The Eastern Enlargem of the European Union

John O'Brennan

Routledge
Taylor &Francis Gmup

N W YORK AND LONDON E

1989 and beyond

In the spring of 1994, the Grst formal applications for membership of the European Union by the C e n d and East European (CEE) states were made. Almost five years had passed since the dramatic days of peacefd revolution of 1989. In that period, many of the old certainties of the Cold War had disappeared. The Soviet Union's implosion had rendered the CEE states f?ee to pursue their own external policies for the first time since the 1930s. Across Europe the entire Eiamwork of economic, political, security, and cultural relationshipsseemed to be in flux as the EU snuggled to put in place a concrete process that would govern its relationship with the new democracies. Although it was cautious about making any categorical promises of membership, it became clear that enlargement of the Union to include those countries in CEE that had expressed an interest in joiniig represented the only viable policy option for the Union. This chapter serves a dual purpose. Fit,it seeks to describe the evolution of the EU's relations with the CEE states in the years after the 'newbeginning' of 1989: second, it will outline the main elements of EU enlargement strategy towards CEE and how the EU became progressively committed to a wide enlargement round. It begins by describing the events of 1989-90 and their significance for the European Union.
The EU response to the 1989 revolutions
The drarnadc but largely peacefd revolutions that transformed Cenhal and Eastern Europe in 1989 are often described in grandiloquent terms. Phrases such as 'velvet revolutions', 'geopolitical earthquake' and 'acceleration of history' quickly entered political discourse as scholars and public figures struggled to come t terms with the magnitude of the events. Within a short time it became dear that o the demise of Communism held prafound implications for the future of Europe both east and west. As the old certainties of the Cold War era gave way to a somewhat amorphous geopolitical framework, the EU found itself confronted with a drastically altered European configuration. The Europe of the Twelve would now have to address the question of how it might relate to rmd possibly assimilate its neighbours to the East.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the Gorbachev reforms had effectively emboldened reformers and encouraged dissent. In short, internal Soviet disarray provided Warsaw-Pact dissident oppormnity. Prior to the era ofglasnost and perestroika. relations between the EU and the CEE states were practically non-existent.' EC' activity was mainly confined to a few narrowly concentrated areas of trade, ensuring the protection of key economic sectors from unfair competition from the Eastern Bloc.2 '4t a political level, Cold War geopolitical thinking hindered the dwelopment of closer relations. For the Central and East European states emerging from the shadow of the Soviet monolith, the aspiration was clear: a 'Return to Europe' - the Europe from which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly separated for over four decade^.^ The new CEE governments from the beginning framed their endeavours and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values of European integrati~n.~ sought freedom, prosperity, and a secure place in the internaThey tional community of nations, especiallv within European organizations. Opinion p o h pointed to massive support for joining Europe'? For the European Union, however, the aftermath to the peaceful revolutions would produce a period of intensive questioning: first, what was actually meant by 'European'; second, and more pragmatically, how should the Community respond to the CEE states' stated desire for membership of the club. For the first time, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, which simply stated that 'any European State can apply' for membership of the Community, began to be scrutinized." Even at this early stage, however, a division between EC/EU 'drivers' (advocates) and 'brakemen' (obstructionists)was in evidence. On one side British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher unashamedly made the case for an EC commitment to enlarge. The question of what motivated her advocacy is usually answered with the assemon that she saw a wider Europe as a tool for slowing down the integration process and forestalling, if not derailing, any moves to embrace federalism. It was undoubtedly the case, however, that she also admired the CEE states for overthrowing communism and embracing the dual freedom of the market and the ballot box. At the Aspen Institute in Colorado on 5 August 1990 she called for a pan-European 'Magna Carta'.' Her foreign minister Douglas Hurd was equally suppomve, as was John Major once he became Prime hlinister.' For some European leaders, however, the idea of a speedy enlargement was just too big a leap of the imagination. French President Francois Mitterand, for example. declared in Prague that it would be several decades before the CEE states could become members of the Community? The Commission for its part took a middle path at this time, urging closer links but seeking to deflect the question of In November 1989 the enthusiasm and readiness of the West to help was clearlv expressed." Altruism could indeed be detected, not just in the rhetoric but also in the actual nature. of the response.'2 The heady atmosphere was captured in the European Council's declarations at the S m b o u r g summit in December 1989 where it specifically acknowledged a 'special responsibility' for Central and Eastern Europe and suggested that the Community was the only point of reference of s i w c a n c e for the CEE states.I3T h was despite the fact that the revolutions had

