The Financial System: Opportunities and Dangers: Chapter 20 of Edition, by N. Gregory Mankiw ECO62
The Financial System: Opportunities and Dangers: Chapter 20 of Edition, by N. Gregory Mankiw ECO62
See https://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/s
eries/TEDRATE
for current data.
Recap: Six Common
Features
Although each financial crisis is
unique, most financial crises share
certain common elements
1. Asset-price booms and busts
2. Insolvencies in financial institutions
3. Falling confidence
4. Credit crunch
5. Recession
6. A vicious circle
Credit Crunch
With spreading insolvency shutting
down one financial institution after
another, and falling confidence
causing depositors to take money out
of financial institutions, would-be
borrowerseven those with
profitable investment projects
would have trouble getting loans
Credit Crunch
During the Great Recession, loans for
home buyers dried up almost
completely, as it became clear that
home prices do not always go up
Recap: Six Common
Features
Although each financial crisis is
unique, most financial crises share
certain common elements
1. Asset-price booms and busts
2. Insolvencies in financial institutions
3. Falling confidence
4. Credit crunch
5. Recession
6. A vicious circle
Recession
Many households were unable to
borrow money to buy homes or to
even buy simple things
Many businesses were unable to
borrow money to build new factories
or buy machines, furniture, etc.
So, aggregate planned expenditure
fell
A recession began
Recession
GDP fell
Unemployment rose
Officially the economy began to
recover in June 2009
But in reality, that recovery has been
very weak
Recap: Six Common
Features
Although each financial crisis is
unique, most financial crises share
certain common elements
1. Asset-price booms and busts
2. Insolvencies in financial institutions
3. Falling confidence
4. Credit crunch
5. Recession
6. A vicious circle
A vicious circle
A recession sets off a vicious circle
Businesses fail and cant repay their
loans
This further intensifies the insolvency
of financial institutions, which had
helped cause the recession in the
first place
As people lose their jobs, they
default on their debts, again adding
to the vicious circle
Six Common Features
CASE STUDY: WHO IS TO BLAME
FOR THE CRISIS OF 2008-2009?
Case Study: Who should be blamed
for the financial crisis of 2008-2009?
Possible culprits include:
The Federal Reserve: it may have kept interest
rates too low for too long after the 2001
recession, thereby fueling the housing bubble
Home buyers: they were too stupid to realize
that home prices could fall at some point and
that theyd be better off renting
Mortgage brokers: knowing that they could sell
to investment banks the loans theyd made
and being greedy and unprincipledthey paid
no attention to loan quality
Case Study: Who should be blamed
for the financial crisis of 2008-2009?
Investment banks: they were greedy and
unprincipled enough to package the mortgage
loans and sell them to gullible buyers (such as
pension funds) who believed what the rating
agencies said about the mortgage loan
packages
Rating agencies: they gave high grades to
mortgage assets that later turned out to be
highly risky.
Maybe they were just stupid.
Others say they were greedy for the investment
banks business and did not want to make them angry.
Case Study: Who should be blamed
for the financial crisis of 2008-2009?
Regulators: government regulators were not
paying any attention to the rampant
misbehavior of the private sector.
These regulatory bodies were often underfunded.
There was a general ideology that hated regulation.
Government policy makers: for decades,
politicians in both the Republican and
Democratic parties sought to use government
policies to encourage home ownership over
renting.
This may have partially fed the home price bubble
POLICY RESPONSES TO A
CRISIS
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Policy makers used many tools to
fight the crisis:
Conventional fiscal policy
Conventional monetary policy
Central banks lender-of-last-resort role
Injections of government funds
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Conventional fiscal policy
Taxes were cut
Government spending was increased
But this meant increased budget
deficits, which would make already high
government debt even higher and,
therefore, raise the possibility of a
government debt crisis
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Conventional monetary policy
Short-term nominal interest rates were
cut till they reached zero
But nominal interest rates cannot be
reduced below zero
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Central banks lender-of-last-resort
role
Banks take short-term deposits from
savers and lend money for long-term
business projects
So, if falling confidence leads to a
sudden withdrawal of deposits, even a
solvent bank would face a liquidity crisis
The bank may have to sell its assets at
fire sale prices, which could crash asset
prices, and turn the liquidity crisis into
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Central banks lender-of-last-resort
role
A central bank could prevent such a dire
outcome by printing money and lending
it to banks that face a liquidity crisis
When the central bank makes loans when
nobody else would, it is acting as a lender of
last resort
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Central banks lender-of-last-resort role
During the Great Recession, the Fed made
lots of such loans, not only to banks, but
to other financial institutions that faced
liquidity crises
These institutions are called shadow banks
because they take short-term deposits and
make long-term loans, just like banks
Example: money market mutual funds. Fed
became a lender of last resort to these funds,
when depositors fled
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
When borrowers default on their bank loans, a
bank may have to shut down, in which case its
depositors would lose their money
That could have ripple effects because the
depositors would cut back on their spending
plans
The FDIC insures bank deposits up to a limit.
This limit was raised from $100k to $250k in 2008
This reduces the adverse ripple effects of bank
failure
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
But the FDIC does not insure all deposits
at a failed bank.
