Message Authentication Codes

Message Authentication
 message authentication is concerned with:
 protecting the integrity of a message
 validating identity of originator
 non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)
 will consider the security requirements
 then three alternative functions used:
 hash function
 message encryption
 message authentication code (MAC)
Message Security Requirements
 disclosure
 traffic analysis
 masquerade
 content modification
 sequence modification
 timing modification
 source repudiation
 destination repudiation
Symmetric Message Encryption
 encryption can also provides authentication
 if symmetric encryption is used then:
 receiver know sender must have created it
 since only sender and receiver know key used
 know content cannot have been altered...
 ... if message has suitable structure,
redundancy or a suitable checksum to detect
any changes
Public-Key Message Encryption
 if public-key encryption is used:
 encryption provides no confidence of sender
• since anyone potentially knows public-key
 however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• have both secrecy and authentication
 again need to recognize corrupted messages
 but at cost of two public-key uses on message
Public-Key Message Encryption
 Dirty little detail on PKCS
• Every time you encrypt, size expands
• Due to protections in PKCS#1
 So signing (by encryption) then encrypting,
the size is more than doubled!
 Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
 generated by an algorithm that creates a
small fixed-sized block
 depending on both message and secret key
 like encryption though need not be reversible
 appended to message as a “signature”
 receiver performs same computation on
message and checks it matches the MAC
 provides assurance that message is
unaltered and comes from sender
Message Authentication Code
 a small fixed-sized block of data
 generated from message + secret key
 MAC = C(K,M)
 appended to message when sent
 Message Authentication
Codes
 as shown the MAC provides authentication
 can also use encryption for secrecy
 generally use separate keys for each
 can compute MAC either before or after
encryption
 is generally regarded as better done before, but
see Generic Composition
 Message Authentication
Codes
 why use a MAC?
 sometimes only authentication is needed
 sometimes need authentication to persist longer
than the encryption (e.g. archival use)
 note that a MAC is not a digital signature
• Does NOT provide non-repudiation
 MAC Properties
 a MAC is a cryptographic checksum
MAC = CK(M)
 condenses a variable-length message M
 using a secret key K
 to a fixed-sized authenticator
 is a many-to-one function
 potentially many messages have same MAC
 but finding these needs to be very difficult
 Requirements for MACs
 taking into account the types of attacks
 need the MAC to satisfy the following:
1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible
to find another message with same MAC
2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the
message
 Security of MACs
 like block ciphers have:
 brute-force attacks exploiting
m/
 strong collision resistance hash have cost 2 2

• 128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better

 MACs with known message-MAC pairs
• can either attack keyspace (cf. key search) or MAC
• at least 128-bit MAC is needed for security
 Security of MACs
 cryptanalytic attacks exploit structure
 like block ciphers want brute-force attacks to
be the best alternative
 more variety of MACs so harder to
generalize about cryptanalysis
Keyed Hash Functions as MACs
 want a MAC based on a hash function
 because hash functions are generally faster
 crypto hash function code is widely available
 hash includes a key along with message
 original proposal:
KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message)
 some weaknesses were found with this
 eventually led to development of HMAC
 Problem with Keyed Hash
 KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message)
 Recall hash function works on blocks
 Let M = Key | Message | Padding and M
M=M1 M2 … ML, where |Mi| = Blocksize
Hash=H(H(…H(H(IV,M1),M2),…,ML)
 But can add extra block(s) ML+1 by
Hash’=H(Hash,ML+1)
 Unless formatting prevents it…
… but still best to use HMAC!
 HMAC Design Objectives
 use, without modifications, hash functions
 allow for easy replacement of embedded
hash function
 preserve original performance of hash
function without significant degradation
 use and handle keys in a simple way.
 have well understood cryptographic analysis
of authentication mechanism strength
 HMAC
 specified as Internet standard RFC2104
 uses hash function on the message:
HMACK(M)= Hash[(K+ XOR opad) ||
Hash[(K+ XOR ipad) || M)] ]
 where K+ is the key padded out to block size
 opad, ipad are specified padding constants
 overhead is just 3 more hash block calculations
than the message needs alone
 any hash function can be used
 eg. MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool
 HMAC
Overview
 HMAC Security
 proved security of HMAC relates to that of
the underlying hash algorithm
 attacking HMAC requires either:
 brute force attack on key used
 birthday attack (but since keyed would need
to observe a very large number of messages)
 choose hash function used based on
speed verses security constraints
 Using Symmetric Ciphers for
MACs
 can use any block cipher chaining mode and use
final block as a MAC
 Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is a widely
used MAC based on DES-CBC
 using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block
 encrypt message using DES in CBC mode
 and send just the final block as the MAC
• or the leftmost M bits (16≤M≤64) of final block
 but final MAC is now too small for security…
… can use message blocks in reverse order…
Data Authentication Algorithm
 CMAC
 previously saw the DAA (CBC-MAC)
 widely used in govt & industry
 but has message size limitation
 can overcome using 2 keys & padding
 thus forming the Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code (CMAC)
 adopted by NIST SP800-38B
CMAC Overview
 Authenticated Encryption
 simultaneously protect confidentiality and
authenticity of communications
 often required but usually separate
 approaches
 Hash-then-encrypt: E(K, (M || H(M))
 MAC-then-encrypt: E(K2, (M || MAC(K1, M))
 Encrypt-then-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, C)
 Encrypt-and-MAC: (C=E(K2, M), T=MAC(K1, M)
 decryption /verification straightforward
 but security vulnerabilities with all these
 Counter with Cipher Block
Chaining-Message
Authentication Code (CCM)
 NIST standard SP 800-38C for WiFi
 variation of encrypt-and-MAC approach
 algorithmic ingredients
 AES encryption algorithm
 CTR mode of operation
 CMAC authentication algorithm
 single key used for both encryption & MAC
 CCM
Operation
 Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
 NIST standard SP 800-38D, parallelizable
 message is encrypted in variant of CTR
 ciphertext multiplied with key & length over
GF(2128) to generate authenticator tag
 have GMAC MAC-only mode also
 uses two functions:
 GHASH - a keyed hash function
 GCTR - CTR mode with incremented counter
GCM Functions
GCM Functions
 GCM
Mode
Overview
 Authenticated Encryption
 Want confidentiality and integrity/authenticity
 Use combination of encryption
– but how?
 Generic Composition:
– “Foolproof” ways to combine (compose)
encryption and MAC to achieve AE
– Trouble is, fools are so clever!
 Generic Composition
 Classic result by Bellare & Namprempre
 Basic compositions (BN 2000)
• MAC then Encrypt
• Encrypt then MAC
• Encrypt and MAC
 Major result:
• Only Encrypt then MAC is always safe
• But caveats – depends on assumptions
of encrypt...
 Generic Composition
 Recent reconsideration by Namprempre,
Rogaway & Shrimpton (2014)
 160 possible compositions - A-schemes
• 8 “favored” A-schemes - always good
• 1 “transitional” A-scheme - inferior
• 3 “elusive” A-schemes - not sure
• 148 are nonsense or wrong
 Convert to B-schemes
 Generic Composition
 A-schemes use
• IV-based encryption (ivE)
• Vector MAC (vecMAC)
 B-schemes use
• IV-based encryption (ivE)
• String MAC (strMAC)
 Both produce nAE
• Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption
 A-Schemes
N M A N M A

