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4-Network Security Applications

The document discusses several applications for network security including authentication applications like Kerberos and PKI, electronic mail security using PGP and S/MIME, and IPSec for securing internet protocol traffic. It also briefly mentions network management security.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
61 views27 pages

4-Network Security Applications

The document discusses several applications for network security including authentication applications like Kerberos and PKI, electronic mail security using PGP and S/MIME, and IPSec for securing internet protocol traffic. It also briefly mentions network management security.

Uploaded by

samuel
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Network Security Applications

 Authentication Applications: Kerberos, Public Key


infrastructure, Directory Authentication Service
 Electronic Mail Security: Pretty good Privacy (PGP) , S/MIME
 Internet Protocol Security(IPSec)
 Network management security
We cannot enter into alliance with
neighboring princes until we are
acquainted with their designs.
—The Art of War, Sun Tzu
User Authentication

 fundamental security building block


 basis of access control & user accountability
 is the process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity
 has two steps:
 identification - specify identifier
 verification - bind entity (person) and identifier
 distinct from message authentication
Means of User Authentication

 four means of authenticating user's identity


 based on something the individual
 knows - e.g. password, PIN
 possesses - e.g. key, token, smartcard
 is (static biometrics) - e.g. fingerprint, retina
 does (dynamic biometrics) - e.g. voice, sign
 can use alone or combined
 all can provide user authentication
 all have issues
Authentication Protocols

 used to convince parties of each others identity and to exchange session keys
 may be one-way or mutual
 key issues are
 confidentiality – to protect session keys
 timeliness – to prevent replay attacks
Replay Attacks

 where a valid signed message is copied and later resent


 simple replay
 repetition that can be logged
 repetition that cannot be detected
 backward replay without modification

 countermeasures include
 use of sequence numbers (generally impractical)
 timestamps (needs synchronized clocks)
 challenge/response (using unique nonce)
One-Way Authentication

 required when sender & receiver are not in communications at


same time (eg. email)
 have header in clear so can be delivered by email system
 may want contents of body protected & sender authenticated
Using Symmetric Encryption

 as discussed previously can use a two-level hierarchy of keys


 usually with a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC)
 each party shares own master key with KDC
 KDC generates session keys used for connections between parties
 master keys used to distribute these to them
Needham-Schroeder Protocol

 original third-party key distribution protocol


 for session between A B mediated by KDC
 protocol overview is:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: E(Ka,[Ks||IDB||N1|| E(Kb,[Ks||IDA])])
3. A -> B: E(Kb, [Ks||IDA])
4. B -> A: E(Ks, [N2])
5. A -> B: E(Ks, [f(N2)])
Needham-Schroeder Protocol

 used to securely distribute a new session key for communications between A & B
 but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old session key has been compromised
 then message 3 can be resent convincing B that is communicating with A
 modifications to address this require:
 timestamps in steps 2 & 3 (Denning 81)
 using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)
One-Way Authentication

 use refinement of KDC to secure email


 since B no online, drop steps 4 & 5
 protocol becomes:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: E(Ka, [Ks||IDB||N1 || E(Kb,[Ks||IDA])])
3. A -> B: E(Kb, [Ks||IDA]) || E(Ks, M)
 provides encryption & some authentication
 does not protect from replay attack
Kerberos

 trusted key server system from MIT


 provides centralised private-key third-party authentication in a
distributed network
 allows users access to services distributed through network
 without needing to trust all workstations
 rather all trust a central authentication server
 two versions in use: 4 & 5
Kerberos Requirements

 its first report identified requirements as:


 secure
 reliable
 transparent
 scalable
 implemented using an authentication protocol based on Needham-
Schroeder
Kerberos v4 Overview

 a basic third-party authentication scheme


 have an Authentication Server (AS)
 users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
 AS provides a non-corruptible authentication credential (ticket granting ticket
TGT)
 have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
 users subsequently request access to other services from TGS on basis of users
TGT
 using a complex protocol using DES
Kerberos v4 Dialogue
Kerberos 4 Overview
Kerberos Realms

 a Kerberos environment consists of:


 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server
 this is termed a realm
 typically a single administrative domain
 if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers must share keys and trust
Kerberos Realms
Kerberos Version 5

 developed in mid 1990’s


 specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
 provides improvements over v4
 addresses environmental shortcomings
 encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket lifetime, authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
 and technical deficiencies
 double encryption, non-std mode of use, session keys, password attacks
Kerberos v5 Dialogue
Remote User Authentication

 public-key encryption for session key distribution


 assumes both parties have other’s public keys
 may not be practical
 have Denning protocol using timestamps
 uses central authentication server (AS) to provide public-key certificates
 requires synchronized clocks
 have Woo and Lam protocol using nonces
 care needed to ensure no protocol flaws
One-Way Authentication

 have public-key approaches for email


 encryption of message for confidentiality, authentication, or both
 must know public keys
 using costly public-key alg on long message
 for confidentiality encrypt message with one-time secret key, public-key encrypted
 for authentication use a digital signature
 may need to protect by encrypting signature
 use digital certificate to supply public key
Federated Identity Management

 use of common identity management scheme


 across multiple enterprises & numerous applications
 supporting many thousands, even millions of users
 principal elements are:
 authentication, authorization, accounting, provisioning, workflow
automation, delegated administration, password synchronization, self-
service password reset, federation
 Kerberos contains many of these elements
Identity Management
Identity
Federation
Standards Used

 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)


 XML-based language for exchange of security information between online business partners
 part of OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards)
standards for federated identity management
 e.g. WS-Federation for browser-based federation
 need a few mature industry standards
Federated Identity Examples

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