INDIAN

EVIDENCE
ACT
BHARATIYA
SAKSHYA
ADHINIYAM,
2023
1 2 3
Document – Survivorship – Death –
Presumption - Kinds and Proof Certain Offences Legitimacy – Suicide Cases

ANJALI.O AKASH KUMAR M ANBUCHEZIAN R

4 5 6
Existence of certain facts – Doctrine of promissory
Rape cases Doctrine of estoppel estoppel

HEISHYA S FATMA AL ZAHRA AKSHAYA M

7
Tenants and Licensee – Acceptor of Bill of
Exchange, Bailee and Licensee

ABIJITH RAJITHEN M

8
Estoppel and Res Judicata –
Estoppel and Waiver

FARITHA M
PRESUMPTION
ANJALI.O
 PRESUMPTION

● Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “the fact of believing that something is true without having any
proof”.
● Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as “a legal inference as to the existence or truth of a fact not
certainly known that is drawn from the known or proved existence of some other fact”.
 2 TYPES OF PRESUMPTION

PRESUMPTIONS

Presumptions of Presumptions of
Fact or, Law or,
Natural Artificial
Presumptions Presumptions

Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law

Irrebuttable
Presumptions of Law
Presumptions of Fact and Presumptions of Law.
Presumptions of Fact are always permissive, rebuttable and do not constitute a branch of
jurisprudence. They are indicated in the IEA by the expression ‘may presume’ (refer sections 86-88,
90 and 114).
They are indicated in the Bhartiya Sakshya Act,2023 by the expression “may presume ‘( refer section 2
(h), S.88, S.89.
Presumptions of Law are always obligatory, may be rebuttable or irrebuttable, and constitute a
branch of jurisprudence.
Rebuttable Presumptions of Law are indicated in the IEA by the expression ‘shall presume’ (refer
sections 79-85, 89 and 105) and are indicated in the Bhartiya Sakshya Act,2023 in S.2(l), S.78- S.85.
Irrebuttable Presumptions of Law are indicated in the IEA by the expression ‘conclusive proof’ (refer
sections 41, 112 and 113) and are indicated in the Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023 (in S.2(b), s.35,36 , and
S.116.)
 SECTION 4 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

Section 4, IEA, defines may presume, shall presume and conclusive proof as:
“May presume”. –– Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either
regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.
“Shall presume”. –– Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard
such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.
“Conclusive proof”. –– When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court
shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the
purpose of disproving it.
● May Presume: Leaves it to the discretion of the court to make presumption according to
circumstances of case.
○ Example: The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is
corroborated in material particulars [Section 114(b)]
● Shall Presume: Leaves no discretion or option with the court not to make presumption. Court is
bound to take the fact as proved until evidence is given to disprove it.
○ Example: The court shall presume the genuineness of every government publication. [Section
84]
● Conclusive Proof: Irrebuttable presumption; the court has no discretion at all and cannot call upon a
party to prove that fact.
○ Example: The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between
his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother
remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it
can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he
could have been begotten. [Section 112]
 MAY
PRESUME
Explained: Sections 113-A and 114, IEA
section 2 (h), S.88, S.89 of Bhartiya Sakshya Bill
 SECTION 113-A OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

Section 113A deals with Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.

Read as: “When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her
husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case,
that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation. –– For
the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).
● Section 113-A, Evidence Act mandates that when a woman commits suicide within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty
as per the terms defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such suicide has been
abetted by the husband or the relative, Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC
48.
● Essentials of this section are:
o That the woman had committed suicide within the period of seven years after date of her
marriage;
o That her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty;
o That the case of such suicide had been abetted by her husband or such relative of he
husband.
 Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48.

● Facts: The case involved the murder of Haren Pandya, a former Home Minister of Gujarat. Pinakin
Mahipatray Rawal was one of the accused in the case.
● Fact in Issue: The primary issue was whether Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal was involved in the murder of
Haren Pandya or not.
● Arguments on Both Sides:
• Prosecution: The prosecution argued that Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal was involved in the conspiracy to
murder Haren Pandya and presented evidence to support this claim.
• Defense: Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal likely presented arguments challenging the evidence presented by the
prosecution and asserting his innocence.
● Evidence Produced in the Case: The evidence presented likely included witness testimonies, forensic
evidence, and any other relevant materials linking Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal to the murder of Haren Pandya.
● Judgement: The Supreme Court of India, in its judgement, would have evaluated the evidence presented by
both sides and determined whether Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal was guilty of the murder of Haren Pandya
beyond a reasonable doubt. The specific outcome of the case would be detailed in the judgement.
● Presumption under this section is rebuttable and is totally based on facts.
● Presumption of abetment of suicide can be drawn only by the prosecution has discharged the
initial onus of proving cruelty. In such type of cases the court may call upon the prosecution to
adduce sufficient evidence and to prove that it was a case of suicide abated by the husband or
his relation.
● The legal presumption provided under this provision clearly includes the past inference of
cruelty spread over a period of seven years from the date of the marriage of the victim.
● Where the deceased in her dying declaration stated that she poured kerosene on herself and
lighted a match stick on account of ill- treatment and beating by her husband the court can
draw a presumption under section 113A of the Act. This kind of presumption is totally in the
discretion of the court (i.e., discretion of the court to make presumption according to
circumstances of case).
● The Supreme Court, in Heera Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2017), has held that in a case of
suicide of wife, acquittal of the relatives or husband under Section 498A IPC (that happens
when prosecution fail to prove instance of cruelty) will bar prosecution to use presumption
available under Section 113A of the Evidence Act to prove abetment to suicide under Section
306, IPC. A bench comprising Justice RF Nariman and Justice Mohan M Shantanagoudar also
held that harassment is something of a lesser degree than cruelty, and the mere fact that there is
a finding of harassment would not lead to the conclusion that there is “abetment of suicide”.
 SECTION 114 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

Section 114 deals with Presumption by court about existence of certain facts.
Read as: “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public
and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”
● Under section 114 of the Evidence Act the court has unfettered discretion to presume a fact, as
proved until it is disproved, or ignore such a presumption and call for a proof of it.
● This section authorizes the court to make certain presumptions of facts. They are all
presumptions which may naturally arise, but the section, by the use of the word ‘may’ instead
of ‘shall’, both in body of the section, and in the illustrations, shows that the court is not
compelled to raise them, but is to consider whether, in the circumstances of the case, they
should be raised (discretion).
● In Imran Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 46, dated 14-01-2019,
Bombay High Court referred to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which provides that the court
may presume the existence of certain facts. Illustration (a) of this section states that “a man
who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the
goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.” In this case, the
petitioner was not able to rebut the presumption under Section 114 as he failed to account for
the articles found in his possession immediately after the theft. Conviction was upheld.
● Brief Facts and Procedural History: The petitioner was charge-sheeted for committing theft of
gold ornaments and cash at night. As per the prosecution, after lodging of complaint in the
matter, the petitioner was immediately arrested and was found in possession of gold ornaments
and cash of Rs 2500 complained to be stolen. The matter went to trial and the petitioner was
convicted under sections 380 and 457, IPC.
 SHALL
PRESUME
Explained: Sections 105, 111-A, 113-B and 114-
A IEA
Explained section : S.2(l), S.78- S.85. Bhartiya
Sakshya Bill
 SECTION 105 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

● Section 105 deals with Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

● The general principles relating to burden of proof are:

● (i) the accused is always presumed to be innocent, and
● (ii) it is upon prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
● In Elavarasan v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police (SC judgment dtd. July 05, 2011), it was
held that, “in all the crimes in which the intention was an essential element, the accused could
escape from the punishment if he was able to prove insanity either from the evidence of the
prosecution or defence witnesses” However, in this case conviction of accused was made
Section 304(2), IPC. Appellant had raised the defence of insanity and contended that his
availability in the place of occurrence after the occurrence and earlier treatment for mental
illness proved the defence which was resisted by the State.
● JUDGEMENT : Court held that: mere absence of fleeing from the scene of occurrence would
not be a decisive factor to prove the insanity of the appellant. Medical treatment for mental
illness would not be a defence unless such illness prevented the accused from deciding right or
wrong . The conduct of the appellant showed that he was though not having an intention to
murder his daughter but had knowledge of the consequences of his act.
 SECTION 111-A OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

● Section 111-A deals with Presumption as to certain offences.

