Practical Training Paper I

Professional Ethics and Contempt of Court Law

1 Functions of
State Bar Councils And Bar Council Of India
INTRODUCTION
The Advocates Act, 1961 is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to legal practitioners
and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Councils and an All-India Bar. It was enacted by the Parliament
in the Twelfth Year of the Republic of India.
The Advocates Act,1961 provides for the constitution of two types of councils:
State Bar Council (Section 3) Bar Council of India (Section 4)
Functions of State Bar Council (Section 6) Bar Council of India (Section 7)
The Bar Council as well as the State Bar Councils have various functions to perform
(Sec 2) Definitions.―6[(1)] In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,―
(d) “Bar Council” means a Bar Council constituted under this Act;
(e) “Bar Council of India” means the Bar Council constituted under section 4 for the territories to which this
Act extends;
(Sec 3) State Bar Councils.―(1) There shall be a Bar Council—
5[(ccc) for the States of Maharashtra and Goa and the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and and
Daman and Diu, to be known as the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa;]
(Sec 4) Bar Council of India.―(1) There shall be a Bar Council for the territories to which this Act extends to
be known as the Bar Council of India
(Sec 6) Functions of State Bar Councils.―(1) The functions of a State Bar Council shall be―
1. Admission as an advocate on state roll
2. Maintenance of roll of advocates
3. Rule- making power
4. Power to punish for professional or other misconduct
5. Appointment of committees and staff members
6. To safeguard the rights, privileges and interest of advocates on its roll.
7. To promote and support law reform
8. To manage and invest the funds of the Bar Council
9. To provide for the election of its members

(Sec 7) Functions of Bar Council of India.― 1[(1)] The functions of the Bar Council of India shall be―
To promote and support law reforms
1. To exercise general supervision and control over State Bar Council.
2. Rule making power
3. To recognize Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrollment as an advocate and for
that purpose inspect Universities
4. To manage and invest the funds of the Bar Council
5. To provide for the election of its members
6. To provide legal aid to the poor.
7. To promote legal education.
 2 Right to Practise

Advocates alone entitled to practise. And Power of High Courts to make rules.
(Sec 33) Advocates alone entitled to practise.—
Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, on or
after the appointed day, be entitled to practise in any court or before any authority or person unless he is
enrolled as an advocate under this Act.
(Sec 34) Power of High Courts to make rules.—
(1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be
permitted to practise in the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto.
[(1-A) The High Court shall make rules for fixing and regulating by taxation or otherwise the fees payable as
costs by any party in respect of the fees of his adversary’s advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or
in any court subordinate thereto.]
[(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the High Court at Calcutta may make
rules providing for the holding of the Intermediate and the Final examinations for articled clerks to be passed
by the persons referred to in Section 58-AG for the purpose of being admitted as advocates on the State roll
and any other matter connected therewith.]
3 (Case Law-1)
Vishram Singh Raghubanshi vs State Of U.P on 15 June, 2011

The Supreme Court Of India

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 697 of 2006

Vishram Singh Raghubanshi _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Appellant

Versus
State of U.P. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Respondent
JUDGMENT
Nature and Scope
Appellant contemnor, advocate of 30 years' standing using uttermost foul language and trying to overawe
Judge physically to obtain favourable order - Also defying Judicial Officer concerned to make a reference of
contempt to High Court - Acceptance of apology - Conditions for - Held, apology cannot be accepted as a
matter of course and court can reject same where it is found that
words used were calculated and intended to cause insult, and where apology lacked penitence, regret or
contrition - On facts held, apology tendered by appellant shows no repentance or remorse - Besides, apology
was tendered belatedly, only under pressure, after framing of charges, and to escape punishment - Hence,
such apology is unacceptable - Magistrate concerned directed to take appellant into custody forthwith to
serve out his sentence of three months' SI, (2011) 7 SCC 776-A

• Criminal Contempt Scandalise or lower authority of court - Defamation vis--vis contempt - Maintainability
of contempt proceedings - Considerations - Seriousness of irresponsible acts of contemnor and degree of
harm caused to administration of justice, held, determine whether matter should be tried as criminal
contempt - Further held, court has to consider whether wrong was done to Judge personally or to public -
Act will be an injury to public if it creates apprehension in minds of people regarding integrity, ability or
fairness of Judge or deters litigants from placing complete reliance upon courts' administration of justice,
or if it is likely to cause embarrassment to Judge himself in discharge of his duties, (2011) 7 SCC 776-B

