Scientific theories and progress

Thompson, Mel. 2012. Understand Philosophy of Science. London:

McGraw-Hill. (Chapter 4: Scientific theories and progress ).

1
Introduction
In this chapter you will:
1. consider the status of scientific claims
2. consider the way in which scientific theories may be challenged
3. examine the way science makes progress.

During the twentieth century the place of the inductive method

in science was challenged and there was considerable debate
about how scientific theories should be evaluated, how science
makes progress, how one law or set of laws comes to replace
another, and whether (if at all) one can ever decide that one
particular theory is inherently better than another.

2
Background (1)

Science assumed that it had set aside all

metaphysical speculation and would
Until the end of the eventually achieve a full and systematic
nineteenth century the knowledge of the physical world.
general scientific view
of the world was that it There were to be no a priori elements in
scientific knowledge – all presuppositions or
was a mechanism in hypotheses could be set aside in favour of
motion, waiting for theories based on solid evidence and proved
humanity to measure by inductive argument.
and calculate its
operation The scientist was required to take an objective
look at matter, and formulate theories to
explain its operations.

3
Background (2)
Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German
idealist philosopher, had argued for distinction to
be made between things in themselves (noumena)
and things as we perceive them to be
(phenomena).
All the evidence we receive from our senses is
‘phenomena’; we only know what we perceive. We
may assume that there is a separate reality ‘out
there’ causing us to have those sensations, but – if
so – we can never engage it directly.

The philosopher and logician Ernst Mach

(1838–1916), in The Analysis of Thus, from the work of Hermann von Helmholtz
Sensations (1886), argued that science (1821–94) in the 1870s through to Ernst Cassirer
reflects the content of the consciousness, as (1874–1945) in the early years of the twentieth
it is produced by sensation. century, there developed a recognition that science
is not looking at things in themselves, but at the
There are no predetermined structures, but structures of phenomena – the way in which we
everything should be reducible to perceive the world.
statements about sensations.

4
THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS (1)
Into this situation there came the Logical Positivists of the Vienna
Circle, of whom probably the best known are Moritz Schlick
(1882–1936) and Rudolf Carnap (1892–1970).
They were generally interested in both science and mathematics
and were influenced by the work of the early Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) and Bertrand Russell.
Their task was to determine what constituted a valid, factual
proposition.

In general, the position adopted by the Logical

Positivists was that the meaning of a statement was They wanted to define correspondence rules, by
its method of verification. which the words we use relate to observations.
If I say that there is a dog in the room, I actually They also wanted to reduce general and theoretical
mean that, if you go into the room, you will see a terms (e.g. mass or force) to those things that could
dog. be perceived.
If you cannot say what evidence would count for or In other words, they thought that the mass of a
against a proposition – in other words, how you body should be defined in terms of the
could verify it through sense experience – then that measurements that can be made of it.
proposition is meaningless.

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THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS (2)
The Logical Positivists saw science as tracking patterns in experience, concerned
only with things that could be observed.
In particular, they rejected any idea of deeper structures or levels of meaning –
everything was on the surface, awaiting literal description.

This seems a logical

development of the traditional
inductive method of science,
but it raises some fundamental
questions:

What do you do if faced with two Can everything

alternative theories to explain a science wants to
phenomenon? say be reduced to
Can they both be right? sensations?

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THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS (3)

Once a theory is accepted and

established as a ‘law of nature’ on the However, even while this
basis of empirical evidence, it seemed
inconceivable that it could subsequently view was dominating the
be proved wrong. philosophy of science, the
Theories which apply to a limited range actual practice of science –
of phenomena might be enlarged in order especially in the fields of
to take into account some wider set of
conditions, but it was difficult – given relativity and quantum
the strict process of induction from the physics – was producing ideas
phenomena of sense experience – to see that did not fit this narrow
why a theory, so confirmed by
experience, should be set aside in favour schema.
of another.

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Falsification (1)

Karl Popper (1902-94)’s

He therefore pointed out that
theory of falsification, Popper argued that one a scientific theory could not
although important for the could not prove a be compatible with all
philosophy of science, has scientific theory to be possible evidence.
much wider application. true simply by adding If it is to be scientific, then it
In the 1920s and 30s new confirming must be possible, in theory,
Logical Positivists were evidence. for it to be falsified.
arguing that statements only
had meaning if they could On the other hand, if In practice, of course, a
be verified by sense data. some piece of sound theory is not automatically
evidence goes against a discarded as soon as one
In other words, if you could
theory, that may be piece of contrary evidence is
not give any evidence for a
produced, because it might
statement, or say what enough to show that the
be equally possible that the
would count for or against theory is false. evidence is at fault.
it, then it was meaningless.

