THE ‘AXIS OF EVIL’: IRAQ

USFP Lecture 13 – Dr Stephen McGlinchey

The War on Terror
A Quick Recap
1. The 2002 National Security Strategy defined
the scope of the ‘War on Terror’. Read it!
2. As part of that new ‘war’ 3 countries were singled out: Iran, Iraq and North Korea – the ‘
Axis of Evil’
• The Taliban in Afghanistan had already been attacked in 2001 as the first strike in the War on Terror, with UN
support
3. As 2003 approached attention began to focus on Iraq as the next target
4. The existing policy of containing Iraq with sanctions and air strikes (Clinton 1990s) was clearly
not popular any more
• And the same neoconservative people who drafted ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses’ and outlined a priority
for attacking Iraq in the 1990s were now in Bush’s inner circle
• 9/11 changed things, old sores needed treated with more urgency
Background: Briefly going back to the 1990s
1. After the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam
Hussein left in power in Iraq
2. Through the 1980s Iran had been
actively sponsoring terrorism in the
Middle East
3. Two troublesome nations… Both seen
as the most significant threats to the
US in the New World Order era (1991–
2001)
4. In the Clinton era they became the
subject of a policy called ‘Dual
Containment’
Iraq – General Context
1. After the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was
‘contained’ by a multilateral UN force
2. A ‘non-country’ split into Sunni, Shiite and Kurd
factions literally created by imperial powers
cutting the cake
3. Removing Saddam would create a civil war, and
no one wanted that on their plate
4. Iraq was strategically important, and all major
global powers agreed it should be kept intact
5. Otherwise, instability could (again) spread over
the region
• Remember 1979/1980 is just over 10 years previous
1990s: Dual
Containment
1. The first proper attempt at a systematic post Cold War foreign policy package for the Gulf
2. In this era, the US alliance with Israel was stronger than ever, and the Saudi alliance was firm but
Iran and Iraq were rogue actors.
3. The new policy was built on the logic that had been put in place in the Carter doctrine of 1980
• No one country could become powerful enough to dominate the Middle East and hold oil
supplies hostage
• The policy also had its roots in Reagan’s idea to use Iraq to balance Iran by arming it in the
1980s
• Except the appetite for balancing one against the other was now dead
4. At Clinton’s direction, his NSC team developed a new policy that would seek to contain both Iraq
and Iran and check any prospect of either state rising to greater power and destabilising the area
Note: this ‘containment’ has no relation to the Cold War Containment policy… it is a much more local
and literal term in this application
Dismissed options
Iraq came first in the planning (Iran is next week):
1. Options ranged from throwing a coup in Iraq to
depose Saddam Hussein (the CIA)…
2. …to fully courting him as a potential ally who
could feasibly be bought for the right price as in
the 1980s (The JCS)
• See: Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American
Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, Martin Indyk, 2009

3. The end policy was one of containment by

sanctions and occasional force (bombings) via the
maintenance of no fly zones.
4. Bill Clinton wanted Saddam out, but knew it had
to be done by a grass roots internal opposition
that could hold Iraq together
WMDs during the 1990s
1. Iraq had used biological weapons against Iran, and the Kurds in northern Iraq (botulism, anthrax
etc.. sometimes attached to missiles)
2. A UN Special Commission was set up to remove these from Iraq as part of the sanctions and its
containment, but Saddam was able to give them the run-around through the 1990s
• US members of the UN team were expelled from Iraq in 1997 … leading to serious tensions
and eventually more severe air strikes on Iraq by Bill Clinton to show force
3. Reflected that Clinton was in a no-win scenario
• He was too weak at home (sex scandal/impeachment) and the US was unable to rally support
for a new UN mandate to remove Saddam from power (a weak diplomatic moment)
4. When George W. Bush comes to office, and 9/11 happens that same year (2001) Iraq’s situation
ramps up in severity and importance
• In reality, tensions have been boiling through the late 1990s anyway as we saw last week
The 2003 Invasion of
Iraq
1. The US invaded Iraq in March 2003
2. Importantly (unlike Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 1991), this was not done
with UN approval.
• Though approval was sought, it was rejected
• Even ‘western’ countries like France and Germany were opposed
• But mighty Britain was behind the US and joined the war: 38 minutes in (beware, parody)

3. A ‘coalition of the willing’ (mainly US & UK) went ahead and invaded Iraq anyway
• The legality is heavy contested, but can be found in the 2002 NSS and George W. Bush’s
West Point speech – both in your primary sources this week.
• Reflected the Bush administration's unilateralist posture (doing whatever they wanted)
Excerpts from George W. Bush’s Speech at West Point, 1 June
2002
“For much of the last century America's defense relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and
containment. In some cases those strategies still apply. But new threats (terrorism) also require new thinking.”

“We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. If we wait for threats to fully materialize
we will have waited too long.”

“The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans
and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered the only path to safety is
the path of action. And this nation will act.”

“There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty.
We are in a conflict between good and evil. And America will call evil by its name.”

“By confronting evil and lawless regimes we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead
the world in opposing it.”

