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Persons & Family Relations: Case Reporting CASES 1-70

This case report involves 5 cases related to persons and family relations law: 1. Tañada vs. Tuvera discusses the requirement for all laws to be published as a condition for effectivity. 2. Basco vs. Mercado examines whether publication and notice requirements were met for a probate case. 3. Pasei vs. Torres analyzes the rulemaking authority of the Department of Labor regarding recruitment restrictions. 4. Republic vs. Extelcom discusses what constitutes proper publication of administrative rules and regulations. 5. Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. vs. Republic examines whether an agreement can have the force of law without being published.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
706 views173 pages

Persons & Family Relations: Case Reporting CASES 1-70

This case report involves 5 cases related to persons and family relations law: 1. Tañada vs. Tuvera discusses the requirement for all laws to be published as a condition for effectivity. 2. Basco vs. Mercado examines whether publication and notice requirements were met for a probate case. 3. Pasei vs. Torres analyzes the rulemaking authority of the Department of Labor regarding recruitment restrictions. 4. Republic vs. Extelcom discusses what constitutes proper publication of administrative rules and regulations. 5. Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. vs. Republic examines whether an agreement can have the force of law without being published.
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We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

CASE REPORTING
CASES 1- 70

PFR CLASS 2019

Atty. Manuel I. Cabrera


Dean & Professor
1
TAÑADA vs. TUVERA
146 SCRA (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on


April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general


applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of


effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose


is to inform the public of the content of the law.
2
BASA, ET AL., vs. MERCADO
61 Phil 632
FACTS:
Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa,
deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the
administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the
will and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein
petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said proceedings
be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter
because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of
the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that although the
trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for
"three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the
will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and
the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the
date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the
hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the
weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published,
was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
ISSUES:
Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the
sec. 630 of Code of Civil Procedure?

Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general


circulation?

RULING:
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein,
should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on
the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made
twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The record shows
that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it
is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it
has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng
Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice,
referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper
with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation.
3
PASEI vs. TORRES
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
“Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department
order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong
bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and
recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in
the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers
filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.

ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
RULING:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC)
clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment
and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in


administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing
complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article
2 of the Civil Code to wit:
4
Republic vs Extelcom,
373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002
FACTS:

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the


provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section
3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the
Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register where the phrase “on its own initiative” were
deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law
Center.
ISSUE:

WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is
the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority.

RULING:

No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies


that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act
that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative
Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua
non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.
5
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012
FACT:

R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company


(CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under
Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of
every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of collecting and
administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA).
Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory
provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the
coco levy. Per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the entire acquisition
price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of First United Bank (FUB)
stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with
129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation
on maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would
cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued
shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from
the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304
FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10%
(158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded the status of
a law without publication.

RULING:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. It is
well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable
condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 1986) said as
much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in
the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. The publication must
be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the
contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or
whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication
requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of
P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The SC cannot, therefore,
extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the
Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil
Code.
6
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. vs.
Department of National Defense (DND)
G.R. NO. 187587, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 359

FACTS:

Former President Marcos issued a proclamation which


excludes a certain area in a parcel of land previously reserved for
military purposes and declared it open for disposition. The proclamation
includes three barangays (Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village) in its body and another barangay (Western Bicutan) contained
at the bottom through a handwritten addendum by the President. Said
proclamation was published in the Official Gazette without the hand
written addendum.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the handwritten addendum is an integral part of


the proclamation.

RULING:

No, the handwritten addendum has no legal force and effect


due to lack of the required publication in the Official Gazette.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all for the purpose
that it should inform the public of the contents of the law. Pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is
indispensable in the effectivity of a law unless otherwise provided by
the law itself.
7
De Roy vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the
private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do.
In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence.
On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court
finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs
Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be
applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

RULING:
 No.
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective.
It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications
as the SCRA and law journals
Hence, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
8
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed
against respondent.

Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the


judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground
that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in


the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of
the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.The trial
judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.

RULING:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat
it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article
40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is not a prejudicial question. Hence the petition is hereby,
GRANTED.
9
ERNESTINA BERNABE v. CAROLINA ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
FACTS:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife,
leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and
also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate.
RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the
putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error
due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent has a cause of action to file a case
against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment
of paternity by the latter.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. An action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
In the case at bar, the FC makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. The putative parent is
given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.

The Petition is hereby DENIED.


CASES 10-12 ALIGSAO
CASES 13-15 AMARGA
CASES 19-21 ANOC
22
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. REBESENCIO, et. al.
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing
under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is
located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue,...
Makati City (Philippine Office).
Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight
Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. After working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants.
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were
separated from service on various dates in 2006.Respondents were
told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the
same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as
separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. If the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this
shall render her employment contract as void and she will be
terminated due to lack of medical fitness.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated

RULING:
We emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination of
employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. Saudia's policy
excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.
It would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so
permanent and immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's
employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender,
may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions.
However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an
impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be)
the illegal termination of respondents' employment, this case is
immutably a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with
clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws
properly find application in and govern this case.
Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal,
it is clear that respondents were constructively dismissed. Hence, their
termination was illegal.
The termination of respondents' employment happened when they
were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account of child delivery
and infant rearing.
Stripped of all unnecessary complexities, respondents were dismissed
for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant. This is as
wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for
termination of... employment can be. This is no ordinary case of illegal
dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It is an
affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of
tenure, but more so, to the Constitution's dictum of fundamental
equality between men and women.
23
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that
Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of her business in
Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
24
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA, et. al.

