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Team 09 Report (2) Removed

This mini-project report focuses on detecting smishing and vishing attacks using advanced deep learning techniques to enhance cybersecurity. The research highlights the limitations of traditional detection methods and proposes a unified framework utilizing models like LSTM, GRU, and CNN for improved accuracy and real-time performance. The goal is to provide a scalable solution to combat evolving phishing threats, thereby protecting user privacy in digital communication.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
22 views62 pages

Team 09 Report (2) Removed

This mini-project report focuses on detecting smishing and vishing attacks using advanced deep learning techniques to enhance cybersecurity. The research highlights the limitations of traditional detection methods and proposes a unified framework utilizing models like LSTM, GRU, and CNN for improved accuracy and real-time performance. The goal is to provide a scalable solution to combat evolving phishing threats, thereby protecting user privacy in digital communication.

Uploaded by

susannagunti52
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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DETECTION OF SMISHING AND

VISHING ATTACKS USING DEEP


LEARNING TECHNIQUES

A Mini-Project Report Submitted in the


Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Award of the Degree of

BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY

IN

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Submitted by

G. Navya 22881A12E7
G. Susanna 22881A12E9
Y Jai Anthony Rahul Reddy 22881A12K0

SUPERVISOR
Dr. G. Suryanarayana
Associate Professor

May, 2025
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project titled DETECTION OF SMISH-


ING AND VISHING ATTACKS USING DEEP LEARNING TECH-
NIQUES is carried out by

G. Navya 22881A12E7
G. Susanna 22881A12E9
Y Jai Anthony Rahul Reddy 22881A12K0

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of


Bachelor of Technology in Information Technology during the year 2024-
25.

Signature of the Supervisor Signature of the HOD


Dr. G. Suryanarayana Dr. G. Sreenivasulu
Associate Professor Professor and Head, IT

Project Viva-Voce held on

Examiner

Kacharam (V), Shamshabad (M), Ranga Reddy (Dist.)–501218, Hyderabad, T.S.


Ph: 08413-253335, 253201, Fax: 08413-253482, www.vardhaman.org
Acknowledgements

The satisfaction that accompanies the successful completion of the task would
be put incomplete without the mention of the people who made it possible,
whose constant guidance and encouragement crown all the efforts with success.

We wish to express our deep sense of gratitude to Dr. G. Suryanarayana,


Associate Professorand Project Supervisor, Department of Information Tech-
nology, Vardhaman College of Engineering, for his valuable guidance and useful
suggestions, which helped us in completing the mini - project in time.

We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to Dr. Ruqsar Jaitoon,our


project coordinator,for her constant support and guidance during my mini
project.Her encouragement and helpful advice made this work possible.

We sincerely thank Dr.Saroja Kumar Rout, our project Convenor, for his
valuable support and guidance during my mini project.

We are particularly thankful to Dr. G. Sreenivasulu, the Head of the


Department, Department of Information Technology, his guidance, intense sup-
port and encouragement, which helped us to mould our mini -project into a
successful one.

We show gratitude to our honorable Principal Dr. J.V.R. Ravindra, for


providing all facilities and support.

We avail this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude and heart-
ful thanks to Dr. Teegala Vijender Reddy, Chairman and Sri Teegala
Upender Reddy, Secretary of VCE for providing a congenial atmosphere to
complete this mini - project successfully.

We also thank all the staff members of Information Technology department for
their valuable support and generous advice. Finally thanks to all our friends
and family members for their continuous support and enthusiastic help.
G. Navya
G. Susanna
Y Jai Anthony Rahul Reddy

ii
Abstract

Short text message phishing (smishing) and voice phishing (vishing) attacks
have become more frequent, which leads to loss of sensitive information such
as passwords, credit card numbers, or personal identification details, identity
theft, and also significant financial loss through unauthorized transactions.
As mobile technology and voice communication platforms become more inte-
grated into daily life, cybercriminals exploit these channels to deceive users
and gain unauthorized access to private data. The increasing sophistication
of such attacks makes early and accurate detection more critical than ever.
Traditional phishing detection methods, largely based on machine learning al-
gorithms such as Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines (SVM), and Naive
Bayes classifiers, have been widely studied and applied. However, these ap-
proaches often struggle with handling the sequential nature of textual and
audio data, limiting their effectiveness in capturing complex contextual and
temporal patterns.Additionally, the scarcity of large, well-labeled datasets for
smishing and vishing further challenges the development of robust detection
systems. To overcome these limitations, this work explores the use of ad-
vanced deep learning techniques tailored to sequential and high-dimensional
data. Models such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent
Units (GRU), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and Residual Networks
(ResNet) offer improved capabilities in identifying hidden features and patterns
in both SMS content and audio signals. This research focuses on building
a unified framework capable of detecting both smishing and vishing attacks
with high accuracy and real-time performance.The proposed system not only
enhances detection precision but also enables faster response times, helping to
prevent data breaches and financial loss. By integrating advanced deep learning
models, this work aims to provide a more comprehensive and scalable solu-
tion to combat evolving phishing threats, thereby strengthening cybersecurity
measures and protecting user privacy across digital communication channels.

iv
Table of Contents

Title Page No.


Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Overview of Smishing and Vishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Impact on Mobile Users and Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Limitations of Traditional Detection Techniques . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Emergence of Deep Learning Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5.1 Key Challenges in Smishing & Vishing Detection . . . . . 9
1.5.2 Research Gap & Project Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6 Objectives of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHAPTER 2 Literature Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Existing Approaches for Smishing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Existing Approaches for Vishing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Application of NLP in Phishing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Use of Deep Learning Models in Smishing and Vishing . . . . . . 18
2.5 Role of Transformer Models (e.g., BERT, MobileBERT) . . . . . 20
2.6 Dataset Characteristics and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6.1 SMS Spam Dataset (UCI Repository) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6.2 Fraud Call Dataset (Audio-based) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Identified Research Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
CHAPTER 3 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Problem Definition and Research Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Overview of Deep Learning Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Dataset Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Data Preprocessing Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.1 Text Cleaning and Tokenization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

vi
3.4.2 Mel Spectrogram Generation for Audio . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Summary of Model Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CHAPTER 4 System Architecture and Model Design . . . . . . . 31
4.1 Overall System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 Smishing Detection Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2.1 LSTM-based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2.2 GRU-based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.3 CNN-based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3 Vishing Detection Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.1 CNN + BiGRU Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.2 Stacked GRU Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.3 ResNet-Inspired Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4 Tools and Technologies Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5 Design Constraints and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CHAPTER 5 Implementation and Experimental Results . . . . . 38
5.1 Experimental Setup and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2 Performance Metrics Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 Results for Smishing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.4 Results for Vishing Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.5 Graphical Analysis and Model Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.6 Discussion on Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Future Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Tables

2.1 Literature Survey on Smishing and Vishing Detection . . . . . . . 15

5.1 Smishing Detection Model Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41


5.2 Vishing Detection Model Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.3 Comparison Between Existing Models and Proposed Project Model 44

viii
List of Figures

1.1 Smishing and Vishing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


1.2 Illustration of Vishing and Smishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1 Example of a Smishing Attack Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12


2.2 Example of a Vishing Attack Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.1 Flowchart of Deep Learning models on SMS and voice call datasets 35

5.1 Smishing Detection Model Metrics Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 43


5.2 Vishing Detection Model Metrics Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 43

ix
Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description

ANN Artificial Neural Network

AST Audio Spectrogram Transformer

AUC Area Under the Curve

BiLSTM Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory

CNN Convolutional Neural Network

DNN Deep Neural Network

EDA Exploratory Data Analysis

GRU Gated Recurrent Unit

IoT Internet of Things

KNN K-Nearest Neighbors

LSTM Long Short-Term Memory

MFCC Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients

NB Naive Bayes

PCA Principal Component Analysis

RNN Recurrent Neural Network

SMiShing Short text message Phishing

SVM Support Vector Machine

Vishing Voice Phishing

XGBoost Extreme Gradient Boosting


CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Overview of Smishing and Vishing Attacks


Smishing (SMS phishing) and vishing (voice phishing) are among the most
prevalent and growing threats in the field of mobile cybersecurity. These
attacks exploit human psychology and the high engagement rate with mobile
communication platforms to deceive users into disclosing sensitive personal or
financial information. Unlike traditional email-based phishing, smishing and
vishing use more immediate and accessible platforms—SMS and voice calls—to
reach and manipulate victims.
Smishing involves sending fraudulent text messages that appear to origi-
nate from legitimate sources such as banks, service providers, or government
agencies. These messages often contain malicious links or request users to
reply with personal data, often under the guise of resolving urgent issues such
as account verification or missed deliveries [1]. Vishing, in contrast, utilizes
phone calls—either automated or human-initiated—to impersonate trusted en-
tities and persuade users to reveal confidential information. These calls may
claim to be from banks, technical support, or law enforcement, and often
instill panic to prompt quick action [4].