● (1):

any area in which there has been, over a period of more then one month, extensive disturbance of the public peace, and it
is shown that such person had been at a place in such area at a time when fire-arms or explosives were used at or from that
place to attack or resist the members of any armed forces or the forces charged with the maintenance of public order acting
in the discharge of their duties, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that such person had committed such
offence.
● (2)- (2) The offences referred to in sub-section (1) are the following, namely :- (a) an offence
under Section 121-A, Section 122 or Section 123 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (b)
criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit, or abetment of, an offence under Section 122 or
Section 123 of the Indian Penal Code.
 SECTION 113-B OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

● Section 113-B of the IEA deals with Presumption as to dowry death.

● Section 118 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Bill deals with the presumption as to dowry death .
● In Baijnath And Ors. v. State of M.P. (SC decision dtd. Nov. 18, 2016), it was held that: “The
presumption (under section 113B of the Evidence Act) as to dowry death thus would get
activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty
or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in
the reasonable contiguity of death,” the bench of Hon’ble Justices Dipak Misra and Amitava
Roy said.
● “Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily
ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged
therewith.”
● A comparative study of Sections 11З-А and 113-В highlights that under
Section 113-A the court “may presume” having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, an abetment of suicide as visualized by Section
306, IPC, but Section 113-B which is relatable to Section 304-B, IPC the word
“may” has been substituted by “shall’’ and there is no reference to the
circumstances of the case.”
 SECTION 114-A OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

● Section 114-A of the IEA, deals with Presumption as to absence of consent in certain
prosecution for rape.
● Section 120 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Bill deals with the presumption as to absence of consent in
certain prosecution for rape.
 S.120 OF THE NEW ACT

● In a prosecution for rape under sub-section (2) of section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the
consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and such woman states in her evidence before the
Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent.
● Explanation.—In this section, "sexual intercourse" shall mean any of the acts mentioned in section 63
of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
CONCLUSIVE PROOF
Explained: Sections 41, 112 and 113
IEA
 SECTION 41 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

● Section 41, IEA deals with Relevancy of certain judgments in exercise of probate,
matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction.
● Section 35 (1) of the Bhartiya Sakshya Bill deals with the relevancy of certain judgements in
exercise of probate , matrimonial, admirality or insolvency jurisdiction.
● Section 41, IEA, consists of two parts. The first part makes certain judgments relevant. The
second part makes the judgments conclusive evidence of certain matters.
● The conditions necessary for making a judgment relevant may be considered under two heads:
those having reference to the contents of judgment, and those to the nature of the proceeding in
which judgment is sought to be relied upon.
● This section deals with judgments in rem, i.e., judgments which are conclusive not only
against the parties to them, but against the whole world.
 Presumption as to Document-
Survivorship- Death- Presumption
of certain offences
A Project by:- Akash Kumar M
 Sections

● Sec. 107 IEA states that a person is presumed being alive, if there is
nothing to suggest the probability of death within 3o
 Presumption of Survivorship

• Presumption of survivorship question arises when, two persons of one

family may die in a common circumstance.
• In such cases, for the purpose of succession of properties of one or
both of the deceased persons, it may be necessary to know who died
earlier and who died later, i.e. who survived
• By post-mortem examination, it may not be possible to say who died
earlier and who later, if the deaths have occurred with a gap of a few
minutes only.
• The case is decided by the facts and evidence
 The factors that are to be considered are

• Age, adults withstand better then young and elderly,

• Sex, males withstand more than females,
• Constitution, strong and robust withstand better than weak, debilitated and
diseased,
• Nature and severity of injuries, extent of hemorrhage, involvement of vital
organs
• Mode of death, swimmer survives a non-swimmer.
 Sections

● Sec 108 IEA states that, if it is proved that the said person has not
been heard of for 7 years by them, who are expected to hear about him,
if he would be alive, then death is presumed.
 Presumption of death

• Presumption of Death, is a legal issue which does not have any medical
implication or involvement.
• It is in connection with inheritance or succession of property of a person,
missing for a long period or for claiming insurance money when the
individual is alleged to be dead and body is not
Case law
 PRECEDENT:

●Privy Council in Lal Chand

Marwari v. Mohant Ramrup Gir, AIR
1926 PC 9
JUDGEMENT:
 PRESUMPTION OF CERTAIN OFFENCES:

● Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the "Presumption
of certain offences." Here's a short note on this section:
● Section 111 (a) of the Indian Evidence Act pertains to the presumption of
certain offences. It states that when a person is shown to be in
possession of stolen property, within a short time after the theft, it may
be presumed that he/she is either the thief or has received the stolen
property knowing it to be stolen, unless he/she can account for their
possession satisfactorily.
● This provision essentially creates a legal presumption against the
possessor of stolen property, placing the burden of proof on them to
explain how they came into possession of the property in question. The
law assumes that a person in possession of recently stolen goods is
likely either the thief or knowingly received stolen property unless
proven otherwise.
● However, it's essential to note that this presumption is not absolute and
can be rebutted by providing a satisfactory explanation for the
possession of the stolen property. The section aims to aid in the
 SECTIONS RELATED
111A. Presumption as to certain offences.-

1) Where a person is accused of having committed any offence specified in sub-section (2), in-

● (a)any area declared to be a disturbed areas under any enactment, for the time being in force, making
provision for the suppression of disorder and restoration and maintenance of public order; or

● (b)any area in which there has been, over a period of more than one month, extensive disturbance of the
public peace, and it is shown that such person had been at a place in such area at a time when firearms
or explosives were used at or from that place to attack or resist the members of any armed forces or the
forces charged with the maintenance of public order acting in the discharge of their duties, it shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that such person had committed such offence.

(2) The offences referred to in sub-section (1) are the following, namely:-

● (a)an offence under section 121, section 121A section 122 or section 123 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860);

● (b)criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit, or abatement of, an offence under section 122 or section
123 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]
SL.No OLD ACT (INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872) NEW ACT ( BHARATIYA SAKSHYA
. ADHINIYAM,2023)
1. S.107 Burden of proving death of person known S.110 When the question is whether a man is alive or
to have been alive within thirty years dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years,
the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person
who affirms
it.
2. S.108 Burden of proving that person is alive who S.111 When the question is whether a man is alive or
has not been heard of for seven years. dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for
seven years by those who would naturally have heard of
him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is
alive is shifted to the person who affirms it.
3. S. 111A. Presumption as to certain offences S.115. (1) Where a person is accused of having
committed any offence specified in
sub-section (2), in—
(a) any area declared to be a disturbed area under any
enactment for the time being in force, making provision
for the suppression of disorder and restoration and
maintenance of public order; or 5
(b) any area in which there has been, over a period of
more than one month, extensive disturbance of the public
peace,
PRESUMPTION IN
LEGITIMACY AND
SUICIDE CASES
BY ANBUCHEZIAN (HC21037)
PRESUMPTION as to LEGITIMACY.

• Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

relates to the legitimacy of a child born during
wedlock.
• The law presumes that if a child is “born during
the continuance of a valid marriage between his
mother and any man, or within two hundred and
eighty (280) days after its dissolution, the mother
remaining unmarried…”, it is conclusive proof of
its legitimacy unless it can be proven that the
parties to the marriage did not have any access to
one another.
● The legislative spirit behind this section seeks to establish that any child born
during a valid marriage must be legitimate.
● The law does not presume dishonorable or immoral actions unless conclusive
proof can be produced for the same.
● Therefore, section 112 is based on the presumption of public morality and
public policy .
PRESUMPTION AS TO LEGITIMACY UNDER BHARATIYA
SAKSHYA BILL, 2023

● Section 116 of the New act deals with presumption as to Legitimacy.

