Persons & Family Relations: Case Reporting CASES 1-70
Persons & Family Relations: Case Reporting CASES 1-70
CASE REPORTING
CASES 1- 70
ISSUES:
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein,
should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on
the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made
twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The record shows
that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it
is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it
has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng
Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice,
referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper
with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation.
3
PASEI vs. TORRES
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
“Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department
order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong
bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and
recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in
the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers
filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.
ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
RULING:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC)
clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment
and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article
2 of the Civil Code to wit:
4
Republic vs Extelcom,
373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002
FACTS:
WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is
the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority.
RULING:
RULING:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. It is
well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable
condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 1986) said as
much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in
the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. The publication must
be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the
contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or
whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication
requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of
P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The SC cannot, therefore,
extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the
Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil
Code.
6
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. vs.
Department of National Defense (DND)
G.R. NO. 187587, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 359
FACTS:
RULING:
RULING:
No.
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective.
It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications
as the SCRA and law journals
Hence, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
8
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed
against respondent.
RULING:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat
it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article
40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is not a prejudicial question. Hence the petition is hereby,
GRANTED.
9
ERNESTINA BERNABE v. CAROLINA ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
FACTS:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife,
leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and
also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate.
RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the
putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error
due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent has a cause of action to file a case
against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment
of paternity by the latter.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. An action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
In the case at bar, the FC makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. The putative parent is
given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
RULING:
We emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. Saudia's policy
excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.
It would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so
permanent and immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's
employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender,
may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions.
However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an
impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be)
the illegal termination of respondents' employment, this case is
immutably a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with
clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws
properly find application in and govern this case.
Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal,
it is clear that respondents were constructively dismissed. Hence, their
termination was illegal.
The termination of respondents' employment happened when they
were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account of child delivery
and infant rearing.
Stripped of all unnecessary complexities, respondents were dismissed
for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant. This is as
wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for
termination of... employment can be. This is no ordinary case of illegal
dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It is an
affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of
tenure, but more so, to the Constitution's dictum of fundamental
equality between men and women.
23
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that
Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of her business in
Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
24
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA, et. al.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a
child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Unfortunately, after about three and a half
years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating
divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.On
the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court
in Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William
Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and
be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute
petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even though they are
no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.
RULING:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage , the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
25.
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy alleging respondent was not legally
capacitated to marry because of his prior subsisting marriage on an Australian
citizen.
Rederick Recio, a Filipino who was then naturalized Australian citizen, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1,
1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
court issued a divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha
on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Starting October 22,
1995, the petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were then divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia. The petitioner then filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she
learned only that Redrick’s prior marriage to Editha Samson in November 1997.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia an
absolute evidence to prove his legal capacity to contract in the second marriage
and be absolved of bigamy?
RULING:
No. Under the Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as he obtained a divorce decree but then the respondent failed to
establish and present in court a certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21
of the Family Code and has not submitted it together with the application for a
marriage license. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that
respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to
declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence to show the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
and failing in that then the court a quo declares a nullity of the parties’ marriage
on the ground of bigamy, as there are already evidences of two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994. Petitioner was affirmed in her Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy against the
respondent. Petition granted.
26
ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ et. al.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 404 SCRA 495
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18,
1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, Roehr filed a motion to
dismiss then a motion for reconsideration, but both were denied by the trial court. Roehr
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children
should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by the RTC.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang. The RTC partially set aside its previous order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has
already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
RULING:
NO. As cited in the case Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany. It was held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Despite the
aforementioned, such a decree must still be determined by the courts before giving it
the effect of res judicata.
This is merely presumptive evidence of a right (as in the case, child custody) as
between the parties. Foreign judgement merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof of the contrary.
27.
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004 422 SCRA 376
FACTS:
August 30, 1990: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete contracted
marriage on. January 17, 1992: the Ontario Court granted the petition
for divorce to Lucia. On October 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993: Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
October 19, 1993: Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an information
filed with the RTC Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on
the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Motion was granted but subsequently denied. RTC convicted Lucio for
the crime of Bigamy on the ground that it discounted the claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Case was appealed
to CA. CA affirmed RTC's decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first marriage was void. Whether or not he is guilty of
bigamy.
