Russia" despite the "greater tenacity" of the Russian soldier, his "insensibility against
threatening the flanks," the scarcity of roads, and the vast space involved "giving . . . the
opponent the possibility of avoiding decision." In the words of one German general, not only did
this misapplication of experience influence the operational plan against Russia, it also
"contributed to the final disappointment."[7]

It is also a distortion to compress the past into distinctive patterns, for it is as true of history as it
is of nature that "each man reads his own peculiar lesson according to his own peculiar mind and
mood."[8] History responds generously to the adage "seek and ye shall find." At the turn of the
century the Chief of the German General Stall, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, was faced with the
need to plan for a war on two fronts. His solution was to point toward a quick victory on one
front in order to avoid ultimate defeat on both, and his inspiration for the battle of annihilation
essential to a quick victory came, at least in part, from reading the first volume of Hans
Delbruck's Geschichte der Kriegskunst, which was published in 1900. Delbruck's treatment of
the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. convinced Schlieffen that Hannibal had won his lopsided
victory by deliberately weakening his center and attacking with full force from both flanks. The
much publicized Schlieffen Plan was an adaptation of this idea. Having thus discovered the
"key," Schlieffen turned in his writings to the idea of envelopment to unlock the secrets of
Frederick the Great and Napoleon, both of whom, he claimed, had always attempted to envelop
the enemy. Similarly, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart was to discover from his research for a

xxii
biography of Sherman that the key to Sherman's success lay in a strategy of indirect approach.
When he turned to history at large for confirmation, of course he "discovered" that nearly all
successful generals, whether they had been aware of it or not, had employed something akin to
the strategy of indirect approach. The future British field marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, who
always found Liddell Hart's ideas stimulating whether he agreed with them or not, once slyly
suggested to the captain: "With your knowledge and brains and command of the pen, you could
have written just as convincing a book called the `Strategy of the Direct Approach.'"[9] Wavell
appreciated that it was Liddell Hart and not the muse of history who preached this attractive
doctrine.

Moreover, nothing is necessarily proven by citing examples from history. There are many works
on military theory that provide examples of bad argument from analogy or authority; such faulty
use of historical examples, according to Karl von Clausewitz, "not only leaves the reader
dissatisfied but even irritates his intelligence." The mere citation of historical examples provides
only the semblance of proof, although the reader who understands little about the nature of
history may set aside his book convinced of the essential truth of some new theory, and the
audience exposed to a well-organized and seemingly cogent lecture sprinkled with examples
from history is equally vulnerable. "There are occasions," Clausewitz noted,

where nothing will be proven by a dozen examples. . . . If anyone lists a dozen defeats in
which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that
very tactic was employed. Obviously this is no way to reach a conclusion.

And if the author or lecturer has never mastered the events he describes, "such superficial,
irresponsible handling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing."[10]

Perhaps the greatest disservice to history and its lessons comes from its frequent association with
a given set of military principles of doctrine, and here the celebrated Swiss theorist Baron de
Jomini may have had an unfortunate influence. Drawing upon an exhaustive examination of 30
campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon, Jomini deduced certain fixed maxims and principles
which he claimed were both eternal and universal in their application. If such maxims would not
produce great generals they would "at least make generals sufficiently skillful to hold the second
rank among the great captains" and would thus serve as "the true school for generals."[11]

To future generations of young officers, Jomini said, in effect: "Gentlemen, I have not found a
single instance where my principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success. They are based
upon my unrivaled knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon, much of it acquired at first hand,
and of the basic works of Thiers, Napier, Lloyd, Tempelhof, Foy, and the Archduke Charles.
Thanks to my labors you need not invest years of your own time in scrutinizing these
voluminous histories. Did not Napoleon himself confess: `I have studied history a great deal, and
often, for want of a guide, have been forced to lose considerable time in useless reading'? You
have only to study my principles and apply them faithfully, for `there exists a fundamental
principle of all the operations of war' which you neglect at your peril."[12]

Jomini had many prominent disciples, and their books were nearly all written on the assumption
that battles and campaigns, ancient as well as modern, have succeeded or failed to the degree that

xxiii
they adhered to the principles of war as explained by Jomini and could be confirmed by the
"constant teachings of history." But where Jomini read history, many of his followers read
primarily Jomini and thus were one step removed from history and its processes.

The emergence of doctrine (as late as the American Civil War there were only drill manuals) and
the introduction of historical sections on most European general staffs after the Prussian victories
in 1866 and 1870 meant that increasingly, in the eyes of professional soldiers at least, military
history was linked to doctrine and more specifically, to the principles of war as these principles
were rediscovered and refined. Since World War I it has become fashionable to use history to
illustrate the official principles of war as they are variously defined.

There are three dangers inherent in this approach. In the first place, pressed into service in this
way history can only illustrate something already perceived as being true; it cannot prove its
validity or lead to new discoveries. This is probably the terrain on which most soldiers first
encounter the subject, and they would do well to heed the warning of Clausewitz that if "some
historical event is being presented in order to demonstrate a general truth, care must be taken that
every aspect bearing on the truth at issue is fully and circumstantially developed--carefully
assembled . . . before the reader's eyes." In other words, the theorist ought to be a pretty good
historian. Clausewitz goes so far as to suggest that, even though historical examples have the
advantage of "being more realistic and of bringing the idea they are illustrating to life," if the
purpose of history is really to explain doctrine, "an imaginary case would do as well."[13]
Moreover, to use history primarily to illustrate accepted principles is really to put the cart before
the horse. If one starts with what is perceived as truth and searches history for confirmation or
illustrations, there can be no "lessons learned." How can there be?

A second weakness in linking history to doctrine is the natural tendency to let doctrine sit in
judgment of historical events. Sir William Napier, who had a healthy respect for Jomini's
theories, used his maxims as a basis for rendering historical judgment on the generalship of
French and British leaders in his classic History of the War in the Peninsula. Similarly, Major
General Sir Patrick MacDougall "discovered" that these maxims could also serve as criteria for
judging the generalship of Hannibal, and Matthew F. Steele's American Campaigns, which was
published in 1909 and endured as a text at the Military Academy and other Army schools even
beyond World War II, used the maxims of Jomini, von der Goltz, and other late 19th-century
theorists to form the basis for historical commentary on the generalship of individual American
commanders.

Most serious of all is the ease and frequency with which faith in doctrine has actually distorted
history. This was happening frequently by the end of the 19th century as each army in Europe
developed and became committed to its own doctrine. It is the primary reason why the tactical
and strategical lessons of the Civil War, which in many respects was the first modern war, went
unheeded.[14] Even the elaborate German General Staff histories on the wars of Frederick the
Great and the wars of liberation against Napoleon never failed to drive home the soundness of
current German doctrine,[15] and the German official histories of the Boer War and the Russo-
Japanese War similarly serve to demonstrate above all else the continuing validity of German
doctrine. The Boers had applied that doctrine and therefore usually won, at least in the earlier
battles before the weight of numbers alone could determine the outcome. British doctrine was

xxiv
faulty, if indeed the British yet had a doctrine, and therefore the British suffered repeated defeats.
The Germans had trained the Japanese Army and the Japanese had won in 1904-05, "proving"
again the superiority of German doctrine. Had a trained historian instead of an officer serving a
tour with the Military History section analyzed the same campaigns, surely he would have asked
some searching questions about the differences in the discipline, morale, and leadership of the
two armies. Did the Japanese cavalry win, for example, because of superior doctrine based on
shock tactics or because it was better disciplined and led? To the officer corps of the day, the
results demonstrated the weakness of the Russian Army's mounted infantry concepts in the face
of shock tactics, whereas 10 years later, in a war that, at the outset, was strikingly similar in the
conditions prevailing on the battlefield, shock tactics did not prevail anywhere for long.

Thus military history distilled by Jomini and his disciples ultimately found itself shaped by a
commitment to doctrine, and the instinct of most professional soldiers before World War I was to
explain away exceptions to the official rules rather than to use history as a means of testing and
refining them.

Facts in History

Although it is not always evident in a lecture or a textbook, we can never be completely certain--
and therefore in agreement--about what actually happened in history. Frederick and Napoleon
knew this well. Skeptical both of the historian's motives and of the reliability of his facts, they
evinced a healthy skepticism about the ability of the human mind ever to recreate an event as it
actually had happened.

"The true truths are very difficult to ascertain," Napoleon complained. "There are so many
truths!"[16]

Historical fact . . . is often a mere word; it cannot be ascertained when events actually occur,
in the heat of contrary passions; and if, later on, there is a consensus, this is only because
there is no one left to contradict. . . . What is . . . historical truth? . . . An agreed upon fiction..
. . There are facts that remain in eternal litigation.[17]

A Union staff officer whose corps bore the brunt of Pickett's charge at Gettysburg put it a
different way:

A full account of the battle as it was will never, can never, be made. Who could sketch the
charges, the constant fighting of the bloody panorama! It is not possible. The official reports
may give results as to losses, with statements of attacks and repulses; they may also note the
means by which results were attained . . . but the connection between means and results, the
mode, the battle proper, these reports touch lightly. Two prominent reasons . . . account for
the general inadequacy of these official reports . . . the literary infirmity of the reporters, and
their not seeing themselves and their commands as others would have seen them. And
factions, and parties, and politics . . . are already putting in their unreasonable demands. . . .
Of this battle greater than Waterloo, a history, just, comprehensive, complete, will never be
written. By-and-by, out of the chaos of trash and falsehood that newspapers hold, out of the
disjointed mass of reports, out of the traditions and tales that come down from the field, some

xxv
 eye that never saw the battle will select, and some pen will write what will be named the
history. With that the world will be, and if we are alive we must be, content.[18]

This writer intuitively understood that as soon as the historian begins to impose order on
something as chaotic as a battle, he distorts. If his narrative is to mean anything at all to the
reader he must simplify and organize the "disjointed mass of reports." He must, for lack of space,
omit incidents that did not contribute to the final result. He must resolve controversies, not
merely report them, and he must recognize that not every general is candid, every report
complete, every description accurate. Orders are not always executed; not every order is even
relevant to the situation. At Gettysburg, the watches in the two armies were set 20 minutes apart,
and after the battle Lee had some of his subordinates rewrite their after-action reports to avoid
unnecessary dissension. Well may it be said that "on the actual day of battle naked truths may be
picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their
uniforms."[19]

During World War I, German General Max Hoffman confided to his diary: "For the first time in
my life I have seen `History' at close quarters, and I know that its actual process is very different
from what is presented to posterity."[20] Plutarch Lied is the descriptive title of an impassioned
indictment of the French military leadership on the other side of no-man's land:

Men who yesterday seemed destined to oblivion have, today, acquired immortality. Has
some new virtue been instilled in them, has some magician touched them with his wand? . . .
Civilian historians have studied historical events from a point of view which is exclusively
military. Far from trusting to their judgment, they have not considered it respectful to
exercise their critical faculties on the facts as guaranteed by a body of specialists. An
idolatrous admiration for everything which concerns the army has conferred upon them the
favour of having eyes which do not see and memories which are oblivious of their own
experiences. . . . An incredible conspiracy exists in France at this very moment. No one dares
to write the truth.[21]

Even with the best of intentions and an impartial mind, it is difficult to reconstruct what actually
happened in history. This truth was given eloquent expression by a French pilot on a
reconnaissance flight to Arras in May 1940 as he reflected on the chaos engulfing a dying society
30,000 feet below.

Ah, the blueprint that historians will draft of all this! The angles they will plot to lend shape
to this mess! They will take the word of a cabinet minister, the decision of a general, the
discussion of a committee, and out of that parade of ghosts they will build historic
conversations in which they will discern farsighted views and weighty responsibilities. They
will invent agreements, resistances, attitudinous pleas, cowardices. . . . Historians will forget
reality. They will invent thinking men, joined by mysterious fibers to an intelligible universe,
possessed of sound far-sighted views and pondering grave decisions according to the purest
laws of Cartesian logic.[22]

Even where there can be agreement on facts, there will be disagreements among historians. "To
expect from history those final conclusions which may perhaps be obtained in other disciplines

xxvi
is . . . to misunderstand its nature." Something akin to the scientific method helps to establish
facts, but the function of the historian is also to explain, to interpret, and to discriminate, and
here "the personal element can no longer be ruled out . . . Truth, though for God it may be One,
assumes many shapes to men."[23]

This explains the oft-quoted statement of Henry Adams, the famous American historian: "I have
written too much history to believe in it. So if anyone wants to differ from me, I am prepared to
agree with him."[24] No one who does not understand something about history could possibly
know what Adams meant by this apparently cynical statement. Certainly he did not intend to
imply that history, because it lacked unerring objectivity and precision, is of no practicable use to
us. Quite the contrary. To recognize the frail structure of history is the first essential step toward
understanding, which is far more important in putting history to work than blind faith in the
validity of isolated facts. History tends to inspire more questions than answers, and the questions
one asks of it determine the extent to which the subject may be considered practicable.

Making History Instructive

What, then, can the professional soldier expect to learn from history? If it can offer no abstract
lessons to be applied indiscriminately or universally, if it cannot substantiate some cherished
principles or official doctrine, if the subject itself is liable to endless bickering and interpretation,
what is the point of looking at history at all?

Here Napoleon, whose writings and campaigns formed the basis of study for every principal
military theorist for a hundred years after his death,[25] provides a useful answer in his first
major campaign. When he assumed command of the French army in Italy in 1796, he took with
him a history of a campaign conducted in the same theater by Marshal Maillebois half a century
before, and more than one authority has noted the similarity in the two campaigns. "In both cases
the object was to separate the allies and beat them in detail; in both cases the same passes
through the maritime Alps were utilized, and in both cases the first objectives were the
same."[26] In 1806, when he sent his cavalry commander, Murat, to reconnoiter the Bohemian
frontier, he recommenced that Murat take with him a history of the campaign that the French had
waged there in 1741, and three years later Napoleon approved the location of pontoon bridges at
Linz because Marshal Saxe had successfully constructed two bridges there in 1740. In 1813 he
sent one of his marshals "an account of the battle fought by Gustavus Adolphus in positions
similar to those which you occupy."[27]

Obviously history served Napoleon not so much because it provided a model to be slavishly
followed, but because if offered ways to capitalize on what others before him had experienced.
History, Liddell Hart reminds us,

is universal experience -- infinitely longer, wider, and more varied than ally individual's
experience. How often do we hear people claim knowledge of the world and of life because
they are sixty or seventy years old?. . . There is no excuse for any literate person if he is less
than three thousand years old in mind.[28]

By this standard Patton was at least 900 years old after studying the Norman conquest of Sicily.

xxvii
Napoleon also proposed, in 1807, the establishment of a special school of history at the College
of France that would have practical application for officers. Trained historians would teach the
military student how to make sound historical judgments, for Napoleon understood that "the
correct way to read history is a real science in itself." He regarded the wars of the French
Revolution as "fertile in useful lessons," yet apparently there had been no systematic effort to
retrieve them. This too "would be an important function of the professors in the special school of
history." For similar reasons Napoleon ordered his War Minister in 1811 to have the Depot of
War prepare comprehensive records of the sieges and attacks of the fortified towns captured by
the French armies in Germany, not for publication but for ready reference. And he did not
discourage the printing of a similar volume on the sieges in Spain.[29]

Napoleon thus conceived of history as serving a purpose similar to that of the publications of the
Old Historical Division and its ultimate successor, the Center of Military History. He would have
applauded the appearance of the Guide to the Study and Uses of Military History,[30] for some
way had to be found to steer the military student through the "veritable labyrinth" of campaign
studies, technical treatises, and memoirs. Like Frederick, who viewed history as "a magazine of
military ideas,"[31] Napoleon would have been delighted with the official histories of the
campaigns of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and with the extensive monographs on
specialized subjects such as mobilization, logistics, and medical services.

On St. Helena Napoleon spoke of the need to publish manuscripts in the Imperial Library as a
way of establishing a solid foundation for historical studies. Probably one of the first proposals
of its kind, it anticipated by half a century the decision of the US War Department to publish in
128 meaty volumes The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, a unique
compilation of the after-action reports and official correspondence of Union and Confederate
leaders. Napoleon also gave the first impetus to official military history when he created a
historical section of the General Staff and named Baron Jomini to head it.[32]

His most enduring suggestion, however, was the deathbed advice he offered to his son: "Let him
read and meditate upon the wars of the great captains: it is the only way to learn the art of
war."[33]

Because Napoleon occasionally mentioned certain "principles of the art of war," he is often
thought to have meant that the study of the Great Captains is valuable because it leads to the
discovery of enduring principles or illustrates their successful application in the hands of genius.
While acknowledging that these Great Captains had "succeeded only by conforming to the
principles" and thus had made war "a true science," Napoleon offered more compelling reasons
for studying the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and
Frederick:

Tactics, the evolutions, the science of the engineer and the artillerist can be learned in
treatises much like geometry, but the knowledge of the higher spheres of war is only acquired
through the study of the wars and battles of the Great Captains and by experience. It has no
precise, fixed rules. Everything depends on the character that nature has given to the general,

xxviii
 on his qualities, on his faults, on the nature of the troops, on the range of weapons, on the
season and on a thousand circumstances which are never the same.

The Great Captains must therefore serve as "our great models." Only by imitating them, by
understanding the bases for their decisions, and by studying the reasons for their success could
modern officers "hope to approach them."[34]

Napoleon agreed with Frederick, who considered history "the school of princes"--princes, that is,
who are destined to command armies--and who wrote his own candid memoirs in order that his
successors might know "the true situation of affairs . . . the reasons that impelled me to act; what
were my means, what the snares of our enemies" so that they might benefit from his own
mistakes "in order to shun them." And both would have endorsed Liddell Hart's observation that
"history is a catalogue of mistakes. It is our duty to profit by them."[35]

Whereas Jomini concentrated upon maxims, Frederick and Napoleon focused their attention on
men. They stressed the need for a commander to view a military situation from the vantage point
of his opponent, and for the military student to become privy to the thinking process of
successful commanders. This was the advice Prince Eugene, Marlborough's sidekick and the
greatest commander who ever served the Hapsburgs, gave to young Frederick when, as the heir
to the Prussian throne, Frederick accompanied the Prussian contingent serving with the Imperial
Army along the Rhine in 1734. After he had become the foremost general of his day, Frederick
urged his own officers, when studying the campaigns of Prince Eugene, not to be content merely
to memorize the details of his exploits but "to examine thoroughly his overall views and
particularly to learn how to think in the same way."[36]

This is still the best way to make military history practicable. "The purpose of history," Patton
wrote shortly before his death,

is to learn how human beings react when exposed to the danger of wounds or death, and how
high ranking individuals react when submitted to the onerous responsibility of conducting
war or the preparations for war. The acquisition of knowledge concerning the dates or places
on which certain events transpired is immaterial . . .[37]

The future Field Marshal Earl Wavell gave similar advice to a class at the British Staff College
shortly before World War II:

The real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations,
and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision and then see in
what way you could have improved upon it. "For heaven's sake," Wavell warned, don't treat
the so-called principles of war as holy writ, like the Ten Commandments, to be learned by
heart, and as having by their repetition some magic, like the incantations of savage priests.
They are merely a set of common sense maxims, like `cut your coat according to your cloth.'
`a rolling stone gathers no moss,' `honesty is the best policy,' and so forth.

Merely to memorize the maxim "cut your coat according to your cloth" does not instruct one
how to be a tailor, and Wavell reminded his listeners that no two theorists espoused exactly the

xxix
same set of principles, which, he contended, "are all simply common sense and . . . instinctive to
the properly trained soldier."

To learn that Napoleon in 1796 and 20,000 men beat combined forces of 30,000 by
something called ‘economy of force’ or ‘operating on interior lines’ is a mere waste of time.
If you can understand how a young, unknown man inspired a half-starved, ragged, rather
Bolshie crowd; how he filled their bellies, how he out-marched, out-witted, out-bluffed, and
defeated men who had studied war all their lives and waged it according to the text books of
the time, you will have learnt something worth knowing.

But the soldier will not learn it from military texts.[38]

Sometimes military history is treated, in books and lectures alike, as though it exists primarily
for the future field commander. Frederick might have assumed something of the sort in his own
writings, but he wrote more about such practical subjects as feeding and drilling an army, the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence, and how to treat friendly and hostile populations than he
did about strategy. Likewise, Napoleon was concerned about military education at every level,
and his advice to his son on studying the decisions of the Great Captains should not obscure the
fact that he believed strongly in military history in his officers' schools and also as a practical
subject for research.

History can be made practicable at any level. The future field marshal Erwin Rommel did not
have future corps commanders necessarily in mind when he wrote Infantry Attacks in 1937. His
lessons, deduced from the experiences of his battalion in World War I, could indeed have been of
value to any company or field grade officer. For example, describing the events he witnessed in
September 1914, Rommel concluded:

War makes extremely heavy demands on the soldiers strength and nerves. For this reason
make heavy demands on your men in peacetime exercises.

It is difficult to maintain contact in fog. . . . Advances through fog by means of a compass

must be practiced, since smoke will frequently be employed. In a meeting engagement in the
fog, the side capable of developing a maximum fire power on contact will get the upper
hand; therefore, keep the machine guns ready for action at all times during the advance.

All units of the group must provide for their own security. This is especially true in close
terrain and when faced with a highly mobile enemy.

Too much spade work is better than too little. Sweat saves blood.

Command posts must be dispersed . . . . Do not choose a conspicuous hill for their location.

In forest lighting, the personal example of the commander is effective only on those troops in
his immediate vicinity.

The rain favored the attack.[39]

xxx
Rommel drew his own conclusions from his experiences, but a discriminating reader could
probably have extracted them for himself.

These observations were not lost on Patton, who probably shared similar experiences and had
been involved in training troops. During the Saar campaign in early 1945, Patton confided to his
diary:

Woke up at 0300 and it was raining like hell. I actually got nervous and got up and read
Rommel's book, Infantry Attacks. It was most helpful, as he described all the rains he had in
September 1914 and also the fact that, in spite of the heavy rains, the Germans got
along.[40]

And so, shortly, did the Third Army.

