NUCLEAR PLANT

SAFETY CONCEPTS

-By Raghav PVK

Introduction to the Nuclear Process
• Nuclear energy involves changes in the nuclei of
atoms. Small amounts of matter from the nucleus are
converted into large amount of energy by:
– Fission:
 nuclear energy released when atom split
or
– Fusion:
 nuclear energy released when atoms fused
Nuclear Fission
Fusion: Nuclear Energy for the Future?
Fusion
 What is Hazard?
 Physical, chemical, biological or radiological.
Don’t get confused: nuclear power plant vs nuclear
bombs.
Impossible for any nuclear reactor to
explode like an atomic bomb.
For an uncontrolled chain reaction to occur that is similar
to an atom bomb, the uranium fuel must be extremely
enriched, much more than the 4% 235U.
What happens in a nuclear reactor, if it
can’t explode?
The answer is what is called as meltdown.
Temperature rises in the core, so much that the fuel rods
actually turn to liquid.
Further heating of core leads to, the steel walls of the core
gets melted.
 Why does Melt down occurs
Occurs due to failure of coolant water.
In absence of coolant the reactor core’s temperature rises
( up to 2700deg C).
Why can’t we stop melt down using
control rods.
Control rods stops the nuclear chain reaction but can’t
absorb or remove the heat from the core.
Residual heat and the heat produced from the decay of the
fission products are enough to drive the core's temperature
up even if the nuclear chain reaction stops.
 INTRODUCTION TO
DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Level 1: Prevention of abnormal
operation and failure
Level 2:Control of abnormal
operation and detection of failure
Level 3: Control of accidents
within the design basis
Level 4: Control of severe plant
conditions
Level 5:Mitigation of radiological
consequences
INTRODUCTION TO
DEFENCE IN DEPTH
INTRODUCTION TO
DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Defence in Depth (DID) in 5 Levels

 Level 1: Prevention of abnormal operation and failure

 Elimination of the hazard of loss of coolant flow:
 Heat removal from core under operating as well as shut
condition- Eliminates hazard of loss of coolant flow
 Reduction of the extent of over power transient:
 Slightly negative void coefficient of reactivity
 Low core power density
 Negative fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity
 Low excess reactivity
 Defence in Depth (DID) in 5 Levels
 Level 2:Control of abnormal operation and detection of failure
 Increased reliability of control system – by advancement in IT
 Increased operator reliability-by advancement in display by AI
 Large coolant inventory in the main coolant system
 Level 3: Control of accidents within the design basis
 Increased reliability of ECCS-by injection of cooling water
directly into fuel cluster through 4 individual parallel trains.
 Increased reliability of shut done –by mechanical shutoff rods &
liquid poison injection. In case of extreme low probability failure
of both steam pressure for the injection of poison is available
(passive shutdown system)
 Increased reliability of decay heat removal-by transferring
decay heat to GDWP by natural circulation ( passive removal)
 Prolonged cooling by- Large inventory of water inside
Defence in Depth (DID) in 5 Levels
 Level 4: Control of severe plant conditions
 Use of moderator as heat sink
 Flooding of reactor cavity following LOCA
 Level 5:Mitigation of radiological consequences
 Double containment
 Passive containment isolation
 Vapor suppression in GDWP
 Passive containment cooling
 Safety Design Features - DID
Sl. Safety Design Features Cat:A-D (passive Relevant DID
No Sys)Per IAEA- Level per NS-R-1
TECDOC-626 and INSAG-10
1 Natural convection of the coolant B 1,2,3
2 Slightly negative void coefficient of A 1
reactivity
3 Negative fuel temperature coefficient of A 1
reactivity
4 Low core power density A 1
5 Low excess reactivity A 1
6 Large Coolant inventory in the main A 1,2,3
coolant system
7 Two independent fast acting shut systems D 2,3