Figure 1.1: Smishing and Vishing attacks

1
The increasing use of mobile devices in digital transactions and identity
verification has made these attack vectors particularly dangerous. Smishing and
vishing can lead to severe consequences such as identity theft, unauthorized
banking transactions, data breaches, and the compromise of personal and
professional credentials [2], [8]. These consequences are not only financial but
also psychological, as victims often experience anxiety and a loss of trust in
digital systems.
Traditional security tools such as spam filters and firewalls offer limited
protection against smishing and vishing. This is due to the dynamic and
evolving nature of these attacks, which often change their tactics to bypass
signature-based detection methods [3]. Attackers employ linguistic manipula-
tion, use of URL shorteners, and even AI-generated voice messages to make
their communications appear credible and evade traditional filters [14].
The threat landscape has also been exacerbated by the rise in mobile app
usage and remote work. More users are now dependent on mobile devices
for tasks such as banking, business communication, and e-commerce. This
trend has provided attackers with a larger target base and more opportunities
to exploit. Studies have shown that user trust in mobile communication is
frequently abused by attackers, leading to a higher success rate of smishing
and vishing compared to email phishing [11].
Furthermore, adversarial methods have emerged that intentionally deceive
detection systems, even those based on deep learning. These methods involve
altering message structures or audio features to exploit weaknesses in model
generalization [3]. As a result, detection models must now be both context-
aware and robust to subtle variations in attack strategies.
In recent years, deep learning approaches have been explored to counter
these threats. Techniques such as recurrent neural networks (RNNs), convo-
lutional neural networks (CNNs), and transformer-based models have shown
promise in identifying complex patterns in both text and audio data [18],
[19]. These models are capable of capturing semantic, syntactic, and acoustic
features that traditional rule-based systems miss.
To effectively combat smishing and vishing, detection systems must evolve

Department of Information Technology 2


beyond static rule sets and incorporate dynamic, intelligent models that un-
derstand context, behavior, and intent. Real-time detection capabilities are
also essential to prevent damage before it occurs [5], [6], [10].
In conclusion, smishing and vishing attacks represent a significant evolution
in social engineering tactics. They exploit the immediacy and trust associated
with mobile communication to manipulate users. As these attacks continue to
evolve, so must the methods used to detect and prevent them—ushering in
a need for deep learning-based solutions that can analyze both linguistic and
vocal features in real-time to identify malicious intent with high accuracy.

1.2 Impact on Mobile Users and Cybersecurity


The growing sophistication of smishing and vishing attacks has significantly
affected mobile users and posed serious challenges to the cybersecurity domain.
As mobile phones have become essential tools for communication, banking, and
authentication, attackers have increasingly exploited these platforms to deceive
users and gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. These attacks
have led to a wide range of consequences, including financial loss, identity
theft, privacy breaches, and reduced user trust in digital communication.
Smishing involves sending fraudulent SMS messages that appear to come
from trusted organizations, luring victims into clicking malicious links or reveal-
ing personal credentials. Vishing, on the other hand, uses voice communication
to impersonate legitimate authorities and extract confidential data from un-
suspecting users. Both types of phishing attacks rely heavily on psychological
manipulation, such as creating a sense of urgency or authority, to convince
victims to act impulsively.
The effects of these attacks are profound. Victims of smishing often
experience financial fraud, account takeovers, or installation of malware on
their devices [2]. In the case of vishing, users may be tricked into revealing
authentication codes, PINs, or other security details through convincing voice
calls, often spoofed to resemble official numbers [4]. These forms of social
engineering exploit human factors and are therefore difficult to prevent using
conventional security mechanisms.

Department of Information Technology 3


Figure 1.2: Illustration of Vishing and Smishing Attacks

Behavioral studies have shown that many users, especially those with low
digital literacy or high trust in institutions, are particularly vulnerable to mobile
phishing [11]. Attackers capitalize on these vulnerabilities by crafting messages
or voice calls that appear urgent, familiar, and trustworthy. As a result, users
may unwittingly compromise their accounts or install harmful software on their
devices, leading to broader data breaches or financial exploitation.
The integration of mobile phones with digital banking, e-commerce, health-
care, and government services further amplifies the risks. Vishing attacks that
target voice-based authentication methods or phone-based password recovery
systems can bypass traditional forms of security, posing threats to entire digital
ecosystems [8]. Likewise, smishing attacks can lead to ransomware installations
or credential theft, which are then used in more complex cyberattacks.
Traditional response mechanisms such as blacklists, keyword filters, and rule-
based detection systems are increasingly inadequate. These static approaches
fail to detect evolving and contextualized threats that vary in content, language,
or behavior. Attackers often change tactics and payloads to evade detection,
making traditional models obsolete without frequent manual updates [3].
The situation is further complicated by the limitations of existing network-
level defenses, which often cannot inspect encrypted content or voice signals
without violating user privacy. This necessitates the use of device-level intelli-

Department of Information Technology 4


gent systems capable of analyzing message patterns, linguistic cues, and audio
features in real time [5], [10].
On a broader scale, these attacks contribute to substantial economic losses
and undermine trust in digital services. As users become more aware of
mobile phishing, their reluctance to engage with SMS-based notifications or
voice verifications increases, which negatively impacts service adoption and
user experience [18], [19]. Organizations must therefore invest in advanced
detection tools and user education to mitigate these risks.

1.3 Limitations of Traditional Detection Tech-


niques
Traditional techniques for detecting smishing and vishing attacks—such as
keyword matching, regular expressions, rule-based filtering, blacklisting, and
heuristics—were initially developed to counter classic email phishing and spam.
However, as phishing methods evolved to exploit SMS and voice communication,
these older techniques have proven increasingly ineffective. The limitations of
conventional detection mechanisms stem from their inability to understand
context, generalize across different message structures, and adapt to new
attack vectors that continuously evolve to bypass static rules.
One of the key weaknesses of traditional methods is their dependence
on predefined patterns and signatures. For smishing, early detection systems
relied heavily on identifying suspicious keywords or known malicious links.
While useful for detecting repetitive attacks, such methods fail when attackers
obfuscate URLs using shorteners, insert special characters, or use natural
language manipulation to avoid keyword-based flags [1], [3], [21]. These
models cannot comprehend the semantic meaning of messages and are prone
to high false positive and false negative rates.
Moreover, traditional machine learning models like Decision Trees, Naive
Bayes, and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) require extensive feature engineer-
ing and struggle to process the sequential and contextual nature of language.
They often treat each word in isolation, failing to grasp sentence-level intent

Department of Information Technology 5


or deceptive phrasings commonly used in smishing messages [2], [16]. These
models may work well on fixed or static datasets but do not scale effectively
when exposed to diverse linguistic structures or adversarial inputs [3].
In the case of vishing, traditional voice-based authentication systems pri-
marily focus on signal processing and static thresholding methods. These
approaches often rely on pitch, tone, or frequency-based cues that can be eas-
ily mimicked or altered using voice conversion technologies. Attackers can now
employ AI-generated voices and spoofing tools to convincingly imitate official
call centers or service providers, bypassing basic voice-matching techniques [8],
[14], [24].
Another fundamental problem is the lack of adaptability in rule-based
systems. These systems require constant updates and manual tuning to keep
up with new phishing patterns. They cannot self-learn or evolve based on
new attack data, making them ill-suited for real-time detection in dynamic
environments like mobile networks or VoIP platforms [5], [17].
Furthermore, traditional models are limited in multilingual and code-mixed
scenarios, which are common in smishing messages targeting global or regional
user bases. For instance, models trained only on English-language data may
perform poorly when faced with phishing messages written in local dialects or
in a mix of languages, as shown in research focused on multilingual detection
challenges [17], [18].
Vulnerability to adversarial manipulation is another major limitation. At-
tackers can modify the structure of a message—changing words, altering sen-
tence format, or inserting irrelevant content—to evade detection without losing
the original malicious intent. These subtle modifications are often enough to
trick rule-based and conventional ML systems, while more robust models are
needed to detect these patterns reliably [3], [27].
Lastly, traditional detection systems lack the ability to analyze audio
signals effectively, making them unsuitable for vishing detection. Vishing
requires advanced analysis of acoustic patterns and sequential voice charac-
teristics—capabilities that traditional signal processing and machine learning
models lack [8], [20], [26].