Another book of this genre is Infantry in Battle, which was prepared at the Infantry School in
1934 under the direction of then Colonel George C. Marshall and revised four years later.
Written on the assumption that "combat situations cannot be solved by rule," contributors to this
book fell back upon numerous examples from World War I to introduce the reader to "the
realities of war and the extremely difficult and highly disconcerting conditions under which
tactical problems must be solved in the face of the enemy."[41]

Military history has also been used to test the ability of military students. In 1891 a British
colonel published a tactical study of the battle of Spicheren, fought 20 years earlier. In the
introduction he explained:

To gain from a relation of events the same abiding impressions as were stamped on the minds
of those who played a part in them--and it is such impressions that create instinct--it is
necessary to examine the situations developed during the operations so closely as to have a
clear picture of the whole scene in our minds eye; to assume, in imagination, the
responsibilities of the leaders who were called upon to meet those situations; to come to a
definite decision and to test the soundness of that decision by the actual event.[42]

Learning from History

What Frederick, Napoleon, Rommel, Patton, Wavell, and many others referred to here have
shared in common can be summed in one word: reading. An English general in the 18th century
urged young officers to devote every spare minute to reading military history, "the most
instructive of all reading."[43]

"Books!" an anonymous old soldier during the Napoleonic wars pretended to snort. "And what
are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a Mack, but have they ever made a
Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick, or a Bonapart? Who would not laugh to hear the
cobbler of Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war?"

"True," is his own rejoinder, "but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobbler."[44]

xxxi
Since the great majority of today's officers are college graduates, with a healthy percentage of
them having studied for advanced degrees, they have probably long since passed the stage at
which they can actually benefit from a conventional lecture on history, with the emphasis on
factual content and the expectation of a clear conclusion. The leading question therefore
becomes: How do we teach them to learn from history? J. F. C. Fuller, coauthor of the concept
that later became known as blitzkrieg, had this problem in mind when he addressed a class at the
British Staff College a few years after World War I. "Until you learn how to teach yourselves,"
he told the students, "you will never be taunt by others."[45]

Fuller did not specify how this was to be accomplished, but he probably would insist that to
teach the officer how to teach himself should be avowed objective of every course in military
history. Certainly he would agree that no course in military history can really do much good if
the officer is exposed every half dozen years throughout his career to no more than a structured
course of only a few months' duration, especially if in the process he has gained little
understanding of history as a discipline or a scant appreciation for how it can be used and
abused. Assuredly such a voracious reader as Fuller--who at age 83 confessed to having recently
sold off all of the books in his library that he could not read within the next 10 years--would
argue that there would be no point to any history course whatever if the student is not stimulated
to spend some time afterwards poking around the field a bit on his own. "Books," Fuller once
wrote, "have always been my truest companions."[46]

Any student of history must learn to identify with the men and events he reads about, seeking
above all to understand their problems and to accept the past on its own terms. The student must
also learn to ask questions, not of the instructor necessarily, but of his material and especially of
himself. Historians usually worry more about asking the right questions than finding definitive
answers, for they know from experience that no document or book can answer a question that is
never asked. Had Patton read Rommel's book when the sun was shining, for example, and all
was going well, chances are he would never have paid any attention to the casual observation
that rain seemed to favor the attack. Cannae was an important battle to Schlieffen because the
double envelopment achieved by Hannibal suggested a method by which a battle of annihilation
might be fought in a war against France and Russia. But to Colonel Ardant du Picq, the foremost
French military theorist of the 1860s, Hannibal was a great general for a quite different reason--
"his admirable comprehension of the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier."[47] The
two men were searching for solutions to different kinds of problems, and in reading about
Cannae each responded to his individual interests.

In the old Army, when there was enough leisure time for reading, riding, or a regular game of
golf, it was probably understood that the burden of learning from military history must rest
primarily upon the individual officer. The annual historical ride to the Civil War battlefields--
which had been preserved by Act of Congress "for historical and professional military
study"[48]--directly involved students from the Army War College in the unending dialogue
between past and present. Students were frequently asked on location how they would have
handled some problem in tactics or command and control that had confronted a commander
during battle. "It is not desirable to have the question answered," the instructions specified.
"Some will know the answer, but all who do not will ask themselves the question."[49]

xxxii
This is the only way to learn from history. The textbook or the instructor can organize
information, but only the student can put it to work. "Mere swallowing of either food or
opinions," Fuller reminds us, "does not of necessity carry with it digestion, and without digestion
swallowing is but labour lost and food wasted."[50]

Today there is a shortage of both "labour and food," as other budgetary priorities and manpower
shortages have forced severe cutbacks in history courses throughout the Army.

But in a sense this blinds us to the real problem, for it does not necessarily follow that more
money and instructors must be the solution. A formal course in military history, however
desirable, is not the only way and may, in fact, not be the best way to teach students how to teach
themselves history, which is the goal. George C. Marshall, as future Chief of Staff, regarded his
two years at the Army Staff College is 1906-08 as having been "immensely instructive," but not
because of the quality of the courses there. "The association with the officers . . . the reading we
did and the discussion . . . had a tremendous effect. . . . I learned little I could use," Marshall
wrote, but "I learned how to learn. . . . My habits of thought were being trained."[51]

Marshall's words touch upon the essence of practicability. Military history may be of
indeterminate value for the immediate future (if World War III were to be fought next week, for
example), but among the captains in the career courses today are the Army's top administrators
and leaders of tomorrow, and not all graduates of the war colleges in June will retire in the next
six or eight years. Those that remain are bound to benefit from anything that can heighten their
understanding of society, of other armies, of the political process, of leadership, of the nature of
war, of the evolution of doctrine, and of a dozen similar areas of human activity in which history,
pursued by an intelligent and inquisitive reader, can still be strikingly practicable to the modern
soldier.

To any set of military maxims, whatever their origin, perhaps the following literary maxims
should be added:[52]

The history that lies inert in unread books does no work in the world.

If you want a new idea, read an old book.

`Tis the good reader that makes the good book.

A book is like a mirror. If an ass looks in, no prophet can peer out.

Notes

1. As quoted in Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, Vol. II: 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1974), p. 283.
2. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I: Years of Decision (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1955),
p. 119.

xxxiii
3. Pieter Geyl, Napoleon For and Against (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), p. 15.
4. As quoted in Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-lngelfingen, Letters on Artillery, 2d Ed. (London:
Edward Stanford, 1890), p. 108.
5. Memoirs of the History of France during the reign of Napoleon, dictated by the Emperor at
Saint Helena . . . (7 Vols.; London: Henry Colburn and Company, 1828), VI, 18-27; Ernest
Picard, Preceptes et jugements de Napoleon (Paris: Berger-Leurault, 1913), pp. 405-06.
6. Frederick the Great on the Art of War, Ed. and Trans. by Jay Luvaas (New York: The Free
Press, 1966), pp. 77-78.
7. Lothar Rendulic, "Mistakes in Deducing War Experiences," Historical Division, European
Command, 10 October 1951. Italics added.
8. Herman Melville, as quoted in John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 14th Ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1968), p. 698.
9. Wavell to Liddell Hart, 15 March 1934, Liddell Hart Papers, States House, Medmenham,
England.
10. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Ed. and Trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 170, 172-73.
11. Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War . . . (New York: Greenwood Press, 1954), p.
329.
12. The quote from Napoleon is found in his "Observations on a plan to establish a special
school of literature and history at the College of France," 19 April 1807, Correspondance de
Napoleon Ier (32 Vols.; Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1858-70), XV, 107-10.
13. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 171-72.
14. See Jay Luvaas, Military Legacy of the Civil War (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959),
pp. 119-69 passim.
15. See Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism Rev. Ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p.
26; A. L. Conger's remarks in "Proceedings of the Conference on Military History," Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1912 (Washington: GPO, 1914),
pp. 162-74.
16. As quoted in J. Christopher Herold, The Mind of Napoleon (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1955), p. 50.
17. Ibid.
18. Frank L. Byrne and Andrew T. Weaver, Eds., Haskell of Gettysburg (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970), pp. 200-01.
19. Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War (2 Vols; London:
E. Arnold, 1906), I, v.
20. B. H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (London: Faber and Faber, 1938), p. 227.
21. Jean de Peirrefeu, Plutarch Lied (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), pp. 10, 23.
22. Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Flight to Arras (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942), pp. 133-
35.
23. Geyl, pp. 15-16.
24. As quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn From History (London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1946), p. 10.
25. Our basic principles of war first appeared in their modern form in the early writings of J. F.
C. Fuller, who in turn had deduced them from his reading of the printed Correspondance of
Napoleon. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson &
Co., n.d.), pp. 13-14.

xxxiv
26. J. Holland Rose, The Personality of Napoleon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), pp.
95-97.
27. Camon, Pour Apprendre l'art de 1a Guerre (Paris: Berger-Leurault, n.d.), p. 4.
28. Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn from History, pp. 7-8.
29. Napoleon, Correspondance, XV, 107-10, XXI, 378-79.
30. John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, Eds., A Guide to the Study and Use of Military
History (Washington: US Army, Center of Military History, 1979).
31. Frederick, The History of the Seven Years War (2 Vols.; London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson,
1789), I, xii.
32. Rose, p. 244; S. J. Watson, By Command of the Emperor: A Life of Marshal Berthier
(London: The Bodley Head, 1957), p. 185. Napoleon may in fact have been the first to distort
the official history of a campaign by applying pressure on the historian to twist his narrative
to suit his own ends. See General Camon, Genie et Metier chez Napoleon (Paris: Berger-
Leurault, 1930), pp. 33-44 passim.
33. HeroId, pp. 255-56.
34. Napoleon, Correspondance, XXXI, 365.
35. Frederick, The History of My Own Times (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1789), ix:
Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 138.
36. Frederick the Great on the Art of War, p. 50. Italics added.
37. Blumenson, II, 750.
38. As quoted in John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (2 Vols.; London: Collins, 1964), I,
161.
39. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Attacks (Vienna, Va.: Athena Press, 1979), pp. 16-60 passim.
40. Blumenson, II, 571. Italics added.
41. US Army, Infantry in Battle (Washington: US Army, 1939), introduction.
42. G. F. R. Henderson, The Battle of Spicheren. . . , 2d Ed. (London: Gale & Polden, 1909), pp.
vi-vii.
43. A Series of Letters recently written by a General Officer to his Son, on his entering the Army.
. ., 1st American Ed. (Salem: Cushing and Appleton, n.d.), I, v.
44. Hints to Young Generals, by an old soldier (John Armstrong) (Kingston: J. Buel, 1812), pp. 7-8.
45. J. F. C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson,
1936). pp. 417-18.
46. J. F. C. Fuller, The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars. . . . (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), p.
112. In 1961, Fuller told the writer that he was unloading the books he could not hope to read
during the next 10 years.
47. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies. Ancient and Modern Battle (Harrisburg: Military Service
Publishing Co., 1947), p. 68.
48. Ronald F. Lee, The Origin and Evolution of the National Military Park Idea (Washington:
Office of Park Historic Preservation, 1973), pp. 33-35.
49. US Army War College, "Memorandum: Instructions for students designated to be present on
Historical Ride," Fort Humphreys DC, 4 May 1937.
50. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 417.
51. Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942 (New York:
Viking Press, 1966), p. 101.
52. The "maxims" quoted come from Clark Becker, Lord Lytton, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and
Georg Lichtenberg.

xxxv
 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS:
HISTORY OF THE MILITARY ART

Excerpts are reprinted with permission from the Department of the Army, United States Military Academy, West
Point, NY 10996-1793 (from History of the Military Art, H1301, Public Domain).

1. Fundamental Concepts. A primary purpose of this course is to teach each midshipman to

master the fundamental concepts listed below. Such mastery provides a common language for
professional discourse and a basis for analysis of military operations of the past, present and
future.

This is by no means a comprehensive list. Instructors may add a concept here or there. As an
officer, the graduate will encounter many more than these ideas as well as different definitions of
each. The purpose here is to provide each midshipman with a solid foundation upon which to
build his post-graduate professional development. These ideas are consistent with joint doctrine.

By the end of the course, each midshipman must be able to define each of these terms and to
demonstrate his/her understanding of it with historical examples. Additionally, he/she will be
expected to have mastered them, that is, to use them readily and in combination, verbally and in
writing, to critically analyze military events.

2. Threads of Continuity. The study of military history reveals the art of war as an ever-
changing phenomenon. Each war is different in some way from those preceding it. Sometimes
the changes have been evolutionary; other times, they have been revolutionary. Military leaders
must adapt to these changes, often under the pressure of battle. Failure to recognize the impact
of these changes, often because reliance upon ideas and concepts that proved successful in the
past, has resulted in defeat. On the other hand, we see historical examples of leaders who have
accurately judged the impact of these changes, reacted accordingly, and emerged victorious. In
the hope of joining the latter group, we study the process of change in military history.

Although the art of war has changed from age to age, we are able to distinguish several factors in
different ages, in different societies, and in different armies, the changes that have occurred
which stand out more clearly and can be better understood. These factors that provide a common
reference for the study of the changes in the art of war are called threads of continuity. These
factors fall into two groups: the internal threads, which are predominantly or exclusively a part
of the military profession; and the external threads, which are part of a greater social milieu in
which the military exists.

a. Internal Threads: The threads of continuity that are entirely or almost entirely a part of
the military profession are: military professionalism, tactics, operations, strategy, logistics and
administration, generalship, and military theory and doctrine.

(1) Military Professionalism. The definition of military professionalism is dependent

on an understanding of a profession. A profession is an occupation or a calling that requires
specialized knowledge of a given field of human activity, that requires long and intensive
training, that maintains high standards of achievement and conduct through force of education or
concerted opinion, that commits its members to continued study, and that has the rendering of a

xxxvi
public service as its prime purpose. Military professionalism as a thread of continuity, then, is
the conduct of war. Attitude thus distinguishes the “professional” members of the military from
those who are not professionals. Those who are seeking to create or striving to perfect the
profession of arms are military professionals. Those who practice or think about the conduct of
war solely for personal glory or material gain are not military professionals.

(2) Tactics. The second thread of continuity that is strictly part of the military
profession is tactics. Tactics are the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and
engagements. This includes activity out of enemy contact that is intended to directly and
immediately affect such battles and engagements. The word tactics is derived from the Greek
taktos, which means ordered, or arranged; modern usages restrict the word to ordered
arrangement, to include the positioning of supporting weapons, that facilitates the defeat of a
rival in battle. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “tactics” was further refined by
the adjectives “grand” and “minor”. Grand tactics were the tactics of large organizations, and
minor tactics were the tactics of small organizations or of organizations consisting entirely of one
arm (infantry, cavalry, or artillery). Grand tactics are now included in the operational level of
warfare.

(3) Operations. The third thread of continuity, operations, is also strictly part of the
military profession. Operations involves the planning and conduct of campaigns designed to
defeat an enemy in a specific space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. While
this thread of continuity can be used to analyze even the earliest campaigns, its origins as a
separate field of study date only from the era of Napoleon. The two theorists who are most
famous for their analysis of Napoleon’s success, Karl von Clauswitz and Henri Jomini, both
discerned the difference between Napoleon’s conduct of the battle and the actions that preceded
and followed it. They believed these techniques differed enough from the conduct of the battle
to merit separate study.

By the beginning of the 20th century most military writers accepted this distinction, although
they differed on terms and limits. “Grand tactics” and “military strategy” have both been used in
the past to describe what is now termed “operations.” The Prussians and later the German Army
made the most systematic studies of the subject, while it is a relatively new concept in the
American army. FM 100-5 Operations had identified “operations” as the link between strategy
and tactics which governs the way campaigns are planned and conducted. As a result, operations
is concerned with using available military resources to attain the objectives in a specific theater
of war. Therefore, operations seeks to attain the objectives of strategy while at the same time
addressing the way in which campaigns are planned and pursued in a theater.

(4) Strategy. The fourth internal thread of continuity, strategy, no longer belongs
entirely to the military profession, for today’s military leaders generally work closely with
government officials in the field of strategy. “Strategy” is derived from the Greek strategos,
which means the art of skill of the general, and this definition remains useful in understanding
modern definitions of the term. Until late in the 18th and early in the 19th centuries, the specific
tasks of generals differed little from the tasks of subordinate commanders or from the tasks of
politicians, and no specific term was used to describe the art or the skill of the generals. Political
and military leadership of a group was often vested in the same individual, and the resources of

xxxvii
small unit leaders on the battlefield differed little from the resources of the general in overall
command.

By the late 18th century the existence of a resource available to higher leaders was recognized
and given the “stratagem”: a ruse or a trick that gives and advantage to one side in battle or in
war. By the early 19th century, “strategy” referred to the use of resources or the particular tasks
of war that were peculiar to the high-ranking officer. It was defined as the preparation for war
that took place on the map or the use of battles to win campaigns. Since the modern appearance
of the term, however, no precise definition has approached universal acceptance. Yet the term
continues to be widely used, and it finds itself among the vital concepts used to examine and
describe the evolution of the profession of arms. The following definition attempts to facilitate
the student’s quest; the student should also be aware that many other thoughtful definitions exist.
Strategy is the long-range plans and policies for distributing and applying resources to achieve
specific objectives. Strategy allows the achieving of adopted goals. But because conditions in
war and peace are constantly changing, strategy must be modified as it is being executed, and at
times even the goals of strategy must be altered.

Strategy, like tactics, can be further refined by restricting modifiers. For example, grand strategy
is the strategy of a nation or of an alliance. The goal of grand strategy is the attainment of the
political objective of a war.

Grand strategy is formulated by heads of state and their principal political and military advisors.
Grand strategy is more accurately called national strategy if the goals of a single nation are being
sought. A third refinement or level of strategy is military strategy, which is a strategy where the
means and resources are those of the armed forces of a nation and where the goal of strategy is
the securing of objectives consistent with national policy through the application of force or the
threat of force. Military strategy can be formulated by military commanders at all levels, but
commanders below general officer rank are rarely involved in strategy that affects national
policy. A fourth level of strategy is campaign strategy, which is the strategy of a commander of
a force of considerable size that is acting independently. Its immediate goals are generally the
occupation of territory or the defeat of all or a significant part of the enemy armed forces; its
long-term goal remains to support political goals.

(5) Logistics and Administration. The fifth thread of continuity, logistics and
administration, is much likely strategy, in the sense that even though most of its functions are
wholly a part of the profession of arms, many functions are dependent upon and interact closely
with civilian-controlled activities. In addition to this similarity with strategy, logistics and
administration are closely involved with strategy, for logistics and administration provide many
of the resources that strategy puts to work. Logistics is the providing, movement and
maintenance of all services and resources necessary to sustain military forces. Administration is
the management of all services and resources necessary to sustain military forces.

Logistics includes the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation and disposal of material; the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization
of personnel; the acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities;
the acquisition of civilian labor; and the acquisition or furnishing of services, such as baths,

xxxviii
laundry, libraries, and recreation. Since administration applies to the management of men,
material and services, it is intimately associated with logistics.

(6) Military Theory and Doctrine. The sixth internal thread of continuity, military
theory and doctrine, is almost wholly a part of the profession of arms, but since it is involved
with external factors, it too has some application to areas outside the military. Military theory is
the body of ideas that concern war, especially the organization and training for and the conduct
of war. Doctrine is the authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their
actions in support of objectives. Those men whose thoughts about war have influenced
considerable numbers of soldiers are know as military theorists. Doctrine in modern armies is
generally disseminated through manuals, regulations, circulars, and handbooks that prescribe
standardized procedures and organizations. After examination and acceptance by highly
experienced professionals, theory becomes doctrine, with a reasonable assurance of positive
results. Doctrine does not, however, alleviate the requirement for sound judgment, for the
solutions to every critical decision cannot be found in doctrine.

(7) Generalship. The final thread of continuity that is wholly or largely a part of the
profession of arms is generalship, which is defined as exercising the qualities and attributes
necessary to command major units. Generalship is closely involved with each of the threads of
continuity discussed above. It involves strategy, that is, an ability to use all means and resources
available to achieve an assigned goal. It involves tactics – the formation and control of ordered
arrangements of troops when training for the clash of arms or when the clash of arms is
imminent or underway. It involves logistics – that is, a concern for services and material and
administration, the ability to control and manage all the resources available to a senior
commander. And it involves military theory and doctrine – the formulation of new ideas about
war, their evolution, and acceptance or rejection. Generalship also connotes a deep
understanding of the conduct, aims and qualities of members of the military profession.
Generalship involves leadership at the highest levels of command and represents a deep
understanding of the value of moral and espirit to the profession.

b. External Threads. In addition to the important role played by strategy, operations,

tactics, logistics and administration, military theory and doctrine, and military professionalism,
the perceptive student of war is keenly aware that there are also external factors that influence
the military profession. The most significant of these external factors, or “threads of continuity,”
are political factors, social factors, economic factors, and technology.

(1) Political Factors. Those ideas and actions of governments or organized groups
that affect the activities of whole societies are political factors. They shape warfare, determine
the composition and strength of military organizations, and often establish the goals and policies
for which wars have been fought. Until the middle of the 19th century, the political chiefs, or
heads of state or government, were usually the commanders of the military as well. Alexander,
Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon are prime examples. In such
cases, political policy and military goals were nearly synonymous. However, in democratic
societies of more recent vintage, such as Great Britain since the 17th century and the United
States since its founding, political policies often have been quite removed from military
capabilities and goals. Regardless of the conditions, political factors maintain a major influence

xxxix
upon the military profession. In modern democratic societies, political factors have a double
meaning: at one level, they involve the activities of the military profession that influence
legislation and administrative decisions regarding national security; at another lever, they involve
the consequences of military actions on the international balance of power and the behavior of
foreign states. The two levels are closely related, and in spite of the many differences between
military leaders and civilian politicians, political factors themselves remain closely intertwined
with the military profession.