8 Passive injection of emergency coolant C 3

water directly into fuel cluster through 4
independent trains
 Safety Design Features - DID
Sl. Safety Design Features Cat:A-D (passive Relevant DID
No Sys)Per IAEA- Level per NS-R-1
TECDOC-626 and INSAG-10
9 Passive decay heat removal by ICs C,D 2,3
10 Passive shut down by injection of poison into C 3,4
moderator by using HP steam
11 Large inventory of water inside containment A 4
12 Use of moderator as hat sink A 4
13 Presence of water in the calandria vault A
14 Flooding of reactor cavity following LOCA B,C 4
15 Double containment A 3,4,5
16 Passive containment isolation by formation of B 3,4,5
water seal in the ventilation ducts
17 Vapour suppression in the GDWP B 3,4,5
18 Containment cooling by the passive cntainment B 3,4,5
coolers
Safety Design Features - DID
Comparative
Study
Comparative Study
 Comparative Study
CANDU PWR AHWR
380 small diameter 1 large diameter, thick 120mm pressure tubes;7.4 m
(10cm) thin,4.2 mm pressure vessel dia clandria
pressure tubes
Horizontal orientation Vertical orientation Vertical orientation

Heavy water coolant Light water coolant (3290C) Boiling light water coolant
(3120C) (In:2590C; Out:2840C)
Separate heavy water Coolant is the same as the 452 Coolant channels
moderator (650C) moderator, both hot
Reactivity devices in Reactivity devices in high Fuel operating;
low pressure moderator pressure coolant/moderator Central:9400C; Clad : 2990C;
Max Clad Temp:4000C
Large core, low energy Small core, high energy Small core
density (11MW/m3) density (60MW/m3)
Comparative Study
Comparative Study
 Comparative Study
CANDU PWR AHWR

Natural Uranium Enriched Uranium Self sustaining in U23;Most

of the power from thorium to
achieve negative void
coefficient of reactivity
Low burn up High burn up Fuel assembly suspended fro
the top in the coolant channel
Short bundles (0.5 Long bundles (3.8 Long single fuel cluster,54
meters) meters) fuel pins in 3 concentric rings
( 12 inner,18 middle,24 outer)
On-power refueling Shut down to refuel On-power refueling

Remove defected Remove defective fuel Remove defected fuel during

fuel during operation only when shut down to operation
refuel
Comparative Study
Comparative Study
Comparative Study
 Comparative Study
CANDU PWR

Each channel is individually The pressure vessel is a large pot

connected to collectors (headers) containing all the core water in one
above the core place
Pumps, steam generators above the Pumps, steam generators above the
core core
Each particle of fluid goes through the Each particle of fluid goes through the
core twice before it gets back to where core twice before it gets back to where
it started it started

One or two loops Two, three or four loops

Operating pressure-10MPa Operating pressure-15.5 MPa

Comparative Study
Comparative Study
Comparative Study
 Comparative Study
Reactor Type Coolant Moderator Fuel Comments
Pressurized Water Light Water Light Water Enriched Steam
Reactors (PWR,VVER) Uranium generated in
sec. loop.
Boiling Water Reactors Light Water Light Water Enriched Steam from
(BWR) Uranium boiling water
fed to turbine
Pressurized Heavy Water Heavy Water Heavy Water Natural Uranium
Reactor (PHWR)