Department of Information Technology 6


1.4 Emergence of Deep Learning Solutions
As traditional detection systems struggle to cope with the evolving nature of
smishing and vishing attacks, deep learning (DL) has emerged as a powerful
alternative capable of addressing the shortcomings of earlier methods. Deep
learning techniques offer the ability to automatically learn complex patterns,
contextual semantics, and sequential dependencies from raw data without
manual feature engineering. This has revolutionized how phishing detection
systems are developed, particularly in handling unstructured data such as SMS
text and voice signals.
Smishing detection has greatly benefited from natural language processing
(NLP) models built using deep neural architectures. Models like Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and Bidirectional
LSTMs (BiLSTM) are capable of understanding the sequence of words in a
message, allowing the system to identify malicious intent even in obfuscated or
contextually ambiguous text [5], [6], [18]. These models outperform traditional
ML methods by capturing dependencies between words and their meanings
over time, which is essential for identifying phishing messages that disguise
harmful intent within legitimate-sounding content.
Moreover, convolutional neural networks (CNNs), traditionally used in image
processing, have shown promise in text classification when adapted for 1D
convolutions. These models are efficient in identifying character-level and
word-level patterns in SMS messages and can be combined with RNNs for
improved accuracy [7], [27]. Transformer-based models like BERT (Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers) have further advanced smishing
detection capabilities. BERT-based models can analyze bidirectional context
and have achieved high accuracy in detecting phishing attempts even with
limited training data [15], [16], [19].
For vishing detection, the application of deep learning is equally impact-
ful. Audio-based data requires models that can extract temporal and spectral
features from voice recordings. CNNs applied to Mel spectrograms, which
transform audio into visual representations, allow the model to treat audio

Department of Information Technology 7


signals like images for classification purposes [8], [24]. More advanced archi-
tectures such as CNN + BiGRU and ResNet variants have been successfully
employed to detect fraudulent voice calls by learning from audio frequency
patterns and temporal sequences [14], [26].
One of the major advantages of deep learning is its ability to scale with
data and improve performance with exposure to new attack patterns. Unlike
traditional rule-based systems, deep learning models can generalize across
different types of messages, including code-mixed languages and adversarially
crafted content [3], [17]. Additionally, DL models can be deployed in real-time
systems, offering fast and accurate detection with minimal manual intervention
[5], [9].
Studies have demonstrated that hybrid deep learning architectures out-
perform standalone models. For instance, combining CNN with BiGRU or
integrating attention mechanisms enhances the model’s ability to focus on key
segments of input data that are indicative of phishing behavior [14], [27].
This has led to significant improvements in both detection accuracy and false
positive reduction.
Furthermore, deep learning enables continuous learning through transfer
learning and fine-tuning. Pre-trained models like BERT can be adapted to
specific domains such as SMS or voice phishing with minimal labeled data,
accelerating development and deployment [15], [19], [23].

1.5 Problem Statement


Attacks using smishing and vishing techniques have grown more common,
resulting in identity theft, large financial losses, and the compromise of private
data. Traditional approaches for identifying these attacks, such as Deci-
sion Trees, Support Vector Machines, and Naive Bayes classifiers, frequently
fail to handle the sequential and dynamic character of text messages phish-
ing(smishing) and voice phishing (vishing). This work focus on deep learning
techniques which best suits in detecting both smishing and vishing attacks.

Department of Information Technology 8


1.5.1 Key Challenges in Smishing & Vishing Detection
• Dynamic and Adaptive Attack Strategies

– Attackers continuously modify their tactics, using social engineering


techniques, urgency-inducing language, and impersonation of trusted
entities (e.g., banks, government agencies) [3][4].

– Unlike email phishing, smishing messages are shorter and more context-
dependent, making them harder to detect using conventional NLP meth-
ods [5][6].

• Adversarial Attacks on ML Models

– Cybercriminals employ adversarial perturbations (e.g., misspellings,


Unicode substitutions) to bypass machine learning-based detection systems
[3].

– Recent studies demonstrated that deep learning models like LSTM and
BERT can be deceived using carefully crafted adversarial examples [3].

• Multilingual and Regional Variations

– Smishing attacks are not limited to English; fraudsters exploit regional


languages (e.g., Swahili, Hindi, Spanish) to target victims [6][17].

– Most existing models are trained on English-centric datasets, limiting


their effectiveness in multilingual environments [17].

• Real-Time Detection Constraints

– Many current solutions rely on batch processing, introducing delays in


threat detection [5][20].

– Edge computing-based real-time detection is necessary to prevent


fraud before users interact with malicious messages [5][26].

• Lack of Labeled Datasets

– Publicly available datasets for smishing and vishing are limited and
imbalanced, affecting model training [25].

Department of Information Technology 9


– Synthetic data generation using Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) has been explored, but ethical concerns remain [25].

1.5.2 Research Gap & Project Focus


This project aims to develop an advanced, real-time detection framework
to combat evolving smishing and vishing threats through multiple innovative
approaches. The solution will leverage cutting-edge transformer-based models
for deep contextual analysis of suspicious messages, enabling more accurate
identification of phishing attempts. To counter sophisticated evasion tactics,
the system will incorporate adversarial training techniques that strengthen
model resilience against manipulated inputs. Recognizing the global nature of
these threats, the framework will extend its detection capabilities to multiple
languages using transfer learning methodologies. For practical deployment,
the project will focus on developing optimized, lightweight models capable
of running efficiently on edge devices, ensuring real-time protection without
compromising performance. The integrated approach combines natural language
understanding with robust security features to create a comprehensive defense
system against modern social engineering attacks delivered via SMS and voice
channels. This multi-faceted solution addresses current limitations in detection
accuracy, language coverage, and response times present in existing security
systems.

1.6 Objectives of the Project


This project aims to develop a comprehensive solution for detecting and
preventing smishing and vishing attacks through innovative deep learning
approaches. The key objectives are:

• Dual-Modality Phishing Detection System

– Develop integrated deep learning models capable of detecting both


SMS text (smishing) and voice call (vishing) fraud attempts, creating
a comprehensive solution for mobile communication security threats.

Department of Information Technology 10


– Implement separate but complementary processing pipelines opti-
mized for textual and audio data analysis, ensuring each modality
receives specialized treatment for maximum detection accuracy.

• Advanced Model Architectures

– Design and rigorously compare three distinct smishing detection


architectures (LSTM, GRU, CNN) for text analysis, evaluating their
respective strengths in processing sequential and local patterns in
SMS content.

– Develop three specialized vishing detection models (CNN+BiGRU,


Stacked GRU, ResNet-inspired) for audio processing, each employing
different approaches to analyze temporal and spectral features in call
recordings.

– Systematically optimize model hyperparameters through extensive


experimentation to achieve maximum detection accuracy while main-
taining computational efficiency.

• Data Processing Framework

– Implement a robust text preprocessing pipeline incorporating tok-


enization, sequence padding, and embedding generation to transform
raw SMS data into optimal formats for neural network analysis.

– Develop a comprehensive audio processing workflow featuring Mel


spectrogram conversion, time-frequency analysis, and signal normal-
ization to extract meaningful patterns from voice call recordings.

– Create carefully balanced training datasets for both smishing and


vishing scenarios, ensuring representative samples of legitimate and
fraudulent communications.

These objectives collectively address current limitations in phishing detection


while advancing the state-of-the-art in mobile communication security.

Department of Information Technology 11


CHAPTER 2

Literature Survey

2.1 Existing Approaches for Smishing Detection


The evolution of smishing detection methodologies has progressed through three
distinct technological generations. Initial solutions predominantly relied on rule-
based systems and static blacklists, which demonstrated modest accuracy rates
between 70-75% according to [1]. These systems proved inadequate against
evolving attack vectors due to their inability to adapt to novel patterns.
The subsequent generation embraced machine learning techniques, with [2]
demonstrating that Random Forest classifiers could achieve 89% accuracy by
analyzing over 85 distinct features including message length, special character
frequency, and URL properties. However, [3] exposed critical vulnerabilities in
these models, revealing how simple adversarial perturbations (such as character
substitutions like “PayP@l” instead of “PayPal”) could degrade detection
performance by up to 40%.

Figure 2.1: Example of a Smishing Attack Message

The current paradigm has shifted decisively toward deep learning architec-
tures, yielding significant improvements in detection capabilities. Research by
[16] established that convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could effectively
detect localized phishing patterns (including urgent action cues and suspicious

12
n-grams) with 96% precision. Complementary work by [18] demonstrated
that long short-term memory (LSTM) networks achieved superior performance
(98.2% F1-score) in capturing sequential dependencies and contextual relation-
ships within message content. The introduction of transformer models marked
a substantial breakthrough, with [19] reporting BERT-based systems attaining
99.1% accuracy through advanced contextual analysis of message semantics,
albeit requiring approximately 15 times more computational resources than
traditional machine learning approaches.Several persistent challenges continue
to impact smishing detection systems.

2.2 Existing Approaches for Vishing Detection


The detection of voice phishing (vishing) attacks presents unique technical
challenges due to the audio modality and real-time processing requirements.
Traditional detection systems primarily relied on call metadata analysis includ-
ing caller ID verification and blacklisting techniques. These methods demon-
strated moderate effectiveness but proved particularly vulnerable to number
spoofing and voice manipulation techniques [4], [14]. The introduction of voice
biometrics marked a significant advancement, enabling systems to analyze spec-
tral characteristics of human speech and detect synthetic voices with improved
accuracy [8],[24].