(2) Social Factors. The activities or ideas emanating from human groups and group
relationships that affect warfare are social factors. These factors involve such diverse concepts
as popular attitudes, the role of religious institutions, level of education, roles of educational
institutions, psychological warfare, reactions to and roles of mass media, interracial and minority
rights questions, combat psychology, standards of morality and justice, and ultimately the will of
a people to resist. In total war social factors are objectives that can be as important as terrain
objectives or the destruction of the military forces in the field.

(3) Economic Factors. Those activities and ideas that involve the production,
distribution, and consumption of the material resources of the state are economic factors.
Different types of economies (for example: capitalist, communist, laissez-faire, industrial,
agrarian, commercial, subsistence, or common market) affect warfare differently. Economic
war, which takes such forms as blockade or boycott, is a part of total war, but it can also occur
when war as a general condition does not exist.

The interrelation of political, economic and social factors is generally complex, especially in
modern societies, and the detailed study of one alone is often impossible. Together, these factors
provide the foundations of national power.

(4) Technology. Political, social, and economic factors provide the foundations of
power, and technology often provides the limits to power. Technology is the using of knowledge
to create or improve upon practical objects or methods. Within the military profession,
technology leads to progressive advancement in such important areas as transportation,
weaponry, communications, construction, food production, metallurgy, and medicine.
Technology has an undeniable influence on strategy, tactics, logistics, military theory and
doctrine and generalship; when a group’s technology is superior to its adversary’s, it greatly
enhances the probability of success in military endeavors.

The 11 threads of continuity discussed above do not provide an infallible means for learning
about every aspect of the military past. Rather they offer a conceptual framework that seeks to
provide a means to reconstruct at least the general outline of the tapestry of the military past.
The full meaning and magnitude of that tapestry can be appreciated only after long study or long
years of service and significant contribution to the profession of arms.

3. The Principles of War: (FM 100-5, App A)

a. OBJECTIVE: Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and
attainable objective.

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 b. OFFENSIVE: Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

c. MASS: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.

d. ECONOMY OF FORCE: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary

efforts.

e. MANEUVER: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible

application of combat power.

f. UNITY OF COMMAND: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one
responsible commander.

g. SECURITY: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

h. SURPRISE: Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is

unprepared.

i. SIMPLICITY: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding.

4. Levels of War. War is a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest
levels of policy making to the basic levels of execution. Strategic, operational, and tactical levels
are the broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war. While the Principles of
War are appropriate to all levels, applying them involves a different perspective for each.

a. The Strategic Level of Warfare. The level of war at which a nation or group of nations
determines national or alliance security objectives. Activities at this level establish national and
alliance military objective; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of
military and other instruments or power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those
objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan.
(JCS Pub 1-02)

The strategic perspective is worldwide and long-range. The strategic planner deals with
resources, capabilities, limitations, and force postures. He sets broad priorities for allocation of
resources and time frames for accomplishment. Working within a broad perspective of forces
and capabilities, strategy concerns itself with strategic mobility, mobilization, civil defense,
forward force deployments, nuclear deterrence, rapid reinforcements and rapid deployment.
Cooperation among the services and allied nations to produce a unity of effort is of vital concern
in the strategic arena. Strategic planning is not a military function only. It is formulated by input
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Security Council, members of Congress, and
selected advisors to the President.

b. The Operational Level of Warfare. The level of war at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within

xli
theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these
events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they insure
the logistic and administrative support to tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical
successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

The operational art of war is primarily the planning and conduct of campaigns and practiced by
large field, air, and fleet unity of the services. It involves joint, combined, and coalition forces
that maneuver with the objective of defeating the enemy and achieving strategic objectives
within a theater of operations, rather than a specific battlefield.

Operations take the form of large-scale maneuvers such as penetrations, envelopments, double
envelopments, frontal attacks, naval blockades, air interdiction, turning movements, feints,
amphibious landings, and airborne assaults. At the operational level, maneuver may be
sometimes entirely movement.

c. The Tactical Level of Warfare. The level of war at which battles and engagements are
planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units and task forces.
Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in
relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

The objective of the tactical level of war is the detailed destruction of enemy forces or thwarting
directly the enemy intentions. Tactics consists of the employment of division size and smaller
units in weapons engagements and battles with the enemy. Close support, interdiction,
destroying equipment, disrupting facilities, reconnaissance and surveillance, killing or capturing
personnel, positioning and displacement of weapons systems, and supply and support are tactical
activities.

The tactical commander’s perspective is one of a battle or engagement when he “executes” a

plan of movement with fire support to achieve a specific objective such as clearing an area,
blocking enemy movement, protecting a flank, gaining fire superiority or seizing a location. The
room for anticipating opportunities and risk-taking is somewhat limited by the confines of the
immediate aspects of the battle and the specificity of the objective.

Maneuver at the tactical level is nearly always a combination of movement and supporting fires.
These two functions are tightly integrated instead of being somewhat discrete as they may
frequently be at the operational level. Movement, instead of resulting from opportunities for
positional advantage, is usually an effort to position forces to concentrate fires on the enemy or
to escape enemy fires.

Tactical unit commanders depend on their higher operational level commander to move them
effectively into and out of battles and engagements. Success or failure at the tactical level, when
viewed as a whole by the operational-level commander, are the basis for a wider scheme of
maneuver. Small unit actions stimulate the operational-level commander’s anticipation for result
in victory. The perspective of the tactical commander is somewhat more subjective – his
concern is destruction of the enemy forces in his zone of action and his own force’s survival. He

xlii
must concentrate on executing his portion of the overall mission effectively, at the same time
visualizing the overall operational-level perspective.

d. Schematic

(1) Grand Strategy. A coalition’s long-range plans and policies for using military
and other resources of each member to achieve specific, shared objectives.

(2) National Security. The art and science of development and using the political,
economic, and psychological powers of a nation or alliance, together with its armed forces,
during peace and war, to secure national or alliance objectives.

STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR

(3) Military Strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation
or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force.

(4) Campaign Strategy. A military commander’s long-range plans and policies for
using the resources available to him to achieve specific, assigned objectives in a given space and
time.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

(5) Operations. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply,

attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

(6) Tactics. The employment of units in combat or the ordered arrangement and
maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to utilize their full
potentialities.

5. Forms of Strategy

a. EXHAUSTION – A strategy which seeks the gradual erosion of an enemy nation’s will
or means to resist.

b. ATTRITION – A strategy which seeks the gradual erosion of the combat power of the
enemy’s armed forces.

c. ANNIHILATION – A strategy which seeks the immediate destruction of the combat

power of the enemy’s armed forces.

6. Operations and Tactics

a. Categories of Operations

xliii
 (1) OFFENSIVE. Operations designed to achieve one’s purpose by attacking the
enemy.

(2) DEFENSIVE. Operations designed to cause an enemy’s attack to fail.

(3) JOINT. Military operations involving more than one service.

(4) COMBINED. Military operations involving the armed services of more than one
allied nation.

b. Operational Design

(1) Center of Gravity: This concept derives from the idea that an armed combatant,
whether a warring nation or an alliance, an army in the field, or one of its subordinate
formations, is a complex organism whose effective operation depends not merely on the
performance of each of its component parts, but also on the smoothness with which these
components interact and the will of the commander. As with any complex organism, some of the
components are more vital than others to the smooth and reliable operations of the whole. If
these are damaged or destroyed, their loss unbalances the entire structure, producing a cascading
deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness which may result in complete failure, and which will
invariably leave the force vulnerable to further damage. Clausewitz defined the idea as “the hub
of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” (FM 100-5)

(2) Line of Operation: The directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy.
Lines of operation connect the force with its base of operation on the one hand and its
operational objective on the other. Normally a campaign or major operation will have a single
line of operation, although multiple lines of operation in a single campaign are not uncommon.
Classical theory makes special note of the relationship between opposing lines of operations. A
force is said to be operating on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and
when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to each other. Interior
lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the
enemy, or due to the successful conduct of the defense.

(3) Culminating Point: That point in any offensive operation where the strength of
the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued
offensive operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat. In operational theory, this
point is called the culminating point. The art of attack at all levels is to achieve decisive
objectives before the culminating point is reached. Conversely, the art of defense is to hasten the
offensive when it arrives. Culminating points may occur because movement of supplies cannot
keep pace with the attack or because lines of communication are under attack by partisans or
other forces such as airborne or air mobile units capable of attacking rear area assets.

c. Forms of Maneuver. (FM 100-5, pp. 101-106). For map references, see pamphlet from
Avery Publishing Group -- the West Point Military History series.

xliv
 (1) FRONTAL ATTACK – An offensive action that strikes the enemy across a
broad front and over the most direct approaches. Pickett’s Charge, depicted on Map 37b of the
Civil War Atlas, is an example of a frontal attack.

(2) PENETRATION – An offensive action that breaks through the enemy on a

narrow front and seizes deep objectives to destroy the coherence of his defense. Map 5c in the
back of Chapter 5 of The Dawn of Modern Warfare depicts Marlborough’s penetration of the
French line at the Battle of Blenheim.

(3) ENVELOPMENT – An offensive action that passes around or over enemy

defenses to seize objectives on his flank or rear. Jackson’s flank march and his subsequent
attack at Chancellorsville, shown on Map 28 of the Civil War Atlas, is an example of an
envelopment.

(4) TURNING MOVEMENT - An envelopment that forces the enemy to abandon

his position, divert major forces and fight in two directions simultaneously. An attacker who
conducts a turning movement usually attempts to avoid the defense entirely, seeking instead to
secure terrain deep in the enemy’s rear and along his line of communication. Map 26 of the
Civil War Atlas shows the turning movement conducted by Hooker at the opening of the
Chancellorsville Campaign.

(5) INFILTRATION – The covert movement of all or part of the attacking force
through enemy lines to a favorable position in their rear.

d. Types of Offensive Operations (FM 100-5, ch. 6)

(1) MOVEMENT TO CONTACT - An offensive action whose purpose is to gain

or reestablish contact with the enemy. The movement of the Grand Armee through the
Thuringian Forest Campaign, shown on Maps 27 and 28 of the Napoleonic Atlas, is an excellent
example of a movement to contact.

(2) HASTY ATTACK – A planned offensive action made without pause in the
forward momentum of the force upon initial contact with the enemy. A hasty attack was
conducted by Henry Heth’s division against Union infantry and cavalry situated west of
Gettysburg on 1 July 1863. It is described on pages 156-157 of the Civil War text and depicted
on Map 35a of the accompanying atlas.

(3) DELIBERATE ATTACK – A thoroughly planned and coordinated offensive

action whose purpose is to initiate the forward momentum of friendly forces in contact with a
prepared enemy. Soult’s corps conducted a deliberate attack at the Battle of Austerlitz. It is
shown on Map 23 in the Napoleonic Atlas.

(4) EXPLOITATION – An offensive action the purpose of which is to prevent the

enemy from reconstituting his defense or conducting an orderly withdrawal. The operations
conducted by the Army of Italy after the crossing of the Po River in 1796 is an example of
exploitation. It is depicted on Map 4 of the Napoleonic Atlas.

xlv
 (5) PURSUIT – An offensive action the purpose of which is to intercept and
annihilate a retreating enemy which has lost its ability to react effectively. The actions of the
Grand Armee following the Battle of Jena, shown on Map 32 of the Napoleonic Atlas, are
excellent examples.

e. Types of Defensive Operations (FM 100-5, ch. 8-9)

(1) MOBILE DEFENSE – A defense that employs a combination of offensive,

defensive, and delaying action to defeat the enemy attack. Robert E. Lee’s conduct of the
Chancellorsville Campaign, depicted on Maps 26-31 of the Civil War Atlas, is an example of a
mobile defense at the operational level of war.

(2) AREA DEFENSE – A defense which is conducted to deny the enemy access to
specific terrain for a specified time. The fortifications at West Point are representative of an area
defense. Their mission: do not allow the west point of the Hudson River to fall into British
hands.

f. Retrograde Operations (FM 100-05, ch. 10)

(1) DELAY – A retrograde operation whose purpose is to gain time for friendly
forces to reestablish the defense, cover a defending or withdrawing unit, protect a friendly unit’s
flank, or to participate in an economy of force effort. The 1st Cavalry Division and the I Corps
of the Army of the Potomac fought a delay on the hills west of Gettysburg on the morning of 1
July 1863. It is shown on Maps 35a and 35b of the Civil War Atlas.

(2) WITHDRAWAL – A retrograde operation the purpose of which is to remove

subordinate units from combat, adjust defensive positions, or relocate the entire force. After the
Battle of Gettysburg, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia conducted a withdrawal. It is shown on
Maps 38a and 38b of the Civil War Atlas.

(3) RETIREMENT – A rearward movement away from the enemy by a force not in
contact. The actions of the Russian Army prior to the Battle of Austerlitz, described in The Wars
of Napoleon, pp. 49-50, and on Map 20 of the Napoleonic Atlas, constitute a retirement.

(4) RETREAT – Though it is not officially recognized by U.S. Army doctrine, the
term “retreat” is often used generically in literature to describe any movement of a unit away
from the enemy. The term generally implies that the movement is forced by the enemy and is
often characterized by a high degree of disorder.

g. Main and Supporting Attacks

(1) MAIN ATTACK – An offensive action constituting the commander’s principal

effort to achieve his purpose. Soult’s corps conducted the main attack at Austerlitz. It is shown
on Map 22 of the Napoleonic Atlas.

xlvi
 (2) SUPPORTING ATTACK – An offensive action, separate from the main attack,
intended by the commander to facilitate the success of the main attack. Common purposes of a
supporting attack can include deception, fixing the enemy in position, and seizing key terrain.
Lannes’ corps conducted the supporting attack at Austerlitz (Map 22).

7. Terms

a. CAMPAIGN – A series of related military operations intended to accomplish a

common objective, usually within a given space and time.

b. COMBAT POWER – A unit’s fighting ability. Combat power is an abstraction that

represents one’s judgment of a unit’s fighting ability considering size and weaponry, but also
espirit, leadership, training, discipline, and other relevant subjective qualities. Because these are
not constant factors, a unit’s combat power is not constant. Combat power is significant only in
relation to a specific enemy; therefore, the degree to which a unit’s combat power is superior to
that of the enemy can be increased by the manner of employment, such as achieving surprise,
attacking a flank, or exploiting the advantages of terrain.

c. GUERRILLA WARFARE – Military and paramilitary operations conducted in hostile

territory by irregular and primarily indigenous forces.

d. INSURGENCY – An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted

government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

e. INTELLIGENCE – The product resulting from the collection, evaluation and analysis
of all available information about opposing forces or nations.

f. INTERIOR LINES – The ability to reinforce one’s separated units faster than one’s
opponent, due to central position, superior mobility or both, relative to the enemy. Robert E. Lee
utilized interior lines at the tactical level in his conduct of the Battle of Antietam, depicted on
Map 14 of the Civil War Atlas.

g. LIMITED WAR – A war prosecuted by a belligerent who voluntarily exercises

restraints on means, objective, geographical area, or time.

h. LINES OF COMMUNICATION – The land, sea and/or air routes that connect a
military force with its base of operations and along which logistical support is provided.

i. LOGISTICS – The provision, movement and maintenance of all services and resources
necessary to sustain military forces.

j. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES – Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation

-- as opposed to the means for seeking these ends -- towards which a policy is directed and
efforts and resources of the nation (or alliance) are applied.

k. NATIONAL POLICY – A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted

xlvii
by the government (or alliance) at a national level in pursuit of national objectives.

l. RESERVE – A combat element intentionally withheld from action by the commander

so as to be available for commitment at the decisive moment. The decisive moment can be one
anticipated in the commander’s plan or one imposed by enemy action.

m. STRATEGIC CONSUMPTION – The loss of available combat strength due to

diversions and irreplaceable casualties imposed by the expansion of one’s base of operations.
Examples of diversions include guarding one’s line of communication as one advances and
garrisoning key positions in one’s rear.

n. SUPPORTING DISTANCE – The distance by which two or more forces can be

separated while retaining the ability to reinforce each other before anyone can be defeated
individually. Supporting distance is estimated on the basis of terrain, relative mobility, and
relative strength.

o. TOTAL WAR – A war conducted by a belligerent in which few restraints on means,

objective, geographic area, or time are exercised and in which the involvement of all resources of
the society are normally committed.

xlviii
 “HOW TO GET THE MOST OUT OF A SEMINAR FORMAT”
by
Dr. Bradley J. Meyer

Written for this course by Dr. Meyer.

The seminar discussion is one of the most powerful teaching tools available. It has a
number of advantages. First, discussion is an active rather than a passive form of learning.
In a well-run discussion, students do not simply “absorb” material, as in a lecture. They react to
what is being said: they agree or disagree, they come up with something to add to the discussion,
they express a point of view in their own words. They continually compare and integrate their
own knowledge with that of others. Sometimes, they come up with ideas that are new to
themselves or to others.

Preparing for the discussion is also an exercise in active learning. Typically, a reading
assignment constitutes the base of knowledge upon which the discussion will be built. While
knowledge derived from work or life experience can often be worked into a seminar discussion,
and this is an advantage of the discussion format, in an academic situation, a reading assignment
will normally form the basis of the discussion.

Reading itself is a form of active learning. The words on the page are clues to the writer’s
meaning, but each reader must make his or her own sense out of them. Normally, in a well-
organized seminar, students will already have a topic for discussion in mind as they do the
assigned reading, so that even before the discussion group meets, they begin relating the reading
material to the discussion topic. Then again, for most people, reading is the most time-effective
way of acquiring information, much more efficient than hearing a lecture or watching a video
presentation. The typical seminar will cover a lot of ground, simply in terms of processing
information efficiently.

Reading is a powerful learning tool, but a good seminar discussion will enhance the payoff
from time spent in reading. If a group of 8 to 10 people all read the same material, they will
likely come away with 8 or 10 interpretations of that material. If they then spend an hour or two
attempting to reconcile those interpretations, chances are good each person will gain a clearer
understanding of the issues at hand. If nothing else, each discussion participant hears how other
people have interpreted the material, and this helps to fill in some of the blanks and blind spots
that everyone has. By arguing about and discussing the issue at hand, discussion participants
sort out the evidence that speaks for and against a given point of view.

This brings us to the most important advantage of the seminar: it promotes synthesis.
Synthesis, bringing the factors that bear on a complex problem into an ordered whole, is the
ultimate goal of most education in the humanities. Discussion helps the students make sense of
the assigned material. All members of the discussion group, and not just the teacher, can help
each other come to terms with the material. In a good discussion, everyone comes away with a
better grasp of the issues.

Finally, a good seminar is one of the most enjoyable forms of learning. Everyone can
make a contribution to the group effort, and everyone should. Generally speaking, people like

xlix
being able to say something in class, to throw in their two cents worth, rather than simply to
listen while someone talks to them. A good discussion is lively and it helps keep the interest of
the class in the subject matter high.

HOW TO RUN A SEMINAR DISCUSSION

From the instructor’s point of view, running a good discussion is an exercise in backwards
engineering. The instructor first synthesizes material bearing on the discussion topic. Then the
instructor assigns to the students that portion of the material which allowed him or her to achieve
that synthesis, together with a discussion topic to focus the student’s attention. The students read
the material in light of the discussion topic, work the matter over in their heads, and come to
class, not necessarily knowing all the answers, but at least ready to discuss the question. The
instructor guides the class discussion, generally in light of some prearranged plan. At the end of
the discussion, hopefully, a body of insight and knowledge the instructor alone had possessed is
now the common property of all.

The role of the discussion leader might be compared to the helmsman on a ship. The
discussion leader chooses the destination the discussion will aim for. This goal is based on the
course objectives and the discussion leader’s own synthesis of the material. With an objective in
mind, the discussion leader sets the initial course of the discussion, through selection of readings
(in some educational settings) and through selection of the discussion topic, which the students
keep in mind as they do the readings. The discussion leader generally helps get the discussion
moving, and stands ready to restart it if it gets stalled. Having chosen an objective and set a
course, the discussion leader applies rudder corrections if the discussion strays too far off course.
But the steering mechanism is somewhat loose: the discussion leader expects a somewhat
meandering course across the bay, and realizes that to a great extent a discussion has a life of its
own – so long as the discussion leader allows the discussion to occur.

Once a general objective for the discussion has been assigned, the instructor surveys the
material that bears on the topic, attempting to achieve a synthesis of the subject. Once the
instructor has come to a general understanding of the problem suggested by the topic, the
instructor assigns to the students those materials from which the synthesis was achieved.

Note that the instructor has already done the students a service, by preselecting the
materials the students will read to achieve a synthesis through the discussion process. It might
be possible to send the students into the library with a learning objective and have the students
research the topic themselves. The students would then come to their own synthesis based upon
their own research -- if they had the necessary research skills (a major “if” at certain levels of
education). But this would take more time. The instructor can do the selection and sorting for
the students in advance. A discussion seminar can cover more ground than the students could on
their own -- more learning can take place.

Generally speaking, once the instructor has achieved a synthesis, there is no need to worry
that the students will be able to “get it.” In the seminar format, the students will have a lot of
help in “getting it.” First, the materials they will read are preselected, so they don’t have to read

l
through a lot of superfluous material. Second, the students have a discussion topic to focus their
inquiry. Third, the discussion format allows the instructor to “jump start” the students to a
higher level of understanding than they could achieve on their own, at least in the amount of time
available for the course.

A well-chosen discussion topic, provided to the students before they do the reading, can be
great assistance in dealing with a mass of information presented in the reading. Basically, the
discussion topic will ask the question which the discussion will attempt to answer. All of the
assigned reading will be relevant (hopefully), at least in terms of providing necessary
background, but only a small amount, perhaps scattered in several places, will actually answer
the discussion topic.

When the actual discussion arrives, the goal is to have a lively discussion that stays on the
topic and arrives at some kind of conclusion. The students should talk more to each other than to
the instructor. The discussion leader should not talk to the discussion group for any length of
time, should not deliver a lecture, impromptu or otherwise. The discussion is not a lecture.
Neither should the instructor ask a series of questions of the students, which they answer. The
discussion is not a recitation. (Neither should everyone sit around and stare at each other.)