FL FL FL FL

IV IV
Ek Ek

C T C T
Scheme A-1 Scheme A-2
N=nonce, M=msg, A=associated data
FL=keyed MAC with key L, EK = encryption with key K
C = ciphertext, T = tag (MAC value)
 A-Schemes
N M A N M A

FL FL FL

IV IV
Ek Ek

C T C T
Scheme A-3 Scheme A-4
N=nonce, M=msg, A=associated data
FL=keyed MAC with key L, EK = encryption with key K
C = ciphertext, T = tag (MAC value)
 A-Schemes
N M A N M A

FL FL FL FL

IV IV
Ek Ek

C T C T
Scheme A-5 Scheme A-6
N=nonce, M=msg, A=associated data
FL=keyed MAC with key L, EK = encryption with key K
C = ciphertext, T = tag (MAC value)
 A-Schemes
N M A N M A

FL FL FL FL

IV IV
Ek Ek

C C
Scheme A-7 Scheme A-8
N=nonce, M=msg, A=associated data
FL=keyed MAC with key L, EK = encryption with key K
C = ciphertext, T = tag (MAC value)
 B-Schemes
N M A N M A

FL1 FL2 F FL1 FL2 F

L3 L3

+ + +
IV IV
Ek Ek
+
C T C T
Scheme B-1 Scheme B-2
N=nonce, M=msg, A=associated data
FL=keyed MAC with key L, EK = encryption with key K
C = ciphertext, T = tag (MAC value)
 Generic Composition
 6 more B-schemes
 Built similarly (use XOR and strMAC)
 Bottom line:
Must understand nature of encryption, nonces
vs. random values, etc.
 Pseudorandom Number
Generation (PRNG) Using
Hash Functions and MACs
 essential elements of PRNG are
 seed value
 deterministic algorithm
 seed must be known only as needed
 can base PRNG on
 encryption algorithm (Chs 7 & 10)
 hash function (ISO18031 & NIST SP 800-90)
 MAC (NIST SP 800-90)
 PRNG using a Hash Function
 hash PRNG from
SP800-90 and
ISO18031
 take seed V
 repeatedly add 1
 hash V
 use n-bits of hash
as random value
 secure if good
hash used
 PRNG using a MAC
 MAC PRNGs in
SP800-90,
IEEE 802.11i,
TLS
 use key
 input based on
last hash in
various ways
 Summary
 have considered:
 message authentication requirements
 message authentication using encryption
 MACs
 HMAC authentication using a hash function
 CMAC authentication using a block cipher
 Generic Composition for Authenticated
Encryption
 Pseudorandom Number Generation (PRNG)
using Hash Functions and MACs