hs caught the Community off guard. For the EU ti was as much a qucztinn cd' adjusting the cognitive, as well as the physical, map of Europe. I\!' ~,rrlin., according to Sedelmeier and Wallace, was characterized at this time hv. nrnamy other things,hyperactivity. enthusiastic pledges of support. and consrnsus that tllr. EU should play a leading role in the transformation process in CEE, even if it wx. unclear what this might inv~lve.'~ Initially, talk of a Marshall-type Plan for Eastern Europe was commonplacc, with the EU appearing to acknowledge the existence of a moral imperative for large-scale aid transfers to the eastern countries." The Luxembourg accord ofJune 1988, billed as theJoint Declaration on the Establishment of Official Relations, led to the initiation of bilateral trade deals with the CMEA member states, and can be seen as ushering in a new phase of more normal relations.I6 The Community removed long-s&ding import quotas on a number of products and extended the General System of Preferences (GSP) to the CEE countries. The Commission began a major assessment of the progress of economic and political reform in the region." The resulting Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) would, by October 1990, be signed by all of the former Warsaw Pact states in Cenual and Eastern Europe.'' A Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA),formed from former~~ornecon members, was also instituted in 1993 as an additional mechanism for freeing up uade.lg This was in addition to a Central European initiative - the so-called Visegrad declaration - which sought to turn the three countries Hungary, Poland, ~iechoslovakia a single economic zone." Further into encouragement was garnered from the decisions made at the G24 summit of July 1989 (actually the G 7 summit but recognized retrospectively as the wider G24 grouping),which provided substantive help to the reforming Eastern countries by means of reschedulingof debt, provision of aid to tackle fiscal problems, and, most signilicantly, commitments on aid for economic development. With respect to pledges of financial aid, it is estimated that the G24 block together committed approximately $45 billion over a three-year period.'' Further commitments were Alan Mayhew's calculations show that the made in the months that followed.22 actual grant assistance delivered to the recipient countries amounted to only 15 per cent of the headline figure promised.23 Despite the EU's rhetorical support for the process of uansition, however, the reality was that doubt and vacillation soon replaced Western enthusiasm. Consequently, a tremendous gap developed between, for example, the amount of aid promised and that which was actually disbursed. Iver T. Berend showed that had the Marshall Plan been emulated for Central and Eastern Europe, even on a limited basis, with, for example, a Western contribution of only one halfof one p r cent of GDP. thin would have yielded up to L 100 billion annually for reconsmction and transition in Central and Eastern Europe.24Nothing on this scale wm rrdi ~ e d . 'If one shifts the focus to EU aid alone, and employs Berend's rnnilrl rl~r ~ outcome reflects very poorly on the EU15. In 2004 the comhinerl I : ;IS G1)1' .[ amounted to over 9 &on. A Marshall-style financial aid p r o p l n n l r W ~ I I I I I I have delivered approximately 90 billion per year to CEE. Evrn n ~.on~ril>rtric,~~ 411 one half of one per cent of EU GDP would have yielded a t i ~ u r r F1 ' I>~llln~~ r,T I

