CRIMINAL LAW

Q: State the characteristics of criminal

law and explain each. (1988, 1998 Bar)
 A: The characteristics of criminal law are as follows:
 1. Generality – that the law is binding upon all persons who reside to sojourn
in the Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color, creed, or personal
circumstances.
 2. Territoriality – that the law is applicable to all crimes committed within the
limits of Philippine territory, which includes its atmosphere interior water and
maritime zone. (Art. 2)
 3. Prospectivity – that the law does not have any retroactive effect, except if it
favors the offender unless he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22) or the law
otherwise provides.
 Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie
in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the
Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe
in Calamba, Laguna. Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? (1994 Bar)

 A: No. Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy

since the bigamous marriage was contracted or
solemnized in Singapore, hence, such violation
is not one of those where the Revised Penal
Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied
extraterritoriality. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the
situation.
Q: Ando, an Indonesian national who just visited the Philippines, purchased a ticket for a passenger vessel bound for Hong Kong.
While on board the vessel, he saw his mortal enemy Iason, also an Indonesian national, seated at the back portion of the cabin
and who was busy reading a newspaper. Ando stealthily approached Iason and when he was near him, Ando stabbed and killed
Iason. The vessel is registered in Malaysia. The killing happened just a few moments after the vessel left the port of Manila.
Operatives from the PNP Maritime Command arrested Ando. Presented for the killing of Iason, Ando contended that he did not
incur criminal liability because both he and the victim were Indonesians. He likewise argued that he could not be prosecuted in
Manila because the vessel is a Malaysian-registered ship. Discuss the merits of Ando's contentions. (2015 Bar)

 A: Both contentions of Ando lack merit. The argument of Ando that he did not
incur criminal liability because both he and the victim were Indonesians is not
tenable. Under the generality principle, penal laws shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in the Philippine territory (Article 14 of the Civil Code). The foreign
characteristic of an offender and offended party does not exclude him from
operation of penal laws (People v. Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027). Under the Revised
Penal Code, except as provided in treaties and laws of preferential application,
penal laws of the Philippines shall have force and effect within its territory. Here,
since the killing took place within the Philippine territory, our penal laws applies
and Ando may be held criminally responsible despite his being and Indonesian
citizen
Q: Distinguish intent from motive in Criminal
Law. (1996, 2004 Bar)

 A: Motive is the moving power which impels

one to action for a definite result; whereas
intent is the purpose to use a particular means
to effect such results. Motive is not an
essential element of a felony and need not be
proved for purpose of conviction, while intent
is an essential element of felonies by dolo.
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate, because Pula was
courting Ganda, whom Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to
teach Pula a lesson and went to a veterinarian to ask for
poison on the pretext that he was going to kill a sick pet, when
actually Puti was intending to poison Pula, the Vet instantly
gave Puti a non-toxic solution which, when mixed with Pula’s
food, did not kill Pula. What crime, if any, did Puti commit?
(1994, 1998, 2004, 2009, 2014 Bar)

 Puti committed an impossible crime of murder. Puti,

with intent to kill Pula, unknowingly employed
ineffectual means to accomplish the intended felony,
that is, using a non-toxic solution.
a. What is an impossible crime?

 Impossible crime is an act which would be an

offense against person or property, were if not
for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
b. Is an impossible crime really a crime?

 No, an impossible crime is not really a crime.

It is only so-called because the act gives rise to
criminal liability. But actually, no felony is
committed. The accused is to be punished for
his criminal tendency or propensity although
no crime was committed.
 c. A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the
house of X, Y, a neighbor of X, who happened to be passing by,
pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four
culprits peppered the room with bullets. Not satisfied, A even
threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed X’s room. However,
unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and
nobody was hit or injured during the incident. Are A, B, C and D
liable for any crime? Explain.
 Yes, A, B, C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the
destruction of the room of X with the use of an explosive, the hand
grenade.
 Liability for an impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act
committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised Penal
Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod v. CA
(215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for
an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in the said case, which
constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was
intended.
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between
justifying and exempting circumstances in criminal
law. (2004, 1998 Bar)
 A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not the
actor; while exempting circumstance affects the
actor, not the act.
 In justifying circumstance, no criminal and,
generally, no civil liability is incurred; while in
exempting circumstance, civil liability is generally
incurred although there is no criminal liability
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his
gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun.
FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder. In his defense, AA invoked the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that by preventing ST from
shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)

 A: No, AA's defense will not prosper. The act of the victim's
son, ST, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence,
justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful
aggression by BB and CC. ST’s act to defend his father's life
and to stop BB and CC achieve their criminal objective cannot
be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law,
a lawful act. What AA did was a lawful defense, not greater
evil. Likewise, AA’s defense will not prosper because in this
case there was a conspiracy among the three of them, hence,
the act of one is the act of all.
Q: Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate, escaping from jail and
ordered the latter to surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon
attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear. Filemon missed in
his first attempt to hit Pat. Negre, and before he could strike
again, Pat. Negre shot and killed him.
(a) Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain.
(b) Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot, and Filemon ran
away without parting with his weapon. Pat Negre pursued
Filemon but the latter was running so fast that Pat Negre
fired warning shots into the air shouting for Filemon to stop.
In as much as Filemon continued running Pat. Negre fired at
him hitting and killing him. Is the plea of self-defense
sustainable? Why would you then hold Pat. Negre criminally
liable? Discuss.(1993 Bar)
 (a) Yes. Self-defense can be claimed as there is
an imminent and great peril on the life of
Negre.
 (b) No. Self-defense is no longer sustainable
as there is no more peril on his life.
Q: Osang, a married woman in her early twenties, was
sleeping on a banig on the floor of their nipa hut beside the
seashore when she was awakened by the act of a man
mounting her. Thinking that it was her husband, Gardo, who
had returned from fishing in the sea, Osang continued her
sleep but allowed the man, who was actually their neighbor,
Julio, to have sexual intercourse with her. After Julio
satisfied himself, he said “Salamat Osang" as he turned to
leave. Only then did Osang realize that the man was not her
husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed a balisong from the wall
and stabbed Julio to death. When tried for homicide, Osang
claimed defense of honor. Should the claim be sustained?
Why? (2000, 1998 Bar)
 A: No. Osang's claim of defense of honor should not be sustained
because the aggression on her honor had ceased when she stabbed
the aggressor. In defense of rights under Art. 11(1) of the RPC, it is
required inter alia that there be (1) unlawful aggression, and (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
The unlawful aggression must be continuing when the aggressor
was injured or disabled by the person making a defense. Otherwise,
the attack made is a retaliation and not a defense. Hence, Osang's
act of stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was
finished, is not defense of honor but an immediate vindication of a
grave offense committed against her, which is only mitigating.
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A
took his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, A claimed he acted in
defense of his daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstance or circumstances? (2002, 2000, 1998 Bar)

 A: No. A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's honor in having killed B
since the rape was already consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence,
there was no aggression to defend against and no defense to speak of. Defense of
honor as included in self-defense, must have been done to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression. There is no defense to speak of where the unlawful
aggression no longer exists. A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of a grave offense to a
descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Art. 13 of the RPC.