Figure 2.2: Example of a Vishing Attack Message

Modern vishing detection systems employ sophisticated deep learning archi-


tectures to analyze multiple aspects of voice communications. Contemporary
approaches typically process audio signals through spectrogram analysis using

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Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) to capture both frequency and
temporal patterns [8], [14]. Hybrid architectures combining convolutional neu-
ral networks with recurrent layers have shown particular success in modeling
both the spectral qualities of voice and the sequential nature of speech patterns
[14], [26]. For practical deployment, these models often undergo optimization
through techniques like quantization and pruning to meet stringent latency
requirements [24].
Current vishing detection systems generally incorporate three complemen-
tary analysis strategies:

• Content Analysis: Natural language processing of call transcripts to


identify phishing intent and social engineering patterns [10], [19]

• Voice Characteristics: Spectral analysis of voice quality to detect


synthetic voices and audio artifacts [8], [24]

• Behavioral Patterns: Examination of call metadata and interaction


sequences for suspicious patterns [4], [11]

Several significant challenges persist in the field of vishing detection:

• Real-time Processing: The need for sub-second response times imposes


strict computational constraints [24]

• Multilingual Support: Performance degradation when processing non-


training language samples [17], [19]

• Data Diversity: Limited coverage of regional accents and cultural social


engineering tactics [11], [20]

• Evolving Threats: Increasing sophistication of voice synthesis and


manipulation technologies [3], [22]

Emerging solutions focus on hybrid approaches that combine multiple detec-


tion modalities and adaptive learning techniques [14], [26]. Recent developments
include federated learning frameworks that enable continuous model improve-
ment while addressing privacy concerns [22]. However, the rapid advancement

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Table 2.1: Literature Survey on Smishing and Vishing Detection
Author(s) Title / Approach Techniques Used Dataset Accuracy
[1] Smishing detection using ma- SVM, Naive Bayes, Custom SMS 95%
chine learning classifiers Decision Tree dataset with
Random
Forest
[2] Deep learning model for LSTM, GRU, RNN SMS Spam Col- 97%
spam SMS detection lection with
LSTM
[3] Hybrid ML model for smish- TF-IDF + SVM Private SMS 94%
ing attack detection dataset with
SVM
[4] Audio call scam detection CNN on spectrograms Synthetic vishing 91%
using CNN audio
[5] Vishing detection using deep CNN + BiGRU VCTK dataset 95%
speech embeddings
[6] Smishing classifier using NLP Word2Vec + Logistic SMS Spam 93%
Regression dataset
[7] Voice phishing fraud detec- Spectrogram + VoIP call logs 90%
tion LSTM with
LSTM
[8] Transformer-based vishing Audio Spectrogram Custom voice 65%
detection Transformer data
[9] SMS spam filtering using en- XGBoost, Random Kaggle SMS data 96%
semble learning Forest with
XG-
Boost
[10] Vishing detection using MFCC + CNN VoIP calls 89%
speech signals
[11] LSTM and BERT hybrid for BERT + BiLSTM SMS Spam corpus 97%
smishing with
BERT-
LSTM
[12] Vishing detection using Gaussian Mixture Phishing call au- 84%
GMM Models dio
[13] Real-time vishing detection Attention-RNN Telecom call data 93%
with RNN
[14] SMS spam detection using 1D CNN + embed- SMS Spam 95%
CNN dings dataset
[15] Audio feature extraction for MFCC + BiGRU Public call 94%
fraud calls dataset

of generative AI for voice synthesis presents ongoing challenges that require


constant innovation in detection methodologies [3], [24]. The field continues to
evolve toward more robust, efficient systems capable of handling the diverse
and dynamic nature of modern vishing threats.

2.3 Application of NLP in Phishing Detection


Natural Language Processing (NLP) has become a critical pillar in the field of
cybersecurity, particularly in the detection of phishing attacks like smishing and
vishing. NLP techniques help in understanding, interpreting, and classifying
human language data — a central characteristic of smishing, where text
messages are crafted to appear legitimate. Traditional detection mechanisms,
such as blacklist-based filters or rule-based models, fall short in the face of novel

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and adaptive phishing attacks. NLP, in contrast, facilitates dynamic detection
by examining semantic and contextual elements of textual communication [1],
[2], [21].
Smishing attacks leverage SMS messages that are short, ambiguous, and
often structured to provoke immediate action, such as clicking a link or
revealing sensitive credentials. NLP enables automated systems to parse these
messages and detect linguistic patterns associated with phishing. For instance,
keywords related to urgency, monetary gain, or account-related services often
recur in phishing messages [6], [7], [18]. Classical NLP techniques like Term
Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), Bag of Words (BoW), and
Word2Vec have been widely applied to capture the frequency and semantic
relevance of such terms in a corpus [1], [2].
Recent literature indicates that machine learning models, when combined
with NLP features, demonstrate improved accuracy in spam and phishing
detection. By transforming raw text into numerical vectors through tokenization
and embedding, algorithms like Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines
(SVM), and Random Forests can effectively discriminate between benign and
malicious content [5], [16], [17]. However, these classical models have limitations
in capturing the context and sequence in language, especially in smishing where
word order may carry important clues.
Deep learning-based NLP models have significantly outperformed tradi-
tional methods. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM), and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) models use embedded represen-
tations of tokens to capture dependencies and sequential patterns in phishing
texts [5], [6], [16]. These architectures are able to retain contextual information
over longer sequences, making them particularly suited for classifying nuanced
SMS content. For example, an LSTM can differentiate between ”verify your
account” and ”account has been verified”, which may be indistinguishable
under a BoW approach.
Furthermore, transformer-based models like BERT (Bidirectional Encoder
Representations from Transformers) have revolutionized the field by introducing
attention mechanisms that model relationships between all words in a sentence

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simultaneously. This ability to consider context bidirectionally enables BERT
to detect phishing attempts with greater nuance [15], [19], [23]. Studies have
demonstrated that models like MobileBERT and DistilBERT, due to their
efficiency and reduced computational complexity, are ideal for mobile device
deployment while maintaining state-of-the-art performance in spam detection
[15], [19].
In addition to lexical analysis, modern NLP systems also incorporate Named
Entity Recognition (NER) to detect entities such as URLs, phone numbers,
and account references which are often manipulated in phishing messages
[6], [10]. This improves the model’s ability to identify deceptive patterns.
Preprocessing steps, such as stopword removal, stemming, lemmatization, and
text normalization, are critical to enhance NLP model performance and reduce
noise in the dataset.
The application of NLP extends to vishing detection as well, especially when
transcripts of voice calls are available. Text derived from speech recognition
can be subjected to the same NLP pipeline, enabling unified analysis across
smishing and vishing data [4], [8], [24]. This convergence of modalities further
supports the development of holistic cybersecurity frameworks.
Despite its advancements, NLP in phishing detection still faces challenges
such as data imbalance, multilingual text, and the evolution of phishing tactics
that mimic legitimate behavior [17], [20]. Future research is expected to
explore multilingual NLP models, adversarial training techniques, and domain
adaptation to make phishing detection more robust and globally applicable.
NLP forms the backbone of effective phishing detection systems, especially
when enhanced by deep learning and transformer-based architectures. It enables
systems to go beyond surface-level analysis and understand the deeper intent
and structure of malicious content, ultimately aiding in the protection of users
from deceptive cyber threats.

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2.4 Use of Deep Learning Models in Smishing
and Vishing
Deep learning has significantly transformed the landscape of phishing detection
by enabling systems to learn complex patterns directly from raw data. Smishing
and vishing attacks, which exploit human communication through SMS and
voice calls respectively, exhibit subtle and context-dependent characteristics
that traditional machine learning algorithms often fail to capture. The use of
deep neural networks has therefore emerged as a highly effective strategy for
detecting these types of attacks [5], [6], [14].
In the domain of smishing detection, text data in SMS messages is
inherently sequential and context-sensitive. Deep learning models like Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) are partic-
ularly well-suited for this task as they can preserve contextual dependencies
over time steps [5], [16], [18]. In this research, a tokenized and padded SMS
dataset sourced from the UCI Machine Learning Repository was utilized. Each
message, labeled as either ”ham” or ”spam,” was processed and encoded into
numerical sequences. These sequences were fed into LSTM and GRU models
to capture the long-term dependencies between words in phishing messages.
The LSTM model utilized an embedding layer to represent words in a dense
vector space, followed by a 64-unit LSTM layer that processed the sequential
information. A sigmoid-activated output neuron provided binary classification.
Similarly, the GRU model, which offers a simpler and more efficient architecture
compared to LSTM, demonstrated near-equivalent performance. Both models
effectively detected semantic and syntactic cues typical of smishing attacks,
such as urgency phrases or phishing URLs [5], [16].
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) were also explored for smish-
ing detection. Unlike RNNs, CNNs are adept at identifying local patterns
such as n-grams. The architecture included a 1D convolutional layer fol-
lowed by pooling and dense layers. Despite their non-sequential nature, CNNs
yielded high precision and recall, outperforming LSTM in some metrics due to
their ability to capture spam-indicative patterns such as link structures and

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command phrases [7], [27].
In the case of vishing detection, deep learning approaches focus on
analyzing audio signals. Raw audio data was transformed into Mel spectrograms
using the Librosa library. These spectrograms offer a visual representation of
the frequency content over time and are particularly well-suited for CNN-based
models [8], [14], [24].
Multiple architectures were investigated:

• CNN + BiGRU: This hybrid model combined convolutional layers for


feature extraction with bidirectional GRU layers for temporal pattern
recognition. It effectively captured both spatial and sequential character-
istics of fraudulent voice signals [14], [26].

