Field Listening exercise

S E C U R I T Y, SA FE T Y A N D R E S I L I E N C E ,
NOVEMBER 2022

I N T E R N A L US E O N LY
 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Table Of Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3

Methodology and report writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5

How respondents see the future of security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7

Progress towards the desired future state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8

Culture and leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8

Integration of security into the rest of the organisation . . . . . Page 14

Recruiting and resourcing for holistic security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17

Enabling security staff to succeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19

Listening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24

Annex 1: Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 25

Annex 2: Combined recommendations and ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 26

Acronym glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 31

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 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Executive Summary

The work carried out by World Vision’s security teams actively facilitates the goal of enabling safe and effective
programming to deepen our commitment to the world’s most vulnerable children and communities, as outlined
in World Vision’s Our Promise strategy. World Vision (WV) Security1 has seen a significant increase in capacity and
impact over the past several years, and has become an integral part of the organisation’s ability to reach the most
vulnerable children. Security staff and leadership are key drivers in operational support, training, and management of
crises globally, which support the implementation of WV’s crucial work. Many technical skills within the Security team
are praised both internally and externally.

As the team’s impact and influence has grown, the team has commissioned this research in order to listen and learn
from field staff across the partnership, in security and non-security roles. The findings in this report come directly
from this and are based on staff feedback, and outline possible improvements and next steps in the evolution of
WV security culture and impact. These next steps focus primarily around relational and integration themes for a
more ‘people-centred’ approach that regularly listens to, appreciates and supports staff. The overarching objective for
Security should be to enable security staff, from recruitment onwards, to be a key member of their office on technical,
relational and strategic levels. To achieve this, several of the suggestions from respondents include ways to collaborate
with more functions to build a security culture through programme design and strategy, among other topics.

Key findings
The key findings are predominantly related to the desire for security to be better integrated into the organisation as a
whole, through a focus on collaboration, soft skills, adequate support for security staff, and leadership from the Global
Centre (GC) to help build a good security culture.

In general, Security is well appreciated and liked, but in the broader organisation it is sometimes under-sold. Security is
sometimes seen to speak its own language and at times is viewed as a separate entity, with a perceived emphasis on
systems and compliance over relationships. This can put the team and field staff working on security at a disadvantage
when it comes to influencing and engaging with the organisation as a whole.

Respondents commented that they would like more frequent strategic and relational engagement and communication
with senior Security staff, in addition to tapping into the technical expertise that they hold. Contextually nuanced
influence and soft skills are often used by staff but is also an area where staff would like more support from Security
leadership. This is to better integrate security into “up-stream” security issues such as risk-aware programme design
and culture, in addition to “down-stream” security issues like crisis management and emergency response, the latter
being seen as comparatively more mature. Such integration and culture building will require sufficient resources,
time and support from the regional and global level.

The key findings from staff also focus mainly on the shaping of culture, relationships and leadership, rather than on
technical, systematic and solution categories. This is not because the latter is not needed, but because the technical
aspects are seen as comparatively more developed than the relational ones. It is also because the relational aspects
are sometimes less tangible but nevertheless show important value that field security staff bring to their teams.

1 For the purpose of this report, Security refers to the functions of ‘Security Operations’ and ‘Security Training’ and the Partnership leader within the
Security, Safety and Resilience (SSR) team at Global Centre level. However, many of the recommendations will have relevance across all parts of SSR for engage-
ment with the field.

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Executive Summary (continued)

In short, the findings of this report can be summed up in two broad points.

Firstly, staff would like more access to and time with senior leaders for conversation, learning and relationship-building
with them. Most staff see the necessity of some communication taking place through emails and systems, but they also
highly value in-person meetings and personal connections.

Secondly, security staff need a better understanding of the wider organisation and how security fits into the culture,
strategy, programme design and operations of WV as a whole. Too often security has been seen in isolation and removed
from the partnership; both security staff and the wider organisation need that to change primarily through intentional
relationship-building and communication. This means ensuring that security staff have both the soft, personal and
technical skills to make this change, with the right resources and ongoing support of a leadership team which itself needs
to be well-placed and communicative enough to build these relationships.

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Methodology and report writing

Purpose From January-July 2022, the WV SSR Security Operational Support team carried out a field listening exercise.
This aim was to listen and learn from WV staff working in National Offices to better shape WV security to be ‘people-
centred’ in its support to staff. The full Terms of Reference is available upon request.

Data collection: Information was gathered through speaking to more than 90 members of staff via key informant
interviews and focus groups. The staff interviewed were country (national, response, Vision Fund) and regional
security staff, as well as non-security staff at these levels with Security or People and Culture (P&C) responsibilities or
intersections between these functions. The interviews were primarily set up and conducted by analysts from the SSR
Security Operational Support team.

Some staff, either from the Region or at the National Office (RO/NO) level, ran their own focus groups and sent the
notes to the analysts. Interviews were in English, French and Spanish and focus groups were often a mix of security and
non-security staff, and either within a specific office or for a whole region. In the document, security staff are referenced
primarily through the nature of their job as either full-time Country Security Managers (CSM) or part-time Security Focal
Points (SFP).

Three or four offices were chosen from each of WV’s six regions to participate in the research, and three or four staff from
each office took part in the interviews. The offices were chosen in close coordination with the Regional and National
Offices to bring in a range of different perspectives (e.g. low, medium and high risk contexts as well as selecting the
most relevant security and non-security staff to participate). In one context, private security contractors were also
interviewed.

Questions asked: Interviewees answered questions on defining security, daily workload and tasks, work that is
rewarding, challenges and concerns, wider support from and engagement with Security, and ideas or recommendations
they would propose. The questions are available in Annex 1. The interviews were done on the understanding that their
views would be kept confidential and that there was not a guarantee that all suggested solutions can be or will be
actioned.

Report writing: The SSR Security Operational Support analysts, with support from the Southern Africa Regional
Security Director (RSD), wrote the below report. The key findings in each section reflect what staff shared throughout
the process. It is not intended as a fully comprehensive review of the views of all security staff or all the solutions to the
issues raised, but a snapshot perspective from those involved. The conclusions in each section are additional analysis
by the three authors. The full list of ideas suggested by interviewees is captured in Annex 2.

Use: The combination of field staff reflections, author conclusions and field staff ideas for solutions is a starting
point for a discussion within SSR, with regional and national security staff, and with other WV teams. The aim is to
help identify, contextualise and agree on practical ways to improve security practices. Some of these discussions have
already begun in SSR strategic meetings in London in 2022 with a commitment to ongoing further discussion and
action. While some ideas from this report may be taken up directly, it is hoped this report will also generate and inspire
further ideas and solutions.

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The overarching conclusions are:

CULTURE There needs to be a better connection between SSR senior leadership and national staff
AND through stronger and regular strategic engagement and communication in-person and
LEADERSHIP remotely.

Better integration of security in the organisation can be done by equipping all security staff
INTEGRATION to participate regularly in key organisational processes such as programme, budget and
strategy design.

RECRUITING There should be better enabling of strategic resourcing of security, including appropriate
AND
RESOURCING remuneration of staff and further support on budgeting.

Security needs to hire the right type of people with more emphasis on soft skills, for the
internal and external context (internal refers to the office culture and capacity, external
refers to the context as a whole).

ENABLING
SECURITY Provision of better ‘people-centred’ support for staff will enable their success, such as better
STAFF TO on-boarding, continual and multi-disciplinary learning, and staff care.
SUCCEED
Security should enable, decentralise and communicate more contextualisation of training
material. This should include more practical training and professional development using
language and illustrations that are more accessible to NO staff.

There is a need for more extensive listening to and consultation of regional and field security
LISTENING
There should be better enable strategic resourcing of security, including appropriate
LISTENING and non-security staff for their input on security matters. These views should be included
remuneration of staff and further support on budgeting.
into action plans.

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How respondents see the future of security

The staff who were interviewed described what security meant to them and what they felt it should be focusing on,
including the future profile of security staff. This was assessed as a good benchmark for comparing how well staff feel
Security is achieving this, including areas of success and areas for improvement (which is covered in Progress Towards
the Desired Future section).

Those interviewed wanted security and safety to be approached holistically. This includes traditional security disciplines,
but also programme design and strategy as well as physical and mental health. Through the security architecture in
place, Security should keep its focus on how WV values staff but also consider how employees shape, contribute
and are responsible for security through their own actions and behaviours. Staff wanted a clear and more consistent
definition of what security risk management is and is not. This included clarity on WV’s duty of care concerning keeping
staff, assets, programmes, beneficiaries and partners (including security contractors) safe from harm and how this then
enables the organisation to operate effectively.

Those interviewed particularly wanted clear explanations of their responsibilities regarding safety and resilience
functions (e.g. staff care). Non-security staff wanted security to be an enabler of programming, integrated into both
design and grant acquisition. It was noted that the existing strategies of acceptance, protection and deterrence are
useful in security risk management by all WV staff within programming.

The staff who were interviewed wanted a security culture that is co-created, defined and led by the field, centred on
people, and championed and supported appropriately by regional and Security staff. The region’s support to security
staff remains vital; it helps define and encourage a stronger security culture as well as advocating for better resourcing,
contextualised training, and opportunities for learning. It was seen as essential to have senior leader buy-in and support
for security at all levels to encourage vigilance, and that lines of authority for security decisions should be clarified for
staff. There should be a clear strategic direction and good communication from Security so that security is better
integrated within the organisation and has adequate space to not only respond to security incidents but also anticipate
and prepare for them.