• Professional standards and ethics Held, an advocate in a profession should be diligent and his conduct
should conform to requirements of law by which an advocate plays a vital role in preservation of society
and justice system - Any violation of professional ethics by an advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable -
Dangerous trend of making false allegations against judicial officers and humiliating them should be
curbed with heavy hands - In present case, contemnor advocate, of 30 yrs' standing sent to jail for 3
months' SI, for such conduct, (2011) 7 SCC 776-D
4 (Case Law-2)
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs Union Of India & Anr on 17 December,
2002

Supreme Court of India : CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 132 of 1988
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PETITIONER
Versus
Union of India & Anr. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ RESPONDENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/2002
BENCH : CJI, DORAISWAMY RAJU, S. N. VARIAVA, D. M. DHARMADHIKARI

JUDGMENT
Issue:
Whether the lawyers have a right to strike and give a call for boycotts of Courts?
• The petitioners submitted that strike as a mean for collective bargaining is recognised only in industrial
disputes. He submitted that lawyers who are officers of the Court cannot use strikes as a means to
blackmail the Courts or the clients. He submitted that the Courts must take action against the Committee
members for giving such calls on the basis that they have committed contempt of court.

• He submitted that the law is that a lawyer who has accepted a Vakalat on behalf of a client must attend
Court and if he does not attend Court it would amount to professional misconduct and also contempt of
court. He submitted that Court should now frame rules whereby the Courts regulate theright of lawyers to
appear before the Court.

• He submitted that Courts should frame rules whereby any lawyer who mis-conducts himself and commits
contempt of court by going on strike or boycotting a Court will not be allowed to practice in that Court. He
further submitted that abstention from work for the redressal of a grievance should never be resorted to
where other remedies for seeking redressal are available.

• He submitted that all attempts should be made to seek redressal from the concerned authorities. He
submitted that where such redressal is not available or not forthcoming, the direction of the protest can be
against that authority and should not be misdirected, e.g., in cases of alleged police brutalities Courts and
litigants should not be targeted in respect of actions for which they are in no way responsible. He agreed
that no force or coercion should be employed against lawyers who are not in agreement with the “strike
call” and want to discharge their professional duties.
• Respondent submitted that lawyers had a right to go on strike or give a call for boycott. He further
submitted that there are many occasions when lawyers require to go, on strike or gave a call for boycott. He
submitted that this Court laying down that going on strike amounts to misconduct is of no consequence as
the Bar Councils have been vested with the power to decide whether or not an Advocate has committed
misconduct. He submitted that this Court cannot penalise any Advocate for misconduct as the power to
discipline is now exclusively with the Bar Councils. He submitted that it is for the Bar Councils to decide
whether strike should be resorted to or not.

