SSRN Id3596193 Code3890068
SSRN Id3596193 Code3890068
by
Victoria C. Onyeagbako, ACIArb
1. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual Property (IP) Law is concerned with legal rights associated with creative
efforts or commercial reputation and goodwill.1 It governs the acquisition, regulation and
enforcement of intellectual properties in any given jurisdiction. According to the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom there is a general consensus as to the core contents of
intellectual property but none as to its limits.2 Generally, the core fields of IP include
copyright and related rights, patents, trademarks, industrial design, geographical
indications and reaching to plant variations and traditional knowledge. 3 What unites
these rights which fall under the rubric ‘intellectual property’ is that the subject matter of
protection is intangible.4 More specifically, the three central Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRs) are Copyright, Patent and Trademarks:5
IPRs have been described as negative rights.6 What this implies is that these rights
rather than confer on a right- holder the ability to exploit his IP, deters or retrains others
from the use of or exploitation of such IP without license of the right- holder. This is
because a right- holder does not require IP protection to personally exploit an intellectual
property.
A historical survey of the evolution of intellectual property can be traced as far back as
the evolution of our species when for tens of centuries IP existed in a primitive form
such as the early man creating impressions on the walls of his caves creating among
others; man’s first artistic works, tools carved out of stone as a means of survival for
1
David Bainbridge, Intellectual Property (9th Edition Pearson Education Ltd 2012) p 3
2
Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 28; [2013] 1 AC 1 [20]
3
Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd Edition Oxford University
Press 2017) p 1
4
The concept of ‘intangibility’ remains an uncertainty as the definition and scope of intangible subject matter may
prove problematic. However, intellectual property rights unlike tangible or real properties are incorporeal.
5
William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied
Rights (8th Edition Sweet and Maxwell 2013) p 7
6
Ibid 6
1
The various fields of IP have massively developed or expanded and have attracted global
attention. The development of commercial aspects of intellectual properties and
consequent high rate of infringement led to the clamour for protection and recognition of
intellectual creations as property rights. There are numerous theories justifying the
protection of IPR and monopoly attached thereto. Consequently, some of these schools
of thought have been largely criticised as the protection afforded to IPRs arguably stifle
the growth of prevalent national and international trade relations by granting monopolies
to right- holders. The various theories justifying the existence of IPRs such as copyright
and patents and their inherent nature as rights are herein canvassed.
I. NATURE OF COPYRIGHT
7
Amir Khoury, Intellectual Property and You [2010] Washington, U.S Patent and Trademark Office 27
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.intprop/ipyou0001&i=43> accessed 8 January 2020
8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
Lionel Bentley, Brad Sherman, Dev Gangjee and Phillip Johnson, Intellectual Property Law (5th Edition Oxford
University Press 2018) p 37
11
Brad Sherman, Remembering and Forgetting: The Birth of Modern Copyright Law (1995) 10 IPJ 1
2
The subject matter of copyright is regulated by national and international laws and
include literary, artistic, dramatic and musical works and by extension, performing rights,
choreographic works, broadcasting and recording. These are cumulatively known as
author and neighbouring rights respectively. An important feature of copyright protection
is the need for ‘fixation’ which stems from the need for an ‘expression’ of an idea. 16 This
simply requires the expression of a work in a tangible or permanent form. Copyright
confers two types of rights; economic and moral rights which are enjoyed for a limited
period of time, usually the life time of the author and 70 years after.17
12
Article 5(2) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886
13
Paul Torremans (n 12) 175
14
Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECDR 16
15
Designers Guild v Russell Williams Textiles Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2416; Kleeneze Ltd v DRG (UK) Ltd [1984] FSR 399
16
Paul Torremans (n 12) 176
17
Section 12, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
18
World Intellectual Property Organisation, <https://wipo.int/patents/en> accessed 9January 2020
19
As amended by the Patents Act 2004 (by the Regulatory Reform (Patents) Order 2004 (SI 2004/2357)
3
For an invention to qualify as novel, it must not constitute ‘state of the art’ which
comprises all matter (product, process or any information relating to either) which has
been made available to the public, before the priority date24 of the invention.25
Following the expansion of intellectual property rights, the nature of intellectual property
rights protection and its propensity to result in a monopoly, various justifications for the
protection of these rights have been propounded. Certainly, not one justification is
20
TRIPS forms part of the agreements establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and bind all WTO member
states including the UK and EC who have been members since 1st January 1995. It sets out minimum standards
with respect to substantive patent law- Article 27- 34; Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law:
Text, Cases and Materials (2nd Edition Oxford University Press 2017) p 550
21
CBD was signed at Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992. Pursuant to Article 1, its aim is the conservation of biological
diversity, sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the
utilization of generic resources. By Article 16(1) contracting parties undertake to provide and/or facilitate access
for and transfer to other contracting parties of technologies, including biotechnology, that are relevant to the
conversation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
22
Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1; Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985]
RPC 59 at 73-74
23
Kirin- Amgen Inc v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667 at 98
24
This determines the cut-off for determining what is included in the ‘state of the art’ and refers to the date on
which an application is filed; see Section 5 Patent Act 1977.
