Approaches to the Study

UNIT 2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY of Comparative Politics

OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS
NOTES
Structure
2.0 Introduction
2.1 Unit Objectives
2.2 Traditional Approaches
2.2.1 Historical, Legal and Comparative Approach
2.2.2 Institutionalism
2.3 Modern Approaches
2.3.1 Behavioural Approach
2.3.2 Traditionalists versus Behaviouralists
2.4 Marxist Approaches
2.4.1 Political Economy and Historical Materialism
2.4.2 Rational Choice
2.5 Summary
2.6 Key Terms
2.7 Answers to ‘Check Your Progress’
2.8 Questions and Exercises
2.9 Further Reading

2.0 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, comparative politics is gaining more and more importance. For studying
political institutions comparatively and in a more meaningful and purposeful way, it is
essential that not one but several approaches be adopted. No single approach can be
universally adopted to solve every political, social or economic problem.
According to some thinkers, new approaches have brought revolution in political
science; but whether that is true or not, one thing is certain—traditional approaches are
slowly being replaced by newer, more novel approaches. Two of these approaches are
systems approach and behavioural approach. The systems approach draws its main
support from natural sciences. The behavioural approach lays emphasis on scientific
outlook and objectivity. This unit discusses the traditional as well as modern approaches
to the study of comparative politics.

2.1 UNIT OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:
 Assess the historical, legal and comparative approaches to comparative politics
 Analyse the institutional approach and the emergence of comparative government
 Describe the behavioural approach to comparative politics
 Explain the Marxist approaches to the study of comparative politics

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Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics 2.2 TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
The traditional approach to the study of comparative governments emerged as a response
NOTES to historicism of the 19th century. It stressed the historical examination of Western
political institutions from the earliest to the modern times. The traditional approaches to
the study of comparative politics are historical, legal and the comparative approach, and
institutionalism.
2.2.1 Historical, Legal and Comparative Approach
The various methods of comparison are mentioned in this section.
Historical Method
The historical method can be distinguished from other methods in that it looks for causal
explanations which are historically sensitive. Eric Wolf emphasizes that any study which
seeks to understand societies and causes of human action could not merely seek technical
solutions to problems stated in technical terms. The important thing was to resort to an
analytic history which searched out the causes of the present in the past. Such an
analytic history could not be developed out of the study of a single culture or nation, a
single culture area, or even a single continent at one period in time, but from a study of
contacts, interactions and ‘interconnections’ among human populations and cultures.
The world of humankind ‘constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes,
and inquiries that disassemble this reality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify
reality’.
Historical studies have concentrated on one or more cases seeking to find causal
explanations of social and political phenomena in a historical perspective. Single case
studies seek to produce general statements which may be applied to other cases. Theda
Skocpol points out that comparative historical studies using more than one case fall
broadly into two categories, ‘comparative history’ and ‘comparative historical analysis’.
Comparative history is commonly used rather loosely to refer to any study in
which two or more historical trajectories are of nation-states, institutional complexes, or
civilizations are juxtaposed. Some studies which fall in this genre, like Charles, Louis and
Richard Tilly’s The Rebellious Century 1810-1930, aim at drawing up a specific
historical model which can be applied across different national context. Others, such as
Reinhard Benedix’s Nation Building and Citizenship and Perry Anderson’s Lineages
of the Absolutist State, use comparisons primarily to bring out contrasts among nations
or civilizations, conceived as isolated wholes. Skocpol herself subscribes to the second
method, i.e., comparative historical analysis, which aims primarily to develop, test, and
refine causal, explanatory hypothesis about events or structures integral to macro-units
such as nation-states. This it does by taking ‘selected slices of national historical
trajectories as the units of comparison’, to develop causal relationship about specific
phenomenon (e.g., revolutions) and draw generalizations.
There are two ways in which valid associations of potential causes can be
established. These methods laid out by John Stuart Mill in his A System of Logic are: (i)
the method of agreement and (ii) the method of difference. The method of agreement
involves taking up for study several cases having in common both the phenomenon as
well as the set of causal factors proposed in the hypothesis.