• Stacked GRU: A two-layer GRU architecture was employed to model


temporal dependencies over long audio sequences. This model demon-
strated superior performance in capturing voice anomalies indicative of
vishing [20], [26].

• ResNet-Inspired CNN: This model used residual connections to facili-


tate the training of deeper CNNs. Though capable of extracting high-level
features, the limited size of the dataset led to minor overfitting, and its
performance was marginally lower than GRU-based models [14], [24].

All models were trained using the binary cross-entropy loss function and
the Adam optimizer. Training was conducted over 20+ epochs with an 80:20
train-test split. Evaluation metrics included accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-
score. The CNN and LSTM models achieved an accuracy of 99% for smishing
detection, whereas the Stacked GRU model achieved 98.90% accuracy for
vishing detection, validating the robustness of these architectures [5], [14].
These results confirm that deep learning models, with their ability to
model non-linear and hierarchical relationships, are particularly suited for
phishing detection. Moreover, hybrid architectures that combine spatial and
temporal analysis further enhance detection performance, especially in audio-
based vishing scenarios [14], [26].

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Despite their success, deep learning models are computationally intensive
and require large labeled datasets for training. Transfer learning, data aug-
mentation, and model compression techniques like pruning and quantization
are potential solutions to these limitations [14], [22]. For future work, incorpo-
rating multilingual datasets and exploring transformer-based deep architectures
like AudioBERT for vishing could yield further improvements [24], [23].
Deep learning models, by leveraging both sequence learning and feature
extraction capabilities, provide a comprehensive solution for detecting smish-
ing and vishing attacks, thereby significantly advancing the field of mobile
cybersecurity.

2.5 Role of Transformer Models (e.g., BERT, Mo-


bileBERT)
Transformer-based models have revolutionized natural language processing
(NLP) through their ability to model bidirectional context and long-range
dependencies using attention mechanisms. In phishing detection, especially
smishing and vishing, where subtle linguistic and contextual cues determine
the legitimacy of a message or call, transformers offer a significant performance
edge over traditional and recurrent architectures [15], [19].
One of the most influential models in this domain is BERT (Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers). Unlike RNNs or LSTMs
that process sequences in a unidirectional or bidirectional but sequential man-
ner, BERT utilizes the transformer architecture to simultaneously attend to
all tokens in a sentence. This self-attention mechanism enables it to consider
both left and right contexts, making it exceptionally suitable for identifying
context-aware phishing attempts [19], [23].
BERT has been applied in smishing detection tasks by fine-tuning its
pretrained layers on labeled SMS datasets. The embedding generated from
BERT captures not only semantic information but also the syntactic structure,
enabling better discrimination between benign and malicious text. Studies show
that fine-tuned BERT models outperform classical machine learning models

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and even LSTM-based architectures in phishing detection tasks [15], [16], [19].
Accuracy improvements of 1–3% have been observed, with significantly reduced
false positive rates.
In practical deployments, full-sized BERT models may be computationally
expensive, particularly for mobile environments where smishing typically occurs.
For this reason, variants such as DistilBERT and MobileBERT have been
adopted. MobileBERT, in particular, retains the core transformer architecture
but introduces architectural optimizations such as bottleneck layers and inverted
bottlenecks to reduce memory footprint and inference time. This makes it a
practical solution for real-time smishing detection on mobile platforms [19],
[27].
Transformer models also support multilingual phishing detection, which
is essential in global communication systems. Fine-tuning on datasets from
multiple languages allows BERT to generalize better across different linguistic
patterns [17], [19]. Moreover, phishing messages often attempt to mimic
trustworthy communication using domain-specific terminology. Transformer
models, pretrained on vast corpora, already possess the language understanding
to catch such nuanced impersonation strategies [15], [23].
Beyond text-based smishing, transformers are also making inroads into
audio-based vishing detection. While traditional models rely on spectrograms
processed via CNNs, recent transformer-based models like Audio Spectro-
gram Transformer (AST) or AudioBERT are beginning to show promise
in learning both temporal and frequency representations directly from raw au-
dio or spectrogram features. These models apply the self-attention mechanism
to audio frames, enabling them to capture complex temporal dependencies
which are crucial for detecting fraudulent voice patterns [24].
In integrated frameworks, transformers can be combined with Named Entity
Recognition (NER) to improve phishing detection further. By identifying
and analyzing elements like URLs, phone numbers, and names, transformers
contextualize these tokens and evaluate their legitimacy within the broader
message content [6], [10].
Despite their advantages, transformers come with challenges such as in-

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creased training time and resource requirements. Mitigation strategies include
using knowledge distillation, quantization, and pruning to make models suitable
for embedded devices [15], [19]. Researchers are also exploring transformer
variants tailored to specific domains, such as BERTweet for social media
phishing and TinyBERT for edge devices.
Transformer models such as BERT and MobileBERT significantly advance
the field of phishing detection. Their ability to understand context-rich and
deceptive messages makes them highly effective in identifying smishing attacks.
As transformer-based architectures are extended to audio processing, their role
in vishing detection is expected to grow, offering a unified and powerful
solution for combating both text and voice phishing threats.

2.6 Dataset Characteristics and Challenges


The development of an effective phishing detection system, especially for
smishing and vishing attacks, is highly dependent on the availability and
quality of datasets. In this research, two datasets were employed — one for
SMS-based smishing detection and another for voice-based vishing detection.
Each dataset presents unique characteristics and introduces specific challenges
that influence model performance and generalizability [5], [14].

2.6.1 SMS Spam Dataset (UCI Repository)


This dataset comprises 5,572 labeled SMS messages categorized as either “ham”
(legitimate) or “spam” (phishing). It is widely used for training and evaluating
text-based spam detection models. The dataset includes short message content,
making it ideal for identifying linguistic patterns associated with smishing. The
primary features include:

• Text message content: Often short, containing URLs, urgent language,


or spoofed brand names [1], [7].

• Label: Binary class indicating spam (1) or ham (0).

Challenges:

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• Class Imbalance: The dataset contains significantly more legitimate mes-
sages than spam, which can bias the model toward the majority class
and affect the recall rate for spam detection [5], [21].

• Limited Context: SMS messages are typically short and lack rich context,
making it harder to detect subtle phishing cues [2], [16].

• Lexical Variation: Attackers often use misspellings or obfuscated links to


bypass keyword-based filters, requiring robust preprocessing and semantic
understanding [6], [15].

2.6.2 Fraud Call Dataset (Audio-based)


This simulated dataset includes 200 audio call samples labeled as either
“normal” or “fraud”. It consists of a mix of metadata and raw audio
recordings, making it suitable for training deep learning models on voice-based
vishing detection.
Features:

• call id, call type, caller gender, language, duration, emotion,


transcript, and audio file.

• Voice recordings are converted into Mel spectrograms, which visually


represent the frequency content over time [8], [24].

Challenges:

• Small Dataset Size: With only 200 samples, the dataset is prone to
overfitting when training deep learning models. It limits the model’s
generalization capacity [20], [26].

• Labeling Complexity: Vishing detection requires accurate labels indicating


whether a call is malicious or not. In real-world scenarios, this can be
ambiguous and subjective [4], [11].

• Audio Quality Variation: Differences in speaker accent, background noise,


and recording quality introduce variability that affects spectrogram gen-
eration and model robustness [8], [14].

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• Emotion and Tone Detection: Identifying stress, urgency, or manipulation
in voice is complex and requires sophisticated temporal modeling [14],
[24].

Cross-Modal Challenges: The integration of smishing and vishing de-


tection into a unified system also introduces challenges:

• Heterogeneous Data Types: Combining textual and audio data requires


models capable of handling multiple modalities [5], [19].

• Feature Alignment: Text embeddings and audio spectrogram features


exist in different dimensional spaces, complicating fusion strategies [14],
[24].

• Computational Overhead: Audio preprocessing (e.g., Mel spectrogram


generation) is computationally intensive and may not be feasible for
real-time applications without optimization [24].

Data Augmentation and Preprocessing: To mitigate these challenges,


extensive preprocessing is applied:

• Text: Tokenization, padding, stopword removal, and encoding for uniform


model input [5], [6].

• Audio: Spectrogram normalization, duration alignment, and filtering of


noise to enhance consistency [8], [14].

Future Considerations: Future datasets should strive for:

• Larger and more diverse samples across demographics, languages, and


attack types [17], [20].

• Real-world data collected from communication networks or user devices


with privacy-compliant labeling [9], [13].

• Balanced class distributions and inclusion of edge cases such as spoofed


calls/messages mimicking trusted entities [3], [27].

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2.7 Identified Research Gaps
Despite substantial progress in applying deep learning and natural language
processing (NLP) techniques to detect phishing attacks, several research gaps
persist in the domains of smishing and vishing detection. These gaps, if
addressed, can significantly enhance the reliability, generalization, and appli-
cability of intelligent anti-phishing systems.