25
Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law (4th Edition Oxford University Press 2012) p 289
4
26
Michael Spence, Intellectual Property (Oxford University Press 2007) p 45
27
Ibid (n 3)
28
A succinct example is the effect of substandard pharmaceutical inventions in the absence of pharmaceutical
patents.
5
The first justificatory strand reflected in the moral/ natural rights theory is that all
resources given by God to the exclusion of one’s own body are part of the ‘commons’
which God has endowed every individual with the ability and right to use. Where, then,
one has worked on such resources mixed with labour, such property forms part of that
person’s personal or private property.34 Applying Locke’s theory to intellectual property,
29
Micheal Spence, ‘Justifying Copyright’ in Daniel McClean and Karsten Schubert, Dear Images: Art, Copyright and
Culture (Manchester Ridinghouse 2002) p 389-403 at 395-6
30
Ibid
31
Tanya Aplin (n 3) 4.
32
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, (1988) 77 Geo L J 287; Helen Norman, Intellectual
Property Law (2nd Edition Oxford University Press 2014) p 89
33
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise (3rd Edition Cambridge University Press 1988) p 287-
288
34
Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2008)
p 54
6
It generally appears unjust and against natural law to deprive a creator or an inventor of
the privileges which will otherwise accrue to a creation of mental application. It is for this
reason that intellectual properties must be protected by the state through enactment of
laws to regulate the exercise and protection of intellectual property rights. The moral/
natural rights justification is predominantly adopted for copyright and patents protection.
Other lines of argument closely associated with the natural rights theory are the desert
argument,37 personal autonomy38 and personhood.39
This theory has been criticised for applying Locke’s theory of property to intangible
property as it is not clear that the total value of an intellectual creation is entirely
attributable to the ‘labour’ of an individual, an imprecise tool for designating the
boundaries of intangible objects.40 According to Hettinger, a right- holder may be
rewarded by gratitude, awards and public financial support as opposed to exclusive
rights of ownership over such intangible properties.41 The concept of moral/ natural
rights is burdened with uncertainties as to application or scope.
35
Tanya Aplin (n 3) 6
36
Lawrence Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L Rev 628, also available
at<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c2dc/a6a2b40f3e18891707af3b0541f6fbf5711b.pdf> accessed 6 January
2020
37
A claim that the creator of a work deserves control over its use; Lawrence Becker, ‘Deserving to Own Intellectual
Property’ (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L Rev 628
38
The value of personal autonomy must involve recognising the right of control over things of close association
such are intangible properties; Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Tests, Cases and
Materials (3rd Edition Oxford University Press 2017) p 63
39
This posits that the act of creation entails the choice of expression, anembodiment of the creator’s personality.
Control over the creation becomes necessary to secure the creator’s personality; Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Property
and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957; Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988-9) 77
Geo L J 287 at 330
40
Ibid (n 38)
41
Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property (1989) 18 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31; also available at
http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Hettinger%20-%20Justifying%20Intellectual%20Property.pdf accessed
6.1.2020
7
This is an economic approach to the need for protection of intellectual properties. This
theory posits that the exclusive right to utilise intangible property is required to stimulate
intellectual creativity. There exists an understanding that the creation or invention of
intangible properties result from the personal application and investment (fiscal or
otherwise) of the creator. As a result, investment should be stimulated by the presence
and enforcement of positive laws that provide a framework ensuring that the publication
of new works, research and development, manufacture and marketing of new products
may yield a return on that investment.44 It is logical that an inventor requires utmost
maximisation of profit accruing to an investment in property; tangible or intangible. The
idea of incentivising a creator to further apply mental ability into creation is not only
beneficial to the creator but to the economy at large. There are numerous benefits of
intellectual properties to an economy; economic growth, technology advancement in
areas such as telecommunications and transportation, increased prosperity and
employment, improvements in healthcare by the introduction of patents to
pharmaceuticals and so on.45 This theory found favour in the United States and is duly
established by Article 1, s. 8 of the United States Copyright and Patents clause of the US
constitution 1789 (as amended) which states thus:
“… to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries”.
42
Tanya Aplin (n 3) 13.