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Falsification (2)
Popper was particularly critical of the Marxist theory of dialectical materialism and Freudian
psychology.
He observed that Marxists have the habit of interpreting every event in terms of Marxist
theory, and then using such interpretations to produce more evidence to confirm that theory.
He argued that, if nothing were allowed to falsify the Marxist view of dialectical materialism,
then that theory could not be genuinely scientific.

A key feature of Popper’s claim here is that scientific laws always go beyond existing
experimental data and experience.
The inductive method attempted to show that, by building up a body of data, inferences can be
made to give laws that are regarded as certain, rather than probable.
Popper challenges this on the grounds that all sensation involves interpretation of some sort, and
that in any series of experiments there will be variations, and whether or not such variations are
taken into account is down to the presuppositions of the person conducting them.
In other words, progress comes by way of finding the limitations of existing scientific theories
and pushing beyond them.

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Falsification (3)
Instead, he saw the human
Popper’s view mind as having a creative
challenged two role vis-à-vis experience.
popular philosophical In the scientific realm this
For Popper, all ideas: means that progress is made
genuine scientific 1 Locke’s idea that the
when a person makes a
creative leap to put forward
theories had to be mind is a tabula rasa an hypothesis that goes
logically self- until it receives beyond what can be known
through experience.
consistent and experience.
It does not progress
capable of 2 Wittgenstein’s idea, gradually by the adding up
falsification; an in the Tractatus of additional information to
confirm what is already
irrefutable theory Logico-Philosophicus
known, but by moving
(1921), that the task of
is not scientific. language is to provide
speculatively into the
unknown, and testing out
an image of the hypotheses, probing their
external world. weak points and modifying
them accordingly.

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Falsification (4)
This view of scientific work paralleled Popper’s In effect, the goal of science is
more general view that the basic form of intellectual therefore to produce propositions
work is problem-solving. which are high in information
The need for critical engagement is central for content, and which are therefore low
Popper’s politics as well as his philosophy of in probability of being true (since
science. the more information they contain,
Democracy allows people to engage with, criticize the greater the chance of finding
and replace governments, whereas authoritarian them to be false), but which actually
systems impose answers and forbid questions. come close to the truth.

In general, science works by means of experiments.

Results are presented along with detailed information Popper’s approach to scientific method was therefore as
about the experimental methods by which they have been follows:
obtained. 1 be aware of the problem (e.g. the failure of an earlier
The task of those who wish to examine the results is to theory)
repeat the experiments and see if they produce identical 2 propose a solution (i.e. a new theory)
results. 3 deduce testable propositions from that theory
Now, as it goes on, a theory is going to predict facts, 4 establish a preference from among competing theories.
some of which will be verified, some of which will not.

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Certainty or quest? (1)
Is there a solid basis upon which all our knowledge can be
shown to rest?
The quest for such a basis is generally termed foundationalism.
Some seek it in pure reason, others in sense experience; others
opt for a foundation in terms of religious or other authority.

If every theory needs to be open to the possibility of being falsified,

does that mean that there is no ‘truth’ or ‘reality’, but it is all down
to whatever particular theory we happen to accept at this moment in
time?
Is it possible to do science without some certainty upon which to
base one’s work?

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Certainty or quest? (2)
Popper’s answer to this is both In taking that view, we can
radical and remarkable.
believe that there is ‘truth’ or
He argued for ‘rationality without ‘reality’ as a regulative idea –
foundations’
as something that guides our
He points out that we can opt to take quest, but about which we can
rational argument as the basis for
our quest for truth without having never claim to have reached
any proof or guarantee that rational absolute truth or reality,
argument is a solid foundation. recognizing that our attempts to
Given a scientific theory or a describe it will always be
political regime, we can opt to fallible and open to
examine it critically, modify it if falsification.
necessary, but yet remain open to
accept criticism of our own
To repeat: if it isn’t capable of
reasoning. being falsified, it isn’t science.

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SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE
We need to recognize The distinction between science
that for any claim to be and pseudoscience is therefore
accepted, it needs to be essentially one of method and
testable against openness to criticism, rather
experience. than content.