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a
child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Unfortunately, after about three and a half
years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating
divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.On
the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court
in Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William
Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and
be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute
petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even though they are
no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.
RULING:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage , the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
25.
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy alleging respondent was not legally
capacitated to marry because of his prior subsisting marriage on an Australian
citizen.
Rederick Recio, a Filipino who was then naturalized Australian citizen, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1,
1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
court issued a divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha
on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Starting October 22,
1995, the petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were then divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia. The petitioner then filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she
learned only that Redrick’s prior marriage to Editha Samson in November 1997.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia an
absolute evidence to prove his legal capacity to contract in the second marriage
and be absolved of bigamy?

RULING:
No. Under the Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as he obtained a divorce decree but then the respondent failed to
establish and present in court a certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21
of the Family Code and has not submitted it together with the application for a
marriage license. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that
respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to
declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence to show the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
and failing in that then the court a quo declares a nullity of the parties’ marriage
on the ground of bigamy, as there are already evidences of two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994. Petitioner was affirmed in her Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy against the
respondent. Petition granted.
26
ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ et. al.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 404 SCRA 495
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18,
1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, Roehr filed a motion to
dismiss then a motion for reconsideration, but both were denied by the trial court. Roehr
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children
should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by the RTC.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang. The RTC partially set aside its previous order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has
already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

RULING:

NO. As cited in the case Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany. It was held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Despite the
aforementioned, such a decree must still be determined by the courts before giving it
the effect of res judicata.
This is merely presumptive evidence of a right (as in the case, child custody) as
between the parties. Foreign judgement merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof of the contrary.
27.
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004 422 SCRA 376
FACTS:
August 30, 1990: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete contracted
marriage on. January 17, 1992: the Ontario Court granted the petition
for divorce to Lucia. On October 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993: Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
October 19, 1993: Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an information
filed with the RTC Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on
the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Motion was granted but subsequently denied. RTC convicted Lucio for
the crime of Bigamy on the ground that it discounted the claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Case was appealed
to CA. CA affirmed RTC's decision
ISSUE:

Whether or not the first marriage was void. Whether or not he is guilty of
bigamy.

RULING:

Yes. Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
No. The petitioner does not need to file a declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumabago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. The effect of
the final judgment declaring nullity acquitted Lucio Morigo from the crim of
Bigamy.
34.
GONZALO vs. TARNATE
G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
After the DPWH had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-
Benguet Road to his company, Gonzalo Construction, petitioner Gonzalo
subcontracted to respondent Tarnate on October 15, 1997, the supply of
materials and labor for the project under the latter’s business known as
JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would
pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively,
upon Tarnate’s first and second billing in the project.
Furthermore, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment
whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent
to 10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention
fee was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. In
the deed of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official
receipt of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents relative to
the collection of the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to be issued
by the DPWH for that purpose. The deed of assignment was submitted to the
DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for the
retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded
the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of
assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; and that
the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued in the
name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but
to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subcontract and deed of assignment
are void contracts.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the subcontract agreement


and deed of assignment between Gonzalo and Tarnate are void
for being contrary to law. However, even though both parties are
in pare delicto the Court allowed Tarnate to recover his retention
fee, as an exception, due to unjust enrichment. According to
Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to
an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal
fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that
holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance,
or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and
where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any
kind will be given to one against the other.
35.
AMONOY vs. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001
FACTS:
Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased
Julio Cantolos for the settlement of the latter’s estate. On
January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Formilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and
Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said
two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the
payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the
taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties
adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated.
When Pasamba and Formilda passed away, Formilda was
succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970,
Amonoy filed for the closure of the two lots alleging the non-
payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the
allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.
Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy
was able to buy the lots by auction where the house of the spouses
Gutierrez was situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders
were implemented for the demolition of structures in the said lot,
including herein respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985, David
Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension
of the demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already
been demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by respondents,
which was denied by RTC but granted by CA, thus this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable
for damages to respondents.

RULING: NO. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred


to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may
be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of
respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was
not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. The
petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.
36.
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., et. al., vs.CA &
BALTAO
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed
Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel plates which the latter
ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was issued by
one “Eugenio Baltao”. Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum
of money due them, filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the
amount of the bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a
mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting
business in the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son,
Eugenio Baltao III. It was found that the signature of the check was not
of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust filing of a
criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for
damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law.

RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse
of rights. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20
speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure. There is no proof or showing that
petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of
fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable
for damages.
37
RCPI vs. CA
143 SCRA 657 (1986)
FACTS:
Petitioner, RCPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving
and transmitting messages. One of its employees had committed an error of
sending libelous messages to a certain Loreto Dionela. As a consequence, a
case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, and the decision was
in favor of Dionela. When it was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the decision
of the RTC was affirmed. RCPI then went to the Supreme Court, praying that it
was not liable to the respondent since the criminal act from which the civil
liability arouses was an act of its employee; there was no sufficient publication of
the libelous telegram; and that the liability of the petitioner arising from Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code was erroneous.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was violated by RCPI, as
claimed by the
Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not Dionela was entitled to have some indemnifation from the
petitioner due to
damages incurred by the latter.
RULING:

Respondent committed breach of contract through the negligence of its


employees. It was still
said to be liable since every time a person transmits a message
through the facilities of the
petitioner, a contract is entered into. In contracts, the negligence of the
employee is the
negligence of the employer. Libelous messages or matters were
included in the message
transmitted, without the knowledge or consent of the sender. Breach of
contract was committed then. As a corporation, the petitioner can act
only through its employees. Hence, the acts of its employees in
receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of
petitioner’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the
services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. Res
ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) was the doctrine applied by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury. The Court affirmed the assailed decision.
38
Constantino vs. Mendez
209 SCRA 18 (1992)

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by


Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez
including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita
met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.
Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards,
he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated
their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had
to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral
damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and
giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence


her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second
week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even
established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and
November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to
Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and
not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself
with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
39
Baksh v CA 219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school
while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According
to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. Because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to
marry.