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 The method of difference, which is used by Skocpol, takes up two sets of cases: Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
(i) the positive cases, in which the phenomenon as well as the hypothesized causal
relationships are present and the (ii) the negative cases, in which the phenomenon as
well as the causes are absent but are otherwise similar to the first set. In her comparative
analysis of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions, in States and Social NOTES
Revolutions, A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, (Cambridge,
1979), Skocpol takes up the three cases as the positive cases of successful social revolution
and argues that the three reveal similar causal patterns despite other dissimilarities. She
also takes up a set of negative cases, viz., failed Russian Revolution of 1905, and selected
aspects of English, Japanese and German histories to validate the arguments regarding
causal relationship in the first case.
Critics of the historical method feel that because the latter does not study a large
number of cases, it does not offer the opportunity to study a specific phenomenon in a
truly scientific manner. Harry Eckstein, for instance, argues that generalizations based
on small number of cases ‘may certainly be a generalization in the dictionary sense.’
However, ‘a generalization in the methodological sense’ ought to ‘cover a number of
cases large enough for certain rigorous testing procedures like statistical analysis to be
used’ (Harry Eckstein, Internal War: Problems and Approaches, 1964).
Legal Method
Since we are exploring the traditional approaches, we will also refer to methods like
legal and juridical. As evident, this means that we shall analyse political systems along
with the institutions and legal processes that comprise it. For political scientists using this
method, law and justice are not limited to being the matters of jurisprudence but the state
itself is treated as in charge of an equitable and effective system of law and order.
Therefore, for political scientists, organizational matters, as well as those related to
jurisdiction and independence of judicial institutions, are matters of concern. State has
been analysed as a corporation or a juridical person by analytical jurists from Cicero in
ancient times to Dicey in the modern period. Politics thus became a science of legal
norms, independent of the science of the state as a social organism. This approach,
therefore, treats state as the prime entity to craft and implement laws.
Applied to the study of national and international politics, the legal method presumes
that any action which is to be taken in case of an emergency is prescribed in law. It
forbids action taking in some other situations, thus fixing the limit of action permitted.
Moreover, it emphasizes that where rule of law prevails, its very knowledge among the
citizens can help in determining their political behaviour. However, by its very nature, the
legal method is very narrow.
Philosophical Method
Principles of political theory were laid with the help of history, law, ethics and philosophy.
This approach significantly contributed to literature on normative political theory. Thinkers
like Plato and Burke successfully laid down the principles of political theory and developed
concepts like liberty and equality, rights, law and justice. On the one hand, with traditional
approach, Plato, Kant and Hegel idealized the state; on the other hand, Aristotle, Hobbes
and Machiavelli became more practical and developed theories of the state which could
be practiced for real. Relationship between politics and law was adopted by Grotius,
Bentham, Austin and Dicey. This approach continued to remain in operation for a very
long time and examined every political institution with the help of available evidences.
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Approaches to the Study Comparative Approach
of Comparative Politics
The comparative method, its nature and scope, has its own supporters and critics. Theorists
like A. N. Eisenstadt argue that the approach has no specific method but involves focuses
NOTES on cross-societal institutional or other macro aspects of societies for social analysis. On
the other hand, theorists like Arend Lijphart, contend that comparative approach is a
method and not just a vague term that symbolizes or indicates towards the focus of one’s
research. Lijphart defines this method as a basic method compared to others that are
more experimental, statistics-based or rely on case studies to make generalizations.
Another theorist, Harold Lasswell, argues that the comparative nature within the scientific
approach cannot be avoided and thus to anyone who uses such an approach to a political
phenomena, a completely independent comparative method, seems redundant.
Comparative approach has also been equated to the scientific method by Gabriel
Almond. Yet, there is a general agreement between different scholars that the comparative
method is not a method of measurement but aimed at discovering empirical relationships
between variables. The first step is to measure variables before a relationship is explored
among them. It is the latter step which is referred to as the comparative method. Theorists
argue that a distinction must be made between the technique and the method and identify
comparative method as a broad, general method and not a narrow, specialized technique.
Keeping these arguments in mind, theorists refer to it as the comparative approach
method or a method of comparison because it lacks the nature and principles of a method.
Therefore, the comparative approach can also be thought of as a more basic research
strategy than a strategic tool of research.
When compared with the experimental, statistical or case study methods, the
comparative approach can be better understood. For instance, the experimental method
is a process to understand the relationship between two variables in a controlled
environment. Such experiments are rare and difficult in political science, therefore, an
alternative is used by the way of statistical method. Within statistical method, the empirical
data is conceptually manipulated to discover controlled relationships among variables.
Control is ensured through division of the sample into many different groups, also referred
to as parting correlations or cross tabulations, like differentiating on the basis of age,
income, gender, education. This is followed by finding the correlation between two selected
variables in each case. This is the standard procedure followed in this method and
applied to most empirical research. The two methods—experimental and statistical—
use the same logic and are often referred to as the approximation of each other.
Therefore, comparative method essentially resembles the statistical method except
that the number of cases it deals with is often too small to permit statistical methods. But
it is necessary to understand that the comparative method is not an adequate substitute
for the experimental method as in the case of natural sciences. But these weaknesses
can be minimized in a number of ways. The statistical method is best to use as far as
possible, except in cases where entire political systems are being compared, then the
comparative method has to be used. The two can also be used in combination. In this
comparative analysis it is the first stage in which macro hypotheses are carefully
formulated, usually covering the structural elements of total systems, and the statistical
stage is the second, in which through micro replications these are tested in as large a
sample as possible. Second, too much significance must not be attached to negative
findings: for example, rejecting a hypothesis on the basis of one deviant case especially
when the sample is small. Rather, research should aim at probabilistic and not universal
generalizations. Third, it is necessary to increase the number of cases as much as possible
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(though small samples are not of much use). Comparative politics has advanced because Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
of the formulation of universally applicable theories or grand theories based on the
comparison of many countries or political phenomenon within them. For example, structural
functional analysis theory opened up a world of comparative research unknown before.
Fourth, increase the number of variables if not the number of cases; through this more NOTES
generalizations are possible.
Fifth, focus on comparable cases, i.e., those that have a large number of comparable
characteristics or variables which one treats as constants, but dissimilar as far as those
variables which one wants to relate to each other. This way we study the operative
variables by either the statistical or comparative method. Here, the area or regional
approach is useful, for example, while comparing countries within Latin America or
Scandinavia or Asia. But many scholars have pointed out that this is merely a manageable
argument, which should not become an imprisonment. Another alternative is studying
regions within countries, or studying them at different points of time as the problem of
control is much simpler as they are within the same federal structure. Here, it may be
mentioned that the states within the Indian Union provide a rich laboratory for comparative
research that has not yet been undertaken. Many scholars feel that focus should be on
key or contextual variables, as too many variables can create problems. This not only
allows manageability but also often leads to middle range theorizing or partial comparison
of political systems. This has been used successfully in anthropological studies as tribal
systems are simple. Political scientists can also do this by limiting the number of variables.
The case study method is used whenever only one case is being analysed. But it
is closely connected with the comparative method, and certain types or case studies can
become an inherent part of the comparative method whenever an in-depth study of a
variable is needed prior to comparison with other similar ones. The scientific status of
the case study method is somewhat ambiguous because science is neither generalizing
nor a ground for disapproving an established generalization. But its value lies when used
as a building block for making general propositions and even theory building in political
science when a number of case studies on similar subjects are carried out. Case studies
can be of many types, for example, a theoretical or interpretative, theory confirming or
informing each useful in specific situations. Thus, the comparative and the case study
method have major drawbacks. Due to the inevitable limitations of these methods, it is
the challenging task of the investigator in the field of comparative politics to apply these
methods in such a way as to capitalize on their inherent strengths and they can be useful
instruments in scientific political inquiry. Many scholars have spent much of the post war
period constantly improving the use of these methods.
2.2.2 Institutionalism
The study of institutions goes a long way back, starting possibly with the philosophical
explorations of Plato’s Republic. In this section, we will get a general idea of the historical
evolution of the institutional approach.
We are, for the most part, concerned with studying the approach within the field
of comparative political analysis. Therefore, our main concern is with the historical
moment at which the institutional approach took on a comparative character.
Ethnocentrism is a typical feature of this approach. A major portion of the works which
represent the institutional approach in comparative politics have only taken into account
governments and institutions in the West. Inherent in this approach is the belief that
western liberal democratic institutions are dominant. Thus, according to this view, western
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Approaches to the Study liberal democracy is not only the best form of government, but it also has a normative
of Comparative Politics
and universal character. The widespread nature of western liberal democracy takes for
granted that not only is this style of government the best, but also relevant across the
world. The ‘normativity’ of western liberal democracies is a consequence of this belief.
NOTES If it is the best form of governance which is also appropriate in all contexts, liberal
democracy is the form of government which should be implemented everywhere. But
an important exception also arises from this prescribed norm of liberal democracy. This
exception implies: (a) that the institutions of liberal democracy were specifically western
in their origin and contexts and, (b) that non-western countries were incapable of
democratic self-rule and would only be fit to do so if they underwent training under
western imperialist rule.
In the following sections, we shall undertake a detailed study of the beginning of
the institutional approach from ancient times to the first quarter of the present century
when it became a prime method which made comparative study possible.
Historical Background
Aristotle studied constitutions and practices in Greek city-states. Possibly, this is the
oldest comparative study of governments. Aristotle contrasted them with politics in the
so-called ‘barbarian’ states. He established similarities and differences between
governments differentiating between monarchies, oligarchies and democracy, and between
these ‘ideal’ governments and their ‘perverted’ forms. An interrelation between facts
and values marked the study of comparative politics at this stage. At the initial stages, an
attempt was not made to analyse the theory and practice of government, as James
Bryce had emphasized in the late nineteenth century. In its place was an irresistible
desire to explore ‘ideal’ states and forms of governments. More emphasis was given to
assumption, on what should be instead of on what ‘is’ or what is actually present. Practical
details and knowledge of existing state of affairs, however, came to be known due to the
efforts of Machiavelli (The Prince) in the sixteenth century and Montesquieu (The
Spirit of Laws) in the middle of the eighteenth century. A large number of constitutional
lawyers were the followers of Montesquieu. Their profession demanded that they