43
Contract/ consideration theory suggests a contract between the state and an inventor/ creator for the transfer
of invention to the state in exchange for IP protection for a given period. The consideration theory was canvassed
by Jacob J in Phillips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1998] RPC 283
44
David Bainbridge, Intellectual Property (10th Edition Pearson Education Limited 2019) p 21
45
Ibid
8
This theory of justification has been criticised as having its motivation as the community
benefit rather than appreciation for the inventor. This is evident in the grant of a patent
only to the ‘first to file’ to the exclusion of all other inventors such as the first to invent
and independent inventors.48 Professor Michael Pendleton shares the opinion that
existing IP rights such as patent amount to unjustifiable monopolies which can be
avoided through the adoption of an all embracing law of valuable commercial
information as a means of incentivizing inventors, replacing specific rights with wide and
subjective economic discretion.49 It is argued that the foundational belief of this theory is
superfluous as IP rights guarantee protection for inventors but not motivation as
innovation is stimulated by various independent factors such as interest.50 This argument
stems from an understanding that motivation is more internal than external. In the
absence of exclusive rights to an intellectual creation, there remains the presence of an
inherent motivation by which an inventor creates. Furthermore, contrary to that which
the incentive/ reward theory suggests, extrinsic rewards stifle creativity. With regard to
the transfer of knowledge and open source technology in a society, Ghosh argues that
even where positive rights encourage creation, there remains the question of whether
strong rights promote the distribution and consumption of the fruits of intellectual
property as to achieve ‘greater good’.51
46
Recital 2, EC Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001; based on
Articles 47(2), 55 and 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Union.
47
Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 10) [1995] FSR 335 at 332
48
Catherine Colston and Kristy Middleton, Modern Intellectual Property Law (2nd Edition Cavendish Publishing
Limited 2006) p 43
49
Michael Pendleton, Intellectual Property, Information Based Society and a New International Economic Order-
the Policy Options [1985] EIPR 31
50
Colston (n 51) 45; Eric Johnson, ‘Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy’ (2012) 39 Fla St U L Rev 623
51
Shubha Ghosh, ‘The Intellectual Property Incentive: Not So Natural as to Warrant Strong Exclusivity’ (2006) 3
SCRIPTed 96
9
Article 17:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others. (Emphasis added)
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 27:
(1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community,
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
(Emphasis mine)
The UDHR remains a landmark agreement in the history of human rights protection, a
reason it is reckoned on in the human rights implication of the protection of intellectual
properties. Article 27(2) in clear terms provides for what is regarded as the economic
and moral rights of an author. This implies that intellectual properties should be
accorded the recognition and protection of human right and non-protection should be
construed as a breach of right to property. To further illustrate this point, Article 15 of
ICESCR provides:
52
Tanya Aplin (n 3) 9
10
By the preamble of the UDHR, all member states are obliged to adapt and/or replicate
these provisions on human rights protection in their national laws. This suggests that
creators and inventors, in the absence of stipulated IP laws, may validly protect and
claim against an infringer.
In the European Union, Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR and Article 17(1) and (2) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU both recognise that intellectual property falls
within the scope of the ‘right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath one’s lawfully
acquired possessions.53
Like other theories, the argument to treat intellectual property as human right has been
criticised on various grounds. According to Peter Yu 54, the inclusion in the human rights
debate of a relatively trivial item like intellectual property protection would undermine
the claim that human rights are of fundamental importance to humanity. Other writers
such as Ostergard, opine that the United Nations Declaration is flawed as intellectual
properties are not all significant in the physical well-being of a person and as such,
issues relating to physical well-being must take priority over guarantee of IP as a
universal human right.55 Furthermore, the declaration of IP as human right is more
problematic as IP protection raises barriers to commodity access beneficial to physical
well-being and national development.56
Irrespective of these criticisms, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has
been seen to invoke this theory in aid of intellectual property protection.57
53
Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Tests, Cases and Materials (3rd Edition Oxford
University Press 2017) p 9
54
Peter Yu, ‘Ten common questions about intellectual property and human rights’ (2006) 23 Ga St U L Rev 713
55
Robert Ostergard, ‘Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right’ (1999) 21 Hum Rts Q 175
56
Ibid 176
57
C- 277/10 Martin Luksan v Petrus Van der Let Case [2013] ECDR 5
11
Although not one theory of justification for the protection of intellectual property rights is
all- encompassing, the plethora of texts on the justification of intellectual property
protection, to a large extent evidences the necessity of the subject matter. The
importance of protection afforded to intellectual properties cannot be over-emphasized.
The criticisms of most theories adopt a technical approach in analyzing a prevalent
loophole of a theory. Intellectual Properties are an undeniable practical constituent of
every society.