RULING:
Yes. Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
No. The petitioner does not need to file a declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumabago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. The effect of
the final judgment declaring nullity acquitted Lucio Morigo from the crim of
Bigamy.
34.
GONZALO vs. TARNATE
G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
After the DPWH had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-
Benguet Road to his company, Gonzalo Construction, petitioner Gonzalo
subcontracted to respondent Tarnate on October 15, 1997, the supply of
materials and labor for the project under the latter’s business known as
JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would
pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively,
upon Tarnate’s first and second billing in the project.
Furthermore, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment
whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent
to 10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention
fee was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. In
the deed of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official
receipt of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents relative to
the collection of the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to be issued
by the DPWH for that purpose. The deed of assignment was submitted to the
DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for the
retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded
the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of
assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; and that
the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued in the
name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but
to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subcontract and deed of assignment
are void contracts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable
for damages to respondents.
RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse
of rights. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20
speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure. There is no proof or showing that
petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of
fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable
for damages.
37
RCPI vs. CA
143 SCRA 657 (1986)
FACTS:
Petitioner, RCPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving
and transmitting messages. One of its employees had committed an error of
sending libelous messages to a certain Loreto Dionela. As a consequence, a
case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, and the decision was
in favor of Dionela. When it was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the decision
of the RTC was affirmed. RCPI then went to the Supreme Court, praying that it
was not liable to the respondent since the criminal act from which the civil
liability arouses was an act of its employee; there was no sufficient publication of
the libelous telegram; and that the liability of the petitioner arising from Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code was erroneous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was violated by RCPI, as
claimed by the
Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not Dionela was entitled to have some indemnifation from the
petitioner due to
damages incurred by the latter.
RULING:
FACTS:
HELD:
FACTS:
Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school
while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According
to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. Because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to
marry.
ISSUE:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Is Article 21 of
the Civil Code applicable in the case?
RULING:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
RULING:
These facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only
be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the
proper fees.
41
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that
moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he
suffered shock, trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a
student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was
indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by
not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the
University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor
of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral
damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with
modification. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.
42
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILAB
INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 152411, September 29, 2004
FACTS:
In 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an the
Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture
were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E.
Marcos Foundation (FEMF) agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory
furniture, including the fabrication thereof. For the manufacturing of the
equipment to be used in Biotech, FEMF orally contracted with Philab for the
same. Philab began manufacturing the said equipment without drafting a
contract between them and FEMF. The equipment was de-livered to UP, and
FEMF issued a check in favor of Philab. This method of payment was repeated
2 times. On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP
Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant
financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of
buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligation of FEMF under the MOA includes
financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH
COMPLEX.
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice
No. 01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final
payment of laboratory furniture. FEMF didn’t pay the
outstanding balance despite repeated demands. PHILAB
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
UP. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to
PHILAB’s recourse against the FEMF. The CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there
was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB.
Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA
between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party
thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did
not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture;
nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No
one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principle of
unjust enrichment when it held that UP and not FEMF is liable to PHILAB.
RULING:
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime or quasi-delict.
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do
not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an
action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its
claim, its a valid contract the existence and terms of which are governed by the
conduct of the parties. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture
under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
49
Perido, et al vs. Perido, et al.
63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975
FACTS:
Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. The first wife was Benita
Talorong, with whom he got three children; Felix, Ismael, and
Margarita. After Benita died, Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom they had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofrina, and Gonzalo.
Then in 1942, Lucio died and a year thereafter, on 1943, the second
wife Marcelina died.
RULING:
The court held that the five children were born during the
marriage between Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat,
therefore, legitimate. A conclusive proof of evidence cited
by Court of Appeals that the first wife Benita died during
the Spanish period, therefore, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
the first child in 1900.