16 ?he unfolding ofea.stm enlargemint 1989-2004 annually for a limited period. The financial package agreed for the acceding states at the Copenhagen summit in 2002 mounted to a total of 40.8 billion for the period 2004-2006.26 At first glance the headline figure seems quite generous. But it equates only to approximately 0.15 per cent of EU15 GDP for each year 200G 2006. Further probing, however, reveals a si@lcant dilution of that headline amount. It does not include conmbutions made to the EU budget by the incoming states for 2004.2005 and 2006. If that is factored in the net financial aid accorded the CEE states in the period amounts to a sum of onlv 1 0.3 billion for 2004-2006. . That amounts to no more than one thousandth of EU GDP.?' % Table 2.1 demonstrates this is a very long way short of Marshall-era support and even significantly less than the support the EU15 provide on a bilateral basis to developing countries. The aggregate EU 15 financial aid to developing countries amounts to

1989 and b ~ o n d 17
0.3 per cent of EU GDP, in other words about three times the amount the CEE states will receive between 2004-2006.28 Further evidence of this apparent failure of response is provided by comparative analysis of actual EC/EU aid to CEE and transfers to its own poorer member and states. In 1992, the peripheral EU countries (Ireland, Spain, ~ r e e c e Portugal) received fifteen times more per capita than did the CEE countries.Yg Ten years later the gap had narrowed but was still very sigdcant. Poland would receive 667 per capita, Hungary 49, Slovenia 641, and the Czech Republic 29 in the period up to the end of the 2006 financial framework. Bv contrast, in 2000, Greece received 437 per capita, while Ireland got 4 18. Spain 62 16 and Porngal62 11. Further, it w&stipulated that aid to individual CEE states was not to exceed the imposed 'absorption capacity' figure of 4 per cent of GDP. This threshold was set much lower than had been the case in previous enlargement rounds. It is little wonder that the CEE states look wistfully at the Cohesion states and their very generous levels of s~bvenaon.~' point is hrther put in perspective when one The considers that Ireland, although already by 2000 one of the richest states in the Union, was still in receipt of almost six times more aid than was envisaged for ~ o l a n d .To further emphasize the lack of support offered CEE a com~arison ~' with German transfers to its eastern h d e r can be-evinced: in 1993, these arnouinted to a staggering $5900 per capita.32In the decade after unification, Ilet f x a l tr:andm from the German Federal Government to the former East Germlany amouinted to -..*. .. some 1.2 nillion DM. This fipre amounrs to ten times what the LU has ~ o c a t e d in aid to al the CEE candidate countries in the financial framework to 2006." The l impression of the CEE countries remaining the poor relations is diicult to refute and is reflected in the opinion of some that the Oder-Neisse line quickly transmuted into a new and lasting economic divide, separating Europe's haves and have-nots."

Tabb 2.1
c my mb

EU GDP and potential financialaid to Central and Eastern Europe 2009-6

Ausaia

Belgium
Denmark

Finland

135 1446 2063

France Germany Greece

130
116

Luxembourg Netherlands 1.27 123 650 234

PHARE
Notwithstanding the gap between EU commitments and disbursements, there did emerge a more coherent collective approach to financial aid and economic resuucturing in the transitioning states. The G24 conference ofJuly 1989committed its members to aiding the economic reconsmaion of Central and Eastern Europe. Out of this would evolve a practical operational device to assist with fmancial aid and technical matters. This became known as PHARE;J5 it would eventually encompass a l of the CEE states.36The European Commission at the time identil fied the prime missions of PHARE as supporting the process of economic transformation, with a focus on core areas such as indusw, agriculture and energy, and In providing fmancial support for CEE efforts to reform and reb~ild.~' addition, the programme included food and humanitarian aid, balance of payments help and access to European Investment Bank (EIB)loans.%PHARE soon became the biggest assistance programme in CEE with funding increasing from an initial amount of 500 million in 1990 to 1600 million in 1995. In total, the PHARE programme allocated 4.2 billion for the period 1990-94; this increased to 66.693