Sufficient resourcing was also raised and included ensuring staff are properly remunerated and equipped, and that
this is included in programme budgets. Security staff also wanted increased recognition of their roles and often heavy
workloads. Listening exercises like these are helpful to show this value but need to be followed by tangible action in
terms of addressing staff concerns and challenges and meaningfully considering the solutions they suggest.

Moving forward, there should be an emphasis on specific skills and capabilities for security staff to ensure good
risk management. This includes leadership, relationship building, context monitoring, working in multicultural
settings, flexibility, communication, networking, analysis and critical thinking, observation, negotiation, diplomacy
and influencing, a focus on being anticipatory, and understanding WV’s core business (industry and organisational
knowledge). These skills should not only be sought in recruitment but also factored into orientation, coaching,
mentoring and opportunities for professional development (e.g. through deployments or secondments). This should
be considered alongside recruiting for technical security skills.

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Progress towards the desired future state

CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP
Subject of discussion: Many staff commented that building a culture of security is sometimes a bigger challenge
than managing the actual risks in the context. This is a key finding for an organisation like WV; it means that although
there is work to be done, key challenges are within the organisations control.

Many security managers and senior level staff who were interviewed said a good security culture was one of most
rewarding things about their work in, or related to, security. At the same time, in trying to achieve this, many had
experienced challenges and discouragements. This was particularly true for part-time staff based in low risk countries,
although there were exceptions. Stronger leadership, especially from SSR, RSDs, P&C, HEA and strategy, and Heads of
Office (including National Directors, Response Directors, etc.), will support a better security culture.

While discussing security culture, respondents helpfully defined it. Many staff identified it in two parts which are
ideally, but not always, connected to each other. Firstly, those interviewed felt security culture meant all WV staff
(including drivers, cleaners, etc.) having a role in and responsibility for their own safety and security; security is a whole
of organisation task and not the sole responsibility of the security team. Secondly, staff should contribute to a wider
positive organisational security culture through their actions and behaviours. This is set out by WV as an employer, where
the security (prevention of harm) of fellow staff, programs, assets and beneficiaries is taken seriously (i.e. managed well)
as WV undertakes its work. Respondents felt the responsibility to encourage and build a security culture needed to be
at multiple levels - global, regional and national. Security culture looks different across the contexts in which WV works
and the more a security culture is embedded, the higher its sustainability despite staff turnover.

K E Y FINDINGS AT A GL ANCE: CULTURE AND LE ADERSHIP

1. There are many examples of positive security culture.

2. There is a strategic and communication disconnect with SSR that inhibits a good security culture:
•
Lack of communication on the strategic direction of security within WV.
•
Regular whole-of-team communication and engagement.

3. WV security culture and approach from Security is seen as ‘top heavy and field light’.
4. The Regional Office is, and should remain, a key champion of security culture in National Offices.
5. The importance of building security culture at the National Office level:
•
The importance of senior leadership buy-in.
•
NO security culture is influenced by how security is seen by WV overall.
•
Enabling proactive responsibility for a security culture.
•
External contexts with perceived lower levels of risk have resulted in some senior leaders not
investing in security until something happens.
•
Security culture is stronger if able and respected security staff are part of a SLT or report to the
Head of Office.
•
Take into account the different cultures within the contexts we operate.
•
Allow sufficient time and resources to build a security culture.

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Progress towards the desired future state

Key findings (in detail):
There are many examples of positive security culture: Several security and non-security staff gave examples of good
security cultures in their offices. It pleases staff that WV cares about them and their security. The interviews identified
that there was considerable appreciation for the CSMs and their work to keep people safe. Staff members spoke of
their own awareness for personal security and safety and explained how in their day-to-day work they did not just
rely on their CSMs but also identified security or safety risks themselves and put in place strategies to mitigate them.
This included within their travel, fleet, programming, information collection, communications strategy and WV profile
management duties. Line managers spoke of trying to engage staff to better understand safety and security issues.
This was often helped by training as well as good awareness of (ideally contextualised) security and safety procedures
that staff are expected to follow and context updates. This was usually done through regular dialogue and information
passed to staff.

There is a strategic and communication disconnect with SSR that inhibits a good security culture: This was
a trend across most interviews, where many wanted more access to and engagement with senior leaders at the GC.
Specifically, there is a lack of regular communication and engagement apart from when responding to a crisis. Those
interviewed expressed an interest in this connection to the SSR team in addition to their ongoing engagement with
their RSDs. This does not diminish the acclamation many interviewees had for individual senior leaders in SSR, who
were available operationally when needed in times of crisis; staff members appreciated them and the wider team’s
operational support at these times. However, this more general disconnect will impede the ability of SSR to encourage
and enable a WV security culture, alongside Regional and National Offices. Two specific sub points raised included:

1. Lack of communication on the strategic direction of security within WV: Some staff, both security and non-security,
had not heard or seen any communication about the new formation of SSR or its repositioning under P&C. Of
those with security roles that had heard, several said they were unclear on what ‘resilience’ and ‘safety’ included
and the implications and expectations for their roles in the field. The disconnect was clearly demonstrated
when some staff asked how they could be a part of it, as if it were something separate to them. Several raised
a number of concerns as to how P&C and SSR culture fit together, and the plans to ensure SSR integrates and
benefits from P&C but also retains its technical capacity and profile. Non-security staff also mentioned they
were now unclear what functions their CSM or SFP was responsible for.

The staff care function was raised several times with divided opinions as to the role of Security within this. There
is a lack of clarity as to whether it is within security staff’s existing remit, whether they should do more and/or if
they have hired the right people with the right skills to do this. Many field staff are keen to do more, especially in
relation to mental health, but need clearer parameters from SSR about when, where and how to do this.

The lack of this strategic conversation with field security and non-security staff on this topic could be detrimental
to efforts to develop a good security culture. Although this strategic engagement point was specifically in
regard to the example of SSR’s formation, it also showed in a lack of clarity about other wider security policies
or thematic areas (e.g. security budgeting, humanitarian access, staff feeling safe reporting loss of safety-critical
equipment without fearing reprisals, etc,). This was linked either to insufficient dissemination or lack of clear
explanation to field staff.

2. Regular whole-of-team communication and engagement: Many respondents noted that they do not hear from or
are not engaged by SSR as a whole in comparison to other GC teams. Other teams have newsletters, town halls,
offers of coaching or mentoring for staff development, staff profiles and testimonies, and facilitated learning
sessions (NO-to-NO, region-to-region, or global), as well as featuring in wider WV communications such as
Ignite. Interviewees felt Security was often absent in this regard and they were not sure why this was. A few staff

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Progress
noted towards theanydesired
they had not had recent visitsfuture state
from senior leaders, in terms of bringing their global perspective
but also taking time to connect with field staff, listen and understand their field realities and challenges. This
absence had been exacerbated by COVID-19 travel restrictions. A few also mentioned they didn’t often receive
global security products.

CSMs said they wanted to see and hear more from SSR senior leaders in terms of their sharing thoughts on
global trends, strategic perspectives, best practices and recommendations for useful resources, which could
benefit their work in-country and their professional development. They felt this could have value in both larger
forums (e.g. all security staff town halls) and/or specific security platforms (e.g. regional Integrated Security
Team meetings), especially if there was a degree of consultation about agenda topics. These spaces would be
valued as a way to be able to talk to senior leaders about their concerns and ask questions. Non-security staff
also said they felt SSR needed to increase its engagement with Heads of Office to encourage and influence
security culture, either through existing platforms with the Senior Director of Operations in each region or
creating new opportunities or dedicated spaces as appropriate. This would also help encourage accountability
for their building a stronger security culture.

The lack of regular and proactive communication could be perceived as a lack of appreciation and value of
the security staff and their work in-country. This could connect to poor staff retention and a lack of buy-in
regarding security at the NO level by senior leaders, with ramifications regarding security staff credibility and
available budget.

A lack of communication could also give the impression that security considers itself as a third party to WV
rather than part of it and this could also damage efforts to build a whole of organisation security culture. Staff
provided examples, such as not seeing any communication from Security that talked about how security fitted
within WV’s core values.

WV security culture and approach from Security is seen as ‘top heavy and field light’: In the absence of regular
communications and engagement, respondents felt that the main security culture message and the definition of ‘good
security risk management’ that came from Security was often one of compliance and standardisation, rather than
being people and context appropriate.

The preference of staff is to have a more consultative approach to security culture in collaboration with Security rather
than being told to undertake activities on which they have not been consulted. Several regional colleagues similarly
expressed that there could be more efforts from SSR to consult and listen to their needs before starting any new
initiatives. Many systems, processes and products are frequently reviewed and changed without first checking with
field staff if there are any problems. If field staff identify problems, they should also be consulted for possible solutions.

Several staff felt that the requirements as stipulated by SSR are not matched with sufficient resources to implement this
workload in the field, especially in relation to staffing numbers. The perceived inflexibility of some of the systems (e.g.
Shepherd approval requests) has sometimes caused tension at the NO level between CSMs and Heads of Office that
hinder efforts to build a good security culture.