ISSUE:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Is Article 21 of
the Civil Code applicable in the case?
RULING:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so.

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.

Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the


acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
40
PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.
SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997
FACTS:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa


petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the
1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful
attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to many her. It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. Her trust in him and
their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman.
ISSUE:
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971
because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

RULING:
These facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only
be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the
proper fees.
41
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
FACTS:

Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed


to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first
semester of his last school year. However, he was able to
remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college
approved his application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws
and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement
Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended
the investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from
his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a
deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take
the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary
damages arising from the latter’s negligence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.

RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that
moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he
suffered shock, trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a
student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was
indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by
not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the
University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor
of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral
damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with
modification. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.
42
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILAB
INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 152411, September 29, 2004
FACTS:
In 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an the
Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture
were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E.
Marcos Foundation (FEMF) agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory
furniture, including the fabrication thereof. For the manufacturing of the
equipment to be used in Biotech, FEMF orally contracted with Philab for the
same. Philab began manufacturing the said equipment without drafting a
contract between them and FEMF. The equipment was de-livered to UP, and
FEMF issued a check in favor of Philab. This method of payment was repeated
2 times. On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP
Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant
financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of
buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligation of FEMF under the MOA includes
financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH
COMPLEX.
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice
No. 01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final
payment of laboratory furniture. FEMF didn’t pay the
outstanding balance despite repeated demands. PHILAB
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
UP. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to
PHILAB’s recourse against the FEMF. The CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there
was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB.
Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA
between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party
thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did
not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture;
nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No
one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another."
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principle of
unjust enrichment when it held that UP and not FEMF is liable to PHILAB.

RULING:
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime or quasi-delict.

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do
not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an
action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its
claim, its a valid contract the existence and terms of which are governed by the
conduct of the parties. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture
under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
49
Perido, et al vs. Perido, et al.
63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975
FACTS:

Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. The first wife was Benita
Talorong, with whom he got three children; Felix, Ismael, and
Margarita. After Benita died, Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom they had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofrina, and Gonzalo.
Then in 1942, Lucio died and a year thereafter, on 1943, the second
wife Marcelina died.

On August 15, 1960, the children and grandchildren of Lucio Perido


from the 1st and second marriages executed a Declaration of Heirship
and Extra-Judicial Partitions for the parcel of land situated in
Himamaylan, Negros Oriental. However, the children of 1st marriage,
filed a counter protest of declaring said declaration to be null and void
on the grounds of illegitimacy of the children of the second wife as heir,
and therefore having no successional rights. And that the contested
parcel of land was the conjugal property of the Lucio and Benita.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the five children of Lucio Perido with


Marcelina Baliguat legitimate.

RULING:

The court held that the five children were born during the
marriage between Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat,
therefore, legitimate. A conclusive proof of evidence cited
by Court of Appeals that the first wife Benita died during
the Spanish period, therefore, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
the first child in 1900.
50
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Martin Casao
220 SCRA 362, March 23, 1993
FACTS:
The complainant Maribel Ilagan was 17 years old and on her
sixth grade. In the afternoon of October 1987, the incident of
took place where the accused, Martin Casao pulled and brought
her to the banana plantation where the sexual advantage took
place. The victim attempted to resist the act but the suspect
pointed at her neck a “balisong” forcing and threatening to kill
her if she told her parents of the advantage taken. It was only in
1988, that her mother noticed her being pregnant and admitted
the incident. On the part of the suspect, he alleged that he and
Maribel are sweethearts and that they have been engage to
sexual activities for several times. The suspect claimed that he
never forced the Maribel because he loves her and at some
point, offered her marriage.
51
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Elias
Borromeo
133 SCRA 472, 109 (1984)
FACTS:

At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four-year-old niece of Susana


& Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that
Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada
told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in
turn, told his father and together, they went to Susana’s hut.
There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant
and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his
hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they
were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for
“homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks such because there
was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after
that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was
his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
ISSUE:

Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a


marriage void?