Discussable questions are the discussion leader’s stock in trade. A discussable question is
one that is open-ended enough to form the basis for a portion of the discussion, but at the same
time is based on the discussion topic and the reading. Obviously, a discussable question does not
have a short definite answer: “1862” or “Abraham Lincoln.” A discussable question is
something like this: “How would different political groups in the North react to Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation?” Such a question does not lend itself to short, simple answers, but
to longer, more complex answers. Discussable questions that have two sides to them are
particularly prized by the discussion leader: they get discussions going. They get arguments
going (always good for the liveliness of the discussion) that force people to answer objectives
and present their point of view to others. Discussable questions that demand an answer to
unanswerable questions can sometime be quite useful: “Did Lincoln issue the Emancipation
Proclamation to free the slaves or to save the Union?”

Drawing up, in advance, an outline of a discussion, just as one would draw up an outline of
a lecture or a paper, is an excellent idea. The discussion leader should ask: “What is the
ultimate objective of this discussion, what understandings should be reached, and what is the best
way to proceed towards the objective? What are the intermediate understandings that have to be
reached? What critical points have to be brought out? What is the evidence for these critical
points? In other words, a discussion can be “gamed out,” just as an essay writer or a lecturer
games out what his audience needs to know, and in what order they need to know it.

All of these considerations give the discussion leader a rudder for controlling the
discussion. If the discussion has exhausted a given sub-topic and needs to go in a certain
direction, the discussion leader can throw out an introduction to a whole area of intermediate
consideration, according to the pre-arranged plan. On the other hand, very often the discussion
will tend to move on from an issue before it has been well enough explored. Now is the time for
the discussion leader to throw out a specific, focused question about the issue. Now is the time

li
to ask specific questions about the evidence for a given point of view. These tactics help to
ensure that an important subsidiary point is fully discussed before the group moves on to
something else.

Frequently, as a discussion gets going, four or five major issues will be thrown out by the
discussants within the first five minutes. There are, after all, only so many things that can be
said about a given discussion topic, based on a given set of readings. Each of those four or vice
areas is a potential lead into a major area of discussion. The discussion leader can come back to
some of them 20 or 30 minutes down the road. But if the discussion leader has not “gamed out”
the course of discussion, the major issues thrown out by the students probably will not be
recognized for what they are.

In many ways the only difference between the discussion leader and any ordinary member
of the discussion group is that the discussion leader has more authority than the other members
of the discussion group, and it is generally easier for the discussion leader to get “into” the
discussion than for anyone else. One thing this means is that the discussion group generally will
look to the discussion leader to get the group back on track if it gets off the topic. Discussion is a
spontaneous, open-ended form. One aspect of this is that even the most “high-powered” groups
can spiral off into meaningless drivel in about nine seconds flat. In such cases, experienced
discussion groups will automatically look to the discussion leader to restore order.

A very powerful means of steering a discussion is to have a comment, or a new line of

inquiry “ready to go,” when the discussion bogs down, as all discussion will from time to time.
If everyone is wondering what to say, particularly if a particular point has been “talked out,” the
group will generally seize the new line of attack and run with it.

All the techniques (and reasons) for steering a discussion are available to the students as
well as to the instructor. Members of a long-standing discussion group will gradually learn to be
better discussants, which is an important skill in many professions. Humanity makes many of its
decisions through discussions -- and arguments -- and it is important for many people to be
known as someone who makes comments that are relevant to the discussion, as opposed to
irrelevant, and perhaps even a reputation for saying things that are conclusive. Perhaps most
importantly, the most serious mistakes are often made when argument and discussion have not
taken place, and as a result no one knows what decisions truly mean and what is at stake.

SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF LEADING A DISCUSSION

No matter how many people are in the room, only about four or five will be in discussion
at any time. This seems to be an empirical fact. In a large group, the more articulate and
informed, or those most determined to be heard, will tend to dominate the discussion. It follows
that, for optimal learning, discussion groups need to be small. Four of five people probably are
too small: then everyone needs to be in the discussion all the time. A group of about 8 or 10
seems to work well: that way, it is relatively easy for an individual to get into the discussion, but
everyone doesn’t have to be in it all the time. In groups larger than this, it becomes harder for an
individual to get into the discussion. Not being able to get a word in edgewise can be frustrating.

lii
 Groups where the members know each other outside of a formal classroom setting are
more likely to discuss freely in class. If there is a free and easy interchange around the table
before class starts, it is more likely discussion will come easily. It follows that discussion leaders
should encourage students to get to know each other outside the formal classroom setting, even if
this just means having introductions around the table before class starts. Obviously, it also helps
if discussants are all more or less at the same knowledge level.

People who say too much, and who say it in ways that do not contribute to the discussion,
can be one of the biggest problems a discussion leader faces. Generally, if the discussion leader
is aware of a problem, everyone else is as well. People who try to dominate a discussion for
their own ends, whether for the sheer pleasure of hearing themselves talk, or because they have
an ax to grind, typically are not subtle about it. The discussion group won’t like this phenomena,
and group pressure is one of the most effective ways of bringing this problem under control.

CONCLUSION

As a pedagogical tool, the discussion can be an important part of a quality educational

program. Just as with any pedagogical tool, there are a number of techniques which can enhance
the success of the experience. How to run a discussion is rarely taught. Although it is apparent
to most that a good lecture involves a good deal of preparation and technique, most people
probably think that a good discussion just happens. The approach outlined above has worked
well for the author of this piece, and he hopes that it will be of interest and benefit to others.

liii
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 1 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Introduction

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend the value and purposes of a

study of military history.

B. The student will know and recall the course

professional competency objectives.

C. The student will know and state the pertinent

administrative aspects of the course (e.g.,
presentation methods, testing/grading, student
responsibilities).

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. “Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military

Art” (in front matter of this curriculum guide)

2. “Military History: Is It Still Practical?” (in

front matter of this curriculum guide and, at the
time of this writing, also available at:
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/luvaas.htm.)

3. Warfighting, MCDP-1 (Available online at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp
1.pdf.)

B. Student texts: (Articles to be distributed and

discussed at the first opportunity, prior to the course
lessons being taught.)

1. “Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military Art”

2. “Military History: Is It Still Practical?”

III. Instructional Aids

A. Course outline

1
 B. Chalkboard/whiteboard

C. Copies of materials to be used by the students

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to accomplish the objectives of

this lesson is to describe basic course objectives
and purposes, and then to emphasize the importance
of a sense of warfare history.

2. A review of the course syllabus will aid the

student’s appreciation of the scope of the course
and will serve to further demonstrate the
importance of warfare in world history.

3. Course mechanics and administrative matters should

be discussed to ensure the student knows what he/
she can expect from the course and what the
instructor expects from the student.

V. Presentation

A. Discuss course purpose and professional core competency

objectives.

B. Ask, “Why do you suppose it’s important to study the

evolution of warfare?” Discuss answers and provide
instructor’s point of view. Discuss the high points of
the Luvaas article (“Military History: Is It Still
Practical?”) to illustrate how history can be used to
help understand and impact the future.

C. Briefly review the course syllabus, highlighting areas

of importance or of unique interest (e.g, student
presentations, exercises, etc.).

1. Emphasize the importance of each student

2
 formulating his/her own ideas about how warfare
has evolved, changed, remained the same, etc.

2. Use the course syllabus as a guide in discussing

course materials.

D. Course administration. Discuss the following:

1. Participatory nature of the course, if applicable.

2. Attendance policy.

3. Reading assignments and class preparation.

4. Testing policy, quizzes, projects.

5. Grading policy.

6. Resource bibliography - unit and university

libraries, other sources.

7. Vocabulary of warfare - use and importance. Have

students read the “Fundamental Concepts: History
of the Military Art” handout on military terms and
threads of continuity in order to better study
warfare and levels of war.

3
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 2 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Man and War

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and discuss varying definitions

related to the operational art of war.

B. The student will know, list, and explain the nine

principles of war as presented in class.

C. The student will know and discuss the relevance of the

threads of continuity and political and strategic
considerations as they apply to warfare and how/where
operations and tactics fit in.

D. The student will know, list, and discuss the six causes
of international conflict as defined by Jomini.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Face of Battle, pp. 15-78

2. Men in Arms, pp. 5-14

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 11-15

4. “Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military

Art” (in front matter of this curriculum guide)

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts/resource materials

1. The Face of Battle, pp. 15-78

2. Men in Arms, pp. 5-14

3. “Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military

Art” (handout)

4
III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Guided discussion

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to accomplish the objectives of

this lesson is to begin soliciting varying
definitions of war, followed by a discussion of
war as a natural or unnatural, constructive or
destructive force in society and whether it’s an
art or a science.

2. Present a brief lecture on the principles of war

and Jomini’s causes of conflict to provide a
framework for studying the evolution of warfare.

V. Presentation

A. Definitions of war.

1. Solicit definitions from students and discuss.

2. Instructor definitions of war:

a. Conflict carried on by force of arms, as

between nations or states.

b. “Any conflict between rival groups by force

of arms or other means, ...recognized as a
legal conflict.” (Preston and Wise)

c. Other definitions.

3. Conflict as a common denominator .

5
 4. Types of conflict:

a. Military.

b. Political.

c. Economic.

d. Religious/moral.

e. Ideological.

f. Psychological.

g. Other.

B. Principles of war and a description of each. (Refer to

the “Fundamental Concepts: History of the Military Art”
article.)

1. Mass - Combat power and its concentration at the

decisive point and time.

2. Objective - General areas or points of strategic

or tactical value (including the enemy force
itself), the destruction of which is the ultimate
end of military operations.

3. Offensive - Use of initiative in combat to set the

time, place, strength, type, and direction of
attack.

4. Surprise - Psychological weapon applied by action

that cannot reasonably be expected.

5. Economy of Force - Distributing available forces

in the most advantageous manner; corollary of
mass.

6. Movement - Maneuvering forces in the execution of

a scheme of maneuver.

7. Unity of Command - Cooperation; teamwork.

8. Security - Never being surprised.

6
 9. Simplicity - The acid test of the soundness of any
plan for a military operation and of the orders
issued for its execution.

C. Causes of international conflict (Jomini).

1. To reclaim certain rights or to defend them.

2. To protect and maintain the great interests of the

state.

3. To maintain the balance of power.

4. To propagate political or religious theories, to

crush them or to defend them.

5. To increase the influence and power of the state

by acquisitions of territory.

6. To gratify a desire for conquest (or glory).

D. Summary

7
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 3 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Development of Warfare in Ancient Times

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the evolution of

weaponry from rudimentary to the Assyrian Iron Age.

B. The student will know and describe the Assyrian

military system, to include military organization,
siege tactics, and the use of terror.

C. The student will know and describe the Persian military

ascendancy under Cyrus and Darius, with emphasis on
methods used to consolidate their conquests.

D. The student will know, identify, and discuss Graeco-

Persian conflicts, with emphasis on Marathon,
Thermopyale, and Salamis.

E. The student will know and trace the development of the

Greek military system, with emphasis on Spartan
training and the phalanx.

F. The student will comprehend the nature of the

Peloponnesian War (land power versus sea power) and the
resolution of that conflict.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 1-21

3. War Through the Ages, pp. 3-15 (optional)

4. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student text: The Art of War in the Western World, pp.

1-21

8
III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Trace the development of ancient weapons.

1. Rocks and clubs.

a. Weapons were either hand-held or in some way

projected through the air.

b. Rocks evolved into darts, javelins, and

arrows.

c. Clubs evolved into hatchets, spears, and

swords.

2. Protective armor.

a. To assist in warding off blows.

b. Evolved from leather stretched over a wooden

frame (plus wooden and wicker varieties) into
use of metals.

c. As soldiers suffered injury to different

parts of their bodies, armor was developed to
protect those parts.

3. Use of metals.

a. In both weapons and armor.

9
 b. Reflected evolving technology.

c. Iron replaced bronze.

B. First great military power.

1. Some fragmentary accounts of fighting in Egypt

during the period 3100-1000 B.C.

2. First detailed accounts are of the Assyrians who

were dominant for five centuries.

a. Beginnings.

(1) Initial dominance under Tiglath-Pileser

I (1166- 1093 B.C.).

(2) Fought off roving invaders.

(3) Zenith under Tiglath-Pileser III (745-

727 B.C.).

(4) First to recognize superiority of iron

over bronze.

(5) First to equip army with iron weapons.

b. Organization.

(1) Had a military society.

(2) Divided forces into separate branches

(spear-men, archers, charioteers,
cavalry) and trained them.

(3) First to use cavalry effectively.

(4) Developed siege tactics and built

special siege equipment to attack walled
cities that had developed in response to
roving invaders.

(5) Could move and supply 50,000 men across

all types of terrain.

(6) Senior army officers were also priests

10
 and the word for “rebel” was the same as
for “sinner.”

c. Tactics.

(1) First to have siege capabilities.

(2) Used terror deliberately to intimidate

enemies.

(3) Some cities would surrender without a

fight, hoping to avoid mass slaughter.

d. End.

(1) Fell in 612 B.C. to a coalition of

Babylonians and Medes.

(2) Assyrians’ king threw himself into the

flames of the city.

(3) Defeat and subsequent enslavement and

deportation were so thorough that
Assyria, as a separate nation,
disappeared.

C. Persian military ascendancy.

1. Transition.

a. Coalition that defeated Assyrians collapsed.

b. Persia became independent in 559 B.C.

2. Cyrus the Great.

a. Primary military victory at Thymbra in 546

B.C. against the Lydians who outnumbered him.

b. To avoid being outflanked, he put troops in a

huge square with archers in the middle.

c. Improvised a camel corps, which frightened

the Lydian horses.

d. Subjugated the largest territory (conquered

and held) at that time.

11
 e. Considered the first Great Captain in
history.

f. Killed in battle in 530 B.C.

3. Darius the Great.

a. Cousin of Cyrus.

b. Consolidated Cyrus’ area and then began

expanding.

c. Relatively enlightened governing policies.

d. Made first attempt to reach Greece in 492

B.C.

D. Greek military development.

1. Phalanx.

a. Common to all Greek city-states, including

two dominant ones -- Athens and Sparta.

b. Made up of hoplites-warriors who could afford

their own equipment, which consisted of a
shield, a short “cut and thrust” sword, and a
10-foot spear.

c. Marched virtually shoulder-to-shoulder and

usually eight deep with all spears pointing
to the front.

2. Spartan system - All spartans, male and female,

were screened and trained in military matters from
age 7 to 60.

E. Graeco-Persian conflicts.

1. Marathon, 490 B.C.

a. Persians landed in Marathon, intent on

pulling forces away from Athens, which they
would then attack.

b. Athenians, under Miltiades, pressed attack

12
 and sprang a double envelopment.

c. Athenian Army countermarched rapidly back to

Athens. Its presence deterred the Persians
from attacking.

2. Thermopylae, 480 B.C.

a. Between Spartans and Persian land force.

b. Spartans outnumbered, put up a legendary

fight, and died to the last man.

c. Did delay and punish Persians.

3. Salamis, 480 B.C.

a. First decisive naval engagement in history.

b. Outnumbered Greeks; lured Persian fleet into

constricted area where Persian numbers did
not help.

c. Greek leader, Themistocles, had contributed

to Persian overconfidence by sending Persian
leader, Xerxes, a message stating falsely
that the Greeks were on the verge of
widespread desertion.

d. In aftermath, Persian land force was defeated

at Plataea.

F. Peloponnesian War.

1. Transition.

a. Having freed themselves of invaders, the

Greek city-states began to fight among
themselves.

b. Period of Peloponnesian Wars: 431 B.C. to

404 B.C. Described by Thucydides.

c. Primary antagonists were Athens and Sparta.

2. Athens - primarily, a sea power.

13
 3. Sparta.

a. Primarily, a land power.

b. Up until the decisive battle, Athens won the

sea battles, and Sparta, the land battles.

4. Resolution.

a. At Syracuse (Sicily) in 413 B.C.

b. Sparta defeated the Athenian fleet, breaking

Athens’ back, though fighting drags on for
several more years.

c. Final battle was the victory of the Spartan

Admiral Lysander at Aegospotamoi (405 B.C.).

d. Thus, Sparta, the land power, adapted to and

ultimately defeated Athens at sea.

G. Summary

14
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 4 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Alexander and the Macedonian System

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and briefly discuss the

continuing strategic and tactical innovations of
Sparta, Epaminondas of Thebes, and Philip of Macedon.

B. The student will know and discuss the organizational

and tactical improvements of the Macedonian military
system, 350-320 B.C.

C. The student will know and describe Alexander’s unique

resolution of the land power/sea power dichotomy.

D. The student will know and trace Alexander’s route of

conquest, with emphasis on his use of tactical
concentration in striking at the decisive point at the
decisive time.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 21- 54,

57-62

2. Men in Arms, pp. 27-31

3. War Through the Ages, pp. 16-42 (optional)

4. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 21- 54,

57-62

2. Men in Arms, pp. 27-31

III. Instructional Aids

15
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. The Battle of Leuctra - Epaminondas of Thebes.

1. Parallel advance.

2. Refused wing.

B. Philip of Macedon.

1. Cooperative arms.

a. Infantry.

(1) Sarissa.

(2) Light infantry.

b. Cavalry.

(1) Scouting.

(2) Skirmishing.

c. Artillery.

(1) Ballista.

(2) Catapult.

2. Organizational staff.

16
 3. Engineering Corps.

4. Baggage train.

5. Medical service.

6. Drill masters.

7. National standing army.

C. Alexander’s strategy of defeating sea power by the

taking of seaports from the land side.

D. Alexander the Great.

1. Battle of Issus.

2. Siege of Tyre.

3. Discuss the following aspects of Alexander’s siege

craft:

a. Ram.

b. Bore.

c. Penthouse.

d. Mantelets.

e. Siege tunnels.

f. Naphtha.

g. Spies.

h. Mole.

4. Siege of Gaza.

5. Tactics employed by Alexander at the Battle of

Arbela.

6. Crossing the Jaxartes and the Battle of the

Hydaspes.

E. Explain the success of Alexander in relation to:

17
 1. Principles of war.

2. The man.

3. Human resources.

F. Summary

18
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 5 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Roman Modifications, Hannibal, and the Punic Wars

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend, know, and explain the

organization of the Roman army, with emphasis on the
legionary system.

B. The student will know and trace the Roman subjugation

of the Italian peninsula, with emphasis on the
campaigns against King Pyrrhus.

C. The student will know/describe the First Punic War,

with emphasis on the campaigns against King Pyrrhus.

D. The student will know and recount the major battles of

the Second Punic War, to include the battles of Trebia,
Lake Trasimene, and Cannae.

E. The student will know and evaluate Hannibal as a Great

Captain.

F. The student will comprehend and explain Hannibal’s

failure to gain strategic victory despite tactical
success.

G. The student will know and review the Battle of Zama and
Scipio’s impact on the outcome.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 26- 45,

65-72

3. Men in Arms, pp. 32-39

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 43-69 (optional)

19
 5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 26- 45,

65-72

2. Men in Arms, pp. 32-39

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Maps

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Roman Military Organization.

1. Legion composition.

a. Three lines.

b. First two lines composed of 20 maniples each,

with a maniple having 12 men across and 10
deep.

c. Maniples spaced, checkerboard style, allowing

second line to step up or first line to step
back smoothly, forming one solid line in
either case.

d. Soldiers in first two lines carried two 7-

foot javelins and a 2-foot sword.

e. First line = hastati = 25-30 years old.

20
 f. Second line = principles = 30-40 years old.

g. Third line had some 120-man maniples and some

60-man maniples, adding flexibility and
weight.

h. Soldiers in third line carried a 12-foot

spear, plus sword and javelin.

i. Third line = triarii (veterans on last

campaign) and velites (17-25 years old).

j. One maniple of each classification, from

front to rear formed a cohort, and 10 cohorts
made up the infantry strength of the legion.

k. Supported by cavalry, archers, and

skirmishers.

2. Discipline.

a. Harshest ever inflicted on citizen soldiers.

b. Thoroughly trained.

B. Rise of Rome.

1. Origin.

a. According to legend, founded in 753 B.C.

b. A city-state, blessed with a particularly

good location.

2. Conquest of Italy - Required conquering other

city-states.

3. Pyrrhus.

a. Was a Greek soldier-king invited in by an

Italian city-state trying to avoid Roman
take-over.

b. Pyrrhus brought 20,000 infantry and more than

3,000 cavalry.

21
 c. Pyrrhus defeated Romans (partially due to
judicious use of elephants), but suffered
heavy, difficult-to-replace casualties (280
B.C.).

d. Credited with saying, “One more such victory

and I am lost;” thus, the phrase, “Pyrrhic
victory.”

e. Decisively defeated in 275 B.C. and returned

to Greece saying, “What a fine field of
battle I have here for Rome and Carthage.”

f. Pyrrhus was killed in a street fight in 272

B.C. Hannibal rated Pyrrhus as second only
to Alexander the Great.

C. First Punic War.

1. Nature of powers.

a. Carthage - a sea power.

b. Rome - a land power with no navy.

2. Roman Navy.

a. Took a Carthaginian ship that washed up on

the beach and used it as a model.

b. To make up for weaknesses in close-in boat

handling; introduced the corvus, a huge hook
mounted on prow of a warship (used to grapple
an enemy vessel, facilitating boarding).

3. Sea Battles.

a. Mylae, 260 B.C.

b. Cape Ecnomus, 256 B.C.

c. Went ashore and set down harsh surrender

terms.

4. Carthaginian reaction - Hired Xanthippus; defeated

Roman army in Africa.

22
 5. Resolution.

a. Carthaginian fleet destroyed in 241 B.C., in

the Battle of Aegusa.

b. Rome was victorious.

D. Second Punic War.

1. Origins.

a. Hamilcar in Spain.

b. Hannibal assumed leadership in 221 B.C.

2. Hannibal’s campaigns.

a. Move to Italy.

b. Trebia, 218 B.C.

c. Lake Trasimene, 217 B.C.

d. Campaigns against Quintus Fabius Maximum

(Fabian tactics).

e. Cannae, 216 B.C.

f. Defeat of Hasdrubal - a good example of use

of interior lines.