Gas Cooled Reactors CO2 Graphite Natural or

(Magnox,AGR,UNGG) Enriched
Uranium

Light Water Graphite Pressurized Graphite Enriched Soviet design

Reactor (RMBK) Boiling Water Uranium

Advanced Heavy Water Light Water Heavy Water U233/ Steam fed to
Reactor (AHWR) ThoriumPu239/ turbine.
Thorium
 Introduction to AHWR
 Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is a vertical,
pressure tube type, heavy water- moderated, boiling light-
water-cooled reactor.
 The reactor is designed to produce 920 MW of thermal
power, generating 300 MW(e) (gross), and 500 m3/day of
desalinated water.
 The fuel cluster of AHWR consists of (Th-233U)O2 pins
and (Th–Pu)O2 pins with a dysprosiazirconia displacer tube
at the center.
 The reactor core is designed to generate maximum energy
from thorium, to maintain self-sufficiency in 233U
 AHWR Design Parameters
Reactor power 920 MWTh Heated fuel length 3.5 m
Core Vertical, pressure Total core flow rate 2175 kg/s
configuration tube type design
Coolant Boiling light water Coolant inlet temp. 259 oC
(nominal)
No. of coolant 452 Feed water temp. 130 oC
channels
Pressure tube ID 120 mm Average steam 19%
quality
Lattice pitch 270 mm (square Steam generation rate 414 kg/s
pitch)
No. of pins in 54 Steam drum pressure 70 bar
fuel cluster (Th-Pu)O2 - 24 pins PHT loop height 39 m
(Th-U)O2 - 30 pins Calandria diameter 7400 mm
Pin OD 11.2 mm Calandria height 5000 mm
Inherent Safety Features of AHWR
Negative void coefficient of reactivity
Negative fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity
Negative power coefficient of reactivity
Double containment system
Absence of main circulating pumps
High pressure and low pressure independent ECCS
trains
Direct injection of ECCS water into the fuel
cluster
Passive Safety Features & systems of
AHWR
 Core heat removal by natural convection of the coolant during normal
operation & in shut down conditions
 Decay heat removal by isolation condensers immersed in a large pool
of water in GDWP
 Direct injection of ECCS water into fuel cluster in passive mode during
LOCA; initially from accumulator ,later from GDWP
 Containment cooling by the passive containment coolers during LOCA
 Passive containment isolation via formation of water seal in the
ventilation ducts following a large break LOCA
 Passive concrete cooling system to protect the concrete structure in
high temperature zone
 Passive shut down by injection of poison to the moderator, using a high
pressure steam (SDS-2)
Emergency Core Cooling System
 1st stage: Injection from accumulators
 2nd stage: Water from GDWP cools the core for 3 days.
 3rd stage: Recirculation of reactor cavity accumulated water
through GDWP
What is FFCD?
 Device that reduces flow automatically after some time
because of increase in the pressure drop due to formation of
vortex.
Why FFCD?
 Makes the design simple; high reliability; cools core for
longer time
Advanced Accumulator with FFCD
Leak Before Break: Advantage over
PHWR
Pressure
Tube
 On power Refueling
 Maintaining integrity of pressure boundary of reactor coolant channel
 Ensuring cooling of spent fuel clusters in fuelling machine
 Prevention of physical damage to fuel cluster
 To prevent undue radiation exposure
 To prevent unacceptable release of radioactivity
 Provision for cooling of fuel clusters in fuelling machine to remove decay of
heat
 During fuel handling & storage operations loads of fuel cluster/fuel assembly
maintained within specified limit
 Fueling machine head stores max two fuel clusters at a time
 Length of fuel cluster is 4300 mm. Basis for magazine length
 Max weight of any lifted component –less than 100 Te
 Pressure drop across fuel cluster, shield A & shield B maintains upward force
on these components to get self lifted
 Adequate cooling & shielding provided for thermal& radioactive fuel cluster
 New fuel cluster is shielded under water of min 3mt depth.
 Shut Down System
Function Group-1 System Group-2 System

Safe shut down SDS-1 SDS-2

capability
Decay heat removal 1) Condenser –CEP-MFP 1) Cooling by moderator
2) Isolation condensers –GDWP cooling
3)ECCS-Advance accumulators, 2) Active shut down
recirculation pumps/HX & GDWP cooling system
Prevent/minimise release SDS-1, ECCS 1) SDS-2, containment
of radioactivity isolation system & other
containment systems
Protect the coolant 1) SDS-1, ICs SDS-2, Passive relief
pressure boundary 2) SDS-1, Instrumented relief valves
agianst over pressure valves
Monitoring the safety Main control room Backup control room
state of the plant
A Case Study
Comparison of RMBK Design to Western
Reactors
Advanced Gas Reactor Design

RMBK Reactor Design

Chernobyl Reactor and Basis for Experiment

 On 25th April 1986 Reactor 4 was scheduled to be

shutdown for maintenance after its first fuel cycle
 An experiment was proposed to test a safety
emergency core cooling feature during the shut
down procedure
 There was a concern that in the event of an external
power failure the station would overload and lead to
an automated shutdown, which would result in no
power for the cooling water pumps. The backup
generators took 60-75 seconds to get to speed and
were only capable of running one pump
Aim of the Experiment that lead to the accident

The idea was to use the momentum in the

steam turbine as it spun down, to generate
electricity to run the cooling pumps
Conditions Prior to the Accident
 The preparations for the test were made on 25th
April 1986
 The day shift was familiar with the processes for
the experiment and the reactor power output had
been reduced to 50%
 However a regional power station unexpectedly
went off line and the Kiev central controller asked
for further reductions in power to be postponed
 By the time the reduction in power was authorised
the day shift had left and the night team had taken
over
Processes/Actions Leading up to the Accident
The plan for the experiment required the power
output of the reactor to be drastically reduced.
For unknown reasons a young engineer
accidentally inserted control rods too far,
causing the reactor to nearly shut down
At this low level a phenomenon called xenon
poisoning became prominent and inhibited the
nuclear reaction
The operators appeared unaware of the
poisoning and withdrew control rods to increase
the reactivity of the reactor
Processes/Actions Leading up to the Accident