RULING:

In the view of the law, a couple living together with the


image of being married, are presumed married unless
proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order
of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides
on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the
marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The
absence of the record of such marriage does not
invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all
requisites are present.
52
PEOPLE vs. ROSARIA V. IGNACIO,
G.R. No. 107801 March 26, 1997
FACTS:
Rosaria V. Ignacio was accused of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, for fatally hitting her husband, Juan Ignacio, with a wooden club resulting
the death of her husband. They lived together for two (2) years and seven (7)
months.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused and the victim are legally married.
Whether or Not the accused is guilty of parricide.
RULING:
Yes they are married. Here, appellant not only declared in court that the victim
was her fourth husband but she also swore that they were married before a
judge in Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his father and appellant
were husband and wife and appellant's daughter, Milagros, held the victim to be
her mother's husband. Appellant's own admission that she was married to the
victim was a conformation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio which means
A presumption always arises in favor of marriage.
The decision of the trial court finding appellant Rosaria V. Ignacio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
53
SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 84464 June 21, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of
Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275
sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was
registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners
on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her
late husband on February 7, 1968.
The Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the
subject land on August 25, 1965, described his civil status as "single."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Catalina is married to Mr. Roberto Sanchez and
that she had the capacity to institute the complaint as a wife.
RULING:

Yes, Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as


the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission
of the marriage contract. The elementary principle
that the best documentary evidence of a marriage
is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate
is the best evidence of ownership of registered
land, not of the civil status of the owner.
And As the surviving spouse of Mr. Roberto, the
private respondent could validly file the complaint
for the recovery of her late husband's property,
without prejudice to the succession rights of his
other heirs.
54
BALOGBOG vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
FACTS:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of


Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and
1961, respectively. The petitioners had an older brother, Gavino, but he
died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
Then the 2 respondents claim that they were the children of
Gavino and are entitled to the one-third share of Gavino as his children
in the estate of their grandparents.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She
testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt,"
presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned
during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon
and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso.
Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Gavino Balogbog and Catalina Ubas were legally married.

RULING:

Yes they are married even though Mrs. Catalina could not produce a
marriage certificate they proved it through testimonial evidence, in the
presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as
husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took
place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of
marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without
an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence.
58.
Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals and
Mario C. Hernandez
G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
FACTS:
This was a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the lower court’s decision dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage filed by the petitioner, the wife on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the husband. The petitioner alleged that
from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit,
private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family
and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of
his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further
claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited
with different women, and endangered her health by infecting her with
gonorrhoea, a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of the private respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The self-serving declarations of the petitioner failed to establish that at the time
of their marriage, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. The allegations of the petitioner
did not by themselves constituted grounds for psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts were manifestations of a disordered personality which
made private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to his youth and self-
conscious feeling of being handsome considering that the private respondent
was five years younger than that of the petitioner.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of the husband’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage rests upon the petitioner. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favour of the validity of marriage.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
59.
May D. Anonuevo, et. al. vs. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
FACTS:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate in 1966. His brother, Bernardino
Jalandoni (Bernardino) was the Special Administrator the estate. In 2003, the
petitioners and their siblings filed for a Manifestation before the intestate court
and introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia) who
was the daughter of Isabel Blee with John Desantis.
The petitioners and their siblings contended that their grandmother- Isabel- was,
at the time of Rodolfo’s death, was the latter’s legal spouse. For which reason,
Isabel was entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. Seeking to enforce the
right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings prayed that they be allowed to
intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo. As it
was, by the time of Manifestation was files, both Sylvia and Isabel were already
dead.
In 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings but the Court of Appeals
nullified the orders of the intestate court in 2007 thus the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the


orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

RULING:

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision made by
the Court of Appeals. The former agreed with the latter court’s
findings that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer
sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse
of Rodolfo. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis was adequately established in the presentation of the
birth certificate of Sylvia that contained the Isabel and John
Desantis were “married” and that Sylvia was their “legitimate”
child. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
marriage has been dissolved by the time Isabel married
Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion was that the latter marriage
was bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
60
Miguel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012

FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment filed with the Office or Bar Confidant by the
complainant, Villatuya against the respondent, Tabalingcos with gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was guilty of gross immoral conduct for
having married thrice.
RULING:

The allegation of committing bigamy was substantiated by the


submission of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by the respondent with three different
women. For purposes of the disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Contracts bearing the name of the respondent were
competent and convincing evidences proving that he committed
bigamy which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the
bar. The Marriage Contracts, having been issued by a
government agency were accorded much evidentiary weight
and carried with it the presumption of regularity. In this case, the
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut
those documents. Thus, the Court found the respondent guilty
and ruled his disbarment from the bar for engaging in bigamy, a
grossly immoral conduct.
64
Sy vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 127263, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. On September
15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately
and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina
filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was
later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving
their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based
on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a
criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of
Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari,
petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration.
The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent
is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the
ceremony?

RULING:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio.
The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the
case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also
shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in
Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in
Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license
was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of
the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of
exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code.
The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is
moot .Petition is granted. The marriage is hereby declared void ab initio
for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
65 (replacement)
Renato A. Castillo vs. Lea P. De Leon Castillo,
GR.NO.189607
FACTS:
On may 1972, respondent lea de Leon Castillo married
Benjamin Bautista. On January 6,1979, respondent married
herein petitioner Renato Castillo.
On may 28,2001, Renato filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, praying that his marriage to lea
be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed and contended that her marriage was null
and void as they had not secured any license. RTCdeclared
marriage void on the ground that it was bigamous.
Ca reversed and set aside RTC’s decision and order and upheld
the validity of marriage. Ca said that since lea's marriage were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the
family code on august 3, 1988,the civil code is the applicable
law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriage were
celebrated and not the family code.
ISSUE:
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the
nullitt of marriage.

RULING:
No, the court held that the subsequent marriage of lea to renato
is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this
is not a requirement under the civil code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of lea's first
marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
66
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA,VS. FELIPE
APELAN FELIX
GR. NO. L-9005, JUNE 20,1958

FACTS:

Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband in
Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea
became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra visited and convinced her to go for confession.
They fetched Father Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter
upon hearing the confession of the bed-ridden Matea and knowing that
she is living with Felipe without the benefit of marriage then ratified the
union of the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis with
the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her illnes but died
subsequently after few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria,
granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint and complete delivery
of the property of the deceased contending that they are the
succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is
not valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the contracting
parties. Felix resisted the action standing his rights as the widower. CFI
ruled in favor of the complainants but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis
is valid.