3. Resolution - Publius Cornelius Scipio.

a. Rome defeated Spanish bases at Carthage.

b. Threatened Carthage.

c. Zama, 202 B.C., victory by Scipio.

E. Evaluation of Hannibal.

1. Strategic victory versus tactical victory. An

officer of Hannibal’s told him after Cannae: “You
know how to win victories, but not how to use
them.”

2. Accomplishments particularly noteworthy in view of

23
 long supply line.

F. Summary

24
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 6 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Pax Romana

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and identify the changes made in

the Roman military organization after the Third Punic
War and the causes of these changes.

B. The student will know and describe the civil wars

between Caesar and Pompey, with emphasis on the reasons
for Caesar’s success militarily.

C. The student will comprehend and explain the power

struggle after the death of Caesar, with emphasis on
the Battle of Actium.

D. The student will know and recall the key changes in the
Roman military system from Actium to Adrianople and the
causes of these changes.

E. The student will comprehend and explain the concept of

Pax Romana.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 34- 45,

72-86

2. Men in Arms, pp. 39-49

3. War Through the Ages, pp. 70-88 (optional)

4. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 72-86

2. Men in Arms, pp. 39-49

25
III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Maps

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Lecture

B. Lecture and discussion

C. Guided discussion

V. Presentation

A. Changes in Roman military organization after Third

Punic War.

1. Legions were composed of Roman and non-Roman

citizens.

2. Legions loyal to their generals, vice the state

itself.

3. Civil disorder.

4. Garrison duty.

5. Unlimited powers of Proconsula.

6. Cohort becomes the basic unit of the order of

battle.

B. Caesar.

1. Greatest Roman political general.

2. Took command of legions in Gaul.

3. The man:

a. Personal courage.

26
 b. Tactical skill.

c. Intelligence.

d. Loyalty.

e. Inspiring leader.

4. Defeated Pompey in 48 B.C. in Greece; later in

Spain and Africa.

C. Caesar’s Lieutenants.

1. Mark Anthony - ruled from Egypt.

2. Octavian - ruled from Rome.

3. Battle of Actium.

a. Sea battle conducted in Ionian Sea.

b. Over 400 galleys and 80,000 men involved.

c. Anthony and Cleopatra defeated and betrayed.

d. Established Roman Navy as the premier Navy of

the time.

e. Combined with Army to secure frontiers and to

police Mediterranean.

4. Octavian reaches Alexandria in July 30 B.C.;

Anthony and Cleopatra commit suicide.

5. Octavian takes title of Caesar Augustus.

D. Pax Romana and changes in the military system.

1. “Pax Romana” refers to period from Caesar Augustus

(27 B.C.) to Battle of Adrianople (A.D. 378).

2. Longest period of peace Roman Empire had

experienced.

3. Army was oriented to defense.

27
 4. Primary goal was consolidation and security of
frontiers.

5. Soldiers recruited for 16-year tours; later

increased to 20 years.

E. Battle of Adrianople.

1. Legion weakened by increasing number of light foot

and cavalry.

2. Moral decay of the state.

3. Roman General Valens and 40,000 infantry

annihilated.

4. Battle of Adrianople signified the end of the

Roman military tradition.

F. Summary

28
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 7 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Byzantine Empire

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and recall the attempt by

Justinian to reunite the old empire and his use of the
tactical genius of his commanders, Belisarius and
Narses.

B. The student will know and discuss the Byzantine

military philosophy.

C. The student will know and outline the Byzantine

military system.

D. The student will know and identify the tactical and

philosophical innovations of the Byzantines (i.e.,
cavalry, stirrup, and greek fire).

E. The student will know and trace the succession of

battles that culminated in the fall of Constantinople.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 92- 109

3. Men in Arms, pp. 50-63

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 104-131 (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 92- 109

2. Men in Arms, pp. 50-63

III. Instructional Aids

29
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: A suggested

means to accomplish the objectives of this lesson is to
develop the Byzantine military system in isolation and
then to offer some comparative remarks about the
Byzantines and previous military systems.

V. Presentation

A. Byzantium - Origin and Philosophy.

1. Eastern Roman Empire - Fervently nationalistic;

survival-oriented.

2. Commercial dominance and geographical

considerations.

3. Centralized, autocratic rule.

4. Military philosophy.

a. Defensively-oriented; Constantinople - the

heart.

b. Native-born soldiers vice mercenaries.

c. Use of ruses, stratagems, etc.; morality in

war not crucial.

d. Studies all aspects of war carefully.

30
 e. Cavalry - an important ingredient.

f. Stern discipline and incessant drilling.

g. Heavy emphasis on “generalship.”

B. Justinian as emperor - Attempts to reunite the old

empire by going on the offensive.

1. Small-sized expeditionary forces.

2. Use of horse archers and cavalry lances.

3. Excellence in weaponry and use of mounted bowmen.

4. No reunification per se, but Justinian’s efforts

halted the decline of the East Roman (Byzantine)
Empire.

5. Used tactical genius of Belisarius and Narses.

C. Post-Justinian Byzantium.

1. Maurice initiates a long period of defensive

orientation.

2. Theme system.

a. Small standing army as a central reserve.e

b. Themes individually organized.

c. Massive frontier fortifications.

3. Naval affairs important because of economic

situation.

4. Military innovations.

a. Cavalry.

b. Stirrup.

c. Greek fire.

D. The empire declines; Constantinople falls.

31
 1. Persians and Slavs in 7th century.

2. Islamic attackers in 7th and 8th centuries.

3. Battle of Manzikert (1071) - fatal to the empire.

4. Constantinople finally falls to the Ottoman Turks

(1453).

E. Summary

32
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 8 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Feudal Warfare and the Renaissance of the Military Art

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the development of the

Franks, with emphasis on the Battle of Tours.

B. The student will know and discuss Charlemagne and the

beginning of feudalism, and its acceleration due to the
pressure of Viking raids.

C. The student will comprehend and analyze the Battle of

Hastings and its impact on the armored rider becoming
the preeminent instrument of medieval warfare.

D. The student will know and describe the influence of

religious and technological factors on the Crusades, to
include rudimentary mass communication and the
crossbow.

E. The student will know and trace the decline of mounted

knights, cavalry, and crossbow and the emergence of the
longbow, pike, and gunpowder.

F. The student will comprehend and explain the

contribution of Machiavelli, with emphasis on his
attitudes on ethical war and the Condottieri.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 102-122,

134-142

3. The Face of Battle, pp. 79-116

4. Men in Arms, pp. 65-97

5. War in the Modern World, pp. 19-25

33
 6. War Through the Ages, pp. 91-103 (optional)

7. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts/resource materials

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 102-122,

134-142

2. The Face of Battle, pp. 79-116

3. Men in Arms, pp. 65-97

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. The Franks - A Germanic group of tribes which moved

slowly into Gaul during the late 5th and early 6th
centuries.

1. Initially, they were a primitive, albeit

effective, infantry force.

a. They wore no body armor.

b. They employed javelins, swords, daggers, and

the “francisca,” a heavy, well-balanced
battle-axe that was thrown with great

34
 accuracy just prior to making contact with
the enemy.

c. Defeat of the Franks by the Byzantines at

Casilinum (A.D. 554) demonstrated the
impotence of their formation when facing a
well-trained cavalry force.

2. A.D. 496 - The various Frankish bands were forced

to recognize Clovis as king.

3. Charles Martel.

a. Victor at Battle of Tours (A.D. 732).

(1) Franks assumed a strong defensive

position wherein they massed.

(2) Moslems foolishly and futilely assaulted

the massed Frankish infantry.

b. As a result of Charles’ administrative skill,

the Franks also developed a large body of
mounted soldiers.

B. Charles the Great (Charlemagne), King of the Franks,

A.D. 768-814.

1. His military and administrative ability resulted

in the creation of an extensive empire that
collapsed soon after his death.

a. Although he continued to employ infantry, the

percentage of cavalry in the Frankish army
constantly increased under Charlemagne.

b. He issued a variety of edicts designed to

develop the cavalry arm.

2. The rise of feudalism.

a. The comitatus.

b. Development of the system of vassalage.

(1) Widened in scope under Charles Martel.

35
 (2) Further extended by Charlemagne to
include conquered areas.

c. Reform of the infantry levy by Charlemagne,

which narrowed the social bounds within which
the military art was practiced.

d. Social disorder after the division of the

empire among Charlemagne’s grandsons.

e. Raids by the Vikings and Maggars.

(1) The local lord, his castle, and his army

provided the only protection from these
raids.

(2) The effect was to increase the power of

the local noble with a concomitant
diminution in power of the central
monarchy.

C. The Battle of Hastings (1066).

1. The Norman Army.

a. Cavalry was the leading element.

b. Also included archers and infantry.

2. English Army - all infantry.

3. The Norman cavalry failed to penetrate the shield

wall of the English infantry.

a. The wings of the English army, however,

reacted to cavalry feints and were destroyed.

b. Norman high-trajectory missile fire was then

employed to weaken the ranks of the English
center, rendering it vulnerable to a cavalry
assault.

4. Thus, the medieval view that this battle proved

the preeminence of the cavalry arm was simplistic,
since the Norman archers and the poor performance
of the English infantry contributed substantially
to the Norman victory.

36
D. The Crusades.

1. In an age of universal faith, the medieval church

was an extraordinarily powerful and influential
institution.

2. By virtue of its centralized authority, the church

was unique among medieval institutions in its
ability to communicate its position to the
nobility and to the masses. Support for and
participation in these “holy wars” were emphasized
from every pulpit in Europe.

3. The crossbow, developed during the 11th century,

fired a metal bolt that could penetrate chain
mail.

a. As a consequence, chain mail began to be

replaced by cumbersome and costly armor
plate.

b. Most feudal armies included a complement of

cross-bowmen, despite efforts by the Papacy
to limit its employment to wars against
infidels.

c. The victories won by the crusaders resulted

from an intelligent use of a combined force
of cross-bowmen, infantry, and cavalry --
lessons that were forgotten upon returning to
Europe.

E. Two essentially contemporaneous and independent

developments signaled the beginning of the end of the
armored cavalry’s dominance.

1. Swiss infantry.

a. Used a phalanx formation and long pikes to

withstand the shock of a cavalry charge.

b. Halberds were then employed to unseat and

kill the riders.

2. English long bow.

37
 a. Could outrange and outshoot the crossbow.

b. Employed with great effect at Crecy (1346),

Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415).

F. Gunpowder, which was employed only sparingly prior to

the mid-15th century, rendered the stone castle
obsolete.

G. Niccolo Machiavelli.

1. He perceived and expressed the effect of emerging

nation-states on warfare.

a. He separated politics from morality, arguing

that expediency shall be the prince’s guide
and that power was the secret of the state’s
success.

b. War, which was a struggle for the state’s

existence, could not be fettered by ethical
considerations or any other limitation.

2. Condottieri-Mercenaries employed by the Italian

city-states.

a. Their leisurely, safe campaigns resembled

games more than war.

b. They proved completely incapable of resisting

the French invasion of 1494.

c. The Condottieri represented the antithesis of

Machiavelli’s views on warfare.

H. Summary

38
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 9 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Spanish Square and the Great Armada

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace Spain’s tactical

evolution on land with her infantry, emphasizing
Cordoba and the Battle of Pavia.

B. The student will know and describe the Battle of

Lepanto.

C. The student will know and identify the significant

developments in weaponry during the mid-16th century.

D. The student will know and discuss the revolt in the

Netherlands and the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 195-213

2. Men in Arms, pp. 98-109, 119-131

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 19-40, 60-66

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 211-214, 227-261

(optional)

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 195-213

2. Men in Arms, pp. 98-109, 119-131

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

39
 B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Spain’s tactical evolution on land.

1. Conquest of Grenada during the late 15th century

involved numerous siege operations necessitating
professional soldiers and heavy artillery.

2. Gonzalo de Cordoba, “the Great Captain,” combined

infantry arms (i.e., pikes, swords, and firearms)
in the proper proportions to score impressive
victories in Italy during the late 15th and early
16th centuries.

a. For perhaps the first time, small arms fire

was decisive on the battlefield.

b. As one might expect, Cordoba’s victories

resulted also from his tactical ability,
which was at least equal to his
organizational skill.

3. 1505 - Spain began to group four or five companies

together under a colonel.

a. Initially, this grouping was only for

organization and administration on the march.

b. By 1534, the tercio was developed, a tactical

unit of some 3,000 men armed with pikes and
arquebuses.

40
 4. Pavia (1525) - Again, Spanish small arms proved
decisive. The French Cavalry was methodically
shot as it attacked piecemeal.

B. Battle of Lepanto (1571) - The last significant galley

battle, influenced by gunpowder, but otherwise little
changed from the “infantry battle at sea”
characteristics of earlier naval engagements.

1. The opposing Christian and Turkish forces were

nearly equal.

2. The Christian forces made good use of the new

galleasses, which differed from galleys in that
they were wider, heavier, and had a gundeck over
the rowers.

3. The overwhelming Christian victory was won by

hand-to-hand fighting, but the ability of the
Christian forces to adapt the new gunpowder
weapons to sea warfare was a contributing factor.

C. Weapons development during the mid-16th century.

1. The musket, due to its greater range and stopping

power, gradually replaced the arquebus.

2. The wheel-lock pistol resulted in the renewed

importance of the cavalry arm.

3. The prototype ship-of-the-line was developed

during the reign of Henry VIII.

D. The revolt in the Netherlands and the defeat of the

Armada.

1. The Netherlands were inherited by the Spanish

branch of the Hapsburgs upon the abdication of
Charles V in 1555.

2. The Netherlands revolt (1568-1609).

a. Resulted from religious differences (the

northern Netherlands provinces were strongly
Protestant) and patriotic feelings.

b. Initial Spanish successes culminated in 1585

41
 with the recapture of Antwerp by Alexander
Farnese, Duke of Parma, the finest soldier of
his age.

c. Parma’s achievements forced the English to

intervene openly on the side of the rebels.

3. The Spanish Armada.

a. An amphibious operation designed to invade

England and dethrone its Protestant Queen,
Elizabeth I.

(1) The Spanish Plan.

(a) The armada was to rendezvous with

Parma’s army in the vicinity of
Dunkirk and escort it across the
channel.

(b) The armada itself carried a

subsidiary landing force.

(c) The naval force was designed to be

strong enough to engage the English
fleet if necessary, but its
principal mission was to convoy the
two landing forces.

(2) The English plan was to prevent the

junction of the armada with Parma’s
force.

b. The English fleet engaged the armada off

Gravelines after a week of skirmishing.

(1) English ships, guns, and gunnery proved

decisively superior.

(2) The armada’s only chance was to close

and attempt to board, but the English
succeeded in thwarting these efforts.

(3) The junction with Parma was prevented,

and only a sudden squall saved the
armada from destruction.

42
 c. Shortages of provisions and bad weather
resulted in additional serious personnel and
ship losses to the armada during the voyage
around Scotland and back to Spain.

4. The revolt in the Netherlands continued for 21

years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

a. Under Maurice of Nassau, the rebels succeeded

in gaining control of the seven northern
provinces.

b. The Truce of 1609 resulted in the

independence of the northern provinces,
whereas, the nine southern Catholic provinces
remained under Hapsburg control.

E. Summary

43
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 10 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The 17th Century and Military Innovations

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and discuss the continuing

religious strife that led to the Thirty Years' War and
the total nature of such ideological struggles.

B. The student will know and describe the Thirty Years'

War from the standpoint of Gustavus' strategy and
tactics.

C. The student will know and review the military

innovations introduced by Gustavus Adolphus.

D. The student will know and describe the growth of

defensive fortifications during the reign of Louis XIV.

E. The student will know and recall the development of the

law of nations in reaction to the unlimited warfare of
the Thirty Years' War.

F. The student will relate/apply the development of

Cromwell's New Model Army to the changes in civil-
military relationships in 17th century England.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 221-266

2. Men in Arms, pp. 109-131

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 40-44

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 262-346 (optional)

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

44
 1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 221-266

2. Men in Arms, pp. 109-131

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. The Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter-

Reformation of the 16th century resulted in innumerable
conflicts.

1. Conflicts between Catholic Spain and the

Protestant Netherlands and England were examined
during the previous class.

2. Spain was also involved in attempts to suppress

the Hugenot uprisings in France.

3. Since both sides felt they were defending the

"true faith," these wars were ferociously fought.

4. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) was initially a

continuation of this religious strife.

a. It would be simplistic to suggest that any of

these conflicts were precipitated exclusively
by religion. Economics, dynastic rivalries,
etc., were also underlying causes.

45
 b. As the Thirty Years' War progressed, it
became a power struggle between monarchs as
opposed to a religious war. Catholic France
was ultimately allied with Protestant Sweden
against the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor.

c. The ruthlessness associated with religious

wars continued to characterize the Thirty
Years' War.

B. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, the "Great Captain"

of the Thirty Years' War.

1. Strategy.

a. Secured and developed a firm base of

operations on the Baltic Coast prior to
commencing active campaigning.

b. His marches and attacks were made with a view

toward future operations.

c. He coordinated the actions or armies in

various parts of the country.

d. The mobility of his forces served him in good

stead strategically, as well as tactically.

2. Gustavus' tactical skill was demonstrated most

clearly at the Battle of Breitenfeld.

a. His battle groups were capable of skillful

and expeditious maneuver to meet threats from
the flanks.

b. His infantry, artillery, and cavalry were

coordinated to an extent that was heretofore
unique.

C. Military innovations of Gustavus Adolphus.

1. A national standing army.

2. By reducing the weight of the weapons and

equipment carried by the individual soldier, he
enhanced the army's mobility.

46
 a. Musketeers ceased using armor, save for a
helmet.

b. Lighter muskets enabled the musketeers to

divest themselves of the cumbersome rest and
to arm themselves with a sword.

3. Paper cartridges, which greatly increased the rate

of fire.

4. Artillery innovations.

a. Standardization and reduction of weight.

(1) Siege, field, and regimental guns were

standard in the Swedish army.

(2) Regimental gun was 1,000 pounds lighter

than that used in other armies.

b. Introduction of the artillery cartridge

greatly increased the rate of fire and made
ammunition handling significantly safer.

D. Louis XIV and the development of defensive

fortifications.

1. The efficiency and organization of Louis' army

resulted from the reforms of the Marquis de
Louvois, the War Minister.

2. Colbert, the Finance Minister, obtained the wealth

necessary to pay for the French military.

3. Defensive fortifications.

a. By the end of the Middle Ages, artillery had

rendered the medieval castle obsolete, thus
giving a marked advantage to the offensive.

b. The period from the mid-17th century to

Frederick the Great saw little advance in
artillery and a resurgence in military
engineering.

c. Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, Louis XIV's

47
 great engineer, constructed three systems of
fortifications that were instrumental in
reducing the advantage that artillery had
given the offensive.

(1) His fortresses probably saved Paris

during the War of the Spanish Succession
and the French Revolution.

(2) Vauban also devised a system for

attacking fortifications by digging
parallels to approach the walls.

(3) His fortresses and his methodical siege

system resulted in these aspects of
warfare resembling a geometric exercise
and contributed to the limited nature of
conflicts during the latter portion of
the 17th century.

E. The atrocities associated with the Thirty Years' War

precipitated a moral revulsion that was partially
responsible for the formulation of laws to govern the
conduct of nations.

1. Hugo Grotius' Rights of War and Peace (1625).

a. Treated states as individuals within the

society of nations.

b. The law of nations contemplated that each

nation would respect the rights of other
nations and would honor its obligations
contracted with them.

2. The law of nations, together with the rationalism

of the late 17th and 18th century, tended to limit
the way in which wars were fought.

F. Oliver Cromwell and the New Model Army.

1. Civil War in England, 1642.

2. Initially, both the Royalists and Parliamentary

forces were composed of untrained militia.

3. After the Royalist victory at Edgehill (1642),

48
 Cromwell recognized the importance of raising a
disciplined and well-trained force. The result
was the New Model Army.

a. This Army proved superior to both the

Royalists and the Scots. Cromwell became the
first ruler of England to conquer the whole
British Isles.

b. The New Model was the foundation of the

British Army of the Future.

c. Ultimately, however, the New Model Army

became the instrument of the military
dictator that Cromwell became.

d. The Anglo-American distrust of standing

armies stems from the experiences during the
Protectorate.

G. Summary

49
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 11 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Limited Warfare in the Age of Monarchs

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and explain the

resurrection of mobility and the offensive by
Marlborough.

B. The student will know and trace the emergence of

limited war, international law, and the tight
professional armies of kings.

C. The student will know and describe strategy, tactics,

and the means of limited warfare.

D. The student will comprehend and explain the emergence

of Great Britain as the dominant maritime and colonial
power by the end of the 18th century.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 289-309,

314-319

2. Men in Arms, pp. 133-163

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 44-59,66-75

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 347-414 (optional)

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 289-309,

314-319

2. Men in Arms, pp. 133-163

III. Instructional Aids

50
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Reaction to Thirty Years' War: Revulsion so thorough

it touched all aspects of international life.

B. Mobility and offensive.

1. Marlborough.

2. Frederick the Great.

C. International law.

1. Attempts to codify rules of war.

2. No real attempts to outlaw war completely; was

seen as a worthwhile means of achieving political
ends, if violence and destruction could be
moderated.

D. Limited war.

1. Nature of armies.

a. Drew officers from idle nobility and enlisted

men from the dregs of society -- two non-
productive groups.

b. Heavy reliance on harsh discipline, both to

keep men in the army and to prepare for
battle.

51
 c. No relationship between military and civilian
segments of society.

2. Examples of discipline.

a. Frederick the Great.

b. Barracks, no night marches, no marching near

forests.

c. Bright uniforms to facilitate spotting

deserters.

3. Objectives of limited wars.

a. Small, carefully defined.

b. Did not require collapse of opposing

government to win.

c. Military used to gain the edge at bargaining

table.

d. Civilian populace not involved.