Loopholes in Section 112 of the Evidence Act.

● The establishment of paternity under both, civil and

criminal law, is extremely important. The law
presumes the legitimacy of a child born during a valid
marriage as conclusive.
● The only exception under the law is non-access
between the parties.
● This “non-access” refers to the non-existence of
opportunities for sexual intercourse. This creates a
legal lacuna with respect to cases where paternity may
be disputed even when the parties had “access” to
each other.
 CONCLUSIVE PROOf
● Section 4 of the Act, lays down three degrees of presumption –
‘May presume’, ‘Shall presume’, and ‘Conclusive proof’. It must
be noted that section 112 of the Act uses ‘conclusive proof’ and
thus section 4 and section 112 must be read together. Therefore, if
the two requirements of section 112 are proven, it shall be
considered as conclusive proof of legitimacy, which means that
further evidence to disprove said fact may not be given. The
legitimacy of such a child cannot be rebutted unless non-access
can be proved. This creates problems for the party disputing the
paternity of the child. S. 4 s.112
 EXCEPTION OF “NON-ACCESs.

● The terms access and non-access refer to the existence and non-existence of
opportunity for sexual contact.
● In other words: The term access used in section 112 of the Indian Evidence
Act refers to the existence of opportunity of marital intercourse.
However, non-access can be established if it is proved that the husband was
physically incapable of procreating.
 Object of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act

● The object of section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is:

1. To determine the legitimacy of a child for the purpose of succession and
inheritance in the father’s property.
2. Legitimacy determines the right of maintenance.
 DNA TESTING TO ASCERTAIN PATERNITY
● DNA Tests are conclusive evidence admissible under the Indian Legal
System. The introduction of DNA technology, however, has faced extensive
criticism and has been said to violate Article 21 (Right to Privacy) and
Article 20(3) (Right Against Self-Incrimination) of the Indian Constitution.
 Right to Privacy – Article 21

● In Govind Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

the Supreme Court held that a fundamental
right must be subject to restriction on the
basis of compelling public interest. Thus,
Right to Life and Liberty, which includes
Privacy, is not absolute. And it is on this basis
that the constitutionality of the laws affecting
Right to Life and Personal Liberty are upheld
by the Supreme Court which includes medical
examination.
 Right Against Self-Incrimination – Article 20(3)

● Medical tests which involve giving blood do not involve any exchange of
‘personal’ knowledge and are a mechanical process, they do not violate
Article 20(3).
 Bengal
● HELD:
● 1. The courts in India cannot order for the blood test as a
matter of course.
● 2. The application for blood tests cannot be entertained.
● 3. There must be a strong prima facie case that the
husband should establish non-access to dispel the
presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act.
● 4. The court must examine the consequence of ordering a
blood test, whether it will have the effect of branding the
child as a bastard and the mother as unchaste.
● 5. No one can be compelled to give blood samples for
analysis.
 Refusal of wife to comply with a DNA test.

● In Dipanwita Roy vs Ronobroto Roy,

the Supreme Court held that it would
not be incorrect to issue direction to
the wife to undergo a DNA test to
determine the parentage regarding
the case challenging her infidelity.
And if the wife refuses to undergo
the test of the child to determine
parentage, an adverse presumption
can be drawn against the wife.
 PRESUMPTION IN SUICIDE CASES

● Section 113 A deals with hardcore crime that is Presumption as to abatement

of suicide by a married women and Section 113 B deals with the presumption
as to dowry death.
 Abetment as to Suicide by a Married Women

● Section 113A deals with the

presumptions of abetment of
suicide of a married woman
either by her husband or any
of his relatives.
Abetment as to Suicide by a Married Women UNDER BHARATIYA SAKSHYA BILL, 2023

● Section 117 deals with this topic.

● Cruelty section has been changed from Section
498A of the IPC to Section 84 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
● Other than this no changes.
 ESSENTIALS OF THE PROVISION:

● (i) The incident of suicide was committed within a period of seven years from
the date of her marriage; and
● (ii) Her husband, or his relative, has subjected her to cruelty as according to
the Section 498A of IPC.

Suicide within years

 Chhagan Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh

● Facts: The accused beat the victim for alleged rice theft,
leading to the victim's suicide.
● Fact in Issue: Determining if the accused is responsible for
the suicide and if Section 113A applies.
● Arguments: Prosecution cites the accused's actions, while the
defense argues lack of cruelty evidence.
● Evidence: Accused's claim, absence of cruelty proof, and
circumstances of the suicide.
● Judgement: Accused acquitted; insufficient evidence of
cruelty, and Section 113A doesn't apply without established
nexus between cruelty and suicide. Emphasizes careful
application of legal presumptions. Only applies to husband or
relative who has treated the women with cruelty.
 Nilakantha Pati v State of OrissA

● Facts: Accused, after receiving dowry, later demanded

money for a house. When the victim couldn't arrange it,
she faced torture and died in 1986.
● Fact in Issue: Whether the accused is guilty under Section
113A for abetment of suicide?
● Arguments: Accused reasoned that the presumption is
rebuttable; court found his arguments relevant, leading to
acquittal.
● Evidence: Dowry benefit, accused's demand, victim's
torture, and death in 1986.
● Judgment: Court deems the presumption under Section
113A as rebuttable. Accused acquitted as he successfully
disproved the presumptions, emphasizing the situational
relevance of legal provisions.
 Presumption as to dowry death

● The section 113B of the Indian

Evidence Act deals with the dowry
death. Section 113B states that:
● Section 113B: If a woman has faced
cruelty or harassment related to dowry
shortly before her death, and the
question is whether someone
committed her dowry death, the court
shall presume that the person caused
the dowry death.
Presumption as to dowry death UNDER BHARATIYA SAKSHYA BILL, 2023

● Section 118 deals with this topic.

● Cruelty section has been changed from Section 304B of the IPC
to Section 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
● Other than this no changes.
 Mangal Ram & Anor v State of
Madhya Pradesh
● Facts: Wife's suicide within five years; lived with parents for 2-
3 years. Returned to matrimonial home, committed suicide
within a month. Harassment claims by husband and in-laws Suicide within years of marriage
unproven beyond doubt.
● Fact in Issue: Determining if the husband can be presumed
guilty in the wife's suicide.
● Arguments: Lack of clear evidence for harassment during the
critical month; presumption against the husband unjustified.
● Evidence: Wife's suicide, residence history, short stay in
matrimonial home, insufficient proof of harassment.
● Judgment: Presumption against the husband not justified
without clear evidence. Court stresses the need for conclusive
proof beyond reasonable doubt in such cases.
 Prem Singh v. State of Haryana
● Facts: The unnatural death of a married woman within 7
years of marriage. Evidence includes harassment by the
husband for dowry, medical findings of death by smothering,
and unexplained injuries on the deceased.
● Issue: Determining if the presumption of dowry death
applies to the husband.
● Arguments: Harassment, unnatural death, and unexplained
injuries support the presumption.
● Evidence: Dowry harassment, cause of death, lack of
explanation for injuries.
● Judgment: Presumption of dowry death justified; High
Court's acquittal reversal deemed appropriate given the
compelling evidence.
Presumption of existence of
certain facts
HEISHYA S (HC21025)
Old act: Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

NEW ACT: Section 119 of Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023.