Some security systems and processes are seen as overly complicated and use an inaccessible vocabulary for people
who do not have security backgrounds (in particular, Western military backgrounds). Staff expressed some frustration
that some systems, documents and procedures are not available in other languages.

In addition, security staff and leaders who make security decisions are discouraged when systems are not accompanied
by mentoring, accountability, follow up and support when they try to use them and do their work well. For example,
some respondents said they did not get any follow up on their reporting in Shepherd to help them analyse what issues,

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Progress towards
internal or external, the
they had the desired
most challenges future
with in theirstate
contexts and how to address them. These interviewees
said this support took place in the past but seemed to have stopped.

Those interviewed also commented that accountability is further limited because the Core Security Requirements
(CSRs) are not connected to the office’s overarching performance agreements and evaluations. Several staff felt this
eroded the importance of security and impacted both the buy-in of senior leaders and the credibility and authority of
CSMs to try and institute a good security culture. There was hope, however, that this may improve in future as CSRs are
now part of office audits.

The Regional Office is, and should remain, a key champion of security culture in National Offices: Respondents
appreciated the region as a voice for the field. The region often works as an independent intermediary between Security
and NOs to help educate, navigate and at times push back on security initiatives if they feel it needs to be changed or
is detrimental to promoting a security culture. It is seen as the ideal platform to create opportunities for office-to-office
and region-to-region learning exchanges on security and promote the narrative of security as an enabler of good
programming. RSDs in particular were appreciated as accessible, supportive and consultative. Several staff commented
that RSDs would be able to continue building a security culture by taking a holistic view of their portfolio and ensure
they proactively, regularly and strategically engage with all their countries (CSMs and senior leaders/Heads of Office),
irrespective of risk level or whether there are issues. This would mean ongoing fostering of relationships with senior
leaders in their regions who make security decisions, especially Heads of Office, for better influence and support as well
as supporting CSMs and SFPs to build relationships with them.

The importance of building security culture at the National Office level: NO security culture discussions raised
the following issues:

1. The importance of senior leadership buy-in: All CSMs and SFPs interviewed were in agreement that senior
leadership buy-in helps build a good security culture throughout an office and promotes security as a whole-
of-organisation responsibility. The key to this success appears to be a relationship of trust and mutual respect
between the CSM and senior leaders, often built over time. Several security staff spoke highly of their Senior
Leadership Team’s (SLT) outlook on security and how they helped to build awareness of security and safety
(although this could still be a challenge with staff even if CSMs and SLTs are in agreement). This was reflected
in interviews with some of these leaders who also spoke highly of their CSMs and the need for a narrative that
showed security as an enabler of good programming. Most security staff felt that if the senior leadership were
on board, this made their work a lot easier in terms of engaging with staff and having adequate resources.
Conversely, if the CSMs are not able or do not feel able to brief senior leaders directly about various issues and
outline the risks presented, for whatever reason, this can lead to inadequate security risk management in an
office. Many interviewees in these groups, therefore, emphasised the importance of allocating appropriate
time and resources for building relationships with each other and with staff to further build a good security
culture together in their NOs.

2. NO security culture is influenced by how security is seen by WV overall: How security is seen by WV overall often
determines how well it is accepted and implemented by SLTs. From an historic angle, much of the Security
material, methodology and staff come from outside the organisation, with content based on security industry
best practises or developed almost exclusively within SSR (such as fleet training and security standards). While
this has often been necessary, it can bolster the perception that security acts as a third party to WV rather than
as an integral part of the organisation. Therefore, the concepts of ‘security’ require more internal acceptance.

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Progress towards
Respondents theit desired
noted that future
sometimes seems as if state
acceptance of security, and a good security culture, is
measured by compliance and requirements. Those interviewed expressed concern that demanding adherence
to standards and procedures without building understanding and acceptance of why and how these activities
benefit programmes works against the security culture it is trying to build. Too often the mode of persuasion
has been applying complex standards and processes, and further iterations which aim to simplify these
processes occasionally resulting in more complexity, rather than a focus on relationships, in-person meetings
and collaboration on ways to keep the organisation safe and effective. This means that sometimes National
Office security staff are required to implement systems that have not yet been fully socialised in that office. This
is discouraging to them as they do not experience buy-in and can experience push-back from other colleagues.
It can also create frustration for the Head of Office who may not understand or see the value of implementing
the system in question.

3. Responsibility for a security culture: The Head of Office is responsible for their staff’s safety and they should
proactively seek ways of ensuring it. The communication from security staff at all levels should be adapted
so that the Head of Office has a good understanding of what the practical needs are and how the measures
proposed from security will effectively meet those needs. While global standards and systems can be helpful, to
earn the buy-in of NO leadership the security staff need to speak their language and meet their needs in ways
that make sense in that context, which often begins with building and maintaining good relationships. This
points towards a need for more communication and flexibility to avoid various challenges that respondents also
highlighted during interviews.

4. External contexts with perceived lower levels of risk have resulted in some senior leaders not investing in security until
something happens: This was especially a sentiment of some security staff working in low risk contexts. This
frustrated some staff, as either operating in a low risk context was equated to having no work to do, but equally
some contexts which might be perceived as low risk by those within them might actually require increased risk
management in anticipation of potential events or incidents. One issue in high risk contexts was senior leaders
or managers becoming used to a level of insecurity as ‘normal’, whether because they are from the context or
have lived there for a sustained period of time, and have developed risk habituation. This might result in lower
levels of security risk management due to an inability to objectively assess the risks present in the context.
However, this was not raised as frequently in the interviews. This situation can make work on acceptance,
protection, preventive and deterrence security measures more challenging for CSMs and SFPs. Convincing
leadership in low-risk contexts of the value-add of security is different to doing so in high-risk contexts and
requires a different approach.

5. Security culture is stronger if able and respected security staff are part of a SLT or report to the Head of Office: Overall,
the observation is that Security most of the time should sit on the SLT and if not, needs to be represented
by someone on the SLT who can accurately and fairly raise security needs and concerns. It is often also more
effective if CSMs report to the Head of Office. If offices are able to take reasonable steps towards this, it will
mitigate concerns from SFPs and CSMs regarding the prioritisation of security. More research could take place
regarding the efficacy of security staff being part of the SLT and/or reporting to the Head of Office and if both
have to happen together. Both approaches are more common in high risk contexts compared to medium or
low risk contexts. If a security staff member reports to the Head of Office, they are also usually an SLT member.
However, there are cases where security staff sit on the SLT without reporting to the Head of Office. Both
reporting structures could be looked at separately. Most interviewees felt it was helpful to ensure security is a
standing agenda item for the SLT and the right messages and actions are decided and conveyed at the highest
level to get buy-in across the office. Others reiterated the security staff member not being part of the SLT and/

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Progress
or not towards the
reporting to the Headdesired future
of Office could state
undermine security’s credibility in the eyes of staff, meaning that
their advice is not always followed and they do not feel they can insist on practices being adopted.

Efforts to build a good security culture appear to depend far more on the relational and influencing skills of the
individuals involved (the CSM/SFP and SLT) than the structures they are placed within. This includes how they
relate to each other (whether in a line manager relationship or not) and staff more generally. It also depends on
their respective backgrounds, style of working (e.g. accessibility and approachability, etc.), experience (e.g. SLT
experience of managing crises, awareness of the CSMs about WV programming, etc.) and the wider cultural
contexts in which they are working. If efforts to build security culture are a joint venture, built on respect and
understanding, this can help tackle some of the following issues that CSMs/SFPs cited:
•
Lack of clarification about roles and responsibilities
•
The wrong staff recruited for security roles. This particularly applies to part-time staff where they
were not primarily recruited for a security role but it is added to their responsibilities.
•
Delays in security approvals and other decisions which made some security and non-security staff feel
discouraged and undervalued.
•
Inaccurate grading or inappropriate line management of security staff which can lead to low staff retention
and disrupted efforts to build security culture.

The above analysis does not invalidate the need for existing reporting security structures; these are useful, for
example, in complex high risk contexts or for new security staff who need access, formal and informal, to senior
leaders in order to do their job but have not had time to build the necessary relationships.

6. Wider context culture: This refers to how local cultures and social norms can vary significantly between contexts,
exist in the workplace, and impact how staff interact with one another. In certain cultures, it is uncommon
for a person to question the actions or decisions of someone they perceive as being senior to them in the
workplace hierarchy, while in other cultures it is perceived as bad manners to decline a request from someone
more senior. This can impact how well standardised and more formal policies and procedures are followed or
interpreted in different contexts, especially when some cultures are more informal. In some places this might
impact how willing CSMs or other staff are to lobby for what they need within security with senior leaders,
report issues, and result in their taking on work without having the resources to support this.

7. Allow sufficient time and resources to build a security culture: Security culture is often built in the midst of fast
paced and busy contexts and internal working environments and sometimes high security staff turnover. This
sometimes results in tension over insufficient time for staff to build a security culture. For example, there may
be insufficient time allotted to allow staff to undertake training or focus on security. Similarly, the percentage
of a person’s time to be allocated to their roles as the security focal point may be insufficient for the expected
workload.