HELD:
YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis,
where all the requisites are present renders its validity. The
failure of the solemnizing priest to make and file an affidavit as
required under Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not
affect the validity nor renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence,
CA’s decision is affirmed.
73
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, et. Al.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
Facts:
Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) formed a judicial audit team that investigated on
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several MTCs and
RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created went
undercover with another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that
there were fixers or facilitators offering package fees to parties who would
like to apply for marriage. After their interviews and investigation, the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the following judges and court employees
generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:

Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with questionable documents


even where one of the contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit
instead of a certificate of legal capacity from his embassy; and under Art. 34
(one of the contracting parties was a minor during cohabitation)
Judge Acosta – failed to make sure that solemnization fee has been
paid and also solemnized a marriage under Art. 34
Judge Rosales – failed to make sure the solemnization fee has been paid and
solemnized marriage between foreigner who only submitted an affidavit;
also solemnized a marriage without the marriage license
Judge Tormis – solemnized marriages with questionable
documents; failed to make sure solemnization fee has been paid;
solemnized marriage between foreigner who only submitted an affidavit;
solemnized marriage with expired marriage license.
Helen Monggaya – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel – prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false
information for the purpose of perpetrating
an irregular marriage
Rhona Rodriguez – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by participating in the
collection of an agreed upon additional fee to process the documents, and
in one case, received 4,000 pesos to facilitate an irregular marriage

Issues:

Whether or not the said judges and judicial personnel have violated the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Ruling:
The Court promulgated the ff. decisions:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis , Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales - GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

Court Interpreter Helen Mongaya and Rhona F. Rodriguez,


Administrative Officer - GUILTY of violating the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

Desiderio S. Aranas Process Server and Rebecca Alesna, Court


Interpreter - GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months
with a warning; and
Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III -
GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of
violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning.

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding


Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu
City; and Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn


statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be
REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge. (Update:
August 2016, she was DISBARRED from the practice of law and her
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.)
74
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES
LUNA
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Facts:
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appealed the adverse
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The CA thereby denied her right in the
25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court
of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic and on the same date, he contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm (LUPSICON) as the managing
partner. The firm acquired a condominium unit in 1978 bearing his name (and marital status
with SOLEDAD) as co-owner. In 1992, the firm was dissolved and property was partitioned.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as
the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.
RTC judgment:
Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna."
Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in
the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have been made for transport and storage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner had legal claims over the condominium unit as well as
the law books, office furniture and equipment of the late Atty. Luna

RULING:
The SC affirmed the modified decision of the CA. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with
Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death and his marriage with Soledad,
being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death,
was void.
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Agreement for Separation and Property


Settlement was void for lack of court approval. The
insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted. With
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable
under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy.
75
EDELINA T. ANDO vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014
FACTS:
In September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National,
in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. In September 2004,
Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under Japanese
laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce
Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly
authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila.
Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry
of Manila.
Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by
such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on
13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga.
In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate
her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she
can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first marriage is lawfully annulled by virtue of a divorce
decree making the second marriage valid.

DECISION:
No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven and like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a
trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, the court was still
unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be
insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her
first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree
and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
76. REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 (cont’d.)

RULING:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2


be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced
by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
77. CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOL GEN
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife.
He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he
registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any
response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
77. CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOL GEN
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010 (cont’d.)
RULING:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of
the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in
favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with conformity to alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the
foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage
certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is
reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
78. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III VS. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012
FACTS:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico
Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent,
Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s
and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After
Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the
petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared
null and void.

Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently,
Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme
Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court
decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federico’s estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel and Emilio III can be a co-administrators of the estate of
Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay.

HELD:
NO. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists a sequence to be observed,
an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin
and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate,
or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate
must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration
thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6,
Rule 78. In the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one
to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest
"next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same
estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound
discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel
have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical,
nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s
estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other
witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged
from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate
to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate
85
Valerio Kalaw V. Ma. Elena Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
FACTS:
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his
marriage with Ma. Elena annulled on the ground that she is
psychologically incapacitated. The R.T.C., after hearing the
expert, witnesses testifying in court, eventually granted the
petition, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said
decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court and in
September 2011, the S.C. affirmed the decision of the C.A.
Tyrone filed for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the September 2011 decision should be
reversed?
RULING:

Yes, respondent willfully expressing her


children to the culture of gambling on every occasion
of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act subordinating their needs for parenting to
the qualification of her own personal and escapist
desires. This revealed her disgrace for her children’s
moral and mental development.
86
Robert F. Mallilin V. Luz G. Jamesolamin and the
Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 192718

Facts:

In September 6, 1972, Robert Mallilin and Luz


Jamesolamin got married and had three children. Robert filed a
complaint for nullity of marriage on the grounds that Luz
suffered from psychological and mental incapacity and during
their marriage in a way she did not performed her
responsibilities to the family and she dated several men and
contracted loans without his knowledge. Respondent countered
the petition and the R.T.C. declared their marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals
however, reversed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence adduced proves
that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated?