The control rods that operators withdrew

were taken beyond their correct position for
normal operations and against safety
regulations, this had to be done manually
and operators overrode the automatic
system
Slowly the reactivity within the reactor
increased to 200MW. This was only a third
of the minimum required for the
experiment, yet the preparations continued
Processes/Actions Leading up to the Accident
 As part of the experiment water pumps were
activated, increasing flow. The flow exceeded safety
limits at 1.19am and the extra water lowered the
core temperature
 Water acts as a neutron absorber and resulted in a
further reduction in reactivity in the reactor. This
prompted the operators to remove more control rods
to increase power output
 This was a critical point and put the reactor in a
highly unstable condition as nearly all of the control
rods had been removed, allowing for the potential of
a run away reaction.
Processes/Actions leading up to the
accident
The only thing keeping the reactor stable
was the xenon poisoning absorbing neutrons
and keeping the reaction rate low
At this point with the reactor in a highly
unstable position it should have shut down
automatically, however operators had
disabled the automatic shutdown system
At 1:24am the experiment began
The Experiment
 The extremely unstable condition of the reactor did
not appear to have been recognised by the operators
 Steam flow to the turbines was shut off. The
momentum of the turbine generators drove the water
pumps
 However the water flow rate to the reactor decreased,
allowing for the formation of steam voids at hot spots
within the core
 A rise in temperature in the core resulted in a build-
up of steam and an increase in power
 With the majority of the control rods removed and the
effects of xenon poisoning no longer limiting neutron
generation, a runaway reaction was imminent
The Experiment
With reactor power output rapidly increasing
the operators initiated an emergency shutdown
or SCRAM. This involved the full insertion of all
the control rods
The control rods took 20 seconds to travel the
7m into the core
The SCRAM displaced the core’s coolant (due to
a flaw in the reactors design) which further
increased the reaction rate, resulting in a
massive energy spike and the core overheated
At this point some of the control rods fractured,
blocking the control rods columns and causing
some rods to become stuck after only making it
a third of the way into the core
The Experiment
 Within seconds the reactor had jumped to around
ten times the normal operational output
 The rapid increase in steam pressure destroyed fuel
channels and ruptured the large cooling pipes. Fuel
rods began to melt and reached cooling water in
the basement
 20 seconds after the SCRAM was initiated the first
steam explosion took place. It blew the lid off the
reactor, damaged the top of the reactor hall and
ejected fragments of material.
 A second hydrogen explosion occurred two seconds
later, resulting in a graphite fire which greatly
contributed to the spread of radioactive material
and contamination of outlying areas
Results of the Explosion
The fire in the reactor quickly spread to the
reactor building roof and turbine hall.
Contrary to safety regulation the roof had
been constructed from a combustible
material
Ejected material had also set fire to the
adjacent roof of Reactor 3 that was at the
time still operational. It would be hours
before the reactor was allowed to be
shutdown by the Chief Engineer
 Results of the Explosion – Fire
 Shortly after the explosion
fire-fighters arrived to try
and extinguish the fires
 The fire-fighters were not
told the seriousness of the
situation and the dangers
of the radiation, they were
told that it was an
electrical fire. Many would
suffer from acute radiation
sickness within 30 minutes
 Results of Accident
After radiation alarms were set off at a
Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden the Soviet
Union had to admit that an accident had
occurred, however they still tried to cover
up the true scale of the disaster
Local city of Pripyat evacuated on the 27th
April and a 30km exclusion zone set up
around the reactor. In total an estimated
135,000 people were displaced by the
disaster
Four square kilometres of pine forest
turned ginger brown and died, “Red Forest”
 Chernobyl Today
 Remains of the
reactor are enclosed
in a large concrete
sarcophagus, which
is in danger of
collapse
 200 tonnes of highly
radioactive material
remains with the
sarcophagus, which
poses a significant
environmental
hazard
 Chernobyl Today
 A new Safe Confinement Structure is due to replace
the failing sarcophagus in 2011
 35000 cubic metres of liquid low and intermediate
level waste
 An estimated 180 tonnes of fuel remains within the
reactor
 Forest fires in areas of contaminated land still pose
a significant threat