concentrate more on the contents, i.e., the theoretical (legal-constitutional) framework
of governments rather than the manner in which these frameworks unfolded in practice.
The forbearer of the study of ‘theory and practice’ was Tocqueville. This theory
later became the real spirit of the institutional approach in comparative political analysis.
Another noteworthy contribution to the expansion of this element of the institutional
approach was made by Bagehot (The English Constitution, 1867) in his examination of
the British cabinet. In this, he drew points of comparison with the American executive.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Bryce, Lowell and Ostrogorski contributed
significantly to a comparative study of institutions and by doing so, to the development of
a distinct branch of study that dealt with comparative governments.
Institutional Approach and the Emergence of Comparative Government
At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, there
was a drastic change in the contents of the institutional approach, and thereby the nature
and scope of comparative politics. This was due to the contributions of Bryce, Lowell
and Ostrogorski.
In his appraisal of their work, Jean Blondel asserts that Bryce and Lowell were,
indeed, the true founders of comparative governments as it developed as a separate
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branch of study in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The American Commonwealth Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
(1888) and Modern Democracies (1921) were two noteworthy works of Bryce. In
Modern Democracies, Bryce focused on the theory of democracy and examined the
working of the legislatures and their decline. Lowell’s works, Governments and Parties
in Continental Europe (1896) and Public Opinion and Popular Government (1913), NOTES
where he undertakes separate studies of France, Germany, Switzerland, etc., and a
comparative study of referendums and its impacts respectively, were equally important.
In the same way, another pioneering work was Ostrogorski’s study Democracy
and the Organization of Political Parties (1902) which aimed to test the hypothesis of
the ‘democratic’ or ‘oligarchical’ character of political parties.
It becomes significant to see how these works improved and changed the way in which
institutions were being studied until now.
(i) Theory and practice of governments: It has been mentioned earlier that
comparative study of governments was inclined to be philosophical-speculative
or largely legal-constitutional, i.e., they were either concerned with theoretical
concepts like the ‘ideal state’, or with data regarding the legal-constitutional
frameworks and structures of governments. With the liberal constitutional theory
as a base, the formal institutional structures were examined with emphasis on
their legal powers and functions. This formed part of studies on ‘Comparative
Government’ or ‘Foreign Constitutions’. These works were a result of the effort
of the elites in institutional-building in different countries. This is the reason
institutionalism acquired some fascination in the newly independent countries.
According to Bryce and Lowell, the existing studies were partial and incomplete.
An all-inclusive scrutiny of governments should comprise the working of the legal-
constitutional frameworks of governments. They emphasized that such a study
not only necessitated a study of the theoretical bases or contexts of governments
(i.e., the legal-constitutional framework and governmental institutions) but also
equally important was the emphasis on the study of ‘practices of government’.
Focussing just on constitutions, as was done by lawyers, was inadequate as it
would result in ignoring the difficulties of their operation and implementation.
Alternatively, focusing completely on practice without putting it in its theoretical
(constitutional) perspective would not give the complete picture as one could lose
sight of the contexts within.
It was, thus, primarily with Bryce and Lowell that the content of institutional
approach in comparative political analysis came to be defined as a study of the
‘theory and practice of government’.
(ii) Focus on ‘facts’: An important part of these studies was the concern to study
‘practice’ through an analysis of ‘facts’ about the functioning of governments. To
examine practice, one required to find out and ‘amass’ facts. Bryce categorically
backed his view that it was essential to base one’s analysis on facts, without
which, he said, ‘data is mere speculation’: ‘Facts, facts, facts, when facts have
been supplied each of us tries to reason from them’. A major complication
encountered during collection of data regarding practices of governments was
the tendency among governments to conceal facts than to make them public.
This made it difficult to acquire facts because governments and politicians often
hid facts or were reluctant to clarify what the real situation was. However, this
difficulty did not discourage them from stressing the importance of collecting data
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Approaches to the Study about almost every aspect of political life, parties, executives, referendums,
of Comparative Politics
legislatures, etc. This effort was sustained by later comparativists like Herman
Finer (Theory and Practice Institutional Approach of Modern Government,
1932) and Carl Friedrich (Constitutional Government and Democracy, 1932).
NOTES (iii) Technique: While searching for facts, Bryce and Lowell came across the use of
quantitative indicators, on the basis of the realization that in the study of government,
qualitative and quantitative types of verification have to be fair. Finally, however,
Bryce and Lowell felt that findings could be reliable only on the basis of as wide
a range of facts as possible. Keeping this in mind, they extended their studies
geographically to a large number of countries which, at the time, had institutions
of a constitutional or near constitutional character. They, therefore, endeavoured
to focus their study on governments of western, central and southern Europe. But
it was with Ostrogorski’s work that comparative political analysis began to focus
on studying particular institutions on a comparative basis. In 1902, Ostrogorski
published a comprehensive analysis of political parties in Britain and America.
The institutional approach faced much criticism in the 1950s from ‘system theorists’
like Easton and Macridis who stressed upon the building of overarching models
having a general global application. They attempted to understand and explain
political processes in different countries on the basis of these models. These
criticisms and the defence offered by institutionalists will be discussed in the next
section.
Institutional Approach: A Critical Evaluation
Criticisms of the institutional approach in comparative political analysis have come in
consecutive waves, in the early part of the twentieth century and later in the 1950s. A
refined version of the approach reappeared after each wave of criticism.
The approach was criticized before the study of institutions attained a comparative
nature (however restricted) at the turn of the century. It was said to be not only: (i)
speculative but also (ii) prescriptive and normative. (iii) It was concerned with only
irregularities and regularities and ignored relationships. (iv) It focussed on individual
countries and therefore was non-comparative. It was said to be (v) ethnocentric as it
focused on western European democracies. (vi) As it focussed on formal structure, both
constitutional and governmental—it was said to be descriptive. (vii) It did not focus on
analysis but at the same time was historical. (viii)The contributors tended to ignore the
upper chambers of UK, the US and the USSR. (ix) Methodologically, they were said to
be incomplete, at least in part. Theoretically, however, they were said to have failed to
recognize the essence of political life.
With Bryce and his contemporaries, the nature and content of the institutional
approach went through a phase of transformation. The approach attained a comparative
character and at the same time attempted to combine theoretical contexts with
governmental practices. In the 1950s, the institutional approach, as it developed with
Bryce, Lowell and Ostrogorski, once more faced severe criticism by political scientists
like David Easton and Roy Macridis.
David Easton criticized Bryce’s approach in his work The Political System (1953),
calling it ‘mere factualism’. Easton claimed that this approach had affected American
Political Science admitting that although Bryce did not neglect ‘theories’ his aversion to
making explanatory or theoretical models, had led to a ‘surfeit of facts’ and as a result to
‘a theoretical malnutrition’.
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 It will not be difficult to understand why Easton felt that Bryce’s approach had Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
misguided American Political Science in the wrong direction. Jean Blondel defends the
institutional approach from critics like Easton who attacked its ‘factualism’. Blondel
argued that the charge of ‘surfeit of facts’ was incorrect since very few facts were
actually available to political scientists to analyse politics comprehensively. NOTES
Actually, there was hardly any knowledge of the structures and activities of key
institutions of most countries, especially about the communist countries and the
underdeveloped countries. It was important, therefore, to collect more facts, considering
that governments tended to hide facts rather than pass them on.
Any successful study had to be based on facts. Reasoning would not be possible
in the absence of ‘facts’ or ‘data’. This, along with the point that facts were not easy to
get hold of, made them vital to the study of political analysis.
In 1955, Roy Macridis felt that the comparative study of governments should be
reoriented. He felt that in the present form, comparative study had been ‘comparative in
name only’. According to Macridis, the orientation of the institutional approach was
‘non-comparative’, ‘parochial’, ‘static’ and ‘monographic’. He said that a fair amount
of work was ‘essentially descriptive’. He owed this to the analysis being historical or
legalistic, and therefore quite narrow.
In the 1950s, it became obvious that there was a dearth of facts which was a
cause of concern. It was not possible to make proper generalizations. According to
Blondel, there was, a ‘surfeit of models’ instead of a ‘surfeit of facts’. He pointed out
that building models without basing them on facts would lead to misinformation. It was
not easy to obtain information about certain countries. Also, wrong information was
likely to influence and reinforce preconceptions about those countries.
In 1971, while writing about Latin American Legislatures, W. H. Agor stated that
legislatures in that part of the world were not strong. With no facts available for the
purposes of the study, the reliance was more on evidence which was ‘impressionistic’.
Thus, those who followed the institutional approach emphasized the need for collecting
and coming up with ways of collecting facts.
The criticisms were, however, followed by works that had a more comparative
focus and included non-western countries.
Check Your Progress
2.3 MODERN APPROACHES 1. What have
historical studies
concentrated on?
The modern approaches to political science play a very important role in studying
2. Name the methods
comparative politics. It includes approaches like the behavioural system, structural- by which valid
functional and the Marxist approach. Many thinkers and theorists have given their views associations of
and theories with regard to these approaches. This section deals with the behavioural potential causes can
approach. be established.
3. How did David
2.3.1 Behavioural Approach Easton criticize
Bryce’s work on
As you know, behaviouralism is related to the rise of the behavioural sciences and is institutional
approach?
based on the natural sciences. It examines the behaviour, actions and acts of individuals
4. What does the
instead of the characteristics of institutions like legislatives, executives and judiciaries. theory of
Before the Behaviouralist Revolution, critics saw the study of politics as being institutionalism
state?
primarily qualitative and normative. They also claimed that it lacked a scientific approach
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Approaches to the Study which was necessary to call it a science. However, behaviouralists would go on to use
of Comparative Politics
strict methodology and empirical research to validate their study as a social science. The
behavioural approach was innovative because it changed the attitude of the purpose of
inquiry moving towards research supported by verifiable facts.
NOTES Behaviouralism uses the following methods to understand political behaviour:
 Sampling
 Interviewing
 Scoring and scaling
 Statistical analysis
David Easton was the first to differentiate behaviouralism from behaviourism in
the 1950s. In the early 1940s, behaviourism itself was referred to as a behavioural
science and later called behaviourism. The two disciplines were given distinct meanings
by Easton.
Easton also listed the ‘intellectual foundation stones’ of behaviouralism, which
are as follows:
 Regularities: This is related to the generalization and explanation of
regularities.
 Commitment to verification: This refers to the ability to verify one’s
generalizations.
 Techniques: This represents an experimental attitude towards techniques.
 Quantification: Results are to be expressed as numbers wherever it is possible
and meaningful.
 Values: The approach also keeps ethical assessment and empirical
explanations distinct.
 Systemization: The importance of theory in research also must be considered.
 Pure science: It defers to pure science rather than applied science.
 Integration: It aims at integrating social sciences and value.
Objectivity and value-neutrality
According to David Easton, behaviouralism must be ‘analytic, not substantive, general
rather than particular, and explanatory rather than ethical.’ Therefore, the theory aims to
evaluate political behaviour without ‘introducing any ethical evaluations’. Rodger Beehler
calls this ‘their insistence on distinguishing between facts and values’.