Held:

The appeal is denied, the evidence shown by the


appellant is insufficient to annul the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and there is no other evidence or facts
to support the appellant’s claim.
87
Republic of the Philippines V. Court of Appeals and
Molina
G.R. No. 108763

FACTS:

On April 14, 1985, plaintiff, Roridel O. Molina married


Reynaldo Molina which union formed a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to
spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for
assistance and was nerve honest with his wife in regards to
finances resulting in frequent quarrels with each other. The
R.T.C. granted Rovidel’s petition for declaration for nullity of her
marriage which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:

No, there is no clear showing of psychological defect


spoken of as incapacity, but appears to be more of a “difficulty” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligation. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
88.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, left respondent Lolita
Hamano and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his
family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But
except for 2 months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters the respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but did not bother to see
them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to
contact him, but to no avail. Respondent filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to
psychological incapacity.
RULING:

No. The Court find that the totality of evidence presented fell
short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.
89.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. Although they
slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no
sexual intercourse took place. They submitted themselves for medical
examinations. Gina Lao Tsoi was found normal and still a virgin while
her husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet


homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

On the other hand, Chi Ming Tsoi does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her, he has no defect on his part and is
physically (not impotent) and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with
his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the
marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. One of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.
90
MARABLE V. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741, [January 17, 2011]
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner Rosalino Marable and
respondent Myrna Marable , They were blessed with 5 children
but several years after the marriage their relationship got soured
with frequent quarrels as a consequence. Eventually, the
petitioner had incessant marital conflicts leading to withdrawal of
marital obligations.

Rosalino Marable filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of


his marriage on the ground of his own psychological
incapacity. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who reported that
petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder,"
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and
lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of rejection
starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have
made him so self-absorbed for needed attention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Rosalino Marable is psychologically
incapacitated.

RULING:
The Court said that the petitioner was able to prove infidelity on
his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities apparently, it doesn’t constitute
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
106. Lupo Almodiel Atienza, Complainant vs. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes Jr., respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995
FACTS:
This case is a complaint against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Judge Brillantes
became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in 1965,
albeit without marriage license. In December 4, 1991, he married
Yolanda De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California.
In the same month, complainant Lupo Atienza with whom Yolanda
De Castro has two children, saw Judge Brillantes sleeping in his
house in No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon inquiry,
the houseboy told him that De Castro has been cohabiting with
Judge Brillantes.
Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him since his first marriage was in 1965 and therefore not
covered by the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
106. Lupo Almodiel Atienza, Complainant vs. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes Jr., respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even
without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.

RULING:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
void marriage shall make the subsequent marriage void ab initio.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for the retroactivity of the
Family Code provided that it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As
a general rule, no vested right may arise from procedural laws.
Article 40 is a rule of procedure, hence it has no vested right and
therefore cannot be violative of rights vested in other laws.
Therefore, it has retroactive effect and is thus applicable to
respondent's marriage to Ongkiko in 1965. Respondent dismissed
from service.
107. Vincent Mercado, petitioner vs.
Ma. Consuelo Tan, respondent
G.R. No. 137110 , August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva,
contracted another marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan.
Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and one month after the latter
filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva.
The RTC decision declared the marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.

RULING:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article
40. The absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void."
107. Vincent Mercado, petitioner vs.
Ma. Consuelo Tan, respondent
G.R. No. 137110 , August 1, 2000 (cont’d.)
RULING:
A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one
can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may
be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also
necessary even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute
"void."
In the case at bar, Mercado was already married to Tan but did not
file a declaration of nullity of marriage with Oliva until Tan filed
bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then.
To file a petition to have his first marriage void after Tan charged
him with bigamy is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
108. Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for a
period of four years afterwards, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines
but left again for Canada to work there. They maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with
Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City,
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
108. Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
defense of good faith.

RULING:
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity.
Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
118. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro
filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of
the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite
the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. The said judge
likewise solemnizes marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October
27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
118. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

RULING:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was
void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between
Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. With regard to the marriage of
Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the
Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their
marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
119. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court under the rules on Summary Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code to
declare her husband judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. She averred that she was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude,
and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being
unable to engage in any gainful work prior to their marriage. In
order to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
Since1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all and no
communications happened since then. The RTC granted the
petition and rendered the decision final and executory.
Nevertheless, the CA studied the case upon appeal of the Solicitor
General representing the republic, but affirmed the decision of the
RTC; hence this petition.
119. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was correct considering that the decision was
rendered as final and executory.
RULING:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately final and
executory”. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to
give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal
of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. It was
fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its
Special Fourth Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as
Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the Republic’s appeal and
affirmed without modification the final and executory judgment of
the lower court. The petition is therefore denied.
120. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Yolanda Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1991. In
1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment but since then, he
never communicated with Yolanda. After nine (9) years of waiting,
she filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
which the RTC granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed
from the decision contending that Yolanda failed to prove earnest
efforts to locate Cyrus and thus, failed to prove well-founded belief
that he was already dead. Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal
contending that the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
based under Art. 41, Family Code was a summary judicial
proceedings in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable. The CA granted the motion.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of the appeal correct, considering that the Family
Code provides for summary procedure?
120. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 (cont’d.)
RULING:
Judgment declaring a spouse presumptively dead is immediately
final and executory; remedy is Rule 65, not Rule 45. The RTC
decision is immediately final and executory and not subject to
ordinary appeal. The appropriate remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In sum, under Article 41
of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
121. ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
GR 136467. 6 April 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of land.
He was survived by his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married to William Bounds
in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February
1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta
and Teodorico got married without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming
to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that the marriage
between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly bigamous is by
itself null and void. She prayed that her son be appointed as
administrator of the estate of the decedent and inheritance be
adjudicated to her.