 judgment • In conclusion it is held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not
even on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements, TV interviews,
carrying out of Court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour arm bands,
peaceful protect marches outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. It is
held that lawyers holding Vakalats on behalf of their clients cannot not attend Courts in pursuance to a call
for strike or boycott. All lawyers must boldly refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can
be visited with any adverse consequences by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any
nature including that of expulsion can be held out. It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association can
permit calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a call for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for
such meeting must be ignored. It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and
independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest
abstention from work for not more than one day
 Civil Contempt and
5 Defense of Civil Contempt
Civil Contempt INTRODUCTION
According to section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 civil contempt means willful
disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of
an undertaking given to a court.
Thus from the abovementioned definition it can be ascertained that there are two important essentials
to constitute civil contempt
Defences In Civil Contempt
A person charged with civil contempt of court can take the following defences-
• No knowledge of order
The general principle is that a person cannot be held guilty of contempt in respect of an order of which he
claims to be unaware. Law casts a duty upon a successful party to serve the certified copy of the order on the
other side either personally or by registered speed post. Notwithstanding the fact that the order has been
passed in presence of both the parties or their counsels.
So, it can be successfully pleaded in defense that the certified copy of the order was not formally served on
the alleged contemnor.
• Disobedience or breach was not willful
It can be pleaded that although disobedience or breach of the order has taken place but it was due to
accidental, administrative or other reasons beyond the control of the party concerned. This plea can be
successful only when the order has been complied with and a reasonable explanation has been given for
non- compliance thereof.
The Court may assess the intention of the party from the act done in the same way asa reasonable prudent
man would assess in the given circumstances.
• Order disobeyed is vague or ambiguous
If the order passed by court is vague or ambiguous or its not specific or complete, it would be a defense in
the contempt or alleged contemnor can raise a plea in defense that the order whose contempt is alleged
cannot be complied with as the same is impossible. In case of R.N.Ramaul vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh[7]
the Supreme Court directed the respondent corporation to restore the promotion of the petitioner in service
from a particular date.
This direction was complied with by the respondent corporation by treating him as promoted from that
particular date which was given in the order. But, the monetary benefits for that period were not paid by the
respondent corporation and as such the contempt petition was filed. Respondent Corporation took a
defense that monetary benefits were not paid to the petitioner because there was no direction in the order
for payment of monetary benefit and they cannot be held liable for contempt.
In case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. State of Bihar[8], the Supreme Court clarified the legal position by
holding that where the order is incomplete and ambiguous, the parties should approach the original court
and get the order clarified by getting the ambiguity removed.
• Order involves more than on reasonable interpretation.
If the order whose contempt is alleged involves more than one reasonable and rational interpretation and the
respondent adopts one of them and acts in accordance with one such interpretation, he cannot be held liable for
contempt of court. However, this defense is available only when a bonafide question of interpretation arises. The
intention of bonafide interpretation can be gathered from the fact that the order has been complied with by
adopting one such interpretation. In case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka[9] it was held that this
defense won’t be allowed if a doubt about the order has been deliberately created when actually there is no
doubt at all.
Compliance of the order is impossible.
In proceedings for civil contempt, it would be a valid defense that the compliance of the order is impossible.
However, the cases of impossibility must be distinguished from the cases of mere difficulty. In case of Amar
Singh v. K.P.Geetakrishnan, the court granted certain pensioner benefits to a large number of retired employees
with effect from a particular back date. The plea of impossibility was taken on the ground that the
implementation of the order would result in heavy financial burden on the exchequer. However, the plea of
impossibility was rejected by the court with the observation that although it’s difficult to comply with the
order but it’s not impossible to comply and therefore, it should be complied with.
The order has been passed without jurisdiction.
If the order whose contempt is alleged, has been passed by a court which had no jurisdiction to pass it, the
disobedience or violation would not amount to contempt of court for the reason that the order passed without
jurisdiction is a void order and binds nobody. In case of Krishna Devi Malchand V. Bombay Environmental Action
Group[10], the Supreme Court clarified the legal position and held that if the order is void, it cannot be ignored
by the party aggrieved by it.
 Criminal Contempt and
6 Defense of Criminal Contempt
Criminal Contempt INTRODUCTION
Under Section 2(c) of The Contempt Of Courts Act Of 1971, criminal contempt has been defined as the
publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of
any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which:
(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or
(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding, or
(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of
justice in any other manner.
Defences Against Criminal Contempt
• Innocent publication and distribution of matter.
S.3 deals with this defense. If a criminal contempt is initiated against a person on the ground that he is
responsible for publication or for distribution of publication which prejudices or interferes with the pending
proceedings, the contemptner may take the following steps:
(a) he may plead under S. 3(1) that at the time of publication, he had no reasonable ground for believing that
the proceeding was pending.
(b) he may plead under S.3(2) that at the time of publication, no such proceeding was pending.
(c) he may plead under S.3(3) that at the time of distribution of publication, he had no reasonable ground for
believing that the matter (published or distributed by him) contained or was likely to contain any material which
interfered or obstructed the pending proceeding or administration of justice.
• Fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings
S.4 of the Act provides that a person should not be held guilty of Contempt of Court for publishing a fair and
accurate report of any judicial proceedings or any stage thereof. S. 7 of the Act provides Exception to the
general principle that justice should be administered in public. Sub sections (1) and (2) of S.7 provide that a
person shall not be guilty of Contempt of Court for publishing the text or for publishing fair and accurate
summary of the whole or any part of the order made by the court in camera (in Chamber) unless the court has
expressly prohibited the publication of the proceedings on the grounds of:
a) Public Policy
b) Public Order
c) Security of the State
d) Information relating to a secret process, discovery or invention, or, in exercise of the power vested in it.

• Fair criticism of judicial act

S.5 provides that a person shall not be guilty of criminal contempt for publishing any fair comment on the
merits of any case which has been finally decided. A defense can be taken that the statement complained of (in
respect of publication of which criminal contempt has been initiated) must be in respect of a case which has
been finally decided and not in respect of pending proceedings. Moreover, the statement should come from the
mouth of a knowledgeable person in the field of law and not from a litigating party which has lost the case.
In short, fair criticism means that criticism which while criticizing the act of a Judge does not impute any ulterior
motive to him. In case of Arundhati Roy, the Supreme Court has held that judicial criticism cannot be invoked
under the garb of Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
The Supreme Court further clarified that fair criticism of the judiciary as a whole or the conduct of a Judge in
particular may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public interest. To ascertain the 'good
faith' and 'public interest' the Courts have to take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances including
the person's knowledge in the field of law, the intention behind the comment and the purpose sought to be
achieved. A common citizen cannot be permitted to comment upon the Courts in the name of criticism by
seeking the help of Freedom of speech and expression for the reason that if it is not checked, it would destroy
the judicial institution itself.