Several comments were made about how the apportionment of time to SFP roles has been cut over recent years
and within a role. Others, however, mentioned that a SFP with multiple roles could turn this to their advantage
through knowledge of multiple departments which could lead to better integration of security. Perceived
disinterest from other departments could also result in insufficient integration into wider conversations about
programmes and grants in order to secure a budget to carry out security responsibilities.

Conclusions
Within WV, there should be a better connection between Security senior leadership, regional and national staff
through stronger and regular strategic engagement and communication. This will elevate the voice of the field as staff

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 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

are able to meet and engage with SSR SLT on a regular basis and build a wider sense of a security team in WV. In order
to ensure this is consistent and sustainable, this could be achieved through an SSR communications strategy that has a
long term plan for dedicated communications, knowledge management, and learning capacity within the team. As any
plans are implemented it could aim to help tackle some of the stereotypes and challenges staff experience in-country
when building security culture. Consistent and regular engagement, learning and communication with the field can also
be modelled within and between the SSR team as well as in engagement with other functions at the Global Centre and
with Support Offices (for example with Support Office SFPs).

INTEGRATION OF SECURITY INTO THE REST OF THE ORGANISATION

Subject of discussion: The staff who were interviewed explained how they engage with other functions on
security-related tasks. National Office security staff appeared to be better at integrating with other departments than
staff at the global or regional level, although this engagement was seen as easier in high and medium risk contexts.

Examples given at the field level included working with:

•
Risk departments for a more holistic discussion on the overall risk to offices
•
Fleet departments on investigations for road traffic accidents
•
Operations and humanitarian emergency affairs (HEA) departments on access issues and specific programme and
grant risk assessments/proposals
•
Finance, procurement and supply chain departments for payments for equipment, budgets and due diligence on
security contractors, etc.
•
P&C departments on staff care and safeguarding
•
SLTs through sitting on incident or crisis management teams
•
Communications departments on reputational risk matters.
This was in addition to wider communications with all staff on security related issues.

KEY FINDINGS AT A GL ANCE: INTEGR ATION

1. There is a mixed integration picture in WV.

2. Integration of security into the organisation is highly dependent on the buy-in of the SLT.
3. Integration of security is dependent on the personality and skill set of the CSM or SFP and needs to be
more intentional and proactive.

4. Integration of security needs to be reflected in WV security architecture, including recruitment and

within roles.

5. Integration needs to happen through formal and informal channels with a focus on relationships.
6. Integration needs to be properly resourced.
7. Integration can be hindered due to perceptions of security staff which can result in a reluctance to
engage with them.

8. Integration requires all security staff to know WV’s core business and be part of programme design.
9. Integration is easier and better when security is seen as an enabler of good programming.

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Key findings (in detail):

There is a mixed integration picture in WV: There was a general feeling by CSMs and SFPs that they were regularly
and proactively engaging with other departments Those interviewed said they mostly had good relationships where
they could approach other colleagues for collaboration, support and feedback. Security staff acknowledged integration
into the organisation helped with day-to-day security risk management, as it brought wider organisational ownership
and responsibility for security. However, some outside Security felt efforts by Security to integrate could still improve,
with better accountability for doing it from the regional and global security teams, and a stronger encouragement for
security staff to join and integrate into external NGO platforms as appropriate.

Integration of security into the organisation is highly dependent on the buy-in of the SLT: If an SLT acknowledges
the importance of security and facilitates its integration within other functions, this helps build a good security culture
and emphasises that security is a whole-of-organisation responsibility. Respondents gave examples of their SLTs
reiterating integration as a key non-negotiable principle of NO strategy, which then helped to embed it as a way of
working for all functions. Senior leader’s accessibility is also a factor in supporting security integration.

Integration of security is dependent on the personality and skill set of the CSM or SFP and needs to be
more intentional and proactive: CSMs and SFPs that acknowledged the importance of integrating security into
the organisation were often those who demonstrated it in interviews by their choice of examples. This showed they
were more proactive in seeking collaboration, primarily through good communication and relational skills. This was
appreciated by the non-security staff interviewed who were from the same offices. Many CSMs mentioned integration
or work with other functions but added that it was only as required or when there was a problem. The challenge is
ensuring the right relationships are in place so that when this collaboration is needed it can happen smoothly. This
requires work in advance to foster those relationships. In addition, integration is not only beneficial for better responses
to security incidents or issues but can also allow more strategic thinking, innovation and collaboration on security
between different departments.

Integration of security needs to be reflected in WV security architecture, including recruitment and within roles:
The reporting on this point was mixed. The importance of integrating security into the wider organisation is not always
reflected in standard CSM job descriptions and required skill sets (i.e. specifically seeking relational skills), recruitment
processes and orientation. Respondents felt it was not prominently reflected in WV’s wider security architecture, and
that there was a lack of emphasis on relationship building. Some interviewees highlighted the requirement to spend
time on WV systems which might better be spent on other tasks such as better integration. These were issues staff felt
needed to be reviewed at the global level, with better championing and modelling of integration.

Integration needs to happen through formal and informal channels with a focus on relationships: Many
respondents gave examples about integration taking place during weekly, bi-weekly or monthly management
meetings. The security team, along with others, share updates, recommendations, challenges, observations and plans
and hear the same from others. It appears this was most useful when done in-person and helped them anticipate
what may happen in the future, undertake joint planning and look at co-dependencies. One concern shared by some
respondents is that engagement needs to go beyond these meetings and take place informally outside these meetings
for increased effectiveness.

Integration needs to be properly resourced: It was apparent from the interviews that there was sometimes a lack of
time to foster integration if there was only one security staff, sometimes part-time, and multiple requests or opportunities
from different functions to collaborate. CSMs and SFPs appear keen to collaborate but need to be properly resourced
according to the scale of need and requests, often related to the size of the overall office and the complexity of the
operating environment and programme portfolio. Some offices have chosen to supplement resources through the use

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Progress towards the desired future state

of security contractors and a number of those offices had reached arrangements for contractors to be better integrated
into WV by sitting in WV offices at NO level.

Integration can be hindered due to perceptions of security staff which can result in a reluctance to engage
with them: All those interviewed voiced perceptions of security staff, whether accurate or not, or current or historic.
Security staff sometimes appear not to be integrated, consulted, or included in decisions or initiatives on the assumption
that they will be a dissenting voice. For example, several non-security staff reiterated that they expected security staff to
say no to their requests or tell them to take measures such as staying at home or leaving the office early in order to opt
for the lowest level of risk. Some perceptions are that CSMs are there to police other staff, though a few interviewees
followed this by saying that they realised that was not true once they got to know the CSM better or saw their work.
Several CSMs gave examples of being told about decisions at the last minute, afterwards, or forgotten in a process
entirely. Some also acknowledged that staff might be uncertain in approaching them because of their title or military
background. Other SFPs were frustrated when they were not consulted or approached because their lack of security
background meant people felt they were not credible to give advice or be involved in decision-making.

Integration requires all security staff to know WV’s core business and be part of programme design: It was
widely noted in the interviews that the majority of security staff came from military or police backgrounds. This, in and
of itself, was not deemed problematic. However, a concern raised multiple times was that these staff are sometimes
not familiar with the development or humanitarian sector (especially with programme cycles and management) and
its unique culture. It appears that making the transition into the sector, and into WV with its own organisational culture,
is sometimes not addressed or not addressed well. This can start with orientation and on-boarding, such as ensuring
that security staff spend sufficient time in the field to understand the context and the programming taking place. Some
security staff have made efforts to bridge this knowledge gap once hired, especially to enable them to influence and
engage with their SLTs by learning the right language to use and building key relationships. When this did not happen,
there were often gaps cited in security staff not being a part of programme design conversations and this having
implications later such as a lack of security risk management and accompanying budget. This is explored further in the
section on resourcing, which stresses that integration is nevertheless a joint responsibility and there needs to be active
communication and relationship building on both sides. The Fragile Contexts Programme Approach (FCPA) is one good
example where security is now more fully integrated into programme design and can be one good model for future
engagement. A lack of understanding of WV and how it works appears to be feeding into some leaders’ concerns that
security at multiple levels, including SSR, sees itself as ‘providing for’ and not ‘part of’ WV.

Integration is easier and better when security is seen as an enabler of good programming: Non-security staff
who were senior leaders acknowledged that the view of security reflecting the military was not helpful in terms of
achieving better integration. It does appear that several Heads of Office and other senior staff are trying to reset the
narrative to encourage all staff to see security as an enabler of good programming by ensuring it is as safe and effective
as possible. However, this does require more understanding on the part of security staff regarding the need to balance
risk appetite with meeting WV’s programming objectives. Security staff also need to understand and acknowledge
non-security staff’s objectives and stresses around their own projects and tasks. This also dovetails with the need to be
proactive in building good working relationships with other functions and staff to dispel myths, build understanding
and be included more in broader organisational conversations.

Conclusions
Better integration of security in the organisation can be done by equipping all security staff to participate regularly in
key organisational processes such as programme, budget and strategy design and management, as well as context
monitoring. Although some processes such as FCPA may already integrate security, all offices need to be proactive in

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Progress towards the desired future state

doing this. Integration can extend not only to National Office initiatives but also SSR and wider security staff involvement
and contributions to broader partnership and/or other GC team initiatives e.g. FCPA, context analysis and monitoring
that benefits multiple functions, and Disaster Management (DM) learning and events, for example in regional disaster
management trainings (RDMT).