50
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Martin Casao
220 SCRA 362, March 23, 1993
FACTS:
The complainant Maribel Ilagan was 17 years old and on her
sixth grade. In the afternoon of October 1987, the incident of
took place where the accused, Martin Casao pulled and brought
her to the banana plantation where the sexual advantage took
place. The victim attempted to resist the act but the suspect
pointed at her neck a “balisong” forcing and threatening to kill
her if she told her parents of the advantage taken. It was only in
1988, that her mother noticed her being pregnant and admitted
the incident. On the part of the suspect, he alleged that he and
Maribel are sweethearts and that they have been engage to
sexual activities for several times. The suspect claimed that he
never forced the Maribel because he loves her and at some
point, offered her marriage.
51
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Elias
Borromeo
133 SCRA 472, 109 (1984)
FACTS:
RULING:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused and the victim are legally married.
Whether or Not the accused is guilty of parricide.
RULING:
Yes they are married. Here, appellant not only declared in court that the victim
was her fourth husband but she also swore that they were married before a
judge in Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his father and appellant
were husband and wife and appellant's daughter, Milagros, held the victim to be
her mother's husband. Appellant's own admission that she was married to the
victim was a conformation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio which means
A presumption always arises in favor of marriage.
The decision of the trial court finding appellant Rosaria V. Ignacio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
53
SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 84464 June 21, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of
Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275
sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was
registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners
on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her
late husband on February 7, 1968.
The Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the
subject land on August 25, 1965, described his civil status as "single."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Catalina is married to Mr. Roberto Sanchez and
that she had the capacity to institute the complaint as a wife.
RULING:
Whether or not Gavino Balogbog and Catalina Ubas were legally married.
RULING:
Yes they are married even though Mrs. Catalina could not produce a
marriage certificate they proved it through testimonial evidence, in the
presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as
husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took
place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of
marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without
an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence.
58.
Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals and
Mario C. Hernandez
G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
FACTS:
This was a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the lower court’s decision dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage filed by the petitioner, the wife on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the husband. The petitioner alleged that
from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit,
private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family
and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of
his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further
claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited
with different women, and endangered her health by infecting her with
gonorrhoea, a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of the private respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The self-serving declarations of the petitioner failed to establish that at the time
of their marriage, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. The allegations of the petitioner
did not by themselves constituted grounds for psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts were manifestations of a disordered personality which
made private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to his youth and self-
conscious feeling of being handsome considering that the private respondent
was five years younger than that of the petitioner.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of the husband’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage rests upon the petitioner. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favour of the validity of marriage.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
59.
May D. Anonuevo, et. al. vs. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
FACTS:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate in 1966. His brother, Bernardino
Jalandoni (Bernardino) was the Special Administrator the estate. In 2003, the
petitioners and their siblings filed for a Manifestation before the intestate court
and introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia) who
was the daughter of Isabel Blee with John Desantis.
The petitioners and their siblings contended that their grandmother- Isabel- was,
at the time of Rodolfo’s death, was the latter’s legal spouse. For which reason,
Isabel was entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. Seeking to enforce the
right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings prayed that they be allowed to
intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo. As it
was, by the time of Manifestation was files, both Sylvia and Isabel were already
dead.
In 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings but the Court of Appeals
nullified the orders of the intestate court in 2007 thus the petition.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision made by
the Court of Appeals. The former agreed with the latter court’s
findings that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer
sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse
of Rodolfo. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis was adequately established in the presentation of the
birth certificate of Sylvia that contained the Isabel and John
Desantis were “married” and that Sylvia was their “legitimate”
child. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
marriage has been dissolved by the time Isabel married
Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion was that the latter marriage
was bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
60
Miguel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment filed with the Office or Bar Confidant by the
complainant, Villatuya against the respondent, Tabalingcos with gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting, among others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was guilty of gross immoral conduct for
having married thrice.
RULING:
RULING:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio.
The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the
case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also
shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in
Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in
Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license
was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of
the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of
exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code.
The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is
moot .Petition is granted. The marriage is hereby declared void ab initio
for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
65 (replacement)
Renato A. Castillo vs. Lea P. De Leon Castillo,
GR.NO.189607
FACTS:
On may 1972, respondent lea de Leon Castillo married
Benjamin Bautista. On January 6,1979, respondent married
herein petitioner Renato Castillo.