Portugal
Spain Sweden United Kingdom

EU15 Total GDP

881 1 88

0.5% of EUl5 GDP 0.1% of EU GDP

44
8.8

billion for the period 1995-99, with another 4.7 billion provided between 1999 and 2002. The focus of PHARE would change in time from demand-driven support for transition-related restructuring, developing in parallel with the preaccession suategy, into an entirely accession-driven instr~ment.~' IfPHARE was intended as a crucial i n s m e n t for the support of restructuring it quickly became apparent that inherent problems compromised its effectivene~s.~" Firstly-, the financial support was very modest given the scale of ambitions for PHARE. Second, analysts railed against the perceived inadequacies of the PHARE distribution system and in particular against the preponderance of western management consultants employed in implementation. Pflueger demonstrated that only ten per cent of PHARE funds were channeled into investment in the early 1990s, whereas management consultants, frequently from the west, p o d eted vast amounts." OEcial concern was publicly expressed and this contributed to a demonstrable loss of confidence in the programme on the CEE side.'2 The EU itself acknowledged the legitimacy of the complaints. In 1993, the EC Court of Auditors brought into sharp focus the mismanagement of specific components of the aid budget concluding that 'almost none of the leading in the management units are nationals of the recipient counmes. Thus, the claimed recipient control over implementation seems specious.*3 The question of serious h u d undermining the new aid programmes was also a recurring one. There did not seem to be suEciently rigorous scrutiny of EC aid.% Further criticism of PHARE was based on the employment of a mixture of biIateral and multilateral aid, which at times compounded the problems of implementation and conspired against the overall goals of the programme. A Belgian government memo expressed the general frustration: it called for more consistency between the policies of member states and that of the Corn~nunity.~~ overall picture was one of good The intentions, compromised by administrative deficiencies and a lack of cwrdina tion.& Acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the PHARE programme came at the Copenhagen European Council summit meeting in June 1993. Consequently PHARE took on a new and explicitly political orientation; it was redesigned to keep pace with political developments, in particular with regard to a more concrete accession scenario. After 1994 the programme was characterized by support for the legislative framework and administrative structures, as well as for projects promoting democratization and civil society, and for investment in ini?astructure: involving cross-border c~operation.~' move to substantive capacity-building The had begun, even if it was somewhat tentative. In addition to PHARE the EU also put in place two new financial institutions intended to provide finance and advice to governments in Central and Eastern Europe. These were the European Invesment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EIB was guaranteed by the EU and made project-based loans, targeted at productive or infrastructure investment available at competitive interest rates. ELI3 loans were hugelv important for the transitioning countries in the early 1990s when their access to investment capital was negligible. Later investment would be focused on trans-European infmtructure projects such as the upgrading of train and motorway routes.48The

s EBRD, a French government initiative, was designed r prnvirlr nttl)luttr 1 ~ ~ 1 balance of payments problems, currency convertibility, nntl : \ i f l ill III'II~ I11I1111' programmes in technology, training and d e ~ e l o ~ m e n t . " ~ w:ls ,111 c ~ tIIl l i i l ~ 1 l v ~ Tlrrrr amount of publiciq attached to its launch on 15 April l9Ql." 1\11 irnittllrll 1 1 1 disquiet, however, centred on both the choice of London as tllc I~r:trlr~ir;rr lit1 rr1.c the bank and on the activities of its larger-than-life president, JarIllri A t 1 : 1 1 1 " , \ T early as 1991 there were suggestions that the bank was failing in i13 rrmi!.'' Ar 114 second annualmeeting inLondon on 1 April 1993 there was uproar n111itl t.ln;nlaIII' great extravagance.j3When Attali decided to resign there w a Lirtlr s\lrpri.rr.'"I,;VPII after his departure, however, the Bank was dogged by negativr puhlic.itv will) suggestions that management consistently favoured French companica ~ n t Cdlic l interests." Nevertheless change was effected and the bank b e e n to have nn impact.56
The Europe agreements
The third arm of early EU policy developed out of the existing templace of association and association agreements, which had been used to manage reladons with third countries since the inception of the EC." It became apparent that a deeper form of association agreement would be required in managing relations with CEE. Following on kom the initial trade and cooperation agreements of 1989 and 1990, the EU saw the need for a more effective institutional framework in which the new relationships, both political and economic, inight be consolidated. The Association Agreements (or Europe Agreements as they were more commonly referred to) were described as 'second-generation' agreements, symbolic of a second stage of relations between the EU and the CEE countries. The first such Agreements, with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, were signed on 18 December 1991 and came into operation on I March 1992.58The European Commission defined the Agreements as 'a legal, political and economic framework for the relationship of the signato~yCEE countries with the EU'.59They provided the framework for bilateral relations between the EU and its member states with the partner countries. Described as representing 'far-reaching liberalization' with respect to trade and economic ties, the Agreements were viewed by the EU as a positive contribution to the CEE efforts to reduce the economic disparities with the EU member states. They covered trade, political dialogue, legal approximation and other areas of cooperation, including industry, environment, transport and customs. They aimed progressively to establish a free trade area between the EU and the associated counmes over a given period, on the basis of reciprocity, but applied in an asymmetrical manner. According to the Commission, the Agreements were 'based on shared understanding and values' and prepared the way for economic and political convergence.60 For all of the normative rhetoric that framed the new EU--CEE relations, the tectonic plates of economic reality continually impinged upon cffom at d e c ~ r engagement. Testimony to the protectionist nature of the Europe Agreemenu abound^.^' h this respect, they were frequently portmyed as being one-sided in