Successful integration needs sufficient resourcing and time, especially for security staff (global, regional and field) to
gain a better understanding of WV and its programming. This will help to bridge the knowledge gap for any new staff
coming from non-NGO backgrounds. Inclusion of integration metrics in security staff Key Performance Indicators and
performance agreements at all levels may also support stronger accountability to work with other teams. On the other
side, integration of CSRs into office performance and accountability mechanisms, which seems to be in motion, will help
to ensure security is a key part of risk conversations so that integration is seen as a joint responsibility

RECRUITING AND RESOURCING FOR HOLISTIC SECURITY

Subject of discussion: Security culture at both the regional and national levels impacts how WV operates. A key
trend noted by respondents is how a perceived lack of security culture affects how security is resourced, especially
related to staffing and being apportioned an appropriate budget. Budget and funding were specifically raised as issues
by the majority of respondents. The overarching issue is that without a budget, or with an insufficient budget for security,
programming cannot take place safely and effectively. Staff saw security funding as a key enabler of any WV programme
or response, with several staff members stating that they felt security should be consulted during the initial stages of
programme design to ensure security requirements are then adequately captured in all costings and funding proposals.

When staff felt security funding was inadequate, this manifested in an inability to hire the correct staff profile and
conduct necessary security training for staff. As a result, sometimes security staff took on additional workloads due
to staff shortages, leading to burnout and other staff care issues. In some cases, although a budget for security was
available, staff noted that drawn-out procurement process sometimes meant delays in receiving necessary items such
as satellite phones, which also added to levels of stress and frustration.

KEY FINDINGS AT A GL ANCE: RECRUITING AND RESOURCING

FOR HOLISTIC SECURITY

1. Ensuring appropriate remuneration.

2. Reasons why sufficient security budgets do not always materialise:
•
More active communication and relationship building between security and programming or
GAM staff to acknowledge that it is a joint responsibility to ensure security is integrated.
•
Clarification about donor expectations and appetite to fund security costs.
•
Clarification for security staff on why there are certain internal funding allocations or stipulations.
•
Non-security staff need to better understand the needs of security, enabled by security staff also
being clearer with their business cases.

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Progress towards
Key Findings (in detail):the desired future state
Ensuring appropriate remuneration: Budget has an impact on the profile of staff hired into the organisation, as
well as on the retention and development of current staff members. Issues of remuneration have resulted in high staff
turnover at the security officer level across WV. Regional staff, NO senior leaders and CSMs have noted that budget
restrictions meant they were unable to attract or retain candidates with the necessary skills. This has resulted in the
hiring of individuals not best suited to these roles and has, in some cases, perpetuated a poor security culture where
other staff within an office have low levels of trust in security staff. Offices also noted an increase in higher level security
staff moving to roles at the UN or other organisations due to their offering a higher salary and whether there is a need to
review how WV compares with our sector peers. It is assessed that the increase in global living costs into 2023 will make
it increasingly likely that staff will seek higher paying roles elsewhere. It was also noted that many security staff have a
high and intense workload, with little downtime. This is also a factor that should reflect in remuneration, staff numbers,
as well as considered through staff care approaches to avoid burnout.

Reasons why sufficient security budgets do not always materialise: There are issues for both Security and Grant
Acquisition and Management (GAM) staff to address, both individually and collectively. This includes:

1. More active communication and relationship building between security and programming or GAM staff to acknowledge
that it is a joint responsibility to ensure security is integrated: Interviewees provided examples of security managers
complaining that they were not told about upcoming proposals, consulted by staff working on grants during
funding applications, or felt actively excluded because they perceived programme managers did not want
to share funding with other teams. At other times it appears security was simply forgotten but there was no
malicious intent. On the other hand, some non-security staff talked about security staff’s perceived inaccessibility
or lack of integrated way of working as a barrier to their inclusion in these conversations.

Those interviewed also noted that security staff are often seen (wrongly or rightly) as people who might say no,
particularly around topics such as programme area expansion. This perception can create a hesitancy to include
security in early stages of programme design, and also lead to security staff being left out of conversations
around budget. Both Security and GAM did agree that a more open dialogue between security and non-
security staff in relation to funding would be beneficial, and that some budget issues could actually be resolved
by better integration of teams.

2. Clarification about donor expectations and appetite to fund security costs: Many staff who were interviewed said
there was sometimes an assumption that donors would not include security costs in budgets. It appears,
however, that there is no systematic process to ask donors about security costs or actively influence donors
to agree to these costs if there is initial hesitancy. Examples were given in which donors had limited security
funding but also those where it was accepted. This raises a broader question of not only how WV departments
engage internally regarding security funding, such as through communication between functions and giving
security staff input at the programme design stage, but also how they champion security with donors through
existing Support Office relationships, both in terms of education and advocacy.

3. Clarification for security staff on why there are certain internal funding allocations or stipulations: For example,
security funding limited by donors, limited or dwindling internal Sponsorship, Private Non-Sponsorship funding
or allocation of Fragile Context Strategic Fund (FCSF) support. These all impact how much security funding
offices can request regardless of input from WV security staff. Equally, donor stipulations might not allow the
sharing of security assets between projects, or might focus funding at the programme level which makes any
national level costs difficult to include (e.g. staffing).

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Progress towards
4. Non-security staff needthe desired
to better understandfuture
the needs state
of security, enabled by security staff also being clearer with
their business cases: This would include security staff providing a breakdown of their costs, rationale for their
use (especially as many items tend to be expensive) and clarification on how long equipment can be used for
before it will need replacing. Many expressed the desire for budgeting guidelines to assist both parties with
this or for more effective dissemination of existing guidelines, with a review of the language to make it more
accessible to non-security staff. In particular, staff were keen for further global discussions on admin ratios,
minimum percentage spend on security budgets and if offices can share equipment to lower costs. Inventories
of equipment could also help security staff make better business cases (for in-country use, as well as to Support
Offices to use with donors) as well as guidance for how long equipment should be kept.

Conclusions
There should be better enabling of strategic resourcing of security, including appropriate remuneration of staff and
further support on budgeting. It is important that WV puts the adequate resources in place to hire high-quality security
staff, while also ensuring we continue to support the development of progression of these staff members to retain them
in the organisation and reduce staff turnover. It is also important to use funding to invest in increased security capacity
within teams, whether full- or part-time across the partnership, to ensure staff workload is manageable and does not
lead to burnout.

It is also imperative for both security and non-security staff to work together to address gaps in security funding. This
can be done in a variety of ways, such exploring options for funding already available but not utilised, working with
Support Offices to open a dialogue with donors around security funding needs and ensuring both Security and GAM
understand each other’s requirements and limitations.

ENABLING SECURITY STAFF TO SUCCEED

Subject of discussion: WV staff, including those who work on security, are one of the organisation’s greatest
assets to enable WV’s work. Aligning to the core value of ‘We value people’, staff touched on two areas for improvement:

1. Hiring the right type of people with the right skills for the contexts into which they will be placed.
2. Ensuring that, once hired, all staff receive support to enable their success, with an emphasis on learning and
training.

K E Y FINDINGS AT A GL ANCE: ENABLING SECURIT Y STAFF TO SUCCEED

1. Place more emphasis on soft skills for the context.

2. Security is better implemented than the reporting shows.
3. Gauge the appropriate security role for the context.
4. Ensure better on-boarding, staff care and effective systems to support security staff and culture.
5. A strong focus on learning, particularly through contextualised training
•
Engagement with training
•
Training accessibility and follow up
•
HEAT attendance
•
Professional growth and learning

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Progress
Key findingstowards
(in detail):the desired future state
Place more emphasis on soft skills for the context: Soft skills were cited as the skills used most frequently by security
staff across all contexts. However, many staff didn’t see this reflected in job descriptions or measured during interviews
for security positions in alignment with the need for that particular office culture. Many staff were keen to develop
soft skills as well as have their recognition and value increased within Security. This includes communication, listening,
negotiation, collaboration, problem solving, cross cultural awareness, networking, influencing, and relationship building
within and outside the organisation. An understanding of the international development and humanitarian sector (or a
willingness to learn this) and a commitment to integrate and work towards enabling programming was also highlighted
as key. Those interviewed acknowledged that technical skills, especially analysis and critical thinking were necessary for
all security roles but that soft skills might need to be focused on at this this stage in WV Security, in order to make sure
there is a correct balance. The RSDs were highlighted as one group that could champion these skill sets during staff hire
or allocation.

Security is better implemented than the reporting shows: Security should better recognise the intangible, culture-
building and soft-skill successes of security staff. These traits were highlighted in the report as one means by which WV
often implements security better than it is reported. This is partially due to a reporting culture that often focuses on
technical skills and compliance. An example of intangible success mentioned by security staff was that they felt they
contributed to a good security culture primarily through their advice, reassurance and influence rather than a reliance on
systems and paperwork, which ultimately keeps staff safe and avoiding casualties, particularly in high risk areas.