Criticism of behaviouralism
The approach has been criticized by both conservatives and radicals for the purported
value-neutrality. Conservatives see the distinction between values and facts as a way of
undermining the possibility of political philosophy. Neal Riemer feels this approach does
away with ‘the task of ethical recommendation’ because behaviouralists believe ‘truth
or falsity of values (democracy, equality, and freedom, etc.) cannot be established
scientifically and are beyond the scope of legitimate inquiry’. Christian Bay believed
behaviouralism was a pseudo political science and that it did not include ‘genuine political
research’.

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 Bay objected to empirical consideration taking precedence over normative and Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
moral examination of politics.

Post-Behaviouralism
The theory of post-behaviouralism questioned the prevalent notion that academic research NOTES
needed to be ‘value neutral’. They also claimed that despite the alleged value-neutrality
of behaviouralist research, it was biased towards the status quo and social preservation
over social change.
This school of thought argued that values should not be neglected and that
behaviouralism was biased towards observable and measurable phenomena. Simply put,
this meant that trivial issues that could be easily worked on were being emphasized at
the cost of more important topics. The post-behaviouralists believed that research was
very relevant in society and intellectuals had a positive role to play in the same.

Criticism of Post-behaviouralism
Well-known American political scientist Eulau criticized post-behaviouralism as a ‘near
hysterical response to political frustrations engendered by the disconcerting and shocking
events of the late sixties and early seventies’.
2.3.2 Traditionalists versus Behaviouralists
Traditionalism in political science is a continuation of classical political philosophy in the
modern times. It is represented by political scientists of varied professional inclinations,
having an affinity with practitioners of moral or social philosophy. It also includes
institutional analysts.Contrary to traditionalism in political science, behaviouralism postulates
that social sciences can more closely approximate to methods and goals of natural
sciences. On the other hand, traditionalism takes the stand that political science can
never become a science in the real sense. The traditionalists continue to argue that even
if it were possible for political science to become a science, it would be undesirable to
attempt it.
The traditionalists’ challenge to behaviouralist methods is the most outspoken.
Their basic premise is that political science can never really become a science. To
support their view, they advance the proposition that units of analysis in political science
are not comparable to those of natural science. Unlike the stable units found in natural
sciences, human beings are unique by virtue of their self-consciousness. They have the
capacity to alter any plan about behaviour on the basis of past, present and future
expectations and experiences. Therefore, any claim to general predictive laws would be
highly presumptuous and inaccurate. Political behaviour by its very nature is not amenable
to experimental enquiry. For, in a historical sense, it is unique and not recurring at intervals.
Hence, the very search for regularities which the behaviouralist analysis undertakes is in
vain.
The traditionalists maintain that quantification and analysis do not suit political
science. The discipline as a whole is lacking in both precise concepts and the required
metrics. Significant issues usually cannot be quantified, while those quantifiable easily
are usually trivial. The traditionalists doubt the extent to which significant human behaviour
can actually be apprehended and observed in a systematic manner.
Moreover, the traditionalists argue that additional subject matter differences
between social and natural science. They are convinced that social scientists cannot
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Approaches to the Study examine or investigate their subject matter dispassionately. Nor is it possible to achieve
of Comparative Politics
objectivity as demanded by the scientific method. In fact, the scientific method confronts
social scientists with the pervasive reality of their biases at all stages of investigation.
This detracts them from keeping values and facts separate.
NOTES As in methods, the differences between the traditionalists and behaviouralists
also focus on scope and objectives. The traditionalists uphold such appropriate objectives
that are action oriented. They appear in the role of humanitarian advocate, critic and
reformer. Indeed, the traditionalists’ position implies a special characterization of the
scientific method. On one level, it amounts to rejecting the scientific method, claiming
that the pattern of justification varies between natural sciences and social sciences. On
another level, the traditionalists’ position implies that techniques of discovery differ in
natural and social sciences. The former claim is much more radical in import than the
latter one. Much of the current debate fails to articulate this important distinction.
On the contrary, it is possible to establish such broad meanings that almost any
systematic accumulation of information can be so designated. When it is not clear what
claims are being made for or against science, there is an artificiality about these debates.
In recent years, philosophers of science have persuasively stated the case for a view of
science and scientific methods that falls between the above extremes. Thus, a middle
path has emerged in recent times. To quote the political scientist Malcolm B. Parsons,
‘It is possible to define sciences and scientific enquiry so narrowly that only a few areas
in the physical sciences could qualify.’
At this stage, it would be worthwhile to explain the differing implications of the
traditionalist and the behaviouralist positions in political science. The debate between
them points to one significant conclusion. It is at least possible to set the requirements of
a genuine science whether so narrowly as to rule out all but a few natural sciences or to
make it so broad-based that it could include almost any kind of common sense speculation.
If we limit science only to those areas of enquiry for which there exists fully formalized
theories, offering explanations that are strictly deductive in form, this would considerably
narrow down the range of scientific enquiry. On the contrary, if the difficulty in obtaining
relatively unbiased observational data is overemphasized, and the importance of law-like
generalizations is underscored, a vast array of pre-scientific and philosophical enquiries
would lay claim to be included in a scientific discipline.
The role of theory is central to all scientific explanation. It is on this score that
social science has been found most lacking. To date, social science has singularly failed
to produce a widely accepted account that can serve as a paradigm for further research.
It has not been able to produce even the grounds for adjudicating the relevance and law-
likeness of empirical generalizations and far less the grounds for explanation of social
behaviour. Traditionalists treat this failure as endemic to political science. Not only has
the discipline failed to measure up to the requirements in the past, but there are overriding
reasons for assuming that it can never satisfy these demands. In a way, it is an empirical
claim resting on past history and the present condition of political science. Evidence is
quite adequate for predicting a continued failure of the discipline to measure up to the
requirements of a genuine science.
Contrary to this, the behaviouralists’ plea is that social scientists have been
successful in applying a variety of sophisticated statistical techniques to data. In a large
number of cases, these techniques have been used to make accurate predictions. As a
result of this, many empirical theories have been propounded which have attained some