• Bonafide complain against the presiding officer of a subordinate court.

• No substantial interference with due course of justice.
• Justification by truth.
• The statement complained of is open to different interpretations.
• Defamation of the judge personally.
 7 (Case Law 1)
Pushpaben & Anr vs Narandas V. Badiani & Anr on 29 March,
1979

Supreme Court of India

Case number: Appeal Criminal 43 of 1973
PUSHPABEN & ANR. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PETITIONER
Versus
NARANDAS V. BADIANI & ANR. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ RESPONDENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1979
BENCH : FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KOSHAL, A.D.
JUDGMENT
ACT:      
Contempt of  Courts Act-Section 12(3)-Scope of-Sentence of imprisonment-When should be awarded in civil
contempt.
Facts:
• This is an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts against an order of the High Court of Bombay convicting the
appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing them to one month’s simple imprisonment
• The Respondent No. 1 had given a loan of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellants on certain conditions which was not paid by the
appellants, as a consequence to which respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under S. 420, I.P.C. against the appellants
• While the complaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into a compromise and the
appellants undertook to pay the loan of Rs. 50,000/- with simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum

Contd..
• An application was filed before the Court for allowing the parties to compound the case and acquit the accused. The Court
after hearing the parties, passed the following order:
• “The accused has given an undertaking to Court that he shall repay the sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the complainant on or before
21.7.1972 with interest as mentioned on the reverse. In view of the undertaking, I permit the compromise and acquit the
accused."
• This undertaking was violated, and the amount of loan was not paid. On moving to the High court –the High court Held that
appellants had committed wilful disobedience of the undertaking given in the court and were therefore guilty of civil
contempt (Section 2(b))

Key aspects of this case

• Scope of Section 12 (3)
• Whether the legislature intended-the sentence of imprisonment as an exception while sentence of fine as the rule
• Under what circumstances where an offender is guilty of civil contempt should sentence (simple imprisonment) be given to
an offender
Section 12(3) “A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature
intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special
power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it think that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes
the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of
imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of
fine is the rule”

Held

• The High Court was, right in holding that the appellants were guilty of civil contempt under s. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts
Act.
• Having regard to the circumstances of the case the present case falls within the first part of s. 12(3) of the Act and a
sentence of fine alone should have been awarded by the High Court.
• In the present case there are no special reasons why the appellants should be sent to jail
 (Case Law 2)
8 Noorali Babul Thanewala vs K.M.M. Shetty And Ors on 20
December, 1989