The claim to be scientific rests on the methods The issue about what constitutes science or pseudo-science is
used in setting up appropriate experiments or in not always straightforward.
gathering relevant evidence, and also on the Take the example of Marxism.
willingness to submit the results to scrutiny, Clearly, Marx’s work on dialectical materialism was based on
and to accept the possibility that they may be logic and the observation of the way in which societies in the
interpreted in more than one way. past were organized and the factors that brought about change.
In this sense, following the inductive method, Marx’s theory
The most obvious example of a pseudo-science is might indeed be regarded as genuinely scientific.
astrology.
But the problem is that a Marxist may try to use that theory to
Astronomy is regarded as a science because it is based on interpret every event in such a way that, whatever happens,
observations, and any claims made today may need to be Marxism appears able to predict it.
replaced owing to further observations in the future.
This creates a problem, which was at the heart of Karl
Astrology, on the other hand, is not considered a science Popper’s criticism of both Marxist and Freudian thinking – a
because it is based on a mythological scheme with an theory that is not open to be falsified cannot be scientific.
annual cycle of ‘signs’.

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Paradigms and ‘normal science’ (1)
Thomas Kuhn (1922–96) struggled to
understand how progress in science Science did not simply get rid of
could be reconciled with either the theories and replace them every
idea of straightforward induction, or time a conflicting piece of
with the implications of Popper’s evidence was found; rather – at
falsification approach, where a single least for most of the time – its
piece of contrary evidence was work was gradual and
deemed sufficient to require the cumulative.
rejection of a theory.

He therefore distinguished between ‘normal science’ and those

As laws and theories moments of crisis in which the whole approach is changed in what
become established within amounts to a scientific revolution.
the scientific community, The periods of stability are dominated by a single paradigm, but over a
period of time problems inevitably develop with the use of that
they are used as a basis for paradigm and increase until they provoke a crisis, at which time an
further research; these he alternative paradigm may emerge, one that is able to deal with the
problems that have caused the crisis.
termed ‘paradigms’. Once that new paradigm is accepted, science settles down once again.

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Paradigms and ‘normal science’ (2)
A particularly controversial aspect of Kuhn’s theory is that he claims that there is no
independent evidence by which to decide between two different paradigms, since all evidence is
either interpreted in the light of one or in the light of the other.
We cannot make observations that are genuinely independent of the paradigm within which we
operate, simply because those observations are shaped by the paradigm.
In other words, each paradigm has its own language, with which the terms used by other
paradigms may be incompatible.

There is some ambiguity about the use of the term ‘paradigm’, however.
Sometimes Kuhn uses it to denote a single theory that is so successful that it
becomes the exemplar for others; on other occasions ‘paradigm’ is used for the
whole set of theories that together form a way of looking at reality.
The term ‘paradigm shift’ for a major turning point in science clearly refers to
the second of these meanings.

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Progress (1)
If that is the case, what is the
The implication of Kuhn’s motivation to do science?
argument that there is no In the seventeenth and eighteenth
external, objective point of centuries scientists thought that
view from which to judge they were gradually dispelling
between paradigms is that we ignorance and establishing the rule
of reason.
cannot show that science
progresses.

In Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of

Knowledge (1975), Paul Feyerabend (1924–94) argued that
Kuhn’s own answer to this is rather progress is misguided and impossible; we cannot achieve ‘true
curious. knowledge’, only various ways of seeing.
From within a paradigm, because it took Hence, for Feyerabend, the choice of one theory over another
over from a previous one by appearing to may be made for all sorts of personal, cultural, aesthetic and
address at least some of its shortcomings, subjective reasons.
its adoption is going to look like progress. Each person is free to choose his or her own view, and science
But that view of progress is limited to the cannot impose an absolute or fixed criteria for what is true and
perspective given by the paradigm, and what is not – in other words, when it comes to the theory of
cannot claim to be objective. knowledge, anything goes.

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Progress (2)

Feyerabend’s position could not be more

different from that of Popper.
Popper has an ideal of truth or reality which,
although never attainable, acts as a guide in
the critical evaluation of theories.
For Feyerabend, truth is related to one’s
personal commitment to a theory or
paradigm.
Kuhn hovers between these two positions,
without objective criteria for assessing the
relevant value of paradigms, but with an
overall increase in problem-solving.

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Progress (3)
In practice, there is likely to be more
than one research programme on the
Looking at the history of science, it is
go in a field of study at any one time.
clear that Kuhn’s is the more realistic
view. Progress can therefore be made when
one of these is shown to be more
An existing paradigm is going to be
fruitful than the others.
changed only if the evidence against
it becomes overwhelming and an Competition is not simply between
alternative is ready to take over. theories, but between research
programmes.