20

The unfolding ofeastern enlurgemmt 1989-2004

defending EU interests, and hardly representative of a mechanism designed to lead to membership ofthe associated c~unmes.~' leaders were quick to point to t CEE incongruity of the EC position.63Lndeed, the delays and tensions which wou characterize much of the enlargement process to follow were very evident in i negotiation of the Europe Agreemenr~.~ Although the EC had made concessio during the final negotiations, the Agreements n everth he less protected the ~~Hx.U 'sensitive' sectors of key EU industr ies such as agricultural products, textiles a coal and stee1.'j5 These were the sect:on where CEE producers wielded siqnifica . LU competito&. Although the EU provid comparative advantage relative to then- --. greater market access, the restrictive features of the Agreements effectively limit CEE market penetration. These sectors accounted for approximately 40 per cent total CEE exports. The impact of these restrictions on CEE trade may be gaugi by focusing on one important component of CEE trade: agricultural goods. T clear trend is of a highly advantageous swing to the European Union in the terms trade. The EU, which in 1989 had a trade deficit in agricultural goods of some 9 1 million ECU, had by 1993 turned this into a surplus of 433 million ECU .Although CEE trade with the EU certainly increased, EU trade performance improved much more significantly. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, while EU total exports grew by 63 per cent, exports to CEE grew by 112 per celnt. Neen 1995 and 2000, the EU's global trade surplus amounted to some 6. on. Its trade surplus with CEE: however, reached 100 billion, or more th; :e the global figure.67 .'he protectionist instincts of the EU were already evident during the negotiation of the association agreements, as some member states sought to block generous terms for the CEE c o ~ n t r i e sMayhew identified three important results of such .~ use of instruments of commercial defence by the EU: it caused damage to the economies of the associated countries at a critical stage in their transition to mark economies, caused many in these countries to doubt the wisdom of made liberaliz cion and had a negative impact on public opinion.69Indeed, concern grew to su nn extent that Jacques Delors was forced to comment thus: 'You cannot shed teiu 3 . ofjc)y for the people of Eastern Europe one day and the next tell them that you crtill not buy their products.'" His view was shared across Europe." A second criticir of tlze Europe Agreements was that they did not establish a clear Link between as! ciation and membership.j2 The Commission had attempted to pre-ernpt the are ment by denying any dear relationship and stating that there was 'no link eitk explicit or implicit' between association and accession with membership con: A tuting a 'totally separate q~estion'.'~ formula in the preambles to the agree me^.^ >gnized membership as a final objective of the CEE states. But this was vt erent from endorsing in any way the prospect of CEE accession^.^^ his hesitant and rather ungenerous response to CEE on the EU's part H predicated on a number of factors. First? the Union's self-absorption in the early 1990s stands out. Paradoxically, the demise of Communism acted to the disadvantage of the CEE-associated countries because it triggered an intensification of Western European integration eff~rts.'~ Indeed, Maaseicht is singularly identified as the quidpro quo for German Unification; the assurance of a united Germany's
- A -