E. Conduct of limited war.

1. Strategy.

a. Maneuver most important; better for forcing

the enemy into a situation requiring
surrender.

b. Soldiers expensive to replace, since it took

two years to train one.

c. Maneuver and strategy pinned to supply points

with primary ones (magazines) located 3 days'
march apart and supplementary ones (ovens)
located at one-day intervals.

2. Tactics.

a. Fighting fierce when two armies chose to meet

in battle.

52
 b. Occurred when both commanders were fairly
sure of winning.

c. Needed a broad, reasonably level plain, since

all armies practiced linear tactics.

d. Key was to shoot second.

e. Frederick's "Oblique Order."

3. Means.

a. Bayonet with socket invented in 1678; made

the musket man also a pike man.

b. Flintlock musket.

c. Frederick improved artillery both

mechanically and functionally; also
introduced horse artillery and indirect
firing.

F. Emergence of Great Britain.

1. Defeat of Spanish Armada in 1588 – difference in

tactics.

2. Response to Cardinal Richelieu's fleet – "ship

money" tax in 1634.

3. Anglo-Dutch Wars.

a. Third ended in 1647 with Britain victorious.

b. During these conflicts, British refined

fighting technique of "line-ahead."

4. Defeat of France at sea.

a. In War of Spanish Succession, drove France

and Spain from sea and exhausted her ally,
Holland.

b. Mahan: "She [Great Britain] was the sea

power."

5. Solidification of hold.

53
 a. Establishment of colonial empire.

b. Defeat of France in Seven Years' War.

G. Summary

54
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 12 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The American Revolution

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and contrast/compare the

expressions "strategy of attrition" and "partisan
warfare" and apply them to the American Revolution.

B. The student will know and discuss British and American

strategy and objectives, and note how they changed
during the course of the American Revolution.

C. The student will comprehend and contrast the

Continental Army with the professional armies of the
18th century and show how this difference dictated
Washington's strategy.

D. The student will comprehend and explain how French

intervention tipped the balance in favor of America in
the War of Independence.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Men in Arms, pp. 164-178

2. War in the Modern World, pp. 76-97

3. The American Way of War, pp. 3-39

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 417-439 (optional)

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 164-178

2. The American Way of War, pp. 3-39

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

55
 B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Definition of terms.

1. Strategy of attrition.

2. Partisan warfare. (Discuss current models, such as

Vietnam and Afghanistan.)

B. Application of terms.

1. Strategy of attrition.

a. Long-term British support.

b. European enemies.

c. Length of war.

2. Partisan warfare.

a. American militia rising to local occasions

around hard core of continental soldiers,
such as Saratoga and in the south.

b. Tactics suited to capabilities, with classic

example being Cowpens.

C. American strategy and objectives.

1. At Lexington.

2. At Saratoga.

56
 3. In the southern campaigns.

D. British strategy and objectives.

1. At Lexington.

2. At Saratoga.

3. In the southern campaigns.

E. Opposing forces.

1. British.

a. Began as classic 18th century European army.

b. Loyalty/dedication suspect, especially with

Hessians.

2. American.

a. Prior to van Steuben, little to no discipline.

b. Van Steuben blended European military

philosophy to American individualism.

c. Used musket much more than British.

d. More flexible.

e. Length of service and training sometimes

impacted on strategy and tactics, such as at
Quebec, Trenton, and Cowpens.

F. Impact of French.

1. Contributions.

a. Individual leaders, such as Lafayette.

b. Soldiers.

c. Weapons.

d. Sea power.

57
 2. Coordination.

a. Difficult, as evidenced at New York and

Newport.

b. France’s assistance at the decisive Battle of

Yorktown.

G. Impact of American Revolution on warfare.

1. Began democratization of warfare (again).

a. Started on movement from limited to total

warfare.

b. Napoleon would carry trend to extreme.

2. Changed linear tactics -- Use of musket made

linear tactics difficult.

H. Summary

58
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 13 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The French Revolution

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the transition from

limited war to unlimited war during the French
Revolution.

B. The student will comprehend the uniqueness of the

Revolutionary Army, the role of ideology in the levee
en masse, and the problems of controlling such an army.

C. The student will comprehend and relate the rise of

Napoleon to the failure of the French Revolution.

D. The student will know and discuss the impact of new

technology on warfare in the Napoleonic period.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 320-330

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 98-117

4. Men in Arms, pp. 179-187

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 320-330

2. Men in Arms, pp. 179-187

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

59
 B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lectures and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study the assignments in The Art of War in the Western
World and Men in Arms.

V. Presentation

A. The dramatic increase in the size of armies was the

principal reason for the change to unlimited warfare.
Reasons for the increased size include, but are not
necessarily limited to:

1. Emergence of democratic ideal, with its emphasis

on individual freedom, equality, and "popular"
government.

a. John Locke.

b. Jean Jacques Rousseau.

c. American Revolution.

d. Conscription (i.e., levee en masse) is

unthinkable without this ideology. Since the
governed were now governing, at least
ostensibly, they had an affirmation
obligation to defend the government.

2. Larger populations, improved communications

systems, beginnings of mass production, and
improved agricultural methods made it possible to
man, control, arm, and feed these huge new armies.

60
 3. Military theories of Comte Jacques de Guibert:

a. "Ordre mixte."

b. Breaking the army down into smaller, more

manageable units or divisions.

c. Dispersion and then concentration at the

critical time and place.

4. Lazare Carnot succeeded in gaining control of the

Revolutionary Army, which initially had been
little more than undisciplined, untrained rabble.

a. Emphasis on the offensive in mass; enemy to

be pursued until he is destroyed.

b. Foraging enhanced mobility by divesting the

army from its cumbersome baggage train.

c. By 1794, the French Army was enjoying the

advantages of both mass and mobility.

B. The armies that the Revolution created ultimately made

Bonaparte the Emperor of France, thereby turning the
clock back to autocracy.

1. Moderate legislature elected in 1797 desirous of

ending the war.

2. Radical Directory conspired with Bonaparte.

3. In the ensuing coup, Carnot was fortunate to

escape to Switzerland. Many of his supporters
were executed or banished.

C. The impact of technology.

1. Gribeauval's artillery reforms.

a. Interchangeable parts.

b. Improved carriages.

c. Tangent sight.

61
 d. By the time of the Revolution, French
artillery was clearly superior to that of
other armies.

2. Mobility and communication enhanced by:

a. Improved roads and maps.

b. Signal telegraph.

3. It should be noted that Napoleon was a

conservative relative to new weapons and
technology. He, for example, failed to make use
of:

a. Balloons.

b. Shrapnel.

D. Summary

62
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 14 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Napoleon

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and contrast Napoleon's victory

at Austerlitz and his defeat at Waterloo.

B. The student will comprehend and explain how the

stalemate at sea and on land in 1805 dictated a
strategy of economic warfare.

C. The student will comprehend and explain how Napoleon's

Russian campaign underscored his weakness as a "grand
strategist".

D. The student will know and list Napoleon's major

contributions to military thought.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 330-358

2. The Face of Battle, pp. 117-203

3. Men in Arms, pp. 179-199

4. War in the Modern World, pp. 117-139

5. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon

(optional)

6. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts/resource materials

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 330-358

2. The Face of Battle, pp. 117-128

3. Men in Arms, pp. 179-199

63
III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study the assignment.

V. Presentation

A. French Revolution.

1. Brief historical/philosophical review.

2. Pre-Napoleon battles.

3. Available technological improvements.

4. Decree of 23 August 1793, by the Committee on

Public Safety.

B. Napoleon.

1. Brief historical background.

2. Rise to power.

a. Italian campaign.

b. Control of battle action reports.

c. Return from Egypt.

C. Austerlitz - Describe battle (considered by many to be

Napoleon's best).

D. Conflict with England.

64
 1. Lord Nelson:

a. The great naval captain of his age.

b. Ensured English remained dominant at sea.

2. Economic war.

E. Russian Campaign.

1. Spanish problems - Guerilla war sapping French

strength.

2. Weaknesses in grand strategy - Resupply? Timing?

3. Russian reaction.

a. Scorched earth.

b. Partisan warfare.

c. Weather - harsh winter.

4. Retreat - losses.

F. Post-Russian Campaign.

1. Considering problems, the battles before his first

exile were well done.

2. Waterloo.

a. Background, to include ability to put

together another army.

b. Description.

c. Compare to Austerlitz.

G. Napoleon's impact on warfare.

1. Philosophy.

a. Stress on offense.

b. Would come back to haunt French in World War I.

65
 2. Technology.

a. Refused lighter-than-air balloons and a

Fulton submarine.

b. Used mass production, improved roads and

bridges, signal telegraph, more mobile and
accurate artillery, improved mapping, and
quickstep march.

c. Used ideas like division concept and

propaganda (both internal and external).

H. Summary

66
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 15 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Clausewitz/Jomini

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend Clausewitz's statement that

"war is nothing but a continuation of political
intercourse with an admixture of other means."

B. The student will comprehend and contrast the present

day acceptance of Clausewitz's dicta to those of
Jomini's.

C. The student will know and describe the wide spectrum of

the types of war that Clausewitz addressed (e.g.,
People's War).

D. The student will comprehend the importance assigned by

Clausewitz to moral force vice physical force.

E. The student will know and discuss Clausewitz's impact

on current communist military and political thoughts
and practices.

F. The student will know and describe Jomini's

contribution to the theory of warfare, especially his
"discovery" of the "fundamental principles of war."

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Men in Arms, pp. 207-208, 238-240, 338

2. War in the Modern World, pp. 149-160

3. The American Way of War, pp. 82-83, 88-89, 210-213

4. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp 92-113, 143-213

(optional)

5. On War (optional)

67
 B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 207-208, 238-240, 338

2. The American Way of War, pp. 210-213

III. Instructional Aids: None

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lectures and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study the assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Clausewitz.

1. Background - Personal military experience.

a. Began at age 12.

b. Wanted command; did not like writing.

c. Left Prussia rather than fight under

Napoleon.

d. Director of War Academy.

2. Most quoted/famous statement.

a. "War is nothing but a continuation of

political intercourse with an admixture of
other means."

(1) Political dialogue should not stop; only

adds facets.

(2) Defines current communist approach.

b. Further defined idea: "Is not war merely

another kind of writing and language for

68
 political thoughts? It has certainly a
grammar of its own, but its logic is not
peculiar to itself."

3. Acceptance then and now.

a. Then:

(1) Jomini was a contemporary and a rival.

(2) Jomini was far more popular.

(3) Jomini was read by Civil War generals.

b. Now:

(1) Jomini is little read.

(2) Clausewitz's philosophy has stood the

test of time and is readily applicable
to current world.

(3) Provides a standard against which

military actions may be measured.

4. Clausewitz's scope.

a. Primary work is On War, published by his

widow.

b. Absolute war was described in opening chapter

to give a starting place. [Note that the
state of “absolute war” was not physically
possible for a nation in that era, but it is
now possible (i.e., nuclear war).]

c. Chapters devoted to many types of war (for

example, People's War chapter applicable to
both Vietnam and Afghanistan).

d. Defined their primary objectives of war:

(1) Conquer and destroy the enemy's armed

force.

(2) Gain possession of material elements of

aggression of the enemy.

69
 (3) Gain public opinion.

5. Moral force.

a. Agrees with Napoleon. Napoleon had said that

moral force was to physical as 3 is to 1.

b. He compared physical force to the wooden

handle of a sword and moral to the shining
blade.

6. Clausewitz and Communism.

a. Mao and Lenin.

(1) Both quote him in their works.

(2) Lenin read him thoroughly prior to 1917.

b. Vietnam - Communists followed Clausewitz

theory precisely.

7. Other quotations.

a. War is "a trinity of violence, chance, and

reason."

b. "As soon, therefore, as required expenditure

of force exceeds the value of the political,
the object must be abandoned and peace will
be the result." (Reason why the U.S. got out
of Vietnam.)

B. Jomini.

1. Brief historical background.

a. Chose to be a part of history.

b. Lived to enjoy his fame.

2. Nature of approach.

a. That of a scientist seeking to condense his

observations into a workable formula for use
by those who follow.

70
 b. Books have many diagrams and geometrical
references.

c. Produced a system of war, while Clausewitz

would produce a philosophy of war.

d. Felt that object of war was occupation of

territory.

C. Summary

71
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 16 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Industrial Revolution and Warfare

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend the overall impact of the

Industrial Revolution on civilization and particularly
on the art and science of war.

B. The student will know, trace, and discuss the various

specific developments of the Industrial Revolution that
affected the waging of war in the first 60 years of the
19th century.

C. The student will comprehend and assess the impact of

the Industrial Revolution on the face of war in the
19th century.

D. The student will know and explain the Marxist response

to the Industrial Revolution.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. War in the Modern World, pp. 143-164, 208-212

2. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp 155-171, 415-456

(optional)

B. Student texts: None

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

72
 1. Lecture

2. Lectures and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to accomplish the first three

objectives is to build a list (using student
input) of the technological innovations from the
Industrial Revolution and apply them to conflicts
in which they were used.

2. This exercise should be followed by a discussion

of how Marx, as a social revolutionary, responded
to the forces of technological revolution. This
will provide the student with both the "hardware"
and the philosophical impacts of the Industrial
Revolution.

V. Presentation

A. From agriculture to technology.

1. Overall impact - Greatest "revolution" of all?

a. Mass production.

b. Dominance of unskilled workers.

2. Social consequence.

a. Emergence of a "class" of permanent wage-

earners.

b. Poor working/living conditions.

c. Rising discontent.

3. Impact on the military.

a. Military slow in taking advantage of new

technology during first half of 19th century.

b. A different story in second half of century

73
 (Civil War, etc.).

B. A catalogue of inventions and their applications.

1. Iron-clad vessels.

2. Screw propeller/steam propulsion.

3. Rockets.

4. "Machine-guns", rifle-muskets.

5. Rifled cannon, projectiles.

6. Hand grenades.

7. Submersibles.

8. Floating mines.

9. Land mines.

10. Balloons for aerial observation.

11. Locomotives - military transportation.

12. Communications - telegraph, etc.

13. Mass production - the common denominator.

C. The Marxist response.

1. Some important philosophical ideas from Marx:

a. Material world is the fundamental and only

reality.

b. Production of means to support life is the

principle that governs all human relations.

c. There are only two classes in society: Those

who control the means of production and those
who do not.

d. The dictatorship of the proletariat (a

classless and stateless society) is
inevitable.

74
 2. Fourfold nature of warfare - an escalating
process.

a. Diplomatic.

b. Economic.

c. Psychological.

d. Military.

D. Summary

75
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 17 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The American Civil War

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the evolution of

American military thought from the time of the War of
1812 to the Civil War.

B. The student will know and describe Winfield Scott’s

campaign to seize Mexico City and discuss the political
motivation for that strategy.

C. The student will comprehend and compare the Civil War

belligerents with regard to the military and economic
resources and the socio-political fabrics of the
opposing populations.

D. The student will comprehend and explain how the waging

of the Civil War changed from limited warfare to total
warfare upon the ascendancy of Grant, Sherman, and
Sheridan.

E. The student will comprehend and relate Lincoln’s

issuance of the “Emancipation Proclamation” to the
South’s need for European Allies.

F. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast Lee

and Grant as “Great Captains.”

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of the War in the Western World, pp. 409-

418

2. Men in Arms, pp. 247-258

3. The American Way of War, pp. 59-76, 92-152

4. War Through the Ages, pp. 573-580, 590-632

(optional)

76
 5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of the War in the Western World, pp.409-

418

2. Men in Arms, pp. 247-258

3. The American Way of War, pp. 59-76, 92-152

III. Instructional Aids: Chalkboard/whiteboard

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lectures and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study the assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Post-war of 1812.

1. Professional development.

a. Improvements of West Point under Thayer.

b. Opening of artillery school (Fort Monroe) and

infantry school (St. Louis).

c. Writings (e.g., by Halleck, Mahan, and Scott).

2. Professional staff - Initially, functionally

independent of senior military men.

3. Military - political relationships.

a. Exchanges between Secretary of War Davis and

Commanding General Scott.

b. By 1848, Polk would actually function as

77
 Commander-in-Chief.

B. Mexican War.

1. Vera Cruz.

a. 10,000 men and 150 vessels.

b. Even though unopposed, the mere fact that

they could organize and execute the operation
is indicative of solid staff work.

2. Mexico City campaign.

a. Cut own supply lines.

b. Series of successful battles, though always

outnumbered.

c. Final attack on Mexico City.

3. Military-political aspects.

a. Taking capital in accordance with Clausewitz.

b. Fatal because Mexican population, government,

and army anchored on Mexico City.

c. Scott considered a political rival by Polk,

as was Taylor.

4. Innovations introduced.

a. First American war in which West Point

graduates took part.

b. First modern war correspondent.

c. First active Commander-in-Chief.

d. Navy’s shift from sail to steam.

C. Beginning the Civil War.

1. First modern war, although it would not be

recognized as such in Europe.

78
 2. Populations.

a. North - 23,000,000 in 22 states.

b. South - 9,000,000 (including 3,500,000

slaves) in 11 states.

3. Resources.

a. North - 109,000 manufacturing plants

employing over 1,000,000 men.

b. South - 31,000 manufacturing plants employing

less than 200,000 men, plus only one
ironworks (the Tredegar Ironworks in
Richmond).

c. South - agriculture, mostly cotton.

4. Military leadership.

a. Of 1,080 officers in the Regular Army, 286

went south, including 184 of 824 West
Pointers.

b. Of 900 West Pointers in civilian life, 114

joined the Northern Army, and 99, the
Southern.

c. In 55 of the 60 largest battles of the Civil

War, West Pointers led both sides.

5. Political leadership.

a. South - Davis, a former Secretary of War, a

West Pointer, and a veteran of the Mexican
War, yet too busy with details; unable to
delegate authority.

b. North - Lincoln had no military experience,

but had good instincts and learned fast.

D. Northern attempts at Richmond.

1. Necessity.

a. Overemphasizing Clausewitz’s one point at

79
 expense of others.

b. Southern population not anchored on Richmond,

either numerically or psychologically.

c. Only southern ironworks located there.

2. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign.

a. Urged by Lincoln.

b. Preceded by Monitor-Virginia clash.

c. Cautious movement throughout.

d. Hampered by Jackson’s moves in Shenandoah

Valley.

e. CSA General Magruder made up for troop

shortages through deception.

f. Malvern Hill - a demonstration of new

strength of defense and of Lee’s fallibility.

3. Burnside’s Fredericksburg Campaign.

a. Lost edge by waiting for bridging.

b. Successive attacks against Marye’s Heights.

c. Tactical use of telegraph communications by

North.

d. Demonstration of futility of massed assaults

against strongly positioned defense.

4. Hooker and Chancellorsville.

a. Lee’s greatest tactical victory.

b. Hooker lost initial advantage.

c. Jackson killed.

5. Grant and Richmond.

a. Intent on destruction of Southern Army.

80
 b. Constant pressure.

c. War of attrition.

E. Change of warfare.

1. Defense relatively strong.

a. Thanks to entrenchment, advances in small

arms technology and improved artillery.

b. Malvern Hill, Cold Harbor, and other attempts

at frontal assaults prove point -- Napoleonic
tactics obsolete.

2. Industrial impact.

a. Products of the mature industrial revolution

precluded a successful Napoleonic strategy.

b. These lessons would be relearned at great

expense in World War I.

F. Limited war to total war.

1. North had to bring down the Southern government in

order to win.

2. Not total war until Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan

took over.

a. A conscious effort to take decision for

ending the war away from CS Army and give it
to Southern populace.

b. Introduced constant pressure, rather than

“fight and rest” system of first few years.

c. Sherman’s march across Georgia equivalent to

saturation bombing, except better aimed and
more personal.

G. Emancipation Proclamation impact.

1. Military-political relationship - A political move

that aided the military effort.

81
 2. Direct effects:

a. Freed no one immediately.

b. Declared only “their” slaves free on coming 1

January.

3. Indirect effects:

a. Labeled the South as “pro-slavery.”

b. Cut off last chance of European help.

c. Served absolute notice that it was to be a

fight to the finish.

H. Great Captains.

1. Lee.

a. Not given command of all Southern Armies

until February 1865.

b. Much loved by men.

c. Master of the defense.

d. Essentially, was an 18th century warrior

fighting a 19th century war.

e. Sought the climactic, Napoleonic battle.

2. Grant.

a. Gained command in March 1864.

b. Crude, rough-edged man.

c. With Sherman, changed the nature of war - a

strategy of annihilation.

d. Was a 20th century warrior fighting a 19th

century war.

I. Summary

82
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 18 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Pax Britannica and Colonialism

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend the meaning of Pax

Britannica and how the British Fleet provided the
deterrence to renewed total war.

B. The student will know and discuss the weaknesses of the

British Army as demonstrated in the Crimean War.

C. The student will comprehend and explain the reasons for

the revival of the race for empires and the necessary
military requirements.

D. The student will comprehend and explain how the Boer

War put 19th century British imperialism to its most
severe test.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 820-855

2. Men in Arms, pp. 200-237

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 164-169, 206-214

4. The American Way of War, pp. 167-191

B. Student text: Men in Arms, pp. 200-237

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Maps

83
IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to accomplish the objectives of

this lesson is to define (with student assistance)
Pax Britannica.

2. Relate it to British naval strength, British

Empire designs, and the race for empires among
other nations (French, American, Germans).

V. Presentation

A. Pax Britannica.

1. Background - British negative attitude concerning

colonial acquisitions following Napoleonic wars
and exceptions (“far-flung” strategic bases).
Point out these bases to demonstrate strategic
significance and British coverage of key areas.

2. Importance of sea power versus land power to

British hegemony.

a. Industrial Revolution caused increased

importance of commerce and the concomitant
used to control the seas.

b. Continental land power weakened by Napoleonic

Wars.

c. Royal Navy “supreme in the world at a time

when sea power was of increasing growth and
when Britain was the only power able to wield
it.”