An appropriate role for the context: Throughout the interviews, a common tension that was raised was how to
gauge the appropriate level of security capacity and capability for each context. Most offices felt their security team
was understaffed. In medium and low-risk countries where SFPs are more common than CSMs, some staff members felt
they lacked credibility within their offices. This lack of credibility was occasionally related to the wider security and office
culture but also related to SPFs usually being part of and shared with other functions. This was further compounded
because SFPs typically do not have a security background. Thus, their colleagues within an office sometimes do not
see these individuals as having any ‘security expertise’, which makes it difficult for SFPs to have their comments and
recommendations heard. In addition, if the security function is not their primary focus, security activities might be
relegated when staff members prioritise the workload of their primary role. This could lead to a reactive rather than
proactive approach to managing security incidents and implementing good security risk management. However, there
were also examples of SFPs using their multi-function roles to their advantage, supporting the integration of security
through knowledge and collaboration with other departments. Senior leaders noted the need for a consultative discussion
between Security, Regional and National Offices on the contextualisation and flexibility of security requirements to align
with available resources and with consideration of local contexts when agreeing what capacity and capability is required.

Better on-boarding, staff care and effective systems: An inadequate or non-existent on-boarding process for
staff members with security roles impacts the quality of their work and the wider security culture, as well as failing to
support the staff member’s professional development. This can be linked to inadequate or lack of guidance for how
outgoing CSMs and SFPs should undertake handovers. Some security staff felt there wasn’t sufficient distinction during
orientation for what is required for a CSM compared to an SFP. For example, for SFP orientation, some felt there should be
an emphasis on building the technical and soft security skills needed for them to carry out all necessary tasks and look at
how they can use their other roles to complement their security work. There were some common topics they felt both
should cover which they sometimes don’t (e.g. the importance of building a good security culture, relationships, working
with other teams and visiting programmes once in the role). The quality of work and culture can also be impacted if
there is insufficient staff care. Some of those interviewed gave examples. This included concerns about the lack of

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Progress towards the desired future state

contextualised R&R and/or leave for security staff in light of their roles as well as their external context (to mitigate staff
burnout), the need for more training in peer support and psycho-social care options, and signposting staff care support
before there is a crisis so staff know where to find help when needed.

In addition, if the systems that security staff use are not accessible and straightforward they can hinder security staff in
enabling safe and effective programing by preventing the management and reporting of security incidents, lessening
effective context monitoring, or inhibiting good communication between teams, for example. Some interviewed cited
travel tracking, guidance on use of security providers, vendors and contractors, and in-country communication options
as specific areas where they would like more support.

A strong focus on learning, particularly through contextualised training: A lack of regular and proactive spaces
for learning and reflection could be perceived by some as a lack of appreciation for WV’s security staff and their work in-
country. Learning and training can also be a key aspect of building a security culture. Those interviewed gave examples
of how training had enhanced their situational awareness and ability to identify and mitigate risks. HEAT, SAINT and
most recently the innovation with Rapid Access Security Training (RAST) were particularly helpful in this regard. Training
was seen as especially helpful when delivered in-person in order to build key relationships and take part in practical
simulations. Within this topic, four specific points were raised:

1. Engagement with training: Staff frequently mentioned that they would like to have more engagement with
training. This engagement is in the form of participation in training and involvement in the facilitation and
design of training for a specific context, which staff felt would be beneficial for their offices. The majority of those
interviewed felt they would benefit from more frequent SAINT training, specifically a wider roll out enabled by
a stronger emphasis on “Training of Trainers” so there are more qualified instructors available to facilitate. They
also felt this could be useful within other trainings (IMT, CMT, Drivers training) and would increase ownership,
build capacity and show trust in staff to replicate it with other staff. There was also a desire for SAINT trainings
to be scheduled proactively, rather than reactively for a NO or response. For example, an office may host an
annual SAINT training to ensure new staff members receive this, as opposed to sporadic trainings which are
often conducted after a significant security incident has occurred.

Regarding training design, some examples suggested here include consulting with the Security Training Team
to add, remove or edit core course content to reflect the context, including more scenarios and practical
simulations rather than classroom based learning where possible, and amending the timeframes of courses to
work with the budget and timelines available to the office. Some mentioned the gender modules in particular
as content they would like to input into given the widely varied contexts for female staff across the partnership,
particularly when gender security is taught at the national level in SAINT. Staff also mentioned a desire for Light
360 personal security training to better reflect different contexts in which WV staff might find themselves,
particularly the difference between staff travelling into a context and those who are already based there.

2. Training accessibility and follow up: Some of those interviewed felt there was a lack of clarity on the accessibility
of training, online and in-person, for certain people (e.g. to volunteers, consultants, drivers, cleaners, VisionFund
staff, contractors, etc.) and lack of clarity on WV’s policy regarding duty of care Interviewees also noted that
there could be an increased emphasis on having training in more languages and in more accessible vocabulary.
There was a concern about how training stays relevant in the wider office culture once it has concluded,
specifically related to a need to pass it on, and for better follow up and refreshers to ensure knowledge is not
lost and that there are opportunities to apply the training. In some instances, security staff are not fully aware
of the training resources available to them and that there are opportunities to amend these as needed.

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Progress towards
3. HEAT attendance: the
Some desired
of those future
interviewed state at an apparent disconnect and inconsistency
were frustrated
about which staff members are required to attend HEAT and the selection criteria for attendance. While some
staff reported being hired and provided with HEAT at a later date (sometimes after arriving in-country due to
HEAT waivers), others reported it being specifically identified as a condition of hire. In this instance, not meeting
the criteria for HEAT was seen as a potential barrier to further career progression within WV as they could not
apply for roles that required an existing HEAT qualification. It is also noteworthy that offices are balancing other
considerations when deciding whom from their offices will attend HEAT courses, including cost, the suitability of
staff for high-risk environments, and the concerns about losing staff, whether to other WV roles or externally, and
how they might backfill these roles if there were gaps.

4. Professional growth and learning: Respondents raised other training that they felt would benefit staff within
WV, including some outside WV which could provide professional accreditation. These included analysis
(especially forecasting, information collection and scenario planning), business continuity management, crisis
and incident management, managing stress and mental health, first aid, fire safety, investigations, and language
development. Staff noted that they would value more professional accreditation within their role but felt this
was often overlooked in favour of similar in-house trainings which do not come with external credentials. The
frequency with which staff raised this issue highlights the enthusiasm amongst security staff for professional
growth within WV, and several respondents said their request for additional training and qualifications is directly
linked to their planned career development. Staff were also keen for increased exposure through deployments,
secondments and coaching from Security senior leaders where available and felt that this had not been easily
available or accessible thus far.

Conclusions
Security needs to hire the right type of people with more emphasis on soft skills, for the internal and external context
(internal refers to the office culture and capacity, external is the context in the country as a whole). As well as the technical
skills required for the role it is important to ensure staff are well placed to meet expectations and challenges. Providing
better ‘people-centred’ support for staff to enable their success, such as on-boarding, continual and multi-disciplinary
learning, and staff care is key to ensuring staff feel supported from the outset and also supported to develop in their
careers within WV. The importance of staff care cannot be underestimated, especially signposting it for staff before a
crisis. Regular peer-to-peer networking and learning on security risk management can offer opportunities to continue
to improve our work through sharing best practises. This could come from CSMs and SFPs, both within and between
different regions, and connect with the Security team, senior leadership and the wider Partnership as well as externally.
Existing platforms can be used or new ones created and exchange visits can be a particularly useful within or between
regions for security staff so they are able to learn and support each other.

Staff identified training as an important resource to support staff in the field and highlighted the positive impacts of
this. Security should enable, decentralise and communicate more contextualisation of training material, such as more
practical training, professional development using language and illustrations that are more accessible to NO staff, as well
as more input into the development of modules at the national level. The ability and necessity of trainers to contextualise
the training for their audiences should be clarified, and this can help build a security culture that is relevant to a particular
office and enable even more staff to be reached with the most relevant information for their contexts.

22 | PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DESIRED FUTURE STATE

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Progress
LISTENINGtowards the desired future state

Subject of discussion: The security and non-security staff interviewed appreciated being listened to. For those
interviewed it signified that WV, and SSR in particular, values them and their opinions. The respondents particularly
appreciated the guarantee of anonymity and the use of open and non-judgmental questions that allowed them to speak
freely, propose solutions, and explain their answers on the basis of their individual contexts. The use of participatory
focus groups was especially appreciated as staff were able to listen to and discuss with each other as well as giving input
to the interviewers.

Non-security staff involved in security decisions appreciated the exercise for giving them time away from their day-to-
day work to reflect more deeply on security issues. Several of these staff members said it made them consider issues
which they had not thought of before or that it made them realise that they occasionally took security for granted. A
small number of part-time security staff also reflected that the exercise helped them renew their focus on security.

KEY FINDINGS AT A GL ANCE: LISTENING

1. Use this initiative as a template for future listening exercises.

2. Ensure accountability to act regarding the findings of the final report.

Key findings (in detail):

A template for future listening exercises: Many interviewees said they hoped these exercises would be repeated,
whether virtually or in-person. In light of this, the model for these interviews could be replicated and applied by other
GC teams. Questions about staff wellbeing and their support needs should remain, as well as feedback on security
developments within SSR. During the interviews, it was clear that several staff members had not been part of such an
exercise before in WV, with the exception of Our Voice surveys. The SSR listening exercise sets a helpful precedent for
continuing to encourage listening at all levels, including field staff listening to communities. It also promoted the value
of listening to field and regional staff before SSR reviews any system or product or introduces any new initiatives. This
particularly related to being asked to identify any problems that need to be fixed and what solutions they recommend
rather than only consulting the end users once systems and solutions have already been created.