One way of dealing with this is put forward by Imre Lakatos (1922–74) in his
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1970).
Lakatos recognized that, in practice, science made progress by way of research
programmes, which were essentially problem-solving activities.
Within such a programme, one might distinguish between a ‘hard core’ of
theories without which the programme would not be viable, and which scientists
would not discard without overwhelmingly good reasons, and a ‘protective belt’
of supplementary theories which could be examined and changed without totally
abandoning the overall programme.
Hence progress is possible by constantly adjusting these less crucial theories.

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The status of scientific theories (1)
If a theory is to gain acceptance, it is
important that it should be compatible The key thing to remember is that
with other well-established theories. the pictures or models by which
If predictions made by two theories we attempt to understand natural
are mutually exclusive, then one of phenomena are not true or false,
them will eventually be shown to be but adequate or inadequate.
unsuccessful.

In practice, one theory (or paradigm, even)

Naturally, the acceptance of a theory by the scientific seldom gives way immediately and
community does not thereby guarantee its permanent obviously to another.
status, but there are criteria by which one theory may There is frequently a period of overlap
be preferred to another. during which rival theories are compared. It
Acceptance may often depend on a theory’s ability to is also common for a new theory to be
predict successfully; the more its predictions are dependent initially upon an older theory or
confirmed, the greater is its degree of acceptance. paradigm, even if it subsequently becomes
independent of it.

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The status of scientific theories (2)
At the same time, where there are equally successful theories, a choice between them may be made on the
ground of simplicity or elegance.
This follows from ‘Ockham’s Razor’, a principle named after William of Ockham who argued that one
should not multiply causes beyond necessity. In other words, if there are two competing theories, all other
things being equal, the best policy is to accept the simpler.

In his book The Essential Tension (1977), Kuhn sets out what he saw as the five characteristics of a good scientific
theory.
They are:
1 accuracy; 2 consistency; 3 scope; 4 simplicity ; 5 fruitfulness

He points out that these may well conflict with one another;
there may be a conflict between (for example) a more accurate
theory and one which, in practice, is more fruitful in enabling
scientists to make more predictions.

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THE DUHEM–QUINE APPROACH (1)
Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), writing in the 1890s, Quine recognized that science is a human construct,
argued that you could disprove a theory only on the and not something that can simply be reduced to a
basis of other theories that you held to be true. catalogue of bits of empirical evidence:
If your existing and accepted theories were at fault, The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs,
then your disproof of the new theory would be from the most casual matters of geography and
invalid. history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or
Thus, he argued that it was a mistake to try to even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made
separate theories off from one another at all; they fabric which impinges on experience only along the
should be taken all together as parts of a whole. edges.

W.V. Quine (1908-2000) took a similar

Taken collectively, science has its
line of approach in an important article, double dependence upon language
‘The Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, written and experience; but this duality is
in 1951. not significantly traceable into the
He argued that our ideas fit together, so we statements of science taken one by
should not assume that each and every one… The unit of empirical
statement can be reduced to sets of facts significance is the whole of
that can empirically confirmed in isolation:
science.

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THE DUHEM–QUINE APPROACH (2)

In his article, the two dogmas attacked by Quine were:

1 the traditional distinction made between ‘analytic’
statements, which were deemed to be true or false
depending on their internal logic independent of facts,
and ‘synthetic’ statements, which referred to matters of
fact and could be judged on the basis of evidence. (Quine
held that the terms used in analytic statements had a
meaning that depended upon their use, and that depended
upon facts.)
2 the idea that every meaningful statement is related to
matters of immediate experience (which is what the
Logical Positivists had argued).
It is this second dogma that led Quine to the idea that
meaning should be related to the whole of science, rather
than to each individual statement.

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KEEP IN MIND
1 Logical Positivists and 3 For Popper, truth is an
others sought empirical 2 Popper argued that, to be ideal towards which science 4 Kuhn contrasts moments
confirmation and reduced scientific, a theory must be strives through critical of crisis with ‘normal
everything to sense capable of falsification. engagement with existing science’.
experience. theories.

6 Feyerabend advocates
5 Kuhn also argues that
anarchy in the theory of 7 Lakatos sees progress 8 A model should be judged
everything is to be
knowledge, with no through competing research by whether it is ‘adequate’,
understood from within a
objective criteria for programmes. rather than ‘true’.
paradigm.
deciding between theories.

9 Kuhn’s five criteria for a

good theory: accuracy, 10 Quine sees our ideas as
consistency, scope, fitting together like a fabric.
simplicity and fruitfulness.

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