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measure of support. However, if we were to expect from a science a total theory which Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
does for social science or at least for one of its major divisions what Newton’s theory did
for physics, the traditionalists’ denigration of the accomplishments of empirical theorists
would be deemed plausible. It is, however, doubtful whether even physics has a theory
of such cosmic significance. NOTES
Distinguished American sociologist Robert K. Merton rightly maintains that the
proper aim, at least in current conditions, and the proper measure of social science, is its
success in providing theories of mid-range. Such theories are more than empirical
generalizations or summaries of observed uniformities. They comprise specific testable
assumptions that can be falsified or confirmed by observation. They occupy a middle
position between isolated observational generalizations and all-embracing speculative
theories. Merton’s characterization of the theories of the mid-range embraces such
classic accounts as Emile Durkheim’s theory of suicide and Max Weber’s theory of
relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. More recent examples include the
reference-group theory and the role set theory.
Given the numerous theories of the middle range, it is wrong to lament the death
of theories as the traditionalists do. Moreover, the failure of political science to produce
widely accepted and well-established grand theories (in a period of only 30 years or so)
which can be used to predict future developments is naive and immature. This cannot be
deemed a sufficient ground for denying politics its scientificness of its accomplishments
in the realm of scientific theory. If the history of the development of other sciences is
any guide, the gestation period for a new natural science often has been much longer.
The traditionalists’ attack in relation to political behaviour is three-fold:
(i) The human political behaviour involves too many variables. It is too complex
to visibly exhibit the regularities necessary for the determination of empirical
laws and theories.
(ii) The subject matter, that is, human behaviour, precludes explanation by
empirical laws and theories.
(iii) That even such laws and theories as might be presented are inevitably
biased in such a way as to prevent scientific objectivity in evaluating them.
Each of these criticisms has been widely challenged. These have, however, failed
to establish that it is impossible for social sciences to resemble natural science in method.
In fact, political science, if properly practised, can be a genuine science. This does not
mean that social science must or will develop to meet the requirements of scientific
explanations and if possible, predict as well.
Reproductive Fallacy
The traditionalists’ objection that social and political behaviour is too complex to be
explained in terms of law-line generalizations drawn from adequate empirical theory,
suffers from a few confusions. The primary one among them is called the ‘reproductive
fallacy’. This means that an adequate explanation of a given event must account for that
event in all its uniqueness. Any event is susceptible of many descriptions and it is argued
that no complete description is possible, that language in general is inadequate to capture
experience and that describing a thing is different from actually perceiving and reacting
to it. However, this in no way implies that descriptions are somehow necessarily inadequate.
Nevertheless, an adequate explanation of social behaviour is possible under only one of
the many possible descriptions.
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Approaches to the Study Social and Natural Science—Points of Divergence
of Comparative Politics
Similarly the objection that the uniqueness governing social behaviour is not merely
uniqueness governing all events, but rather the kind of behaviour that does not recut. In
NOTES other words, it is that behaviour that appeals to political science as a matter of fact and
applies to a single instance or at best to a few cases. As against this, the descriptions of
interest to physicists apply to large phenomena for purposes of explanation. This limitation
of social science is shared by other physical sciences like geology and meteorology.
These natural sciences too are interested in explaining unique events, but lack adequate
tools and techniques of explain the phenomena before them. This is not a failure of the
younger natural sciences alone but also older sciences like physics. They lack knowledge
of the contingencies and variables governing the infinite diversity of particular conditions.
Moreover, the kinds of concepts employed by physicists are idealisations that
actual physical objects only approximate to. Physical laws apply in their purity to rigid
bodies like objects in a vacuum or frictionless mass. Explanation and prediction apply to
objects and events only when we accept simplifying assumptions that exclude some
variables. For example, the rational economic man is a construct or idealisation that
involves simplifying assumptions. Actual economic agents only approximate to this ideal.
However, this does not mean that we cannot adduce law-like generalizations which
apply to actual economic behaviour.
Philosopher Karl Popper supports the viewpoint that social science deals with the
phenomena that are more complex than those investigated by natural scientists. He
finds the source of complexity of subject matter of social science in the tendency to
compare concrete social or political situations with those found in the laboratory of
natural scientists. But the laboratory situation is shaped exactly to limit the effect of
certain variables.
Another source of the assertion of complexity, Popper argues, is the belief that
social scientists must give an account of social phenomena. This somehow includes the
mental condition of all participants. This requirement is highly unrealistic. It is tantamount
to demanding that physicists know the behaviour of each molecule before they can
employ concepts like pressure or temperature that relate to the collection of a large
number of molecules.
The traditionalists claim that human behaviour is different in kind from the behaviour
of inanimate objects. This is so because human being are clearly conscious of their own
behaviour. This point to the fact that human beings can alter their own behaviour. They
can do so despite or precisely because social scientists have preferred a theory or made
a prediction. Besides, human beings can give meaning to their actions and their institutions.
There can be no complete or even adequate explanation of human political behaviour
and institutions unless it takes account of this factor. Moreover, this meaning or significance
cannot be understood in terms of some theory which abstracts from the overt behaviour
responses. Consequently contemporary behaviouralism misses the most important
dimension of human behaviour due to abstracted empiricism.
Most scholars agree that dissemination of the results of political enquiry in social
sciences may have effects altogether different from the publication of conclusions in
natural science. For example, the publication of preference poll results may affect outcome
of the election, while nobody expects the publication of tide tables to affect the tides.
Nevertheless this difference between the natural sciences and social sciences may not
be significant as may be first imagined. The effects of publishing preference polls are
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themselves open to empirical study, just as are the effects of using a thermometer. Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
Herbert Simon’s work on the bandwagon effect offers a good example of how publication
of preference polls may be treated as an empirical variable.
Peter Winch supports the claim that the subject matter of social science enjoins a
methodology which may radically differ from that employed in natural science. According NOTES
to Winch, the description of human behaviour as an action, rather than merely as a piece
of physical behaviour, demands that the actor possesses in advance certain concepts in
the light of which he views his action. What he does is intimately connected to what he
perceives himself to be doing. Indeed all meaningful behaviour, and social behaviour, in
particular, can be adequately described only when it is treated in terms of the concepts
the agents actually have. More importantly, since the ideas and theories of people change
and develop social behaviour and social relations are not suited to making broad
generalisations. As a corollary to this, social science differs from natural science in two
ways.
First, the criteria for determining evidence are not those of the observer, but those
of the observed.
Second, appropriate explanation does not come through assumption of particular
behaviour under law like generalisation. It emanates from an understanding of behaviour
as an instance of some social practice or activity.
British philosopher Winch aligns himself with Max Weber against the position
taken by Pareto and Durkheim. The latter plead for a vocabulary of recurring observable
social features. In their view, these can be developed and (at least in principle) are
suitable for inclusion in scientific generalization. Social facts may describe social behaviour
in terms radically different from those employed by the actors themselves. Durkheim’s
concept of anomie as it functions in his discussions of suicide is a case in point.
Winch and Weber argue that social scientists must attempt to obtain a Verstehen
which means an emphatic or interpretative understanding of human action. For both, this
understanding is not merely a case of a social scientist attempting to put himself into the
other man’s shoes, and seeing the world as the social actor sees it, but more than that.
Weber sees Verstehen as a first step in social research to be supplemented by a
search for statistical generalization. In contrast, Winch suggests that social scientists
should engage in an enquiry akin to that of philosophers. They should try to grasp the
standards or social rules relevant to the behaviour under study as a result of which this
behaviour becomes intelligible.
Winch, admittedly, is justified in joining out the importance of the agent’s own
account of social and political behaviour, which behavioralists can take into consideration.
Normal social and political concepts or categories provide a focus for investigation and
specific individual explanations can be included as data. The demand to account for
human behaviour in all its uniqueness is only another example of the reproductive fallacy.
In a sense bureaucratic behaviour cannot be understood or appreciated unless we see it
from the viewpoint of a practising bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it does not imply that
there is an alternative explanation of understanding to be gained from subsuming this
behaviour under law-like generalizations. This may be so even when the concepts
employed in framing these generalizations and in describing specific pieces of behaviour,
differ radically from those that the agent himself would employ.
As against Winch’s position, social science has been described as the study of the
unintended consequences of human action. This description understates the relevance
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Approaches to the Study of Winch’s argument, while this position itself misses one vital aspect of social enquiry.
of Comparative Politics
Conceding that one important task of social science is to characterise the rules which
constitute various social practices or activities, one need not accept the suggestion that
his is all there is to social enquiry. Such an analysis is conspicuously static. It does not
NOTES leave room for equally important questions that arise about the origin and development
of various practices and activities.
Problem of Objectivity
The traditionalists emphasize the intrusion of values at every stage of political analysis.
This tends to make objective judgements impossible. Bias or prejudice will surely enter
the collection and evaluation of data, allocation of funds for research and admission or
rejection of certain variables in theories. Even behaviouralism leads to concern with
problems which are not politically relevant. It, thus, given at least tacit support to existing
political institutions and practices.
Another objection is that all our complex judgements are reflection of ideology.
They are, therefore, historically relative rather than objective.
The given logic has been countered by the behaviouralists or other practitioners
of scientific methodology in political analysis. Undeniably, particular pieces of research
have been infected by bias or they have been characterized by an unacceptable intrusion
of particular judgements of value and by the investigator’s points of view. Probably this
happens more often in social sciences than in natural science. However, empirical
evidence does not show that the intrusion of values is unique to social science or that it
can be eliminated. Furthermore, judgements of value enter into the evaluation and
reception of results in natural as well as in social sciences. In this respect, social science
may be seen, in principle, as no worse than natural science.
Social science also does not vary in kind from natural science. However, it cannot
be denied that some research in social science has been trivial and irrelevant to immediate
social and political problems. But it is also wrong to assume that all or even most
investigations in natural science are endowed with special significance or scientific
importance. Triviality in choice of research problems, unimaginative research design,
lack of insight into the relationship between particular pieces of research and larger
problems in a field, and finally, the relative stupidity of the investigator can result in
banality and trivialisation of research in both natural and social sciences.
The lack of direct relevance or application often besets basic research in both
natural and social sciences. Theorizing is always some steps removed from practical
application and what may lead to a fruitful development is not known in advance. Freedom
is, therefore, necessary in matters of choice concerning a research problem. It is difficult
to see how the demand for relevance at the expense of theorising is different from the
charge that a scientist should turn away from some basic research. Both may be
worthwhile and not necessarily exclusive undertakings. It does not mean, however, that,
in particular cases, priorities cannot be established. If funds are limited, the more important
of the research areas may be given priority.
Finally, even if biases and verifying value systems create greater difficulty in
social science, it does not follow that they cannot be eliminated. For example, when the
application of the Western developmental model to the Third World hides a value bias
and is culture-bound. It is a case of intrusion of values into scientific enquiry.

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Problem of Value-Relativism Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
The traditionalists advance the thesis of relativism. They deny scientific objectivity to
social science research. In their view social science fails to be objective, that is, truly
scientific because it is but one instance in which human ideology intrudes upon our NOTES
judgement. Absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject
and unrelated to the social context is impossibility.
In support of this position, the traditionalists adduce American philosopher Samuel
Kuhn’s thesis called the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. They seize upon those
passages in which Kuhn talks about replacement of one paradigm by another in natural
sciences as a Gestalt Switch or conversion to reinforce their argument. They assess that
even in natural science, individual and group prejudices shape judgements. Thus there is
no objective procedure for ultimately adjudicating various claims.
Such a global indictment does not clearly distinguish the problems faced by social
scientists from those faced by natural scientists. In fact both are tarred with the same
brush. Moreover, behaviouralists need not commit themselves to finding some absolute
truth. Indeed, they may develop laws and theories adequate to their subject matter in the
same sense that laws and theories are adequate in natural science. Such a global relativism
generates what is known as Mannheim’s paradox, ‘Since all judgements about social life
are relative to the social and the individual perspective, they, therefore, lack of objectivity
cast doubts on particular judgements about social life, then doubt is cast equally on the
relativist thesis itself.’
As a matter of fact, part of the initial appeal of relativism comes from the
identification of absolute truth with objectivity. To hold that scientific statements are
tentative or hypothetical is to acknowledge that they are open to revision. This would
amount to rendering them non-objective, i.e., merely relative. However such a claim
attempts to hold scientific judgements or good evidence ot an appropriate standard.
The assumption that objectivity must entail neutrality further complicates the
questions about objectivity. Science can be seen as providing institutionalised control
procedures. These are necessary in as much as observers and theorisers are not neutral.
In this connotation, redundancy, duplication, and overlap are essential to maintain the
integrity of the system of scientific enquiry. From this, it follows that objectivity in science
is possible even though people may be conditioned or shape in several different ways. It
is not necessary that scientists should claim neutrality but should accept responsibility in
Check Your Progress
the joint enterprise of collecting and assessing evidence and of considering and evaluating
alternative theories. 5. What methods does
behaviouralism use
to understand
2.4 MARXIST APPROACHES political behaviour?
6. State the aim of
behaviouralism
There are a number of Marxist concepts that are related to the study of political science— theory.
political economy, historical materialism and rational choice theory. The term ‘political 7. What do you
economy’ denotes the distribution of political and economic power in a particular society understand by
and how it influences the directions of development and policies that bear on them. Karl traditionalism in
political science?
Marx’s concept of historical materialism also examines the process of capitalism as a
8. Why is the human
whole. Extensions of Marxism such as analytical Marxism and the rational choice theory behaviour different
move beyond traditional Marxist studies and help in analysing social and economic from that of
behaviour. inanimate objects?

