The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue

Network Security

1
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
Objectives of the
Topic
• After completing this
topic, a student will
be able to
– explain Kerberos V4
authentication
dialogue.

2
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
Figures and material
in this topic have
been adapted from
• “Network Security
Essentials:
Applications and
Standards”, 2014 by
William Stalling.

3
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• Two issues with the
more secure
authentication
dialogue:
• First problem is the
lifetime associated
with the ticket-
granting ticket.

4
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• If this lifetime is very
short (e.g., minutes),
then the user will be
repeatedly asked for a
password.
• If the lifetime is long
(e.g., hours), then an
opponent has a
greater opportunity
for replay.

5
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• An opponent could
capture a copy of the
ticket-granting ticket
and then wait for the
legitimate user to log
out.
• Then opponent could
forge the legitimate
user’s network
address and send the
message to the TGS.

6
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• This would give the
opponent unlimited
access to the
resources and files
available to the
legitimate user.
• A similar issue arises
when an opponent
captures a service-
granting ticket.

7
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• Thus, we arrive at an
additional
requirement.
• A network service (the
TGS or an application
service) must be able
to prove that the
person using a ticket is
the same person to
whom that ticket was
issued.

8
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The second problem is
that servers should
authenticate
themselves to users.
• An opponent can
sabotage the
configuration so that
messages to a server
were directed to
another location.

9
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
Kerberos Solution:
• The threat is that an
opponent will steal
the ticket and use it
before it expires.
• Let the AS provide
both the client and
the TGS with a secret
piece of information
in a secure manner.

10
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• Then client can prove
its identity to TGS by
revealing secret
information, again in a
secure manner.
• Kerberos uses an
encryption key as the
secure information;
this is referred to as a
session key.

11
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The client sends a
message to the AS
requesting access to
the TGS.
• The AS responds with
a message, encrypted
with a key derived
from the user’s
password (KC), that
contains the ticket.

12
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The encrypted
message also contains
a copy of the session
key, KC,tgs.
• Because this session
key is inside the
message encrypted
with KC, only the
user’s client can read
it.

13
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The same session key
is included in the
ticket, which can be
read only by the TGS.
• Thus, the session key
has been securely
delivered to both C
and the TGS.

14
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue

15
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• Message (1) includes
a timestamp, so that
the AS knows that the
message is timely.
• Message (2) includes
several elements of
the ticket in a form
accessible to C.
• C learns that this
ticket is for TGS and
when it expires.
16
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• Now C sends the TGS
a message that
includes the ticket
plus the ID of the
requested service.
• C also transmits an
authenticator, which
includes the ID and
address of C’s user
and a timestamp.

17
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The authenticator is
intended for use only
once and has a very
short lifetime.
• Now TGS can decrypt
the ticket with the key
that it shares with AS.
• This ticket indicates
that user C has been
provided with the
session key KC,tgs.
18
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• The TGS uses the
session key to decrypt
the authenticator.
• The TGS can then
check the name and
address from the
authenticator with
that of the ticket and
with the network
address of the
incoming message.

19
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• If all match, then the
TGS is assured that
the sender of the
ticket is indeed the
ticket’s real owner.

20
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue

21
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• C now has a reusable
service-granting ticket
for V. When C
presents this ticket, it
also sends an
authenticator.
• The server can
decrypt the ticket,
recover the session
key, and decrypt the
authenticator.

22
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
• If mutual
authentication is
required, the server
returns the value of
the timestamp from
the authenticator,
incremented by 1, and
encrypted in the
session key.
• C can decrypt this
message.

23
The Version 4 Authentication Dialogue

24