This writer agrees with the utilitarian justification to the extent that it amounts to quid
pro quo for parties; a right- holder, a user and the government. It is a lesser evil for the
government to grant positive rights to creators and inventors at little or no cost than to
actively reward every inventor for a valuable invention. The determination of that which
is ’valuable’ becomes subjective; a situation of uncertainty. Safe to say that a positive
law approach protects members of the public from fraudulent misrepresentation such as
wrongful attribution of authorship of a work or harmful reproduction of substandard
medicines and medical equipment(s).
In response to the Pendleton critique and in concurrence with Professor Cornish 58 taking
a competition dimension, enacting loose-end laws as opposed to the grant of specific
rights may become a weapon by which first entrants into a successful market can
engage in legislative bullying of competitors seeking to enter the market. This is because
for the right-holder there are endless possibilities to that which can be claimed.
Furthermore, reacting to ‘inherent motivation’ critique over reward, it is submitted that
although absence of economic rights may not exterminate the presence of internal or
inherent motivation, the effect of material gains over creativity cannot be ignored.
Intellectual properties are no doubt creations of the mind, largely fuelled by interest and
passion. However, in the absence of fiscal gains or returns, necessary materials through
which research is conducted may be unavailable, thereby hampering the level of
creativity attainable. An inventor is also motivated to work hard to earn a living off that
which he creates. Taking away exclusive rights to utilise and control intellectual creation
falls nothing short of slavery and/or theft by a government over its subjects.
58
William Cornish, ‘Genevan Bootstraps’ [1997] EIPR 336
12
Email- victoria@myiplawguide.com
Tel- +447564731428
Whatsapp- +2348036313220
59
Instituted by the Madrid Agreement 1891 for an International Trademark System (registration and
management) and provides trademark protection over 122 countries through filing a single application in a
member state; more information at WIPO website <https://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/> accessed 11 January 2020
60
Introduced by the Patent Co-operation Treaty 1970; more information available at the WIPO website
<https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/> accessed 11 January 2020
13
Cases
UK cases
Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd [2006] ECWA Civ 1371, [2007] RPC 7
EU cases
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening(C-5/08) [2009] ECDR 16
Martin Luksan v Petrus Van der Let Case (C- 277/10) [2013] ECDR 5
Statutes
UK Statutes
Copyright Act 1710
Patents and Designs Act, CAP P2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004
UK Statutory Instruments
Regulatory Reform (Patents) Order 2004 (SI 2004/2357)
14
Treaty establishing the European Community of 10 November 1997, (consolidated version 2002)
OJ C 340, OJ C 325 24.12.2002
Others
Constitution of the United States of America 1789
International Legislation
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (15 April 1994)
1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (adopted 9 September
1886 and entered into force 5 December 1887)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (16 December 1966)
14531 UNTS 993
Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks (adopted 14 April 1891 ad
entered into force 1892)
Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) 1970 (adopted 19 June 1970 and entered into force 24
January 1978)
Patent Law Treaty (PLT) 2000 (adopted 1 June 2000 and entered into force 28 April 2005)
Official Materials
European Commission (EC) directive on copyright, EC Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
Secondary Sources
Books
Aplin T and Davis J, Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd Edition Oxford
University Press 2017)
15
Bentley L and others, Intellectual Property Law (5th Edition Oxford University Press 2018)
Colston C and Middleton K, Modern Intellectual Property Law (2nd Edition Cavendish Publishing
Limited 2006)
Cornish W, Llewelyn D and Aplin T, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and
Allied Rights (8th Edition Sweet and Maxwell 2013)
Davis J, Intellectual Property Law (4th Edition Oxford University Press 2012)
Dutfield G and Suthersanen U, Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
2008)
Locke J, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise (3rd Edition Cambridge University Press
1988)
McClean D and Schubert K, Dear Images: Art, Copyright and Culture (Manchester Ridinghouse
2002)
Norman H, Intellectual Property Law (2nd Edition Oxford University Press 2014)
Torremans P, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law (9th Edition Oxford University
Press 2019)
Journal Articles
Becker L, ‘Deserving to Own Intellectual Property’ (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L Rev 628
Ghosh S, ‘The Intellectual Property Incentive: Not So Natural as to Warrant Strong Exclusivity’
(2006) 3 SCRIPTed 96
16
Ostergard R, ‘Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right’ (1999) 21 Hum Rts Q 175
Sherman B, ‘Remembering and Forgetting: The Birth of Modern Copyright Law’ (1995) 10 IPJ 1
Yu P, ‘Ten common questions about intellectual property and human rights’ (2006) 23 Ga St U L
Rev 713
Websites
Khoury A, ‘Intellectual Property and You’ [2010] Washington, U.S Patent and Trademark Office
27 <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.intprop/ipyou0001&i=43> accessed 8 January 2020
17