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Approaches to the Study 2.4.1 Political Economy and Historical Materialism
of Comparative Politics
Karl Marx explains his approach on the subject of political economy in his work, Das
Kapital. Das Kapital is a wide-ranging discourse on political economy written in German
NOTES by Karl Marx and edited (in part) by Friedrich Engels. A Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy was also written by Karl Marx and it provides a significant scrutiny
of capitalism. The concept of ‘political economy’, according to Marx, is not a moral
exposition. It is an attempt to examine the process of the capitalist system as a whole, its
origins and future. Marx tried to find out the causes and dynamics of the addition of
capital, the growth of wage labour, the alteration of the workplace, the concentration of
capital, competition, the banking and credit system, the tendency of the rate of profit to
decline, land-rents and many other things. According to Marx, the strength of capitalism
lay in the misuse and alienation of labour. The ultimate source of capitalist profits and
surplus was the unpaid labour of wage labourers. Employers could claim the new output
value because of their ownership of the productive capital assets which was protected
by the state through property rights.
Marx said that the political economists could study the scientific laws of capitalism
in an objective way because the expansion of markets had in reality objectified most
economic relations. The cash nexus had stripped away all previous religious and political
illusions.
Marx also says that he viewed ‘the economic formation of society as a process
of natural history’. The growth of commerce happened as a process which no individual
could control or direct, creating an enormously complex web of social interconnections
globally. Thus, a ‘society’ was formed ‘economically’ before people actually began to
consciously master the enormous productive capacity and interconnections they had
created, in order to put it collectively to the best use. The concept of capital does not
propose a theory of revolution (led by the working class and its representatives). Instead,
it throws up a theory of crises as the condition for a potential revolution or what Marx
refers to in the Communist Manifesto as a potential ‘weapon’, ‘forged’ by the owners
of capital, ‘turned against the bourgeoisie itself’ by the working class. Such crises,
according to Marx, are rooted in the contradictory character of the commodity, the most
fundamental social form of capitalist society. According to Marx, in capitalism,
improvements in technology and rising levels of productivity increase the amount of
material wealth (or use values) in society while simultaneously diminishing the economic
value of this wealth, thereby lowering the rate of profit. This tendency leads to a paradox
characteristic of crises in capitalism of ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’ or more precisely,
crises of overproduction in the midst of under-consumption.
Karl Marx also wrote that the term ‘political economy’ most commonly refers to
interdisciplinary studies drawing upon economics, law and political science in explaining
how political institutions, the political environment and the economic system—capitalist,
socialist, mixed—influence each other.
The term was originally used for studying production, buying, and selling and their
relations with law, custom and government, as well as with the distribution of national
income and wealth, including the use of the budget process. Figure 2.1 shows the essence
of Marx’s concept of the political economy.

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 Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
Essence of
Political Economy

NOTES

Accumulation
Attention Economic Surplus of Capital
Crisis Value

Fig. 2.1 Political Economy

Social Production of Existence

In the theory of the social production of existence, men usually enter definite relations,
which are independent of their will. This includes relations of production that are
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society.
This is the real foundation on which a legal and political superstructure arises and with
which the definite forms of social consciousness corresponds. The mode of production
of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is
not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence
that determines their consciousness. At a particular stage of development, the material
and productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production
or with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto.
From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their
bindings. This leads to changes in the social economic foundation that lead sooner or
later to the transformation of the whole superstructure.
In studying such transformations, it is always necessary to understand the material
transformation of the economic conditions of production. This can be determined with
the precision of ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and
the fight begins. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about
himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness. On
the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material
life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations
of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for
which it is sufficient have been developed and new superior relations of production
never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured
within the framework of the old society.
Mankind, thus, inevitably sets itself only such tasks as one is able to solve, since
closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material
conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.
Broadly speaking, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of
production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development
of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social
process of production but the productive forces developing within the bourgeois society
create the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism also.

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Approaches to the Study Historical Materialism
of Comparative Politics
The concept of history according to Karl Marx is known as dialectical or historical
materialism. ‘To Marx’, explains Larson ‘matter is not a product of mind: on the contrary,
NOTES mind is simply the most advanced product of matter.’ Though Marx rejected Hegel’s
content orientation, he retained the dialectical structure. Historical materialism is the
Marxist theory of society. This is clear in a detailed passage in the Preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.
Stages of Human History
One of the primary themes contained in Karl Marx’s The Communist Manifesto is the
stages of human history. He differentiated the stages of human history on the basis of
their economic regimes and categorized them into four modes of production which he
called the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the bourgeois.
Being a materialist, Karl Marx believes thoughts to be based on facts. According
to Marx, ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the
contrary, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness.’
In this way, social laws change along with the history of social and economic
evolution. There have always been conflicting classes in society. From historical evidence,
these conflicting classes have three major forms, which are as follows:
 Society of slave tradition
 Aristocratic society
 Capitalist society
According to Marx, only a communist society can resolve the conflict.
Even the economic basis of social evolution has two parts:
 Means of production
 Economic relations
The first comprises machines and second, ownership and ways of distribution.
The order of society underwent a change with the development of the classes. With the
development of agricultural implements, it entered into a state of agriculture.
The industrial age was conceived with the discovery of industrial machinery. In
the same way, society underwent important changes with the entry of banks and currency
into the medium of distribution.
Modes of Production and Practical Aspects of Historical Materialism
Therefore, the history of society is reflected in the history of development and the law
governed during the successive modes of production. This succession passes through
six consecutive modes of production.
 Primitive society: This was the first and the lowest form of organization of
people. It existed for thousands of years. In this stage, men made use of primitive
implements. The relations of production and the productive forces were not very
developed. Everything was done on communal basis. The people tilled the
communal land together with common tools and lived in a common dwelling,
sharing products equally. The productive forces developed slowly. With the growth
of productivity, the clan began to break into families. The family became the