MAIN ELEMENTS
1. Common Course of natural
events
2. Human conduct
3. Public and private business
 1. Theft (exception)

Possession of stolen goods immediately after theft Shopkeeper – cannot account for its possession
 TULSIRAM V. STATE AIR 1954 SC 1
1. Facts:
1. Kawadu, a man who used to watch two mango trees, was found dead near his hut.
2. His gold earrings were missing.
3. The police arrested Tulsiram Kanu, the appellant, and seized various items from his house, including a knife, a dhoti with suspected blood stains, and a
rusted axe.
4. A confession was recorded from the appellant.
2. Fact in Issue:
1. Whether Tulsiram Kanu committed the murder of Kawadu?
3. Arguments:
1. The prosecution argued that the seized items (knife, dhoti, axe) linked the appellant to the crime.
2. The confession recorded from the appellant further incriminated him.
4. Evidence:
1. Seized items: Knife, dhoti with suspected blood stains, rusted axe.
2. Confession statement made by the appellant.
5. Judgment:
1. The High Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and convicted the appellant for murder.
2. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, considering the evidence and the confession.
3. The appellant was sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Penal Code.

The SC observed that the presumption must be permitted to be drawn u/s 114 ill. (a), has to be read along with time factor.
 2. ACCOMPLICE (EXCEPTION)

Unworthy of credit unless he can be corroborated in Good character – explains in detail what exactly
a material particular. was done and even admits the carelessness
 1. Facts:
1. Two individuals attempted to bribe a Minister for a favor.
2. The Minister informed the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
3. The accused persons were arrested during a trap operation.
2. Fact in Issue:
C. R. MEHTA V. STATE 1. Whether the accused persons were guilty of bribery and corruption.
3. Arguments:
OF MAHARASHTRA 1. The prosecution argued that the accused attempted to bribe the
1993 Crl lj 2863 (Bom) Minister.
2. The defense may have argued that there was no intent to bribe or that
the evidence was insufficient.
4. Evidence:
1. Testimony from the Minister regarding the bribe attempt.
2. Details of the trap operation and the arrest.
3. Any other relevant evidence presented during the trial.
5. Judgment:
1. The court would have considered the evidence, arguments, and legal
provisions.
2. If found guilty, the accused could have been convicted under relevant
sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
● On the basis of the evidence of the Minister, whose general integrity was
 3. BILL OF EXCHANGE (EXCEPTION)

Accepted or endorsed for good consideration Ignorant – Under Influence

 4. STILL EXISTING (EXCEPTION)

Ancestral property – Presumed it will continue to River ran a certain course – Prone to change due to
pass on to upcoming generations floods
 5. Judicial and official acts (exceptions)

Irregularity was performed under exceptional

Performed in the right way and regularly. circumstances.
 6. Common course of business (exception)

Section 16 of IEA
Letter Usual course is disrupted by some disturbances
 7. Evidence not presented (EXCEPTION)

Minute significance – Might harm the reputation of

Unfavorable to the person who has been holding it his family or hurt their feelings
 8. Refusal to answer, not bound by law (exception)

Might cause loss in matter that are irrelevant to the

If answered, it would not be in his favor present issue
 9. Document creating obligation in hands of obligor
(exception)

Obligation has been discharged. May have been acquired by theft

 ● In the case of Tulsa v. Durghatiya (2008) 4 SCC 520, the Supreme Court of India addressed the
presumption of a valid marriage between partners who have lived together as husband and wife for an
extended period.
1. Facts:
1. The case involved a dispute over a sale deed related to ancestral property.
2. The disputed property was jointly owned by Radhika Singh, Sunder Singh, and Dadau Singh.
3. Radhika and Sunder died without legal heirs, leaving the plaintiffs (including Smt. Rani and Smt.

Tulsa v. Durghatiya Butan) as the sole owners.

4. The plaintiffs claimed that the property was their joint ancestral property.
(2008 (4) SCC 520) 2. Fact in Issue:
1. Whether the disputed property was the joint ancestral property of Radhika Singh, Sunder Singh, and
Dadau Singh.
3. Evidence and Arguments:
1. The plaintiffs relied on the presumption of a valid marriage between Radhika Singh and plaintiff No. 1
(Dadau Singh’s wife).
2. They argued that Radhika and plaintiff No. 1 had lived together for a long time as husband and wife.
3. The plaintiffs presented evidence of their joint cultivation and other shared activities.
4. The defendants contested this claim and sought to prove that no valid marriage existed.
4. Judgment:
1. The trial court noted that there was a presumption of a valid marriage due to the prolonged
cohabitation of Radhika and plaintiff No. 1.
2. The burden of proof lay on the party seeking to deny the legal origin of the relationship.
3. The court held that where partners live together as husband and wife for an extended period, the law
presumes a valid marriage unless proven otherwise.
4. The sale deed was upheld in favor of the plaintiffs.
● In summary, the case established that when partners live together for a long time as husband and wife, there
is a presumption in favor of wedlock. This presumption can be rebutted, but the burden lies on the party
challenging the marriage to prove that no valid marriage occurred.
PRESUMPTION IN RAPE
CASES
HEISHYA S
 INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
● Section 114A ● Section 376 (2)
PRESUMPTION AS TO ABSENCE OF PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE
CONSENT IN CERTAIN PROSECUTION FOR
RAPE.
 Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023

● Section 120 ● Section 64 (2)

PRESUMPTION AS TO ABSENCE OF PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE
CONSENT IN CERTAIN PROSECUTION FOR
RAPE.
a) Police officer
b) Public servant
c) Armed forces
d) Jailor
e) Hospital staff
f) Relative, guardian or teacher
g) During communal or sectarian violence
h) Pregnant
i) Under 16 years of age
j) Incapable of giving consent
k) Control/Dominance
l) Mental or physical disability
m) Harm/Maims/Disfigures/Endangers
n) Repeatedly on same woman
In a prosecution for rape

● Proved: Sexual intercourse by the accused.

● Question: Whether it was without the
consent of the woman alleged to have been
raped
● Statement: Such woman states in her
evidence before the court that she did not
consent
● Presumption: The court shall presume that
she did not consent.
 GAGAN BIHARI SAVANT V. STATE OF ORISSA 1991
(3) SCC 562

Facts:
•The appellants forcibly took the victim (P.W. 2) to a secluded place on March 19, 1983.
•They made her consume liquor and then sexually assaulted her.
•Afterward, they left her in a truck.
•The victim managed to escape from the truck while it was unloading materials near a village.
•She was rescued by P.W. 7 and taken to the house of P.W. 8 (a distant relative).
•Her father (P.W. 1) lodged a police report.
•A case was registered against both appellants under sections 363 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Fact in Issue:
•Whether the appellants committed rape on the victim without her consent.
Evidence:
•The uncontroverted testimony of the victim (P.W. 2) established the offense against the accused.
•The victim had protested and struggled during the sexual assault.
•The appellants denied the allegations, claiming false implication due to refusal to marry the girl and previous
enmity.
● Arguments:
• The defense pleaded false implication, but the trial court rejected this.
• The trial court found that the appellants committed rape on the victim without her consent.
• The trial court relied on Section 114A of the Evidence Act.
• The appellants were convicted under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for three years.
● Judgment:
• The victim’s uncontroverted testimony, along with her protest and struggle, indicated the
absence of consent.
• Corroboration was not the sine qua non for conviction in rape cases.
• The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence.
• The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.
● In summary, the case highlights the importance of victim testimony and the legal presumption
of absence of consent in sexual assault cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
based on the victim’s evidence and the provisions of the Evidence Act.
Dilip vs. State of M. P. 2001 (9) SCC 452
The presumption was
raised but it was held that
in view of the infirmities in
the evidence, the place of
rape was not proved.