renewed commitment to its EU partners. Suspicion of German hegemoni awandizing intent was not slow in materializing. Eastward enlargement. it widely thought, would benefit Germany economically and geopolitically m re more than any other EU member state. Thus, fear of ' the putati~ German caused some of the present member states to steer e nlargemenlt along the lane'. For the CEE states this meant that, at precisely the moment of their retu the mainstream European interstate arena, they were effectively locked out o central political process that would shape the future Europe. Their absence the Maastricht negotiations, for example, was striking.'' Exclusively the incum members would determine the shape of the new European compact withou input from the Central and Eastern European States. CEE leaden thus wat Maastricht unfold with a great degree of concern. Second, the impact of the 1990s Europe-wide recession on the member s and, later, the deflationary policies employed in many countries in ord conform to the EMU convergence criteria, also had a measurable negative ence on the Union's early approach to eastward enlargement. Budget de increased unemployment and attendant social strain resulted in the subordin of enlargement to domestic policy issues in many member states in the early to 1990s. Third, the logistical problems encountered by the Commission in its e to coordinate aid programmes for the CEE states were significant; it had , , before in its history been presented with a challenge on this scale. Depende outside experts brought in on contract and with a lack of resources devoted t management of programmes in DG I, the Commission soon ran into implem tion difficulties and lots of criticism. Sedelmeier and Wallace assert that th found it easier to devise ad hoc policy than to design a more rounded appr This was a common charge, though mostly levelled with the benefit of hind and with little regard to the problems reladng to speed, timing, and stafTand e ihn tise shortage^.^' In addition, rivalries w t i the Commission -principally bet DG I and DGs II(industry)and V1(agriculture)- and within national admin I tions - typically foreign ministries against seaoral rninismes - contributed problems in the early stages. Sedelmeier and Wallace present this as a 'm meso' divide among policy makers, with 'macro' policy-makers (usually lo within the foreign ministries of national administrations) typically taking the term view and being more sympathetic to the CEE concerns, while 'meso' p makers (usually to be found in sectoral ministries) engaged in short-termism were very susceptible to the claims of special interests. Even w i h n DG I the signhcant division along similar lines." Finally, the gradual realization, on the part of EU leaders, of the daunting tutional and policy implications of enlargement also encouraged cautio inertia. Analysis of the micro-implications of enlargement was provided by range of commentators and by the European Commission and European P ment?' The shadow of enlargement thus hovered over every rnajor intern debate from the early 1990s onwards. Throughout that periodI growing co about the direction of EU policy towards Central and Eastern I5urope mani . . itself on a regular basis. Indeed, a European Comrmssion ouicial was quo

1989 and bqond

23

saying: 'The level of seriousness about enlargement is not minimal, it simply does not exist."' The initial euphoria of 1989 then soon gave way to muted resignation as the EU found that its response to the emerging democracies became increasingly atTected by the economic and political vicissitudes ofboth EU and global politics. For their part the CEE states continued to press for membership at the earliest opportunity.81