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 owner of the means of production. Thus, private property arose and with it, social Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
inequality. This resulted in the first antagonistic classes—masters and slaves.
 Slave society: In the earlier stages of human society, called primitive communism
by Marx, the community was a society. People did not have the need to
accumulate. However, when man started using the result of one day’s labour NOTES
over a number of days, the tendency to accumulate increased. This was the
beginning of the convention of wealth.
Ownership of objects spread to ownership of men because slaves helped to
increase the inflow of objects. In this way, the slave and master classes came into
being in society and consequently, master and slave morality grew. This increased
dissatisfaction which in turn led to class conflicts. Slaves revolted against masters
for equal rights.
 Feudal society: As time passed, the masters did concede some rights to slaves.
Though the slaves possessed some ownership over land, a major portion of the
yield still went to the master. It was the inception of ‘lordship society’. In this
society, too, there were two conflicting classes—serfs and lords. Lords were
superseded by kings or emperors. The serfs laboured and the lords or kings
benefited. In order to give sanction to the authority of kings and lords, religion
was resorted to.
In this way, religious ethics were born and the concepts of Heaven and Hell came
into being. God was recognized as the religious emperor under whom lay many
gods and goddesses. The serf was taught to pray to this God and to rest satisfied
with his lot, which was allocated to him by God. It was God who had vested
authority in the king. Also, there were lords authorized by the king. Thus, to obey
their orders was the duty of the public. There was a vast difference in the status
of the ruler and the ruled.
 Capitalist society: In this age, conflicts in the lordship system became more
intense. On the other side, steam was discovered in the forces of production and
factories derived power from steam engines. The lords abandoned their dukedoms
and entered the industrial field. They created the capitalist or owner class. They
joined hands with businessmen and white-collared middle class people. The serfs
went on to become the labour class. Thus, society was again stratified into two
layers or classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the bourgeois and
proletariat morality too, there is a tremendous conflict as in all conflicting classes.
The policy of the bourgeois is one of exploitation. They have nothing to do with
the problems of the proletariat. Resorting to secular orders, laws of action and
religion, they preach lessons of humbleness and patience to the labourers.
 Socialist society: After the working class has been exploited to the hilt, it looks
for an escape. Class consciousness is built up that leads to revolution against the
capitalists and if it is successful, socialism is gained. In socialism, production is
directed by the elected councils of the workers. The means of production are
transferred from the hands of capitalists to that of the workers. He called this
change the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. Economically, each worker is paid
according to the amount of labour he contributes to the society.
 Communist society: The communist society, according to Marx, is the future
society aimed at by all form of development and revolution in society. This is best
defined by the Party Programme in USSR as, ‘Communism is a classless social
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Approaches to the Study system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full
of Comparative Politics
social equality of all members of society under it, the all-round development of
people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through
continuous progress in science and technology; all the springs of cooperative
NOTES wealth will flow more abundantly, and the great principle, “From each according
to his ability, to each according to his needs” will be implemented. Communism is
a highly organized society of free, socially conscious working people in which
public self-government will be established, a society in which labour for the good
of society will become life’s prime want of everyone, a necessity recognized by
one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit
of the people.’
In the communist state, the class struggle will come to an end. The disparity
between mental and physical labour will lose recognition and the government and
religion will be destroyed. Only then will true morality be conceived.
An Assessment of Historical Materialism
Historical materialism or the materialist conception of history is the direct application of
the principles of dialectical materialism to the development of society. Karl Marx made
it the cornerstone of his social and political philosophy. Even though Marx does not
explain what he means by his theory of historical materialism, it is based on the economic
interpretation of history. Marx probably used the word ‘materialistic’ to contrast his
theory with that of Hegel as sharply as he could.
The theory of the materialistic conception of history starts with the belief that
economic activities are the basis of political, legal, cultural and religious institutions and
beliefs. Various forms of state or varieties of legal system cannot be taken as results of
the development of human mind but have their origin in the material conditions of human
life. The theory starts with the simple truth that man must eat to live and in order to eat,
he must produce. Thus, his survival depends upon the success with which he can fulfil
his needs.
Production is the most important of all human activities. Society is the result of
these necessities of man. Marx grouped the efforts of man in this regard into four main
stages:
 Primitive or Asiatic stage
 Ancient stage
 Feudal stage
 Capitalist stage
In all these stages, the class which controls the means of production controls the
rest. It is this fact of domination which creates a perpetual state of tension and conflict.
In all stages of human life, the forces or conditions of production determine the structure
of society.
Marx’s theory of materialistic conception of history contains a greater amount of
truth than his dialectical materialism. According to the Marxist thinker Carew Hunt, all
modern writers on social sciences are indebted to Marx, even if they do not admit it. In
this sense, Marx’s historical materialism or economism represents a very valuable
development in the methods of social sciences.

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 However, it is impossible to explain all historical movements exclusively in economic Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
terms. Marx’s theory ignores the fact that human passions, sentiments, emotions and
religion also influence human behaviour. As a philosophical doctrine, the economic
interpretation of history is incapable of universal application.
We may see reason in the emphasis laid down by Marx on economic factors NOTES
though history cannot be explained in terms of decisions made by politicians and kings
acting in vacuum. The major problem arises when the views of Marx are offered as a
complete explanation of an extremely complex phenomena. Many ideals which, according
to Marx, were only reflections of material interests of one’s place in the economic order,
actually attain independent status. It is possible that Karl Marx and his colleague Engels
recognized the over-emphasis that was laid on the economic factors. The excessive zeal
of some of his admirers to make his ideas rigid led Marx on one occasion to say that he
was not a Marxist. By this, he seems to have meant that he was rigid when they were
applying the materialist conception of history.
2.4.2 Rational Choice
The rational choice theory provides a framework for not just understanding but also
modelling behaviour, both social and economic. Not only is it important in the school of
microeconomics, that is presently dominant, but it is also of great significance in modern
political science, sociology and philosophy. It is the same as instrumental rationality,
which involves the identification of the most cost-effective method for achieving a specific
goal without affecting the worthiness of that goal.
Individual preferences
The rational choice theory is based on the idea that behavioural patterns in societies
represent the choices made by individuals during their attempt to maximize benefits and
minimize their costs. In other words, the decisions of people regarding the way they act
is made by comparing the costs of different actions with their benefits. As a result,
patterns of behaviour will develop within the society the results from those choices. The
concept of rational choice, wherein comparison of costs and benefits of certain actions
are made by people, is quite evident in economic theory. Since people want to get as
many useful goods as possible at the lowest price, they will consider/weigh the benefits
they get from a certain product (for example, how useful or appealing it is) compared to
similar objects. They will then compare the prices. Simply out, most consumers will
select the object which will give them the maximum reward at the minimum price or
cost. It is claimed that rational choice theory makes certain unrealistic assumptions to
generate predictions that are tractable and testable. These include: An individual possesses
complete information regarding what exactly will result from a certain choice. Models
that are complicated depend on the probability of describing the outcomes. An individual
possesses the cognitive ability and time to consider and weigh each against every other
choice. Studies about the drawbacks or constraints related to this assumption are included
in theories of bounded rationality.
Proponent of Rational Choice Theory
The application of rational choice theory was supported by Gary Becker, recipient of the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1992 for his studies on crime, discrimination
and human capital. In the late 20th century, the rational choice theory was the school of
thought that dominated the study of political science. Rational choice is more
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Approaches to the Study self-consciously theoretical than other research programmes. History and culture are
of Comparative Politics
irrelevant for rational choice theorists, who wish to understand political behaviour. All
they need to know is the interest of the actors and the assumption that these interests
are pursued in a rational manner. While the decision-making approach in the past chose
NOTES to explain the decisions of elite groups (usually in foreign policy-related issues), rational
choice theorists chose to apply their formal theory (at times requiring mathematical
notations also) to all aspect of political life.
Rational Choice Theory: Practical Applications
The main feature that defines the rational choice theory is that people attempt to always
maximize their interests in situations where their vote is required or where they are
required to volunteer politically. There are many variants to the approach. Decision
theory, for instance, is based on cost-benefit analysis done by individuals without reference
to anyone else’s plans. The game theory, on the other hand, examines how people make
choices on the basis how they expect others to act.
The primary idea of the rational choice, economic and public choice (although
these variants differ in important particulars) is that behaviour is purposive. Political
behaviour is not just an outcome of psychological drives, socialization or organizational
norms. In fact, individuals possess goals which they attempt to achieve, acting as rationally
as possible given the level of knowledge, available resources and the situation.
Rational Choice Theory in Political Economy
The rational choice theory refers to the interaction between the society, state and markets.
It makes use of sophisticated analytic tools and techniques in its investigations. Rational-
choice theorists examine individual behaviour as well as the state policies in terms of
benefit maximization and cost minimization. The rational choice theory has become
more and more involved in social sciences other than economics, such as sociology and
political science in recent times. It has had far-reaching effects on the study of political
science, especially in fields like the study of interest groups, elections, behaviour in
legislatures, coalitions, and bureaucracy. Models that depend on rational choice theory
often adopt methodological individualism, and assume that social situations or collective
behaviours are solely the outcome of individual actions; that larger institutions play no
Check Your Progress role. The mismatch between this and sociological conceptions of social situations is
9. What does political
responsible for the limited use of the theory in sociology. Among other things, sociology
economy refer to? focuses on the determination of individual tastes and perspectives by social institutions,
10. Fill in the blanks. conflicts with rational choice theory’s assumption that our tastes and perspectives are
(i) The concept of given and inexplicable.
history
according to
Rational choice theory defines ‘rationality’ more narrowly and specifically so as
Karl Marx is to simply mean that an individual tries to balance costs against benefits to decide on an
known as action that gives maximum personal benefits. In general, the rational choice theory does
_______ or not take into account or address the role played by an individual in terms of morals or
______
materialism. ethical decision-making. Thus, economist and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen refers
(ii) __________ to those who follow the rational choice model as ‘rational fools’. This is because the
refers to the rational choice theory is bereft of the understanding of consumer motivation. Some
interaction economists restrict the use of theory to understanding business behaviour where there is
between the
society, state
more clarity of goals.
and markets.