Question of consent

In this case, the accused-appellants, Mohan and Dilip, were held guilty of an offence punishable under Section
376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years along with a
fine of Rs. 2000 each. The incident involved the sexual assault of the prosecutrix, who was approximately 16
years old at the time of the incident.
Facts:
1. The prosecutrix, an orphan, lived with her maternal uncle and aunt.
2. On the day of the incident (5th March 1996), the village was celebrating the Holi festival.
3. The accused Mohan and Dilip approached the prosecutrix when she was alone in her house.
4. The accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her after removing her underwear.
Issues:
5. Whether the accused committed rape?
6. Whether the prosecutrix’s testimony can be relied upon without corroboration?
Evidence:
1. The prosecutrix’s testimony was the primary evidence.
2. Medical evidence was also considered.
Arguments:
3. The defense argued that the prosecutrix’s testimony lacked corroboration.
4. The law does not require automatic corroboration of the prosecutrix’s testimony.
Court’s Reasoning:
5. The prosecutrix is not an accomplice, and her testimony need not be corroborated in material particulars.
6. The court must consider the totality of evidence, including medical evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the
conduct of the accused.
7. The accused’s actions were consistent with the prosecutrix’s account.
8. The medical evidence supported the sexual assault.
9. The accused’s defense was not credible.
Judgement:
10. The court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge and the High Court.
● This case underscores the importance of considering the prosecutrix’s testimony and evaluating the evidence as a
whole. The court emphasized that corroboration is not an absolute requirement, and the circumstances of each
case must be carefully examined.
DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL

BY
FATMA AL ZAHRA
 INTRODUCTION

It has already been noted that under the Evidence Act, there are
certain facts which need not be proved and there are some facts
which cannot be proved because the Evidence Act, would not allow
evidence of such facts. An estoppel is a principle, whereby a party is
precluded from denying the existence of some state of facts which
has formerly admitted. The foundation of the doctrine is that a
person cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time; Purshottam
v. Bhagwat Sharan, Under Indian Evidence Act, sections 115 to 117
based on the principle what is called "doctrine of estoppel".
 SECTION 115

Section 115 of the Act provides that:

115. Estoppel.-
When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission,
intentionally caused or permitted another person to
believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief,
neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any
suit or proceeding between himself and such person or
his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
 Illustration

● A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain

land belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay
for it.
● The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A
seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that, at the time
of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed to
prove his want of title.
 Kinds of Estoppel

Coke, who is the earliest and highest authority on the subject of

estoppel and whose every word on the subject is persistently
treasured and repeated in text-book, and judgment after judgment,
down to the present day, classified estoppels into three kinds, viz.,
(i) estoppel by matter of record;
(ii) estoppel by matter in writing; and
(iii) estoppel by matter in pais. The first two are sometimes referred
to as technical estoppels as distinguished from acquirable
estoppels or estoppel in paiis or pais.
Essential conditions for the Application of section 115

The main ingredients of estoppel as defined in section 115 i.e., :

(1)there must be some representation,

(2)the representation must be made with the intention to be acted upon,
(3)the representation must have been acted upon.
Essential conditions for the applicability of section 115 of the Evidence Act

The following eight conditions must be satisfied to bring a case within

the scope of estoppel as defined in section 115; Chhaganlal Keshavlal
Mehta v. Patel Narandas Haribhai
(i)There must have been a representation by a person to another person,
which may be in any form - a declaration or an act or an omission.
(ii)Such representation must have been of the existence of a fact, and
not of future promises or intention.
(iii)The representation must have been meant to have been relied upon.
(iv)There must have been belief on the part of the other party in its
truth.
(v)There must have been some action on the faith of that declaration, act or
omission. In other words, such declaration, etc., must have actually caused
the other person to act on the faith of it and to alter his position to his
prejudice or detriment.
(vi)The misrepresentation or conduct or omission must have been the
proximate cause of leading the other party to act to his prejudice.
(vii)The person claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show that he was
not aware of the true state of things. There can be no estoppel if such a
person was aware of the true state of affairs or if he had means of such
knowledge.
(viii)Only the person to whom the representation was made or for whom it
was designed, can avail of the doctrine. The burden of proving estoppel lies
on such person.
 Necessary elements of Representation

● The representation to form the basis of an estoppel may be made

either by (i) statement or by (ii) conduct and conduct includes
negligence. Certain general propositions are, however, applicable
whatever manner the representation may be made.
● The focus of law of estoppel is the position in law of party who is
induced to act. Thus a person who is estopped (i.e., person
making the representation) may not have intention to deceive and
may himself be acting under mistake or apprehension. The
estoppel with nonetheless operate in such cases also; Surat
Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chander Laha, (1892) 19 IA 203.
● A representation may also arise from an
"omission" to do an act which one's duty
requires one to do. An estoppel will arise
when the failure to perform one's duty has
misled another and also the duty should be
a kind of legal obligation. In Mercantile
Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India
Ltd., (1938) AC 287; an omission to stamp
the receipts was held sufficient to create an
estoppel. Estoppel by negligence is based
on the existence of a duty which the person
estopped is owing to the person led into the
wrong belief or to the general public of
whom the person in one.
Reliance and Detriment

The condition necessary to create an estoppel is that the

plaintiff altered his position on the basis of the representation
and he would suffer a loss if the representor is allowed to resile
from his statement. Detriment is a prerequisite of actionable
promissory estoppel. Thus, a mere statement of a person that he
would not assert his rights does not create an estoppel unless it
is intended to be acted upon and is in fact acted upon; Dr. Sida
Nitinkumar Laxmankumar Laxmanbhai v. Gujarat University.
 Exceptions to the doctrine of estoppel

1)No estoppel against a minor:-Where a minor represents fraudulently or

otherwise that he is of age and thereby induces another to enter into a
contract with him, then in an action founded on contract, the infant is not
estopped from setting up infancy as a plea. However, equity demands that
he should not retain a benefit which he had obtained by his fraudulent
conduct.

(2)When true facts are known to both the parties:-Section 115 does not
apply to a case where the statement relied upon is made to a person who
knows the real facts and is not misled by the untrue statement (R.S.
Maddanappa v. Chandramma)
(3)Fraud or negligence on the part of other party - If the other party
does not believe the representation but acts independently of such
belief, or in cases where the person to whom representation is made is
under a duty to make a further inquiry, the estoppel will not operate.
(4)When both the parties plead estoppel:-If both the parties establish
a case for application of estoppel, then it is as if the two estoppels
cancel out
(5)No estoppel on a point of law:-Estoppel refers only to a belief in a
fact. If a person gives his opinion that law is such and such and
another acts upon such belief, then there can be no estoppel against the
former subsequently asserting that law is different.
(6)No estoppel against statute/sovereign Acts:-A rule of law cannot
be nullified by resorting the doctrine of estoppel. For example, where a
minor has contracted by misrepresenting his age, he still can
afterwards disclose his real age
BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023
 Section 121
● 121- When one person has, by his declaration,
act or omission, intentionally caused or
permitted another person to believe a thing to
be true and to act upon such belief, neither he
nor his representative shall be allowed, in any
suit or proceeding between himself and such
person or his representative, to deny the truth
of that thing.
Illustration.
● A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe
that certain land belongs to A, and thereby
induces B to buy and pay for it. The land
afterwards becomes the property of A, and A
seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that,
at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must
not be allowed to prove his want of title.
 R.S. Maddanappa Case

In R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma, in a suit for possession of plaintiff's half

share of certain properties, a decree was passed in favour of the defendant No.
1 (brother of plaintiff) with respect to the other half share. In appeal by the
other defendants, it was contended that defendant No. 1 was estopped from
claiming half share (deceased), because:-
(i)he did not reply to a notice by the plaintiff asking him to join her in filing the
suit,
(ii)he wrote a letter to his step mother disclaiming interest in suit property, and
(iii)he attested a will executed by his father disposing of suit properties.
 Judgement