Toward a new phase in relations: the Copenhagen

If the peacell revolutions of 1989 constituted a starting point for the EU's efforts to integrate Central and Eastern Europe into EU smctures, then the decisions taken by the European Council at Copenhagen in June 1993 represented no less sigdicant a milestone. Copenhagen provided real momentum, according to Peter Ludlow, by transforming the enlargement question 'from a theoretical possibility to an agreed goal', and by articulating substantial if vague criteria by which prog.~ ress could be m e a s ~ r e d In the run-up to the summit meeting the Commission produced a new report on enlargement This proposed specific measures for deepening the relationship with the associated counmes, including accelerated market access for the CEE states, increased economic and technical assistance, and an intensification of political dialogue.% Crucially also, it recommended that the associated countries become eligible for accession once they met certain economic and political conditions. EC foreign ministers, meeting in the General Affairs Council (GAC)at Luxembourg on 8June 1993: agreed in principle on measures to accelerate the political and economic integration of CEE into the Community. The European Council endorsed the Commission's view, announcing that it 'agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe shall become members of the European Union'. As Graham Avery points out this was the first time such a promise of membership had been extended to third countries even before they had officially applied for it.85 Further, it was decreed that accession would take place 'as soon as the associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfjmg the economic and political conditions required'. These conditions included the achievement of stable institutions that guaranteed democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minority rights, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.& The European Council also introduced another important criterion - the ability of the Union to absorb new members 'whilst maintaining momentum' and without compromising the deepening of the Union. Thus there was formed an explicit linkage beoveen further deepening and widening of the EU. Enlargement could take place, as long as it did not impair the integrity of the integration process. The European Council also agreed that 'future cooperation with the associated counmes shall be geared to the objective of membership'. thus establishing an explicit Ln between cooperation and accession that did not exist in the Europe .+peeik ments. To this end, the European Council proposed the creation of a new

.structured relationship' with the CEE states, which it defied as a 'multilateral framework for strengthened dialogue and consultation on matters of common intere~t'.~' The structured relationship would consist of meetings between the C~~rlnril its counterparts (governmentministers) from the CEE states on policy and manrm falling under each of the three pillars of EU activity: EC areas (single market), CFSP, and JHA (immigration, asylum, combating organized crime including the traffic of human beings). Separate procedures were also established for meeting of foreign ministers under CFSP. The European Council also proposed rcplar high-level meetings of the Commission President and EU Presiih dency w t their counterparts &om the applicant states, and joint meetings of the heads of state and government when The Copenhagen summit also hrther elaborated measures to accelerate efforts to open EC markets to CEE products, moving faster in this regard than was origiImportant changes to the PHARE nally envisioned in the Europe programme came about as a response to the concerns about its efficacy.g0 The reorientation of PHARE included a new emphasis on infrasuuctural development. The EC also committed itselfto more fmancial assistance and help in the approximation of laws by providing training in EC law and procedure.y' As PHARE's objectives changed it became much more oriented towards the preparation of the associated (later candidate) counmes for accession. In retrospect the Copenhagen Process was also notable for the activism displayed by a range of different political acton. Most commentators now concede the importance of the European Commission's advocacy in pressing for the accommodation of CEE preferences in respect of trade. Also of siydicance was the approach adopted by CEE state representatives, much of which consisted of reminding the EU leaders of the 'historical obligation' and 'practical necessity' which enlargement represented. In a key memorandum presented to the Commission in October 1992, the three Visegrad governments declared that:

Our three counmes are convinced that stable democracy, respect for human rights and continued policy of economic reforms will make accession possible. We call upon the Communities and the member states to respond to o w efforts by dearly stating the integration of our economies and societies, leading to membership of the Communities is the aim of the Communities themselves. This simple, but historic statementwould provide the anchor which we need.

"

The pressure tiom the CEE states was important in particular for highlighting the gap between EU rhetoric about welcoming the post-Communist democracies into the democratic and market capitalist fold, and the substance of actual EU policy, which was much less accommodatingof CEE interests. Through such pressure. the CEE states exploited the feelings of moral obligation toward Central and Eastern Europe held by many within the EU.'3 To this we must add the pressure exerted by the academic c o m m u n i ~ the governments of key member states. and The Gennan government, in particular consistently argued that the post-Communist countries must be given a firm prospect of membership. During a visit to

24

Irhe unfolding ofeartmr mhgrment 1989-2004

Warsaw in February 1992, the then German Foreign Minister Hans Diemch Genscher declared that Poland. Hungarl~. Czechoslovakia should become full and EC members 'as soon as possible'.% The following month, he declared that these countries should be admitted to the EC by the end of the decade.g5Even among the member states that were less enthusiastic about enlargement, there was a nowine acceptance of the need to better integrate the CEE states. After copenhigen thi enlargement process took on a more identifiable and discernible shape as new modes of cooperation, adaptation and preparations for membership evolved.