3. Pax Britannica - A “peace” silently enforced by

84
 British sea power. No real challenges due to
British deterrence.

B. Crimean War - British Army ineptitude in a time of

British maritime dominance. British Army weaknesses
and shortcomings:

1. Poor staff training and abuse of command

appointments.

2. Low level of cooperation among units.

3. Tactical ineptitude.

4. Disorganized, poorly designed logistical system.

C. Imperialism regains prominence with European powers

(1880’s, 1890’s).

1. Increasing industrial capacity produces trade

rivalry (U.S., Germany, France, Russia, Japan),
and colonialistic desires reappear.

2. Naval power no longer totally dominated by

British.

3. European countries recognize the requirements to

settle colonial problems militarily, which leads
to an increased emphasis on naval capabilities.

4. New technology aids in backing up imperialist

nations.

a. Submarine and torpedo.

b. Modern naval guns.

D. Pax Britannica tested in the Boer Wars.

1. Small, stubborn foe gave British Army a difficult

time.

a. Over half a million troops eventually

required a drawdown from other empire
resources.

b. Boers resorted to guerrilla warfare and

85
 protracted the struggle over two and a half
years.

2. Demonstrated the degree of control and unusual

dedication of resources required to keep an
“empire” intact.

E. Pax Britannica ends (early 20th century) - challenge of

German, French, and U.S. naval power.

F. Summary

86
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 19 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Prussian Influence

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and relate the forces of

nationalism in the three wars for the unification of
Germany.

B. The student will comprehend and explain the emergence

of the German General Staff under Moltke.

C. The student will comprehend and explain the Prussian

victory in the Franco-Prussian War.

D. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast Moltke

and Bismarck as grand strategists.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 820-842

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 392-409

3. Men in Arms, pp. 252-258

4. War in the Modern World, pp. 152-158, 169-175,

195-206

5. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 172-205, 281-325,

320-325 (optional)

6. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 392-409

2. Men in Arms, pp. 252-258

III. Instructional Aids

87
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignments in Men in Arms and The Art of War in
the Western World.

V. Presentation

A. Austria and Prussia vie for dominance in Germany from

the Congress of Vienna (1815) until the Prussian
victory at the Battle of Koeniggratz (1866).

1. Prussian Zollverein (customs union) by 1841

included all of Germany except for the Austrian
dominions.

2. Treaty of Olmuetz (1850) - Austria successfully

thwarts a German union under King Frederick
William IV of Prussia.

3. Prussia and Austria join to defeat Denmark in

Schleswig-Holstein War (1864).

a. Schleswig-Holstein placed under joint control

of Austria and Prussia.

b. Disagreements over Schleswig-Holstein lead to

war between Austria and Prussia.

4. Defeat of Austria results in Prussian preeminence

in Germany.

a. North German Confederation formed in 1867

under Prussia.

88
 b. Fear of France forces the southern German
states into an alliance with Prussia.

5. Victory in the Franco-Prussian War results in the

unification of Germany.

B. General Staff

1. Originated with Scharnhorst and other reformers of

the late Napoleonic Period.

a. Quasi-autonomy within the War Ministry.

b. Attention to military theory and doctrine.

c. Rotation of General Staff officers to

positions with the field forces.

d. General Staff a separate “planning and

education” branch.

2. Count Helmuth von Moltke becomes Chief of the

Prussian General Staff in 1857.

a. He attained this position by virtue of

intellectual achievement, not “practical”
soldiering.

b. He set up the Railway Section of the General

Staff, recognizing that railways made
possible much more precise calculations of
movements of troops and supplies.

c. His intellectual and administrative skill,

together with the organization (i.e., General
Staff) that he inherited, developed the plans
that resulted in Prussia’s lightning
mobilization for the wars with Austria and
France.

C. Franco-Prussian War - Prussian victory resulted from:

1. The detailed mobilization plan and flexible battle

plan of Moltke and the General Staff.

2. The lack of such planning on the part of the

89
 French.

3. Superior Prussian artillery.

4. Inability of the French to properly employ their

superior infantry weapons.

D. Moltke and Bismarck.

1. Moltke not a grand strategist in the classic

sense; he never questioned the powers that be and
was neither a statesman nor an original political
thinker.

2. Bismarck’s skill of grand strategy demonstrated

by:

a. Limited aims of the three wars of unification.

b. His diplomacy after the unification.

c. Erring only in the harsh terms imposed upon

France.

E. Summary

90
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 20 HOURS: 1

TITLE: World War I

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the reorganization of

the French General Staff and military system, focusing
on the ideas and contributions of du Picq and Foch.

B. The student will know, identify, and discuss the

harbingers of total war.

C. The student will know and summarize events of July and

August 1914.

D. The student will know and outline the Schlieffen Plan

and the French Plan XVII and describe how they were
implemented.

E. The student will know and summarize the campaigns on

the Eastern Front and evaluate the Russian failures.

F. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast the

British, French, American, and German approaches to and
objectives in World War I.

G. The student will comprehend the Allied problems of

coalition warfare and the evolution of the unified
command.

H. The student will know and describe the final Allied

offensive on land that defeated Germany, with emphasis
on the American contribution.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 392-409,

434-488

2. Men in Arms, pp. 259-277

91
 3. War in the Modern World, pp, 215-235, 239-274

4. The American Way of War, pp. 192-222

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 434-488

2. Men in Arms, pp. 259-277

3. The American Way of War, pp. 192-222

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Maps

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignments.

V. Presentation

A. Reformed French military philosophy.

1. Germany replaces France as the foremost military

power following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-
1871).

2. Reforms hastily instituted to overcome problems of

poor army organization, incomplete staff work, and
incompetent leadership at the highest levels.
French General Staff reorganized (1874) using the
Prussian model.

3. Ardant du Picq - obscure but important military

philosopher.

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 a. Approached the military problem
scientifically.

b. Man is the decisive instrument in battle.

c. Importance of combat psychology, drill

training.

d. Mind over matter.

e. Emphasis on quality rather than quantity.

4. Ferdinand Foch - the re-creator of French military

thought.

a. Influenced greatly by Clausewitz.

b. No victory without battle (the offensive and

maneuver).

c. Basic principles applied to particular

situations.

B. Harbingers of total war.

1. The “little” wars.

a. Spanish-American War (and American

imperialism).

b. Boer War.

c. Russo-Japanese War.

2. European alliances - old balances of power upset.

3. International arms race.

4. Economic and colonial rivalries.

5. British and German belief in racial superiority.

6. Writings of Ivan S. Bloch.

C. Austria.

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 1. Assassination of the Austrian Archduke.

2. Obtains a free hand from Germany.

3. Invades Serbia on 23 July 1914.

4. Russia drawn in war by Austria’s actions.

5. Germany sends ultimatum to Russia and France 21

July 1914.

6. German strategy: Defeat France first, then

Russia.

7. 1 August 1914, Germany declares war and invades

Belgium as Schlieffen Plan put into effect.

8. Violation of 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgium

neutrality and her military agreements with France
brought Britain into the war.

D. Opposing plans.

1. Schlieffen Plan called for 1,500,000 troops

divided into 7 armies.

a. Four German armies to pass through Belgium by

passing supposedly impregnable fortress at
Liege.

b. After 11 days, Liege falls.

c. 20 August, Brussels falls.

2. Plan XVII.

a. Adopted in 1912.

b. Total strength of Allied forces numbered

950,000.

c. An offensive plan without the accepted 3 to 1

superiority ratio.

d. Underestimated strength of German Army.

e. Designed to be a counteroffensive plan, which

94
 would strike center of German line near
Lorraine, disrupting communications, and then
roll back both wings.

f. Joffre commanded French forces.

g. Sir John French commanded British forces.

E. The Eastern Front.

1. Austria initiates opening of Eastern Front when

she attacks Serbia.

2. Russia is drawn in against Austria and Germany.

3. Great Britain and France required to arm Russia.

4. Germany required to support Austria.

5. Political incompetence cripples Russian effort.

6. Neither Britain nor France could supply Russia

with war supplies due to their failure to secure
Dardanelles.

7. Germany successfully aided Austria.

8. Ludendorff and Hindenburg defeat Russians in East

Prussia as a result of superior German rail
system.

9. Political exiles of Russia played on the

conditions of Russian military man. Results:
Overthrow of the Czar in 1917.

a. To project colonialism.

b. National prestige.

c. Committed to aid France/Belgium.

F. French.

1. Bent on revenge after the humiliation of 1870.

2. Return of Alsace-Lorraine.

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 3. Elimination of Germany as a commercial rival.

G. Germans.

1. Believed their race superior to all others.

2. Believed war was inevitable.

3. Vanquished by British and French in the Agadir

diplomatic crisis of 1911.

4. Involved in armament race.

5. Wanted colonial equality.

H. Americans.

1. Sympathy for Allied cause.

2. German torpedoing of neutral ships – Americans

included.

3. Allied economic investment with America.

4. Constitutionalism versus autocracy.

5. Allied propaganda.

6. German presence in Mexico.

I. Coalition warfare/unified command.

1. General J. J. Pershing commands American army.

2. Americans refuse to piecemeal their army.

3. Unified command takes place 26 March 1917. Foch

appointed.

J. Final Allied offensive.

1. Second Battle of the Marne.

2. St. Mihiel.

3. Meuse Argonne.

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 4. Kriemhilde Line.

5. War ends - 11 November 1918.

K. Summary

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 21 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Rise of Communism

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and explain how the

Bolsheviks assumed power in Russia and then took Russia
out of World War I.

B. The student will comprehend and explain the reasons for

Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War and its
failure to deflect the course of the revolution.

C. The student will comprehend the Russian Communists’

philosophy of war, emphasizing its Clausewitzian base
and the conflicting ideas of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin
in the early 1920’s.

D. The student will comprehend the role of the Comintern

in fomenting political unrest outside of Russia, and
explain the failure of the Communists to assume
political control in China in the 1920’s.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Men in Arms, pp. 289-290, 323-324

2. War in the Modern World, pp, 285-290

3. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 322-364, 648-675

(optional)

B. Student text: Men in Arms, pp. 289-290, 323-324

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Maps

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

98
 A. Method options: Lecture

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment

V. Presentation

A. Define “communism” and trace its origins from Karl

Marx.

1. Socialism before and after 1850 - contrast and

compare.

2. The decline in revolutionary fervor in Western

Europe by the end of the 19th century.

B. Discuss the Bolshevik rise to power in Russia.

1. Socioeconomic unrest and the rise of political

parties in the 1890’s.

2. The Revolution of 1905.

3. World War I and its calamitous effect on the

Russian populace.

4. The Russian Revolutions of 1917 - why the

Communists came to power.

5. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

C. Explain Allied motives for intervening in the Russian

Civil War.

1. Loss of an ally or fear of communism?

2. The Czech Legion.

3. Allied military operations in the Civil War.

4. Failure to deflect the course of the revolution.

D. Define the Soviet philosophy of war by comparing the

ideas of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. Lenin was
thoroughly familiar with Clausewitz by 1917. War to
the Soviets was, and is, “a continuation of political

99
 intercourse with an admixture of other means.”

E. Discuss the Comintern and its role in fomenting

international communism.

1. Borodin’s mission to China.

2. Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Kuomintang, and

political unrest in China in the 1920’s.

3. The Comintern, CCP, and Mao Tse-tung’s bitter

lesson.

F. Summary

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 22 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Interwar Years

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend why the interwar period

represented only an armistice, rather than genuine
peace or international stability, by describing
attempts at peace and why they failed.

B. The student will know and explain the bases of American

isolationism in 1920-30’s and the resultant impact on
defense preparedness.

C. The student will know and explain the “doctrine of

defense,” with emphasis on the Maginot philosophy and
the thoughts/contributions of Liddell Hart.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 1027-1050

2. Men in Arms, pp. 278-294

3. War in the Modern World, pp. 275-313

4. The American Way of War, pp. 223-265

5. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 598-623 (optional)

6. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 278-294

2. The American Way of War, pp. 223-265

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

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 B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided Discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to accomplish the first

objective of this lesson is to assign students to
be prepared to discuss the various attempts at
post-World War I peace and why they failed.

2. Learning Objective C of this lesson can be used to

highlight the overall defensive/isolationist mood
during the interwar period.

V. Presentation

A. The interwar period - Attempts at peace.

1. The aftermath.

a. High costs of war in human and material terms.

b. A new attitude of revulsion against war and

the need to recover and build a system to
prevent recurrences.

2. Peacemaking endeavors and their outcomes.

a. League of Nations - Principle of collective

security.

(1) Problems.

(2) Results.

102
 b. Disarmament - Not total, but a limit on arms.

(1) Problems.

(2) Results.

c. Moral compulsion - An idealistic approach.

(1) Problems.

(2) Results.

3. True peace or a 20-year cease-fire?

a. Temporary, shallow peace.

b. No practical solutions.

B. Americans withdraw from the mainstream.

1. Isolationism is a reflection of the war

experience.

a. Avoid being dragged in again.

b. A return to prewar strengths.

c. U.S. - its own best guarantor of peace.

2. Isolationism deepens as the Depression years

unfold.

a. Economic problems at home demand full

attention.

b. Military establishment shrinks. Ford had

more auto workers than America had soldiers.

c. Anti-military service sentiment appears.

3. Defense preparedness takes a back seat.

C. Doctrine of defense - An outgrowth of post-World War I

reaction. Need for passive security dominates military
thought.

1. Maginot Line in France.

103
 a. Fortifications with integrated firepower.

b. Created false sense of security, the “Maginot

mentality;” invincibility of the defense
(“Remember Verdun!”).

c. Stifled offensive thought; long a French

tradition.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart.

a. Personal background.

b. Basic orientation was defensive.

c. Ideas based on needs of Great Britain.

D. Summary

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 23 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Technological Advances

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend the impact of the airplane

on military thought in the 1920-1930’s.

B. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast the

air power theories of Douhet and Mitchell.

C. The student will know and describe the development of

aircraft carrier doctrine and offensive naval air power
in the U.S. between World War I and World War II.

D. The student will know and summarize the development of

amphibious doctrine in the 1920’s and 30’s as a part of
“the new sea power”.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. In Peace and War, pp. 221-236

2. The American Way of War, pp. 223-265

3. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 598-623 (optional)

4. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student text: The American Way of War, pp. 223-265

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Map

105
IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options

1. A suggested means to collectively accomplish the

objectives of this lesson is to blend air and sea
power together as a new force, and to briefly
introduce amphibious warfare as another form of
sea power and warfare.

2. To set the stage for World War II, the students

should complete the study assignment and classroom
work with a sense of the enormity of sea power (in
its many forms).

V. Presentation

A. Air power strategic theorists.

1. Giulio Douhet.

a. Personal background.

b. Major assumptions.

(1) Aircraft are offensive instruments

against which no effective defense can
be foreseen.

(2) Civilian morale will be shattered by

aerial bombardment.

c. Basic argument: Once command of the air is

achieved, victory in other dimensions of war
will follow.

d. Key supporting ideas.

2. General Billy Mitchell.

106
 a. Personal background.

b. Major beliefs.

c. Compare/contrast with Douhet.

(1) Important difference in geographical

outlook (Douhet - Italy).

(2) Mitchell - global.

B. Mobile air power - U.S. carrier doctrine as part of the

“new sea power.”

1. Early carriers - British and U.S.

2. Mitchell versus the Navy - land-based or carrier-

based air?

3. Internal Navy controversy - carriers or

battleships?

4. The Japanese settle the controversy at Pearl

Harbor.

C. U.S. amphibious doctrine as part of the “new sea power.”

1. Background.

a. Advanced base concept.

b. Expeditionary force.

c. LtCol Ellis’ predictions.

d. FMF established.

2. The first textbook (Tentative Manual for Landing

Operations).

3. Supporting equipment - assault craft.

D. Summary.

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 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 24 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Japanese Ascendancy in the Pacific

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the development of

Japanese military thought from the Sino-Japanese War of
1895 to the Manchurian Incident.

B. The student will comprehend and explain the role of the

Kwantung Army in influencing Japanese foreign policy.

C. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast the

military policies of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung,
with emphasis on their campaigns against the Japanese.

D. The student will know and recall Japanese decision-

making, which led to war with western allies in the
Pacific.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 1123-

1198

2. In Peace and War, pp. 263-289

3. Men in Arms, Chapter 18, pp. 311-330

4. The American Way of War, Chapter 13, pp. 269-311

5. War Through the Ages, pp. 843-963 (optional)

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, Chapter 18, pp. 311-330

2. The American Way of War, Chapter 13, pp. 269-311

III. Instructional Aids

108
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options: Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment

V. Presentation

A. Compare and contrast China and Japan’s response to the

West.

1. The Opium War to the Boxer Rebellion.

2. Maiji Restoration and the modernization of Japan.

B. Discuss the evolution of Japanese military thought from

the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 to the Manchurian
incident in 1931.

1. Code of Bushido.

2. Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.

3. Confrontation with the West (San Francisco School

Board edict, the Twenty-One Demands, Washington
Naval Disarmament Conferences).

4. Manchurian incident - causes and effects.

C. Explain the role of the Kwangtung army in determining

Japanese foreign policy.

1. Militarism in the 1930’s.

2. Domestic political turbulence and the response of

the army.

3. Marco Polo Bridge incident.

D. Compare and contrast the military policies of Chiang

Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.

109
 1. The Long March.

2. The Sian incident.

3. Chiang Kai-shek, the Americans, and operations

against the Japanese.

4. Mao Tse-tung’s operations against the Japanese in

north China and the socio-political effects on the
populace.

E. Discuss the Japanese decision for war.

1. The U.S. role in China and the Open-Door Policy.

2. American response to the Sino-Japanese War.

3. U.S. and Allied embargoes.

4. Final decisions in late 1941 and attempts to avert

war.

F. Summary.

110
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 25 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Rise of Nazism and War in Europe

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace Hitler’s rise to power

and explain his subjugation of the German General Staff
and the officer corps.

B. The student will know and describe German military

development.

C. The student will know and summarize the key events of

German political-military expansion in the Rhineland,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

D. The student will comprehend the importance of the Nazi-

Soviet nonaggression pact.

E. The student will know and explain the failure of the

western allies to respond militarily to the invasion of
Poland and the subsequent “Phoney War”.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor reference

1. War in the Modern World, pp. 294-313

2. War Through the Ages, pp. 754-775 (optional)

B. Student text: None

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

111
 1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Of the myriad socioeconomic reasons for Hitler’s rise

to power, among the most important were:

1. General, intense dissatisfaction with the

Versailles Treaty.

a. Took from Germany all its colonies, one-

eighth of its territory, one-tenth of its
population, and most of its iron, steel, and
shipping.

b. Placed the Rhineland and Saar temporarily

under foreign control.

c. Eliminated the Navy and Air Force, and

reduced the Army to a force of 100,000.

d. Admission of war guilt.

e. Extensive reparations.

2. Depression of the early 1930’s.

B. Hitler rose to power within the framework of the Weimar

Republic, not by attacking its institutions.

C. Subjugation of the Army.

1. Soldier’s Oath of 1934 swore obedience to Adolf

Hitler as leader of the German people and
commander in chief of the armed forces.

2. Dismissal of Field Marshal von Blomberg and

General von Fritsch in 1938 and subsequent
erection of the High Command of the Armed Forces
(Oberkommando der Wahrmacht, or OKW), with Hitler

112
 as its head. Hitler now personally commands the
armed forces.

D. German military development.

1. October 1933 - Withdrawal from the League of

Nations and Disarmament Conference. Construction
of Air Force begins.

2. By October 1934, the size of the army had

increased to 240,000 men. Rearmament of the army
was not limited to the heretofore traditional
weapons types.

a. Development of armor and the mechanization of

the army were vigorously pursued.

b. These armor assets were assigned to

completely new units - armor (Panzer)
divisions - that were distinct from the other
arms of the service.

c. These new units were designed to combine

speed, weight, and numbers in order to
penetrate the enemy’s lines and destroy
communications.

3. March 1935 - Hitler introduces compulsory military

service.

4. July 1936 - Civil War in Spain.

a. In November, Germany provides the 4,500-man

Condor Legion to General Franco.

b. In addition to the aviation elements, the

Legion includes armor, transportation, and
intelligence units containing weapons and
equipment to be tested in this “dress
rehearsal.”

c. German dive-bombing tactics and techniques

are refined, resulting in a Stuka “mystique,”
and the myth of invincibility develops.

E. Remilitarization of the Rhineland, March 1936, in

violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties.

113
 1. Failure of French and British to act resulted more
from timorousness than impotence.

2. Fearing a French response, the German generals

counseled against this operation. Its success
solidified Hitler’s ascendancy over his generals.

F. 11 March 1938 - German forces enter Austria unopposed,

resulting in that country’s annexation to Germany.

1. England and France again do nothing.

2. Germany’s strategic position, particularly

relative to Czechoslovakia, is improved.

G. Czechoslovakia - A nation born from the peace

settlement of World War I.

1. A heterogonous population including some 3 million

Germans, which served as a convenient pretext for
Hitler’s aggression.

2. Czechoslovakia had an alliance with France, but

Great Britain refused to make any commitment.
France proved to be unwilling to honor its
commitment without British support.

3. Anglo-French appeasement policy reaches its zenith

with the Munich Conference - 29 September 1938.
Hitler was given large portions of Czechoslovakia,
and plebiscites were to be conducted in other
areas to finally determine the frontiers.

4. March 1938 - Hitler completes his “bloodless”

conquest of Czechoslovakia.

H. 23 August 1938 - Nonaggression pact between Germany and

the Soviet Union.

1. Germany could now proceed against Poland without

having to concern itself about the Soviet Union.

2. Similarly, should England and France go to war

over Poland, the pact assured Germany of a
conflict on only one front.

114
I. 1 September 1938 - German troops invade Poland.

1. England and France, although they did declare war,

took no offensive action despite France’s specific
treaty commitment to conduct offensive operations
should Poland be attacked.

2. The French overestimated German capabilities, and

generally demonstrated the same indecisive and
timid attitude they had been displaying since the
remilitarization of the Rhineland.