ISSUE:
WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the
absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
121. ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
GR 136467. 6 April 2000 (cont’d.)
RULING:
No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was
solemnized in 1958 where the law in force at the time was the Civil
Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family Code
limits its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code provides that
declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the
spouse is enough to remarry, then Marietta’s marriage with
Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right to claim a portion
of Teodorico’s estate.
122. FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents
GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition
for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay
who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of
Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio had
predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by
the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this
fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right
to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.
The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s
parents “null and void” be upheld.
122. FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents
GR No. 132524, December 29, 1998 (cont’d.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?
RULING:
Petition dismissed
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by
the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children
by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be
covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code
which provides that “children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married
petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to the series of physical abuse
against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs,
cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and
giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and
incurring of bank debts without the respondent consent,
respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the
ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to
present his evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The trial court
rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding
the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was
taken.
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996 (cont’d.)
FACTS:
Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties which was opposed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a
Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial
court denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court
should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene.
RULING:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
123. EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996 (cont’d.)
RULING (cont’d.):
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion
that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, the court is convinced that
the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity
of the proceedings in the trial court.
160
MELANIA M. ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONIO M. CAYETANO
G.R No. 92245 June 26, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Melania Roxas is married to Antonio Roxas,
although they are estranged and living separately.
Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Antonio Cayetano
their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, she filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the
contract of lease between her estranged husband and Mr. Cayetano.
Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole
ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania’s
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the
conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and
consent of the wife.

RULING:
No. Petitioner has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file
a case for annulment of the contract of lease entered into
without her consent.
Decision of Court of Appeal is SET ASIDE and
REMANDED to the RTC.
161
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs.
CA and GILDA COPUZ
G.R No. 125172, June 26, 1998

FACTS:
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Copuz, while
she was in Manila seeking for employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property consisting of
their residence and the lot on which it stood.
Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gather her children
and went back to the subject property.
Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was
an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners.. The
said complaint sought the declaration of certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contract without the consent of the wife is void.

RULING:
Yes. Art. 124 of the FC rules that the powers of the a conjugal
administrator do not include powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondent’s consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil
Code requires concurrence of the following elements (1) cause, (2)
object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in
the case at bar.
Avoid contract cannot be ratified.
Case 162
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA
FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO
CAMAISA
G.R No. 147978 January 23, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the
ten-door apartment of spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and
Edilberto Camaisa in Makati and Taytay,Rizal. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price
and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten but the petitioner
was signed by Edilberto with assurance of his wife’s conformity and
consent to the sale. Petitioner was later on surprised when the
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without the wife’s written consent.

RULING:
Art. 124 of FC states that “ In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse in the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Although Norma have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient
to demonstrate consent.
172
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BR 102
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the motion was denied
on 30 October 1995. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family
Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated;
(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147
applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of The FC applies to annulled marriages on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Yes, Article 147 of the FC is applicable to the case at bar.
The Supreme court rules that in a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Furthermore, the first paragraph of
Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
173
MALLILIN vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803, June 15, 2000
FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married
and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in
1979 while respective marriages still subsist. During their union, they
established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation to which petitioner
was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were
registered solely in respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the
couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent
in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had
been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she
and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married
at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent
filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter. The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties
actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code
can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry
each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner and the respondent are considered as co-
owners of the properties.

RULING:
Yes, they are considered as co-owners of the properties.
The provisions of Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a
man and a woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage provided they are not incapacitated. Therefore, this does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code
now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other. The articles states that properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
174
ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:

Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were married on


January 14, 1998. On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. A
psychological report was submitted, establishing that the respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was long-
lasting and incurable. In October 2006, The trial court granted the
petition and ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, the trial
court modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred in its order.
There is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent. But, the SC agreed with
petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. It applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the
MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
178
EMILIO R. TUASON vs. CA and TUASON
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996

Facts:
Private respondent filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage in 1989 of petitioner before the RTC Makati on the ground of
psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save
conjugal properties from further dissipation. RTC scheduled the reception of
petitioner’s evidence on May 11, 1990. The counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country,
thus granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. On June 8,
1990, petitioner failed to appear. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private respondent. Counsel for petitioner
received a copy of this decision. No appeal was taken from the decision.
October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision. The trial court
denied the petition which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the
court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene under
Article 48 of the Family Code.