On may 28,2001, Renato filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, praying that his marriage to lea
be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed and contended that her marriage was null
and void as they had not secured any license. RTCdeclared
marriage void on the ground that it was bigamous.
Ca reversed and set aside RTC’s decision and order and upheld
the validity of marriage. Ca said that since lea's marriage were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the
family code on august 3, 1988,the civil code is the applicable
law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriage were
celebrated and not the family code.
ISSUE:
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the
nullitt of marriage.
RULING:
No, the court held that the subsequent marriage of lea to renato
is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this
is not a requirement under the civil code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of lea's first
marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
66
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA,VS. FELIPE
APELAN FELIX
GR. NO. L-9005, JUNE 20,1958
FACTS:
Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband in
Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea
became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra visited and convinced her to go for confession.
They fetched Father Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter
upon hearing the confession of the bed-ridden Matea and knowing that
she is living with Felipe without the benefit of marriage then ratified the
union of the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis with
the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her illnes but died
subsequently after few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria,
granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint and complete delivery
of the property of the deceased contending that they are the
succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is
not valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the contracting
parties. Felix resisted the action standing his rights as the widower. CFI
ruled in favor of the complainants but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis
is valid.
HELD:
YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis,
where all the requisites are present renders its validity. The
failure of the solemnizing priest to make and file an affidavit as
required under Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not
affect the validity nor renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence,
CA’s decision is affirmed.
73
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, et. Al.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
Facts:
Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) formed a judicial audit team that investigated on
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several MTCs and
RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created went
undercover with another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that
there were fixers or facilitators offering package fees to parties who would
like to apply for marriage. After their interviews and investigation, the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the following judges and court employees
generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:
Issues:
Whether or not the said judges and judicial personnel have violated the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Ruling:
The Court promulgated the ff. decisions:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis , Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales - GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner had legal claims over the condominium unit as well as
the law books, office furniture and equipment of the late Atty. Luna
RULING:
The SC affirmed the modified decision of the CA. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with
Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death and his marriage with Soledad,
being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death,
was void.
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
DECISION:
No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven and like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a
trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, the court was still
unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be
insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her
first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree
and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
76. REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 (cont’d.)
RULING:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
77. CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOL GEN
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010 (cont’d.)
RULING:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of
the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in
favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with conformity to alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the
foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage
certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is
reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
78. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III VS. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012
FACTS:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico
Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent,
Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s
and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After
Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the
petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared
null and void.
Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently,
Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme
Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court
decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federico’s estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel and Emilio III can be a co-administrators of the estate of
Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay.
HELD:
NO. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists a sequence to be observed,
an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin
and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate,
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate
must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration
thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6,
Rule 78. In the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one
to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest
"next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same
estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound
discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel
have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical,
nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s
estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other
witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged
from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate
to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate
85
Valerio Kalaw V. Ma. Elena Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
FACTS:
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his
marriage with Ma. Elena annulled on the ground that she is
psychologically incapacitated. The R.T.C., after hearing the
expert, witnesses testifying in court, eventually granted the
petition, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said
decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court and in
September 2011, the S.C. affirmed the decision of the C.A.
Tyrone filed for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the September 2011 decision should be
reversed?
RULING:
Facts:
Held:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. The Court find that the totality of evidence presented fell
short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.
89.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. Although they
slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no
sexual intercourse took place. They submitted themselves for medical
examinations. Gina Lao Tsoi was found normal and still a virgin while
her husband’s examination was kept confidential.
On the other hand, Chi Ming Tsoi does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her, he has no defect on his part and is
physically (not impotent) and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with
his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the
marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. One of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.
90
MARABLE V. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741, [January 17, 2011]
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner Rosalino Marable and
respondent Myrna Marable , They were blessed with 5 children
but several years after the marriage their relationship got soured
with frequent quarrels as a consequence. Eventually, the
petitioner had incessant marital conflicts leading to withdrawal of
marital obligations.
RULING:
The Court said that the petitioner was able to prove infidelity on
his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities apparently, it doesn’t constitute
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
106. Lupo Almodiel Atienza, Complainant vs. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes Jr., respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995
FACTS:
This case is a complaint against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Judge Brillantes
became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in 1965,
albeit without marriage license. In December 4, 1991, he married
Yolanda De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California.