Supreme Court of India

1990 AIR 464, 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 561
NOORALI BABUL THANEWALA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PETITIONER
Versus
K.M.M. SHETTY AND ORS. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ RESPONDENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1989
BENCH : RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
JUDGMENT
ACT:      
Contempt of Courts Act, 1961: Breach of Injunction or undertaking given to Court—Misconduct
amounting to con-tempt--Punishment by imprisonment of fine.
Detail :
In this petition the petitioner has prayed for convicting Respondent for comminting thecontempt of this Court by violating the
terms and conditions of the undertaking filed in CivilAppeal and for a direction that whosoever is in possession, the suit
premises be handed over to the petitioner. The petitioner as the owner and landlord of the property consisting of ground
floor, first floor and second floor in which the business of restaurant known as Ramakrishna Hindu Hotel is carried on, filed a
civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge against the respondents and four others for eviction from the premises. The suit was
decreed by the trial court. The first respondent who was the first defendant in the suit alone filed an appeal against this
decree before the District court. The appeal was dismissed confirming the order of eviction. Thereafter the first respondent
filed writ petition in the High Court of Bombay and that writ petition was also dismissed. Though defendants 2,3,4 and 5 did
not file the appeal or take matter further to the High Court they were impleaded as respondents in the appeal and the writ
petition filed by the first respondent. The first respondent thereafter filed Civil Appeal. The said appeal was dismissed by this
Court. However, at the request of the appellant this Court allowed the appellant continue to be in possession and carry on the
business till 31-3-1989 subject to the appellant and all those persons who are now occupying the premises as employees or
staff and are staying in the premises file an usual undertaking in this Court within 8 weeks from today stating inter alia that
they will hand over and deliver over vacant possession of the premises on the expiry of the period mentioned above anso
indicate that they will go on depositing the mesne profits until the possession is delivered. In default of furnishing or filing the
undertaking in the manner indicated within the time aforesaid the decree of execution shall become executable forthwith. In
pursuance of this order the first respondent through his advocate had produced the muster roll showing the names of persons
employed by him for running the hotel business in the suit premises as well as list of persons staying in the said hotel. This list
showed 17 persons as being the employees and persons staying in the hotel, and as directed by this Court the 17 persons also
filed an undertaking. In the beginning of 1989 one Raghuram Shetty (second respondent) in the contempt application filed
Civil Suit in the Thane Civil Court for a declaration filed in the Thane Civil Court for a declaration that the decree for eviction
obtained in respect of the suit premises in Civil Suit cannot be executed against him and for a permanent injunction against
the petitioner herein. Pending the suit he had also filed an application under for a temporary injunction from executing the
decree for eviction
. An order was passed granting temporary injunction against the petitioner restraining him upto the disposal of Civil Suit from
executing the decree for second eviction given in Civil suit. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed this contemopt petition both
against his original temant K. Shetty and also against the second respondent who was the plaintiff in Civil Suit. The second
respondent has filed a reply statement in which he has contented that P.A Dange had taken over the hotel business which was
being carried on by M.Shetty in the name and style of Ramkrishna Hindu Hotel, at the ground floor of the suit premises and
underan agreement the said P.A. Dange with the consent of the tenant transferred the said business and the exclusive
possession of the hotel to the second respondent. Subseq uently there was another agreement executed between the tenant
and second respondent under which the second respondent was paying royalty to the tenant and that to the knowledge of
the petitioner he was in, the occupation of the premises and carrying on the business and that inspite of it he had not been
impleaded in the eviction suit or the subsequent proceeding and that therefore he was not bound by the decree for eviction.
A rejoinder has been filed by the landlord petitioner to this reply. As stated earlier the Suit was filed by the petitioner for
eviction not only against the original tenant K.M.Shetty but also against P.A. Dange and two others. The case of the petitioner
landlord was that the tenant had sub-let the premises to the said B.A Dange defendant No.2 and V.A. Dange defendant
No.3.The tenant filed written statement contending that he had allowed the second defendant to manage and conduct the
said hotel business under the terms and conditions set out under an agreement made and entered into between them and
that Municipal licence for the business had always been and still in the name of the tenant(first defendant). Neither P Dange
nor V Dange ever stated that they had parted with the possession to the second respondent either as a licensee or in any
other capacity. Again in the a writ petition filed in the High Court the first respondent had stated that P Dange was permitted
to conduct the said business under an agreement, on his paying the tenant a sum of Rs.500/ per month by way of royalty, that
this agreement was subsequently renewed on 29th January,1970 increasing the royalty amount from 500 to 600 pm but
during the pendency of the appeal before the learned District Judge, Thane, defendants 2 and 3 had returned the business
together with the premises, stock in trade, furniture, fittings which were given to them for conducting the said business to the
first respondent
herein and that the first respondent had been in sole possession and occupation of the said premises and of the business
conducted therein and he himself had been carrying on the business from that time. Again in this Court when he filed the
special leave petition the first respondent prayed for stay of dispossession. This Court by an order granted stay on condition
that the respondent will continue to pay compensation equivalent to rent every month regularly to the petitioner herein and
that the he shall not induct anybody else in the premises in question. Supreme Court held that when a Court accepts an
undertaking given by one of the parties and passes orders based on such undertaking the order amounts in substance to an
injunction restraining that party from acting in breach thereof. The breach of an undertaking given to the Court by or on
behalf of a party to a civil proceedings is, therefore, regarded as tantamount to a breach of injunction all though the remedies
were not always identical. For the purpose of enforcing an undertaking that undertaking is treated as an order so that an
undertaking, if broken would involve the same consequences on the person disobedience to an order for an injunction. In
case of breach of an undertaking by a person the remedy is sentence of imprisonment or fine or all of them. On the facts and
circumstances we find that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the ends of justice. There will have to be an
order to purge the contempt by directing the first respondent to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary
further and consequential directions for enforcing the same. Supreme Court in this case finds the first respondent guilty of
committing contempt by wilful disobedience of the undertaking, given by him in this coiurt and accordingly, we convict him
and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/ within the period of four weeks, failing he shall suffer simple imprisonment for one
month, and also direct him to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner to the extent possible by him. We
further direct the District Magistrate, to evict all those who are in physical possession of the property including the 2nd
respondent and his men and if necessary with police help and give vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner.
Thank you