RULING:
Petition denied, decision of CA affirmed. The facts in the case at bar
do not call for the strict application of Arts 48 and 60 of the Family
Code. The role of the prosecuting attorney of fiscal is to determine
whether collusion exists between parties and to take care that evidence
is neither fabricated nor suppressed. Petitioner was not declared in
default for failure to answer. He actively participated in the proceedings
by filing several pleadings which characterized no collusion between
parties.
184
PABLITO TANEO, JR., et. Al, vs. CA and GILIG
G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent (Abdon Gilig), two (2)
petitioner's (Taneo et. Al) properties were levied to satisfy the judgment
amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio
Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five
(5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,
Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public
auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent (Abdon Gilig)
as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem
the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to
the private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the property was illegally conveyed because it was part of the
petitioners’ family home.
RULING:
No. A family home is a dwelling place of a person and his family.
Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family
home is exempt from execution.
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family
residence; it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences that are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
The applicable law. Therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code
where registration of the declaration of a family home is prerequisite.
Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home
is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father
is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243(2).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
185
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.
ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 177703, 28 January 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs:
John Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma
G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioners). On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal shares
of one-third each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or
mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to agree on how
to divide the property and so the respondent proposed to sell it through
public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in
the auction the house standing on the subject land because it is a
family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family home.
RULING:
Yes. The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public
auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reason.
Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of
the subject land on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by
the deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the moment that began occupying
the same as a family residence 20 years back. Therefor the house cannot be
forced to sale by the respondent because family home is exempt on such sale.
186
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,
et. al.
GR. No. 86355, 31 May 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential
land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought
to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much
as it does not fall under the exemption from execution.
RULING:
No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall
under the exemption from execution of the money judgment aforecited.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable.” It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred
at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
187.
PERLA G. PATRICIO vs DARIO and CA
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
FACTS:

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,


petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he
left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building built thereon.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent,


extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter,
petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of
their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property claiming
that the subject property, which is the family home duly constituted by
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario, cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the
grandson of the decedent.
ISSUES: Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the
co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family
Code

RULING:
No. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
Yes, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can be considered as a beneficiary.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family
home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family
home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
The term “descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a
family home.
188
CABANG vs. BASAY
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172.
FACTS:

Simeon had established his family home over the property of


registered owner Felix Odong and he had been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the
same parcel of land since 1956 up to present. Mr.
& Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the subject property
from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that
Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a
complaint for recovery of property.

ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the controversy is a
duly constituted family home.
HELD:

NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code,


a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and a lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. It is likewise
a given fact that the family home must be
constructed on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Since the property on which
the alleged family home stands is owned by
the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject
land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix Odong.
196
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R.
DEZOLLER vs. CA and TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
FACTS:
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero was married to Martin Guerrero. Upon the
death of Teodora, Martin executed an affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement adjudicating him as the sole heir of TCT-66886 which was
then issued under his
name. Martin sold the lot to respondent, Teodora Domingo. Then,
Martin Guerrero died.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that


they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation, being the niece and nephew of Teodora Guerrero, the
sister of their deceased father Hermogenes Dezoller. Respondent,
Teodora Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit a part of the property in question by
right of representation.

HELD:
NO. The respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. It is well founded that those born in wedlock are legitimate children
and legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked, this principle applies under
Articles 170 and 171 of our Family Code. This action can only be brought by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. Upon
the expiration of such periods, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be brought.

YES. Provisions under Articles 975, 995 and 1001 of the Civil Code provide for
the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided. Hence, upon the death of Teodora, half of the
property is reserved to Martin as his share in conjugal partnership. The
remaining half shall be equally divided between Martin and herein petitioners
who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. In result, the petitioners and
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in question in the proportion
of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
197
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate leaving 2
parcels of land. Petitioner, Rodolfo Aguilar alleging to be the only son of the
spouses Aguilar filed a complaint against respondent Edna Siasat to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession.

Respondent on the other hand, alleged that Rodolfo is not a natural or adopted
child of the spouses Aguilar; that upon Alfredo’s death, Candelaria inherited the
conjugal properties, and thus, when Candelaria died, her brothers and sisters
are the only heirs to her estate as they had no issue; and that subject title were
not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria, who is her aunt.

Petitioner submitted various documents to prove his filiation to the Aguilars. He


also presented a certificate by the local civil registry that his birth certificate had
been destroyed, as well as testimonies confirming his identity as the Aguilars
child. Respondent then submitted an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria
announcing that she and Alfredo had no children and that she is the only heir to
Alfredo’s estate, and a testimony of Candelaria’s sister stating that the Aguilars
had no issue and that she does not know the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner sufficiently established his filiation with the Aguilars
by virtue of the presented evidences.

HELD:
Petitioner was born during the marriage of the spouses Aguilar and
before their deaths, thus sufficiently proving that he is a legitimate issue
of the spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, since his Certificate of
Live Birth was destroyed, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of his filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Thus, petitioner,
sufficiently showing that he is a legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses,
is as well the heirs to their estate. Respondent is left with no right to
inherit from the estate of her aunt, since succession pertains, in the first
place, to the descending direct line.
198
SOLINAP vs. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
FACTS:
Months after Juan “Jhonny” Locsin died intestate, respondent Juan C. Locsin Jr.
filed a “Petition for Letters of Administration” praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child and is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
Herein petitioners filed an opposition to respondent’s petition citing that that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged child of the deceased, who during
his lifetime, never affixed “Sr.” in his name. Petitioners also alleged that
respondent’s claim as a natural child is barred by prescription of the statute of
limitations.
To support his claim, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 indicating that his father is Juan Locsin Sr. as evidenced by
his signatures and also presented the Local Civil Registrar to verify the same;
and a photograph of him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of the
deceased’ coffin which shows that they have been recognized as family
members of the deceased. Petitioners contended that the presented CLB No.
477 was falsified and does not contain the signature of the
deceased. Petitioners also presented a handwriting expert who testified that
the signatures appeared forged.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is an interested party and is qualified to be granted Letters
of Administration.

HELD:
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. The Civil Registry
Law requires that a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, the certified true copy, as
transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with the machine copy
presented by the respondent.

Hence, respondent Juan C. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr., as his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious, and the
photograph submitted is not sufficient proof of filiation. Indeed, respondent is not
an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.

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