In the same month, complainant Lupo Atienza with whom Yolanda
De Castro has two children, saw Judge Brillantes sleeping in his
house in No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon inquiry,
the houseboy told him that De Castro has been cohabiting with
Judge Brillantes.
Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him since his first marriage was in 1965 and therefore not
covered by the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
106. Lupo Almodiel Atienza, Complainant vs. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes Jr., respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even
without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
RULING:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
void marriage shall make the subsequent marriage void ab initio.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for the retroactivity of the
Family Code provided that it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As
a general rule, no vested right may arise from procedural laws.
Article 40 is a rule of procedure, hence it has no vested right and
therefore cannot be violative of rights vested in other laws.
Therefore, it has retroactive effect and is thus applicable to
respondent's marriage to Ongkiko in 1965. Respondent dismissed
from service.
107. Vincent Mercado, petitioner vs.
Ma. Consuelo Tan, respondent
G.R. No. 137110 , August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva,
contracted another marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan.
Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and one month after the latter
filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva.
The RTC decision declared the marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article
40. The absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void."
107. Vincent Mercado, petitioner vs.
Ma. Consuelo Tan, respondent
G.R. No. 137110 , August 1, 2000 (cont’d.)
RULING:
A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one
can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may
be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also
necessary even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute
"void."
In the case at bar, Mercado was already married to Tan but did not
file a declaration of nullity of marriage with Oliva until Tan filed
bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then.
To file a petition to have his first marriage void after Tan charged
him with bigamy is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
108. Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for a
period of four years afterwards, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines
but left again for Canada to work there. They maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with
Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City,
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
108. Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
defense of good faith.
RULING:
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity.
Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
118. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro
filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of
the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite
the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. The said judge
likewise solemnizes marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October
27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
118. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
RULING:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was
void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between
Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. With regard to the marriage of
Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the
Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their
marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
119. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court under the rules on Summary Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code to
declare her husband judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. She averred that she was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude,
and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being
unable to engage in any gainful work prior to their marriage. In
order to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
Since1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all and no
communications happened since then. The RTC granted the
petition and rendered the decision final and executory.
Nevertheless, the CA studied the case upon appeal of the Solicitor
General representing the republic, but affirmed the decision of the
RTC; hence this petition.
119. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was correct considering that the decision was
rendered as final and executory.
RULING:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately final and
executory”. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to
give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal
of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. It was
fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its
Special Fourth Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as
Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the Republic’s appeal and
affirmed without modification the final and executory judgment of
the lower court. The petition is therefore denied.
120. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1991. In
1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment but since then, he
never communicated with Yolanda. After nine (9) years of waiting,
she filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
which the RTC granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed
from the decision contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest
efforts to locate Cyrus and thus, failed to prove well-founded belief
that he was already dead. Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal
contending that the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
based under Art. 41, Family Code was a summary judicial
proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable. The CA granted the motion.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of the appeal correct, considering that the Family
Code provides for summary procedure?
120. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 (cont’d.)
RULING:
Judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately
final and executory; remedy is Rule 65, not Rule 45. The RTC
decision is immediately final and executory and not subject to
ordinary appeal. The appropriate remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In sum, under Article 41
of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
121. ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
GR 136467. 6 April 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of land.
He was survived by his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married to William Bounds
in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February
1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta
and Teodorico got married without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming
to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that the marriage
between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly bigamous is by
itself null and void. She prayed that her son be appointed as
administrator of the estate of the decedent and inheritance be
adjudicated to her.
ISSUE:
WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the
absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
121. ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
GR 136467. 6 April 2000 (cont’d.)
RULING:
No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was
solemnized in 1958 where the law in force at the time was the Civil
Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family Code
limits its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code provides that
declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the
spouse is enough to remarry, then Marietta’s marriage with
Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right to claim a portion
of Teodorico’s estate.
122. FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents
GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition
for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay
who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of
Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio had
predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by
the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this
fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right
to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.
The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s
parents “null and void” be upheld.
122. FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents
GR No. 132524, December 29, 1998 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?