Therefore, some adverse ripple effects
could still occur
When those ripple effects are likely to be
large enough, the bank is called too big
to fail and the government uses its
money to rescue it
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
Moreover, if it becomes impossible for
businesses to borrow money to finance
their projectsespecially somewhat risky
onesbusiness investment spending
could crash, causing a recession
In such a case, the government could use
its funds to directly lend money for such
projects
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
Governments may also use their funds
to invest money into a bank to enable it
to keep lending even when depositors
have withdrawn their deposits
The hope is that the crisis is temporary
and that the government would get its
money back when the crisis ends and
depositors return
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
The use of government funds to bail out the
financial sector is obviously risky because
the government may not get its money back
Moreover, if financial institutions know that
the government would always rescue too-
big-to-fail firms, they would have incentives
to take huge risks (moral hazard) and
to become large just to become TBTF
Policy Responses to a Crisis
Injections of government funds
However, despite the downside of using
taxpayer funds to prop up the financial
industry, it may be necessary to do so in
order to avoid a huge financial
catastrophe
POLICIES TO PREVENT A
CRISIS
Policies to Prevent a Crisis
There are no easy ways to prevent
financial crises. They will definitely
happen again and again.
However, here are a few ideas on
prevention:
Pay more attention to shadow banks
Try to make financial institutions smaller
Force banks to reduce risky lending
Toughen up the enforcement of
regulations
Prevention: Shadow Banks
Commercial banks deposits are
insured by the FDIC
This could induce these banks to take
huge risks
If the risks succeed, the bank keeps the
gains
If the risks fail, the taxpayer takes the
losses
To avoid this, commercial banking is
heavily regulated
Prevention: Shadow Banks
As a result, the commercial banking
sector behaved very well during the
crisis of 2008-09
The bulk of bad behavior came from
the shadow banking sector, which is
only lightly regulated
Investment banks, hedge funds,
insurance companies, private equity
funds, etc.
Prevention: Shadow Banks
The obvious lesson is to treat the
shadow banks just like regular banks:
insure the depositors, but regulate
the shadow bankers
One way to regulate these financial
institutions is to require them to hold
more capital (owners equity) and
less leverage
When more of the owners money is at
stake, these institutions may take more
Prevention: Smaller Wall
Street
No financial institution should be so
vital to the financial system that it
becomes too big to fail
Such an institution would be tempted
to take big risks because
If the risk succeeds, the managers make
money
If the risk fails, the taxpayer will come to
the rescue
Prevention: Smaller Wall
Street
If the financial system is dominated
by just a few firms, they are likely to
be deeply interconnected
In such a situation, the failure of
even one firm may lead to big losses
in all firms, thus making each firm
TBTF
So, the financial system needs
moderately sized firms, and lots of
them
Prevention: Smaller Wall
Street
So, mergers and acquisitions among
financial firms need to be
discouraged
Bigger firms should be required to
have more capital (owners equity)
so that they take sensible risks only
On the other hand, bigness has the
advantage of economies of scale
Prevention: Safer Wall
Street
Apart from higher capital
requirements, the financial system
could be made safer by requiring
commercial bankswhose deposits
are guaranteed by the FDICfrom
trading in complex assets such as
derivatives (Volcker Rule)
Derivatives should be traded in
exchanges, so that regulators can
have better information
Prevention: Tougher
Regulators
The governments regulators clearly
failed in doing their job
The numerous regulatory agencies
could be consolidated into a smaller
number
New regulatory agencies have been
set up in the US to watch the credit
rating agencies, the treatment of
consumers of financial products, and
coordination of regulators
Prevention: Macroprudential
Regs
Traditionally, the governments
regulation of the financial sector has
been microprudential
Focused on what an individual financial
institution needed to do to reduce the
risk of its collapse
Today, financial regulation is also
macroprudential
Focused on what the economy as a
whole needed to do to reduce the risk of
financial crisis
Prevention: Macroprudential
Regs
Example of a macroprudential policy
that could reduce the risk of bubbles
in the housing market:
require homebuyers to pay a higher
down payment when home prices rise
this would make it harder for people to
buy homes when home prices rise,
which would keep home prices from
rising too quickly
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
The debts incurred by European
governments had been widely
considered safe
Consequently, lenders had charged
very low interest rates when lending
to those governments
But things changed in Greece in
2010
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
In 2010, the Greek governments
debt had risen to 116 percent of
GDP, which was twice the European
average
It was revealed that the Greek
government had been misreporting
its finances to keep lenders happy
Fears of default caused the price of
Greeces government bonds to fall.
Lenders began asking for 100
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
Banks in other European countries
such as Germany and France had
loaned money to the Greek
government in the past by buying
Greeces government bonds
With the fall in the price of those
bonds, the banks faced the threat of
insolvency
Remember what you learned in Ch. 4
This could cause a financial crisis
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
So, other European countries got
together and arranged a bailout for
the Greek government
The idea was that the Greek
government would use the money
provided by other countries to repay
its debts
This would stabilize the price of
Greek government bonds and
prevent European banks outside
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
As a condition for the bailout, the
Greek government was forced to cut
spending and raise taxes
The idea was that this would reduce
the Greek governments borrowing
and gradually return Greece to
normality
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
Greece is a member of the European
Monetary Union
Had Greece defaulted on its
government debt, it would have been
forced to leave the Eurozone and
return to using its old currency, the
Drachma
So far, the bailout has worked and
Greece is still in the Eurozone
Case Study: Europes Sovereign
Debt Crisis
However, the European countries
that bailed out Greece resent having
had to pay to keep Greece in the
Eurozone
It is still not clear whether Greeces
budgetary problems have been
solved
Conclusion
The financial system is fragile and
crisis prone
But it is a big help when it works well
So it needs to be kept in working
condition
This requires regulators to watch it
carefully all the time for signs of
trouble
At times, bailouts may be needed
even though people may hate bailing