The Supreme Court held that:-

(i)the conduct in not replying to notice does not mean there was implied
admission (or acquiescence) that he had not interest in properties, justifying an
inference of estoppel,
(ii)when the father (defendant No. 2) knew about true legal position that he was
not the owner of properties and his possession was on behalf of plaintiff and
defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 1's letter to step mother could not have
created an erroneous or mistaken belief in father's mind about his title to the suit
properties.
(iii)similarly, the reason of conduct of defendant No. 1 in attesting his father's
will could not justify an inference of estoppel.
Thus, in this case, as the facts are known to both the parties, the doctrine of
estopel cannot be invoked. Section 115 does not apply to a case where the
statement relied upon is made to a person who knows the real facts and not
misled by the untrue statement. Also, in the present case, there is no detriment to
the other party by the actions of defendant No. 1.
Comparison of estoppel with other concepts
• 'Estoppel' and 'presumption'-An estoppel is a personal
disqualification laid upon a person under peculiar circumstances
from proving particular facts, whereas a presumption is a rule that a
particular inference is to be drawn from particular facts, whoever
proves them. In presumption, evidence to rebut it can be given,
while in estoppel, the party is estopped from denying the truth.
● 'Estoppel and 'Conclusive Proof'-When a fact is conclusively
proved, it is so against all the world. Estoppel operates only as a
personal disability. In both, however, the very same fact cannot be
denied (irrebuttable)
● 'Estoppel' and 'Admission'-Though in both admissions and
estoppels there are statements, an admission does not ripen into an
estoppel unless the person to whom the representation is made
believes it and acts upon such belief, whereas in the case of mere
admission evidence can be given to show that the admission was
wrongly made.
 Conclusion

The doctrine is based on the principle that it would be unjust to allow a person to deny something that they have
previously asserted to be true, especially when others have relied on that assertion. It is a tool to prevent fraud and
ensure consistency in judicial proceedings. In the context of the Indian Evidence Act, the doctrine of estoppel is
not just a rule of evidence but a strategy to prevent injustice. It is applied in various situations, including
contractual disputes, property transactions, and other legal contexts where a party’s previous conduct or
statements have led another party to act in a certain way.
 BY
M. AKSHAYA
 DEFINITION

The principle of Promissory Estoppel in

India is a rule of evidence incorporated
into section 115 of The Indian Evidence
Act, 1972. Promissory Estoppel is related
to future promises whereas section 115
talks about representations regarding
existing facts. It is the legal principle that
a party may recover on the basis of a
promise made when part’s reliance on the
promise was reasonable, and the party
attempting to recover detrimentally relied
on the promise. It seeks to enforce a
promise made under a contract, whether
oral or in writing.
 Promissory Estoppel works on the
principle of equity, fairness and
moral conscience. It is a principle
that prevents a person from going
back on a promise that they made,
even if the promise was not
Principle of Equity supported by a contract. Like all
equitable remedies, it is
discretionary, in contrast to the
common law absolute right like
right to damages for breach of
contract. To claim under this
principle, there should be a
promisor, promisee, and the
promisee should have suffered a
loss. It acts as an shield and not as
an sword.
 Illustration-1

Imagine a landlord promising a tenant that

they won’t raise the rent for the next two years if the tenant
agrees to renovate the property at their own expense.

The tenant relies on the promise,

invest money and started
renovate the property.
The landlord increases the rent after jus one year. In Court the tenant could use
Promissory Estoppel as evidence, arguing that they suffered damages due to
the landlords broken promise.
 Illustration-2

● Imagine, the genie is promising to grant

three wishes to a boy.
● Firstly he is wishing for a world with no
lawyers.
● The genie granted the wish and said you
have no more wishes.
● The boy argued that, you promised me
to grant 3 wishes
● In this scenario, the genie estopped from
the promise made to the boy.
● Now the boy could use the principle of
promissory Estoppel as evidence.
Viewer’s:

Me:
 Requirements of promissory estoppel

1. Promisor made a significant promise to cause the promisee to act on it.

The promise made to the promisee was significant enough and that a
reasonable person would ordinarily rely on it.
2.Promisee relied on the promise

The promisee must have acted on the promise made by

promisor with full trust, even though it was not not supported
by consideration.
3. Promisee suffered damage by relying on the promise.

“Literally the
promiseeee:

The promisee is in a worse position for having acted on and relied on the promise.
4. The nature of promise is such that the only way to avoid injustice is by
enforcing the promise.

Engalukku promise a
enforce panniye aaganum...
ahhhh…
 CASES
CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST
LTD V. HIGH TREES HOUSE LTD
Facts:

High Trees House Ltd leased a property in

Battersea, London, from Central London
Property Trust Ltd in 1937. The agreement
specified an annual ground rent of £2,500.
Due to World War II, the rental market
declined, and High Trees struggled to find
tenants. In 1940, they requested a rent
reduction from Central London Property
Trust, which was agreed upon in writing but
without specifying the duration or providing
consideration. The legal issue was whether the
full rent, as per the original agreement, could
be claimed by Central London Property Trust
from 1940 onwards, despite the earlier
agreed-upon reduction.
Issues:
1.Could the claimant insist on the defendant paying the full
rent?

2.Was the claimant entitled to back- payments?

ARGUMENTS:

Claimant likely argued that the original lease agreement stipulated a rent
of £2,500 a year, and therefore, they were entitled to enforce this
provision. They may have also asserted that the wartime circumstances
were unforeseeable and beyond their control, justifying their decision to
temporarily reduce the rent.

On the other hand, the defendant likely argued that the wartime conditions
severely impacted their ability to generate income from the property by
subleasing the flats. They may have contended that the claimant's
agreement to reduce the rent was a binding promise that should be upheld.
Additionally, they might have emphasized the unfairness of being
required to pay the full rent retrospectively for a period when they were
unable to do so due to circumstances beyond their control.
Decision:
Denning J introduced the doctrine of promissory estoppel, stating that if a
promise is made with the intention to create legal relations, and the
promisee acts on it, then the promisor is estopped from going back on the
promise. Denning applied this principle to the High Trees case, finding that
the promise to reduce the rent was binding during the period when the flats
were not fully let due to wartime conditions. Once the conditions changed
and the flats were fully occupied in early 1945, the reduction ceased to
apply. The case is significant for introducing the doctrine of promissory
estoppel into English contract law.
COMBE V. COMBE

Facts:
During the divorce process, a husband promised to pay his wife a tax-
free sum of £100 each year to represent a permanent maintenance
payment. The wife was aware that the husband was not in a good
financial state and made no claim to this payment. Several years later,
she brought an action to claim the arrears that were owed under their
agreement.
Issue:
The court in this instance was required to
consider whether the husband could
withdraw from his earlier promise to pay
the wife the sum of money. It was
important for the court to understand
whether the wife had given consideration
in return for the husband’s promise and
whether the wife could claim for the sum
of money that had been promised
previously, despite the fact she had not
claimed for the money for several years.
ARGUMENTS:

During the proceedings, the wife likely asserted that the husband's
promise to pay her £100 a year was a binding agreement, emphasizing
that she made her decision not to seek maintenance independently but
influenced by his promise. She argued that her actions constituted valid
consideration for his promise, even though it was not explicitly requested
or exchanged.

Conversely, the husband likely contended that the wife's decision not to
seek maintenance was entirely independent and not made in exchange for
his promise. He probably argued that there was no valid consideration for
the promise, as it was not given in exchange for anything of value.
Decision:
This case was brought only four years after the landmark decision given in
Central London Property Trust LD v High Trees House LD, which held that a
party could not revert on an earlier promise made. The court held that the wife
could only enforce her agreement for the payment which was promised by the
husband if she had given consideration. The court found that no consideration
was given by the wife as she had not agreed to apply for the maintenance that
was promised by the husband. The husband did not request the wife to refrain
from taking the maintenance payment and therefore the wife could not claim for
the money.
M. P. SUGAR MILLS V. STATE OF U. P
FACTS:
Government of UP announced to give tax exemption from sales tax for three years to all
new industrial units of the state. Based on this, plaintiff sought confirmation from Director
of Industries who reiterated the decision of UP government Further unequivocal assurance
was given by Chief Secretary of Government, on behalf of UP Government, to plaintiff
about the same. Plaintiff on this categorical assurance, borrowed money from financial
institutions, brought plant and machinery and set up a new plant in UP. However, State
government went back upon this assurance and instead now promised to give partial
concession to which plaintiff consented and started production. Once again, however, State
government went back even on this promise denying any concession to be given. Plaintiff
sued the government on account of promissory estoppel.
 Issues:
1. Whether plaintiff can have a cause of action on grounds of
promissory estoppel?
2. Whether in present case, plaintiff’s action is bound to
succeed?
ARGUMENTS:

During the proceedings, the plaintiff likely argued that they relied on the explicit
assurances given by the Director of Industries and the Chief Secretary of the UP
Government regarding the tax exemption. They would have contended that they made
significant financial investments based on these assurances, thereby suffering a
detriment when the government reneged on its promises. The plaintiff may have
emphasized the principle of promissory estoppel, asserting that the government should
be held accountable for its assurances, especially considering the plaintiff's reasonable
reliance on them.