RULING:
Petition dismissed
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by
the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children
by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be
covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code
which provides that “children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married
petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to the series of physical abuse
against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs,
cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and
giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and
incurring of bank debts without the respondent consent,
respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the
ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to
present his evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The trial court
rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding
the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was
taken.
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996 (cont’d.)
FACTS:
Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties which was opposed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a
Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial
court denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court
should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene.
RULING:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996 (cont’d.)
RULING (cont’d.):
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion
that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, the court is convinced that
the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity
of the proceedings in the trial court.
160
MELANIA M. ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONIO M. CAYETANO
G.R No. 92245 June 26, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Melania Roxas is married to Antonio Roxas,
although they are estranged and living separately.
Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Antonio Cayetano
their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, she filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the
contract of lease between her estranged husband and Mr. Cayetano.
Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole
ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania’s
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the
conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and
consent of the wife.
RULING:
No. Petitioner has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file
a case for annulment of the contract of lease entered into
without her consent.
Decision of Court of Appeal is SET ASIDE and
REMANDED to the RTC.
161
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs.
CA and GILDA COPUZ
G.R No. 125172, June 26, 1998
FACTS:
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Copuz, while
she was in Manila seeking for employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property consisting of
their residence and the lot on which it stood.
Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gather her children
and went back to the subject property.
Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was
an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners.. The
said complaint sought the declaration of certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contract without the consent of the wife is void.
RULING:
Yes. Art. 124 of the FC rules that the powers of the a conjugal
administrator do not include powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondent’s consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil
Code requires concurrence of the following elements (1) cause, (2)
object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in
the case at bar.
Avoid contract cannot be ratified.
Case 162
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA
FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO
CAMAISA
G.R No. 147978 January 23, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the
ten-door apartment of spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and
Edilberto Camaisa in Makati and Taytay,Rizal. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price
and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten but the petitioner
was signed by Edilberto with assurance of his wife’s conformity and
consent to the sale. Petitioner was later on surprised when the
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without the wife’s written consent.
RULING:
Art. 124 of FC states that “ In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse in the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Although Norma have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient
to demonstrate consent.
172
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BR 102
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the motion was denied
on 30 October 1995. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family
Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated;
(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147
applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of The FC applies to annulled marriages on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes, Article 147 of the FC is applicable to the case at bar.
The Supreme court rules that in a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Furthermore, the first paragraph of
Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
173
MALLILIN vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803, June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married
and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in
1979 while respective marriages still subsist. During their union, they
established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation to which petitioner
was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were
registered solely in respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the
couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent
in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had
been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she
and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married
at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent
filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter. The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties
actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code
can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry
each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner and the respondent are considered as co-
owners of the properties.
RULING:
Yes, they are considered as co-owners of the properties.
The provisions of Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a
man and a woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage provided they are not incapacitated. Therefore, this does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code
now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other. The articles states that properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
174
ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred in its order.
There is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent. But, the SC agreed with
petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. It applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the
MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
178
EMILIO R. TUASON vs. CA and TUASON
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
Facts:
Private respondent filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage in 1989 of petitioner before the RTC Makati on the ground of
psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save
conjugal properties from further dissipation. RTC scheduled the reception of
petitioner’s evidence on May 11, 1990. The counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country,
thus granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. On June 8,
1990, petitioner failed to appear. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private respondent. Counsel for petitioner
received a copy of this decision. No appeal was taken from the decision.
October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision. The trial court
denied the petition which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the
court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene under
Article 48 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Petition denied, decision of CA affirmed. The facts in the case at bar
do not call for the strict application of Arts 48 and 60 of the Family
Code. The role of the prosecuting attorney of fiscal is to determine
whether collusion exists between parties and to take care that evidence
is neither fabricated nor suppressed. Petitioner was not declared in
default for failure to answer. He actively participated in the proceedings
by filing several pleadings which characterized no collusion between
parties.