This thinking was then expanded in the NSS of 2002 – again, READ IT (blackboard)!
Preemptive or Preventive?
This lies at the heart of what we now call the ‘Bush doctrine’
1. Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter define when a nation can attack another… it limits this to self
defence
2. However, you are legally allowed to preempt an ‘imminent’ attack via the principle of self defence
3. The attack was defined by US lawyers as a valid interpretation of pre-emption under Article 51
• A legal defence against terrorism and planned terror attacks
• Argued Saddam’s weapons stockpiles included WMDs and possible nukes which would be passed to
terrorists (see Rumsfeld 1:18:00)
• However, few academics/experts agreed
• Iraq had not attacked or threatened the US, nor was harbouring terrorists
4. So, rather than being ‘preemptive’ (legal) the attack on Iraq was a ‘preventative’ war (illegal?) > one
where the threat is distant and unclear.
5. In the post 9/11 era, the idea of preventive war has become highly contested as often intelligence is used
to counter attacks / hit targets before they mobilise
The Academic WAR WITH IRAQ IS NOT IN
AMERICA'S
Response NATIONAL INTEREST

1. Extremely hostile to the war and its “As scholars of international security
legal implications affairs, we recognize that war is sometimes
2. This was present in 2002, but grew necessary to ensure our national security or
year by year as the war raged on other vital interests.
3. Main sentiment: The US won the
We also recognize that Saddam Hussein is a
war, but lost the peace
tyrant and that Iraq has defied a number of
4. For an example of how much of a U.N. resolutions.
debate this caused, see an advert
placed in But military force should be used only
the New York Times on 26 Septemb when it advances U.S. national interests.
er 2002 War with Iraq does not meet this standard.”
by 33 leading American IR scholars >
The advert continues…(my emphasis in bold)

1. “No credible evidence that Iraq is cooperating with al Qaeda.

2. Even if Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear weapons, he could not use them without
suffering massive U.S. or Israeli retaliation.
3. The first Bush administration did not try to conquer Iraq in 1991 because it understood
that doing so could spread instability in the Middle East, threatening U.S. interests. This
remains a valid concern
4. Even if we win easily, we have no plausible exit strategy. Iraq is a deeply divided society
that the United States would have to occupy and police for many years to create a viable
state.
5. Al Qaeda poses a greater threat to the U.S. than does Iraq. War with Iraq will jeopardize
the campaign against al Qaeda by diverting resources and attention from that campaign
and by increasing anti-Americanism around the globe.
6. The US should maintain vigilant containment of Iraq—using its own assets and the UN
—and be prepared to invade Iraq if it threatens to attack America or its allies. That is not
the case today.”
Why the fierce criticism?
1. The academy largely rejected the neoconservative logic behind the invasion of Iraq (though
there were some supporters in the early days)
• Regarded it as a dangerous experiment fraught with miscalculations
• See last week’s lecture, and resources
2. This came mainly out of the Bush administration's desire for democratisation in Iraq
o but, via military means
o Why? Because it democratisation is not inevitable. It needs pushed .. Evangelical +
interventionist influence overlaid on liberal theory
o Military power is the main tool of the USA
So… ‘when your only tool is a hammer, all problems look like nails’ (Fukuyama, 2006)
3. The logic went, if you give Iraqis the opportunity, you can easily establish a democracy. All you
need to do is get rid of Saddam and the people will respond with open arms: ‘It was doable’
(Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, September 15 2001 In a ‘war cabinet’ meeting)
Neoconservatism Contradicts Realism
1. Neoconservatives believe that through strength you can convince an enemy to lay down /
submit, to jump on the bandwagon of the powerful state
2. The US is an unrivalled global hegemon
• a unipolar actor in a unipolar era (1991>?)

3. Hence, invading Iraq would convince other ‘enemies’ (Iran etc.) to roll over and a
democratisation domino effect would occur over the region / world.
• A borrowing of the domino theory of communism’s spread popular in the Cold War era.
• You could remake the world by scaring others into submission, and if they were not scared, you still had the
power to invade them anyway

4. This was to be the final phase of Huntington’s democratic tide, pushed by unrivalled US power
• Remember ideas like the Third Wave, and the Clash of Civilizations … consider how these fitted into the
mindset of the 9/11 period.
Realism Fights Back
1. Leading realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, John
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt (etc..) firmly believe that states
seek security
• Hence, when a powerful state emerges, weaker states feel less
secure