Accountability to act: Most interviews ended with a question from staff about accountability related to the findings
of the final report. This was not prompted by the interviewers. There is a clear hope that this listening exercise leads to
change, based on some of the comments and suggestions they proposed. Those interviewed asked about transparency
and communication of the final report and for updates if and when any changes take place. There was tangible
excitement at the prospect that any decisions taken as a result of this report could be based, in part, on field input and
not solely made by those outside the context. Demonstrating that these exercises lead to change will increase local
ownership of such decisions and staff willingness to participate in such an exercise again in the future.

Conclusions
There is a need for more extensive listening to and consultation of regional and field security and non-security staff
for their input on security matters, and include those views into action plans. The positive reaction to this first listening
exercise demonstrates a need for the Security SLT, along with other SSR functions, to reflect on this report in the next six
months. There should be transparency and meaningful accountability for what is taken from the key findings.

PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DESIRED FUTURE STATE | 23

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Progress
In addition, stafftowards the desired
interviewed should future
be able to request state
feedback if they want to know why some ideas have not been
taken forward.

If future learning exercises are put in place on a regular basis they should continue to ask the question of what support,
tools, and skills field staff need. They need to also continue to include transparency over next steps and accountability
for actions to be taken. This will ensure that people see they are not just listened to but their ideas and opinions are also
acted on where appropriate. Putting in place a sustainable mechanism where security staff are able to pitch ideas or
alert the SSR team (anonymously if needed) to systems and processes that need simplifying or changing when they are
not fit for purpose might be one idea to ensure there is a good and consistent feedback loop going forward, in addition
to any larger listening exercises.

Conclusion
This report highlights examples of how Security has contributed positively to WV operations and is seen by staff as a
key function. Security has matured significantly over the last decade, becoming better able and equipped to deal with
challenges while also gaining the acceptance of staff and leadership across the organisation. Alongside the positive
reactions to Security, staff were keen to share insights into how they felt Security could continue to develop and improve.
The majority of comments and recommendations centre around the development of soft skills and better integration of
security teams with other functions.

Respondents noted that the technical aspects and competencies of Security may have developed more rapidly than
its relational integration into WV as an entity. There was an articulated appetite among those interviewed to work
more closely with Security on the co-creation of security solutions. This suggests that even though Security and SSR
has learned and developed significantly, there remains untapped capacity to better listen, include and integrate with
security staff based in NOs and use their knowledge and insights.

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 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Annex 1: Questions
For security staff

1. What does security mean to you? What areas do you think security should be focusing on? How can security
leadership engage with you on a regular basis?

2. How are you doing? What does an average day look like for you? How do you divide up your time on different
security tasks/areas? How do you engage with other functions on security-related tasks?

3. What are the things you find most rewarding about your role, whether tangible or intangible? What are you able
to celebrate?

4. What has been difficult lately? Can you tell us about the main challenges you (and your team) face in your role?
(probe if any of these challenges relate to budget)

5. What skill sets do you find you use the most? What skill sets do you feel might be missing and you’d want training
on?

6. What are the main areas you (and your team) would want further support on?

7. What three things would you (and your team) want to see improved/changed when it comes to security? What
would make your work and that of your team/office easier? Do you have any new ideas for things you think we
should try, especially things that might make the organisation more resilient?

8. Do you have any other feedback on how security is performing in WV, especially in regard to care for you as
security staff?

For staff with security responsibilities or who insect with security

1. What does security mean to you? What areas do you think security should be focusing on? How do you know
when security is being done well?

2. What percentage/proportion of your daily work do you apply a security lens to or intersect with security? What
tasks do you end up spending the majority of your time on and how do you prioritise? What skill sets do you find
you use the most? How do you engage with other functions on security related tasks?

3. What are the things you find most rewarding/add value in applying a security lens or intersecting with security,
whether tangible or intangible? What are the main challenges you have faced in this?

4. What are the main areas you would want further support on?

5. What three things would you want to see improved/changed when it comes to security? What would make your
work easier? Do you have any new ideas for things you think we should try, especially things that might make the
organisation more resilient?

6. Do you have any other feedback on how security is performing in WV and its impact, especially in regard to caring
for security staff/staff with security responsibilities?

7. In your opinion, what does a security person of the future look like? (profile, skillsets etc)

ANNEX 1: QUESTIONS | 25
 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

Annex 2: Combined recommendations and ideas

Culture and leadership

Conclusion: There needs to be a better connection between SSR senior leadership and national staff through stronger
and regular strategic engagement and communication in-person and remotely.

Ideas to achieve this:

•
Organise security town hall meetings for each region once a year. This is where staff can meet and engage with
SSR SLT, and suggest topics for the agenda. This can also include senior leaders suggesting courses, reading and
sharing wider reflections.
•
SSR SLT member join existing calls or platforms that engage Heads of Office at least twice a year, which will
encourage accountability for their building a stronger security culture. The SSR senior leadership should also
explore setting up dedicated spaces with Heads of Offices on security and other SSR topics.
•
SSR leaders commit to 1-2 visits to the field per year to different countries. This will help connections with field staff
and understanding of their challenges and realities.
•
A Security SLT member joins at least one of each region’s IST calls and CSM calls during the year. The aim should
be to listen to current concerns and provide a space for questions and answers. This will further encourage a good
security culture.
• 
Create an SSR communications strategy. This should include a long term plan to have dedicated communications,
knowledge management, and learning capacity within the team. This could help to tackle some of the
stereotypes and challenges staff experience in-country when building security culture. This should consider use of
the following:
•
Profiles and testimonies of security staff or staff who make security decisions.
•
Testimonies from non-security staff of the added value of security to programming and other functions (e.g.
training, working with others, etc.).
•
Use of existing communication channels such as Ignite.
•
A newsletter or regular communication with latest news from SSR, sharing best practises, global trends in
security, senior leader reflections etc.
•
Provide clear communications on the following SSR strategic issues as soon as possible:
•
Group strategy and direction, especially the safety and resilience components and what is and is not
included in them
•
Humanitarian access
•
Supporting staff to feel safe reporting the loss of safety-critical equipment without fearing reprisals
•
Create and use a wider security mailing list and Microsoft Teams site for communication to all CSMs and SFPs.
Make sure this is kept up to date and used regularly to build a wider sense of a security team.
•
Ensure more regular communication with and between the SSR team through “all team” meetings at least once a
quarter. Invite different teams to present their learnings.
•
Review dissemination lists for analysis products to ensure they get to the field as appropriate. Communicate to
senior leaders which products they can or should share with staff (e.g. Monthly Security Briefing, Fragility Forecast,
Quarterly High Risk Report).

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 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

•
Encourage CSMs and all senior leaders to allocate appropriate time and resources to building relationships with
each other and with staff to further build a good security culture in their NOs.
•
Discuss with and guide NOs whether CSMs and SFPs should report into the Head of Office, and/or be a member
of the SLT.
•
Update the contact list for Support Office SFPs. Schedule quarterly conversations, especially covering issues of
donor engagement and budgeting.
•
The Regional Security Directors should:
•
Take a holistic view of their portfolio and ensure they proactively, regularly and strategically engage with all
their countries (CSMs and senior leaders), irrespective of risk level or whether there are issues, to continue to
build security culture.
•
Foster relationships with senior leaders in their regions who make security decisions, especially Heads of
Office, for better influence and support. This should particularly focus on incorporation of security into
programming and grants. There should also be further support to the CSMs and SFPs to build relationships
with them as well as networking externally.
•
Create opportunities for office-to-office and region-to-region learning exchanges on security.
•
Continue to promote the narrative of security as an enabler of good programming, using testimonies and
staff profiling.

Integration of security into the rest of the organisation

Conclusion: Better integration of security in the organisation can be done by equipping all security staff to participate
regularly in key organisational processes such as programme, budget and strategy design.

Ideas to achieve this:

•
Make involvement in project design and start up workshops a part of day-to-day security staff tasks, especially in
countries not implementing approaches such as FCPA that have it already built in.
•
Promote and allocate time for security staff (global, regional and field) to gain a better understanding of WV
and its programming, especially helping to bridge the knowledge gap for new staff coming from non NGO
backgrounds, especially the military and/or police. This could be during orientation or through further training.
•
Ensure Security is part of NO strategy conversations as they occur.
•
Ensure SSR and wider security staff are involved in and contribute to broader partnership initiatives e.g. FCPA,
context analysis that benefits multiple functions, etc.
•
Explore how security can feature more in Disaster Management (DM) learning and events, for example in regional
disaster management trainings (RDMT).
•
Invest in further context monitoring tools and approaches as a key part of security risk management and ensure
security staff take part in this as part of wider partnership initiatives.
•
Build integration into security staff Key Performance Indicators and performance agreements at all levels for
stronger accountability to work with other teams.

ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS | 27

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

•
Integrate CSRs into office performance and accountability mechanisms so that it is a part of risk conversations.

Recruiting and resourcing for holistic security

Conclusion: There should be better enable strategic resourcing of security, including appropriate remuneration of staff
and further support on budgeting.

Ideas to achieve this:

•
Invest in a higher number of security staff (whether full- or part-time) across the partnership so that the
appropriate resources are available for security staff to carry out the necessary workload and to ensure this
workload does not become unsustainable
•
More support on budgeting, particularly:
•
Engage other GC teams on a review of the fragile context special fund, and other funding modalities, and its
funding allocation for security costs.
•
Further explore how Sponsorship and Area Programme (AP) funding is used for security costs.
•
Work with the GC Grants team to conduct donor mapping and analysis about their acceptance of, or lack of,
security costings within budgets. Put in place a joint influencing plan for donor education and advocacy.
•
Simplify existing security budget guidelines, including using language that is accessible to non-security staff
and which can be shared more broadly.
•
Discuss with senior leaders whether a recommendation on a minimum percentage spend to support all
security budgets is useful for security and non-security staff.
•
Engage with Support Offices and provide an overarching business case for security costs within grants so they
can advocate with donors.
•
Discuss reframing the narrative on admin ratios with each region. Security costs should be part of programme
implementation rather than overheads.
•
Request CSMs and SFPs conduct an inventory of equipment in their office.
•
Explore if offices can share equipment in order to lower costs (e.g. keep some equipment at the regional office
to distribute as needed).
•
Provide guidance for how long equipment should be kept before needing to be replaced, or disseminate
again if this guidance exists.

Enabling security staff to succeed

Conclusion: Security needs to hire the right type of people with more emphasis on soft skills, for the internal and
external context (internal refers to the office culture and capacity, external refers to the context as a whole). Provision
of better ‘people-centred’ support for staff will enable their success, such as better on-boarding, continual and multi-
disciplinary learning, and staff care. It should enable, decentralise and communicate more contextualisation of training
material. This should include more practical training, and professional development using language and illustrations
that are more accessible to NO staff.

Ideas to achieve this:

•
Hiring
•
Ensure job descriptions reflect soft skills requirements (e.g. communication, influencing, relationship building)
as well as technical skills, and that these soft skills are measured during interviews for security positions in

28 | ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

alignment with the need for that particular office culture. This may mean hiring staff who are more senior in
their careers from outside of security, so they command more respect.
•
RSDs ensure a strong involvement in the hiring of security staff or staff allocation to make sure they have the
right skill sets.
•
Internal context:
•
Explore whether a number of low risk countries could share a CSM to benefit from a more dedicated security
capacity
•
In conjunction with NOs, discuss putting in place performance indicators related to security for SFPs.
•
Put in place a flexible and accessible travel tracking system that security and non-security field office staff can
easily use.
•
Put in place clear guidance on use of security providers, vendors, and contractors.
•
Better on-boarding:
•
Create two separate sets of guidance for orientation and on-boarding for CSMs and SFPs, taking into account
the differences in roles. Ensure both sets of guidance highlight the importance of building a good security
culture, relationships, working with other teams and visiting programmes once in the role. For SFP orientation,
there should be an emphasis on building the technical and soft security skills needed for them to carry out all
necessary tasks and looking at how the SFP can use their other roles to complement their security work.
•
Conduct a gap or learning needs analysis and make this part of CSM and SFP development plans at the start
of their contract.
•
Provide guidance for how CSMs and SFPs should undertake handovers when they leave their roles.
• 
Learning and training:
•
Encourage regular peer-to-peer networking and learning meetings between CSMs and SFPs, both within
and between different regions. The RSDs should lead this engagement and enable discussion of what issues
security staff face and how they have responded to them (e.g. by sharing case studies). This should take place
within Integrated Security Team calls and regional security meetings, ideally as a standing agenda item.
•
Schedule global learning sessions (webinars, conferences, case studies, etc.) on security risk management
so that offices can have opportunities to share best practices with each other, the Security team and senior
leadership, the wider Partnership and at times externally (e.g. via regional or global forums, security providers,
etc.).
•
Budget at the regional level for exchange visits within or between regions for security staff so they are able to
learn and support each other.
•
Plan for annual regional security meetings to happen in-person to enhance learning outcomes.
•
Ensure that in-person training is possible when needed or preferred.
•
Review training (online and in-person) accessibility for short-term staff, consultants, Vision Fund and
volunteers. Clarify the policy regarding duty of care and what training can be accessed by these groups.
•
Ensure follow up after training to identify opportunities to put the learning into practise, refresh where
needed, and check it is being applied.
•
Personal security training:
•
Increase the focus on Training of Trainers (ToT) within existing training (IMT, CMT, SAINT, Drivers training,
etc.). This will increase ownership, build capacity in field offices and show trust in staff to replicate it with
other staff.
•
Review the gender security modules within the existing security training, including consulting with
female field staff on running and improving it.

ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS | 29

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

•
For SAINT, specifically:
•
Plan for training to take place and be refreshed on a regular basis.
•
Add more practical simulations to encourage deeper and better learning.
•
Ensure the ‘mandatory’ parts of SAINT training are more flexible and put at the discretion of the
Integrated Security Teams to address the needs of the context, with final sign off by the Security
Training team IST member.
•
Emphasise the ability and necessity of trainers to contextualise the training for their audiences and build
a security culture that is relevant to a particular office.
•
Encourage staff to pass on what they have learnt to others.
• 
Build the analysis capacity of National Office security and non-security staff who make security decisions,
especially regarding forecasting, information collection, and scenario planning.
•
Increase analyst availability, capacity and visibility to CSMs and SFPs.
•
Provide more training on investigations, first aid, fire safety, crisis and incident management, mental health
and stress, and business continuity. Consider if there are outside providers who can provide professional
accreditation that will support staff’s professional development or if existing WV courses can become
professionally accredited.
•
Create a plan to increase professional accreditation for security staff, whether through better access to external
courses or getting some of WV’s courses accredited externally. Consider creating a scheme where SSR assigns
a budget for this so that field security staff can propose to use it for a course, providing they have their line
manager and RSD approval. This scheme could aim to provide a set number of courses per year to staff who
make a good business case.
•
SSR leadership to commit to coaching one security staff member per year who is not currently in SSR, to
support their professional development. This should be part of performance agreements.
•
Map possible opportunities for security staff deployments.
•
Staff care:
•
Review all security staff, national and international, remuneration including per diems in comparison with our
sector peers (other NGOs) in light of recent issues with staff retention and current cost of living crisis.
•
Reiterate the importance of staff care and where to find help when needed, including before there is a crisis.
• 
Increase investment in psycho-social care options for staff to help with stress.
•
Train more security staff in peer support.
•
Review and contextualise security staff’s R&R allocation and/or leave to mitigate staff burnout in light of their
role as well as their external context.
•
Other:
•
Communicate with CSMs and SFPs regularly on issues raised in the Monthly Security Briefing to help with
accountability and offer support where there might be challenges.
•
Support CSMs with possible options for in-country communication (alerts, analysis, etc.).

Listening

Conclusion: There is a need for more extensive listening to and consultation of regional and field security and non-
security staff for their input on security matters, and include those views into action plans.

Ideas to achieve this:

•
Security SLT, along with other SSR functions, to facilitate security town hall meetings to reflect on this report in the
next six months.

30 | ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS

 FIELD LISTENING EXERCISE 2022

•
Put in place regular listening exercises that consult with regional and field staff.
•
Ensure any listening exercises clearly outline the recommended next steps and that there is meaningful
accountability for actions to be taken. This will ensure that people see they are not just listened to but their ideas
and opinions are also acted on where appropriate. Staff interviewed can also request feedback if they want to
know why some ideas have not been taken forward.
•
Ensure any listening exercises continue to ask the question of what support, tools, and skills field staff need.
• 
Consult field and regional staff before SSR reviews any system or product or introduces any new initiatives.
SSR should ask field and regional staff to identify any problems that need to be fixed and what solutions they
recommend rather than only consulting the end users once systems and solutions have already been created.
•
Put in place a sustainable mechanism where security staff are able to alert the SSR team (anonymously if needed)
to systems and processes that need simplifying or changing when they are not fit for purpose.

Annex 3: Acronym glossary

CSM Country Security Manager

CSR Core Security Requirements

FCPA Fragile Contexts Programme Approach

GAM Grants and Acquisition Management

GC Global Centre

HEA Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs

HEAT Hostile Environment Awareness Training

IST Integrated Security Teams

NO National Office

P&C People and Culture department

RO Regional Office

RSD Regional Security Director

SAINT Security Awareness in National Theatres

SFP Security Focal Point

SSR Security, Safety and Resilience

SLT Senior Leadership team

ANNEX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IDEAS | 31

 DDF
World Vision is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, families and
communities to overcome poverty and injustice. Inspired by our Christian values, we are dedicated to working with the
world’s most vulnerable people. We serve all people regardless of religion, race, ethnicity or gender.

We believe a world without violence against children is possible, and World Vision’s global campaign It takes a world to
end violence against children is igniting movements of people committed to making this happen. No one person, group
or organisation can solve this problem alone, it will take the world to end violence against children.