184
PABLITO TANEO, JR., et. Al, vs. CA and GILIG
G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent (Abdon Gilig), two (2)
petitioner's (Taneo et. Al) properties were levied to satisfy the judgment
amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio
Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five
(5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,
Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public
auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent (Abdon Gilig)
as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem
the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to
the private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the property was illegally conveyed because it was part of the
petitioners’ family home.
RULING:
No. A family home is a dwelling place of a person and his family.
Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family
home is exempt from execution.
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family
residence; it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences that are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
The applicable law. Therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code
where registration of the declaration of a family home is prerequisite.
Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home
is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father
is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243(2).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
185
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.
ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 177703, 28 January 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs:
John Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma
G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioners). On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal shares
of one-third each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or
mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to agree on how
to divide the property and so the respondent proposed to sell it through
public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in
the auction the house standing on the subject land because it is a
family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family home.
RULING:
Yes. The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public
auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reason.
Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of
the subject land on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by
the deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the moment that began occupying
the same as a family residence 20 years back. Therefor the house cannot be
forced to sale by the respondent because family home is exempt on such sale.
186
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,
et. al.
GR. No. 86355, 31 May 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential
land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought
to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much
as it does not fall under the exemption from execution.
RULING:
No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall
under the exemption from execution of the money judgment aforecited.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable.” It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred
at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
187.
PERLA G. PATRICIO vs DARIO and CA
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
FACTS:
Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family
Code
RULING:
No. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
Yes, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can be considered as a beneficiary.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family
home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family
home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
The term “descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a
family home.
188
CABANG vs. BASAY
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the controversy is a
duly constituted family home.
HELD:
HELD:
NO. The respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. It is well founded that those born in wedlock are legitimate children
and legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked, this principle applies under
Articles 170 and 171 of our Family Code. This action can only be brought by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. Upon
the expiration of such periods, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be brought.
YES. Provisions under Articles 975, 995 and 1001 of the Civil Code provide for
the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided. Hence, upon the death of Teodora, half of the
property is reserved to Martin as his share in conjugal partnership. The
remaining half shall be equally divided between Martin and herein petitioners
who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. In result, the petitioners and
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in question in the proportion
of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
197
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate leaving 2
parcels of land. Petitioner, Rodolfo Aguilar alleging to be the only son of the
spouses Aguilar filed a complaint against respondent Edna Siasat to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession.
Respondent on the other hand, alleged that Rodolfo is not a natural or adopted
child of the spouses Aguilar; that upon Alfredo’s death, Candelaria inherited the
conjugal properties, and thus, when Candelaria died, her brothers and sisters
are the only heirs to her estate as they had no issue; and that subject title were
not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria, who is her aunt.
HELD:
Petitioner was born during the marriage of the spouses Aguilar and
before their deaths, thus sufficiently proving that he is a legitimate issue
of the spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, since his Certificate of
Live Birth was destroyed, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of his filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Thus, petitioner,
sufficiently showing that he is a legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses,
is as well the heirs to their estate. Respondent is left with no right to
inherit from the estate of her aunt, since succession pertains, in the first
place, to the descending direct line.
198
SOLINAP vs. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
FACTS:
Months after Juan “Jhonny” Locsin died intestate, respondent Juan C. Locsin Jr.
filed a “Petition for Letters of Administration” praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child and is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
Herein petitioners filed an opposition to respondent’s petition citing that that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged child of the deceased, who during
his lifetime, never affixed “Sr.” in his name. Petitioners also alleged that
respondent’s claim as a natural child is barred by prescription of the statute of
limitations.
To support his claim, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 indicating that his father is Juan Locsin Sr. as evidenced by
his signatures and also presented the Local Civil Registrar to verify the same;
and a photograph of him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of the
deceased’ coffin which shows that they have been recognized as family
members of the deceased. Petitioners contended that the presented CLB No.
477 was falsified and does not contain the signature of the
deceased. Petitioners also presented a handwriting expert who testified that
the signatures appeared forged.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is an interested party and is qualified to be granted Letters
of Administration.
HELD:
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. The Civil Registry
Law requires that a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, the certified true copy, as
transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with the machine copy
presented by the respondent.
Hence, respondent Juan C. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr., as his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious, and the
photograph submitted is not sufficient proof of filiation. Indeed, respondent is not
an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.