2. So, Realism’s logic suggests that the weaker states will join
together to balance the stronger state
3. In that sense, putting Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an ‘axis
of evil’ as Bush did will not scare them into bandwagoning
– rather it will do the opposite.
4. No surprise then that realists do not consider
neoconservatism to be a valid framework for policymaking
as it inverts their logic
Iraq: A predictable failure
1. So, by this reading, the neoconservative idealism behind
the War on Terror was likely flawed and bound to fail
• The realist and liberal critics pretty much got it spot on
2. BUT – don’t let that convince you realism (or any IR theory) is perfect: Remember realism failed
to envision the end of the Cold War, even deep into the late 1980s.
• They assumed bipolarity was stable and productive for both sides, so no reason for it to be
taken away by either side
• But, realism is dominant in US Foreign Policy because it recommends cold-headed reasoning
and strategic thinking – not wishful thinking.
• In times of crisis (real or perceived) realism is a usually the default mindset
3. So, the War on Terror is an oddity in that sense as it was met with a neocon-idealist muscular
liberal plan to remake the world rather than to prioritise US security and national interests
• Thought experiment: imagine if neoconservative thinking had emerged in 1945… we may have
had rollback / regime change of the USSR not containment!
Iraq and Liberal Critiques
It wasn’t just realists that rejected the Iraq war, liberals also did so
from a different angle:
1.The War on Terror’s unilateralism (Bush doctrine) not legitimate
versus the accepted desires for multilateralism in the system
•Think of multilateralism (acting as a coordinated team based on
shared rules/norms) as the operating system of multipolarity
•Think of unilateralism (doing what you want especially if outside
the rules) as the operating system of unipolarity
2.The global IGO framework (the UN – but also the EU and others)
badly undermined due to Iraq
3.The War on Terror and Iraq occupation unsustainable
ideologically, financially, and politically
4.Neoconservative ideology is ethnocentric and provocative
(images of the West VS rest via Huntington’s Clash) See John Ikenberry’s articles in this week’s
weekly readings
The (American) Global System
For liberals, the post 1991 global system is based on 2 ‘grand bargains’
1) The legitimate realities (realism) of security, self help and statism
2) The liberal institutionalism that tempers (1)
= This balances out making the idea of a dominant US safe for the
world, rather than a threat: The concept of ‘Pax Americana’

• The war in Iraq and the War on Terror in general upset that balance.
It made the world insecure and took away the institutional restraints
on state actions (the US ignored the UN by invading Iraq)
• So by trying to remake the Middle East (via unipolar action) the US
not only failed (Iraq and Afghanistan are in chaos, Yemen at war,
Pakistan uncertain, Syria broken), but they threatened the entire
world order by destabilising the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
• Ultimately, the UN and NATO had to come into Iraq after the invasion
to assist in the post-war rebuilding … and not with exact success!
Iraq as the True End of the ‘New World Order’ Era
1. The international system itself was almost destroyed
by the invasion of Iraq
• So the war itself is not as important as its
implications (hence the focus of this lecture)
2. By going ahead with the invasion outside the UN
framework, the US demonstrated that it saw itself as
a unipolar power and was above restraint
• Any ideas that a ‘New World Order’ existed were
dead
• If the world’s most powerful nation rejects the The ‘son’ ends the dreams of the ‘father’ (and
system, what hope can it have? Bill Clinton)
3. A High Level UN Panel rejected the Bush doctrine
“if there are good arguments for preventive military George HW (elder) Bush was virtually silent (I
action, with good evidence to support them, they assume by agreement) during his son’s
should be put to the Security Council” (Byers 2005: presidency due to their ideological differences
62) in policy making.
Iraq in Context: A Significant Episode
1. Due to how the US ‘illegally’ invaded Iraq, there was no longer an
expectation that the US would lead the world as Bush’s father George H.W
Bush, and Bill Clinton, had indicated
2. Hence, as US eyes turned from Iraq to Iran the international community,
represented by the ‘EU3’ placed itself between the US and its will to wage
a third invasion in the War on Terror (next week)
3. The prospect of another unilateral president scared the international
community so much that Barack Obama was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize
just months into office in 2009 (before he had done anything) simply
because he was not George W. Bush and espoused multilateralism
4. US combat troops removed from Iraq by 2011 – 150,000 were drawn
down to 5000-ish security and advisory troops in bases (but see here)
5. Trump has shown no fondness for Iraq outside of anti-terror operations
(we’ll cover this in a few weeks) … his attention is focused elsewhere
6. Yet, clearly, the world wants the US engaged in the Middle East and
elsewhere. George W. Bush was ‘too unilateral’, Trump is ‘abandoning’
traditional US commitments (isolationism?) Obama seemed to ‘get it right’
Stephen Walt’s 10 Lessons
useful to reflect on Iraq, and perhaps to
consider more generally in US foreign policy?

1. The United States lost

2. It’s not that hard to hijack the United States into a war
3. The United States gets in big trouble when the "marketplace of ideas" breaks down and when the
public and our leadership do not have an open debate about what to do.
4. The secularism and middle-class character of Iraqi society was overrated
5. Don’t listen to ambitious exiles who exaggerate and give misleading testimony
6. It’s very hard to improvise an occupation
7. Don’t be surprised when adversaries act to defend their own interests, and in ways we won’t like
8. Counterinsurgency warfare is ugly and inevitably leads to war crimes, atrocities, or other forms of abuse
9. Better "planning" may not be the answer as it can be ignored by ideological policymakers in key
positions (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz etc.)
10. Rethink U.S. grand strategy, not just tactics or methods. The US is not good at running other
countries. So it should be avoided at all costs - never again.