On the other hand, the government may have argued that the assurances given were not
intended to create legal obligations or were contingent upon certain conditions. They
might have claimed that the government had the authority to revise or withdraw the
promised tax exemption based on changing circumstances or legal considerations. The
government could have also argued that any reliance by the plaintiff was not reasonable
or that the plaintiff had other options available to them.
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent was bound to exempt the
appellant from payment of sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati for a
period of 3 years from the date of commencement of production and was not
entitled to recover such tax from the appellant subject to certain directions
regarding the refund of the tax already collected and deposited by the
appellant. For arriving at this decision the Court relied on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
BHARATHIYA SAKSHYA BILL, 2023:

ESTOPPEL:
Section:121. When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission,
intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be
true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be
allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his
representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
The section 116 has been changed into section 122 but the meaning
and the words have no change in Bhartiya Sakshya Bill, 2023
The section 116 of the Indian evidence act has changed in to section 123 in Bhartiya
Sakshya Bill, 2023.
But the meaning and the words have no change.
Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd. is a landmark case in company law that established the principle of separate legal personality for corporations. Let’s break down
the case elements:
1.Facts:
•Salomon, a boot manufacturer, transferred his business from a sole proprietorship to a newly incorporated company called Salomon Ltd.
•The company had members comprising of Salomon and his family.
•The transfer price was paid to Salomon in the form of shares and debentures (with a floating charge on company assets).
•When the company faced financial difficulties and went into liquidation, unsecured creditors claimed their dues.
•The liquidator alleged that the company was a sham, essentially an agent of Salomon, and sought to hold Salomon personally liable for its debts.
2.Fact in Issue:
•The central issue was whether, despite the separate legal identity of the company, Salomon (as the majority shareholder) could be held personally liable for the
company’s debts beyond his capital contribution.
3.Arguments:
•Liquidator’s Argument:
•The company was a mere facade, and Salomon controlled it entirely.
•Salomon was the principal, and the company was his agent.
•Therefore, Salomon should be personally liable for the company’s debts.
•Salomon’s Argument:
•The company was a separate legal entity, distinct from its members.
•The company’s debts were not Salomon’s personal liabilities.
•The company’s limited liability shield should be respected.
4.Evidence:
•The evidence included the company’s incorporation documents, shareholding structure, and the nature of Salomon’s involvement in the business.
•The liquidator presented arguments based on the company’s operations and financial transactions.
5.Judgment:
•The House of Lords ruled in favor of Salomon.
•The court upheld the separate legal personality of the company.
•Salomon was not personally liable for the company’s debts beyond his capital contribution.
•The court emphasized that the company’s incorporation was valid, and its separate identity must be respected.
•This decision reinforced the concept of limited liability for shareholders and established a fundamental principle in company law.
In summary, Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd. affirmed the principle that a company is a distinct legal entity, separate from its shareholders, and its debts do not
automatically become the personal liabilities of its members. This case remains a cornerstone of corporate jurisprudence worldwide.
Let’s delve into the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd 1. Here’s a comprehensive breakdown:
Facts:
•In 1937, Central London Property Trust Ltd (CLPT) leased a block of flats in London to High Trees House Ltd (HTH) for 99 years at an annual rent of
£2,500.
•Due to the impact of World War II, there was a significant under-occupancy of the flats in 1940.
•In response, CLPT agreed to reduce the rent to £1,250 during the war period. HTH paid this reduced rent until the end of 1945.
•By 1945, London had largely recovered from the war, and the flats were again fully occupied.
Fact in Issue:
•The key question was whether the agreement by CLPT to accept a reduced rent during the war was legally binding, preventing them from requesting the full
rent once the flats were fully occupied again.
Arguments:
•CLPT argued that the original lease agreement was still in force, allowing them to claim the full rent for the last two quarters of 1945.
•HTH contended that CLPT’s promise to accept the reduced rent during the war was a binding representation that they intended HTH to rely upon.
Evidence:
•The court considered the correspondence and conduct between the parties during the war years.
•HTH relied on CLPT’s promise and paid the reduced rent based on that representation.
Judgment:
•The court held that CLPT could not go back on its promise to accept the reduced rent during the war.
•This was a clear case of promissory estoppel, where CLPT’s representation bound them, even though it wasn’t supported by consideration.
•However, once conditions returned to normal, the original agreement could be enforced, and CLPT was entitled to claim the full rent for the last quarters of 1945.
•Importantly, Lord Denning clarified that the effect of such a promissory estoppel was only suspensive, temporarily varying the rent payable, and did not
permanently extinguish rights.
In summary, the High Trees case strongly established the principle of promissory estoppel in English law: once a promise is made and relied upon, it cannot be
reneged on without agreement, even if not supported by consideration, if doing so would be inequitable 1.
Let’s delve into the case of Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862), which established the principles of proprietary estoppel. Here’s a breakdown
of the case:
1.Facts:
•A father indicated his intention to give land to his son through a memorandum.
•However, he did not include the land in his will.
•In reliance on this memorandum, the son committed expenditure to build a house on the land.
2.Fact in Issue:
•Whether the son was entitled to the land based on the memorandum.
3.Evidence:
•The memorandum itself, which expressed the father’s intention.
•The son’s reliance on the memorandum, demonstrated by his expenditure on building the house.
4.Argument:
•The court considered whether a voluntary agreement (such as a gift) could be enforced.
•Generally, equity does not assist mere donees who receive gifts without consideration.
•However, the son’s reliance on the memorandum transformed it into a binding promise through proprietary estoppel.
5.Conclusion:
•Lord Westbury LC held that while a mere gift would not be enforced, the son’s reliance on the memorandum made it binding.
•Therefore, the son was entitled to the land based on proprietary estoppel.
In summary, Dillwyn v Llewelyn illustrates how proprietary estoppel can perfect an imperfect gift when there is reliance and detriment.
The son’s expenditure on the land created an equitable interest, overriding the formalities required for passing an estate in land.
 DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN ESTOPPEL
AND RES JUDICATA
Section 11 of the CPC
 ESTOPPEL RES JUDICATA

Estoppel prevents the Res judicata is a legal

parties from doing principle that prevents a
certain things, such as court from taking action
denying what he in a case that another
previously stated. court has already
decided.

Sections 115 to 117 of Section 11 of the Code

the Indian Evidence Act of Civil Procedure, 1908,
of 1872 incorporated the incorporates the
principle of Estoppel principle of res judicata.
APPLICATIONS
Res judicata is focused on It can be applied not only
court proceedings and is a in court proceedings but
defense that can be raised also in contractual and
in subsequent legal actions administrative settings..
involving the same dispute.

ORIGIN

Res Judicata originates Estoppel originates from

from decision of court representation or conduct of
the party
The Doctrine of Res On the other hand Estoppel
Judicata outs the jurisdiction is only a rule of evidence
of the Court to try the case.