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 Approaches to the Study
2.5 SUMMARY of Comparative Politics

 Among the several fields or sub-disciplines, into which political science is divided,
comparative politics is the only one which carries a methodological instead of a NOTES
substantive label.
 The two main areas of thought are the area-specialist and that of the social
scientist. This difference is further divided into those who are primarily inductive
in their approach and those who prefer a more deductive approach.
 The historical method can be distinguished from other methods in that it looks for
causal explanations which are historically sensitive.
 Historical studies have concentrated on one or more cases seeking to find causal
explanations of social and political phenomena in a historical perspective.
 Theda Skocpol points out that comparative historical studies using more than one
case fall broadly into two categories, ‘comparative history’ and ‘comparative
historical analysis.’
 Comparative history is commonly used rather loosely to refer to any study in
which two or more historical trajectories are of nation-states, institutional
complexes, or civilizations are juxtaposed.
 Critics of the historical method feel that because the latter does not study a large
number of cases, it does not offer the opportunity to study a specific phenomenon
in a truly scientific manner.
 Scholars such as A. N. Eisenstadt, argue that the term comparative method does
not properly refer to a specific method, but rather a special focus on cross-societal
institutional or macro societal aspects of societies and social analysis.
 It is essential to underline that scholars do recognize that the comparative method,
is a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables and not a
method of measurement.
 The comparative method is best understood if briefly compared with the
experimental, statistical and case study method.
 Comparative method essentially resembles the statistical method except that the
number of cases it deals with is often too small to permit statistical methods.
 Comparative politics has advanced because of the formulation of universally
applicable theories or grand theories based on the comparison of many countries
or political phenomenon within them.
 The case study method is used whenever only one case is being analyzed.
 Case studies can be of many types for example a theoretical or interpretative,
theory confirming or informing each useful in specific situations.
 Matters relating to the organization, jurisdiction and independence of judicial
institutions, therefore, become an essential concern of a political scientist.
 Themes of law and justice are treated as not mere affairs of jurisprudence, rather
political scientists look at state as the maintainer of an effective and equitable
system of law and order.
 At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century,
there was a drastic change in the contents of the institutional approach, and thereby
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Approaches to the Study the nature and scope of comparative politics. This was due to the contributions of
of Comparative Politics
Bryce, Lowell and Ostrogorski.
 Institutionalism is the belief that western liberal democratic institutions are dominant.
Thus, according to this view, western liberal democracy is not only the best form
NOTES of government, but it also has a normative and universal character.
 Behaviouralism aims to offer an objective, quantified approach to the process of
explaining and predicting political behaviour. This approach to the study of political
science examines the behaviour, actions and acts of individual beings rather than
that of institutions.
 Behaviouralism uses the following methods to understand political behaviour:
o Sampling
o Interviewing
o Scoring and scaling
o Statistical analysis
 The behaviouralist approach has been criticized by both conservatives and radicals
for the purported value-neutrality. Conservatives see the distinction between values
and facts as a way of undermining the possibility of political philosophy.
 Post-behaviouralism challenged the idea that academic research had to be value
neutral and argued that values should not be neglected.
 Traditionalism in political science is a continuation of classical political philosophy
in modern times. It is represented by political scientists of varied professional
inclinations, having an affinity with practitioners of moral or social philosophy. It
includes institutional analysts too.
 The differences between the traditionalists and behaviouralists also centre on
scope and objectives. The traditionalists uphold such appropriate objectives as
are action oriented. They appear in the role of humanitarian advocate, critic and
reformer. Indeed, the traditionalists’ position implies a special characterization of
the scientific method.
 The traditionalists claim that human behaviour is different in kind from the behaviour
of inanimate objects. This is so because human being are clearly conscious of
their own behaviour. This point to the fact that human beings can alter their own
behaviour.
 There are a number of Marxist concepts that are related to the study of political
science—political economy, historical materialism and rational choice theory. The
term ‘political economy’ denotes the distribution of political and economic power
in a particular society and how it influences the directions of development and
policies that bear on them.
 Karl Marx’s concept of historical materialism also examines the process of
capitalism as a whole. Extensions of Marxism such as analytical Marxism and
the rational choice theory move beyond traditional Marxist studies and help in
analysing social and economic behaviour.
 Karl Marx’s approach on the subject of political economy is contained in his book
Das Kapital. Das Kapital is a wide-ranging discourse on political economy written
in German by Karl Marx and edited (in part) by Friedrich Engels.

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  One of the primary themes contained in Karl Marx’s The Communist Manifesto Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
is the stages of human history.
 The concept of history according to Karl Marx is known as dialectical or historical
materialism. ‘To Marx’, explains Larson ‘matter is not a product of mind: on the
contrary, mind is simply the most advanced product of matter.’ NOTES
 Though Marx rejected Hegel’s content orientation, he retained the dialectical
structure. ‘Historical materialism is the Marxist theory of society. This is clear in
a detailed passage in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy.
 The modes of production in society, according to Marx, evolved through six
stages—primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist and capitalist societies.
 Historical materialism or the materialist conception of history is the direct
application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the development of society.
Karl Marx made it the cornerstone of his social and political philosophy.
 The rational choice theory provides a framework for not just understanding but
also modelling behaviour, both social and economic.
 The main feature that defines the rational choice theory is that people always
attempt to maximize their interests in situations where their vote is required or
where they are required to volunteer politically.

2.6 KEY TERMS

 Scientific rigour: It means strictness in judgment or conduct; rigourism.
 Behaviouralism: It is an approach to the study of political science that examines
the behaviour, actions and acts of individual beings rather than that of institutions.
 Post-behaviouralism: It is a response to behaviouralism that claimed that despite
the alleged value-neutrality of behaviouralist research it was biased towards the
status quo and social preservation rather than social change.
 Political economy: It is a Marxist terminology that refers to interdisciplinary
studies drawing upon economics, law and political science in explaining how political
institutions, the political environment, and the economic system—capitalist, socialist,
mixed—influence each other.
 Historical materialism: It is a methodological approach to the study of society,
economics and history that was propounded by Karl Marx.
 Rational choice theory: It is a framework for not just understanding but also
modelling behaviour, both social and economic.

2.7 ANSWERS TO ‘CHECK YOUR PROGRESS’

1. Historical studies have concentrated on one or more cases seeking to find causal
explanations of social and political phenomena in a historical perspective.
2. Valid associations of potential causes can be established by the method of
agreement and the method of difference.

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Approaches to the Study 3. David Easton criticized Bryce’s approach in his work The Political System (1953),
of Comparative Politics
calling it ‘mere factualism’. Easton claimed that this approach had affected
American Political Science admitting that although Bryce did not neglect ‘theories’
his aversion to making explanatory or theoretical models, had led to a ‘surfeit of
NOTES facts’ and as a result to ‘a theoretical malnutrition’.
4. Institutionalism is the belief that western liberal democratic institutions are dominant.
Thus, according to this view, western liberal democracy is not only the best form
of government, but it also has a normative and universal character. The widespread
nature of western liberal democracy takes for granted that not only is this style of
government the best, but also relevant across the world. The ‘normativity’ of
western liberal democracies is a consequence of this belief.
5. Behaviouralism uses the methods of sampling and interviewing to understand
political behaviour.
6. Behaviouralism theory aims to evaluate political behaviour without ‘introducing
any ethical evaluations’.
7. Traditionalism in political science is a continuation of classical political philosophy
in the modern times.
8. Human behaviour is different in kind from the behaviour of inanimate objects
because human being are clearly conscious of their own behaviour.
9. Political economy refers to interdisciplinary studies drawing upon economies, law
and political science in explaining how political institutions, the political environment
and the economic system—capitalist, socialist, mixed—influence each other.
10. (i) dialectical; historical
(ii) Rational choice theory

2.8 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short-Answer Questions
1. State Theda Skocpol’s approach to comparative political system.
2. Why do scholars disagree on the comparative method to comparative politics
and its nature and scope?
3. Give a short historical background of institutionalism.
4. Name the thinker who was the first to differentiate behaviouralism from post-
behaviourism.
5. List the ‘foundation stones’ of behaviouralism.
6. Write a short note on ‘reproductive fallacy’.
7. What is the problem of value-relativism?
8. Write a short note on the concept of ‘political economy’.
9. What is the social production of existence?
10. List the stages of human history as explained in The Communist Manifesto.
Long-Answer Questions
1. What are the various approaches and debates related to comparative political
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50 Material
 2. Critics say comparative history is commonly used rather loosely to refer to any Approaches to the Study
of Comparative Politics
study. Give your arguments.
3. Discuss the contributions of Bryce, Lowell and Ostrogorski to the institutional
approach.
NOTES
4. Discuss the grounds on which behaviouralism was criticized.
5. Do you think the traditionalist approach is a more suitable one than the behaviouralist
approach? Justify your answer.
6. Explain the mode of production in a socialist society.
7. Critically analyse the theory of historical materialism.
8. How is the rational choice theory applicable to political economy?

2.9 FURTHER READING

Johari, J. C. 1982. Comparative Politics. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.
Ray, S. N. 2000. Modern Comparative Politics. New Delhi: PHI Learning.
Palekar, S. A. 2009. Comparative Politics and Government. New Delhi: PHI Learning.
Caramani, Daniel. 2011. Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham. 1970. Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory.
Boston: Little Brown Publishers.
Charlesworth, James Clyde. 1967. Contemporary Political Analysis. New Jersey:
Free Press.
Dogan, Mattei and Ali Kazancigil. 1994. Comparing Nations, Concepts, Strategies,
Substance. Black well.
Easton, David. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice Hall
Publishing House.
Eckstein, Harry and David Apter. 1963. Comparative Politics: A Reader. New York:
Free Press.

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