• Unified Detection Systems Currently, most existing works focus on


either smishing or vishing detection in isolation. While smishing detection
is more mature due to the availability of text-based datasets, vishing
detection remains underexplored, particularly in the context of deep
learning [50], [57], [73]. There is a lack of integrated frameworks that
can simultaneously process textual and audio modalities to provide a
comprehensive anti-phishing solution. This fragmentation limits real-
world applicability, where attackers often use multiple communication
channels.

• Limited Availability of Vishing Datasets A critical bottleneck in ad-


vancing vishing detection is the scarcity of labeled, high-quality datasets.
Most available datasets are either simulated or small in scale, which
hampers the training of deep learning models that require extensive
data for generalization [50], [54], [60]. Unlike text-based phishing, which
has benefited from open repositories like the UCI SMS spam dataset,
audio-based datasets for fraudulent call detection are rarely public due
to privacy concerns and the difficulty of manual annotation.

• Insufficient Multilingual Support Many phishing attacks target users


across different linguistic backgrounds. However, the majority of research
is conducted using English datasets, which fails to account for phishing
attempts in regional or multilingual contexts [56], [58], [67]. This language
bias results in models that are ineffective outside of their training domains.
The need for cross-lingual and multilingual models is critical for expanding
the usability of detection systems across global user bases.

Department of Information Technology 25


• Context and Semantic Awareness Deficiencies Traditional machine
learning models and even early deep learning models often struggle
to capture contextual and semantic subtleties in text. For example,
messages that use implied threats or mimic legitimate communication
styles (e.g., from banks or government agencies) are hard to detect
without deep contextual understanding [28], [30], [36], [49]. Although
transformer models like BERT have improved performance, their adoption
is still limited in real-time mobile security applications due to resource
constraints [51], [63].

• High False Positive Rates In practical deployments, high false positives


can reduce user trust and the usability of phishing detection systems.
Many existing models focus on maximizing accuracy but do not address
the trade-off between precision and recall effectively [34], [35], [41]. This
is especially problematic in vishing detection, where background noise,
speaker variability, and accents may confuse models and lead to incorrect
classifications [53], [64].

• Lack of Real-Time Detection Capabilities Many models are designed


for offline batch processing rather than real-time inference. For mobile
or embedded systems, low-latency, low-memory models are required to
detect smishing or vishing attempts as they occur [51], [54], [68]. Model
optimization techniques such as pruning, quantization, and knowledge
distillation are underutilized in current research but are necessary to
meet these real-world requirements [55], [66].

• Insufficient Use of Hybrid Architectures While hybrid models such as


CNN+BiGRU or LSTM+Attention have shown promising results in small-
scale studies, their systematic comparison across datasets and modalities
is lacking [36], [60], [63]. Few studies evaluate how combining spatial
and temporal learning (especially in spectrograms for vishing) compares
against using CNNs or RNNs in isolation.

• Adversarial Robustness and Security As phishing detection systems


improve, attackers also evolve their strategies. Current models are rarely

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tested against adversarial examples — such as slightly altered messages
that still convey the same malicious intent [3], [52], [70]. Research is
needed into adversarial training methods and robustness testing to ensure
models are resilient to obfuscation tactics and evasion strategies [39], [69].

• Lack of User-Centric Evaluations Most studies report technical met-


rics (e.g., accuracy, F1-score) but do not consider the user experience,
including alert fatigue or the cognitive load of false alarms [42], [43],
[44]. Designing phishing detection systems that balance technical efficacy
with user acceptability remains an open problem.

• Absence of Continual and Adaptive Learning Phishing attacks


constantly evolve. Static models trained on a fixed dataset quickly become
obsolete [29], [48], [74]. However, current systems rarely implement
continual learning, incremental updates, or feedback loops that allow
the model to adapt to new types of attacks without full retraining
[55], [65], [72].To build robust, scalable, and real-time smishing and
vishing detection systems, these gaps must be addressed. Future research
should prioritize multilingual, multimodal, and adaptive solutions that
incorporate transformer architectures, real-time deployment strategies,
and adversarial robustness [49], [56].

Department of Information Technology 27


CHAPTER 3

Research Methodology

3.1 Problem Definition and Research Strategy


The exponential rise in phishing attacks, particularly smishing and vishing,
has necessitated the development of intelligent and adaptive detection systems.
Smishing leverages deceptive SMS messages to trick users into disclosing
personal information, while vishing uses voice calls for similar malicious intent.
The primary problem addressed in this research is the lack of a unified, deep
learning-based framework capable of accurately detecting both smishing and
vishing attacks in real time.
The research strategy involves a dual-modality approach: processing textual
data (SMS) using NLP and deep learning models, and audio data (voice calls)
using spectrogram analysis combined with deep neural networks. The models
are designed, trained, and evaluated on appropriate datasets, with the aim to
maximize classification accuracy while minimizing false positives. The system
is optimized for mobile and edge environments where these attacks are most
prevalent.

3.2 Overview of Deep Learning Approach


This research employs deep learning models due to their superior ability to
learn complex, non-linear patterns in data. For smishing detection, models such
as LSTM, GRU, and CNN are used to process tokenized SMS messages. For
vishing detection, voice call recordings are converted into Mel spectrograms,
and models like CNN+BiGRU, stacked GRU, and ResNet-inspired CNN are
employed.
The workflow involves data preprocessing, model design, training, validation,
and evaluation. TensorFlow and Keras are the primary frameworks used.
Binary cross-entropy is employed as the loss function, and performance is

28
measured using metrics like accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score.

3.3 Dataset Details

SMS Spam Dataset (UCI Repository)

The SMS dataset used in this study is sourced from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository and contains 5,572 messages labeled as either ”ham” or ”spam.”
Each entry includes the text content and the label. This dataset is preprocessed
through text cleaning, tokenization, and padding to ensure uniform input for
deep learning models.

Fraud Call Dataset (Audio-based)

The vishing dataset consists of 200 labeled audio recordings simulating both
normal and fraudulent calls. Features include call type, gender, duration,
transcript, and the audio file itself. These recordings are converted into Mel
spectrograms for deep learning model input.

3.4 Data Preprocessing Techniques

3.4.1 Text Cleaning and Tokenization


Text data undergoes several preprocessing steps:

• Removal of punctuation, numbers, and special characters

• Conversion to lowercase

• Tokenization using Keras Tokenizer

• Padding sequences to a uniform length of 100 tokens

• Label encoding: spam = 1, ham = 0

3.4.2 Mel Spectrogram Generation for Audio


Audio recordings are processed as follows:

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• Conversion to mono and resampling

• Mel spectrogram extraction using Librosa

• Padding or trimming to a fixed size of 128×216

• Normalization to scale values between 0 and 1

3.5 Summary of Model Pipelines


The architecture of the system consists of two primary pipelines:

• Smishing Detection Pipeline: Takes preprocessed SMS messages, ap-


plies word embedding, and passes them through LSTM, GRU, or CNN
layers. The output is a binary prediction (ham or spam).

• Vishing Detection Pipeline: Converts audio into Mel spectrograms


and applies CNN+BiGRU, stacked GRU, or ResNet-inspired CNN models.
The output classifies the call as normal or fraud.

These pipelines are trained and evaluated separately. Their performance


is benchmarked using common classification metrics to ensure robustness and
reliability of the models in phishing detection scenarios.

Department of Information Technology 30


CHAPTER 4

System Architecture and Model Design

4.1 Overall System Architecture


The system architecture is designed to support a dual-modality phishing
detection framework. It consists of two primary pipelines: one for smishing
detection using textual data and another for vishing detection using audio
data. The architecture incorporates stages for data ingestion, preprocessing,
model inference, and prediction. For smishing, SMS messages are tokenized
and fed into deep learning models; for vishing, audio recordings are converted
into Mel spectrograms before classification.
The architecture is modular to facilitate easy scaling and deployment on
edge or mobile devices. TensorFlow and Keras are used for deep learning
model implementation, while Librosa handles audio preprocessing.

4.2 Smishing Detection Models


To detect smishing attacks effectively, several deep learning architectures were
explored using SMS datasets. These models process textual data and aim to
distinguish between legitimate and malicious messages based on contextual,
semantic, and syntactic patterns. Each architecture was evaluated for its
ability to handle varying linguistic structures, detect subtle cues of deception,
and manage imbalanced data.

4.2.1 LSTM-based Model


The Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-based model was designed to capture
long-range dependencies and semantic context within SMS text. The archi-
tecture begins with an Embedding layer with an input dimension of 5000
(representing the vocabulary size) and an output dimension of 64, which con-

31
verts word indices into dense vectors. This embedding is followed by a 64-unit
LSTM layer that maintains a memory of prior words and their relationships.
LSTM networks are particularly suitable for sequence modeling tasks like
smishing detection because they are capable of retaining important information
over long text sequences and mitigating vanishing gradient problems. The
output from the LSTM layer is passed to a fully connected Dense layer with
a sigmoid activation function, which outputs a binary classification indicating
whether a message is smishing or safe.
Although LSTMs provide strong performance in modeling temporal se-
quences, they tend to be computationally intensive and require more training
time compared to simpler architectures like GRUs. Nevertheless, this model
demonstrated high recall, indicating its strength in identifying most malicious
messages, albeit with slightly increased false positives.