Res Judicata is rule of legal Estoppel is rule of equity.

procedures

Res Judicata is based on Estoppel is based on rule of

public policy equity,justice and good
conscience
ESTOPPEL
When one person, either
by his act or omission or
by declaration, has
persuaded another person
to believe something to be
true and act on it, then he
or his representative
cannot deny the truth of
that thing later in the suit
or the proceedings
The primary purpose of estoppel is to prevent
injustice or unfairness by holding parties
accountable for their statements or conduct.
The High Court of Orissa held inJatindra
Prasad Das v. State of Orissa &Ors. (W.P.
C 21449/2011)that Estoppel cannot be
used against statutes and statutory
provisions. It was also stated that statutory
provisions could not be ignored in any
circumstance, even if there is precedent or
a previous administrative decision to
support it.
RES JUDICATA
The Court will
not hear suits or
issues between
parties who are
litigating under
the same title
and matter that a
competent court
has already
decided
 The primary purpose is to promote
judicial efficiency, finality, and
preventing endless litigation by barring
the same matter from being re-litigated.

The primary purpose is to promote judicial

efficiency, finality, and preventing endless
litigation by barring the same matter from
being re-litigated.
CASE LAW

The Supreme Court of India held in the case of

Ragho Prasad Gupta v. Krishna Poddar (A.I.R.
1969 SC 316) that a mere expression of opinion
on a question that is not in issue could not be
treated as res judicata
In Krishan Kumar v. Vimala
Sehgal (I.L.R. 1976 Delhi 238),
the Delhi High Court held that if
the circumstances change, a
second petition for own
occupation can be filed even if
the Rent Controller rejected the
landlord's first application
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872 (Old Act) Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023
(New Act)

115. When one person has, by his 121. When one person has, by his
doolaration, declaration, act or omission,
act or omission, intentionally caused intentionally caused
or permitted' or permitted another person to
another person to believe a thing to be believe a thing to be true and to act
true and to
upon such belief, neither
act upon such belief, neither he nor
his representative he nor his representative shall be
shall be Howed,in any suit or allowed, in any suit or proceeding
pl'oceedingbeb,reen between himself and
himself and such person or his such person or his representative,
representative~ to deny to deny the truth of that thing.
the truth of that thing.
116. No tenant of immovable 122. No tenant of immovable property,
property, or person claiming through or person claiming through such tenant,
such tenant, shall, during the shall,
continuance of the tenancy, be during the continuance of the tenancy or
permitted to deny that the landlord of any time thereafter, be permitted to deny
such tenant had, at the beginning of that the
the tenancy, a title to such immovable landlord of such tenant had, at the
property; and no person who came beginning of the tenancy, a title to such
upon any immovable property by the immovable
licence of the person in possession property; and no person who came upon
thereof, shall be permitted to deny any immovable property by the licence
that such person had title to such of the
possession at the time when such person in possession thereof shall be
licence was given permitted to deny that such person had
a title to such
possession at the time when such
licence was given.
117.No acceptor of a bill of exchange 123. No acceptor of a bill of
shall be permitted to deny that the exchange shall be permitted to
drawer had authority to draw such bill deny that the drawer had
or to endorse it; nor shall any bailee authority to draw such bill or to
or licensee be permitted to deny that endorse it; nor shall any bailee or
his bailor or licensor had, at the time licensee be permitted to
when the bailment or licence
deny that his bailor or licensor
commenced, authority to make such
bailment or grant such licence. had, at the time when the
bailment or licence commenced,
authority to make such bailment
or grant such licence.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ESTOPPEL AND WAVIER
Section 162 of the
Indian Evidence Act,
1872
 ESTOPPEL WAVIER

Estoppel is a rule of Waiver originates from a

evidence and does not form contractual relationship and
a basis for instituting a suit may give birth to cause of
action

The knowledge of reality or In the case of a waiver, real

truth is not a factor or facts or truth is known to
essential condition for both parties.
claiming estoppel

In some circumstances, the In case of a waiver, some

acquiescence amounts to act or conduct is necessary
estoppels together with acquiescence.
Estoppel is used as defence Waiver may be used as a
and not cause for bringing a cause to give rise to a right
suit

Estoppel intent is immaterial waiver the essential element is

actual intent to abandon or
surrender right

waiver of a right cannot be There is no question of waiver

lightly inferred and something where the party is not even
more than the inaction of the aware of his right
right holder in exercising the
right is necessary.
WAVIER
waiver the essential
element is actual
intent to abandon or
surrender right

while in estoppel
intent is immaterial.
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mohd.
Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain (2007), the
Supreme Court of India emphasized the principle
of waiver in the context of the accused voluntarily
disclosing information during police custody. The
court held that such disclosures could be
admissible as evidence, provided they were
voluntary and not obtained through coercion
ESTOPPEL
Estoppel is not a
cause of action. It
may, if established,
assist a plaintiff in
enforcing a cause of
action by preventing
a defendant from
denying the
existence of some
fact essential to
establish the cause
of action.
1. There must be two
parties, one party
making representation
to another party.

2. The other shall have

acted upon such
representation.

3. Relying on such
representation, there
must have been a
change in the position of
a party.
In ACE Union of India vs GB Bhirede (1971), the
Bombay High Court stated that before invoking the
doctrine of estoppel, it must be proved that:
1. There was a representation or promise regarding
something to be done in future.
2. The representation or promise was intended to
affect the legal relations.
3. It is one on which the other side has acted to its
prejudice.
In Olga Tellis & Ors vs Bombay Municipal Corporation,
it was further held that there can be no estoppel
against the Constitution. The Preamble of the
Constitution states India to be a democratic republic
and no citizen could barter away with fundamental
rights.
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872 (Old Act) Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023
(New Act)
115. When one person has, by his
121. When one person has, by his
doolaration,
act or omission, intentionally caused
declaration, act or omission,
or permitted' intentionally caused
another person to believe a thing to be or permitted another person to
true and to believe a thing to be true and to act
act upon such belief, neither he nor upon such belief, neither
his representative he nor his representative shall be
shall be Howed,in any suit or allowed, in any suit or proceeding
pl'oceedingbeb,reen between himself and
himself and such person or his such person or his representative,
representative~ to deny to deny the truth of that thing.
the truth of that thing.
116. No tenant of immovable 122. No tenant of immovable property,
property, or person claiming through or person claiming through such tenant,
such tenant, shall, during the shall,
continuance of the tenancy, be during the continuance of the tenancy or
permitted to deny that the landlord of any time thereafter, be permitted to deny
such tenant had, at the beginning of that the
the tenancy, a title to such landlord of such tenant had, at the
immovable property; and no person beginning of the tenancy, a title to such
who came upon any immovable immovable
property by the licence of the person property; and no person who came upon
in possession thereof, shall be any immovable property by the licence
permitted to deny that such person of the
had title to such possession at the person in possession thereof shall be
time when such licence was given permitted to deny that such person had
a title to such
possession at the time when such
licence was given.
117.No acceptor of a bill of exchange 123. No acceptor of a bill of
shall be permitted to deny that the exchange shall be permitted to
drawer had authority to draw such bill deny that the drawer had
or to endorse it; nor shall any bailee authority to draw such bill or to
or licensee be permitted to deny that endorse it; nor shall any bailee or
his bailor or licensor had, at the time licensee be permitted to
when the bailment or licence
deny that his bailor or licensor
commenced, authority to make such
bailment or grant such licence. had, at the time when the bailment
or licence commenced,
authority to make such bailment or
grant such licence.
162.A witness summoned to 165. (1) A witness summoned to produce a document
shall, if it is in his possession or
produce a document shall, if it is power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection
in his possession or power, bring which there may be to its production
it to Court, notwithstanding any or to its admissibility:
objection which there may be to Provided that the validity of any such objection shall be
decided on by the Court.
its production or to its (2) The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document,
admissibility. The validity of any unless it refers to matters of
such objection shall be decided State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine
on its admissibility.
on by the Court. The Court, if it (3) If for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any
sees fit, may inspect the document to be translated, the
document, unless it refers to Court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the
matters of State, or take other contents secret, unless the
document is to be given in evidence and, if the
evidence to enable it to determine interpreter disobeys such direction, he shall
on its admissibility be held to have committed an offence under section 196
of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023:
Provided that no Court shall require any privilege
communication between the
Ministers and the President of India to be produced
before it.