3. After the fall of Poland, the war in the west was

distinguished only by its inactivity for six
months.

a. Anglo-French forces were content to remain on

the defensive.

b. A combination of events delayed the German

attack.

c. This period was referred to as the “Phoney

War” in the west and the “Sitzkrieg” (Sitting
War) in Germany.

J. Summary.

115
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 26 HOURS: 1

TITLE: World War II in Europe and the Atlantic

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and explain the rapid victory by

Germany in Western Europe.

B. The student will comprehend the reasons for Germany’s

failure to subjugate England in 1940.

C. The student will know and discuss German naval

strategy, with emphasis on the Battle of the Atlantic.

D. The student will comprehend and evaluate German

military weaknesses as exemplified in the Battle of
Stalingrad.

E. The student will comprehend and compare American and

British motives in the decision-making for the North
African and Italian campaigns.

F. The student will know the Anglo-American strategic

bombing offensive.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 1014-1100

2. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 508-595

3. Men in Arms, pp. 295-330

4. The American Way of War, pp. 312-359

5. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 508-595

116
 2. Men in Arms, pp. 295-330

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. German victory in the west.

1. Britain and France declare war on Germany after

Germans invade Poland 1 September 1939.

2. Blitzkrieg is born in Poland.

3. French man the Maginot Line.

4. Denmark and Norway invaded 9 April 1940.

5. Germans take Belgium and Holland 10 May 1940.

6. Germans attack France through Ardennes.

7. Evacuation of Dunkirk 26 May - 3 June 1940.

8. Paris evacuated 11 June 1940.

9. Petain returns to power and immediately signs

armistice. France falls 25 June 1940.

10. French and Polish industrial area located close to

German border.

11. Allies had no mobile armored divisions.

117
 12. Allied doctrine and training based on 1918 trench
warfare doctrine.

B. Battle of Britain.

1. Germany not prepared for seaborne operations.

a. Lacking in amphibious equipment.

b. No amphibious doctrine.

c. Air and local sea power belonged to Britain.

2. Operation Sea-Lion.

a. German air war of attrition against RAF.

b. Germans lacked heavy bombers and hampered by

limited range of its fighters.

c. Goering commanded German Air Force.

d. Air war contained five phases.

e. Britain’s key to victory was her use of radar

and radio area coverage.

f. Incorrect air doctrine cost Germany the

Battle of Britain.

C. German naval strategy.

1. Hitler lacked appreciation of sea power.

2. German submarine force small and designed for

short-medium range operation.

3. German surface fleet totally lacking at outset of

war.

4. British seriously short of escorts for convoy duty

in beginning.

5. Discuss the five phases of the Battle of the

Atlantic.

118
D. Battle of Stalingrad.

1. City of Stalingrad located on Volga River; 500,000

inhabitants.

2. German Sixth Army faces Russian Sixty-Second Army.

3. Hitler’s goal was to cut off Volga River as a

supply route and shut down Stalingrad’s industrial
output - not to defeat the Russian Army.

4. Second week of September, Battle of Stalingrad

begins.

5. Germans are overextended in Russia. German

generals plead with Hitler to withdraw. Pleas
were ignored.

6. Germans attempt frontal assault on city; repulsed

with heavy losses.

7. Germans ordered to reduce city by artillery fire;

turn city into a rubble heap, which aids Russian
artillery and restricts German armor/air arm.

8. Volga served as an economic artery, but Hitler

insisted Stalingrad be taken. House-to-house
fighting ensues.

9. November 19th, Russians surround 22 German

divisions in vicinity of Stalingrad.

10. Germans not prepared for winter campaign.

11. Germans sacrifice Sixth Army as Battle of

Stalingrad ends 31 January.

12. Germans lost Stalingrad because:

a. Hitler’s insistence on seizing territory

rather than destroying Russian armies.

b. German’s overextended lines and exposed

southern flank.

c. Hitler’s failure to retract Sixth Army while

there was still time.

119
E. North Africa and Italy Campaigns.

1. Churchill and Roosevelt established Allied

cooperation.

2. British and American staffs combined for invasion

planning of North Africa.

3. Operation Torch (invasion of North Africa)

designed to pave way for invasion of Europe via
Italy, and also to aid Russia.

4. Allies wanted to knock Italy out of the war as

quickly as possible and to bring air might against
Germany.

5. Washington Agreement 1941. America committed to

defeating Germany first.

6. Discuss the following:

a. Washington meeting 1941.

b. London meeting 1942.

c. Washington meeting 1942.

d. Casablanca meeting 1943.

e. Washington meeting 1943.

f. Quebec meeting 1943.

g. Cairo/Teheran meeting 1943.

h. Quebec meeting 1944.

i. Malta meeting 1945.

j. Yalta meeting 1943.

k. Potsdam meeting 1945.

7. Churchill convinces Roosevelt that invasion of

North Africa is feasible due to locale being out
of range of Luftwaffe.

120
 8. Eisenhower selected as Commander-in-Chief of North
African Campaign.

9. 8 November 1942, allies land in North Africa.

10. Vichy French cease fighting 11 November.

11. Allies determine to attack Italy, the weakest of

the Axis Powers. This would open up Allied supply
line to Far East, draw off German troops on
Russian front, obtain airfields near Foggia, and
encourage Turkey to enter war on side of allies.

12. Sicily invaded 10 July 1943.

13. Allies reach Italy 3 September 1943.

F. Strategic bombing.

1. Initially, British strategic bombing lacking

because:

a. Poor night navigational equipment.

b. Poor target-finding equipment.

c. Inaccurate bombing.

d. Inefficient bombs.

e. British bombers no match for German fighters.

f. Lack of long-range capability.

2. British bombing improves because of:

a. Heavier bombers.

b. Larger bombs.

c. Improved target priorities.

d. Radar-equipped “pathfinder” aircraft utilized

to mark targets.

3. American strategic daylight bombing success was

121
 restricted in the early part of the war due to
weather and enemy fighter opposition. The key
rested in the development of long-range fighter
cover.

4. P-51 Mustang becomes premier long-range fighter.

5. Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force

were not able to bring sufficient strength against
German Luftwaffe, industries, fuel, and
transportation systems until the last year of war.

6. Airborne radar and bomb aiming greatly increased

effectiveness of strategic bombing.

G. Summary.

122
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 27 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Post-World War II Military Development

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend the origins of the Cold War

and the emergence of the United States as the dominant
military power.

B. The student will know and trace the evolution of the

National Security Act of 1947.

C. The student will comprehend and assess the impact of

potential nuclear proliferation on American defense
policy.

D. The student will comprehend and explain the origins of

the Truman Doctrine and the National Security Council
document NSC-68, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for
National Security,” of 14 Apr 50.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Men in Arms, pp. 331-354

2. The American Way of War, pp. 363-381

3. NSC-68, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National

Security” (Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-
68.htm.) (optional)

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 331-354

2. The American Way of War, pp. 363-381

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

123
 B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options: Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment

V. Presentation

A. Discuss the origins of the Cold War.

1. Soviet-American estrangement over Russian

expansion into Eastern Europe.

2. Emergence of two superpowers and the decline of

Great Britain and France in the post-war era.

3. The Berlin Blockade.

4. NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

B. Trace the evolution of the National Security Act of

1947.

1. What each armed service wanted.

2. Navy and Marine Corps Air - air power or sea

power?

C. Assess the impact of the atomic revolution on military

strategy.

1. Negates the use of combatants to fight wars.

2. Doctrine of deterrence.

3. American emphasis on the manned bomber.

D. Explain the origin of the Truman Doctrine.

1. International communism as a threat - Greece.

2. New role of the U.S. as the sole defender of

democracy.

124
E. Discuss the origins and importance of NSC-68.

1. Soviet Union as both a military and ideological

threat.

2. Perceptions of the next war.

3. Authors of NSC-68 concluded it was necessary to

build up American and Allied military strength to
right the power balance.

a. Initial reaction was largely negative due to

the increased military expenditures.

b. The Korean War saves NSC-68 from oblivion,

and it becomes the foundation of American
strategy.

F. Summary.

125
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 28 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Korean Conflict

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and explain the proposition

that preparation for nuclear war left the United States
unprepared to deter a limited war.

B. The student will know and describe the United Nations’

response to the invasion of South Korea in terms of the
perceived monolithic nature of communism.

C. The student will comprehend and evaluate the Inchon

Landing as a deterrent to military stalemate in Korea.

D. The student will comprehend the significance of the

Truman-MacArthur controversy.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Ch. 28, pp.

277-281

2. Men in Arms, pp. 346-348

3. The American Way of War, pp. 382-398

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 346-348

2. The American Way of War, pp. 382-398

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

126
 A. Method options: Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment.

V. Presentation

A. Explain how reliance on air power and preparation for

nuclear war left the U.S. unable to respond effectively
to a limited war.

1. Level of preparedness - U.S. forces.

2. Availability of ground forces.

3. Limitations of non-nuclear air power.

B. Describe the response of the United Nations to the

Korean Conflict.

1. Background to the conflict - a divided Korea.

2. Monolithic nature of the communist threat.

3. Historical lessons affecting decision-making

(Munich 1938, “loss” of China, etc.).

4. Multilateral military response.

C. Evaluate the Inchon Landing.

1. MacArthur’s experiences in World War II -

envelopment by amphibious means not unusual.

2. Perception that atomic weapons made large-scale

amphibious operations impractical.

3. Conduct of the operation/forces used (Army

commander).

4. Effect on the tactical situation in Korea.

D. Discuss the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

1. MacArthur’s history of irreverence for higher

authority - political power, hero image.

127
 2. Repeated instances of policy differences with
Truman - public announcement of disagreements.

3. MacArthur’s “no win” attitude of defeatism; demand

for authority to use nuclear weapons and authority
to strike targets in Manchuria.

4. Who establishes policy?

E. Summary.

128
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 29 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Wars of National Liberation

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and compare/contrast the

terms “nationalism,” “anticolonialism” and “communism”
in the context of the wars of liberation from 1945-
1961.

B. The student will know and explain the steps in

classical guerrilla warfare as defined by Mao Tse-tung.

C. The student will comprehend and assess the impact of

the Communist takeover in China.

D. The student will comprehend and explain the British

successes in the “Malayan Emergency” and evaluate
attempts to apply lessons learned to subsequent
situations.

E. The student will comprehend and explain American

response to the Cuban Revolution, with emphasis on the
“Bay of Pigs Operation.”

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Men in Arms, pp. 364-365

2. “Victory in Malaya”, Marine Corps Gazette, 1963,

Vol. 47, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (optional)

3. Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War (optional)

B. Student texts: None

III. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

129
IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options: Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment

V. Presentation

A. Assess the impact of the Communist victory in China.

1. American support for China since the turn of the

century.

2. World War II support for Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Anticommunism, the Cold War, McCarthyism.

4. Failure to comprehend the nature of a war of

national liberation.

B. Explain British successes in the Malayan emergency.

1. Background to the conflict.

2. Nature of the insurgency and the British response.

3. Emphasize why the conflict was containable;

compare briefly to Vietnam.

C. Define nationalism, anticolonialism, and communism in

the context of the period 1945-1961.

1. Nationalism.

2. Anticolonialism.

3. Communism.

4. Emphasize obfuscation with regard to using these

terms; note overlapping of meanings.

D. Discuss the American response to the Cuban Revolution.

1. Background - the U.S. and Castro.

130
 2. Soviet perceptions of John F. Kennedy.

3. Planning of the Bay of Pigs operation and why it

failed.

4. Effect of the failure on Kennedy’s foreign policy.

E. Explain the steps in classical guerrilla warfare as

defined by Mao Tse-tung.

1. Guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the militarily

weak and is designed to harass, confuse, and
disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication.

2. Tenets of guerrilla warfare:

a. The enemy advances, the guerilla retreats.

b. The enemy camps, the guerilla harasses.

c. The enemy tires, the guerilla attacks.

d. The enemy retreats, the guerilla pursues.

3. Once the guerilla gains military superiority, the

warfare becomes conventional.

F. Summary.

131
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 30 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Vietnam

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the development of the

revolutionary environment and anticolonialism under
French rule.

B. The student will comprehend the voluntary limitation of

the American military effort in the Indochina Conflict.

C. The student will know and review the anticommunist

military effort from the landing at DaNang in 1965 to
the end of 1967.

D. The student will comprehend and contrast the military

realities of the Tet offensive with its popular
American perception and media coverage.

E. The student will comprehend and explain the need for

and implementation of a policy of Vietnamization.

F. The student will comprehend and compare American and

French objectives in Vietnam in 1954 and 1972,
respectively, by contrasting the Geneva and Paris
Agreements.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 1321-1333

2. Summons of the Trumpet, pp. 1-266 (optional)

3. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts: None

III. Instructional Aids

132
 A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options: Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Study

assignment

V. Presentation

A. Trace the development of the revolutionary environment

and anticolonialism under French rule.

1. Origins of French rule.

2. Absence of civil liberties - development of a

revolutionary mentality.

3. Denial of participation in the economic mainstream

(restricts development of a middle class,
capitalist perspective).

4. Persistent anticolonialism; origins of the Viet

Minh.

B. Discuss the reasons for the voluntary American

limitation of the war.

1. Concern for Soviet and Chinese involvement.

2. Belief in monolithic communism and fears of other

communist-inspired insurgencies elsewhere.

3. Ill-defined goals and failure to unite Americans

for U.S. policy in Vietnam.

C. Review the events in Vietnam, 1965-1967.

1. Decision to send in ground troops in March 1965.

2. The counterinsurgency nature of the war -

frustrations.

3. Major operations — Review successes and failures.

133
 4. American optimism by the end of 1966.

D. Review the Tet Offensive.

1. Course of the offensive and its failure militarily.

2. The offensive as a political success.

3. Impact of media coverage, especially television

reporting.

4. Questioning of Americans as to the morality and

practicality of U.S. involvement.

E. Explain the course of American withdrawal.

1. Vietnamization.

2. North Vietnamese attempt to manipulate the 1972

U.S. presidential election.

3. “Rolling Thunder” - Objectives of the war changed.

(Note: “Rolling Thunder” was the operational name
for the new strategy that was also described as
“bombing them back to the peace table.”)

F. Compare American and French motives for reaching a

peace agreement.

1. French motives in 1954.

2. American perceptions in 1972.

3. A lasting peace in either case?

G. Briefly review the events leading to the fall of the

South Vietnamese government.

H. Summary.

134
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 31 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Conflicts In the Middle East

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and trace the evolution of the

Arab-Israeli conflicts.

B. The student will comprehend and then assess superpower

influence in the Mid-East.

C. The student will know and review the October War, with
emphasis on the impact of modern weaponry.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 602-609

2. Men in Arms, pp. 349-351, 390-399

3. “The Arabs and Israel in Perspective,” Marine

Corps Gazette, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2, and 6, 1974
(optional)

4. Instructor Resource Manual (optional)

B. Student texts

1. The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 602-609

2. Men in Arms, pp. 349-351, 390-399

III. Instructional Aid: Chalkboard/whiteboard

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

135
 3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Read and

study assignment.

V. Presentation

A. The Balfour Declaration - England would work to

facilitate the establishment of a national home for the
Jews in Palestine. Date of declaration: 9 November
1917.

B. Friction predictably developed between the Jewish

immigrants and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

1. Arab revolt in 1939.

2. England made concessions to the Arabs in order to

retain their friendship during Second World War,
to include restricting immigration.

C. After the war, English efforts to limit Jewish

immigration into Palestine met with vehement and often
violent resistance. Before the end of 1945, an
underground Jewish rebellion rose up against the
British High Commissioner for Palestine.

D. 14 May 1948: Declaration of Independence that

proclaimed the state of Israel and final departure of
British High Commissioner for Palestine.

E. 15 May 1948: Israel at war with its Arab neighbors.

F. The 1948 war resulted in an Israeli victory and

precipitated the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

G. “Superpower” influence in the Middle East:

1. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were

quick to recognize the new state of Israel in
1948.

2. 1955: Arms agreement between Egypt and the Soviet

Union.

3. 1956: France and Great Britain assist Israel in

136
 winning the second Arab-Israeli War.

a. By March 1957, after considerable prodding

from the United States and the United
Nations, Israel withdrew from the territory
it had conquered.

b. By July 1957, the Soviet Union was rearming

both Egypt and Syria.

4. Russian aid to Nasser and American support of

Israel enhanced the armed forces of the respective
nations and resulted in the Middle East becoming
an area of potential confrontation between the
superpowers.

5. On 5 June 1967, Israeli pilots manning American

and British aircraft successfully attacked
Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian airfields,
initiating the Six Day War.

a. The war resulted in an overwhelming Israeli

victory.

b. On this occasion, Israel did not respond to

pressure to return the conquered territory.

6. September 1970: Death of Nasser, who was

succeeded by Anwar Sadat.

a. Sadat makes overtures to the West.

b. July 1972: Most Soviet advisors and

technicians are expelled from Egypt,
principally because the Soviet Union was not
providing the desired offensive weapons.

c. After October 1972, limited Soviet arms

continued to flow to Egypt.

7. For the first time, and perhaps the only time, the
United States and the Soviet Union acted in
concert to help terminate hostilities in the
October War, although both “superpowers”
resupplied their respective sides during the
conflict.

137
 8. 1979: President Sadat and Premier Begin sign
Eyptian-Israeli peace treaty at White House.

H. The October (Yom Kipper) War.

1. An unprecedented degree of cooperation between the

Arab States was attained.

a. The Egyptian and Syrian attacks were

carefully coordinated.

b. Iraq sent troops; Lebanon mobilized; Saudi

Arabia, Libya, and the Persian Gulf states
provided arms.

c. Israel taken by surprise.

2. Unlike 1967, the Syrian and Egyptian surface-to-

air missiles took a heavy toll on Israeli
aircraft.

3. The dominance of the great Israeli tank formations

was broken by Egyptian infantry use of Soviet
anti-tank guided missiles and rocket-propelled
grenades.

a. Large numbers of Israeli tanks were destroyed

by these weapons.

b. The indication was that the infantryman could

still be a decisive factor on the
contemporary electronic battlefield.

I. Summary.

138
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 32 HOURS: 1

TITLE: Terrorism

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will know and describe current collective

security arrangements.

B. The student will know and then summarize the

proliferation of terrorism and its use as a political
and military method of warfare.

C. The student will know/list the nations of the world

capable of nuclear warfare.

D. The student will know/discuss the possibility of

nuclear terrorism.

II. References and Texts

A. Instructor reference: Men in Arms, pp. 335-399

B. Student texts

1. Men in Arms, pp. 335-399

2. Readings from current periodicals

II. Instructional Aids

A. Chalkboard/whiteboard

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

D. Map

IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

139
 2. Lecture and discussion

3. Guided discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Involve the

students in discussions about terrorism and nuclear
warfare.

V. Presentation

A. U.S. collective security arrangements.

1. NATO - emphasize and relate to Soviet/CIS threat.

2. OAS.

3. Various bilateral agreements.

B. Spectra of nuclear warfare.

1. Who is capable now? (U.S., CIS, China, Great

Britain, etc.)

2. Who could have nuclear weapons soon (2-3 years)?

(Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iraq,
North Korea)

3. What nations have the potential (5-6 years)?

(Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea,
Mexico, Iran)

C. Terrorism.

1. Increasingly widespread form of politico-military

warfare. (Cite recent examples.)

2. Nuclear terrorism - holding entire nations

hostage.

D. Summary

140
 NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE

LESSON 33 HOURS: 1

TITLE: The Gulf War (Desert Storm)

I. Learning Objectives

A. The student will comprehend and be able to discuss the

background and justification used by Hussein for the
invasion of Kuwait.

B. The student will comprehend and be able to discuss the

strategy and operational and tactical concerns of the
coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm.

C. The student will comprehend and be able to identify the

combat “firsts” utilized in Operation Desert Storm.

III. References and Texts

A. Instructor references

1. “A Perspective on Desert Storm,” by Col J. J.

Edson, USMC (Ret), Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75,
No. 6, June 1992, pp. 25-27 (optional)

2. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (optional)

3. “Desert Storm Stirs Up,” by R. R. Keene,

Leatherneck Magazine, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3, March
1991, pp. 23-25 (optional)

4. “Maneuver Warfare and the Operational Art,” by

LtCol G. I. Wilson, USMC, Marine Corps Gazette,
Vol. 75, No. 6, June 1991 (optional)

B. Student texts: None

III. Instructional Aids

A. Map

B. Instructor-prepared PowerPoint slides or transparencies

C. Computer/projection system or overhead projector

141
IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures

A. Method options

1. Lecture

2. Lecture and discussion

B. Procedural and student activity options: Encourage the

students to take notes and engage in classroom
discussion. Have students identify areas of importance
on a wall-mounted map.

V. Presentation

A. State rationale Hussein used to justify invasion.

1. Historical claim to area — “a line in the sand.”

2. Relationship with OPEC.

3. “Stealing” of Iraqi oil by Kuwait.

B. Discuss Iraqi economy and Iranian war losses.

C. Discuss what Hussein and Iraq had to gain by annexation

of Kuwait.

D. Operation Desert Shield - 7 August 1990.

1. U.S. forces arrive in Saudi Arabia.

2. USMC Maritime pre-positioning.

3. Historic presence of U.S. Navy in the region.

4. United Nations economic sanctions.

5. Hussein efforts at involving Palestinian problem.

6. Attempts at peaceful resolution.

E. Operation Desert Storm - 16 January 1991.

1. U.N. forces involved.

142
 2. Air attacks - 100,000 Allied sorties in 6 weeks.

3. Targets.

4. Artillery raids.

5. Intelligence effort.

6. Deception.

F. Operation Desert Sting - 29 January 1991.

G. Ground War - 24 February 1991.

1. Air supremacy.

2. Assault-combat ratio and order of battle.

3. Results in 100 hours.

4. Amphibious demonstration.

5. Effect on environment.

H. Combat “firsts.”

1. Harrier strikes.

2. Coordination between aircraft and armor.

3. Media - interviews with Hussein.

4. PAO.

I. Conclusions and summary.

143