4.2.2 GRU-based Model


The GRU-based model shares a similar structure with the LSTM model but
replaces the LSTM unit with a 64-unit Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU). GRUs
simplify the internal structure by combining the forget and input gates into a
single update gate, making them more computationally efficient.
This model starts with the same Embedding layer (input dimension=5000,
output dimension=64) followed by a GRU layer and a Dense output layer with
sigmoid activation. Despite its simpler architecture, the GRU model achieves
comparable accuracy to the LSTM model while reducing training time and
memory usage.
GRUs are effective at capturing short to medium dependencies in text
and are particularly advantageous when hardware constraints or latency are
considerations. In the smishing detection task, the GRU model balanced
precision and recall well, making it a practical choice for real-time SMS
filtering applications.

Department of Information Technology 32


4.2.3 CNN-based Model
The Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based model leverages local feature
detection to identify patterns in text sequences. The architecture begins with
an Embedding layer, followed by a 1D convolutional layer (Conv1D) with 128
filters and a kernel size of 5. This layer extracts n-gram level features by
sliding a window over the embedded text.
Next, a GlobalMaxPooling1D layer is applied to retain the most impor-
tant features, reducing the output dimensionality while maintaining the most
significant signals. A Dense layer with sigmoid activation produces the final
binary classification.
CNNs are especially effective at detecting local phrases or keywords com-
monly associated with smishing (e.g., “urgent”, “click here”, “update account”).
Unlike RNNs, CNNs allow for parallel processing and require fewer compu-
tational resources. This model demonstrated the highest accuracy among all
smishing detection models, making it an ideal candidate for lightweight and
fast deployments in mobile or edge-based environments.

4.3 Vishing Detection Models


Detecting vishing (voice phishing) requires processing raw audio inputs and
converting them into time-frequency representations such as Mel spectrograms.
Deep learning models are then trained to detect fraud-related acoustic cues in
these spectrograms. The models below were designed to handle the complex
temporal and spatial nature of audio data.

4.3.1 CNN + BiGRU Model


This hybrid model combines the strengths of convolutional layers for spa-
tial feature extraction with Bidirectional GRU (BiGRU) layers for capturing
temporal dependencies in audio sequences. The architecture begins with two
Conv2D layers that apply filters across the Mel spectrograms. These are
followed by Batch Normalization to stabilize learning, MaxPooling to reduce
dimensionality, and Dropout layers to prevent overfitting.

Department of Information Technology 33


The resulting feature map is reshaped and passed through a 64-unit BiGRU
layer. Bidirectionality allows the model to process the audio sequence in both
forward and backward directions, enhancing its ability to detect nuanced
patterns in voice calls.
The output from the BiGRU is passed through Dense layers with ReLU
and sigmoid activations to produce the final binary classification. This model
achieved high accuracy and recall in vishing detection, confirming its effec-
tiveness in learning both spatial and sequential representations from audio
signals.

4.3.2 Stacked GRU Model


The stacked GRU architecture was designed to enhance sequential modeling
capabilities by layering multiple GRU units. This model takes Mel spectrogram
inputs (transposed to match temporal dimensions) and passes them through
two GRU layers: one with 128 units and another with 64 units. The first
GRU layer uses return sequences=True to ensure the second layer receives
full temporal context.
Batch Normalization and Dropout layers are added between the GRU layers
to mitigate overfitting and accelerate convergence. A final Dense layer followed
by a sigmoid activation provides binary classification.
The model excels at identifying temporal dependencies in speech and
intonation patterns that might indicate fraudulent intent. It offers a balanced
performance with robust generalization, especially when trained with diverse
voice call data containing varying speaker accents and noise levels.

4.3.3 ResNet-Inspired Model


The ResNet-inspired model is built on the concept of residual learning, which
addresses the problem of vanishing gradients in deep neural networks. This
model starts with a large Conv2D layer (kernel size 7x7) followed by four
residual blocks. Each residual block consists of two Conv2D layers with
identity skip connections that allow the input to bypass the transformation
layers, preserving original information.

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The number of filters in each residual block increases progressively (32, 64,
128, 256), enabling the model to learn both low- and high-level features. After
the residual blocks, a Global Average Pooling layer reduces dimensionality,
followed by Dense layers that culminate in a sigmoid activation for binary out-
put.While this model is computationally more demanding, it achieved strong
performance in identifying vishing calls and demonstrated resilience to au-
dio variations. Its deep structure and skip connections allowed it to learn
complex representations effectively, making it suitable for high-accuracy offline
applications.

Figure 4.1: Flowchart of Deep Learning models on SMS and voice call
datasets

Department of Information Technology 35


4.4 Tools and Technologies Used
The implementation of the smishing and vishing detection system involved a
combination of specialized libraries and frameworks tailored for deep learning,
audio processing, natural language processing, and visualization. Each tool
played a critical role in different phases of the project, including data prepro-
cessing, model development, training, evaluation, and result interpretation.

• TensorFlow/Keras: TensorFlow, along with its high-level API Keras,


was the primary deep learning framework used for building and training
the models. For smishing detection, recurrent architectures such as LSTM
and GRU, as well as CNNs, were implemented using Keras’ modular
structure. In the vishing detection pipeline, GRU-based models and
ResNet-based architectures were developed using TensorFlow to handle
sequential Mel spectrogram inputs. The framework’s flexibility allowed
for efficient tuning of hyperparameters, incorporation of regularization
techniques (e.g., dropout and batch normalization), and deployment-ready
model saving.

• Librosa: Librosa was extensively used in the vishing detection module


for audio preprocessing and feature extraction. Raw voice call recordings
were loaded, trimmed, normalized, and converted into Mel spectrograms
using Librosa’s audio signal processing functions. These time-frequency
representations served as the primary input to CNN, GRU, and ResNet-
based deep learning models, allowing them to learn fraud-related patterns
from audio characteristics.

• NumPy and Pandas: These foundational Python libraries were used


for data manipulation, cleaning, and feature engineering. NumPy was
integral for numerical operations on arrays and spectrogram matrices,
while Pandas facilitated structured handling of SMS messages, labels,
and model predictions. In the smishing detection task, Pandas was also
used to preprocess text datasets, tokenize sequences, and prepare input
batches for training.

Department of Information Technology 36


• Matplotlib and Seaborn: These visualization libraries were employed
to create performance comparison plots including bar charts of accu-
racy, precision, recall, and F1-score, as well as training-validation curves.
Seaborn was particularly useful in generating aesthetically enhanced con-
fusion matrices that clearly depicted the classification accuracy of each
model. These visualizations played an essential role in model evaluation
and comparison.

• Scikit-learn: Scikit-learn was used for a range of utility functions,


including dataset splitting (e.g., train-test split), label encoding, stan-
dardization, and metric evaluation. It provided built-in functions to
compute key evaluation metrics such as accuracy, precision, recall, and
F1-score. Additionally, the library’s confusion matrix utilities were in-
tegrated into the analysis pipeline for detailed classification performance
insights.

Each of these tools contributed to the overall development and assessment


of the smishing and vishing detection framework. Their integration allowed for
efficient processing of both textual and audio data, enabling the construction of
robust and scalable deep learning models tailored for cybersecurity applications.

4.5 Design Constraints and Assumptions


• The SMS dataset is assumed to be clean and representative of real-world
messages.

• The audio dataset is simulated due to the unavailability of real labeled


fraudulent calls.

• Models are optimized for binary classification (legitimate vs. phishing).

• Preprocessing pipelines normalize input data to reduce variance and


improve generalization.

• Deployment targets are resource-constrained environments, so model ef-


ficiency is considered.

Department of Information Technology 37


CHAPTER 5

Implementation and Experimental Results

5.1 Experimental Setup and Parameters


The development and evaluation of deep learning models for detecting
smishing and vishing attacks required a carefully configured experimental
setup. This setup included both hardware and software specifications suitable
for training computationally intensive deep learning models, as well as a series
of hyperparameters tuned through experimentation to yield optimal results.
All experiments were conducted on a dedicated machine equipped with
a 16GB RAM, Intel Core i7 processor (10th Gen), and NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1660 GPU with 8GB VRAM. The availability of GPU acceleration was
essential for training deep models, particularly those that used convolutional
and recurrent layers, which can otherwise be time-consuming on CPU-only
systems.
The project was implemented using Python 3.8, with the deep learning
models developed using TensorFlow 2.x and the Keras API. These frameworks
were chosen for their flexibility, support for GPU training, and extensive
community support. For preprocessing audio data, the Librosa library was
used, while NumPy, Pandas, and Matplotlib were used for data handling and
result visualization.
The experimental process began with data preprocessing. The SMS dataset
was subjected to operations such as tokenization, stopword removal, lowercas-
ing, punctuation cleaning, and padding to a fixed input length of 100 tokens.
These steps ensured uniformity in model input. The voice dataset consisted
of 200 audio recordings (100 normal and 100 fraudulent calls), which were
converted into Mel spectrograms with a fixed shape of 128 × 216 pixels to
ensure compatibility across deep learning models. These spectrograms were
normalized and resized appropriately to fit GPU memory constraints.

38
The training data was split using an 80:20 train-test split to ensure reliable
performance evaluation. Furthermore, 10% of the training data was reserved for
validation to monitor the models for overfitting or underfitting during training.
All models were trained using the Adam optimizer, which is a widely adopted
stochastic gradient descent variant known for its computational efficiency and
suitability for non-convex optimization. The learning rate was set to 0.001
for most models, and binary crossentropy was used as the loss function due
to the binary nature of the classification task.The following hyperparameters
were fixed across most experiments:

• Batch Size: 32

• Epochs: 20 to 30 (with early stopping monitored on validation loss)

• Activation Function: ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit) for hidden layers


and Sigmoid for the output layer

• Embedding Dimension: 100 for SMS models

• Padding Type: Post-padding for text sequences

• Dropout Rate: 0.2–0.5 (depending on model depth) to prevent overfit-


ting

5.2 Performance Metrics Used


To evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of the deep learning models
developed for smishing (SMS-based phishing) and vishing (voice-based phishing)
detection, several standard performance metrics were employed. These metrics
provide quantitative insights into how well the models distinguish between
spam/fraud and legitimate communications, and help identify any potential
trade-offs between precision, recall, and overall accuracy.

1. Accuracy
Accuracy is the most commonly used metric that measures the overall
correctness of the model by calculating the ratio of correctly predicted instances

Department of Information Technology 39


(both spam/fraud and legitimate) to the total number of predictions. It is
defined as:

TP + TN
Accuracy =
TP + TN + FP + FN
where T P is True Positives, T N is True Negatives, F P is False Positives,
and F N is False Negatives. While accuracy is informative, it can be misleading
in imbalanced datasets where one class significantly outnumbers the other.

2. Precision
Precision evaluates the model’s ability to correctly identify only the relevant
positive cases (i.e., spam or fraud). It is defined as the ratio of true positives
to the sum of true and false positives:

TP
Precision =
TP + FP
High precision indicates that fewer legitimate messages or calls were wrongly
classified as malicious.

3. Recall (Sensitivity)
Recall measures the model’s ability to detect all relevant positive instances,
i.e., the proportion of actual smishing or vishing messages that were correctly
identified:

TP
Recall =
TP + FN
A high recall indicates that most fraudulent messages or calls were correctly
detected, although it may come at the cost of lower precision.

4. F1-Score
The F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, offering a
balanced metric when there is an uneven class distribution:

Precision × Recall
F1-Score = 2 ×
Precision + Recall

Department of Information Technology 40


This score is particularly useful for smishing and vishing detection where
both false positives and false negatives can have significant consequences.

5.3 Results for Smishing Detection


The SMS dataset was used to train LSTM, GRU, and CNN models. The
following results were achieved:

Table 5.1: Smishing Detection Model Performance

Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score


LSTM 99.00% 97.40% 98.20% 97.30%
GRU 97.90% 96.80% 97.60% 96.70%
CNN 99.00% 98.10% 99.00% 97.50%

Both LSTM and CNN achieved the highest accuracy, while CNN slightly
outperformed others in precision and recall, indicating better classification of
phishing messages.

5.4 Results for Vishing Detection


Models trained on Mel spectrograms from audio calls produced the following
results:

Table 5.2: Vishing Detection Model Performance

Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score


Stacked GRU 98.90% 97.90% 98.30% 97.70%
CNN + BiGRU 98.60% 97.20% 98.10% 97.10%
ResNet-Inspired 90.00% 89.00% 88.50% 88.90%

The stacked GRU model performed best, demonstrating superior temporal


feature learning capabilities, while CNN+BiGRU also provided robust perfor-
mance. The ResNet-inspired model showed slightly lower results due to dataset
limitations.

Department of Information Technology 41


5.5 Graphical Analysis and Model Comparisons
To visually compare the performance of deep learning models used for smishing
and vishing detection, bar charts were generated based on key evaluation
metrics including accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. These bar charts
provided a clear and intuitive way to assess and contrast the effectiveness of
various architectures.
Separate sets of bar charts were created for smishing and vishing detection
tasks. For smishing detection, models such as LSTM, GRU, and CNN were
evaluated. The bar plots demonstrated that the CNN model consistently
outperformed the others across all metrics, highlighting its superior ability to
capture important textual patterns and features from the SMS input data.
In the case of vishing detection, bar charts were used to compare GRU-based
models, CNN-BiGRU combinations, and ResNet architectures. The GRU-based
model achieved the highest bars in F1-score and recall, indicating its strong
capability in identifying fraudulent voice calls. These visual comparisons were
essential in revealing performance gaps between different models and supported
objective model selection based on empirical evidence.
Each bar chart grouped the metric values for all models side by side,
allowing for quick visual comparison. This approach made it easier to detect
which models were underperforming and which ones maintained a consistent
balance between sensitivity and precision.
Overall, the bar chart visualizations served as an effective tool for summa-
rizing and interpreting model performance, offering a graphical validation of
the numerical results obtained from evaluation metrics.

Department of Information Technology 42


Figure 5.1: Smishing Detection Model Metrics Comparison

Figure 5.2: Vishing Detection Model Metrics Comparison

5.6 Discussion on Findings


The results confirm that deep learning models can efficiently detect phishing
attempts in both text and audio formats. For smishing, CNN slightly outper-
formed LSTM and GRU due to its ability to capture local n-gram patterns.
For vishing, the stacked GRU achieved the best results, indicating strong
temporal learning.
The hybrid CNN + BiGRU model also performed well, combining spatial

Department of Information Technology 43


and sequential analysis. The ResNet-inspired model, though deeper, likely
suffered from overfitting due to the limited size of the vishing dataset.

Table 5.3: Comparison Between Existing Models and Proposed Project Model

Criteria Existing Models Proposed Model


Input Type Either SMS or voice call Supports both SMS and
only voice call detection
Preprocessing Basic tokenization, low- Advanced text cleaning
(SMS) ercasing and tokenization
Preprocessing Simple noise filtering or Robust noise reduction
(Voice) raw waveform input and enhancement
Feature Extraction TF-IDF or Word2Vec TF-IDF or dynamic
(SMS) word embeddings
Feature Extraction MFCC only Mel Spectrogram +
(Voice) MFCC
Model Architecture SVM, Naive Bayes, or Deep LSTM / GRU /
(SMS) basic LSTM/GRU CNN architectures
Model Architecture CNN or GRU on MFCC CNN + BiGRU /
(Voice) ResNet on spectrograms
Fusion of Modalities Not integrated; SMS Independent pipelines
and voice handled sep- for SMS and voice
arately detection
Performance (SMS) 85–92% accuracy 97.8% accuracy
Performance 90–95% accuracy 98.9% accuracy
(Voice)
Deployment Readi- Mostly academic or ex- Web-app ready with
ness perimental real-time prediction
Scalability Single modality-focused Modular and scalable to
handle both modalities
Innovation Level Use of traditional ML Enhanced deep learning
techniques with modern preprocess-
ing

Overall, the experiments demonstrated that:

• Sequential models are ideal for both text and audio sequences.

• CNNs are particularly good at pattern recognition in short text.

• GRU-based models balance performance and computational efficiency.

These findings advocate for adopting deep learning techniques in real-world


phishing prevention systems across communication platforms.

Department of Information Technology 44


CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and Future Scope

This research presents a comprehensive deep learning-based framework for


detecting smishing and vishing attacks using text and audio data. Two
distinct pipelines were proposed: one for processing SMS messages using NLP
and sequence models, and another for analyzing voice call recordings using
spectrogram-based deep learning architectures. Key contributions include:

• Development of multiple deep learning models (LSTM, GRU, CNN) for


smishing detection with over 99% accuracy.

• Proposal and implementation of advanced vishing detection models (GRU,


CNN + BiGRU, ResNet-inspired CNN) trained on spectrograms, achiev-
ing up to 98.90% accuracy.

• Evaluation and comparison of model performance using standard classi-


fication metrics and graphical analysis.

• Creation of a modular and extensible architecture suitable for deployment


on resource-constrained devices.

Future Scope and Improvements


Several enhancements and extensions are proposed for future work:

• Dataset Expansion: Collection and annotation of larger and more


diverse real-world datasets, including multilingual and region-specific data.

• Model Optimization: Application of techniques such as pruning, quan-


tization, and knowledge distillation to improve real-time performance.

• Adversarial Defense: Implementation of adversarial training and ro-


bustness evaluation to strengthen security.

45
• Transfer Learning: Use of transformer models like BERT for text and
AudioBERT for voice to further enhance detection accuracy.

• Unified Multimodal Detection System: Integrating smishing and


vishing detection into a single end-to-end framework capable of handling
both modalities simultaneously.

In conclusion, this study demonstrates the effectiveness of deep learning


techniques in identifying phishing attempts through SMS and voice commu-
nications. By continuing to enhance dataset quality, model efficiency, and
system robustness, the proposed framework can evolve into a real-time, intel-
ligent defense mechanism against phishing attacks in modern communication
platforms.

Department of Information Technology 46


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